TW200908740A - Vouching for source authorization - Google Patents

Vouching for source authorization Download PDF

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Publication number
TW200908740A
TW200908740A TW97120960A TW97120960A TW200908740A TW 200908740 A TW200908740 A TW 200908740A TW 97120960 A TW97120960 A TW 97120960A TW 97120960 A TW97120960 A TW 97120960A TW 200908740 A TW200908740 A TW 200908740A
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TW
Taiwan
Prior art keywords
domain
key
digital object
authentication
digital
Prior art date
Application number
TW97120960A
Other languages
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
Martijn Maas
Koen Hendrik Johan Vrielink
Original Assignee
Koninkl Philips Electronics Nv
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Application filed by Koninkl Philips Electronics Nv filed Critical Koninkl Philips Electronics Nv
Publication of TW200908740A publication Critical patent/TW200908740A/en

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/126—Applying verification of the received information the source of the received data
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/101—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying security measures for digital rights management
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H04L63/104—Grouping of entities

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

The invention relates to a method of providing an authentication tag over a digital object. The method is to be carried out in a first device belonging to a user domain comprising a plurality of devices, the devices in the user domain sharing a common symmetric domain key. The invention moreover relates to a method of processing a digital object in a second device belonging to a user domain comprising a plurality of devices, the devices in the user domain sharing a common domain key. The digital object is received in said second device together with a validation token of a digital objects issuer issuing the digital object and an authentication tag over the digital object. In both methods of the invention, the authentication tag has a first and a second part, the second part comprising information facilitating authentication of the public key (pk) of an asymmetric key pair.

Description

200908740 九、發明說明： 【發明所屬之技術領域】 、本發明係關於一種在一屬於一包含複數個器件之使用者 域之第一器Μ牛中於一數位物件上提供—鑑認標冑的方法。 本發明另外係關於-種在一屬於一包含複數個器件之使用 者域（UD)的第二器件中處理一數位物件（D〇)之方法。此 外，本發明係關於一種包含一包含複數個器件之使用者域 (UD)的系統、一種包含於一具有複數個器件之使用者域 (UD)中之器件及一種鑑認標籤。 【先前技術】 近年來，可用之内容保護系統之數目已快速增長。此等 系統中之一些系統僅保護内容不被未經授權地複製，而其 他系統限制使用者存取或使用内容之能力。此等系統常常 被稱為數位權利管理（DRM)系統。 消費者希望在無爭論且具儘可能少的限制之情況下享有 内容。、消t者希望對其器#!以網路以啟用所有類型之不 同應用且容易地存取任何類型之内$。其亦希$能夠在無 限制之情況下於其家庭環境下共用/傳遞内容。 “'、 授權域（AD)或使用者域（UD)之概念試圖找到一種解決方 案以同時服務於内容所有者（其希望保護其版權）與内容消 費者(其希望無限制地使用内容)之利益。基本原理為具有 只要内容不跨越授權域之界限便可相對較自自地使用内容 之受控網路環境。通常’授權域以家庭環境（亦被稱為^ 庭網路）為中心。 131643.doc 200908740 當然’其他情境亦為可能的。使用者可（例如）在其旅行 時攜帶具有有限内容量之音訊及/或視訊的攜帶型器件， 且在其旅館房間内使用該器件來存取或下載儲存於其家中 之個人音訊及/或視訊系統上之額外内容。即使攜帶型器 件位於家庭網路外，其仍為使用者之授權域之一部分。以 此方式’授權域（AD)或使用者域（UD)為允許藉由域中之器 件（但不藉由任何其他器件）對内容進行存取之系統。 授權域或使用者域需要解決諸如授權域識別或使用者域 識別、器件登入、器件登出、權利登入、權利登出、内容 登入、内容登出以及域管理之問題。關於對授權域等之使 用的更廣泛介紹’見荷蘭飛利浦研究院的保存在2002年9 月12-16處之IBC 2002會議出版物第467-474頁的S.A.F.A. van den Heuvel、W. Jonker、F.L.A.J. Kamperman、P.J. Lenoir 的"Secure Content Management in Authorized Domains’’ ° 在用於授權域或使用者域之某些架構中，域中之實體 (例如，器件）共用用以建立、存取及/或鑑認諸如可用於域 中之内容或許可證之物件（數位物件及權利物件）的對稱域 密鑰。一個實例為2006年3月3日的開放行動聯盟之DRM架 構之版本 2:核準版本 2.0 OMA-AD-DRM-V2_0-20060303-A，以下簡稱為OMA DRM v2。此文獻可在網際網路上於 member.openmobilealliance.org/ftp/public_documents/bac/ DLDRM/Permanent_documents/處得到且以引用的方式併入 本文獻中。在此等架構中，域密鑰之獲知為證明授權域或 131643.doc 200908740 使用者域之資格的方式。 數位物件可由為向使用者域發行數位物件之網路實體的 數位物件發行者（DOI)來發行。數位物件發行者（DOI)可在 將數位物件傳輸至使用者域中之器件之前將驗證符記（VT) 附加於數位物件。驗證符記為經配置以證明由域管理機構 對數位物件發行者（DOI)用於使用者域之授權的數位物 件。在Koster，P等人的（代理人案號PHNL 005802)之國際 專利申請案第 PCT/IB2007/05 1533 號”Methods to support the introduction of the Domain Issuer in OMA DRM” 中給出 此驗證符記之實例。驗證符記之一要素通常為其期滿曰。 可在授權域或使用者域中之器件之間複製及/或傳遞數 位物件。200908740 IX. INSTRUCTIONS: [Technical field to which the invention pertains] The present invention relates to providing an identification mark on a digital object in a first yak belonging to a user domain including a plurality of devices. method. The invention further relates to a method of processing a digital object (D〇) in a second device belonging to a user domain (UD) comprising a plurality of devices. Furthermore, the present invention relates to a system comprising a User Domain (UD) comprising a plurality of devices, a device included in a User Domain (UD) having a plurality of devices, and an authentication tag. [Prior Art] In recent years, the number of available content protection systems has rapidly increased. Some of these systems only protect content from unauthorized copying, while other systems limit the user's ability to access or use content. These systems are often referred to as digital rights management (DRM) systems. Consumers want to enjoy content without argument and with as few restrictions as possible. The consumer wants to use the network to enable different types of different applications and easily access $ within any type. It also allows you to share/deliver content in its home environment without restrictions. The concept of '', Authorized Domain (AD) or User Domain (UD) attempts to find a solution to serve both the content owner (who wants to protect their copyright) and the content consumer (who wants to use the content without restrictions) Benefits. The basic principle is a controlled network environment that uses content relatively self-contained as long as the content does not cross the boundaries of the authorized domain. Usually the 'authorized domain is centered on the home environment (also known as the network). 131643.doc 200908740 Of course, 'other contexts are also possible. Users can, for example, carry portable devices with limited content of audio and/or video when they travel, and use the device in their hotel rooms to save Take or download additional content stored on the personal audio and/or video system in the home. Even if the portable device is located outside the home network, it is still part of the user's authorized domain. In this way 'authorized domain (AD) Or a User Domain (UD) is a system that allows content to be accessed by devices in the domain (but not by any other device). The Authorized Domain or User Domain needs to be addressed, for example. Domain identification or user domain identification, device login, device logout, entitlement login, entitlement logout, content login, content logout, and domain management issues. A more extensive introduction to the use of authorized domains, etc. 'See Philips, the Netherlands The Institute's SAF van den Heuvel, W. Jonker, FLAJ Kamperman, and PJ Lenoir's "Secure Content Management in Authorized Domains'' were kept at the IBC 2002 conference publications at 12-16 September 2002. ° In some architectures used to authorize domains or user domains, entities (eg, devices) in the domain share objects that are used to establish, access, and/or authenticate content or licenses that are available for use in the domain ( Symmetric domain key for digital objects and rights objects. An example is version 2 of the DRM architecture of the Open Action Alliance on March 3, 2006: Approved Version 2.0 OMA-AD-DRM-V2_0-20060303-A, hereinafter referred to as OMA DRM v2. This document is available on the Internet at member.openmobilealliance.org/ftp/public_documents/bac/ DLDRM/Permanent_documents/ and is incorporated herein by reference. In such architectures, the knowledge of the domain key is the way to prove the eligibility of the Authorized Domain or the user domain of the 131643.doc 200908740. The digital object can be a Digital Object Issuer (DOI) of the network entity that issues digital objects to the user domain. The digital object issuer (DOI) can append a verification token (VT) to a digital object before transferring the digital object to a device in the user domain. The verification token is a digital object that is configured to prove that the domain authority has authorized the digital object issuer (DOI) for the user domain. This verification token is given in International Patent Application No. PCT/IB2007/05 1533 "Methods to support the introduction of the Domain Issuer in OMA DRM" by Koster, P. et al. (Attorney Docket No. PHNL 005802). Example. One element of the verification token is usually expired. Digital objects can be copied and/or transferred between devices in the authorized domain or user domain.

DeviceMAC為由使用者域中之器件藉由使用對稱域密鑰 計算的數位物件上之訊息鑑認碼（MAC)。在提供 DeviceMAC之前，獲取數位物件發行者（DOI)之數位物件 之器件驗證該驗證符記，且僅在驗證成功時提供 DeviceMAC。DeviceMAC用作向使用者域中之其他器件 (亦即，亦知曉域密鑰之器件）的證明，其證明附加於數位 物件之驗證符記在數位物件由使用者域中之器件獲取時有 效。因此，甚至在驗證符記到期之後，亦可在使用者域中 之器件當中分配具有附加之驗證符記及DeviceMAC之數位 物件。使用者域中之器件可接受用當前或先前域密鑰所計 算之DeviceMAC，使得DeviceMAC在更新域密鑰之後保持 有效。 131643.docThe DeviceMAC is a message authentication code (MAC) on a digital object calculated by a device in the user domain by using a symmetric domain key. Before the DeviceMAC is provided, the device that obtains the digital object issuer (DOI) digital object verifies the verification token and provides DeviceMAC only if the verification is successful. The DeviceMAC is used as proof of the other device in the user domain (i.e., the device that also knows the domain key), which proves that the verifier attached to the digital object is valid when the digital object is retrieved by the device in the user domain. Therefore, digital objects with additional verification tokens and DeviceMACs can be assigned among devices in the user domain even after the verification token expires. The device in the user domain can accept the DeviceMAC calculated with the current or previous domain key, so that the DeviceMAC remains valid after updating the domain key. 131643.doc

該器件需要檢查 200908740 若來自使用者域之一器件自使用者域經移除，則該器件 不會獲知已更新之域密鑰。然而，該器件仍可使用舊的域 密鑰為數位物件建構DeviceMAC且在帶外分配具有附加The device needs to be checked 200908740 If a device from a user domain is removed from the consumer domain, the device will not know the updated domain key. However, the device can still construct DeviceMAC for digital objects using the old domain key and have an add-on with out-of-band assignment

DeviceMAC之數位物件。因此，自使用者域移除之器件可 在無域管理機構之允許的情況下在使用者域中分配未經授 權之數位物件。此等非法數位物件不能與經合法獲取之數 位物件區因為藉由使用舊的域密输提供之DeviceMAC 亦為有效的。 OMA DRM v2建議提議藉由要求使用者域中之獲取器件 ㈣eviceMAC外計算DevieeSign :以心心从上具有其秘 密密鑰之簽名來對抗此威脅。此簽名將DeviceMAq及因 此之數位物件）鏈接至執行獲取之器件。域f理機構管理 :吏用者域之此方式可廢止疑似非法分配數位物件之已移除 器件。此方法具有下列缺點： •需要基礎結構來檢查料之廢止㈣，例如 列表。 每當一器件於帶外接收數位物件時 來源器件之廢止狀態。 廢止為停用自使用者域移除之器件之唯一方去 在已廢止-器件後，接著甚至其在廢止之前合法分配 ^㈣件對於接收了該等數位物件之其他域成員變 仔無效。 【發明内容】 本發明之一目 的在於提供保證可在一使 用者域中將數位 131643.doc 200908740 物件自一個器件傳搋5 __ 邈至另窃件且同時禁止自該使用者域 移除之器件非法分配其數位物件之-替代方式。此外，本 發月 目的在於提供藉由有效處理由—使用者域中之器 件共用之域密鑰之更新而鑑認數位物件之一方法。 此等目的及其他目的由一種在一數位物件(d〇)上提供一 鑑認標籤之方法來達成。該方法在_屬於—包含複數個器 件之使用者域（UD)H件巾進行，該使用者域（ud)中 之該等器件共用—共同對稱域密输（kd)。該方法包含：在 該第一器件中，建立該鑑認標籤之一第一部分及一第二部 分，其中該第—部分為藉由一不對稱密鑰對之一秘密密鑰 (sk)的該數位物件（D〇)上之一數位簽名且其中該第二部分 包含藉由使用關於該域密鑰（Kd)之資訊來促進該不對稱密 錄對之一公用密錄（pk)之鑑認的資訊。 藉由以該等上述兩個部分提供一鑑認標籤，該鑑認標籤 之該第一部分不因該域密鑰之更新改變，而該第二部分必 須由該域密鑰之更新來更新。因此，該方法提供在該域密 鑰之更新之狀況下的該鑑認標籤之一有效替換，因為待替 換之部分（亦即，該鑑認標籤之該第二部分）對於該使用者 域中之一器件之所有該等數位物件為相同的。在一第—器 件中之該域密鑰之獲知證明該使用者域之資格且使該第二 器件可能驗證可用以驗證該鑑認標籤之該第一部分中的該 數位簽名之該公用密鑰之確實性。 本發明之提供一鑑認標籤之該方法的優點在於：與上述 DeviceMAC相比，該方法提供離線儲存於（例如）一抽取式 131643.doc •10- 200908740 媒體（諸如，—緊宓伞 數衍铷也 )或數位通用光碟⑴VD))上之 數位物件的容易處理。對 "上之 由使用者Μ… 十於離線儲存之數位物件，不能在 新°器件共用的域密鑰之更新之狀況下直接再 新（亦即，更新）DeviceMAC。因此，使用 再 件在此數位物件之DeviceM /之-他器 件。實情為，數位物件之D 安裝該數位物 之已安妒了奴 咖靴應必須由使用者域中 id 件的器件來再新。此外，使用者域中之 其他域成員I之更新之後將鑑認標籤之第二部分傳輸至 其他域成員，使得離線儲存 首先被再新。 仵仍了被刀配而不必 將鑑認標籤之第-部分與第二部分固有地鍵接到—起， :為弟一邛分中之公用密鑰驗證第—部分中之簽名。此 ，：認標藏之第一部分與第二部分可藉由串聯方式鏈接 到一起。 饮 根據本發明，該第二部分中之該鑑認促進資訊包含借助 於錢密鑰加密之不對稱密鑰對之公用密鑰。因此，第— 器件之公用密鎗之鑑認可由知曉域密鑰之器件來檢查 此促進鑑認標籤之第—部分t之簽名的驗證。僅借助於= 用者域之域密鑰所建立之鑑認標籤可由為使用者域之成員 並因此知曉域㈣之器件來驗證。無論何時更新域密瑜， 均可對於所有數位物件更新鑑認標籤之第二部分，且藉此 僅知曉最近或已更新域密鑰藉此展示使用者域之資格㈣ 件能夠建立鑑認標籤。 °° 或者’該第二部分中之該鑑認促進資訊包含該不對稱密 131643.doc 200908740 錄對之公㈣鑰及藉由域密錄之公用密鑰上之訊息鑑認 碼。再次，第一器件之公用密鑰之鑑認可由知曉域密鑰之 器件來檢查，藉此促進鑑認標籤之第一部 證。僅借助於使用者域之域密鍮所建立之鑑認標== . 冑分的訊息鑑認碼可由為使用者域之成員並因此知曉域密 鑰之器件來驗證。再次，無論何時更新 •職數位物件更新㈣標藏之第二部分，且藉此僅= &或已更新域密鑰藉此展示使用者域之資格的器件能夠建 i 立鑑認標籤。 或者’該第二部分中之該鑑認促進資訊為包含不對稱密 鑰對之公用密鑰及第一器件所屬之使用者域之識別符 (D_inID)的驗證符記（VTdev)，使用者域之該識別符包 含關於域密鑰之資訊。因此，提供所提供之鑑認標籤之第 一器件藉由呈現一驗證符記（VTdev)來證明其使用者域之 資格，該驗證符記（VTDEV)為由管理使用者域之域管理機 y 構所發行之資格證書。此外，驗證符記提供第一器件之公 ^ 用密鑰之鑑認。在鑑認標籤之第一部分中，連同數位物二 上之簽名將使用者域之資格之此證明鏈接至數位物件。應 - 注意，使用者域之識別符（DomainID)可提供關於當前域密 鑰或當前域密鑰產生之資訊。在〇MA中，識別符 (DomainID)之最後三個數位指示域密鑰產生。 有利的是，驗證符記（VTdev)另外包含下列諸者中之— 或多者：驗證符記（VT)所屬之第一器件的實體類型之識別 符、驗證符記（VTDEV)之期滿日，及經配置以管理使用者 131643.doc 200908740 域之域管理機構（DA)之數位簽名。當驗證符記包含經配置 以管理使用者域之域管理機構之數位簽名時，第—器件之 公用密鑰可由驗證符記來認證，該驗證符記最初已由充當 由使用者域界定之系統之可信任方的域管理機構所發行。 .^括驗證符記之期滿日及/或第-器件之實體類型使得驗 s登符記之驗證更為安全。 有利的是’鐘認標籤之更新藉由僅更新該鑑認標籤之第 〇 ;部分來執行。此更新可(例如)在域密鑰之更新狀況下或 在器件之驗證符記到期時進行。 =，用於本發明之方法t的第一器件之不對稱密鑰 料=自信任機構之經認證之密鑰對。然而，不對稱密 機構供Γ可為由第―器件產生或由管理㈣者域之域管理 應之任意不對稱密餘對。此外，可在需要時更新第 :之不對稱密鑰對’因為鑑認標籤本 =對之公用密输之資訊，此資訊可為知曉域密雜: ϋ 使用者域之成員）的任何器件所用。 此外，應注意，術語"使用者垃”音4田1u 域密輸之實體之任竹心涵蓋共用共同對稱 .外，術語”數❹者域可為經授權域。此 利物件、數位内容(諸广：之數位物件’諸如權 遊戲)。内奋(老如’音樂、電影、TV節目、圖片、 本發明進一步提供—錄 用者域之第-哭含複數個器件之使 中之該等！：:Γ 數位物件之方法，該使用者域 、用—共同域密输。在該方法中，該數位物 131643.doc 200908740 件連同發行該數位物件之—數位物件發行者之_驗證符記 (VTD〇a該數位物件上之—鍍認標籤在該第二器件中接 收，該鑑認標藏具有一第一部分及一第二部分，該第一邙 分包含該數位物件(D0)上之一數位簽名且該第二部分包含 促進-不對稱密鑰對之公用密鑰之鐘認的資訊，該方法包 含下列步驟： _執行該驗證符記（VTD0I)是否有效之一第—檢查；Digital object of DeviceMAC. Therefore, devices removed from the user domain can assign unauthorised digital objects in the user domain without the permission of the domain administrator. These illegal digital objects cannot be valid with the legally obtained digital device area because the DeviceMAC is provided by using the old domain secret transmission. The OMA DRM v2 proposal proposes to combat DevieeSign by requiring the acquisition device in the user domain (4) EviceMAC to defend against this threat with a signature with its secret key in mind. This signature links DeviceMAq and hence the digital object to the device that performs the acquisition. Domain Management: This method of the user domain can abolish the removed device that is suspected of illegally distributing digital objects. This method has the following disadvantages: • The infrastructure is required to check for material abolition (4), such as a list. The aborted state of the source device whenever a device receives a digital object out of band. The only way to disable the device removed from the user domain is to abolish the device - and then even legally assign it before the abolition ^ (4) is invalid for other domain members that have received the digital object. SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION It is an object of the present invention to provide a device that guarantees that a digital 131643.doc 200908740 object can be transmitted from one device to another in a user domain while prohibiting removal from the user domain. An alternative way to illegally distribute its digital objects. In addition, the purpose of this month is to provide a method for authenticating digital objects by effectively processing updates to domain keys shared by devices in the user domain. These and other objects are achieved by a method of providing an identification tag on a digital object (d〇). The method is performed in a User Domain (UD) H-piece that contains a plurality of devices, and the devices in the user domain (ud) share a common symmetric domain secret (kd). The method includes, in the first device, establishing a first portion and a second portion of the authentication tag, wherein the first portion is the one of a secret key (sk) by an asymmetric key pair A digital signature on a digital object (D〇) and wherein the second portion includes the identification of a public secret record (pk) by using information about the domain key (Kd) to facilitate the asymmetric secret recording Information. By providing an authentication tag with the two portions, the first portion of the authentication tag is not changed by the update of the domain key, and the second portion must be updated by the update of the domain key. Therefore, the method provides for efficient replacement of one of the authentication tags in the case of an update of the domain key, since the portion to be replaced (ie, the second portion of the authentication tag) is for the user domain All of the digital objects of one device are identical. The knowledge of the domain key in a first device proves the eligibility of the user domain and enables the second device to verify that the public key of the digital signature in the first portion of the authentication tag is validated Authenticity. An advantage of the method of the present invention for providing an authentication tag is that the method provides offline storage, for example, a removable 131643.doc •10-200908740 media (such as - tight umbrella number derivative) compared to the DeviceMAC described above.铷 also) or digital universal disc (1) VD)) The digital object is easy to handle. For the user on the " on the digital object that is stored offline, the DeviceMAC cannot be directly renewed (ie, updated) with the update of the domain key shared by the new device. Therefore, use the DeviceM / - the other device in this digital object. The truth is that the digital device D installed the digital device has been installed and the slave shoe should be renewed by the id device in the user's domain. In addition, the update of the other domain members I in the user domain transfers the second portion of the authentication tag to other domain members, so that the offline storage is first renewed.仵 is still assigned by the knife without having to intrinsically key the first part of the authentication tag with the second part: the signature in the part of the public key verification in the middle of the class. Therefore, the first part and the second part of the identification can be linked together in series. According to the invention, the authentication promotion information in the second part comprises a public key of an asymmetric key pair encrypted by a money key. Therefore, the public device identification of the first device is verified by the device that knows the domain key to verify the signature of the first part t of the authentication tag. The authentication tag established only by means of the domain key of the = user domain can be verified by a device that is a member of the user domain and thus knows the domain (4). Whenever the domain is updated, the second part of the authentication tag can be updated for all digital objects, and thereby only knowing the recent or updated domain key to thereby display the eligibility of the user domain (4) can establish an authentication tag. The identification promotion information in the second part or the second part contains the public key (4) key and the message authentication code on the public key by the domain secret record. Again, the identification of the public key of the first device is checked by the device that knows the domain key, thereby facilitating the first authentication of the tag. The authentication code established only by means of the domain key of the user domain == . The message authentication code of the minute can be verified by the device that is a member of the user domain and thus knows the domain key. Again, whenever a new item is updated, the second part of the item is updated (4), and the device that only displays the domain of the user domain by means of the & or updated domain key can establish an authentication tag. Or 'the authentication promotion information in the second part is a verification key (VTdev) containing the public key of the asymmetric key pair and the identifier of the user domain to which the first device belongs (D_inID), the user domain This identifier contains information about the domain key. Therefore, the first device providing the provided authentication tag proves the qualification of its user domain by presenting a verification token (VTdev), which is the domain management machine y of the management user domain. Qualification certificate issued by the organization. In addition, the verification token provides authentication of the public key of the first device. In the first part of the authentication tag, along with the signature on the digital object 2, this certificate of eligibility for the user domain is linked to the digital object. Should - Note that the user domain identifier (DomainID) can provide information about the current domain key or current domain key generation. In 〇MA, the last three digits of the identifier (DomainID) indicate the domain key generation. Advantageously, the verification token (VTdev) additionally includes one or more of the following: an identifier of the entity type of the first device to which the verification token (VT) belongs, and an expiration date of the verification token (VTDEV) And a digital signature configured to manage the domain administrator (DA) of the user's 131643.doc 200908740 domain. When the verification token contains a digital signature of a domain authority configured to manage the user domain, the public key of the first device can be authenticated by a verifier that was originally served as a system defined by the user domain. Issued by the domain administrator of the trusted party. The date of expiration of the verification token and/or the entity type of the device - makes the verification of the verification of the signature more secure. Advantageously, the update of the 'clock identification tag' is performed by updating only the first part of the identification tag. This update can be done, for example, under the update of the domain key or when the device's verification token expires. =, asymmetric key material for the first device of method t of the present invention = authenticated key pair from the trust authority. However, the asymmetric secret mechanism supply can be any asymmetric pair that is generated by the first device or managed by the domain of the management (four) domain. In addition, the asymmetric key pair can be updated as needed. 'Because the authentication label is the publicly transmitted information, this information can be used by any device that knows the domain complexity: 成员 member of the user domain) . In addition, it should be noted that the term "user" is used to refer to the shared common symmetry. In addition, the term "number" can be an authorized domain. This object, digital content (Zhuguang: digital object such as the right game). Nei Fen (old as 'music, movies, TV programs, pictures, the present invention is further provided - the first part of the hiring domain - crying contains a number of devices!!: Γ method of digital objects, the user domain In the method, the digital object 131643.doc 200908740 together with the digital object issued by the digital object issuer _ verification token (VTD〇a on the digital object - the identification label Receiving in the second device, the authentication tag has a first portion and a second portion, the first component comprising a digital signature on the digital object (D0) and the second portion comprising a promotion-asymmetry The information of the key pair's public key, the method includes the following steps: _ Execute the verification token (VTD0I) is valid one of the first check;

Ο Y若該第一檢查揭示該驗證符記（VTD0I)無效，則執行由 该第二件自其接收該數位物件之該使用者域中的一第一 裔件所提供之鑑認標籤是否有效之—第二檢查，其中該第 二檢查包含藉由使用關於該域密鍮之資訊來檢查該鑑認標 籤之該第二部分；及 _若該第一檢查或該第二檢查揭示一有效驗證符記 (VTD0I)或一有效鑑認標籤，則安裝該數位物件。 該方法提供用以在可驗證該驗證符記或該鑑認標籤之狀 況下安裝該數位物件之一安裝程序。藉由對該驗證符記執 行一第一檢查且僅在一無效驗證符記之狀況下執行該第二 檢查，可在該驗證符記仍有效時安裝該數位内容。僅當該 驗證符記無效時（諸如，在已超過其期滿曰時），執行該第 二檢查。此提供處理連同一驗證符記及一鑑認標籤接收之 數位物件之一有效且安全的方法，僅為該使用者域（UD)之 成員之器件獲知該域密鑰（KD)且因此僅此等域成員能夠建 立該鑑認標籤。因此，該鑑認標籤之該第二部分保證該第 一器件之該公用密鑰之確實性。 131643.doc -14- 200908740 應注意，針對驗證符記（VTd〇i)之有效性的第—檢查可勺 括檢查驗證符記（VTdoi)之期滿日及κ〇之版本。此夕^，= ’主思術4第-器件”意謂表示6提供連同數位物件及驗 證符記傳輸之鑑認標籤之器件。第—器件可能已自使If the first check reveals that the verification token (VTD0I) is invalid, then whether the authentication label provided by a first person in the user domain from which the second piece receives the digital object is valid is valid. a second check, wherein the second check comprises checking the second portion of the authentication tag by using information about the domain key; and _if the first check or the second check reveals a valid verification The token (VTD0I) or a valid authentication label is installed for the digit object. The method provides an installer for installing the digital object in a condition that the verification token or the authentication tag can be verified. By performing a first check on the verification token and performing the second inspection only in the case of an invalid verification token, the digital content can be installed while the verification token is still valid. This second check is performed only if the verification token is invalid (such as when its expiration has expired). This provides an efficient and secure method of processing one of the digital objects received by the same authentication token and an authentication tag, only the device key (KD) is known to the device of the user domain (UD) and therefore only The domain member can establish the authentication tag. Therefore, the second portion of the authentication tag assures the authenticity of the public key of the first device. 131643.doc -14- 200908740 It should be noted that the first check for the validity of the verification token (VTd〇i) may include the expiration date of the verification verification token (VTdoi) and the version of κ〇. This eve ^, = '主思思4第-device" means that the device provides a means of identification along with the digital object and the verification symbol. The first device may have

域外之數位物件發行者獲得數位物件或其可能已自使用者 域中之另—器件接收了數位物件。術語,,第二器件”意謂表 示已自使用者域中之另-器件連同驗證符記聽認標=接 收了數位物件之器件。術語，，安裝數位物件"意謂表示保存 或儲存數位物件用於立即或隨後之使用或執行。數位物件 可為由權利發行者⑽提供之一權利物件（R〇)，該權利物 件指定與-件刪内容（諸如，一首音樂、一部電影等）相 關聯之允許及約束。在該種狀況下，DRM内容在無相關聯 之權利物件（RO)的情況下可能不被使用。 在根據本發明之方法之實施例中，執行第二檢查之步驟 包含： -檢查不對稱密鑰對之公用密鑰(pk)是否可借助於域密 鑰（KD)來鑑認； _若該鑑認成功，則借助於第-器件之該公用密鑰㈣ 來驗證鑑認標籤之第一部分中之簽名。因A，使用者域之 第一器件及第二器件之資格藉由該等器件對域密鑰之獲知 來證明’因為僅知曉域密鑰之器件能夠建立鑑認標籤。 在根據本發明之方法之實施例中，不對稱密料之公用 密鑰之檢i包含藉由使用域密錄來解密經加密之公用密 鑰。因此’第一 |§件之公用密鑰之鑑認可在第二器件知曉 131643.doc -15- 200908740 域密鑰時由第二器件檢查，藉 中之簽名的驗證。僅借助於使 認標籤可由為使用者域之成員 解密。 此促進鑑認標籤之第一部分 用者域之域密鑰所建立之鑑 並因此知曉域密鑰之器件來An out-of-domain digital object issuer obtains a digital object or it may have received a digital object from another device in the user domain. The term "second device" means a device that has been received from another device in the user domain along with a verifier acknowledgment = a device that has received a digital object. The term "installing a digital object" means saving or storing a digit. The item is for immediate or subsequent use or execution. The digital item may be one of the rights item (R〇) provided by the rights issuer (10), the right item specifying the piece of content (such as a piece of music, a movie, etc.) Corresponding permission and constraint. In this case, the DRM content may not be used without an associated rights object (RO). In an embodiment of the method according to the invention, the step of performing the second check Including: - checking whether the public key (pk) of the asymmetric key pair can be authenticated by means of a domain key (KD); _if the authentication is successful, by means of the public key (four) of the first device Verifying the signature in the first part of the authentication label. Because A, the qualification of the first device and the second device of the user domain is evidenced by the knowledge of the domain key by the device. 'Because only the device that knows the domain key can Establish identification label In an embodiment of the method according to the invention, the detection of the public key of the asymmetric secret contains the decryption of the encrypted public key by using the domain secret. Therefore, the public key of the first | It is recognized that the second device checks the signature of the signature when the second device knows the 131643.doc -15-200908740 domain key. The identification can only be decrypted by the member of the user domain. The first part of the tag is established by the domain key of the user domain and thus knows the device of the domain key.

在減本發明之方法之替代實施例中，不對稱”對之 公用密錄之檢查包含藉由使用域密鎗來驗證公用密餘上之 訊息鑑認碼。再次，第—器件之公㈣餘之鑑認可在第二 器件知曉域密鑰時由第二器件檢查，藉此促進鑑認標鐵之 第-部分中之簽名的驗證。僅借助於使用者域之域密输所 建立的鑑認標籤之第二部分之訊息鑑認碼可由為使用者域 之成員並因此知曉域密鑰之器件來驗證。 在根據本發明之方法之又—替代實施例中，不對稱密錄 對之公用密鑰之檢查包含驗證鑑認標籤之第二部分中之一 驗證符記（vtdev)，該驗證符記（VTdev)包含不對稱密鑰對 之公用密鑰。因此，第二器件可藉由檢查驗證符記 (VTDEV)來檢查使用者域之第一器件之資格’該驗證符記 (VTDEV)為由管理使用者域之域管理機構所發行之資格證 書。此外，驗證符記提供第一器件之公用密鑰之鑑認。且 在另一實施例中，該方法可包含下列步驟： _若第一檢查與第二檢查均未揭示有效驗證符記（vtd()1) 或有效鑑認標籤，則向經配置以管理使用者域（UD)之域管 理機構（DA)諮詢數位物件發行者（D〇I)或該第二器件自其 接收該數位物件（DO)之使用者域（UD)中之該第一器件的授 權。因此，使用者域之資格之證明可由域管理機構（例如 131643.doc 200908740 ::驗證符記之形式提供。域管理機構可因此檢查證書狀 恶，且域中之器件可在此方面信任域管理機構。In an alternative embodiment of the method of the present invention, the "asymmetric" check of the public secret record comprises verifying the message authentication code on the public secret by using a domain secret gun. Again, the first (four) of the first device The identification is verified by the second device when the second device knows the domain key, thereby facilitating the verification of the signature in the first part of the identification target. The authentication established only by means of the domain domain of the user domain The message authentication code of the second part of the tag can be verified by a device that is a member of the user domain and thus knows the domain key. In an alternative embodiment of the method according to the invention, the asymmetric secret record pair is publicly secreted. The key check includes a verification token (vtdev) in the second part of the verification token, the verification token (VTdev) containing the public key of the asymmetric key pair. Therefore, the second device can be verified by inspection The VTDEV is used to check the qualification of the first device of the user domain. The verification token (VTDEV) is a qualification certificate issued by the domain management authority of the management user domain. In addition, the verification token provides the first device. Public key authentication. And in another embodiment, the method may comprise the following steps: _ if both the first check and the second check do not reveal a valid verification token (vtd()1) or a valid authentication tag, then configured to manage use The domain authority (DA) of the domain (UD) consults the digital object issuer (D〇I) or the first device in the user domain (UD) from which the second device receives the digital object (DO) Authorization. Therefore, the eligibility of the user domain can be provided by the domain authority (for example, 131643.doc 200908740::Verification). The domain authority can therefore check the certificate and the devices in the domain can trust in this regard. Domain management agency.

根據本發明之方法可進—步包含用借助於由第二器件執 =如請求们之方法所提供的另—鑑認標籤替換該鑑認 才示戴。因此，當-第二器件接收具有—鑑認標籤之一數位 ^件時1器件檢查該標籤，在檢查成功時安裝該數位物 另一標藏。此另一標藏由第二器件之不對稱密鑰 — 使用者域中之每—器件具有不對稱密鑰對之秘 推密鑰1此另-鑑認標籤對於第二器件為特定的且借助 於第二器件之秘密密鑰來準備。 本發月另外係關於-種包含一包含複數個器件之使用者 域之系統，該使用者域中之該等器件共用一共同域密鑰， i系統另外包含一經配置以管理該使用者域之域管理機構 及一經配置以向該使用者域中之器件發行數位物件之數位 件U者，5亥系統中之該等器件中之每一者經組態用 以： 藉由建立一鑑認標籤之一第一部分及一第二部分而在 -數位物件上提供該鑑認標籤，其中該第—部分為藉由一 不對稱密鑰對之秘密密鑰的該數位物件上之一數位簽名且 其中該第二部分包含促進該不對稱密鑰對之公用密鑰之鑑 認的資訊。 —在該系統之一實施例中，該使用者域中之該等器件中之 母一者經配置以檢查一數位物件上之一鑑認標籤，且若該 檢查成功則安裝該數位物件。 131643.doc 17 200908740 本發明另外係關於一種包含於一具有複數個器件之使用 者域中之器件，該使用者域中之該等器件共用—共同域密 鑰’該器件經組態用以： -藉由建立一鑑認標籤之一第一部分及一第二部分而在 一數位物件上提供該鑑認標籤，其中該第一部分為藉由一 不對稱密鑰對之秘密密鑰的該數位物件上之一數位簽名且 其中該第二部分包含促進該不對稱密鑰 行也；對之公用密鑰之鑑 認的資訊。The method according to the invention further comprises the step of replacing the authentication with the aid of a further authentication label provided by the method of the second device. Thus, when the second device receives a digit with one of the authentication tags, the device checks the tag and installs the tag another tag when the check is successful. This further labeling the asymmetric key of the second device - each in the user domain - has an asymmetric key pair secret key 1 which is specific to the second device and Prepare for the secret key of the second device. The present disclosure additionally relates to a system comprising a user domain comprising a plurality of devices, the devices in the user domain sharing a common domain key, and the i system additionally includes a configuration to manage the user domain. A domain authority and each of the devices configured to issue digital objects to devices in the user domain, each of the devices in the 5H system configured to: establish a authentication tag a first part and a second part providing the authentication tag on the digital object, wherein the first part is a digital signature on the digital object by a secret key of an asymmetric key pair and wherein The second part contains information that facilitates the authentication of the public key of the asymmetric key pair. - In one embodiment of the system, one of the devices in the user domain is configured to check one of the identification tags on a digital object and install the digital object if the check is successful. 131643.doc 17 200908740 The invention further relates to a device included in a user domain having a plurality of devices, the devices in the user domain sharing a common domain key 'the device is configured to: Providing the authentication tag on a digital object by establishing a first part and a second part of an authentication tag, wherein the first part is the digital object by a secret key of an asymmetric key pair One of the upper digit signatures and wherein the second portion contains information that facilitates the identification of the asymmetric key line;

U 在-實施例中，根據本發明之該器件進—步經配置以檢 查一數位物件上之一鑑認標籤’且若該檢查成功則安裝該 數位物件。 本發明另外係關於一種包含一第一部分及一第二部分之 鑑認標籤，其中該卜部分為藉由—不對稱密鑰對之:秘 密密鑰的一數位物件上之一數位簽名且其中該第二部分包 含促進該不對稱密鑰對之公用密鑰之鑑認的資訊。刀 【實施方式】 圖1展示-系統1〇〇，該系統100包含—域管理機構 ⑴Α)、-數位物件發行者(D0I)及—包含複數個器件 (DEVi、DEV2、DEV3)之使用者域（UD)。在圖上中僅展示 三個器件；然而，使用者域（UD)可包含另—數目之器件。 該等器件（DEW DEV2 ; DEV3)中之每—者包含—麵代 理程式（DRM1 ; DRM2 ; DRM3)，該Drm代理程式 (DRM1 ; DRM2 ; DRM3)通常實施為執行於所討論之^牛 上之軟體組件。在圖艸所示之系統中，域營理機構與數 131643.doc •18- 200908740 位物件發行者（DOI)相比為獨立器件；然而，可將兩個器 件整合為一個器件。使用者域（UD)之器件（DEV1、 DEV2、DEV3)可經由一網路（未圖示）互連且可（例如）為收 音機、調諧器/解碼器、CD播放器、一對揚聲器、電視、 VCR、數位記錄器、行動電話、磁帶組、個人電腦、個人 數位助理、攜帶型顯示單元、汽車娛樂系統等。此等器件 通常經互連以允許一個器件（例如，電視）控制另一器件（例 如，VCR)。在一些實施例中，一個器件（諸如，調諧器/解 碼器或視訊轉接器（STB))作為中央器件操作，從而提供對 其他器件之中央控制。 數位物件可包含内容，通常為音樂、歌曲、電影、權利 物件、動晝、語音、音樂之視訊片段、TV節目、圖片、 遊戲、鈐聲、有聲圖書及其類似物。 該等器件可使用基地台（未圖示）（例如，使用藍芽或 IEEE 802. lib)無線地或使用習知有線連接而連接至網路。 為允許器件（DEVI、DEV2、DEV3)相互作用，可利用若干 互用性標準，該等標準允許不同器件交換訊息及資訊並相 互控制。一個熟知標準為通用隨插即用標準 (http://www.upnp.org) 〇 系統100可經設置以較佳根據OMA DRM v2標準或其後 繼而藉由作為授權域（AD)操作來管理對於内容之存取。 域管理機構（DA)為（例如）藉由添加及移除DRM代理程式 而管理使用者域（UD)之網路實體。其向使用者域（UD)之器 件中之DRM代理程式（DRM1 ; DRM2 ; DRM3)提供對稱域 131643.doc -19- 200908740 密鑰（kd)。可在必要時更新域密鑰（kd)。另外，域管理機 構（DA)可藉由向數位物件發行者（DOI)提供使用者域上下 文（UDC)而授權數位物件發行者DOI向使用者域中之器件 發行數位物件（DO)。使用者域上下文（UDC)由多樣化域密 錄K_Di及驗證符記（VT)組成。多樣化域密錄（K_Di)待由數位 物件發行者用以保護數位物件（DO)。多樣化域密鑰（KDi)經 計算為域密鑰KD及數位物件發行者（DIO)之公用密鑰之單 向函數，使得使用者域（UD)中之器件（DEVI ; DEV2 ; 1 ' DEV3)之DRM代理程式（DRM1 ; DRM2 ; DRM3)可計算多 樣化域密鑰（KDi)。然而，數位權利發行者（DOI)不能自多 樣化域密錄（K〇i)計异域密錄（Κ〇) ’因此域密錄（Kd)保持為 秘密的。 驗證符記（VT)證明由域管理機構（DA)對數位物件發行者 (DOI)用於域使用之授權。驗證符記（VT)可含有數位物件 發行者之公用密鑰、期滿日及域管理機構（DA)之簽名。然 ,, 而，有利的是，驗證符記另外包含驗證符記（VT)所屬之實U In an embodiment, the device according to the invention is further configured to inspect one of the identification tags on a digital object and to install the digital object if the inspection is successful. The invention further relates to an authentication tag comprising a first part and a second part, wherein the part is a digital signature on a digital object of the secret key by means of an asymmetric key pair and wherein the The second part contains information that facilitates the authentication of the public key of the asymmetric key pair. Knives [Embodiment] FIG. 1 shows a system 1 comprising a domain management organization (1), a digital object issuer (D0I), and a user domain including a plurality of devices (DEVi, DEV2, DEV3). (UD). Only three devices are shown in the figure; however, the user domain (UD) may contain another number of devices. Each of these devices (DEW DEV2; DEV3) includes a face agent (DRM1; DRM2; DRM3), which is typically implemented to execute on the discussed Software component. In the system shown in Figure 域, the domain manager is a separate device compared to the number of object publishers (DOIs); however, the two devices can be combined into one device. The user domain (UD) devices (DEV1, DEV2, DEV3) may be interconnected via a network (not shown) and may, for example, be a radio, tuner/decoder, CD player, pair of speakers, television , VCR, digital recorders, mobile phones, tape sets, personal computers, personal digital assistants, portable display units, car entertainment systems, etc. These devices are typically interconnected to allow one device (e. g., a television) to control another device (e. g., a VCR). In some embodiments, a device, such as a tuner/decoder or video adapter (STB), operates as a central device to provide central control of other devices. Digital objects can contain content, typically music, songs, movies, rights objects, animations, voice, music video clips, TV shows, pictures, games, buzz, audio books, and the like. The devices can be connected to the network wirelessly using a base station (not shown) (e.g., using Bluetooth or IEEE 802. lib) or using conventional wired connections. To allow devices (DEVI, DEV2, DEV3) to interact, several interoperability standards can be utilized that allow different devices to exchange messages and information and control each other. A well-known standard is the Universal Plug and Play standard (http://www.upnp.org). The system 100 can be configured to manage according to the OMA DRM v2 standard or its succession as an Authorized Domain (AD) operation. Access to content. The Domain Authority (DA) manages the User Domain (UD) network entities, for example, by adding and removing DRM Agents. It provides a symmetric domain 131643.doc -19- 200908740 key (kd) to the DRM agent (DRM1; DRM2; DRM3) in the user domain (UD) device. The domain key (kd) can be updated as necessary. In addition, the Domain Authority (DA) can authorize the digital object issuer DOI to issue digital objects (DOs) to devices in the user domain by providing a User Domain Context (UDC) to the Digital Object Issuer (DOI). The User Domain Context (UDC) consists of the Diversified Domain Directory K_Di and the Verifier (VT). The Diversified Domain Directory (K_Di) is used by digital object issuers to protect digital objects (DO). The diversified domain key (KDi) is calculated as a one-way function of the domain key KD and the public key of the digital object issuer (DIO), such that the device in the user domain (UD) (DEVI; DEV2; 1 'DEV3) The DRM agent (DRM1; DRM2; DRM3) calculates the Diversified Domain Key (KDi). However, the Digital Rights Issuer (DOI) cannot self-differentiate the domain secret record (K〇i) and the domain secret record (Kd) remains secret. The Certificate of Authenticity (VT) proves that the Domain Authority (DA) authorizes the Digital Object Issuer (DOI) for domain use. The verification token (VT) may contain the number of the issuer's public key, the expiration date, and the signature of the domain authority (DA). However, and, advantageously, the verification token additionally contains the verification token (VT)

U 體類型（此處為數位物件發行者（DOI))以及使用者域之識別 符（DomainID)。藉由包括實體類型，可處理用於除數位物 - 件發行者外之其他實體（諸如，區域權利管理者及DRM代 理程式）之驗證符記（VT)。藉由包括使用者域之識別符， 驗證符記變為域特定的。在OMA中，DomainID之最後三 個數位指示當前域密鑰產生。此意謂，在域密鑰（KD)之更 新之狀況下，驗證符記（VT)變得無效且域管理機構（DA)必 須分配新的驗證符記。此因以下解釋之原因而為有益特 131643.doc -20- 200908740 性。此外，該特性幾乎不降低效率，因為域密鑰（kd)之更 新通常為不常發生之事件，且無論何時其確實發生，域管 理機構（DA)需要與數位物件發行者（DOI)相互作用以按任 何方式發送新的多樣化域密鑰（KDi)。因此，此處VT經建 構為：VT=·{實體類型，期滿曰，公用密鑰，Domain ID， DA簽名}， 其中DA簽名為在所有先前項上計算之域管理機構（DA)之 簽名。顯而易見，域管理機構（DA)對於其希望針對某一使 用者域而授權之每一數位物件發行者（DOI)產生不同的多 樣化域密鑰（KDi)及驗證符記（VT)。 數位物件發行者（DOI)為向使用者域（UD)發行數位物件 (DO)之網路實體。為此目的，數位物件發行者（DOI)需要 含有未到期之驗證符記（VT)及多樣化域密鑰（KDi)之最近產 生的最新使用者域上下文（UDC)。數位物件發行者（DOI)用 多樣化域密鑰（KDi)加密數位物件（DO)之機密部分，藉由其 秘密密鑰簽名於數位物件（DO)，且附上自域管理機構（DA) 接收之驗證符記（VT)。 器件（DEVI、DEV2、DEV3)中之每一者之DRM代理程式 (DRM1 ; DRM2 ; DRM3)為能夠評估數位物件（DO)之使用 者控制器件。數位物件發行者（DOI)可為權利發行者（RI)， 經發行之數位物件（DO)為權利物件（RO)。權利物件指定與 一件内容相關聯之允許及約束，（例如）内容是否可予以再 現、複製、具使用時間限制等。内容發行者（未圖示）可使 内容（歌曲、電影等）以受保護形式（在OM A之狀況下為 131643.doc -21 · 200908740 "DRM内容”）為使用者域（UD)中之器件所用。為存取内 容’接收内容之器件需要由權利發行者（RI)提供之權利物 件（RO)。RO 2 12之提供可與内容之提供同時發生，但此並 非必要。舉例而言，器件可在某一時間獲取内容且稍後購 買權利物件以存取彼内容。或者，一器件可獲取一權利物 件且稍後僅獲取該權利物件應用之内容。 在OMA DRM中’權利物件（R〇)為指定與一件drm内容 相關聯之允許及約束的XML文件。DRM内容不可在無相關 聯之權利物件（RO)的情況下使用，且僅可根據權利物件 (RO)中所指定之允許及約束來使用。權利物件（R〇)含有再 現實際内容所需之權利表述及密鍮。借助於一組稱為 ROAP之協定來指定R〇獲取、器件登記及域管理。 器件（DEVI、DEV2、DEV3)之 DRM代理程式（DRM1 ; DRM2 ; DRM3)確保附著權利物件（R〇)中所指定之允許及 約束。借助於域密鑰將權利物件（RO)以密碼方式結合至使 用者域中之器件’使得知曉域密鑰之任何DRM代理程式 (DRM1 ; DRM2 ; DRM3)可使用權利物件（R〇)。 注意，内容發行者與權利發行者可為同一實體。在OMA 術語中，此實體又被稱為内容分配器。 當使用者域（UD)中之器件已自權利發行者（數位物件發 行者（DOI))獲取權利物件（數位物件（DO))，器件（DEV1 ; DEV2 ; DEV3)之 DRM代理程式（DRM1 ; DRM2 ; DRM3)藉 由檢查域管理機構（DA)之期滿日及簽名來驗證驗證符記 (VT)。此外，DRM代理程式（DRM1 ; DRM2 ; DRM3)檢查 131643.doc -22- 200908740 權利物件（RO)是否具有有效RI簽名且是否係藉由最新多樣 化域密鑰（KDi)建立。若所有檢查均通過，則DRM代理程 式（DRM1 ; DRM2 ; DRM3)接受權利物件（RO)且計算標 籤。 迄今，已知計算稱為DeviceMAC之標藏。DeviceMAC經 配置以用作向其他DRM代理程式之證明，其證明驗證符記 (VT)在RO獲取時有效。以此方式，甚至在驗證符記（VT) 已到期之後亦可在DRM代理程式當中帶外分配RO。DRM 代理程式接受藉由當前或先前域密鑰所計算之 DeviceMAC，使得其甚至在域密鑰更新之後亦保持有效。 域管理機構（DA)具有兩種方式來停止RI功能性。第一種方 式為停止提供新的驗證符記，因此RI在其當前驗證符記 (VT)到期之後不再能夠發行新的權利物件（RO)。第二種方 式為在不向權利發行者（RI)提供相應最新多樣化域密鑰之 情況下執行域密錄更新。此域密錄更新直接排除彼特殊權 利發行者（RI)，但亦保持與所有DRM代理程式及剩餘權利 發行者（RI)之相互作用。 圖2展示一包含一域管理機構（DA)及一輸入器件2 1 0之系 統200。輸入器件（2 10)為由下列兩個組件組成之使用者控 制器件：區域權利管理者（LRM)及DRM代理程式 (DRM1)。此等組件模仿自權利發行者之RO獲取。區域權 利管理者（LRM)需要來自域管理機構（DA)之一使用者域上 下文（UDC)，該使用者域上下文（UDC)由多樣化域密鑰 (KDi)及驗證符記（VT)(將實體類型設於區域權利管理者 131643.doc -23 - 200908740 (LRM))組成。類似於權利發行者，區域權利管理者（LRM) 使用該使用者域上下文（UDC)之多樣化域密鑰（KDi)及驗證 符記（VT)來計算權利物件（RO)。輸入器件（210)之DRM代 理程式（DRM1)已加入使用者域（UD)並已獲取域密鑰 (KD)。輸入器件（210)之DRM代理程式（DRM1)可檢查權利 物件（RO)及驗證符記（VT)且附上標籤。現可帶外直接分配 權利物件。與自權利發行者（RI)獲取權利物件（RO)之DRM 代理程式的差異在於兩個實體包含於同一器件（輸入器件 (210))中。 此外，系統200包含一包含複數個器件（DEV2、DEV3)之 使用者域（UD)。輸入器件210之DRM代理程式（DRM1)已加 入使用者域（UD)。除輸入器件210之DRM代理程式（DRM1) 外，在使用者域（UD)中僅展示兩個器件（DEV2、DEV3); 然而，使用者域（UD)可包含另一數目之器件。器件 (DEV2、DEV3)中之每一者包含一 DRM代理程式（DRM2 ; DRM3)，該DRM代理程式（DRM2 ; DRM3)通常實施為執行 於所討論之器件上之軟體組件。在圖2中所示之系統中， 域管理機構（DA)為與區域權利管理者（LRM)分離之器件。 域管理機構（DA)為（例如）藉由添加及移除DRM代理程式而 管理使用者域（UD)之網路實體。域管理機構（DA)向使用者 域（UD)中之DRM代理程式（亦即，輸入器件210中之DRM代 理程式（DRM1)及使用者域（UD)之器件（DEV2 ; DEV3)中之 DRM代理程式（DRM2 ; DRM3))提供對稱域密鑰（KD)。可 在需要時更新域密鑰（KD)。另外，域管理機構（DA)可藉由 131643.doc -24- 200908740 向區域權利管理者（LRM)提供使用者域上下文（UDC)而授 權區域權利管理者（LRM)向使用者域（UD)中之器件並向輸 入器件210之DRM代理程式發行數位物件（RO)。使用者域 上下文（UDC)由多樣化域密鑰KDi及驗證符記（VT)組成。多 樣化域密鑰（KDi)待由區域權利管理者（LRM)用以保護數位 物件（DO)。多樣化域密鑰（KDi)經計算為域密鑰KD及區域 權利管理者（LRM)之公用密鑰之單向函數，使得使用者域 (UD)中之DRM代理程式（DRM1、DRM2、DRM3)可計算多 樣化域密鑰（KDi)。然而，區域權利管理者（LRM)不能自多 樣化域密錄（K〇i)計异域密錄（Kd) ’因此域密錄（Kd)保持為 秘密的。 關於包含域管理機構（DA)、數位物件發行者（DOI)或區 域權利管理者（LRM)以及DRM代理程式之OMA架構來給出 關於圖1及圖2所述之例示性實施例。在下文中，數位物件 (DO)為權利物件（RO)且數位物件發行者（DOI)為權利發行 者（RI)。應注意，本發明不限於OMA架構，而可在由共用 共同對稱密鑰之實體之群組所形成的任何使用者域中使 用。此外，本發明不限於權利物件（RO)，而可用於任何數 位物件。 在圖1及圖2中所示之域管理機構（DA)與權利發行者 (RI)(圖1)或與區域權利管理者（LRM)(圖2)之間的分離引起 以下問題。帶外接收權利物件（RO)之DRM代理程式不能檢 查發行者（亦即，RI或LRM)是否在獲取時經授權。對此問 題之一般解決方案為獲取DRM代理程式將一新的要素（亦 131643.doc -25 - 200908740 即，一標籤）添加於權利物件（RO)。此標籤用以向其他 DRM代理程式（帶外接收RO)證明：RO由使用者域（UD)之 符合成員獲取。此又使接收DRM代理程式確信：R〇係自 經授權RI或LRM合法獲取。 上述DeviceMAC為此種標籤。然而，DeviceMAC遭受以 下安全性威脅。考慮已自使用者域移除並因此不知曉最新 域密鑰（KD)之一 DRM代理程式。該DRM代理程式仍可用舊 的域抗输建構用於一 RO之有效DeviceMAC且帶外分配該 C") RO。以此方式，已移除之DRM代理程式可能與未經授權 之發行者（RI或LRM)串通以在無DA之允許的情況下於使用 者域中分配RO。不能將此等非法r〇與合法獲取之r〇區 分’因為來自舊的域密錄之DeviceMAC亦為有效的。注 意，將LRM組件與DRM代理程式組件兩者併入單一使用者 控制器件（見圖2之（2 10))中之輸入器件的引入使此串通攻 擊更加有可能。 〇 針對DeviceMAC之不同解決方案可為以下方案。在域密 鑰更新之狀況下，域中之DRM代理程式再新其所有尺〇之The U body type (here the Digital Object Issuer (DOI)) and the user domain identifier (DomainID). By including the entity type, the verification token (VT) for other entities other than the digital issuer (such as the regional rights manager and the DRM agent) can be processed. By including the identifier of the user domain, the verification token becomes domain specific. In OMA, the last three digits of the DomainID indicate the current domain key generation. This means that in the case of an update of the domain key (KD), the verification token (VT) becomes invalid and the domain authority (DA) must allocate a new verification token. This is useful for the reasons explained below. 131643.doc -20- 200908740 Sex. In addition, this feature hardly reduces efficiency because the update of the domain key (kd) is usually an infrequent event, and the domain authority (DA) needs to interact with the digital object issuer (DOI) whenever it does occur. To send a new diversified domain key (KDi) in any way. Therefore, VT is constructed here as: VT=·{entity type, expiration, public key, domain ID, DA signature}, where the DA signature is the signature of the domain authority (DA) calculated on all previous items. . It will be apparent that the domain authority (DA) generates different multi-domain keys (KDi) and verification tokens (VT) for each digital object issuer (DOI) that it wishes to authorize for a particular user domain. A Digital Object Issuer (DOI) is a network entity that issues digital objects (DOs) to a User Domain (UD). To this end, the Digital Object Issuer (DOI) needs to have the most recent User Domain Context (UDC) of the Unexpired Verifier (VT) and Diversified Domain Key (KDi). The Digital Object Issuer (DOI) encrypts the secret portion of the digital object (DO) with the Diversified Domain Key (KDi), with its secret key signed to the digital object (DO), and attaches a self-domain authority (DA) Received verification token (VT). The DRM agent (DRM1; DRM2; DRM3) of each of the devices (DEVI, DEV2, DEV3) is a user control device capable of evaluating digital objects (DO). The Digital Object Issuer (DOI) may be a Rights Issuer (RI), and the issued Digital Object (DO) is a Rights Object (RO). A rights object specifies the permissions and constraints associated with a piece of content, such as whether the content can be reproduced, copied, time-limited, and so on. The content issuer (not shown) may make the content (song, movie, etc.) in a protected form (131643.doc -21 · 200908740 "DRM content in the case of OM A) as the user domain (UD) The device used to access the content 'receiving content' requires a rights object (RO) provided by the rights issuer (RI). The provision of RO 2 12 may coincide with the provision of the content, but this is not necessary. The device may acquire the content at a certain time and later purchase the rights object to access the content. Alternatively, a device may acquire a rights object and later obtain only the content of the rights object application. In OMA DRM, the right object ( R〇) An XML file specifying the permissions and constraints associated with a piece of drm content. DRM content may not be used without an associated rights object (RO) and may only be specified in the rights object (RO) Permissions and Constraints are used. Rights objects (R〇) contain the rights representation and key required to reproduce the actual content. R〇 acquisition, device registration, and domain management are specified by a set of agreements called ROAP. The DRM agent (DRM1; DRM2; DRM3) of I, DEV2, DEV3) ensures the permissions and constraints specified in the attached rights object (R〇). The rights object (RO) is cryptographically combined with the help of the domain key. The device in the domain 'allows any DRM agent (DRM1; DRM2; DRM3) that knows the domain key to use the rights object (R〇). Note that the content issuer and the rights issuer can be the same entity. In OMA terminology This entity is also known as a content allocator. When a device in a user domain (UD) has obtained a rights object (digital object (DO)) from a rights issuer (Digital Object Issuer (DOI)), the device (DEV1; The DRM agent (DRM1; DRM2; DRM3) of DEV2; DEV3) verifies the verification token (VT) by checking the expiration date and signature of the domain authority (DA). In addition, the DRM agent (DRM1; DRM2; DRM3) Check 131643.doc -22- 200908740 Whether the right object (RO) has a valid RI signature and is established by the latest diversified domain key (KDi). If all checks pass, then the DRM agent (DRM1; DRM2; DRM3) accepts the right object (RO) and counts Labels So far, the calculation is known as the label of DeviceMAC. DeviceMAC is configured to be used as proof to other DRM agents, which proves that the verification token (VT) is valid at the time of RO acquisition. In this way, even in the verification character After the expiration (VT) has expired, the RO can also be allocated out of the DRM agent. The DRM agent accepts the DeviceMAC calculated by the current or previous domain key so that it remains valid even after the domain key is updated. The Domain Authority (DA) has two ways to stop RI functionality. The first method is to stop providing a new verification token, so the RI can no longer issue a new entitlement (RO) after its current verification token (VT) expires. The second method is to perform a domain cryptographic update without providing the rights issuer (RI) with the corresponding latest multiplex domain key. This domain secret update directly excludes the Special Rights Issuer (RI), but also maintains interaction with all DRM Agents and Residual Rights Issuers (RI). 2 shows a system 200 including a domain management mechanism (DA) and an input device 210. The input device (2 10) is a user control device consisting of two components: a regional rights manager (LRM) and a DRM agent (DRM1). These components are modeled after the RO of the rights issuer. The Regional Rights Manager (LRM) requires a User Domain Context (UDC) from a Domain Authority (DA) that is composed of a Diversified Domain Key (KDi) and a Verifier (VT) ( The entity type is composed of the regional rights manager 131643.doc -23 - 200908740 (LRM). Similar to the rights issuer, the regional rights manager (LRM) uses the user domain context (UDC) diversified domain key (KDi) and the verification token (VT) to calculate the rights object (RO). The DRM agent (DRM1) of the input device (210) has been added to the user domain (UD) and the domain key (KD) has been acquired. The DRM agent (DRM1) of the input device (210) can check the rights object (RO) and the verification token (VT) and attach the label. Rights objects can now be distributed directly outside the band. The difference from the DRM agent that acquires the rights object (RO) from the rights issuer (RI) is that the two entities are included in the same device (input device (210)). In addition, system 200 includes a user domain (UD) that includes a plurality of devices (DEV2, DEV3). The DRM Agent (DRM1) of input device 210 has been added to the User Domain (UD). In addition to the DRM agent (DRM1) of the input device 210, only two devices (DEV2, DEV3) are shown in the user domain (UD); however, the user domain (UD) may contain another number of devices. Each of the devices (DEV2, DEV3) includes a DRM agent (DRM2; DRM3), which is typically implemented as a software component executing on the device in question. In the system shown in Figure 2, the Domain Authority (DA) is a device that is separate from the Regional Rights Manager (LRM). The Domain Authority (DA) is a network entity that manages User Domains (UDs), for example, by adding and removing DRM Agents. The DRM of the domain authority (DA) to the DRM agent in the user domain (UD) (ie, the DRM agent (DRM1) in the input device 210 and the device (DEV2; DEV3) in the user domain (UD) The agent (DRM2; DRM3) provides a symmetric domain key (KD). The domain key (KD) can be updated as needed. In addition, the Domain Authority (DA) may authorize the Regional Rights Manager (LRM) to the User Domain (UD) by providing the User Rights Context (UDC) to the Regional Rights Manager (LRM) by 131643.doc -24- 200908740 The device in the middle and issues a digital object (RO) to the DRM agent of the input device 210. The User Domain Context (UDC) consists of a Diversified Domain Key KDi and a Verifier Symbol (VT). The multi-domain key (KDi) is to be used by the Regional Rights Manager (LRM) to protect digital objects (DOs). The diversified domain key (KDi) is calculated as a one-way function of the domain key KD and the public key of the regional rights manager (LRM), such that the DRM agent (DRM1, DRM2, DRM3) in the user domain (UD) ) The diversified domain key (KDi) can be calculated. However, the Regional Rights Manager (LRM) cannot keep the domain secret record (K〇i) from the foreign record (Kd) so the domain secret record (Kd) remains secret. An exemplary embodiment is described with respect to Figures 1 and 2 with respect to an OMA architecture including a Domain Authority (DA), Digital Object Distributor (DOI) or Regional Rights Manager (LRM), and DRM Agent. In the following, a digital object (DO) is a rights object (RO) and a digital object issuer (DOI) is a rights issuer (RI). It should be noted that the present invention is not limited to the OMA architecture, but can be used in any user domain formed by a group of entities sharing a common symmetric key. Moreover, the invention is not limited to the right object (RO), but can be used for any number of objects. The separation between the domain authority (DA) and the rights issuer (RI) (Fig. 1) or the regional rights manager (LRM) (Fig. 2) shown in Figs. 1 and 2 causes the following problems. A DRM agent that receives an entitlement object (RO) out of band cannot check whether the issuer (i.e., RI or LRM) is authorized at the time of acquisition. The general solution to this problem is to add a new element (also known as a label) to the rights object (RO). This tag is used to prove to other DRM agents (out-of-band RO) that the RO is obtained by a compliant member of the User Domain (UD). This in turn convinced the receiving DRM agent that the R is legally obtained from the authorized RI or LRM. The above DeviceMAC is such a tag. However, DeviceMAC suffers from the following security threats. Consider a DRM agent that has been removed from the user domain and is therefore not aware of the latest domain key (KD). The DRM agent can still use the old domain anti-transport to construct a valid DeviceMAC for an RO and to allocate the C" RO. In this way, the removed DRM agent may be colluded with an unauthorized issuer (RI or LRM) to distribute the RO in the user domain without the permission of the DA. It is not possible to distinguish such illegal r〇 from legally acquired r' because DeviceMAC from the old domain secret record is also valid. Note that the introduction of an input device incorporating both the LRM component and the DRM agent component into a single user control device (see Figure 2 (2 10)) makes this collusion attack more likely.不同 The different solutions for DeviceMAC can be the following solutions. In the case of domain key update, the DRM agent in the domain re-creates all its dimensions.

DeviceMAC，亦即，對於每一尺〇藉由新的域密鑰計算再 斤eviceMAC。接著僅依據當前域密鑰之DeviceMAc被接 受，從而消除由具有舊的域密鑰之前面成員給出之DeviceMAC, that is, for each size, is calculated by the new domain key. Then only the DeviceMAc of the current domain key is accepted, thereby eliminating the fact that it is given by the previous member with the old domain key.

DevlceMAC偽造的威脅。，然巾，缺點為每當密錄更新發生 2必須重新計算所有R〇之DeviceMAC的不便。此外，可 能將R〇儲存於抽取式媒體上，此使其DeviceMAC之直接 更新不可能。 I31643.doc •26- 200908740 本發明建議如結合圖3至圖5之描述而在下文中描述的與 DeviceMAC相比之替代標籤。 、 圖3為根據本發明之一第一方法1〇之流程圖。該方法開 始於步則且繼續至步驟12，其中建立根據本發明之 • 藏。可如在以下實例i至實例3中之任_者中所描述來建二 並檢查s亥標籤。該方法結束於步驟13。 實例1 : 實例1之標籤（Τ^1)由藉由器件（MV1)(見圖！或圖2)之 DRM代理程式之秘密密鑰（sk)的數位物件⑴〇)上之一簽名 組成，該簽名與藉由域密鑰（Kd)之DRM代理程式之公用密 餘（pk)的對稱加密串聯：DevlceMAC forged threats. However, the disadvantage is that whenever the secret record update occurs, it is necessary to recalculate the inconvenience of all R〇's DeviceMAC. In addition, it is possible to store R〇 on removable media, which makes direct updating of DeviceMAC impossible. I31643.doc • 26- 200908740 The present invention proposes an alternative tag as compared to DeviceMAC as described below in connection with the description of Figures 3 to 5. FIG. 3 is a flow chart of a first method 1 according to the present invention. The method begins at step and continues to step 12 where a build in accordance with the present invention is established. The s-label can be built and checked as described in any of the following examples i to 3. The method ends at step 13. Example 1: The tag of Example 1 (Τ^1) consists of one of the signatures on the digital object (1) of the secret key (sk) of the DRM agent of the device (MV1) (see Figure! or Figure 2). The signature is concatenated with the symmetric encryption of the public secret (pk) of the DRM agent by the domain key (Kd):

Tag\ 二 SIGNsk(DO)\\ENCKD[pk)。 為檢查Tagl，使用者域（UD)中之器件中的另一器件 (DEV2)(見圖丨或圖2)中之接收DRM代理程式使用最新域密 输（kd)解密皿c^(M)，且使用所得公用密瑜（pk)來驗證數 〇 位物件（D0)上之簽名。此檢查僅在⑽藉由當前域密输 (kd)而建立時成功。接收DRM代理程式（dev2中）可用其自 身標籤替換Tagl，亦即，DEV2之DRM代理程式藉由其自 身秘密密鑰（sk)簽名於數位物件（D〇)並附上其公用密鑰之 加密。在域密鑰更新之狀況下，DRM代理程式僅需再新加 密部分餅‘㈣，該加密部分册⑽對於其所有標鐵 為同等的。為DO特定之簽名保持不變。標鐵之加密部分 證明域密鑰（KD)之獲知並因此證明域資格。藉由簽名將此 資格證明鏈接至特定數位物件p〇)。 131643.doc -27- 200908740 實例2 : 實例2之標籤（Tag2)由藉由DRM代理程式之秘密密鑰（sk) 的數位物件（DO)上之一簽名組成，該簽名與相應公用密鑰 (pk)及藉由域密鑰（KD)之公用密鑰（pk)上之MAC串聯：Tag\ II SIGNsk(DO)\\ENCKD[pk). To check Tagl, the receiving DRM agent in another device (DEV2) in the device in the user domain (UD) (see Figure 丨 or Figure 2) uses the latest domain secret (kd) to decrypt the dish c^(M) And use the resulting public secret (pk) to verify the signature on the digital object (D0). This check is only successful when (10) is established by the current domain secret (kd). The receiving DRM agent (in dev2) can replace Tagl with its own tag, that is, the DRM agent of DEV2 is signed by the personal secret key (sk) to the digital object (D〇) and attached with the encryption of its public key. . In the case of domain key update, the DRM agent only needs to re-encrypt the partial pie ‘(4), which is equivalent for all its standard irons. The signature specific to the DO remains unchanged. The encrypted portion of the standard proves the knowledge of the domain key (KD) and thus the domain qualification. Link this qualification certificate to a specific digital object by signing). 131643.doc -27- 200908740 Example 2: The tag of instance 2 (Tag2) consists of one of the signatures on the digital object (DO) of the secret key (sk) of the DRM agent, the signature and the corresponding public key ( Pk) and MAC concatenation on the public key (pk) by domain key (KD):

Tag2 = SIGNsk(DO)\\ pk \\ MACKD(pk)。 為檢查Tag2，器件（DEV2)(見圖1或圖2)中之一接收DRM 代理程式藉由當前域密鑰（KD)驗證公用密鑰（pk)上之 MAC。若MAC正確，則該接收DRM代理程式使用公用密 鑰（pk)來驗證簽名。接收DRM代理程式（圖1及圖2中之 DEV2)用其自身標籤替換Tag2，亦即，DRM代理程式藉由 其自身秘密密鑰簽名於數位物件（DO)並附上其公用密鑰 (pk)及藉由域密鑰（KD)之公用密鑰（pk)上之MAC。當更新 域密錄（KD)時，DRM代理程式僅需再新訊息鑑認碼 ，該訊息鑑認碼對於其所有標籤為同 等的。為DO特定之簽名保持不變。MAC展示域密鑰（KD) 之獲知並因此證明域資格。藉由簽名將此資格證明鏈接至 特定數位物件（DO)。 實例3 : 實例3之標籤（Tag3)由藉由DRM代理程式之秘密密鑰（sk) 的數位物件（DO)上之一數位簽名組成。在此實例中，借助 於由域管理機構（DA)(見圖1或圖2)發行之驗證符記（VTDEV) 來認證相應公用密鑰（pk)。此驗證符記（VTDEV)具有如上所 述之五項，其中實體類型現指示驗證符記（VTDEV)屬於器 件（DEV1)(見圖1或圖2)之DRM代理程式。Tag3接著經定義 131643.doc -28 - 200908740 如下：Tag2 = SIGNsk(DO)\\ pk \\ MACKD(pk). To check Tag2, one of the devices (DEV2) (see Figure 1 or Figure 2) receives the DRM agent to verify the MAC on the public key (pk) by the current domain key (KD). If the MAC is correct, the receiving DRM agent uses the public key (pk) to verify the signature. Receiving the DRM agent (DEV2 in Figures 1 and 2) replaces Tag2 with its own tag, that is, the DRM agent signs the digital object (DO) with its own secret key and attaches its public key (pk) And the MAC on the public key (pk) by the domain key (KD). When updating the domain secret record (KD), the DRM agent only needs to re-new the message authentication code, which is the same for all its tags. The signature specific to the DO remains unchanged. The MAC displays the domain key (KD) knowledge and thus proves domain eligibility. Link this qualification to a specific digital object (DO) by signing. Example 3: The tag of Example 3 (Tag3) consists of a digital signature on a digital object (DO) of the secret key (sk) of the DRM agent. In this example, the corresponding public key (pk) is authenticated by means of a verification token (VTDEV) issued by a domain authority (DA) (see Figure 1 or Figure 2). This verification token (VTDEV) has five items as described above, where the entity type now indicates that the verification token (VTDEV) belongs to the DRM agent of the device (DEV1) (see Figure 1 or Figure 2). Tag3 is then defined as 131643.doc -28 - 200908740 as follows:

Tag3 = SIGNsk{DO)\\VTDEV ° 為檢查Tag3，器件（DEV2)(見圖1或圖2)之接收DRM代理 程式藉由驗證期滿日、域密鑰產生及DA之簽名來驗證驗 證符記（VTDEV)。若驗證符記（VTDEV)有效，則使用所含公 用密鑰（pk)來驗證數位物件（DO)上之簽名。在安裝數位物 件（DO)後，器件（DEV2)之接收DRM代理程式即用其自身 標籤替換Tag3。無論何時驗證符記到期（因為域密鑰更 新，或因為達到期滿日），均需要將其替換。便利的是， 標籤（Tag3)之簽名部分保持不變。Tag3 = SIGNsk{DO)\\VTDEV ° To check Tag3, the receiving DRM agent of the device (DEV2) (see Figure 1 or Figure 2) verifies the verifier by verifying the expiration date, domain key generation, and DA signature. Remember (VTDEV). If the verification token (VTDEV) is valid, the public key (pk) is used to verify the signature on the digital object (DO). After installing the digital object (DO), the receiving DRM agent of the device (DEV2) replaces Tag3 with its own label. Whenever the verification token expires (because the domain key is updated, or because the expiration date is reached), it needs to be replaced. Conveniently, the signature portion of the tag (Tag3) remains unchanged.

Tag3於證明域資格之方式上在概念上與Tagl及Tag2不 同。亦即，代替證明域密鑰（KD)之獲知，DRM代理程式現 呈現其驗證符記（V T D E V ) ’該驗證符記（V T D E V )為由D A發行 之資格證書。除資格證明外，此驗證符記（VTDEV)提供 DRM代理程式之公用密鑰（pk)之鑑認。連同數位物件（DO) 上之簽名，此將資格證明鏈接至數位物件（DO)。 圖4為在屬於使用者域之第二器件（DEV2)中處理數位物 件（DO)的根據本發明之一方法20之流程圖。方法20應在屬 於一包含複數個器件（DEVI、DEV2、DEV3)之使用者域 (UD)之第二器件（DEV2)中執行，該使用者域（UD)中之該 等器件共用一共同域密鑰（KD)。數位物件（DO)連同發行數 位物件（DO)之數位物件發行者（DOI)之一驗證符記（VTD0I) 及數位物件（DO)上之一鑑認標籤（Tag)在該第二器件 (DEV2)中被接收，該鑑認標籤（Tag)具有一第一部分及一 131643.doc -29- 200908740 第二部分，該第二部分包含促進不對稱密鑰對之公用密鑰 (pk)之鑑認的資訊。 方法20開始於步驟21且繼續至步驟22，其中執行第一檢 查，亦即驗證符記（VTd01)*否有效之檢查。若數位物件發 行者（D〇I)之驗證符記（VTd〇i)有效，則方法繼續至步驟 24，其中安裝數位物件（DO)。方法結束於步驟29。 若步驟22之檢查揭示驗證符記（VTd〇i)無效，則方法繼續 至步驟23，其甲執行由該第二器件（刪2)自其接收該數位 物件（DO)之該使用者域（UD)中之第一器件（DEvi)所提供 的鑑認標籤（Tag)是否有效之第二檢查。在步驟23中執行之 第二檢查包含藉由使用關於域密輪（Kd)之資訊檢查鐘認標 籤之第二部分且驗證鑑認標籤之第一部分中之簽名。若步 驟23之檢查揭示有效鑑認標籤（Tag)，則方法繼續至安裝數 位物件（DO)之步驟24,且結束於步驟29〇否則，方法自步 驟2 3繼續至結束方法之步驟2 9 ^ G 目5為在屬於使用者域之第二器件（DEV2)中處理數位物 件（DO)的根據本發明之__方法3()之流程圖。方法之步驟 31至步驟33對應於方法2G之步驟21至步驟23 ;方法3〇之步 • 冑35及步驟39對應於方法2G之步驟24及步驟29。此處將不 _ 再進Y詳細描述此等相應步驟。若方法3 〇之步驟3 3中之 檢查揭不有效鑑認標籤（Tag)，則方法3〇繼續至安裝數位物 件（DO)之v驟3 5，並結束於步驟3 9。否則，方法自步驟33 繼續至步驟34，在步驟34中諮詢域管理機構（DA)。域管理 機構(DA)經配置以針對數位物件發行者⑴〇ι)或該第二器 131643.doc •30- 200908740 件（DEV2)自其接收該數位物件（D〇)之使用者域（UD)中之 該第一器件（DE V1)的授權來管理使用者域（ud)。若步驟 34中之域管理機構提供數位物件發行者（D〇I)或第一器件 (DEV1)(其為用以向第二器件（DEV2)提供數位物件（D〇)之 來源器件）之授權’則方法繼續至步驟35且隨後繼續至步 驟39。否則，方法自步驟34直接進行至結束方法之步驟 39。 應注意’圖4之方法20之步驟22、23中的檢查及圖5之方 法3 0之步驟3 2及3 3中的檢查可如結合上述實例1至3所描 述。 所有建議之Tag(亦即Tagl、Tag2及Tag3)使用數位簽名。 一般地，簽名不僅鑑認訊息而且鑑認發源站。然而，重要 的是’將數位物件提供至另一器件之發源站器件是否為使 用者域之成員。即使可能陳述數位簽名之使用對於實際應 用而§可能為過重工具（overly heavy tool)，但其具有使得 可能避免與證明公用密鑰之確實性並將此密鑰識別為屬於 特定DRM代理程式之證書的爭論。實情為，所使用之公用 Φ鑰屬於一些（未指定）域成員（亦即，使用者域中之器件） 的簡單證明提供所需等級之鑑認：獲取DRM代理程式之域 資格。該等Tag在其證明此資格之方式上不同： • Tagl包括公用密鑰之加密’藉此屐示域密錄（kd)之獲 知。 • Tag2包括公用密鑰上之訊息鑑認碼（mac)，藉此展示 域密鑰（KD)之獲知。 131643.doc 200908740 • Tag3呈現驗證符記（VTDEV)，藉此展示由域管理機構 (DA)進行之授權。 以上描述表明DRM代理程式甚至無需使用其官方、經認 證之密鑰對，而可使用任意密鑰對。此密鑰對可由DRM代 理程式自身產生或由域管理機構（DA)供應，且可在需要時 加以更新。 標籤Tagl之優點在於域密鑰之使用限於其所欲目的，亦 即加密。Tagl之另一優點在於向外屏蔽公用密鑰，此自隱 私性觀點而言可能為較佳的。Tag3 is conceptually different from Tagl and Tag2 in the way it proves domain qualification. That is, instead of obtaining the proof of the domain key (KD), the DRM agent now presents its verification token (V T D E V )' This verification token (V T D E V ) is a qualification issued by D A . In addition to the qualification certificate, this verification token (VTDEV) provides authentication of the public key (pk) of the DRM agent. Together with the signature on the digital object (DO), this links the qualification certificate to the digital object (DO). 4 is a flow diagram of a method 20 in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention for processing digital objects (DOs) in a second device (DEV2) belonging to a user domain. Method 20 should be performed in a second device (DEV2) belonging to a user domain (UD) comprising a plurality of devices (DEVI, DEV2, DEV3), the devices in the user domain (UD) sharing a common domain Key (KD). The digital object (DO) together with the digital object issuer (DOI) one of the digital object issuer (DOI) verification token (VTD0I) and the digital object (DO) on one of the identification tags (Tag) in the second device (DEV2) Received, the authentication tag (Tag) has a first part and a second part of 131643.doc -29-200908740, the second part contains the authentication of the public key (pk) for promoting the asymmetric key pair Information. The method 20 begins at step 21 and continues to step 22 where a first check is performed, i.e., a check is verified (VTd01)* is valid. If the verification token (VTd〇i) of the digital object issuer (D〇I) is valid, the method continues to step 24 where a digital object (DO) is installed. The method ends at step 29. If the check in step 22 reveals that the verification token (VTd〇i) is invalid, then the method continues to step 23, where A executes the user field from which the second device (deleted 2) receives the digital object (DO) ( A second check of whether the identification tag (Tag) provided by the first device (DEvi) in UD) is valid. The second check performed in step 23 includes checking the second portion of the clock tag and verifying the signature in the first portion of the authentication tag by using information about the domain pin (Kd). If the check in step 23 reveals a valid identification tag (Tag), then the method continues to step 24 of installing the digital object (DO) and ends at step 29, otherwise, the method continues from step 2 3 to step 2 9 of the end method. G is a flowchart of __method 3() according to the present invention for processing digital objects (DO) in a second device (DEV2) belonging to the user domain. Steps 31 through 33 of the method correspond to steps 21 through 23 of method 2G; steps of method 3: steps 35 and 39 correspond to steps 24 and 29 of method 2G. These corresponding steps will not be described in detail here. If the check in step 3 of method 3 揭 does not validate the tag, then method 3 continues to install v (3) of the digital object (DO) and ends at step 39. Otherwise, the method continues from step 33 to step 34 where the domain authority (DA) is consulted. The domain authority (DA) is configured to receive the user domain of the digital object (D〇) from the digital object issuer (1) )ι) or the second device 131643.doc • 30- 200908740 (DEV2) The authorization of the first device (DE V1) to manage the user domain (ud). If the domain management mechanism in step 34 provides a digital object issuer (D〇I) or a first device (DEV1), which is a source device for providing a digital device (D〇) to the second device (DEV2) 'The method then continues to step 35 and then proceeds to step 39. Otherwise, the method proceeds directly from step 34 to step 39 of the end method. It should be noted that the inspections in steps 22, 23 of method 20 of Figure 4 and the steps 3 2 and 3 in the method of Figure 5 can be as described in connection with Examples 1 through 3 above. All suggested tags (ie Tagl, Tag2 and Tag3) use digital signatures. In general, the signature not only identifies the message but also identifies the originating station. However, it is important that the source device that provides the digital object to another device is a member of the user domain. Even though it may be stated that the use of a digital signature may be an overly heavy tool for practical applications, it has a certificate that makes it possible to avoid and prove the authenticity of the public key and identify the key as belonging to a particular DRM agent. Controversy. The truth is that the public Φ key used is a simple proof of some (unspecified) domain members (ie, devices in the user domain) that provide the required level of authentication: the domain qualification for the DRM agent. These tags differ in the way they prove this qualification: • Tagl includes the encryption of the public key' to indicate the knowledge of the domain secret record (kd). • Tag2 includes the message authentication code (mac) on the public key to show the knowledge of the domain key (KD). 131643.doc 200908740 • Tag3 presents a verification token (VTDEV) to demonstrate authorization by a domain authority (DA). The above description indicates that the DRM agent does not even need to use its official, authenticated key pair, but can use any key pair. This key pair can be generated by the DRM Agent itself or by a Domain Authority (DA) and can be updated as needed. The advantage of the tag Tagl is that the use of the domain key is limited to its intended purpose, i.e., encryption. Another advantage of Tagl is that it shields the public key from the outside, which may be preferable from a privacy perspective.

關於Tag3，所使用之公用密鑰由D A發行之驗證符記 (VTdev)”認證”。此驗證符記（VT D E V )僅保證密输之所有者 為域成員，且可因此將其視作由域管理機構（DA)發行之 ”輕量級證書”，域管理機構（DA)充當由使用者域（UD)界定 之系統之可信任方。 應注意，標籤之三個實例可良好相容。在允許每一類型 之Tag之狀況下，一 DRM代理程式可藉由五、 或VT(其中任一者均最佳適合該DRM代理程式） 來鑑認簽名部分*S7GA^(i?0)。 如上所解釋，已知的不可更新之DeviceMAC(由於舊的 域密鑰亦接受其）為不安全的，因為其允許已移除DRM代 理程式保持將數位物件（DO)分配至域中之器件。已知的可 更新DeviceMAC(僅由於新的域密鑰接受其）為與DRM代理 程式無關的，因此接收DRM代理程式可便利地保持連同數 位物件（DO)之其接收之DeviceMAC。然而，在域密錄更新 131643.doc -32- 200908740 之狀況下，DRM代理程式必須針對其所有數位物件（d〇)重 新計算DeviceMAC。即使訊息鑑認碼為有效對稱技術，此 重新計算在DRM代理程式具有許多數位物件（D⑺時亦可為 大量工作。此外，存在關於離線儲存（例如，儲存於抽取 式媒體上）之數位物件（DO)之問題’由於此問題而不能直 • 接再新DeviceMAC。因此，其他DRM代理程式因其陳舊之Regarding Tag3, the public key used is certified by the certificate issued by D A (VTdev). This verification token (VT DEV ) only guarantees that the owner of the secret is a domain member and can therefore be treated as a "lightweight certificate" issued by a domain authority (DA), acting as a domain authority (DA) A trusted party to the system defined by the User Domain (UD). It should be noted that the three examples of labels are well compatible. In the case where each type of tag is allowed, a DRM agent can authenticate the signature portion *S7GA^(i?0) by five, or VT, either of which is best suited to the DRM agent. As explained above, the known non-updatable DeviceMAC (which is also accepted by the old domain key) is unsafe because it allows the removed DRM agent to keep distributing digital objects (DOs) to devices in the domain. The known updateable DeviceMAC (accepted only by the new domain key) is independent of the DRM agent, so the receiving DRM agent can conveniently maintain the DeviceMAC along with the digital object (DO) it receives. However, in the case of domain secret update 131643.doc -32- 200908740, the DRM agent must recalculate DeviceMAC for all its digital objects (d〇). Even if the message authentication code is a valid symmetric technique, this recalculation can be a lot of work when the DRM agent has many digital objects (D(7). In addition, there are digital objects for offline storage (for example, stored on removable media) ( DO)'s problem 'Because of this problem, it is not possible to connect to the new DeviceMAC. Therefore, other DRM agents are obsolete.

DeviceMAC而不能安裝此R0。實情為，該等其他d讀代 〇 理程式之DeviceMAC首先必須由已安裝了 RO之DRM代理 程式再新。 與已知DevieeMAC：相反，對於本㈣之建議的鑑認標 藏’接收DRM代絲式始、終需要#由以其秘密密輪㈣簽 名於數位物件（DO)來建立新的器件特定鑑認標藏。即使數 位簽名之建立為相對昂貴之操作，但本發明之方法為有利 的，原因是此等鑑認標籤在密鑰更新狀況下之再新非常有 效，因為待替換之部分（亦即，加密、mac或ντ)對於 u DRM代理程式之所有標籤而言為相同的。此亦意謂可在域 密鑰（KD)之更新之後將此可變部分（亦即，鑑認標籤之第二 部分）發送至其他域成員。因此，仍可在不必首先再新離 . 線儲存之數位物件之情況下對其進行分配。或者，接收 DRM代理程式可自域管理機構(DA)而非自來源代理 矛主式（DEV 1之DRM)請求此資訊。 如上所解釋，歸Tagl&Tag2巾之簽名之密鑰對不必為 DRM代理程式之經認證之密鑰對，而可為隨機密輸對。域 管理機構(DA)可藉由藉助於驗證符記來認證此密鑰對而充 131643.doc -33- 200908740 當信任中心，因為DRM代理程式固有地信任域管理機構 (DA)且DRM代理程式關注彼此之域資格而非彼此之準確身 份。因此，可避免經認證之密鑰對之使用及關於證書及廢 止列表之相應不便。 以上描述亦適用於權利物件及數位物件之發行者（例 如，權利發行者（RI)及區域權利管理者（LRM))。gp，DRM 代理程式無需知曉發行者之準確身份；其僅希望被保證其 經域管理機構（DA)授權用於域使用。驗證符記（VT)證明此 授權。當域管理機構（DA)在其向一發行者提供驗證符記 (VT)之前檢查該發行者之證書狀態時，DRM代理程式不必 再次進行此操作。因此，可將證書檢查之不便自DRM代理 程式卸至域管理機構（DA)，藉此減少DRM代理程式之責任 及工作負荷。最終，DRM代理程式不再需要RI或LRM上下 文來獲取權利物件（RO)或數位物件（DO)。此意謂經授權之 發行者可使用任何機制（例如，帶外分配）而非要求正式協 定（諸如，ROAP)來向成員DRM代理程式發行權利物件 (RO)或數位物件（DO)。 應注意，貫穿此說明書，表述不對稱密鑰對意謂表示一 對密碼密鑰，亦即公用密鑰（pk)及秘密密鑰（sk)。亦可將 秘密密鑰表示為''私有密鑰’'。秘密密鑰經秘密保持，而公 用密鑰可經廣泛分配。該等密鑰在數學上相關，但私有密 鑰不能得自公用密鑰。藉助於秘密密鑰簽名之數位物件可 僅藉由相應公用密鑰來驗證。反之，對稱密碼學對於加密 與解密兩者或對於建立及/或驗證訊息鑑認碼（MAC)使用單 131643.doc •34- 200908740 一對稱密输（在&說明書中域密鑰為此密餘) ，且熟習 之範疇的 此外’應注意上述實施例說明而非限制本發明 此項技術者將能夠在不脫離附加之申請專利範圍 情況下設計許多替代實施例。 在申請專利範圍中，不應將置於圓括號之間的任 符號理解為限制請求項。詞"包含"不排除除在請求項中所 列出以外的元件❹驟之存b在元件之前㈣”一"不排 除複數個此等元件之存在。本發明可借助於包含若干相里 元件之硬體來實施’且可藉助於經適合程式化之電腦來實 施0 在列舉若干構件之裝置項中，此等構件中之若干構件可 由硬體之同一項目來實施。僅僅在相互不同附屬項中陳述 某i方法之事實並不指不此等方法之組合不可有利地加以 使用。 【圖式簡單說明】 圖1及圖2為根據本發明之系統的圖； 圖3為在一數位物件（D0)上提供鑑認標籤的根據本發明 之一方法10之流程圖；及 圖4及圖5為在屬於使用者域（UD)之第二器件（DE V2)中 處理數位物件（DO)的根據本發明之方法2〇、3 〇之流程圖。 【主要元件符號說明】 10 第一方法 20 方法 30 方法 131643.doc 200908740 100 系統 200 糸統 210 輸入器件 DA 域管理機構 DEVI 器件 DEV2 器件 DEV3 器件 DO 數位物件 DOI 數位物件發行者 DRM1 DRM代理程式 DRM2 DRM代理程式 DRM3 DRM代理程式 KD 對稱域密鑰 KDi 多樣化域密鑰 LRM 區域權利管理者 VT 驗證符記 UD 使用者域 UDC 使用者域上下文 131643.doc -36-DeviceMAC cannot install this R0. The fact is that the DeviceMAC of these other D-processing programs must first be renewed by the DRM agent that has RO installed. Contrary to the known DevieeMAC: In contrast to the proposed identification of the (4), the 'received DRM generation, the final need # is signed by the secret secret wheel (four) to the digital object (DO) to establish a new device-specific identification. Standard. Even though the establishment of a digital signature is a relatively expensive operation, the method of the present invention is advantageous because such authentication tags are very effective in renewing the key update condition because of the portion to be replaced (ie, encryption, Mac or ντ) is the same for all tags of the u DRM agent. This also means that the variable portion (i.e., the second portion of the authentication tag) can be sent to other domain members after the domain key (KD) is updated. Therefore, it is still possible to distribute the digital objects without having to first re-route them. Alternatively, the receiving DRM agent may request this information from the domain authority (DA) rather than from the source agent (DRM of DEV 1). As explained above, the key pair of the signature of the Tagl&Tag2 towel does not have to be an authenticated key pair of the DRM agent, but may be a random key pair. The Domain Authority (DA) can authenticate the key pair by means of a verification token to charge 131643.doc -33- 200908740 as a trust center because the DRM agent inherently trusts the domain authority (DA) and the DRM agent Focus on each other's domain qualifications rather than the exact identity of each other. Therefore, the use of the certified key pair and the corresponding inconvenience regarding the certificate and the abolition list can be avoided. The above description also applies to rights objects and issuers of digital objects (for example, Rights Issuer (RI) and Regional Rights Manager (LRM)). Gp, the DRM agent does not need to know the exact identity of the publisher; it only wants to be guaranteed to be authorized by the domain authority (DA) for domain use. The verification token (VT) proves this authorization. When the domain authority (DA) checks the issuer's certificate status before it provides a verification token (VT) to an issuer, the DRM agent does not have to do this again. Therefore, the inconvenience of certificate checking can be discharged from the DRM agent to the domain management organization (DA), thereby reducing the responsibility and workload of the DRM agent. Ultimately, the DRM agent no longer needs RI or LRM context to obtain a rights object (RO) or a digital object (DO). This means that an authorized issuer can use any mechanism (e.g., out-of-band allocation) rather than requiring a formal agreement (such as ROAP) to issue a rights object (RO) or digital object (DO) to a member DRM agent. It should be noted that throughout this specification, the expression of an asymmetric key pair means a pair of cryptographic keys, i.e., a public key (pk) and a secret key (sk). The secret key can also be expressed as ''private key''. The secret key is kept secret and the public key can be widely distributed. These keys are mathematically related, but private keys cannot be obtained from public keys. A digital object signed by means of a secret key can be verified only by the corresponding public key. Conversely, symmetric cryptography uses both cryptography and decryption for the establishment and/or verification of message authentication codes (MACs). 131841.doc • 34- 200908740 A symmetric key (in the & Further, and in addition to the scope of the invention, it is to be understood that those skilled in the art will be able to devise many alternative embodiments without departing from the scope of the appended claims. In the scope of the patent application, the symbol placed between the parentheses should not be construed as limiting the claim. The word "contains" does not exclude the existence of elements other than those listed in the request item before the element (four) "a" does not exclude the existence of a plurality of such elements. The invention may include several phases by means of The hardware of the components is implemented 'and can be implemented by means of a computer suitable for stylization. In the device item enumerating several components, several of these components can be implemented by the same item of hardware. Only different from each other. The fact that an i method is stated in an attachment does not mean that a combination of such methods cannot be advantageously used. [Simplified Schematic] Figures 1 and 2 are diagrams of a system in accordance with the present invention; A flowchart of a method 10 according to the invention for providing an authentication label on an object (D0); and Figures 4 and 5 for processing a digital object (DO) in a second device (DE V2) belonging to the user domain (UD) Flowchart of the method 2〇, 3〇 according to the present invention. [Main component symbol description] 10 First method 20 Method 30 Method 131643.doc 200908740 100 System 200 System 210 Input device DA domain management unit DEVI DEV2 device DEV3 device DO digital object DOI digital object issuer DRM1 DRM agent DRM2 DRM agent DRM3 DRM agent KD symmetric domain key KDi diversified domain key LRM regional rights manager VT verification token UD user domain UDC use Domain context 131643.doc -36-

Claims (1)

200908740 十、申請專利範圍： L -種在-屬於—包含複數個器件之使 器件中於一數位物件（Dm卜妲# )之弟~ 使用者域⑽)中一鑑認標籤之方法，該 ㈣，該方Μ含4㈣共用—共同對稱域密輪 /建立該鑑認標籤之一第一部分及一第二部分，其中該 C 數位物^ ^ Φ不對稱密鑰對之—秘密密餘（S k)的該 〇)上之一數位簽名且其中該第二部分包含|i 由使用關㈣域密邮D)U訊來促進該残稱密料 之公用密鑰（Pk)之鑑認的資訊。 2.，請求項丨之方法’其中該第二部分中之該鑑認促進資 Λ包含该不對稱密鑰對之借助於該域密鑰（KD)加密之該 公用密輸。 3· k月求項1之方法，其中該第二部分中之該鑑認促進資 讯包含該不對稱密鑰對之該公用密鑰(pk)及藉由該域密 餘（KD)之該公用密鑰（pk)上的一訊息鑑認碼。 4·如明求項1之方法，其中該第二部分中之該鑑認促進資 °K為包含該不對稱密鑰對之該公用密鑰（pk)及該第—器 屬之°亥使用者域之一識別符（DomainID)的一驗證符 °己（VT〇Ev)，該使用者域之該識別符包含關於該域密钤 (D之資訊。 ' 5’如％求項4之方法’其中該驗證符記（VTDEV)另外包含下 士者中之一或多者：該驗證符記（VTDEV)所屬之該第— 态件的實體類型之一識別符、該驗證符記（vtdev)之期滿 131643.doc 200908740 曰’及一經配置以管理該使用者域之域管理機構（DA)之 該數位簽名。 6. 如請求項1之方法，其中該鑑認標籤之更新係藉由僅更 新該鑑認標籤之該第二部分來執行。 7. —種在一屬於_包含複數個器件之使用者域（ud)之第二 器件中處理—數位物件（DO)之方法，該使用者域（UD)中 之該等器件共用一共同域密鑰（KD)，該數位物件（D0)連 ζ·\^ 同發行δ亥數位物件（D〇)之數位物件發行者（DOI)之一 驗證符記（VTD0I)及該數位物件（D0)上之一鑑認標籤在該 第二器件中經接收，該鑑認標籤具有一第一部分及一第 一 °卩刀，δ亥第一部分包含該數位物件（D〇)上之一數位簽 名且該第二部分包含促進一不對稱密鑰對之公用密鑰 (pk)之鐘認的資訊，該方法包含下列步驟： • 執行該驗證符記（VTD0I)是否有效之一第一檢查； -若該第一檢查揭示該驗證符記（VTD0I)無效，則執行 1.) 由該第一器件自其接收該數位物件（DO)之該使用者域 (UD)中的一第一器件所提供之該鑑認標籤是否有效之一 第檢查，其中6亥第二檢查包含藉由使用關於該域密餘 (Kd)之資訊來檢查該鑑認標籤之該第二部分；及 右該第一或該第二檢查揭示一有效驗證符記（VTD0I) 或一有效鑑認標籤，則安裝該數位物件（D0)。 8. A μ求項7之方法，其中該執行一第二檢查之步驟包 含： 檢查該不對稱密鑰對之該公用密鑰（pk)是否可藉助 131643.doc 200908740 於該域密鑰（kd)來鑑認； -若該鑑認成功，則借助於該第一器件之該公用密 (Pk)來驗證該鑑認標籤之該第一部分中之該簽名。’ 9·如請求項8之方法’其中該不對稱密鑰對之該公用密输 ⑽）之該檢查包含藉由使用該域密鑰（Kd)來解密經加密 之該公用密鑰（pk)。 10·如請求項8之方法，其中該不對稱密鍮對之該公用密鑰 (pk)之該檢查包含藉由使用該域密鑰(Kd)來驗證該公用 密鑰上之一訊息鑑認碼。 11·如請求項8之方法，其中該不對稱密鑰對之該公用密鑰 (pk)之該檢查包含驗證該鑑認標籤之該第二部分中之一 驗證符記（vtdev)，該驗證符記（VTdev)包含該不對稱密 鑰對之該公用密鑰（pk)。 12. 如凊求項8之方法，其進一步包含下列步驟： -若該第一檢查與該第二檢查均未揭示一有效驗證符 。己（VTD0I)或一有效鑑s忍標籤，則向一經配置以管理該使 用者域（UD)之域管理機構（DA)諮詢該數位物件發行者 (DOI)或該第二器件自其接收該數位物件（D〇)之該使用 者域（UD)中之該第一器件的授權。 13. 如請求項8之方法’其進一步包含用借助於由該第二器 件執行之如請求項1之方法所提供的另一鑑認標籤替換 該鑑認標威。 14. 一種包含一包含複數個器件之使用者域（UD)之系統，該 使用者域（UD)中之該等器件共用一共同域密鑰（Kd)，該 131643.doc 200908740 系統另外包含一經配置以管理該使用者域（ud)之域管理 機構（da)及一經配置以向該使用者域（υ〇)中之器件發行 數位物件（D〇)之數位物件發行者⑴⑴），該系統中之該 等盗件中之每一者經組態用以： 藉由建立一鑑認標籤之一第—部分及一第二部分而 在一數位物件（DO)上提供該鑑認標籤，其中該第一部分 為藉由一不對稱密鑰對之秘密密鑰（sk)的該數位物件 (DO)上之一數位簽名且其中該第二部分包含促進該不對 稱密鑰對之公用密鑰（pk)之鑑認的資訊。 1 5 .如6青求項14之系統，其中該使用者域（UD)中之該等器件 中之每一者經配置以檢查一數位物件（D〇)上之一鑑認標 籤’且若該檢查成功則安裝該數位物件（D〇)。 16. —種包含於一具有複數個器件之使用者域（UD)中之器 件’該使用者域（UD)中之該等器件共用一共同域密鑰 (KD)，該器件經組態用以： 猎由建立一鑑s忍標戴之一第一部分及一第二部分而 在一數位物件（DO)上提供該鑑認標籤，其中該第一部分 為藉由一不對稱密鑰對之秘密密鑰（sk)的該數位物件 (DO)上之一數位簽名且其中該第二部分包含促進該不對 稱密鑰對之公用密鑰（pk)之鑑認的資訊。 17·如請求項16之器件，其進一步經配置以檢查一數位物件 (DO)上之一鑑認標籤，且若該檢查成功則安裝該數位物 件（DO)。 1 8. —種包含一第一部分及一第二部分之鑑認標籤，其中該 131643.doc -4· 200908740 第一部分為藉由一不對稱密鑰對之一秘密密鑰（sk)的一 數位物件（DO)上之一數位簽名且其中該第二部分包含促 進該不對稱密鑰對之公用密鑰（pk)之鑑認的資訊。 C200908740 X. Patent application scope: L - kind of - belongs to - a method for identifying a label in a device containing a plurality of devices in a device of a digital object (Dm 妲 ) ) 使用者 使用者 使用者 使用者 使用者 使用者 使用者 使用者 使用者 使用者 使用者 使用者 使用者The square Μ4 (4) shared-common symmetric domain pinwheel/establishes a first part and a second part of the identification tag, wherein the C number object ^^ Φ asymmetric key pair-secret secret (S k The digital signature on the 且) and wherein the second portion contains |i is used to facilitate the authentication of the public key (Pk) of the nickname by using the (4) domain cryptographic D). 2. A method of requesting an item wherein the authentication promotion in the second portion includes the public key of the asymmetric key pair encrypted by means of the domain key (KD). 3. The method of claim 1, wherein the authentication promotion information in the second part includes the public key (pk) of the asymmetric key pair and the domain secret (KD) A message authentication code on the public key (pk). 4. The method of claim 1, wherein the authentication promotion in the second part is the public key (pk) including the asymmetric key pair and the use of the first One of the domain identifiers (DomainID) has a verifier (VT〇Ev), and the identifier of the user domain contains information about the domain key (D information. '5' such as % method 4 'where the verification token (VTDEV) additionally includes one or more of the lowerman: one of the entity types of the first state to which the verification token (VTDEV) belongs, the verification token (vtdev) Expiration 131643.doc 200908740 及' and the digital signature of the domain management authority (DA) configured to manage the user domain. 6. The method of claim 1, wherein the update of the authentication tag is updated only by The second portion of the authentication tag is executed. 7. A method of processing a digital object (DO) in a second device belonging to a user domain (ud) comprising a plurality of devices, the user domain The devices in (UD) share a common domain key (KD), and the digital object (D0) is connected to the same A verification identifier (VTD0I) of one of the digital object issuer (DOI) of the alpha-digital object (D〇) and one of the identification tags of the digital object (D0) are received in the second device, the authentication The tag has a first portion and a first file, the first portion of the alpha contains a digital signature on the digital object (D〇) and the second portion contains a public key (pk) that facilitates an asymmetric key pair The information recognized by the clock, the method includes the following steps: • performing a verification of whether the verification token (VTD0I) is valid; - if the first inspection reveals that the verification token (VTD0I) is invalid, then executing 1.) a first check by the first device from which the first device in the user field (UD) of the digital object (DO) receives the validity of the authentication tag, wherein the second check includes 6 The second portion of the authentication tag is checked by using information about the domain secret (Kd); and the first or the second check reveals a valid verification token (VTD0I) or a valid authentication tag, Then install the digital object (D0). 8. The method of claim 7, wherein the step of performing a second check comprises: checking whether the public key (pk) of the asymmetric key pair is available to the domain key (kd) by means of 131643.doc 200908740 To authenticate; - if the authentication is successful, verify the signature in the first portion of the authentication tag by means of the public key (Pk) of the first device. The check of the method of claim 8 wherein the public key (10) of the asymmetric key pair comprises decrypting the encrypted public key (pk) by using the domain key (Kd) . 10. The method of claim 8, wherein the checking of the public key (pk) by the asymmetric key comprises verifying one of the message identifications on the public key by using the domain key (Kd) code. 11. The method of claim 8, wherein the checking of the public key (pk) of the asymmetric key pair comprises verifying one of the second portions of the authentication tag (vtdev), the verification The token (VTdev) contains the public key (pk) of the asymmetric key pair. 12. The method of claim 8, further comprising the step of: - if both the first check and the second check do not reveal a valid verifier. Having (VTD0I) or a valid tag, the domain authority (DA) configured to manage the user domain (UD) consults the digital object issuer (DOI) or the second device receives the tag The authorization of the first device in the user domain (UD) of the digital object (D〇). 13. The method of claim 8 which further comprises replacing the authentication tag with another authentication tag provided by means of the method of claim 1 performed by the second device. 14. A system comprising a user domain (UD) comprising a plurality of devices, wherein the devices in the user domain (UD) share a common domain key (Kd), the 131643.doc 200908740 system additionally comprising a a domain authority (da) configured to manage the user domain (ud) and a digital object issuer (1)(1) configured to issue digital objects (D〇) to devices in the user domain (υ〇), the system Each of the thieves is configured to: provide the identification tag on a digital object (DO) by establishing a first portion and a second portion of an identification tag, wherein The first portion is a digital signature on the digital object (DO) of a secret key (sk) of an asymmetric key pair and wherein the second portion contains a public key that facilitates the asymmetric key pair ( Pk) identification information. 15. The system of claim 14, wherein each of the devices in the user domain (UD) is configured to check one of the identification tags on a digital object (D〇) and if If the check is successful, the digital object (D〇) is installed. 16. A device included in a user domain (UD) having a plurality of devices, the devices in the user domain (UD) sharing a common domain key (KD), the device being configured By: creating a first singularity and a second part of the hunter, the identification label is provided on a digital object (DO), wherein the first part is a secret by an asymmetric key pair A digital signature on the digital object (DO) of the key (sk) and wherein the second portion contains information that facilitates authentication of the public key (pk) of the asymmetric key pair. 17. The device of claim 16, further configured to check one of the identification tags on a digital object (DO) and to install the digital object (DO) if the inspection is successful. 1 8. An authentication tag comprising a first part and a second part, wherein the first part of the 131643.doc -4· 200908740 is a digit of a secret key (sk) by an asymmetric key pair A digital signature on the object (DO) and wherein the second portion contains information that facilitates authentication of the public key (pk) of the asymmetric key pair. C 131643.doc131643.doc
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