201112719 六、發明說明： 【發明所屬之技術領域】 [0001] 本發明涉及一種安全控制遠端無線設備的方法。 [先前技術] [0002] 行動通訊是目前及未來趨勢，由於HSDPA Router ( 3G路 由器）及Portable Navigation Device (可携式自動 導航設備）等行動相關設備開發，瞭解這些設備可結合 簡訊服務（SMS，Short Message Service)功能來做 遠端控制，然而目前簡單控制架構是用戶僅僅發送簡訊 直接控制無線設備，透過電話號碼進行校驗，且在發送 簡訊控制無線設備時沒有進行用戶鑒定。這樣導致了非 法的用戶在沒有鑒定的情況下也可以控制遠端設備，此 外，由於沒有進行資料加密，不能防止其他人偷聽；再 者，電話號碼可能丟失，採用電話號碼進行校驗並不可 靠安全，這樣無法應付未來安全性需求。 【發明内容】 [0003] 鑒於以上内容，有必要提供一種安全控制遠端無線設備 的方法，其以共同的成對主密鑰來相互校驗身份，提供 完整的身份校驗以及資訊加密機制。 [0004] 所述安全控制遠端無線設備的方法，包括步驟：用戶設 備創建請求資訊，發送t青求資訊資料包至遠端無線設備 ，該遠端無線設備校驗該請求資訊資料包，所述的用戶 設備和遠端無線設備擁有共同的成對主密鑰；當該請求 資訊資料包校驗無誤時，所述遠端無線設備創建回復資 訊，發送回復資訊資料包至所述用戶設備，用戶設備校 098131434 表單編號A0101 第4頁/共29頁 0982053933-0 201112719 驗該回復資訊資料包；當該回復資訊資料包校驗無誤時 ，所述用戶設備創建控制資訊’並發送控制資訊資料包 至所述遠端無線設備，遠端無線設備校驗該控制資訊資 料包；當該控制資訊資料包檢驗無誤時，所述遠端無線 設備處理控制資訊’並發送確認資訊資料包至用戶設備 ，用戶設備校驗確認資訊資料包，等待發送下一個控制 資訊資料包。 [0005] 相較於習知技術’本發明所述的安全控制遠端無線設備 的方法，採用成對主密錄對合法用戶進行校驗，使用成 對臨時密鑰加密簡訊資料欄位，大大提高了安全級別， 並有效地防止了重放攻擊。讓用戶可以使用簡訊服務作 為一個溝通通道，安全控制遠端無線設備。 【實施方式】 [0006] 針對本發明的專業辭彙注釋如下： [0007] Nonce :亂數’是任意的或非重複的值，它包括在經過一 個協定的資料交換中，用於免受重放故擊。201112719 VI. Description of the Invention: [Technical Field of the Invention] [0001] The present invention relates to a method of securely controlling a remote wireless device. [Prior Art] [0002] Mobile communication is a current and future trend. Due to the development of mobile-related devices such as HSDPA Router (3G Router) and Portable Navigation Device (Portable Navigation Device), it is understood that these devices can be combined with SMS (SMS, The Short Message Service function is used for remote control. However, the simple control architecture is that the user only sends a short message to directly control the wireless device, performs verification through the telephone number, and does not perform user authentication when sending the short message to control the wireless device. This causes the illegal user to control the remote device without authentication. In addition, since no data encryption is performed, other people cannot be prevented from eavesdropping; in addition, the phone number may be lost, and the phone number is used for verification. Reliable and secure so that it cannot cope with future security needs. SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION [0003] In view of the above, it is desirable to provide a method of securely controlling remote wireless devices that mutually verify identity with a common pairwise master key, providing a complete identity verification and information encryption mechanism. [0004] The method for securely controlling a remote wireless device includes the steps of: the user equipment creates a request information, sends a t-seeking information data packet to the remote wireless device, and the remote wireless device verifies the requested information data package. The user equipment and the remote wireless device have a common paired master key; when the request information package is verified to be correct, the remote wireless device creates a reply message and sends a reply information package to the user equipment. User Equipment School 098131434 Form No. A0101 Page 4 / Total 29 Page 0992053933-0 201112719 Verify the reply information package; when the reply information package is verified correctly, the user equipment creates control information 'and sends a control information package To the remote wireless device, the remote wireless device verifies the control information package; when the control information package is verified, the remote wireless device processes the control information and sends a confirmation information package to the user equipment. The user equipment verifies the confirmation information package and waits for the next control information package to be sent. [0005] Compared with the prior art method for securely controlling a remote wireless device according to the present invention, a paired primary secret record is used to verify a legitimate user, and a paired temporary key is used to encrypt the short message data field. Increased security levels and effectively prevented replay attacks. Allows users to use the SMS service as a communication channel to securely control remote wireless devices. [Embodiment] [0006] The professional vocabulary for the present invention is as follows: [0007] Nonce: Random number is an arbitrary or non-repeating value, which is included in an agreement for data exchange, for protection from heavy Put a shot.
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[麵]ACK :資料包首部中的確認標誌，餐已接收到的報文進行 確認。在通訊協議中，如果接受方成功的接收到資料， 那麼會回復一個ACK資料。通常ACK信號有自己固定的格 式，長度大小’由接受方回復給發送方。 [0009] HMAC . Hash 資訊校驗碼，Hash Message Authentic_ ation Codes，校驗接收資訊和發送資訊的完全一致性 (完整性）。 [0010] HASH主要用於資訊安全領域中加密演算法，把一些任意 098131434 表單編號A0101 0982053933-0 201112719 長度的資訊通過散列演算法轉化成固定長度的輸出，該 輸出就是HASH值，也可以說，HASH就是找到一種資料内 容和資料特徵碼之間的單向映射關係。Hash散列本身就 是所謂加密檢查和或資訊完整性編碼，通信雙方必須各 自執行函數計算來校驗資訊。 [0011] PMK : Pairwise Master Key，成對主密錄。用於幫助 密鑰協商，即用於產生其他臨時密鑰，所產生的這些密 鑰用於保密。 [0012] PTK : Pa i rw i se Trans i ent Key 成對臨時密鑰。.所述 的PTK由PMK協商計算出來。PTK用於產生MIC密鑰（MK) 以及資料加密密鑰（Data Encryption Key，DK)。MK 是用於計算和校驗MIC的密鑰，DK是用於對資料進行加密 的密錄。 [0013] MIC :資訊完整性編碼（Message Integrity Code ) ，是用於鑒別一條資訊的一個短塊密碼校驗。它也被叫 做完整性檢查值，修改檢測編碼或資訊認證碼。 [0014] PDU MODE :是發送或接收手機SMS的一種方法。訊息文 字經過十六進位編碼後進行傳送；PDU發送只能輸入十六 進位的字元0-9、A-F。 [0015] 如圖1所示是本發明安全控制遠端無線設備的方法較佳實 施例的架構圖。所述的架構包括通用移動通信系統1、本 地基站2、遠端基站3、用戶設備4、遠端無線設備5以及 安全通道6。所述的本地基站2通過無線通信網路7與用戶 設備2相連，所述的遠端基站3通過無線通信網路7與遠端 098131434 表單編號A0101 第6頁/共29頁 201112719 無線設備5相連。 [0016] ❹ [0017] 所述的通用移動通信系統（Universal Mobile Telecommunications System ， UMTS)1 是國際標準化組織 3GPP制定的全球3G標準之一。在本較佳實施例中，所述 的用戶設備4是配備有GPRS (General Packet Radio Service，通用分組無線服務技術）/WCDMA或HSDPA ( High Speed Downlink Packet Access，高速下行分 組接入技術）適配器的用戶設備。所述的遠端無線設備5 可以是3G無線路由器、可檇式導航設備等其他任意適用 的遠端無線設備。........................... 此外應說明的是，通過本發明安全控制遠端無線設備的 方法較佳實施例的架構，所述的用戶設備4與遠端無線設 備5可以進行收發資訊。所述的安全通道6可以使用戶設 備4與遠端無線設備5傳送加密控制資訊，對用戶設備4與 遠端無線設備5之間收發的資訊進行加密。 [0018] 〇 如圖2所示，是本發明安全控制遠端無線設備的方法較佳 實施例的流程圖。應說明的是，用戶設備4與遠端無線設 備5是分配到一個相同的、事先生成好的一個PMK。所述 的PMK可以是由認證祠服器（AS，Authentication Server)(圖中未示出）產生的，並通過安全的方法傳 送至用戶設備4與遠端無線設備5。另外也可以透过用户 设备4与远程无线设备5的拥有者事先协商设定。 步驟S10，用戶設備4創建請求資訊，發送請求資訊資料 包至遠端無線設備5，遠端無線設備5校驗該請求資訊資 098131434 表單編號A0101 第7頁/共29頁 0982053933-0 [0019] 201112719 料包。 [0020] 步驟Sll，當該請求資訊資料包校驗無誤時，所述遠端無 線設備5創建回復資訊，發送回復資訊資料包至用戶設備 4，用戶設備4校驗該回復資訊資料包。 [0021] 步驟S12，當該回復資訊資料包校驗無誤時，所述用戶設 備4創建控制資訊並進行加密，發送控制資訊資料包至遠 端無線設備5，遠端無線設備5校驗該控制資訊資料包。 [0022] 步驟S13，當該控制資訊資料包校驗無誤時，所述遠端無 線設備5解密並處理控制資訊，發送確認資訊資料包至用 戶設備4，用戶設備4校驗該確認資訊資料包，等待發送 下一個控制資訊資料包。 [0023] 圖3所示，是圖2中步驟S10之用戶設備發送讀求資訊資料 包及遠端無線設備進行校驗該請求資訊資料包的細化流 程圖。 [0024] 步驟S100，用戶設備4生成一個亂數PNonce以及設置一 個用戶設備4的序列號SNp並保存。 [0025] 步驟S101，用戶設備4創建請求資訊，以用戶設備4的 PMK與請求資訊為參數，通過HMAC-MD5演算法得到請求 資訊的MIC。 [0026] 步驟S102，用戶設備4發送請求資訊資料包至遠端無線設 備5，所述發送的請求資訊資料包中包括用戶設備4的請 求資訊、SNp、PNonce以及請求資訊的MIC ;並設置其超 時值為tl。 098131434 表單編號A0101 第8頁/共29頁 0982 201112719 [0027] [0028] Ο [0029] [0030] [0031] ❹ [0032] 步驟S1 0 3，遠端無線設備5初始化設置遠端無線設備5的 序列號為SNr = 0，並接收來自用戶設備4的請求資訊資料 包。 步驟S104，遠端無線設備5校驗請求資訊的MIC是否正確 。遠端無線設備5以遠端無線設備5的PMK與所接收的請求 資訊為參數，結合HMAC-MD5演算法再次得到所接收的請 求資訊的MIC，校驗其是否和用戶設備4所發送的請求資 訊的MIC—致。若一致，則進入步驟S106 ;若不一致，則 進入步驟S10 5。 步驟S105，遠端無線設備5放棄此請求資訊資料包，並返 回步驟S103。 步驟S106，遠端無線設備5生成一個亂•數RNonce，並保 存該RNonce以及保存請求資訊資料包中的PNonce。 如圖4所示，是圖2中步驟S11之遠端無線設備發送回復資 訊資料包及用戶設備校驗該回復資訊資料包的細化流程 圖。 步驟S200，以遠端無線設備5的PMK、RNonce及所接收的 請求資訊資料包中的PNonce為參數，使用偽隨機函數（ PRF)得到遠端無線設備5的PTK (成對臨時密鑰），所得 到的遠端無線設備5的PTK的長度為128位元組。然後以遠 端無線設備5的PTK、RNonce及所接收的請求資訊資料包 中的PNonce為參數，使用PRF得到長度為256位元組的遠 端無線設備5的密鑰流，提取該遠端無線設備5的密鑰流 的前16個位元組組成遠端無線設備5的MK (MIC Key，資 098131434 表單編號A0101 第9頁/共29頁 0982053933-0 201112719 訊完整性編碼密錄），設置遠端無線設備5的SNr = SNp+l ° ί列如，若SNp為 1 900 ，貝設置SNr等於SNp + 1 ， βρ1901 ο [0033] 步驟S201，遠端無線設備5創建回復資訊，然後以遠端無 線設備5的ΡΜΚ與該回復資訊為參數，根據HMAC-MD5演算 法計算回復資訊的ΜIC。 [0034] 步驟S202，遠端無線設備5發送回復資訊資料包至用戶設 備4，所述發送的回復資訊資料包包括遠端無線設備5的 回復資訊、SNr、RNonce以及回復資訊的MIC，然後設置 其超時值為t2。 [0035] 步驟S203，用戶設備4判斷在ίΐΒ夺間内是否能收到該回復 資訊資料包。若收到遠端無線設備5的回復資訊資料包， 則進入步驟S204 ;若沒有收到遠端無線設備5的回復資訊 資料包，則結束流程。 [0036] 步驟S204，用戶設備4校驗所接收到回復資訊資料包中的 SNr是否等於SNp + Ι。若SNr等於SNp+Ι，則進入步驟 S206 ;若SNr不等於SNp + Ι，貝丨J進入步驟S205 ° [0037] 步驟S205，用戶設備4放棄此回復資訊資料包，返回步驟 S203 °[Face] ACK: The confirmation mark in the header of the package, and the message that has been received by the meal is confirmed. In the communication protocol, if the recipient successfully receives the data, it will reply with an ACK. Usually the ACK signal has its own fixed format, and the length size ' is returned by the recipient to the sender. [0009] HMAC. Hash Message Authentic_ ation Codes, verify the complete consistency (integrity) of received information and sent information. [0010] HASH is mainly used in the encryption algorithm in the field of information security. Some information of the length of 098131434 form number A0101 0982053933-0 201112719 is converted into a fixed-length output through a hash algorithm. The output is the HASH value. It can also be said that HASH is to find a one-way mapping relationship between data content and data feature code. The Hash hash itself is called cryptographic check and or information integrity coding. Both parties must perform function calculations to verify the information. [0011] PMK: Pairwise Master Key, paired master secret. It is used to help key negotiation, that is, to generate other temporary keys, and these keys are used for confidentiality. [0012] PTK: Pa i rw i se Trans i ent Key Paired temporary key. The PTK is calculated by PMK negotiation. The PTK is used to generate a MIC key (MK) and a Data Encryption Key (DK). MK is the key used to calculate and verify the MIC, and DK is the secret record used to encrypt the data. [0013] MIC: Message Integrity Code is a short block cipher check used to authenticate a piece of information. It is also called the integrity check value, modifying the detection code or the information authentication code. [0014] PDU MODE: is a method of transmitting or receiving a mobile phone SMS. The message text is transmitted after hexadecimal encoding; the PDU transmission can only input hexadecimal characters 0-9, A-F. [0015] FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a preferred embodiment of a method for securely controlling a remote wireless device of the present invention. The architecture includes a universal mobile communication system 1, a local base station 2, a remote base station 3, a user equipment 4, a remote wireless device 5, and a secure channel 6. The local base station 2 is connected to the user equipment 2 via a wireless communication network 7, and the remote base station 3 is connected to the remote device 098131434 Form No. A0101, page 6 of 29, 201112719, via the wireless communication network 7. . [0016] The Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) 1 is one of the global 3G standards established by the International Organization for Standardization (3GPP). In the preferred embodiment, the user equipment 4 is equipped with a GPRS (General Packet Radio Service)/WCDMA or HSDPA (High Speed Downlink Packet Access) adapter. User equipment. The remote wireless device 5 can be any other suitable remote wireless device such as a 3G wireless router, a portable navigation device, or the like. ........................... In addition, the architecture of the preferred embodiment of the method for securely controlling a remote wireless device by the present invention is illustrated. The user equipment 4 and the remote wireless device 5 can send and receive information. The secure channel 6 can enable the user equipment 4 and the remote wireless device 5 to transmit encryption control information, and encrypt information transmitted and received between the user equipment 4 and the remote wireless device 5. [0018] As shown in FIG. 2, it is a flow chart of a preferred embodiment of the method for securely controlling a remote wireless device of the present invention. It should be noted that the user equipment 4 and the remote wireless device 5 are assigned to one identical, pre-generated PMK. The PMK may be generated by an Authentication Server (AS) (not shown) and transmitted to the user equipment 4 and the remote wireless device 5 in a secure manner. Alternatively, the user equipment 4 can negotiate settings with the owner of the remote wireless device 5 in advance. In step S10, the user equipment 4 creates the request information, sends the request information packet to the remote wireless device 5, and the remote wireless device 5 verifies the request information. 098131434 Form No. A0101 Page 7 / 29 pages 0992053933-0 [0019] 201112719 Material package. [0020] Step S11: When the request information packet is verified, the remote wireless device 5 creates a reply message, and sends a reply information packet to the user equipment 4, and the user equipment 4 verifies the reply information package. [0021] Step S12, when the reply information data packet is verified to be correct, the user equipment 4 creates control information and encrypts, sends a control information data packet to the remote wireless device 5, and the remote wireless device 5 verifies the control. Information package. [0022] Step S13, when the control information package is verified to be correct, the remote wireless device 5 decrypts and processes the control information, sends a confirmation information package to the user equipment 4, and the user equipment 4 verifies the confirmation information package. Waiting to send the next control information package. 3 is a detailed flow chart of the user equipment in step S10 of FIG. 2 transmitting a read request information packet and the remote wireless device verifying the requested information data package. [0024] In step S100, the user equipment 4 generates a random number PNonce and sets a serial number SNp of the user equipment 4 and saves it. [0025] Step S101, the user equipment 4 creates the request information, and obtains the MIC of the requested information by using the HMAC-MD5 algorithm with the PMK of the user equipment 4 and the request information as parameters. [0026] Step S102, the user equipment 4 sends a request information packet to the remote wireless device 5, where the sent request information package includes the request information of the user equipment 4, SNp, PNonce, and the MIC of the requested information; The timeout value is tl. 098131434 Form No. A0101 Page 8 of 29 0982 201112719 [0028] [0028] [0031] Step [0032] Step S1 0 3, the remote wireless device 5 initializes the setting of the remote wireless device 5 The serial number is SNr = 0, and the request information packet from the user equipment 4 is received. In step S104, the remote wireless device 5 verifies whether the MIC of the requested information is correct. The remote wireless device 5 takes the PMK of the remote wireless device 5 and the received request information as parameters, and combines the HMAC-MD5 algorithm to obtain the MIC of the received request information again, and verifies whether it is a request sent by the user equipment 4. The MIC of the information. If they match, the process goes to step S106; if they do not, the process goes to step S105. In step S105, the remote wireless device 5 discards the request information package and returns to step S103. In step S106, the remote wireless device 5 generates a random number RNonce, and saves the RNonce and saves the PNonce in the request information package. As shown in FIG. 4, it is a detailed flow chart of the remote wireless device sending the reply information package and the user equipment verifying the reply information package in step S11 in FIG. Step S200, using the pseudo-random function (PRF) of the PMK, the RNonce of the remote wireless device 5, and the received PNonce in the request information packet to obtain the PTK (paired temporary key) of the remote wireless device 5, The resulting PTK of the remote wireless device 5 has a length of 128 bytes. Then, using the PTK of the remote wireless device 5, the RNonce, and the PNonce in the received request information packet as parameters, the PRF is used to obtain the key stream of the remote wireless device 5 having a length of 256 bytes, and the remote wireless is extracted. The first 16 bytes of the key stream of the device 5 constitute the MK of the remote wireless device 5 (MIC Key, 098131434 Form No. A0101, page 9 / 29 pages 0992053933-0 201112719 message integrity code), setting SNr = SNp + l ° ί of the remote wireless device 5, if SNp is 1 900, the SNr is equal to SNp + 1 , βρ1901 ο [0033] Step S201, the remote wireless device 5 creates a reply message, and then The UI of the wireless device 5 and the reply information are parameters, and the UI of the reply information is calculated according to the HMAC-MD5 algorithm. [0034] Step S202, the remote wireless device 5 sends a reply information data packet to the user equipment 4, and the sent reply information data package includes the reply information of the remote wireless device 5, the SNr, the RNonce, and the MIC of the reply information, and then sets Its timeout value is t2. [0035] Step S203, the user equipment 4 determines whether the reply information package can be received in the ΐΒ 间. If the reply information package of the remote wireless device 5 is received, the process proceeds to step S204; if the reply information package of the remote wireless device 5 is not received, the process ends. [0036] Step S204, the user equipment 4 verifies whether the SNr in the received reply information data packet is equal to SNp + Ι. If SNr is equal to SNp+Ι, then go to step S206; if SNr is not equal to SNp + Ι, then 丨J proceeds to step S205 ° [0037] Step S205, user equipment 4 discards the reply information package, and returns to step S203 °
[0038] 步驟S206，用戶設備4校驗回復資訊的MIC是否正確。用 戶設備4以用戶設備4的PMK與所接收的回復資訊為參數， 結合HMAC-MD5演算法再次得到所接收的回復資訊的ΜIC ，校驗其是否和遠端無線設備5所發送的回復資訊的MIC 一致。若一致，則進入步驟S207 ;若不一致，則返回步 098131434 表單編號A0101 第10頁/共29頁 0982053933-0 201112719 [0039] Ο [0040] [0041] Ο [0042] [0043] 098131434 驟S205 。 步驟S207，以用戶設備4的ΡΜΚ、PNonce及所接收的回復 資訊資料包中的RNonce為參數，使用偽隨機函數PRF得 到用戶設備4的PTK，該PTK的長度為128位元組，然後以 用戶設備4的PTK、PNonce及所接收的回復資訊資料包中 的RNonce為參數，使用PRF得到長度為256位元組的用戶 設備4的密鑰流，並提取該用戶設備4的密鑰流的前16個 位元組組成用戶設備4的MK以及提取用戶設備4的密鑰流 的後16個位元組組成DK (Data Encryption Key，資料 加密密鑰）。 如圖5所示，是圖2中步驟S12之用戶設備發送控制資訊資 料包及遠端無線設備校驗該控制資訊資料包的細化流程 圖。 步驟S300，用戶設備4設置SNp=SNp+2 ’創建控制資訊， 以用戶設備4的MK以及控制資訊為參數’缱過HMAC-MD5 演算法計算得到控制資訊的MIC，用戶設備4使用用戶設 備4的資料加密密鑰DK對控制資訊的資料部分進行加密得 到DATAnIf (加密的控制資訊的資料部分）。 步驟S301，用戶設備4發送控制資訊資料包至遠端無線設 備5，所述發送的控制資訊資料包包括用戶設備4的控制 資訊、SNp、PNonce、控制資訊的MIC以及ΙΗΤΑην，然後 設置其超時值為t3。 步驟S302，遠端無線設備5判斷在t2時間内是否收到控制 資訊資料包。若收到用戶設備4的控制資訊資料包，則進 表單編號A0101 第11頁/共29頁 0982053933-0 201112719 入步驟S303 ;若沒有收到用戶設備4的控制資訊資料包， 則轉至步驟S103。 [0044] 步驟S303，遠端無線設備5校驗PNonce是否正確。遠端 無線設備5校驗所接收的控制資訊資料包中的PNonce與所 接收的請求資訊資料包中的PNonce是否一致，若一致， 則進入步驟S305 ;若不一致，則進入步驟S304。 [0045] 步驟S304，遠端無線設備5放棄此控制資訊，返回步驟 S302。 ❹ [0046] 步驟S305，遠端無線設備5校驗所接收的SNp是否等於 SNr + Ι 〇由於此時用戶言史備4的SNp = SNp + 2，而 SNr = SNp + l，則校驗SNp是否等於SNr + Ι。若SNp等於 SNr + Ι ，貝4 進Tv步HS306 ，若SNp不等;^SNr + 1 ，貝|J 進 A 步驟S304。 [0047] 步驟S306，遠端無線設備5校驗控制資訊的MIC是否正確 。由遠端無線設備5以遠端無線設備5的MK以及所接收的[0038] Step S206, the user equipment 4 verifies whether the MIC of the reply information is correct. The user equipment 4 takes the PMK of the user equipment 4 and the received reply information as parameters, and obtains the ΜIC of the received reply information again by combining the HMAC-MD5 algorithm, and verifies whether it is the reply information sent by the remote wireless device 5 or not. The MIC is consistent. If they are consistent, go to step S207; if they are not, go back to step 098131434. Form number A0101 Page 10 of 29 0982053933-0 201112719 [0040] [0041] [0042] [0043] 098131434 Step S205. Step S207, using the pseudo-random function PRF to obtain the PTK of the user equipment 4 by using the pseudo-random function PRF as the parameter of the user equipment 4, the PNonce and the received RNonce in the reply information data packet, the length of the PTK is 128 bytes, and then the user The PTK of the device 4, the PNonce, and the RNonce in the received reply information data package are parameters, and the PRF is used to obtain the key stream of the user equipment 4 having a length of 256 bytes, and the key stream of the user equipment 4 is extracted. The 16 bytes constitute the MK of the user equipment 4 and the last 16 bytes of the key stream of the extracted user equipment 4 constitute a DK (Data Encryption Key). As shown in FIG. 5, it is a detailed flow chart of the user equipment sending the control information packet and the remote wireless device verifying the control information package in step S12 in FIG. In step S300, the user equipment 4 sets SNp=SNp+2' to create control information, and uses the MK of the user equipment 4 and the control information as parameters to calculate the MIC of the control information through the HMAC-MD5 algorithm, and the user equipment 4 uses the user equipment 4. The data encryption key DK encrypts the data portion of the control information to obtain DATAnIf (the data portion of the encrypted control information). Step S301, the user equipment 4 sends a control information package to the remote wireless device 5, and the transmitted control information package includes control information of the user equipment 4, SNp, PNonce, MIC of the control information, and ΙΗΤΑην, and then sets the timeout. The value is t3. In step S302, the remote wireless device 5 determines whether the control information package is received within t2. If the control information package of the user equipment 4 is received, the form number A0101 page 11/29 pages 0992053933-0 201112719 proceeds to step S303; if the control information package of the user equipment 4 is not received, then the process goes to step S103. . [0044] Step S303, the remote wireless device 5 checks whether the PNonce is correct. The remote wireless device 5 verifies whether the PNonce in the received control information package is consistent with the PNonce in the received request information package. If yes, the process goes to step S305; if not, the process goes to step S304. [0045] Step S304, the remote wireless device 5 discards the control information, and returns to step S302. [0046] Step S305, the remote wireless device 5 checks whether the received SNp is equal to SNr + Ι 〇 because the SNp = SNp + 2 of the user's history 4 and SNr = SNp + l, the SNp is verified. Is it equal to SNr + Ι. If SNp is equal to SNr + Ι , Bay 4 enters Tv step HS306, if SNp is not equal; ^SNr + 1 , | | J proceeds to step S304. [0047] Step S306, the remote wireless device 5 verifies whether the MIC of the control information is correct. By the remote wireless device 5 with the MK of the remote wireless device 5 and the received
控制資訊為參數，結合HMAC-MD5演算法再次得到所接收 II 的控制資訊的MIC，校驗其是否和用戶設備4的所發送的 控制資訊的MIC—致。若一致，則進入步驟S307 ;若不一 致，則進入步驟S304。 [0048] 步驟S307，判斷此控制資訊是否是Fin (結束）資訊。若 不是Fin資訊，則進入步驟S308 ;若是Fin資訊，則轉至 步驟S10 3。 [0049] 步驟S308，遠端無線設備5解密DATAnir，得到控制資訊並The control information is a parameter, and the MIC of the control information of the received II is obtained again by the HMAC-MD5 algorithm, and it is checked whether it is MIC with the control information sent by the user equipment 4. If they match, the process goes to step S307; if not, the process goes to step S304. [0048] Step S307, determining whether the control information is Fin (end) information. If it is not Fin information, it proceeds to step S308; if it is Fin information, it proceeds to step S103. [0049] Step S308, the remote wireless device 5 decrypts the DATAnir to obtain control information.
UK 處理控制資訊。 098131434 表單編號A0101 第12頁/共29頁 0982053933-0 201112719 [0050] [0051] [0052] Ο [0053] [0054] Ο [0055] 如圖6所示，是圖2中步驟S13之遠端無線設備發送確認資 訊資料包及用戶設備校驗該確認資訊資料包的細化流程 圖。 步驟S400，遠端無線設備5設置SNr = SNr + 2，創建確認資 訊’並以遠端無線設備5的Μ K以及確認育訊為參數，結合 HMAC-MD5演算法得到確認資訊的MIC。 步驟S401，遠端無線設備5發送確認資訊資料包至用戶設 備4，所述發送的確認資訊資料包包括遠端無線設備5的 確認資訊、SNr、RNonce以及確認資訊的MIC，並等待接 收下一個控制資訊資料包。 步驟S402，用戶設備4判斷在t3時間内是否收到確認資訊 資料包。若接收到確認資訊資料包，則進入步驟S403 ; 若沒有收到確認資訊資料包，則結束流程。 步驟S403，用戶設備4校驗RNonce是否正確。用戶設備4 校驗所接收的確認資訊資料包中的RNonce與所接收回復 資訊資料包中的RNonce是否一致，若一致，則進入步驟 S405 ;若不一致，則進入步驟S404。 步驟S404，用戶設備4放棄此確認資訊資料包，返回步驟 S402。 [0056] 步驟S405，用戶設備4校驗所接收的SNr是否等於SNp + 1 。此時SNr=SNr + 2，而SNp = SNr + l，貝1J校驗SNr是否等於 SNp+Ι。若SNr等於SNp + Ι，則進入步驟S406 ;若SNr不 等於SNp + Ι，則進入步驟S404。 098131434 表單編號A0101 第13頁/共29頁 0982053933-0 201112719 [0057] 步驟S406，用戶設備4校驗確認資訊的MIC是否正確。由 用戶設備4通過以用戶設備4的MK以及所接收的確認資訊 為參數，結合HMAC-MD5演算法再次得到所接收的確認資 訊的MIC，校驗其是否和遠端無線設備5的所發送的確認 資訊的MIC—致，若一致，則進入步驟S407 ;若不一致， 則進入步驟S404。 [0058] 步驟S407，用戶設備4判斷是否發送下一個控制資訊資料 包。如果是，則返回至步驟S300 ;若不再發送下一個控 制資訊資料包，則結束流程。 [0059] 應說明的是，通過對所述的序列號和亂數的枚驗，有效 地防止了重新發送此資訊的重放攻擊。.所過對MIC的校驗 ，提供了完整的身份校驗，使用PTK進行加密以及校驗， 提高了安全級別。 [0060] 此外，本發明安全控制遠端無線設備的方法發送SMS的 TPDU所採用的是PDU模式，其.中，PDU中的TP-UD(用戶 資訊）的定義方式如圖7所示。其中的Message Delimiter (定界符） 用於使本發明所發送的資訊區別於一般 的正常的SMS。所述的Message Delimiter預設值為 [0xA0,OxAl，0xC0,0xCl]。如圖 8所示，是TP-UD 中 Message Type (資訊類型）的示意圖。Request message即為請求資訊，其資訊類型為0x00，Fin為0 ; Reply message即為回復資訊，其資訊類型為0x01， Fin為0 ; Control message即為控制資訊，其資訊類型 為0x02，Fin為0 ; Fin message即為結束資訊’其資訊 類型為0x02，Fin為1 ; ACK message即為確認資訊’其 098131434 表單編號A0101 第14頁/共29頁 0982053933-0 201112719 資訊類型為0x03，Fin為0。 [0061] 綜上所述，本發明符合發明專利要件，爰依法提出專利 申請。惟’以上所述者僅爲本發明之較佳實施例，本發 明之範圍並不以上述實施例爲限，舉凡熟悉本案技藝之 人士援依本發明之精神所作之等效修飾或變化，皆應涵 蓋於以下申請專利範圍内。 【圖式簡單說明】 ❹UK handles control information. 098131434 Form No. A0101 Page 12/29 Page 0992053933-0 201112719 [0052] [0054] [0055] [0055] As shown in FIG. 6, is the far end of step S13 in FIG. The wireless device sends a confirmation information package and a detailed flowchart of the user equipment verifying the confirmation information package. In step S400, the remote wireless device 5 sets SNr = SNr + 2, creates the confirmation message and uses the 无线 K of the remote wireless device 5 and the confirmation of the communication as parameters, and combines the HMAC-MD5 algorithm to obtain the MIC of the confirmation information. Step S401, the remote wireless device 5 sends a confirmation information package to the user equipment 4, and the sent confirmation information package includes the confirmation information of the remote wireless device 5, the SNr, the RNonce, and the MIC of the confirmation information, and waits to receive the next one. Control information package. In step S402, the user equipment 4 determines whether a confirmation information package is received within t3. If the confirmation information package is received, the process proceeds to step S403; if the confirmation information package is not received, the process ends. In step S403, the user equipment 4 checks whether the RNonce is correct. The user equipment 4 verifies whether the RNonce in the received confirmation information package is consistent with the RNonce in the received reply information package, and if yes, proceeds to step S405; if not, proceeds to step S404. In step S404, the user equipment 4 discards the confirmation information package and returns to step S402. [0056] Step S405, the user equipment 4 checks whether the received SNr is equal to SNp + 1 . At this time, SNr=SNr + 2, and SNp = SNr + l, and Bay 1J checks whether SNr is equal to SNp+Ι. If SNr is equal to SNp + Ι, then step S406 is entered; if SNr is not equal to SNp + Ι, then step S404 is reached. 098131434 Form No. A0101 Page 13 of 29 0982053933-0 201112719 [0057] Step S406, the user equipment 4 verifies whether the MIC of the confirmation information is correct. By using the MK of the user equipment 4 and the received confirmation information as parameters, the user equipment 4 obtains the MIC of the received confirmation information again in combination with the HMAC-MD5 algorithm, and verifies whether it is transmitted by the remote wireless device 5 or not. If the MIC of the confirmation information is the same, the process proceeds to step S407; if not, the process proceeds to step S404. [0058] Step S407, the user equipment 4 determines whether to send the next control information package. If yes, the process returns to step S300; if the next control information package is no longer sent, the process ends. [0059] It should be noted that the playback attack of resending this information is effectively prevented by the verification of the serial number and the random number. The MIC verification has provided a complete identity verification, using PTK for encryption and verification, and improved the security level. In addition, the method for securely controlling the remote wireless device of the present invention uses the PDU mode for transmitting the TPDU of the SMS, and the definition manner of the TP-UD (user information) in the PDU is as shown in FIG. 7 . The Message Delimiter (Delimiter) is used to distinguish the information sent by the present invention from the normal normal SMS. The default value of the Message Delimiter is [0xA0, OxAl, 0xC0, 0xCl]. As shown in Figure 8, it is a schematic diagram of the Message Type in the TP-UD. Request message is request information, its information type is 0x00, Fin is 0; Reply message is reply information, its information type is 0x01, Fin is 0; Control message is control information, its information type is 0x02, Fin is 0 Fin message is the end message 'its information type is 0x02, Fin is 1; ACK message is confirmation information' its 098131434 form number A0101 page 14 / 29 pages 0992053933-0 201112719 The information type is 0x03, Fin is 0. [0061] In summary, the present invention complies with the requirements of the invention patent, and submits a patent application according to law. However, the above description is only the preferred embodiment of the present invention, and the scope of the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments, and equivalent modifications or variations made by those skilled in the art in light of the spirit of the present invention are It should be covered by the following patent application. [Simple description of the diagram] ❹
[0062] 圖1為本發明安全控制遠端無線設備的方法較佳實施例的 架構圖。 [0063] 圖2為本發明安全控制遠端無線設備的方法的較佳實施例 的流程圖。.1 is a block diagram of a preferred embodiment of a method for securely controlling a remote wireless device according to the present invention. 2 is a flow chart of a preferred embodiment of a method of securely controlling a remote wireless device in accordance with the present invention. .
[0064] 圖3是本發明較佳實施例中用戶設備發送請求資訊及遠端 無線設備進行驗證的細化流程圖° [〇〇65]圖4是本發明較佳實施例中遠端無線設備發送回復資訊及 用戶設備進行驗證的細也流程圖。 [0066] 圖5是本發明較佳實施例中用戶設備發送控制資訊及遠端 無線設備進行驗證的細化流程圖° [0067] 圖6是本發明較佳實施例中遠端無線设備發送確認資訊及 用戶設備進行驗證的細化流程圖。 [0068] 圖7是PDU中的TP-UD的定義方式示意圖° _9]圖8是TP-UD中Message Type的示意圖° 【主要元件符號說明】 0982053933-0 [0070] 通用移動通訊系統1 098131434 表單編號A0101 第15頁/共烈頁 201112719 [0071] 本地基站2 [0072] 遠端基站3 [0073] 用戶設備4 [0074] 遠端無線設備5 [0075] 安全通道6 [0076] 無線通信網路7 [0077] 用戶設備發送請求資訊資料包至遠端無線設備，遠端無 線設備校驗該請求資訊資料包S10 [0078] 遠端無線設備發送回復資訊資料包至用户設備，用戶設 備校驗該回復資訊資料包S11 [0079] 用戶設備創建並加密控制資訊，發送控制資訊資料包至 遠端無線設備，遠端無線設備校驗該控制資訊資料包 [0080] S12 [0081] 遠端無線設備解密並處理控制資訊，發送確認資訊資料 包至用戶設備，用戶設備校驗該確認資訊資料包，等待 發送下一個控制資訊資料包S13 098131434 表單編號A0101 第16頁/共29頁 0982053933-03 is a detailed flowchart of a user equipment transmitting request information and a remote wireless device performing verification in a preferred embodiment of the present invention. [FIG. 4] FIG. 4 is a remote wireless device in accordance with a preferred embodiment of the present invention. Send a reply message and a detailed flow chart of the user equipment for verification. 5 is a detailed flowchart of a user equipment transmitting control information and a remote wireless device performing verification in a preferred embodiment of the present invention. [0067] FIG. 6 is a remote wireless device transmitting in a preferred embodiment of the present invention. A detailed flow chart for confirming the information and user equipment for verification. 7 is a schematic diagram of a definition of a TP-UD in a PDU. FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of a Message Type in a TP-UD. [Main Component Symbol Description] 0982053933-0 [0070] Universal Mobile Communication System 1 098131434 Form No. A0101 Page 15 / Total Page 201112719 [0071] Local Base Station 2 [0072] Remote Base Station 3 [0073] User Equipment 4 [0074] Remote Wireless Device 5 [0075] Secure Channel 6 [0076] Wireless Communication Network [0077] The user equipment sends the request information packet to the remote wireless device, and the remote wireless device verifies the request information package S10. [0078] The remote wireless device sends the reply information data packet to the user equipment, and the user equipment verifies the Reply to information package S11 [0079] The user equipment creates and encrypts the control information, sends the control information package to the remote wireless device, and the remote wireless device verifies the control information package [0080] S12 [0081] Remote wireless device decryption And processing the control information, sending the confirmation information package to the user equipment, the user equipment verifying the confirmation information package, waiting to send the next control information package S13 098131434 Form No. A0101 No. 16 / Total 29 0982053933-0