TW201504843A - Network certification system and method thereof - Google Patents
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Abstract
Description
本揭露是有關於一種認證系統及其方法,且特別是有關於一種網路認證系統及其方法。 The disclosure relates to an authentication system and method thereof, and in particular to a network authentication system and method thereof.
隨著科技的進步以及時代的變遷,無線網路已然成為人們生活中不可或缺的一部分。除了透過第三代(3rd generation,3G)無線通訊技術來連接至網際網路之外,透過存取無線基地台(Wireless Base Station)或無線存取點(Wireless Access Point)提供的無線網路來連接至網際網路亦是人們常用的上網方式。而為了滿足使用者能夠隨時隨地(Ubiquitous)使用網路服務的需求,無線基地台的佈建亦愈趨廣泛。 With the advancement of technology and the changing times, wireless networks have become an indispensable part of people's lives. In addition to connecting to the Internet through third-generation (3 rd generation, 3G) wireless communication technology, wireless network provided by accessing a wireless base station (Wireless Base Station) or a wireless access point (Wireless Access Point) Connecting to the Internet is also a common way of surfing the Internet. In order to meet the needs of users to use Internet services anytime and anywhere (Ubiquitous), the deployment of wireless base stations has become more widespread.
舉例而言,為了讓使用者能夠更加方便地使用無線網路,許多公共場所、學校與企業組織都會提供無線保真度(Wireless Fidelity,Wi-Fi)熱點來讓使用者使用。然而,由於使用者在使用這些無線存取點時並無法驗證這些無線存取點的身份,因而使得不少有心人士藉機利用例如架設惡意無線基地台的方式來對使用 者進行竊取資料或是網路攻擊等惡意行為。具體而言,傳統的無線存取點可藉由無線網路中的驗證、授權與稽核(Authentication,Authorization and Accounting,AAA)機制來驗證使用者的身份,但而使用者並無法驗證所連線無線存取點的身份。因此,有心人士(例如駭客)可輕易地架設惡意無線基地台,以誘導使用者與所述惡意無線基地台建立連線,進而執行例如中間人攻擊(Man-In-The-Middle Attack)的行為。所述中間人攻擊是一種能夠對使用者與外部溝通的所有資訊進行竊取與竄改的網路攻擊行為。 For example, in order to make it easier for users to use wireless networks, many public places, schools, and corporate organizations offer Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) hotspots for users to use. However, because users can't verify the identity of these wireless access points when using these wireless access points, many people who are interested in taking advantage of, for example, setting up malicious wireless base stations are used. Conduct malicious acts such as stealing data or cyber attacks. Specifically, a conventional wireless access point can authenticate a user by means of an Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) mechanism in a wireless network, but the user cannot verify the connection. The identity of the wireless access point. Therefore, a person with a heart (such as a hacker) can easily set up a malicious wireless base station to induce a user to establish a connection with the malicious wireless base station, thereby performing, for example, a Man-In-The-Middle Attack. behavior. The man-in-the-middle attack is a network attack that can steal and tamper with all information communicated by the user and the outside.
為了防禦來自前述惡意無線基地台的攻擊(Rogue Access Point Attack),學者與專家們近年來提出許多防禦方法,而這些防禦方法主要分為偵測(Detection)與預防(Prevention)兩類。所述偵測的作法即為找出惡意無線基地台並加以封鎖,其優點為使用者無需負擔任何成本。然而,所述偵測的偵測率並非百分之百,且也會有貓捉老鼠的可能性(即,在封鎖惡意無線基地台之後,其它的惡意無線基地台又接連產生),因此在實務上並非完善作法。而所述預防作法為由使用者與欲連線的無線存取點進行交換金鑰,並在成功交換金鑰後據以建立連線。在所述預防的作法中,由於無線基地台以及使用者之間在連線前需進行相互驗證,因而可確保無線基地台以及使用者之間可精確地與欲連線的無線存取點建立安全連線。然而,由於所述預防作法傳統上需在使用者能觀看到無線基地台的情形下,方能進行前述的相互驗證操作(即, 實體(face to face)驗證),因而使得實現上的成本對應地增加。 In order to defend against the aforementioned Rogue Access Point Attack, scholars and experts have proposed many defense methods in recent years, and these defense methods are mainly divided into detection and prevention. The detection method is to find and block the malicious wireless base station, and the advantage is that the user does not need to bear any cost. However, the detection rate of the detection is not 100%, and there is also the possibility of cats and mice (that is, after the malicious wireless base station is blocked, other malicious wireless base stations are successively generated), so it is not practical. Improve the practice. The prevention method is that the user exchanges keys with the wireless access point to be connected, and establishes a connection after successfully exchanged the keys. In the prevention method, since the wireless base station and the user need to perform mutual authentication before the connection, it is ensured that the wireless base station and the user can accurately establish the wireless access point to be connected. Secure connection. However, since the prevention method conventionally requires the user to be able to view the wireless base station, the aforementioned mutual authentication operation can be performed (ie, Face to face verification, thus increasing the cost of implementation correspondingly.
有鑑於此,本揭露提供一種網路認證系統及其方法,可在通訊裝置連接至存取點之前,對存取點進行認證,以保證通訊裝置在使用無線網路服務時的安全性。 In view of this, the present disclosure provides a network authentication system and method thereof for authenticating an access point before the communication device is connected to the access point to ensure the security of the communication device when using the wireless network service.
本揭露提供一種網路認證系統,其包括通訊裝置、存取點、伺服裝置以及認證中心。通訊裝置具有第一身份資訊。存取點連接通訊裝置,具有第二身份資訊。伺服裝置連接存取點。認證中心連接伺服裝置以及通訊裝置,儲存分別關聯於通訊裝置以及關聯於存取點的第一金鑰以及第二金鑰。在判斷存取點接收來自通訊裝置的網路連接請求之後,伺服裝置協助存取點發送以第二金鑰加密的第一身份資訊和第二身份資訊至認證中心。通訊裝置發送以第一金鑰加密的第一身份資訊至認證中心。在認證通訊裝置以及存取點之後,認證中心產生第三金鑰,並分別發送以第一金鑰加密的第三金鑰和以第二金鑰加密的第三金鑰至通訊裝置以及伺服裝置。在以第二金鑰解密加密後的第三金鑰之後,伺服裝置發送第三金鑰至存取點。在以第一金鑰解密加密後的第三金鑰之後,通訊裝置依據第三金鑰與存取點建立安全連線。 The present disclosure provides a network authentication system including a communication device, an access point, a servo device, and a certification center. The communication device has first identity information. The access point is connected to the communication device and has the second identity information. The servo is connected to the access point. The authentication center connects the server device and the communication device, and stores a first key and a second key respectively associated with the communication device and associated with the access point. After determining that the access point receives the network connection request from the communication device, the server assists the access point to send the first identity information and the second identity information encrypted by the second key to the authentication center. The communication device transmits the first identity information encrypted by the first key to the authentication center. After authenticating the communication device and the access point, the authentication center generates a third key, and respectively transmits a third key encrypted with the first key and a third key encrypted with the second key to the communication device and the servo device. . After decrypting the encrypted third key with the second key, the servo device sends a third key to the access point. After decrypting the encrypted third key with the first key, the communication device establishes a secure connection with the access point according to the third key.
本揭露提供一種網路認證方法,適於包括通訊裝置、存取點、伺服裝置以及認證中心的網路認證系統。所述方法包括下列步驟。通訊裝置發送網路連接請求至存取點。在判斷存取點接 收網路連接請求之後,伺服裝置協助存取點發送以第二金鑰加密的第一身份資訊和第二身份資訊至認證中心。通訊裝置發送以第一金鑰加密的第一身份資訊至認證中心。在認證通訊裝置以及存取點之後,認證中心產生第三金鑰,並分別發送以第一金鑰加密的第三金鑰和以第二金鑰加密的第三金鑰至通訊裝置以及伺服裝置。在以第二金鑰解密加密後的第三金鑰之後,伺服裝置發送第三金鑰至存取點。在以第一金鑰解密加密後的第三金鑰之後,通訊裝置依據第三金鑰與存取點建立安全連線。 The present disclosure provides a network authentication method suitable for a network authentication system including a communication device, an access point, a server, and a certificate authority. The method includes the following steps. The communication device sends a network connection request to the access point. In judging the access point After receiving the network connection request, the server assists the access point to send the first identity information and the second identity information encrypted by the second key to the authentication center. The communication device transmits the first identity information encrypted by the first key to the authentication center. After authenticating the communication device and the access point, the authentication center generates a third key, and respectively transmits a third key encrypted with the first key and a third key encrypted with the second key to the communication device and the servo device. . After decrypting the encrypted third key with the second key, the servo device sends a third key to the access point. After decrypting the encrypted third key with the first key, the communication device establishes a secure connection with the access point according to the third key.
本揭露提供一種網路認證系統,包括第一通訊裝置、第二通訊裝置以及認證中心。第一通訊裝置具有第一身份資訊。第二通訊裝置具有第二身份資訊。認證中心連接第一通訊裝置以及第二通訊裝置,儲存分別關聯於第一通訊裝置以及關聯於第二通訊裝置的第一金鑰以及第二金鑰。在第一通訊裝置與第二通訊裝置建立直接連線之前,第一通訊裝置發送以第一金鑰加密的第一身份資訊至認證中心,且第二通訊裝置發送以第二金鑰加密的第二身份資訊至認證中心。在認證第一通訊裝置以及第二通訊裝置之後,認證中心產生第三金鑰,並分別發送以第一金鑰加密的第三金鑰和以第二金鑰加密的第三金鑰至第一通訊裝置以及第二通訊裝置。在第一通訊裝置以及第二通訊裝置分別以第一金鑰和第二金鑰解密加密後的第三金鑰之後,第一通訊裝置與第二通訊裝置依據第三金鑰建立直接連線。 The present disclosure provides a network authentication system including a first communication device, a second communication device, and a certification center. The first communication device has first identity information. The second communication device has second identity information. The authentication center connects the first communication device and the second communication device, and stores a first key and a second key respectively associated with the first communication device and associated with the second communication device. Before the first communication device establishes a direct connection with the second communication device, the first communication device sends the first identity information encrypted by the first key to the authentication center, and the second communication device sends the second encryption key. Second identity information to the certification center. After authenticating the first communication device and the second communication device, the authentication center generates a third key, and respectively transmits a third key encrypted with the first key and a third key encrypted with the second key to the first a communication device and a second communication device. After the first communication device and the second communication device respectively decrypt the encrypted third key with the first key and the second key, the first communication device and the second communication device establish a direct connection according to the third key.
本揭露提供一種網路認證方法,適於包括第一通訊裝 置、第二通訊裝置以及認證中心的網路認證系統。所述方法包括下列步驟。在第一通訊裝置與第二通訊裝置建立直接連線之前,第一通訊裝置發送以第一金鑰加密的第一身份資訊至認證中心,且第二通訊裝置發送以第二金鑰加密的第二身份資訊至認證中心。在認證第一通訊裝置以及第二通訊裝置之後,認證中心產生第三金鑰,並分別發送以第一金鑰加密的第三金鑰和以第二金鑰加密的第三金鑰至第一通訊裝置以及第二通訊裝置。在第一通訊裝置以及第二通訊裝置分別以第一金鑰和第二金鑰解密加密後的第三金鑰之後,第一通訊裝置與第二通訊裝置依據第三金鑰建立直接連線。 The disclosure provides a network authentication method, which is suitable for including a first communication device. The second communication device and the network authentication system of the certification center. The method includes the following steps. Before the first communication device establishes a direct connection with the second communication device, the first communication device sends the first identity information encrypted by the first key to the authentication center, and the second communication device sends the second encryption key. Second identity information to the certification center. After authenticating the first communication device and the second communication device, the authentication center generates a third key, and respectively transmits a third key encrypted with the first key and a third key encrypted with the second key to the first a communication device and a second communication device. After the first communication device and the second communication device respectively decrypt the encrypted third key with the first key and the second key, the first communication device and the second communication device establish a direct connection according to the third key.
基於上述,本揭露實施例提出的網路認證系統及其方法可在通訊裝置欲連接至存取點時,透過可信任的第三方認證中心來對存取點進行認證,從而保障通訊裝置在使用無線網路服務時的安全性。 Based on the above, the network authentication system and the method thereof according to the embodiments of the present disclosure can authenticate the access point through a trusted third-party authentication center when the communication device wants to connect to the access point, thereby ensuring that the communication device is in use. Security when using wireless network services.
為讓本揭露的上述特徵和優點能更明顯易懂,下文特舉實施例,並配合所附圖式作詳細說明如下。 The above described features and advantages of the present invention will be more apparent from the following description.
100、300‧‧‧網路認證系統 100, 300‧‧‧Network Authentication System
110‧‧‧通訊裝置 110‧‧‧Communication device
120‧‧‧存取點 120‧‧‧ access point
130‧‧‧伺服裝置 130‧‧‧Servo
140‧‧‧認證中心 140‧‧‧ Certification Center
310‧‧‧第一通訊裝置 310‧‧‧First communication device
320‧‧‧第二通訊裝置 320‧‧‧Second communication device
S210~S260、S410~S430‧‧‧步驟 S210~S260, S410~S430‧‧‧ steps
圖1是依據本揭露之一實施例繪示的網路認證系統示意圖。 FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a network authentication system according to an embodiment of the disclosure.
圖2是依據本揭露之一實施例繪示的網路認證方法流程圖。 2 is a flow chart of a network authentication method according to an embodiment of the disclosure.
圖3是依據本揭露之一實施例繪示的網路認證系統示意圖。 FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a network authentication system according to an embodiment of the disclosure.
圖4是依據本揭露之一實施例繪示的網路認證方法流程圖。 4 is a flow chart of a network authentication method according to an embodiment of the disclosure.
本揭露實施例提供一種網路認證系統及其方法,其可在通訊裝置與存取點進行連線之前,藉由可信賴的第三方認證中心來分別對通訊裝置以及存取點進行認證。在所述第三方認證中心認證存取點為合法(即,非惡意存取點)之後,通訊裝置方能與存取點進行連線,進而使用存取點提供的網路連線服務。如此一來,通訊裝置即可避免誤連至惡意存取點,進而保證通訊裝置的網路連線安全性。 The disclosed embodiments provide a network authentication system and method thereof for authenticating a communication device and an access point by a trusted third party authentication center before the communication device is connected to the access point. After the third-party authentication center authenticates that the access point is legal (ie, a non-malicious access point), the communication device can connect with the access point to use the network connection service provided by the access point. In this way, the communication device can avoid accidentally connecting to the malicious access point, thereby ensuring the security of the network connection of the communication device.
圖1是依據本揭露之一實施例繪示的網路認證系統示意圖。在本實施例中,網路認證系統100包括通訊裝置110、存取點(access point)120、伺服裝置130以及認證中心140。通訊裝置110例如是智慧型手機、筆記型電腦、平板電腦、個人電腦、工作站、個人數位助理等具有網路瀏覽功能的電子裝置。存取點120可連接通訊裝置110,並可提供通訊裝置110例如無線區域網路連線的功能。伺服裝置130連接至存取點120,其可協助存取點120與認證中心140進行相關認證操作,其細節將在之後說明。伺服裝置130例如是驗證、授權與稽核(Authentication,Authorization and Accounting,AAA)伺服器。更進一步而言,伺服裝置130可以是遠端驗證撥號使用者服務(Remote Authentication Dial In User Service,RADIUS)伺服器,其可透過RADIUS協定與存取點120 以及認證中心140進行通訊。 FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a network authentication system according to an embodiment of the disclosure. In the present embodiment, the network authentication system 100 includes a communication device 110, an access point 120, a server 130, and an authentication center 140. The communication device 110 is, for example, an electronic device having a web browsing function, such as a smart phone, a notebook computer, a tablet computer, a personal computer, a workstation, and a personal digital assistant. The access point 120 can be connected to the communication device 110 and can provide the function of the communication device 110, such as a wireless local area network connection. The server 130 is coupled to an access point 120 that assists the access point 120 in performing authentication operations with the authentication center 140, the details of which will be described later. The server 130 is, for example, an Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) server. Further, the server 130 may be a Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) server that can communicate with the access point 120 through the RADIUS protocol. And the certification center 140 communicates.
認證中心140可連接至伺服裝置130以及通訊裝置110。認證中心140例如是可信任的第三方認證中心,其可儲存用於認證通訊裝置110以及存取點120的相關資訊。舉例而言,認證中心140可儲存分別關聯於通訊裝置110以及關聯於存取點120的第一金鑰以及第二金鑰。所述第一金鑰例如是在通訊裝置110與認證中心140連線並完成註冊程序之後,由認證中心140指派給通訊裝置110的金鑰。換言之,在通訊裝置110完成與認證中心140的註冊程序之後,通訊裝置110以及認證中心140可同時持有第一金鑰,以便於後續通訊裝置110以及認證中心140之間的相關認證程序,但本揭露的可實施方式不限於此。 The authentication center 140 can be connected to the servo device 130 and the communication device 110. The certificate authority 140 is, for example, a trusted third party certificate authority that can store relevant information for authenticating the communication device 110 and the access point 120. For example, the authentication center 140 can store the first key and the second key associated with the communication device 110 and associated with the access point 120, respectively. The first key is, for example, a key assigned to the communication device 110 by the authentication center 140 after the communication device 110 is connected to the authentication center 140 and completing the registration process. In other words, after the communication device 110 completes the registration procedure with the authentication center 140, the communication device 110 and the authentication center 140 can simultaneously hold the first key to facilitate the related authentication procedure between the subsequent communication device 110 and the authentication center 140, but The embodiments of the present disclosure are not limited thereto.
第二金鑰則例如是認證中心140用於認證存取點120的金鑰。在一實施例中,在存取點120與伺服裝置130完成連線之後,伺服裝置130可協助存取點120與認證中心140進行註冊程序。在完成此註冊程序之後,伺服裝置130可進而取得由認證中心140指派給存取點120的第二金鑰。此外,伺服裝置130可代為持有關聯於存取點120的第二金鑰,並協助存取點120進行與認證中心140之間的相關認證程序。 The second key is, for example, the key used by the authentication center 140 to authenticate the access point 120. In an embodiment, after the access point 120 is connected to the server 130, the server 130 can assist the access point 120 in registering with the certificate center 140. Upon completion of this registration procedure, the server 130 may in turn retrieve the second key assigned by the authentication center 140 to the access point 120. In addition, the server 130 can instead hold the second key associated with the access point 120 and assist the access point 120 in performing an associated authentication procedure with the authentication center 140.
圖2是依據本揭露之一實施例繪示的網路認證方法流程圖。本實施例中的網路認證方法可由圖1的網路認證系統100實現,以下即搭配圖1的各個裝置說明網路認證方法的各個步驟。 2 is a flow chart of a network authentication method according to an embodiment of the disclosure. The network authentication method in this embodiment can be implemented by the network authentication system 100 of FIG. 1, and the following steps, that is, the respective devices of FIG.
在本實施例中,當通訊裝置110的使用者欲控制通訊裝 置110透過某存取點提供的無線網路連接至網際網路時,所述使用者可先透過例如通訊裝置110的存取點掃描功能找出附近存在的存取點。之後,通訊裝置110可進而產生對應於這些存取點的服務集識別碼(Service Set Identifier,SSID)列表(其可包括存取點120的SSID)。假設通訊裝置110的使用者欲控制通訊裝置110與存取點120(例如是非惡意存取點)進行連接,在步驟S210中,通訊裝置110可發送網路連接請求至存取點120。所述網路連接請求120例如可包括通訊裝置110的第一身份資訊。 In this embodiment, when the user of the communication device 110 wants to control the communication device When the wireless network connected to the access point is connected to the Internet, the user can first find the access point existing in the vicinity through the access point scanning function of the communication device 110, for example. Thereafter, the communication device 110 can in turn generate a Service Set Identifier (SSID) list (which can include the SSID of the access point 120) corresponding to the access points. Assuming that the user of the communication device 110 wants to control the communication device 110 to connect with the access point 120 (eg, a non-malicious access point), the communication device 110 can send a network connection request to the access point 120 in step S210. The network connection request 120 can include, for example, first identity information of the communication device 110.
在一實施例中,在接收來自通訊裝置110的網路連接請求之後,存取點120可轉發通訊裝置110的第一身份資訊以及存取點120的第二身份資訊至伺服裝置130,以通知伺服裝置130與認證中心140進行認證通訊裝置110的操作。在其他實施例中,伺服裝置130亦可主動偵測存取點120上的使用者登入資訊,或者擷取存取點120的登錄檔(log)以即時地掌握欲連線至存取點120的裝置身份資訊,但本揭露的可實施方式不限於此。 In an embodiment, after receiving the network connection request from the communication device 110, the access point 120 can forward the first identity information of the communication device 110 and the second identity information of the access point 120 to the server 130 to notify The servo device 130 and the authentication center 140 perform an operation of authenticating the communication device 110. In other embodiments, the server 130 can also actively detect the user login information on the access point 120 or retrieve the log of the access point 120 to instantly grasp the connection to the access point 120. Device identity information, but the embodiments of the disclosure are not limited thereto.
在步驟S220中,在判斷存取點120接收網路連接請求之後,伺服裝置130可協助存取點120發送以第二金鑰加密的第一身份資訊和第二身份資訊至認證中心140。在一實施例中,伺服裝置130可應用例如高級加密標準(Advanced Encryption Standard,AES)、非對稱性密碼演算法(RSA algorithm)或其他加密技術來依據第二金鑰對所述第一身份資訊和第二身份資訊進行加密,但本揭露的可實施方式不限於此。 In step S220, after determining that the access point 120 receives the network connection request, the server 130 may assist the access point 120 to send the first identity information and the second identity information encrypted by the second key to the authentication center 140. In an embodiment, the server 130 may apply, for example, an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm (RSA algorithm), or other encryption technology to the first identity information according to the second key pair. Encryption is performed with the second identity information, but the implementation manner of the disclosure is not limited thereto.
在步驟S230中,通訊裝置110可發送以第一金鑰加密的第一身份資訊至認證中心140。在本實施例中,通訊裝置110亦可應用AES、RSA等加密技術來對第一身份資訊進行加密。 In step S230, the communication device 110 may transmit the first identity information encrypted with the first key to the authentication center 140. In this embodiment, the communication device 110 may also use an encryption technology such as AES or RSA to encrypt the first identity information.
在一實施例中,在認證中心140接收以第一金鑰加密的第一身份資訊(來自通訊裝置110)以及以第二金鑰加密的第一身份資訊和第二身份資訊(來自存取點120)之後,認證中心140可分別以第一金鑰解密以第一金鑰加密的第一身份資訊,並且以第二金鑰解密以第二金鑰加密的第一身份資訊和第二身份資訊。接著,認證中心140可依據收到的第一身份資訊認證通訊裝置110,並依據收到的第二身份資訊認證存取點120。 In an embodiment, the first identity information (from the communication device 110) encrypted with the first key and the first identity information and the second identity information encrypted with the second key are received at the authentication center 140 (from the access point) 120) Afterwards, the authentication center 140 may decrypt the first identity information encrypted by the first key with the first key, and decrypt the first identity information and the second identity information encrypted by the second key with the second key. . Then, the authentication center 140 can authenticate the communication device 110 according to the received first identity information, and authenticate the access point 120 according to the received second identity information.
在步驟S240中,在認證通訊裝置110以及存取點120之後,認證中心140產生第三金鑰,並分別發送以第一金鑰加密的第三金鑰和以第二金鑰加密的第三金鑰至通訊裝置110以及伺服裝置130。從另一觀點而言,所述第三金鑰可視為是認證中心140所產生的用於讓通訊裝置110以及存取點120進行安全連線的一支金鑰。並且,由於認證中心140是以第一金鑰加密第三金鑰,因此可保證只有同樣持有第一金鑰的通訊裝置110才能對加密後的第三金鑰進行解密。同樣地,由於認證中心140是以第二金鑰加密第三金鑰,因而可保證只有同樣持有第二金鑰的伺服裝置130才能對加密後的第三金鑰進行解密。 In step S240, after authenticating the communication device 110 and the access point 120, the authentication center 140 generates a third key, and respectively transmits a third key encrypted with the first key and a third encrypted with the second key. The key is transmitted to the communication device 110 and the servo device 130. From another point of view, the third key can be regarded as a key generated by the authentication center 140 for the communication device 110 and the access point 120 to securely connect. Moreover, since the authentication center 140 encrypts the third key with the first key, it can be guaranteed that only the communication device 110 that also holds the first key can decrypt the encrypted third key. Similarly, since the authentication center 140 encrypts the third key with the second key, it can be guaranteed that only the server 130 that also holds the second key can decrypt the encrypted third key.
在步驟S250中,在以第二金鑰解密加密後的第三金鑰之後,伺服裝置130發送第三金鑰至存取點120。接著,在步驟S260 中,在以第一金鑰解密加密後的第三金鑰之後,通訊裝置110可依據第三金鑰與存取點120建立安全連線。具體而言,通訊裝置110可依據所述第三金鑰來加密欲傳送至存取點120的所有資料,同時,由於存取點120亦持有所述第三金鑰,使得存取點120可依據所述第三金鑰來解密來自通訊裝置110的所有資料。另一方面,當存取點120發送以第三金鑰加密的資料時,通訊裝置110亦可對應地以自身所持有的第三金鑰來解密來自存取點120的加密後資料。換言之,所述第三金鑰可視為是通訊裝置110與存取點120之間的一把屬於秘密金鑰密碼系統(secret key cryptosystems)的秘密金鑰(secret key)。此時,由於其他欲竊聽的裝置不具有所述第三金鑰的資訊,因而無法竊取通訊裝置110與存取點120之間的通訊內容。因此,由認證中心140所指派給通訊裝置110以及存取點120的第三金鑰可讓通訊裝置110以及存取點120據以建立安全的連線。 In step S250, after decrypting the encrypted third key with the second key, the server 130 transmits the third key to the access point 120. Next, in step S260 After decrypting the encrypted third key with the first key, the communication device 110 can establish a secure connection with the access point 120 according to the third key. Specifically, the communication device 110 can encrypt all the data to be transmitted to the access point 120 according to the third key, and at the same time, because the access point 120 also holds the third key, the access point 120 is All data from the communication device 110 can be decrypted in accordance with the third key. On the other hand, when the access point 120 transmits the data encrypted by the third key, the communication device 110 can also decrypt the encrypted data from the access point 120 correspondingly with the third key held by itself. In other words, the third key can be regarded as a secret key belonging to the secret key cryptosystems between the communication device 110 and the access point 120. At this time, since the device to be eavesdropped does not have the information of the third key, the communication content between the communication device 110 and the access point 120 cannot be stolen. Thus, the third key assigned by the authentication center 140 to the communication device 110 and the access point 120 allows the communication device 110 and the access point 120 to establish a secure connection.
從另一觀點而言,當通訊裝置110誤對惡意存取點(例如邪惡雙子無線存取點)發出網路連線請求時,所述惡意存取點將會因無法順利地通過認證中心140的前述認證行為而無法得到例如第三金鑰等資訊。換言之,所述惡意存取點將無法如先前實施例中所教示的方式來與通訊裝置110建立連線。如此一來,本揭露實施例即可避免通訊裝置110因誤連至惡意存取點而被竊取資料或惡意攻擊的情形發生。 From another point of view, when the communication device 110 mistakenly sends a network connection request to a malicious access point (such as an evil twin wireless access point), the malicious access point will not pass the authentication center 140 smoothly. The aforementioned authentication behavior cannot obtain information such as the third key. In other words, the malicious access point will not be able to establish a connection with the communication device 110 in the manner taught in the previous embodiments. In this way, the disclosed embodiment can avoid the situation that the communication device 110 is stolen or maliciously attacked due to misconnection to a malicious access point.
此外,雖然圖1中的伺服裝置130僅協助存取點120進 行與認證中心140的相關認證程序,但在其他實施例中,伺服裝置130亦可同時管理多個存取點,並個別協助這些存取點進行前述與認證中心140的相關認證程序,但本揭露的可實施方式不限於此。 In addition, although the servo device 130 in FIG. 1 only assists the access point 120 The authentication procedure related to the authentication center 140 is performed, but in other embodiments, the server 130 can simultaneously manage multiple access points and individually assist the access points to perform the aforementioned authentication procedures with the authentication center 140, but The embodiments that can be disclosed are not limited thereto.
從上述實施例可看出,當通訊裝置110欲與存取點120進行連線時,通訊裝置110可藉由認證中心140來認證存取點120,以保證通訊裝置110的連線安全性。在其他實施例中,當一通訊裝置欲與另一通訊裝置建立例如藍牙連線的直接連線時,亦可透過認證中心來對欲連線至的通訊裝置進行相關認證程序,其細節說明如下。 As can be seen from the above embodiment, when the communication device 110 is to be connected to the access point 120, the communication device 110 can authenticate the access point 120 by the authentication center 140 to ensure the connection security of the communication device 110. In other embodiments, when a communication device wants to establish a direct connection such as a Bluetooth connection with another communication device, the authentication center may also perform a related authentication procedure on the communication device to be connected to the communication center. .
圖3是依據本揭露之一實施例繪示的網路認證系統示意圖。在本實施例中,網路認證系統300包括第一通訊裝置310、第二通訊裝置320和認證中心140。圖4是依據本揭露之一實施例繪示的網路認證方法流程圖。圖4所示的方法可由圖3的網路認證系統300來執行,以下即搭配圖3中的各個裝置來說明圖4中的各個步驟。 FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a network authentication system according to an embodiment of the disclosure. In the present embodiment, the network authentication system 300 includes a first communication device 310, a second communication device 320, and an authentication center 140. 4 is a flow chart of a network authentication method according to an embodiment of the disclosure. The method shown in FIG. 4 can be performed by the network authentication system 300 of FIG. 3, and the various steps in FIG. 4 will be described below in conjunction with the various devices in FIG.
在本實施例中,當第一通訊裝置310欲與第二通訊裝置320進行直接連線(例如無線保真度直連連線(Wireless fidelity direct,Wi-Fi direct)或藍芽(Bluetooth)連線)時,第一通訊裝置310以及第二通訊裝置320可先透過認證中心140來認證彼此是否為惡意裝置,進而確保所述直接連線的安全性。本實施例中的認證中心140可儲存分別關聯於第一通訊裝置310以及關聯於 第二通訊裝置320的第四金鑰以及第五金鑰。所述第四金鑰以及第五金鑰例如是在第一通訊裝置310以及第二通訊裝置320與認證中心140連線並分別完成註冊程序之後,由認證中心140分別指派給第一通訊裝置310以及第二通訊裝置320的金鑰。 In this embodiment, when the first communication device 310 is to be directly connected to the second communication device 320 (for example, Wireless fidelity direct (Wi-Fi direct) or Bluetooth connection) In the case of the line, the first communication device 310 and the second communication device 320 can first authenticate each other as a malicious device through the authentication center 140, thereby ensuring the security of the direct connection. The authentication center 140 in this embodiment may be stored separately associated with the first communication device 310 and associated with The fourth key of the second communication device 320 and the hardware key. The fourth key and the hardware key are respectively assigned to the first communication device 310 by the authentication center 140 after the first communication device 310 and the second communication device 320 are connected to the authentication center 140 and respectively complete the registration process. The key of the second communication device 320.
具體而言,在步驟S410中,在第一通訊裝置與第二通訊裝置建立直接連線之前,第一通訊裝置310可發送以第四金鑰加密的第三身份資訊至認證中心140,且第二通訊裝置320可發送以第五金鑰加密的第四身份資訊至認證中心140。所述第三身份資訊及第四身份資訊分別例如是第一通訊裝置310以及第二通訊裝置320的身份資訊。 Specifically, in step S410, before the first communication device establishes a direct connection with the second communication device, the first communication device 310 may send the third identity information encrypted by the fourth key to the authentication center 140, and the first The second communication device 320 can send the fourth identity information encrypted by the hardware key to the authentication center 140. The third identity information and the fourth identity information are, for example, identity information of the first communication device 310 and the second communication device 320, respectively.
在一實施例中,在第一通訊裝置310發送以第四金鑰加密的第三身份資訊至認證中心140,且第二通訊裝置320發送以第五金鑰加密的第四身份資訊至認證中心140之後,認證中心140可分別以第四金鑰解密以第四金鑰加密的第三身份資訊,並且以第五金鑰解密以第五金鑰加密的第四身份資訊。接著,認證中心140可依據收到的第三身份資訊認證第一通訊裝置310,並依據收到的第四身份資訊認證第二通訊裝置320。 In an embodiment, the first communication device 310 transmits the third identity information encrypted by the fourth key to the authentication center 140, and the second communication device 320 sends the fourth identity information encrypted by the hardware key to the authentication center 140. Thereafter, the authentication center 140 may decrypt the third identity information encrypted by the fourth key with the fourth key, and decrypt the fourth identity information encrypted by the hardware key with the hardware key. Then, the authentication center 140 can authenticate the first communication device 310 according to the received third identity information, and authenticate the second communication device 320 according to the received fourth identity information.
在步驟S420中,在認證第一通訊裝置以及第二通訊裝置之後,認證中心140可產生第六金鑰,並分別發送以第四金鑰加密的第六金鑰和以第五金鑰加密的第六金鑰至第一通訊裝置310以及第二通訊裝置320。從另一觀點而言,所述第六金鑰可視為是認證中心140所產生的用於讓第一通訊裝置310以及第二通訊裝 置320進行安全連線的一支金鑰。並且,由於認證中心140是以第四金鑰加密第六金鑰,因此可保證只有同樣持有第四金鑰的第一通訊裝置310才能對加密後的第六金鑰進行解密。同樣地,由於認證中心140是以第五金鑰加密第六金鑰,因而可保證只有同樣持有第五金鑰的第二通訊裝置320才能對加密後的第六金鑰進行解密。 In step S420, after authenticating the first communication device and the second communication device, the authentication center 140 may generate a sixth key, and respectively send the sixth key encrypted with the fourth key and the first encrypted with the hardware key. The six keys are to the first communication device 310 and the second communication device 320. From another point of view, the sixth key can be regarded as being generated by the authentication center 140 for the first communication device 310 and the second communication device. Set 320 a key for secure connection. Moreover, since the authentication center 140 encrypts the sixth key with the fourth key, it can be guaranteed that only the first communication device 310 that also holds the fourth key can decrypt the encrypted sixth key. Similarly, since the authentication center 140 encrypts the sixth key with the hardware key, it can be guaranteed that only the second communication device 320 that also holds the second hardware key can decrypt the encrypted sixth key.
在步驟S430中,在第一通訊裝置310以及第二通訊裝置320分別以第四金鑰和第五金鑰解密加密後的第六金鑰之後,第一通訊裝置310與第二通訊裝置320依據第六金鑰建立直接連線。具體而言,第一通訊裝置310可依據所述第六金鑰來加密欲傳送至第二通訊裝置320的所有資料,同時,由於第二通訊裝置320亦持有所述第六金鑰,使得第二通訊裝置320可依據所述第六金鑰來解密來自第一通訊裝置310的所有資料。另一方面,當第二通訊裝置320發送以第六金鑰加密的資料時,第一通訊裝置310亦可對應地以自身所持有的第六金鑰來解密來自第二通訊裝置320的加密後資料。從另一觀點而言,所述第六金鑰可視為是第一通訊裝置310與第二通訊裝置320之間的一把屬於秘密金鑰密碼系統的秘密金鑰(secret key)。由於其他欲竊聽的裝置不具有所述第三金鑰的資訊,因而無法竊取第一通訊裝置310與第二通訊裝置320之間的通訊內容。因此,由認證中心140所指派給第一通訊裝置310以及第二通訊裝置320的第六金鑰可讓第一通訊裝置310以及第二通訊裝置320據以建立安全的連線。 In step S430, after the first communication device 310 and the second communication device 320 respectively decrypt the encrypted sixth key with the fourth key and the hardware key, the first communication device 310 and the second communication device 320 are in accordance with the The six keys establish a direct connection. Specifically, the first communication device 310 can encrypt all the data to be transmitted to the second communication device 320 according to the sixth key, and at the same time, because the second communication device 320 also holds the sixth key, The second communication device 320 can decrypt all the data from the first communication device 310 according to the sixth key. On the other hand, when the second communication device 320 transmits the data encrypted by the sixth key, the first communication device 310 can also decrypt the encryption from the second communication device 320 correspondingly with the sixth key held by itself. After the information. From another point of view, the sixth key can be regarded as a secret key belonging to the secret key cryptosystem between the first communication device 310 and the second communication device 320. Since the device to be eavesdropped does not have the information of the third key, the communication content between the first communication device 310 and the second communication device 320 cannot be stolen. Therefore, the sixth key assigned by the authentication center 140 to the first communication device 310 and the second communication device 320 allows the first communication device 310 and the second communication device 320 to establish a secure connection.
此外,雖然圖3中僅以兩個通訊裝置來舉例說明,但本揭露實施例的概念亦可應用在多個通訊裝置的情形。具體而言,當多個通訊裝置欲建立彼此之間的直接連線時(例如隨意網路(ad hoc network)),這些通訊裝置亦可在各自與認證中心進行相關認證程序之後,取得一支共有的金鑰。如此一來,這些通訊裝置即可依據所述共有的金鑰來加密彼此傳輸的所有資料,進而保證所述直接連線的安全性。 In addition, although only two communication devices are illustrated in FIG. 3, the concept of the present disclosure can also be applied to a plurality of communication devices. Specifically, when a plurality of communication devices are to establish a direct connection with each other (for example, an ad hoc network), the communication devices may obtain a separate authentication process after each of them performs a related authentication process with the certification center. Shared key. In this way, the communication devices can encrypt all the data transmitted by each other according to the shared key, thereby ensuring the security of the direct connection.
綜上所述,本揭露實施例提出的網路認證系統及其方法可在通訊裝置欲連接至存取點時,透過可信任的第三方認證中心來對存取點進行認證。在所述第三方認證中心認證存取點為合法(即,非惡意存取點)之後,通訊裝置方能與存取點進行連線,進而使用存取點提供的網路連線服務。對通訊裝置而言,本揭露實施例提出的系統及方法可避免其誤連至惡意存取點的情形發生,從而保障通訊裝置在使用無線網路服務時的安全性。 In summary, the network authentication system and method thereof according to the embodiments of the present disclosure can authenticate an access point through a trusted third-party authentication center when the communication device wants to connect to the access point. After the third-party authentication center authenticates that the access point is legal (ie, a non-malicious access point), the communication device can connect with the access point to use the network connection service provided by the access point. For the communication device, the system and method proposed by the embodiment can avoid the situation that the error is connected to the malicious access point, thereby ensuring the security of the communication device when using the wireless network service.
進一步而言,本揭露實施例的網路認證方法適於應用在例如咖啡廳、圖書館或餐廳等地點所提供的公共無線網路系統。在此情況下,當使用者欲在前述地點以其通訊裝置來透過所述公共無線網路系統上網時,使用者可透過前述實施例教示的方式來認證欲連接至的存取點(例如是提供所述公共無線網路系統的存取點),進而保證使用者上網時的安全性。 Further, the network authentication method of the disclosed embodiment is suitable for application to a public wireless network system provided at a place such as a coffee shop, a library, or a restaurant. In this case, when the user wants to use the communication device to access the Internet through the public wireless network system at the foregoing location, the user can authenticate the access point to be connected through the manner taught in the foregoing embodiment (for example, Providing an access point of the public wireless network system, thereby ensuring the security of the user when surfing the Internet.
此外,當通訊裝置與存取點透過本揭露提出的網路認證方法互相進行認證時,通訊裝置與存取點並不需進行實體(face to face)驗證,因而不會使得實現上的成本對應地增加。並且,由於本揭露的網路認證系統是透過伺服裝置來協助存取點進行前述的各種認證操作,因此在實施時可不需在存取點上安裝額外軟體。 In addition, when the communication device and the access point authenticate each other through the network authentication method proposed by the disclosure, the communication device and the access point do not need to be physically (face to Face) verification, and thus does not increase the cost of the implementation correspondingly. Moreover, since the network authentication system of the present disclosure assists the access point to perform various authentication operations described above through the server device, it is not necessary to install additional software on the access point during implementation.
再者,本揭露亦提出另一種網路認證系統及其方法,其認證中心可在兩個(或多個)通訊裝置之間欲建立直接連線時,對這些通訊裝置皆分別進行認證,從而保證所述直接連線的安全性。 Furthermore, the present disclosure also proposes another network authentication system and method thereof, in which the authentication center can separately authenticate these communication devices when a direct connection is to be established between two (or more) communication devices, thereby Ensure the safety of the direct connection.
雖然本揭露已以實施例揭露如上,然其並非用以限定本揭露,任何所屬技術領域中具有通常知識者,在不脫離本揭露的精神和範圍內,當可作些許的更動與潤飾,故本揭露的保護範圍當視後附的申請專利範圍所界定者為準。 The present disclosure has been disclosed in the above embodiments, but it is not intended to limit the disclosure, and any person skilled in the art can make some changes and refinements without departing from the spirit and scope of the disclosure. The scope of protection of this disclosure is subject to the definition of the scope of the appended claims.
S210~S260‧‧‧步驟 S210~S260‧‧‧Steps
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