201036385 六、發明說明： 【發明所屬之技術領域】 本發明係有關於密碼的認證方〉去，尤纟更有關於—次 性密碼的認證方法。 【先前技術】 現7科技發展的腳步快速，電子產品早已充斥於—般 =眾的生活之中’甚至許多與使用者自身機密相關的資 料，也漸漸改以電子產品來儲存與實現。 琳螂滿目的電子產品中，近來最受到重視的，即是各 種可以代表持有者身分之電子式晶片，因此種電子晶片的 L伸使用’例如金融卡、行動電話的用戶識別模塊 ⑸bscriber identity M〇dule，以下簡稱卡）及門禁卡 等更可直接代表使用者進行身份之確認，著實省下使用 者諸多之不便。 曰上述之電子晶片金融卡’即是最具代表性的一種電子 曰曰片θ Γ產品’該晶片金融卡發明後即逐漸汰換掉用存款薄 ，提款單至銀㈣台領款之傳統方式。只要使用者持有該 晶片金融卡’並擁有得以通過該晶片金融卡認證之個人識 別碼（pers〇nal identification number，以下簡稱削 碼）’即使於銀行之下班時間’亦可在提供提款功能之提 款機提取固定帳戶中之金錢，著詩使用者增加使用上之 便利性。 又例如上述行動電話之SIM卡，只要使用者持有得以 4 201036385 代表發話者身份之SIM卡，且知道通過該SIM卡認證之 PIN碼，即可將該SIM卡插接於任何行動電話中，與外界 進行通話。而任何接收通話之一方，皆可因該SIM卡所發 出之一獨一無二的電話號碼，確認發話方之身份。 惟，雖然上述晶片卡可代表持有者之身份，並各自具 有一持有者才可得知之PIN碼加以保護該晶片卡，提高安201036385 VI. Description of the invention: [Technical field to which the invention pertains] The present invention relates to a method for authenticating a password, and more particularly to a method for authenticating a secondary password. [Prior Art] Nowadays, the development of science and technology is fast, electronic products are already full of life-like life. Even many of the information related to users' own secrets are gradually being stored and realized by electronic products. Among the widest range of electronic products, the most recent attention is the various electronic chips that can represent the identity of the holder. Therefore, the L-extension of the electronic chip uses the user identification module (such as financial card and mobile phone) (5) bscriber identity M. 〇dule, hereinafter referred to as card) and access control card can directly confirm the identity of the user, which saves the user a lot of inconvenience. The above-mentioned electronic chip financial card 'is the most representative type of electronic θ θ Γ product'. After the invention of the chip financial card, it gradually replaced the traditional use of deposit slips, withdrawals to silver (four) the way. As long as the user holds the wafer financial card 'and has a personal identification number (persiculating identification number), which can be authenticated by the chip financial card, even if the bank is in the off-hours, the withdrawal function can be provided. The cash machine extracts the money in the fixed account, and the poetry user increases the convenience of use. For example, the SIM card of the above mobile phone can be inserted into any mobile phone as long as the user holds the SIM card that can represent the identity of the caller and knows the PIN code authenticated by the SIM card. Talk to the outside world. Any party that receives the call can confirm the identity of the caller because of a unique phone number issued by the SIM card. However, although the above-mentioned wafer card can represent the identity of the holder, and each has a PIN code that the holder can know to protect the wafer card, the security is improved.
全性。但近年來網際網路發展快速，電腦駭客與電腦病毒 當道，致使許多電腦使用者儲存於個人電腦中之機密檔 案，包括各種電子晶片之PIN碼等資訊被竊取。使得使用 者之電子晶片有被盜用之風險，造成使用者極大之不安， 個人權益也受到極大之威脅。再者，電子晶片内部之 碼雖可變更，但礙於便利，或不具高度的資訊安全觀念， 使用者常以同-組熟穂之密碼，設定大部份需要削碼才 可使用之電子晶片’並未定期更新。如此一來，一旦發生Fullness. However, in recent years, the Internet has developed rapidly, and computer hackers and computer viruses have become the secret, causing many computer users to store secret files in personal computers, including PIN codes of various electronic chips, and other information stolen. The user's electronic chip is at risk of being stolen, causing great uneasiness for users and personal rights and interests. Moreover, although the code inside the electronic chip can be changed, but it is convenient or does not have a high degree of information security concept, the user often sets the electronic chip that needs to be coded to be used by the same-group password. 'Not updated regularly. As a result, once it happens
上述資料被盜用之情事，常令被盜用者損失惨重。 由於上述輸入固定PIN碼進行認證的方式，安全性較 低PIN碼具有被竊取與盜用之風險，因此後來發展出 一種單次性密碼（〇ne time passw〇rd，以下簡稱〇τρ)的身分 驗證方式。 如第一圖所示，為0ΤΡ驗證方法之方塊圖。主要係由 - οτρ用戶端π及一 〇ΤΡ服務端13所共同實現。該用戶端 11欲使用οτρ驗證服務前，係需先向該服務端13進行註 冊。因此該服務端13之一後端資料庫131中係儲存有該用 戶端11之檔案夾133 。而該用戶端丨丨之檔案夾133中，除 5 201036385 了基本個人資料之外，係更包括一套由該〇τρ服務端以與 該用戶端11所共同協議之演算法（lla，13a)及一組相同之密 鑰（secret key)(llc， 13c)。 續請參閱第二圖之OTP驗證方法之流程圖。當該用戶 端11欲進行身份驗證時，係需使用該用戶端u的一資料庫 111中之该演算法lla及該公们lc，經運算後產生一組 0ΤΡ(步驟S20)，並將該0TP及該用戶端u之基本資料傳送 至該0ΤΡ服務端13進行身份驗證之申請（步驟卿。去令 0ΤΡ服務端13接收到該用戶㈣之申請要求時，係先^ 該otp服務端13之該後端資料庫131中，是 ” 戶端11之資料夾133 ，即，該 有以用 13古主冊之特r用戶^11疋否有向該服務端 冊之3己錄(S24)。若該用戶端11已註冊，且該後端資 料庫⑶中也儲存有該用戶端u之播案夾】 二端，存之該演算法13a及該公餘版，並依該= 二3…亥公餘13c*申請時之條件運算出一㈣(步驟 取俊 成服猾Μ係依運算出之該 端11傳送過來之0ΤΡ是否符人彳此 比對。亥用 相傳人，田^ (步驟S28) ’若該二〇ΤΡ 相符合，该用戶端之身份即通 果回傳至該提"請之以 2 ° 4再將驗證之、: 相尸％ U(步驟S2a)。 惟，此種魏方法係僅㈣使 無法當作個人朗密碼運用 ㈣仃射”之確 跄妒夂入从以> 於夕樣性的電子產品上，因4 較為狹小，市場上實需提令 將此種驗證方法更為廣大的運用。 201036385 【發明内容】 本發明之主要目的’係在於提供一種電子晶片的單次 性密碼設定及認證方法’係可使用0TP服務提供者所授權 之0ΤΡ來代替電子晶片認證所需之PIN碼’不但可每次皆 以不同之0ΤΡ來進行認證，亦可對0ΤΡ做使用上之條件限 定。 為達上述目的，本發明係利用單次性密碼（One time password，OTP)服務經運算所產生之〇τρ代替電子晶片用The misappropriation of the above information often results in heavy losses for the stolen. Due to the above-mentioned method of inputting a fixed PIN code for authentication, a less secure PIN code has the risk of being stolen and stolen, and thus a character authentication of a single-password (〇ne time passw〇rd, hereinafter referred to as 〇τρ) has been developed. the way. As shown in the first figure, it is a block diagram of the verification method. Mainly implemented by - οτρ client π and a server 13 together. Before the client 11 wants to use οτρ to verify the service, the server 13 needs to register with the server 13. Therefore, the folder 133 of the user terminal 11 is stored in the backend database 131 of the server 13. In addition to the basic personal data of 5 201036385, the folder 133 of the user terminal further includes a set of algorithms (lla, 13a) which are mutually agreed by the 〇τρ server to cooperate with the client 11 . And a set of the same secret key (llc, 13c). Please refer to the flowchart of the OTP verification method in the second figure. When the client 11 wants to perform identity verification, the algorithm 11a and the public lc in a database 111 of the client u are used to generate a set of 0ΤΡ (step S20), and the 0TP and the basic data of the client u are transmitted to the server 13 for authentication (step qing. When the server 13 receives the application request of the user (4), the otp server 13 In the backend database 131, it is the folder 133 of the client 11, that is, whether or not the user of the 13th book is used to record the number of the service book (S24). If the client 11 is already registered, and the backend database (3) also stores the broadcast folder of the user terminal u, the algorithm 13a and the public version are stored, and according to the = 2 3... The conditions of the application for the 13c* application of Hai Gongyu 13c* are calculated as one (four) (the steps taken by Jun Chengcheng are based on the calculation of the end of the transmission of the end of the 11th, whether it is a match between the person and the opponent. The use of the descendant, Tian ^ (step S28 ) 'If the two matches, the identity of the client will be passed back to the said " Please verify it with 2 ° 4: The corpse is % U (step S2a). However, this type of Wei method is only (4) that it cannot be used as a personal cryptographic code (4) 仃 之 之 跄妒夂 跄妒夂 & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & 4 is relatively small, and there is a real need in the market to make such a verification method more widely used. 201036385 [Summary of the Invention] The main object of the present invention is to provide a method for setting and authenticating a single password for an electronic chip. Use the 0ΤΡ authorized by the 0TP service provider to replace the PIN code required for electronic chip authentication. 'Not only can it be authenticated with different 0每次 each time, but also can be used to limit the use of 0ΤΡ. To achieve the above purpose, The invention uses a one-time password (OTP) service to replace the electronic chip with the 〇τρ generated by the operation.
以 s忍證之個人識別碼（pers〇nai identification number, PIN 碼），於欲使用讀電子晶片時向OTP提供者申請，或是使 用預先申請之具有條件限定之0ΤΡ授權做為電子晶片認證 之鑰匙。 透過本發明之方法，不但可大幅地改善電子晶片的認 證方法，亦可增加電子晶片認證上的安全性。 〇【實施方式】 紋就本务明之—較佳實施例，配合圖式，詳細說明如 後。 首請參閱第三圖，係為本發明之電子晶片的單次性密 碼設定及認證方法之方塊圖。如圖所示，本發明之方法主 要係由單次性密螞（One time password，以下簡稱〇τρ)之服 務提（、者3」*電子晶片35所實現。讀電子晶片35係由-⑽驗*單元351、一私有區儲存單元353及-公有區儲 存單凡355所共同組成。該二儲存單元353, 355中係儲存有 7 201036385 可供對應使用之物件，當目本&吃 午巾見者為一私錄3531，3551及一公鍮 I33,3553’但不以此為限。其中，具有通常知識者皆知， 子晶片内之儲存單元係可視實際所f而加以規 過雨碼或本發明之0ΤΡ驗證才可存取内部物件者，即被 視為受保護之私有區儲存單元，而不需透過驗證，僅需載 ^電^晶片之_程式即可存取㈣物件者，即被視為未 受保護之公有區儲存單元。該電子晶片35中並不必缺包括 一私有區儲存單元353及一公有區儲存單元355 ^非用 來對本發明加以限制者。τ述將僅以該私有區儲存單元 353為例’加以說明。 本發明係以該0ΤΡ服務提供者31所授權之一 〇τρ 33做 為該電子晶片35認證所需之個人識別碼(personal identification number code，以下簡稱 piN 碼），令使用 者得以通過認證’進人該儲存單元353，使用該儲存單元 353内之該私鑰3531或該公鑰邪汩。當一使用者欲使用該 電子晶片35時，係需先制該電子晶片35之pm碼進行認 證，因此，欲進行認證時，需向該〇τρ服務提供者31申請 一 0ΤΡ 33。該電子晶片35内之該驗證單元351係可檢驗所 使用之該ΟΤΡ33是否為該0ΤΡ服務提供者31所授權之有效 0ΤΡ 33。當該驗證單元351確認該所使用之該〇τρ泊有效 後，才可通過s忍證，並使用該電子晶片％内該儲存單元 353中所儲存之該私鑰3531或該公鑰3533，執行進一步之 簽章、提款等等動作。然而，不同於該私有區儲存單元 353 ’該公有區儲存單元355係於載入該電子晶片35之一 201036385 驅動程式後使用該公有區儲存單元355中之該私鑰3551或 該公鑰3553 ;亦可於上述0ΤΡ驗證方式通過後使用該公有 區儲存單元355中之該私鑰3551或該公鑰3553，即，定義 上視為另一受保護之私有區儲存單元。上述分配實可就實 際運用而加以置換，上述僅為本發明之一較具實例，不可 加以限定。 接著請參閱第四圖，係為本發明之電子晶片的單次性 0密碼設定及認證方法之流程圖。首先，當使用者欲使用該 電子晶片35之一延伸產品，例如使用一晶片金融卡進行提 款時，係需先向該0ΤΡ服務提供者31要求一組0ΤΡ 33(步驟 S40)。接著，當該0ΤΡ服務提供者31確認該申請之使用者 的身份，確定具有申請0ΤΡ之資格後，即經運算後隨機產 生一組0ΤΡ 33並授權予該使用者（步驟S42)。 當該使用者接收到經該0ΤΡ服務提供者31授權之該 0ΤΡ 33後，即可使用該0ΤΡ 33做為該電子晶片35之PIN碼 〇 (步驟S44)，進行該電子晶片35之認證動作（步驟S46)。 若所申請之該0ΤΡ 33錯誤，無法通過該電子晶片35内之該 0ΤΡ驗證單元351之認證時，即需重請向該0ΤΡ服務提供 者31申請另一組0ΤΡ 33，並重新進行認證。而若所申請之 該0ΤΡ 33通過該0ΤΡ驗證單元351之認證後，該0ΤΡ驗證 單元351係接著檢驗該0ΤΡ 33是否符合兩端協議之使用條 件（access condition)(步驟 S48)。 使得一提的是，一般使用者（Normal User)係僅可使 用該電子晶片35之資源，而該電子晶片35之初始化與管 9 201036385 理，則係經由一安全管理者（Security Officer，SO)來進行。 該so係可對該電子晶片35進行下列管理： ^設定該電子晶片35是否以0TP代替一般plN碼進行驗 ，即，本發明所述之方法；而若不以代替一般 碼’則該電子晶片35亦可當作—般透過PIN碼進行認證之 電子晶片來使用； 设定該電子晶片35中之該些儲存單元353, 355係為公有 區或私有區，即，是否需透過0ΤΡ或PIN碼之驗證後才可 進行存取； 本發明之0ΤΡ驗證方法所需之演算機制。 而上述第三點所述之演算機制，即為〇τρ之使用條 ^^f^(c〇unt 1而加㈣）及事件限定（event limitatiQn)等模式。係可依 兩端協議之使用條件，於該電子晶片35内設置不同驗證功 能之着驗證單元3S卜或者設定更改運算所得之=力 具有得以被_使祕件之制碼（例如Μ纖， ，、中A代表時間限定）。〇τρ之時間限定係 2 OTP驗證之開始日㈣與結束時㈣）；次數 2用之(例如可❹讀大於㈣，或可使用、 二數位於三與十之間時才滿足次數限制等）； 係於料情況被觸發時，才可使用_等（例 可在某些特定區域岐用，或行動電話_卡只可 疋電話等）。惟以上所述皆僅為本發明較佳之具體實^ 201036385 不可以此為限。 如上所述，當該〇τρ驗證單元351確認所使用之該 〇ΤΡ 33符合所設定之使用條件（步驟S4a)_，才可順利進 =電子晶片35内之該私有區儲存單元353或該公有區儲 予单το 355 ’使用各該儲存單元娜，娜内之該 3531薦或該公鑰卿期（步驟S4c)，進行電子簽章、 提款等等具有高機密性之動作。 然’除以Ίπίι所:lV田》^ b /Use the perseverance identification number (PIN code) to apply to the OTP provider when you want to use the electronic chip, or use the pre-applied conditional 0ΤΡ authorization as the electronic chip certification. key. The method of the present invention not only greatly improves the authentication method of the electronic chip, but also increases the security of the electronic chip certification. 〇 [Embodiment] The outline is as follows - the preferred embodiment, with reference to the drawings, will be described in detail later. Please refer to the third figure for the first time, which is a block diagram of the single-pass password setting and authentication method for the electronic chip of the present invention. As shown in the figure, the method of the present invention is mainly implemented by a single time password (hereinafter referred to as 〇τρ) service (3)* electronic chip 35. The read electronic chip 35 is composed of -(10) The inspection unit 351, a private area storage unit 353 and the public area storage unit 355 are jointly formed. The two storage units 353, 355 are stored with 7 201036385 for corresponding use of the object, when the target & The towel is a private record of 3531, 3551 and a gong I33, 3553'. However, it is known to the general public that the storage unit in the sub-wafer can be rained according to the actual f. The code or the 0ΤΡ verification of the present invention can access the internal object, that is, it is regarded as a protected private area storage unit, without being verified, and only the device can be accessed by the device. That is, it is regarded as an unprotected public area storage unit. The electronic chip 35 does not need to include a private area storage unit 353 and a public area storage unit 355, which are not intended to limit the present invention. Taking the private area storage unit 353 as an example According to the invention, one of the 〇τρ 33 authorized by the service provider 31 is used as the personal identification number code (hereinafter referred to as piN code) required for the authentication of the electronic chip 35, so that the user can be authenticated. The user enters the storage unit 353 and uses the private key 3531 or the public key in the storage unit 353. When a user wants to use the electronic chip 35, the pm code of the electronic chip 35 is required to be authenticated. Therefore, when the authentication is to be performed, the 〇τρ service provider 31 is required to apply for a ΤΡ 33. The verification unit 351 in the electronic chip 35 can check whether the ΟΤΡ 33 used is authorized by the ΤΡ service provider 31. Validity ΤΡ 33. When the verification unit 351 confirms that the used ττ 泊 is valid, it can pass the s forcing and use the private key 3531 stored in the storage unit 353 within the electronic chip % or The public key 3533 performs a further signature, withdrawal, etc. However, unlike the private area storage unit 353 'the public area storage unit 355 is loaded with one of the electronic chips 35 201036 The private key 3551 or the public key 3553 in the public area storage unit 355 is used after the 385 driver is used; the private key 3551 or the public key 3553 in the public area storage unit 355 can also be used after the above-mentioned authentication mode is passed. That is, the definition is regarded as another protected private area storage unit. The above allocation may be replaced by actual use, and the above is only one example of the present invention and cannot be limited. Next, please refer to the fourth figure. It is a flowchart of the method for setting and authenticating the single-digit 0 password of the electronic chip of the present invention. First, when the user wants to extend the product using one of the electronic chips 35, for example, using a wafer financial card for withdrawal, it is necessary to first request a set of 0 ΤΡ 33 from the service provider 31 (step S40). Next, when the service provider 31 confirms the identity of the user of the application and determines that the application has the qualification of the application, a set of 0 ΤΡ 33 is randomly generated and authorized to the user (step S42). After the user receives the 0ΤΡ33 authorized by the service provider 31, the user can use the 0ΤΡ33 as the PIN code of the electronic chip 35 (step S44), and perform the authentication operation of the electronic chip 35 ( Step S46). If the 0 ΤΡ 33 error is applied and the authentication by the ΤΡ verification unit 351 in the electronic chip 35 cannot be passed, the other service provider 31 is requested to apply for another group of ΤΡ 33 and re-authentication. And if the requested ΤΡ 33 is authenticated by the ΤΡ verification unit 351, the ΤΡ verification unit 351 then checks whether the ΤΡ 33 conforms to the access condition of the two-end protocol (step S48). It is to be noted that the normal user can only use the resources of the electronic chip 35, and the initialization of the electronic chip 35 and the management of the electronic chip 35 are via a security officer (SO). Come on. The system can perform the following management on the electronic chip 35: ^Set whether the electronic chip 35 is tested with the 0TP instead of the general plN code, that is, the method of the present invention; and if the electronic code is not replaced by the general code ' 35 can also be used as an electronic chip that is authenticated by a PIN code. The storage units 353, 355 in the electronic chip 35 are set to be public or private, that is, whether the password or the PIN code is required. The verification can be performed after the verification; the calculation mechanism required for the verification method of the present invention. The calculation mechanism described in the third point above is the mode of using ^τρ, ^^f^(c〇unt 1 plus (4)) and event limitatiQn. According to the use conditions of the two-end protocol, the verification unit 3S or the setting change operation obtained by setting the different verification functions in the electronic chip 35 can be coded by the secret component (for example, the fiber, , A represents time limit). The time limit of 〇τρ is 2 (the fourth) and the end (4) of the OTP verification; the number 2 is used (for example, the reading can be greater than (4), or can be used, and the second number is between three and ten, the number limit is satisfied, etc.) When the material condition is triggered, you can use _ etc. (for example, it can be used in certain areas, or the mobile phone _ card can only call, etc.). However, the above description is only the preferred embodiment of the present invention. 201036385 is not limited thereto. As described above, when the 〇τρ verification unit 351 confirms that the 〇ΤΡ 33 used conforms to the set use condition (step S4a)_, the private area storage unit 353 or the public in the electronic chip 35 can be smoothly entered. The district reserves a single το 355 'Using each of the storage units Na, Na Nai's 3531 recommendation or the public key period (step S4c), and performing electronic signatures, withdrawals, and the like with high confidentiality. However, 'divide by Ίπίι: lV田》^ b /
〇授權之方式&向0犯服務提供端申請0TP 該用戶端註冊時，該ητρ Ηβ妙± ^ ^不 ^ ^ ^ ° 服務提供端3丨即將該用戶端經協 疋後所留下之個人資料、’ 立之硬體或軟體，_以製=及公餘等資訊，導入一獨 _二： 成一0τρ產生器5。並設定 U1P33之產生條件（同卜 件限定等）。用戶 時間限定、次數限定及事 生器5後，可服務提供端處取得該㈣產 〇 交 合该些產生條件之情況下，艏恭钫ητρ 產生器5(例如按下該〇Τρ產 x u 藉以得到-嶋，做為ft上之一按紐之方法）， ™碼。但此僅為本發 =仃料子日日片35認證之 為限。 具體實施例，不可加以 以上所述僅為本發明之較佳 本發明之專利範圍，故舉 本實例，非因此即拘限 化’均同理皆包含於本發明之範容所為之等效變 靶固内，合予陳明。 【圖式簡單說明】 201036385 第一圖係OTP驗證方法之方塊圖。 第二圖係0ΤΡ驗證方法之流程圖。 第三圖係本發明之電子晶片的單次性密碼設定及認證 方法之方塊圖。 第四圖係本發明之電子晶片的單次性密碼設定及認證 方法之流程圖。 第五圖係本發明之電子晶片的單次性密碼設定及認證 方法之另一較佳具體實施例之方塊圖 【主要元件符號說明】 【先前技術】 11…用戶端 13…0ΤΡ服務端 111…用戶端資料庫 131…服務端資料庫 1 la, 13a…演算法 11c, 13c···密鑰 133…資料夾 S20〜S2a…步驟 【本發明】 31…0ΤΡ服務提供端 33 …0ΤΡ 35…電子晶片 351…驗證單元 353…私有區儲存單元 355…公有區儲存單元 3531，3551…私鍮 3533, 3553…公鑰 5…0ΤΡ產生器 S40〜S4c…步驟 12〇 Authorization method & Apply to 0 service provider Provider 0TP When registering at the client end, the ητρ Ηβ妙± ^ ^不^ ^ ^ ° Service provider 3丨 The person left after the client is co-proclaimed Information, 'hardware or software, _ system= and public information, etc., import one _ two: into a 0τρ generator 5. And set the U1P33 generation conditions (same as the file limit, etc.). After the user time limit, the number of times limit, and the event device 5, the service provider can obtain the (four) pupa and yoke conditions, and the 钫 钫 ρ τ τ generator 5 (for example, press the 〇Τρ production xu to obtain -嶋, as a method of one of the buttons on ft), TM code. However, this is only for the purpose of this issue. The specific embodiments are not intended to be only the scope of the invention of the present invention. Therefore, the examples are not limited to the equivalents of the invention. Within the target, it is combined with Chen Ming. [Simple description of the schema] 201036385 The first diagram is a block diagram of the OTP verification method. The second figure is a flow chart of the verification method. The third figure is a block diagram of a one-time password setting and authentication method for an electronic chip of the present invention. The fourth figure is a flow chart of a method for setting and authenticating a one-time password for an electronic chip of the present invention. Figure 5 is a block diagram of another preferred embodiment of the method for setting and authenticating a one-time password for an electronic chip of the present invention. [Priority Symbol Description] [Prior Art] 11...User Terminal 13...0 Server 111... Client database 131...server database 1 la, 13a...algorithm 11c, 13c···key 133...folder S20~S2a...step [invention] 31...0ΤΡservice provider 33 ...0ΤΡ 35...electronic Wafer 351...Verification unit 353...Private area storage unit 355...Public area storage unit 3531, 3551...Private 3533, 3553...Public key 5...0ΤΡGenerator S40~S4c...Step 12