TW200833057A - System and method for reducing fraud - Google Patents

System and method for reducing fraud Download PDF

Info

Publication number
TW200833057A
TW200833057A TW96145450A TW96145450A TW200833057A TW 200833057 A TW200833057 A TW 200833057A TW 96145450 A TW96145450 A TW 96145450A TW 96145450 A TW96145450 A TW 96145450A TW 200833057 A TW200833057 A TW 200833057A
Authority
TW
Taiwan
Prior art keywords
voucher
environment
found
credentials
appliance
Prior art date
Application number
TW96145450A
Other languages
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
Eran Shen
Original Assignee
Sandisk Corp
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from US11/613,067 external-priority patent/US8683195B2/en
Priority claimed from US11/613,095 external-priority patent/US20080148401A1/en
Application filed by Sandisk Corp filed Critical Sandisk Corp
Publication of TW200833057A publication Critical patent/TW200833057A/en

Links

Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31User authentication
    • G06F21/33User authentication using certificates

Abstract

Pirated certificates may be published or become available in an environment which includes computer networks and websites. An information appliance connected to the environment searches for certificates in the environment. When a certificate is found in the environment, the appliance determines whether to alert an entity having an interest in the certificate.

Description

200833057 九、發明說明: 【發明所屬之技術領域】 此發明係關於減少偽造之方法及系統。 【先前技術】 隨著全球資訊網的快速擴展,以及發生在全球資訊網上 之商業及其他類型交易的劇增,確定交易另一端上的人是 他或她本人對參與此類交易方越來越重要。各 ^ 上的 一方是組織時,例如公司,也是如此。200833057 IX. Description of the invention: [Technical field to which the invention pertains] This invention relates to a method and system for reducing counterfeiting. [Prior Art] With the rapid expansion of the World Wide Web and the surge in commercial and other types of transactions occurring on the Global Information Network, it is determined that the person on the other end of the transaction is his or her own to participate in such transactions. The more important. The same is true when one of the ^ is an organization, such as a company.

對於數位内容之擁有者及散佈者關鍵問題之一係僅允許 經授權方在已散佈内容後透過從網路(例如網際網路)下載 或透過儲存器件上之内容散佈來存取内容。避免未授權存 取之方式之一係使用用於在將内容存取授予一方前建立該 方之身份的系統。已針對此目的發展系統,例如公用金瑜 基礎建設(PKI)。PKI系統中,稱為憑證機構(CA)之可信賴 機構Sx彳亍用於&供個人及組織身份的憑證。期望建立身份 證明的各方,例如組織及個人,可採用證明其身份之充分 證據登記憑證機構。已向CA證明一方之身份後,CA將對 此方發行憑證。憑證通常包括發行憑證之CA名稱、接受 憑證方名稱、該方之公用金鑰以及藉由該CA之專用金鑰 簽名(即加密)之該方的公用金鑰。 CA之專用金鑰及公用金鑰的關係為使用該公用金鑰簽 名的任何資料可藉由該專用金鑰解密,反之亦然。專用金 鑰及公用金鑰因此形成一金鑰對。用於密碼的專用及公用 至鎗對之一說明在rSA Security Inc·於2〇〇2年6月14日歸檔 126995.doc 200833057 的,,PKCS#1 v2.1:RSA Cryptography Standard,,中提供。CA 之公用金鑰可公開獲得。所以,當一方期望驗證由另一方 提供之憑證是否真實時,驗證方可簡單地使用CA之公用 金鑰來解密憑證内之加密公用金鑰。通常亦在憑證内識別 用於解密憑證内之簽名公用金鑰的解密演算法。若解密公 用金鑰匹配憑證内之未加密公用金鑰,此證明憑證内該方 之公用金鑰未受干擾並且根據CA内之信任及CA之公用金 鑰的真實性驗證為真實。 藉由上述機制,其他情況下可能不會彼此信任的兩方可 藉由使用上述程序驗證另一方之憑證内的另一方之公用金 鑰來建立信任。來自國際電信聯名(ITU)電信標準化部門 (ITU-T)的建議X.509係指定憑證框架的標準,以下稱為 ’’ITU X.509標準’,。此標準中可找到關於憑證及其使用的 詳細資訊。One of the key issues for the owner and distributor of digital content is to allow only authorized parties to access content after it has been distributed by downloading it from the Internet (eg, the Internet) or through content distribution on the storage device. One way to avoid unauthorized access is to use a system for establishing the identity of the party before granting the content access to one party. Systems have been developed for this purpose, such as the Public Golden Yoga Infrastructure (PKI). In the PKI system, a trusted institution called a certificate authority (CA), Sx, is used for & credentials for personal and organizational identity. Parties wishing to establish a certificate of identity, such as organizations and individuals, may register the voucher body with sufficient evidence to prove their identity. After the CA has been certified as a party, the CA will issue a certificate to the party. The voucher typically includes the CA name of the issuing voucher, the name of the recipient voucher, the public key of the party, and the public key of the party signed (ie, encrypted) by the CA's private key. The relationship between the CA's private key and the public key is that any material using the public key signature can be decrypted by the private key and vice versa. The private key and the public key thus form a key pair. One of the dedicated and public-to-gun pairs for passwords is provided in rSA Security Inc. on June 14, 2002, filed 126995.doc 200833057, PKCS#1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard, . The public key of the CA is publicly available. Therefore, when a party desires to verify that the credentials provided by the other party are authentic, the authenticator can simply use the CA's public key to decrypt the encrypted public key within the credentials. The decryption algorithm used to decrypt the signed public key within the voucher is also typically identified within the voucher. If the decrypted public key matches the unencrypted public key in the voucher, the public key of the party in the certificate voucher is undisturbed and verified as authentic based on the trust in the CA and the authenticity of the CA's public key. With the above mechanism, two parties who may not trust each other in other cases can establish trust by using the above procedure to verify the public key of the other party in the other party's credentials. Recommendation X.509 from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a standard for specifying a credential framework, hereinafter referred to as the ''ITU X.509 Standard'. Detailed information about the voucher and its use can be found in this standard.

為方便管理起見,而在較大組織中,較高級CA(稱為根 CA)可適當地將發行憑證之責任轉讓給數個較低級CA。在 二級階層中,例如,位於頂級之根CA對較低級CA發行憑 證,以認證該等低級機構之公用金鑰真實。該等較低級機 構依次透過上述登記程序對各方發行憑證。驗證程序從憑 證鏈之頂部開始。驗證方將首先使用根CA(已知為真實)之 公用金鑰來首先驗證較低級CA之公用金鑰的真實性。一 旦已驗證較低級CA之公用金鑰的真實性,則可使用較低 級CA之已驗證公用金鑰驗證該較低級已對其發行一憑證 的該方之公用金鑰的真實性。藉由根CA及藉由較低級CA 126995.doc 200833057 發行的憑證接著形成已驗證身份之該方的兩憑證鏈。 憑證階層當然可包括兩個以上之層級,其中除根C A外 的較低級處各CA從較高級CA獲得其授權,並具有包含由 該較南級CA發行之公用金鑰的憑證。因此,為驗證另一 方之公用金鑰的真實性,可能需要追蹤憑證至根C A的路 徑或鍵。換言之,為建立一方之身份,欲證明身份的該方 可能需要產生完全從其本身之憑證至根C a憑證的整個憑 證鍵。然而’若根憑證或公用金鑰對驗證方已知,則不需 要提供根憑證。 為驗證一方之身份,驗證方通常將傳送一詰問(例如亂 數)並請求另一方傳送他或她的憑證以及對該詰問之回應 (即採用另一方之專用金鑰加密的亂數)。當接收回應及憑 迅時,驗證方接著可使用憑證内之公用金鑰解密該回應, 並將、、、σ果與表初傳送之亂數比較。若雙方匹配,此意味著 另一方具有正確專用金鑰,因此已證明他或她的身份。若 解密之回應無法匹配詰問,鑑認失敗。因此,期望證明他 或她的身份之一方將需要擁有憑證及相關聯專用金鑰兩 者。 隨著網際網路上多方間安全交易憑證的使用之增長,盜 版也增加。例如,全球使用者借助檔案共享網路共享檔 案許夕^况下,共旱之播案係版權所有人之真實產品的 孤版複本,例如盜版視訊、音訊以及其他類型的資料檔 案。共享之檔案亦可包括移除防複製的軟體或其他材料。 因此存在攻擊者可藉由非法方式獲得憑證或憑證鏈以及相 126995.doc 200833057 關聯專用金錄的危險,並以許多方式造成損害。如此攻擊 者可使此類盜版憑證或憑證鏈以及相關聯專用錢在槽案 共享網路及網站上可用,例如檔案傳輸協定(FTp)站點, 使得未授權方可透過盜版坐享特許及保護之内容,例如媒 體檔案。可用憑證或憑證鏈以及相關聯專用金餘亦可被小 偷用以存取受害者銀行帳戶。所以需要提供用以減小或阻 止此類偽造的解決方案。 【發明内容】 透過非法使用憑證之偽造可藉由在憑證非法發佈及流通 ^于或可能的環境内找到憑證來減少。當找到憑證時,接 者決定是否警告關注個別憑證之實體。一具體實施例中, ㈣執行至少-個上述動作。依此方式,以及作為可選特 徵’、可給予對絲可用的無效憑證,其在其他情況中可能 造成盗版。藉此減少偽造實例。另—具體實施例中,當找 到憑證及其相關聯專用金鑰時,決定是否警告關注個別憑 證之實體。 ^ 本文所引用的全部專利、專利申請案、文章、書籍、說 明書、標準、其他公告案、文件及事件皆出於各種目的而 以引用方式整體併入本文中。就任何併入的公開案、文件 或事件與本文件文字之間的定義或術語之使用方面的任何 或衝犬而S,以本文件之定義或術語之使用為準。 【實施方式】 口 =行憑證作為—實體之身份的真實證明之憑證機構(CA) 可犯出於各種原因決定在其有效性期間註銷憑證。實施註 126995.doc 200833057 銷的方式有报多。通常憑證驗證者檢查;馬 是否已被註銷。可參見义5〇9標準。一疋否“以及For ease of management, in larger organizations, higher-level CAs (called root CAs) can appropriately transfer responsibility for issuing certificates to several lower-level CAs. In the secondary hierarchy, for example, the top-level root CA issues a certificate to the lower-level CA to authenticate the public keys of the lower-level organizations. The lower-level organizations sequentially issue credentials to the parties through the registration process described above. The verification process begins at the top of the chain of credentials. The verifier will first use the public key of the root CA (known as real) to first verify the authenticity of the public key of the lower level CA. Once the authenticity of the lower level CA's public key has been verified, the verified public key of the lower level CA can be used to verify the authenticity of the party's public key for which the lower level has issued a certificate. The certificate issued by the root CA and by the lower level CA 126995.doc 200833057 then forms the two credential chains of the party with the verified identity. The credential level may of course include more than two levels, where each CA at a lower level than the root C A obtains its authorization from the higher level CA and has credentials containing the public key issued by the more south level CA. Therefore, in order to verify the authenticity of the other party's public key, it may be necessary to trace the path or key of the certificate to the root CA. In other words, to establish the identity of a party, the party wishing to prove identity may need to generate the entire voucher key from its own voucher to the root CA certificate. However, if the root certificate or public key is known to the authenticator, then the root certificate is not required. To verify the identity of a party, the authenticator will typically send a question (e.g., a random number) and request the other party to transmit his or her credentials and a response to the challenge (i.e., a random number encrypted with the other party's private key). When receiving the response and the ticket, the verifier can then decrypt the response using the public key in the voucher and compare the , , and σ fruits with the random number of the initial transmission. If the parties match, this means that the other party has the correct private key and therefore has proven his or her identity. If the decrypted response does not match the question, the authentication fails. Therefore, it is desirable to prove that one of his or her identities will need to have both a voucher and an associated private key. As the use of secure transaction credentials between multiple parties on the Internet grows, piracy also increases. For example, in the case of a global user sharing a file with a file-sharing network, the co-drying is a singular copy of the copyright owner's real product, such as pirated video, audio, and other types of data files. Shared files can also include removal of anti-copy software or other materials. Therefore, there is a danger that an attacker can obtain a voucher or credential chain and the associated private record by illegal means and cause damage in many ways. Such an attacker can make such pirated voucher or credential chain and associated special money available on the slot sharing network and website, such as the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) site, allowing unauthorized parties to enjoy privilege and protection through piracy. Content, such as media files. The available voucher or voucher chain and associated special funds can also be used by thieves to access the victim's bank account. It is therefore necessary to provide a solution to reduce or prevent such counterfeiting. SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The falsification of illegal use of vouchers can be reduced by finding vouchers in an environment where the vouchers are illegally distributed and circulated or possible. When a credential is found, the recipient decides whether to warn the entity that is interested in the individual credential. In a specific embodiment, (d) performing at least one of the above actions. In this way, and as an optional feature, invalid credentials can be given to the silk, which in other cases may result in piracy. This reduces the forgery instance. In another embodiment, when a credential and its associated private key are found, it is decided whether to warn the entity that is interested in the individual credential. All patents, patent applications, articles, books, books, standards, other publications, documents, and events cited herein are hereby incorporated by reference in their entirety for all purposes. Any use of the definitions or terms between any incorporated publications, documents or events and the text of this document shall be governed by the definitions or terms used herein. [Embodiment] The voucher = line certificate as a true proof of the identity of the entity (CA) may decide to cancel the voucher during its validity for various reasons. Implementation Note 126995.doc 200833057 There are many ways to sell. Usually the credential verifier checks; the horse has been logged out. See the 5〇9 standard. No, "and

如上所述,建立一方之I 之真用八硷缺 刀、吊需要擁有與憑證相關聯 以复他有時專用金鑰可與憑證分離地發佈或 ^ 式㈣°某些應时,在採取補救措施來遏止屬 證之偽造使用之前,必須搜尋瑪蛾 巧止^ 者_府K d 更哥心5且以及相關聯專用金鑰兩 者車又麻煩。憑證機構可採用一政策,所有憑證由A發行, 及發佈或以其他方式可用之憑證應予註銷。因此 且 體實施例中,為減少因發佈或以其他方式可用之憑證而^ 起的偽造’需要註銷可公開得到之任何憑證,不論是否已 找到相關聯之專用金鍮。透過週期性更新之憑證註銷列表 的發佈、已註銷之憑證列表參考(例如其序號),頻繁地完 成註銷。當憑證參考出現於憑證註銷列表上時,其無法= 現非法存取受保護資料或内容或其他類型之偽造。憑證註 鎖程序在ITU X.509標準中予以說明。 圖1係說明本發明之一項具體實施例的方塊圖1〇。如圖工 所不,將資訊器具12連接至可找到盜版憑證的環境“。資 訊器具12在環境14内搜尋憑證,而當在環境14内找到憑證 時,資訊器具12警告可能關注找到之憑證的憑證機構伺服 态16。資訊器具12可為許多類型之不同器件的任何一個, 其可用於在該環境内實行搜尋,包括桌上型、膝上型及筆 各己型電腦、蜂巢式電話 '個人數位助理、MP3播放器及其 他類型之數位媒體播放器、轉頻器及可用於實行搜尋及通 知伺服器1 6的任何其他類型之器件。環境丨4包括檔案共享 126995.doc 200833057 網路、網際網路網站、專用網路,例如組織内網路,以及 可找到盜版憑證的任何其他類型之數位媒體或通信鏈路。 隨著不同類型之數位媒體及通信通道之使用增加,此類媒 體及通道亦可用作散佈盜版憑證之途徑。因此有用的係器 具12亦搜尋該等類型的數位媒體及通信通道。圖丨之具體 實施例中,器具12通知憑證機構伺服器,其他替代具體實 施例中,可警告或通知不同於憑證機構之實體,只要此類 實體關注器具12在環境内找到之憑證。 參考圖1,器具12搜尋在環境14内發佈或以其他方式可 用之文件、檔案及訊息,並根據當前被各種不同憑證機構 使用的憑證類型查找憑證。若器具12在環境"内找到憑 證,則能夠通知伺服器16。 圖2係對說明太絡日日 夕一目胁與 上—-As mentioned above, the establishment of a party's true use of the gossip is not required, and the hang needs to be associated with the voucher to reinforce that sometimes the private key can be issued separately from the voucher or ^ (4) ° some time, in the remedy Before the measures are taken to curb the forgery of the certificate, it is necessary to search for the moths and the squad, and the car and the associated special key are both in trouble. The voucher body may adopt a policy in which all voucher is issued by A and the voucher issued or otherwise available shall be cancelled. Therefore, in the embodiment, any falsification that is made to reduce the vouchers issued or otherwise available requires the cancellation of any vouchers that are publicly available, whether or not the associated special funds have been found. The logout is frequently completed through the periodic update of the voucher logout list, the deregistered voucher list reference (eg its serial number). When a voucher reference appears on the voucher logout list, it cannot = now illegally access protected material or content or other types of forgery. Voucher Note The lock procedure is described in the ITU X.509 standard. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS Figure 1 is a block diagram showing an embodiment of the present invention. As shown, the information appliance 12 is connected to an environment in which pirated credentials can be found. The information appliance 12 searches for credentials within the environment 14, and when the credentials are found within the environment 14, the information appliance 12 warns that the credentials may be of interest. Credential mechanism servo state 16. The information appliance 12 can be any of a number of different types of devices that can be used to perform searches within the environment, including desktop, laptop, and pen computers, and cellular phones. Digital assistants, MP3 players and other types of digital media players, transponders and any other type of device that can be used to implement the search and notification server 16. Environment 丨 4 includes file sharing 126995.doc 200833057 Internet, Internet Internet sites, private networks, such as intra-organizational networks, and any other type of digital media or communication link that can find pirated voucher. As these types of digital media and communication channels increase, such media and channels It can also be used as a means of distributing pirated vouchers. Therefore, the useful device 12 also searches for such types of digital media and communication channels. In a particular embodiment, the appliance 12 notifies the credential authority server, and in other alternative embodiments, an entity other than the credential authority may be alerted or notified as long as such entity is concerned with the credential that the appliance 12 finds within the environment. Appliance 12 searches for files, files, and messages that are published or otherwise available within environment 14, and looks up credentials based on the type of credentials currently being used by various different credential authorities. If appliance 12 finds credentials in the environment & can be notified to the servo Figure 16. Figure 2 is a pair of descriptions of the day and night.

”3(0x3)”。欄位68内定義憑證5〇之有效週期。 。憑證50具有序號66,其係 6前需要器具12首先驗 。此點如圖4之流程圖 某些具體實施例中,警告伺服器i 6 證在環境14内找到之憑證是否真實。 所示。 126995.doc -10- 200833057 圖4係說明本發明之一項具體實施例的流程圖。資訊器 具12首先登入如圖丨所示之環境14,例如檔案共享或點對 點網路,或者網際網路網站。器具12接著搜尋頻繁用於憑 證内之關鍵字(步驟102)。可用於搜尋之關鍵字包括產品名 稱、推出產品之公司名稱,包括用於增強線上安全之產 品’線上拍賣網站及線上電子商店的名稱1著透過網際 網路及其他媒體的活動進—步發展’可用於搜索之名稱的 列表不可避免地擴大。若在檑案或訊息内找到憑證(箭頭 103),則在一程序中將檔案或訊息下載至檔案共享網路上 (步驟104)。若下載失敗,器具12將在步驟102返回搜尋程 序,以搜尋關鍵字。若下載成功並完成(箭頭105),器具"3 (0x3)". The validity period of the voucher is defined in field 68. . The voucher 50 has a serial number of 66, which requires the appliance 12 to be tested first. This is illustrated in the flow chart of Figure 4. In some embodiments, the alert server i6 verifies that the credentials found within the environment 14 are authentic. Shown. 126995.doc -10- 200833057 Figure 4 is a flow chart illustrating an embodiment of the present invention. The information device 12 first logs into the environment 14 as shown in Figure ,, such as a file sharing or peer-to-peer network, or an internet website. Appliance 12 then searches for keywords that are frequently used in the certificate (step 102). The keywords that can be used for search include the product name, the name of the company that launched the product, and the products used to enhance online security. The name of the online auction site and the online electronic store is 1 step by step through the activities of the Internet and other media. The list of names that can be used for searching inevitably expands. If a voucher is found in the file or message (arrow 103), the file or message is downloaded to the file sharing network in a program (step 104). If the download fails, appliance 12 will return to the search program at step 102 to search for keywords. If the download is successful and completed (arrow 105), the appliance

可視需要將檔案或訊息重新命名為具有共同副檔名者,例 如ZIP、RAR、far、iso、bin、exe,並嘗試從播案或訊息 擷取所需資訊(步驟106)。 貝行檔案或訊息之重新命名係出於以下原因。有時駭客 或安全系統之攻擊者可使用不描述檔案之副檔名,以嘗試 逃避㈣,因4關注盜版憑證者可能僅查找肖定播案類 型。因此’若副檔名不對應於擋案類型,可能需要將槽案 重新命名為正確副檔名。器具12亦可具有演算法之集合, 例如ZIP及RAR。公開可用來源中可找到其他可能的檔案 庫袼式,例如百科全書。可使用隱寫術構造其他可能的檔 案庫格式。參見公開可用的來源,例如百科全書,獲得拆 開檔案或訊息以及用於從檔案或訊息擷取資訊之隱寫方 法。另外,可壓縮特定檔案或訊息,以便從擋案或訊息擷 126995.doc 200833057 取貝讯首先需要解壓縮檔案或訊息。此類情況下,器具u 在可結合步驟1〇6實行的其他步驟外亦實行解壓縮(或視需 要i缩)。若仍無法從找到之檔案或訊息顧取資訊,器具 12返回搜尋關鍵字(步驟1〇2)。 可採用新檔案類型及對應擷取演算法,以便檔案或訊息 可出現此類類型。該等新掏取演算法可能不再擁取演算: 集合内,其在對器具12可用的集合内。因此當在步驟ι〇6 中不能使用可用演算法從檔案或訊息擷取資訊時,器具12 可月b需要在網際網路或盆輪;^、店+ m來/原中搜尋用於從檔案或訊息 tr之額外演算法。若找到該等演算法,則其可用於 备案或訊息操取資訊。接著亦可將該等演算法新增至儲 存於器具12内之演算法集合中 飞對态具12可用的儲存器 中,以便可在未來將演算法用 7所述。 、貝δί1擷取,如以下參考圖 若揭取成功(箭頭107)’器具12接著查找憑證發行者名 -項具體實施例中’可藉由搜尋憑證之特定搁位實行 此點。因此,藉由搜尋圖3所示攔㈣, 位’可確定發行找到之憑證之:牛相關欄 ♦掬?,丨益—土々 戌稱的名%(步驟108) 〇 田找丨卷仃者名稱時(箭頭1〇9), 行功能。若未找到,以12^牛八2在步驟110繼續實 W12返回步驟1G2之搜尋程序。 斤述’某些具體實施例中,可能 行憑證之憑證機構前,首先驗證找到之馬:口據稱發 在驗證可發生前,某此 〜姐' …實。然而, '、二/、體實施例中可能雹 證。例如’憑證可採用若干已 先剖析憑 式之一,例如Base64 126995.doc -12. 200833057 及區分編碼規則("DER”),以便剖析需要考慮該等袼式。 (步驟11〇)。剖析後,器具12接著決定憑證是否真實(步驟 110)。若憑證内數位簽章之驗證失敗,器具在步驟返 回搜哥程序。接著使用憑證機構之公用金输驗證憑證内數 位簽章,例如圖3之攔位62内命名的憑證機構之公用金 鑰。如熟習技術人士所知,發佈憑證機構之公用金鑰,以 便器具12能夠獲得驗證憑證内簽章所需的憑證機構之公用 王鑰(步驟110)。圖5及6内說明驗證程序。若驗證憑證内數 位簽章正確,器具12則推斷憑證合法(箭頭m)。某些情況 中,若g具12可不用驗證程序而決定環境内憑證之真實 性二如若先前已找到相同或相似憑冑,則不需要驗證來 决疋疋否警告關注方,例如發行憑證之憑證機構。一項具 體““列中’器具12警告憑證機才冓,其接著註銷憑證(步 驟 112) 〇 因此,當第二次在環境内找到相同憑證時不需要器具 =次警告關注實體 '然而’纟器具12警告憑證之關注實體 前,需要確認憑證真f。此可透過驗證來完《。否則,攻 擊者可能利用此來達成啟動服務攻擊之拒絕的目的。例 =,攻擊者可在環境内發佈假憑證,其包含由攻擊目標發 行之憑證序號,即使攻擊者無對應於此類憑證之專用金 鑰右接著s告目;^並且目標接著註銷該等憑證,依賴此 類憑證之各方將拒絕藉由該等憑證致能之服務。 圖5係說明用於建立數位簽章之程序的程序流程圖。如 圖5所示,首先提供欲簽名之訊息或檔案152,例如如圖2 126995.doc -13 - 200833057 所述之憑證50(其包含實體之公用金鑰及關於該實體之資 訊)。使用在憑證内指定之雜湊演算法從訊息或檔案產生 雜訊154(例如SHA或MD5),以獲得訊息或檔案摘要156(具 有值Py75c%bn)。接著使用簽名人之金鑰,例如憑證機構 之專用金鑰159,透過在憑證内指定之加密或簽名演算法 加密摘要158,以獲得數位簽章丨6"具有值3kjfgf*£$&), 其接著可用作圖2及3之憑證50内的數位簽章56。接著將數 位簽章160與檔案152之最初訊息組合成一個文件:簽名文 件162。因此若將圖5之程序應用於圖2之憑證5〇,則雜湊 並加密圖2之公用金鑰52及資訊54,以產生數位簽章56。 接著將如此產生之數位簽章56與元件52及54結合,以形成 圖2之簽名憑證5 〇。 圖6係說明用於驗證憑證内數位簽章之程序的程序流程 圖。如圖6所示,首先使用憑證内指定之雜湊演算法在雜 湊程序1 64内雜湊簽名憑證丨62内之檔案1 52的最初訊息, 以產生檔案或訊息摘要166,從而獲得值Py75c%bn。亦使 用憑證内指定之加密或簽名演算法在解密程序168内解密 簽名文件162内的數位簽章160(具有值3kjfgf*£$&),其係 使用憑證機構之公用金鑰丨67,以產生解密文件丨7〇,其可 具有值Py75c%bn。若解密文件170匹配檔案或訊息摘要 166’此意味著用於解密文件ι62内之數位簽章ι6〇的公用 金鑰167與憑證機構之專用金鑰159(見圖5)形成金鑰對,使 得文件162真實。 參考圖4時’若藉由憑證内數位簽章的成功驗證發現箭 126995.doc -14- 200833057 頭111内的憑證合法或真實,則器具12警告伺服器16。伺 服器1 6接著可包括憑證註銷列表内的憑證參考。接著當在 下一更新後更新憑證註銷列表時,憑證5〇之序號接著出現 於更新之憑證註銷列表内,以便憑證5〇將無法用於受保護 資料或内容之未授權存取或其他類型之偽造。(步驟丨丨】。) 建立及驗證數位簽章之程序在汀!^又.5〇9標準内更詳細地 加以說明。憑證註銷及更新憑證註銷列表的程序亦在 Χ·509標準内加以說明。The file or message can be renamed to have a common deputy name, such as ZIP, RAR, far, iso, bin, exe, as needed, and attempt to retrieve the desired information from the broadcast or message (step 106). The re-name of the file or message is for the following reasons. Sometimes an attacker of a hacker or security system can use an extension that does not describe the file to try to evade (4), because 4 people who are concerned about pirated credentials may only look for the type of Xiaoding. Therefore, if the file name does not correspond to the file type, it may be necessary to rename the slot file to the correct file name. Appliance 12 may also have a collection of algorithms, such as ZIP and RAR. Other possible archive formats, such as encyclopedias, can be found in publicly available sources. Other possible file library formats can be constructed using steganography. See publicly available sources, such as encyclopedias, for unpacking files or messages and steganographic methods for extracting information from files or messages. In addition, you can compress a specific file or message so that you can first extract the file or message from the file or message 126 126995.doc 200833057. In such cases, the appliance u is also decompressed (or as needed) in addition to the other steps that may be performed in conjunction with step 〇6. If it is still not possible to retrieve information from the found file or message, the appliance 12 returns to the search keyword (step 1〇2). New file types and corresponding capture algorithms can be used so that files or messages can appear in this type. These new capture algorithms may no longer fetch the calculus: within the set, which is within the set available to the appliance 12. Therefore, when it is not possible to use the available algorithms to retrieve information from files or messages in step ι 〇 6, the appliance 12 may need to search for the slave file on the Internet or the basin; ^, store + m / original Or an additional algorithm for the message tr. If these algorithms are found, they can be used for filing or message manipulation. The algorithms can then be added to the set of algorithms stored in the appliance 12 for use in the memory available to the state 12 so that the algorithm can be used in the future. If the retrieval is successful (arrow 107), the appliance 12 then looks up the voucher issuer name - in the specific embodiment, this can be performed by a specific shelf of the search voucher. Therefore, by searching for the block (4) shown in Figure 3, the bit can be determined to issue the found certificate: the cow related column ♦ 掬? , 丨益-土々 The name of the nickname (Step 108) 〇 丨 Find the name of the 丨 ( (arrow 1〇9), line function. If not found, continue to perform the W12 return to the search procedure of step 1G2 at step 110. In some specific embodiments, before the voucher institution of the voucher may be verified, first find the horse found: the mouth is said to be issued before the verification can occur, some of the ~ sister's ... real. However, ', two /, the physical examples may prove. For example, 'Voucher can use one of several pre-analyzed formulas, such as Base64 126995.doc -12. 200833057 and Distinguishing Encoding Rules ("DER"), so that the profiling needs to be considered. (Step 11〇). After that, the appliance 12 then determines whether the voucher is authentic (step 110). If the verification of the digital signature in the voucher fails, the appliance returns to the search procedure in the step. Then, the public signature of the voucher institution is used to verify the digital signature in the voucher, for example, FIG. The public key of the credential institution named in the block 62. As known to those skilled in the art, the public key of the credential authority is issued so that the appliance 12 can obtain the public key of the credential institution required to verify the signature in the voucher (step 110) The verification procedure is illustrated in Figures 5 and 6. If the digital signature in the verification voucher is correct, the appliance 12 infers that the voucher is legal (arrow m). In some cases, if g 12 has no verification procedure, the voucher in the environment is determined. Authenticity 2 If the same or similar evidence has been found before, there is no need to verify to decide whether to warn the interested parties, such as the issuing institution of the voucher. A specific "" The appliance 12 warns the voucher, which then cancels the voucher (step 112). Therefore, when the second voucher finds the same voucher in the environment, the appliance is not required to be followed by the warning entity 'however' Before the entity, you need to confirm the credential true f. This can be verified by verification. Otherwise, the attacker may use this to achieve the purpose of initiating the service attack rejection. Example =, the attacker can publish the fake voucher in the environment, which includes The number of the certificate issued by the attack target, even if the attacker does not have a special key corresponding to such a certificate, and then the target is subsequently cancelled; and the parties relying on such a certificate will refuse to use the certificate. Figure 5 is a flow chart showing the procedure for creating a digital signature. As shown in Figure 5, the message or file 152 to be signed is first provided, for example as described in Figure 2 126995.doc -13 - 200833057 Credential 50 (which contains the entity's public key and information about the entity). Generates noise 154 (eg, SHA or MD5) from the message or file using the hash algorithm specified in the voucher, Obtain a message or archive summary 156 (with the value Py75c%bn). Then use the signer's key, such as the certificate authority's private key 159, to encrypt the digest 158 by the encryption or signature algorithm specified in the voucher to obtain the digital sign. Chapter 6 " has a value of 3kjfgf*£$&), which can then be used as a digital signature 56 in the voucher 50 of Figures 2 and 3. The digital signature 160 and the initial message of the file 152 are then combined into one file: Signature file 162. Thus, if the procedure of Figure 5 is applied to the voucher 5 of Figure 2, the common key 52 and information 54 of Figure 2 are hashed and encrypted to produce a digital signature 56. The digital signature 56 thus generated is then combined with elements 52 and 54 to form the signature voucher 5 of Figure 2. Figure 6 is a flow diagram showing the flow of a program for verifying a digital signature in a voucher. As shown in Fig. 6, the initial message of the file 1 52 in the signature voucher 62 is first hashed in the hash program 1 64 using the hash algorithm specified in the voucher to generate the file or message digest 166, thereby obtaining the value Py75c%bn. The digital signature 160 (having a value of 3kjfgf*£$&) in the signature file 162 is also decrypted within the decryption program 168 using the encryption or signature algorithm specified in the voucher, using the public key 丨67 of the credential authority to A decrypted file 产生7〇 is generated, which may have a value of Py75c%bn. If the decrypted file 170 matches the archive or message digest 166' this means that the public key 167 used to decrypt the digital signature ι6 within the file ι62 forms a key pair with the voucher's private key 159 (see Figure 5), such that File 162 is true. Referring to Figure 4, if the voucher in the header 111 is legal or authentic by the successful verification of the digital signature in the voucher, the appliance 12 alerts the server 16. The server 16 can then include a credential reference within the credential logout list. Then, when the voucher logout list is updated after the next update, the voucher number 5 is then displayed in the updated voucher logout list so that voucher 5 will not be available for unauthorized access to protected material or content or other types of forgery. . (Step 丨丨).) The procedure for establishing and verifying the digital signature is explained in more detail in the standard of Ting!^ and .5〇9. The procedure for the cancellation of the voucher and the renewal of the voucher logout list is also described in the 509·509 standard.

大多數憑證包含憑證有效之時間週期上的資訊。圖3 中,例如,將資訊68包括於憑證5〇内以指示憑證在1997年 1〇月17日的指定時間前以及1999年则17日的指定時間後 …、效若投哥期間藉由器具12找到的憑證包含指示;馬噔由 於時間過期不再有效的資訊,例如,憑證將無法用:實現 受保容或資料的未授權存取或其他類型之偽造。器具 12不需要通知飼服器16。因此除圖4概述之步驟外,器具 1:亦:搜哥憑證上資訊以指示憑證是否有效,例如藉由比 較當前時間與憑證有效之憑證内時間週期。若憑證有效之 憑證内時間週期已過去,器具12較佳的係不警告飼服器 !6,但若此時間週期未過去,器㈣警告飼服器16。 =新之’a δ主銷列表通常係由憑證機構週期 式散佈’以通知公眾發行後不再有效的憑證。若 間稭“具12找到之憑證已經列於切合㈣« 作為 k特徵’器具12可搜尋發行在該環境内找到之憑證 126995.doc -15· 200833057 的憑證機構之憑證則肖列表,無論憑證是否已在列表上參 考。右疋,則器具I2不需要通知伺服器16。 銷列表上找到憑證,則器具12將通知伺服器16。在 、、一項具體實施例中,器具12可包含可執行之用於實行上 述特徵之電腦代碼,並且器具12執行此代碼以實行上述各 種功能。另-具體實施例中,可將用於實行上述功能之可 執行,腦或軟體代碼儲存於圖W示之儲存器件18内。此 儲存裔件可係可移除類型之健存器(例如快閃記憶卡或任 何其他類型的可移除非揮發性記憶體),其可透過連結^ 連接至器具12。接著可讀取並藉由器具12執行用於實施上 述特被之程式,其係儲存於储存器i 8内的電腦可執行 代碼之形式。 許多檔案共享網路及_使用開放來源軟體,以便可使 用或修改容易可用的軟體,以用於登入網路及網站之任何 此中#案中-或多項具體實施例之軟體可係設計成 遷循登入程序的登入程序及程序序列(例如上文參考圖續 述的程序)可藉由器具12自動實行,而不需操作人。-曰 ί動軟體’將藉由器具12實行登入及以下程序,而無人為 若需要搜尋多個網路及網站,並且若軟體指定網路 罔站之已知網際網路位址’對該等網路或網站之登入程 = 式或順序自動予以實行,例如以固定序列’ μ後疋上述其他程序。將預^ 202^ ^ 叹、式儲存於器具12之存儲器 或::存:18内’如圖7所述。藉由器具η執行及上述的 -或成他動作亦可自動化。例如,可藉由軟體設計自 126995.doc -16 - 200833057 動化搜尋程序,其按儲存於器具12之存館器2〇4或儲存器 18内的預定順序在發行者攔位㈣尋上述㈣的若干關鍵 字。驗證程序可藉由軟體設計自動化,其使用憑證内指定 之演算法及憑證内發行者之公用金鑰以驗證憑證内之數位 簽早。可出於此目的將已知憑證發行者之公用金鑰儲存於 器具12之存儲器2〇6或儲存器18内,如圖7所述。器具η或 儲存器1 8亦可在存儲器2〇8内儲存先前找到之憑證的序 唬,以便可將器具程式化成僅在決定搜尋中找到之憑證已 、、二驗a為真實且先前找到之憑證非複製後自動警告憑證機 構或另一關注方。亦可自動實現程序,例如重新命名、壓 縮或解壓縮以及剖析中軟體設計係可按騎模式執行 用於實行該等程序之演算法,例如固定序列,並且其中將 模式及演算法儲存於器具12内之存儲器2〇2或者儲存器Μ Q 7所述。自動化程序可較有利,因為接著可在一 或夕個指定網路及網站上恆定、連續或根據排程搜尋及驗 證憑證,以及可如上所述視需要f告相1實體。或者可使 用由操作人操作之器具12實行一或多個程序,同時自動實 行其他程序。 =同憑證機構可具有關於是否應註銷發佈之憑證的不同 策某些憑證機構可具有不論是否找到相關聯之專用金 鑰句應17主銷發佈之憑證的政策,如上文參考圖4所述。其 ^ —機構可具有僅在找到相關聯專用金鑰時應註銷發佈 厶且的政琅。圖8說明一具體實施例,其中器具12可$ 八私序以各納兩種類型之政策。如圖8所示,搜尋關鍵 126995.doc -17- 200833057 字(步驟102)、找到關鍵字(箭頭103)及下載檔案(步驟1〇4) 之程序實貝上與參考圖4之上述程序相同。器具12首先使 用圖7之存儲器212内的可用演算法決定是否可依據副檔名 開啟“案及從其擷取資訊(菱形3〇2)。若使用可用演算法可 開啟檔案並可從其擷取資訊,器具12決定檔案是否包含專 用金鑰或公用金鑰憑證(菱形3〇4)。專用金鑰或公用金鑰憑 也可抓用右干已建立格式之一,例如Base64及區分編碼規 則(’’DER”),以便器具12可藉由格式決定檔案是否包含專 用金鑰或公用金鑰憑證。可將已建立格式儲存於器具12之 存儲器210或儲存器18内,如圖7所示。或者,若檔案包含 檔案内之特定資料構成專用金鑰或公用金鑰憑證之指示, 此指示可用於決定。 菱形302内之決定動作可包括使用圖7之存儲器212内的 可用演算法重新命名、壓縮或解壓縮上述檔案。然而,若 無法使用可用於器具之演算法開啟槽案(菱形3()2)或無法從 檔案擷取資訊,器具12將不得不搜尋可如上所述使用的演 #法(v驟306)。若無法找到用於開啟檔案或從其擷取資訊 之演异法,器具12返回步驟1〇2内之搜尋關鍵字。若找到 :用於開啟檔案或從其擷取資訊之演算法,則針對此類演 算法將其儲存於圖7之存儲器212内,並且n具返回菱形 302,以嘗試開啟檔案及從其擷取資訊。 若決定檔案包含專用金鑰(菱形3G4),將其儲存於儲存 庫214内,接著搜尋圖7内之儲存庫216(步驟3ι〇)以找到四 配公用金鍮憑證。可藉由對儲存於儲存庫216内之專用金 126995.doc 200833057 鑰及憑證應用上述詰問回應機制決定是否存在匹配。若在 儲存庫216内未找到匹配發佈公用金鑰憑證,器具12返回 步驟1〇2以實行更多關鍵字搜尋。然而,若在儲存庫216内 找到匹配發佈公用金鑰憑證,器具12繼續至步驟1〇8,以 找到上文參考圖4所述的憑證發行者名稱(步驟1〇8)。 若決定檔案包含公用金鑰憑證,則將此憑證儲存於圖了 内的儲存庫216内(步驟31〇)。亦剖析公用金鑰憑證,以找 ΓMost credentials contain information on the time period during which the voucher is valid. In Figure 3, for example, the information 68 is included in the voucher 5〇 to indicate that the voucher is before the specified time on the 17th of January 1997 and the designated time on the 17th of 1999... 12 The voucher found contains instructions; the information that the horse is no longer valid due to the expiration of time, for example, the voucher will not be available: to achieve unauthorized access to the insured or the data or other types of forgery. The appliance 12 does not need to notify the feeder 16. Thus, in addition to the steps outlined in Figure 4, the appliance 1: also: information on the search vouchers to indicate whether the credentials are valid, such as by comparing the time period within the voucher valid for the current time and the voucher. If the time period within the voucher in which the voucher is valid has elapsed, the appliance 12 preferably does not warn the applicator !6, but if the time period has not passed, the device (4) warns the applicator 16. = The new 'a δ master list is usually distributed periodically by the certificate authority' to inform the public that the certificate is no longer valid after it is issued. If the stalk "has 12 found vouchers have been listed in the matching (four) « as k features' appliance 12 can search for the certificate of the certificate found in the environment 126995.doc -15· 200833057, the certificate list, regardless of whether the certificate Reference has been made to the list. Right, then appliance I2 does not need to notify server 16. Upon receipt of the credentials on the pin list, appliance 12 will notify server 16. In one embodiment, appliance 12 may include executable The computer code for implementing the above features, and the appliance 12 executes the code to perform the various functions described above. In another embodiment, the executable, brain or software code for performing the above functions may be stored in the figure W. The storage device 18 can be a removable type of memory (such as a flash memory card or any other type of removable non-volatile memory) that can be coupled to the appliance 12 via a connection. The program for implementing the above-mentioned features can be read and executed by the appliance 12, which is stored in the form of computer executable code stored in the storage i 8. Many file sharing networks and Source software so that software that is readily available for use can be used or used to log into the network and any of the websites in the case - or a plurality of specific embodiments of the software can be designed as a login program and program sequence for the migration login program (For example, the procedure described above with reference to the figure) can be automatically implemented by the appliance 12 without the need for an operator. - The software will be logged in by the appliance 12 and the following procedures, and no one needs to search for multiple The Internet and the website, and if the software specifies the known Internet address of the Internet site, the login process of the network or website is automatically implemented, for example, in a fixed sequence 'μ疋The program is stored in the memory of the appliance 12 or in the memory: 18 as described in Fig. 7. It can also be automated by the appliance n and the above- or other actions. For example, The software can be designed from 126995.doc -16 - 200833057 to search for programs in the order of the publishers (4) in the predetermined order stored in the repository 12 or the storage 18 of the appliance 12 (4). Keyword. Verifier With software design automation, it uses the algorithm specified in the voucher and the public key of the issuer within the voucher to verify the digits in the voucher. The common voucher's public key can be stored in the instrument for this purpose. 12 of the memory 2 〇 6 or the storage 18, as shown in Figure 7. The appliance η or the storage 18 can also store the sequence of previously found vouchers in the memory 2 〇 8 so that the appliance can be programmed into only Decide that the voucher found in the search has been verified, the second check a is true, and the previously found voucher is not automatically copied to the voucher organization or another interested party. The program can be automatically implemented, such as renaming, compressing or decompressing and parsing the software. The design system can execute algorithms for performing the programs in a ride-on mode, such as a fixed sequence, and wherein the patterns and algorithms are stored in memory 2〇2 or memory Μ Q 7 within appliance 12. Automated procedures may be advantageous because the credentials may then be searched and verified on a regular or continuous basis on a designated network or website, and may be reported as needed as described above. Alternatively, one or more programs may be executed using the appliance 12 operated by the operator while other programs are automatically executed. = The same credential institution may have a different policy as to whether the issued voucher should be cancelled. Some credential agencies may have a policy of whether or not the associated private key sentence should be issued by the 17 major sales, as described above with reference to FIG. ^ ^ The organization may have a government that should be revoked only when the associated private key is found. Figure 8 illustrates a specific embodiment in which the appliance 12 can be arbitrarily ordered in two different types of policies. As shown in FIG. 8, the program for searching for the key 126995.doc -17-200833057 (step 102), finding the keyword (arrow 103), and downloading the file (step 1〇4) is the same as the above procedure with reference to FIG. . The appliance 12 first uses the available algorithms in the memory 212 of Figure 7 to determine whether the "files can be retrieved from and retrieved from the file name (diamond 3 〇 2). If an available algorithm is used, the file can be opened and can be opened from it. Taking the information, the appliance 12 determines whether the file contains a private key or a public key certificate (diamond 3〇4). The private key or the public key can also use one of the established formats of the right key, such as Base64 and the distinction encoding rule. (''DER'), so that the appliance 12 can determine by format whether the archive contains a private key or a public key certificate. The established format can be stored in memory 210 or storage 18 of appliance 12, as shown in FIG. Alternatively, if the file contains an indication that the particular material in the file constitutes a private or public key certificate, this indication can be used for the decision. The decision action within diamond 302 can include renaming, compressing, or decompressing the file using the available algorithms in memory 212 of FIG. However, if the algorithm for the appliance cannot be used to open the slot (diamond 3() 2) or the information cannot be retrieved from the file, appliance 12 will have to search for the method that can be used as described above (v. 306). If the algorithm for opening or extracting information from the file cannot be found, the appliance 12 returns to the search keyword in step 1〇2. If an algorithm is found for opening or extracting information from the file, it is stored in the memory 212 of FIG. 7 for such an algorithm, and n returns to the diamond 302 to attempt to open and retrieve the file. News. If the file is determined to contain a private key (diamond 3G4), it is stored in the repository 214, and then the repository 216 (step 3ι〇) in Figure 7 is searched to find the four public certificate. The above-mentioned challenge response mechanism can be used to determine whether there is a match by using the special challenge 126995.doc 200833057 key and voucher stored in the repository 216. If no matching public key voucher is found in repository 216, appliance 12 returns to step 1 to perform more keyword searches. However, if a matching public key voucher is found within repository 216, appliance 12 proceeds to step 1-8 to find the voucher issuer name described above with reference to FIG. 4 (steps 1-8). If the file is determined to contain a public key certificate, the certificate is stored in the repository 216 (step 31). Also analyze the public key certificate to find Γ

到憑證發行者名稱,並檢查CA政策以在警告匚八或另一關 注方刖決定是否需要找到與憑證相關聯之專用金鑰(步驟 312)。若政策係需要相關聯之專用金鍮,則器具^將藉由 上述詰問回應機制嘗試在儲存庫2〗4内找到匹配專用金鑰 (箭頭314、步驟310)。若未發現匹配專用金鑰,則器I。 返回步驟102。若找到匹配專用金鑰,則器具12繼續至步 驟108 ’以找到上文參考圖4所述的憑證發行者名稱(步驟 108) 〇 若在步驟312内檢查之以的政策係一旦找到發佈之公用 金鍮憑證便警告關注方,而沒有找到相關聯之專用金輪, 則發現公用金鍮憑證後,器具12從步驟312直接繼續至步 驟1〇8(菱形304)’以找到上文參考圖4所述之憑證發行者^ 稱0 無論CA政策如何,在找到憑證發行者名稱後(箭頭 1〇9),若尚未完成則器具12接著剖析憑證,並如上文參考 圖4所述驗證憑證是否真實(步驟11〇)。若憑證真實(箭頭 111),器具12警告切合的CA,以便CA註銷如上述參考圖4 126995.doc 19 200833057 之憑證(步驟112)。若代替警告CA而警告另一關注方,此 使此方採取預防措施。 雖然以上已參考各具體實施例說明本發明,但應明白, 可進行變化與修改而不會脫離僅由隨附申請專利範圍及其 等效内容所定義之本發明之範疇。 【圖式簡單說明】 圖1係說明本發明之一項具體實施例的方塊圖。 圖2係用於說明本發明之一具體實施例的憑證圖示。 圖3係圖2之憑證的更詳細說明。 圖4係說明本發明之一項具體實施例的流程圖。 圖5係更詳細說明本發明之一具體實施例内一特徵的流 程圖。 圖6係說明用於驗證對說明本發明之一項具體實施例内 之一特徵有用的數位簽章之程序的流程圖。 圖7係一方塊圖,其說明儲存對本發明之不同具體實施 例之各種流程圖有用的資訊之不同存儲器。 圖8係說明本發明之另一具體實施例的流程圖。 此申請案中相同組件由相同數字標記。 【主要元件符號說明】 12 資訊器具 14 環境 16 憑證機構伺服器 18 儲存器 20 連結 126995.doc -20- 200833057 50 52 54 56 152 159 160 162 166 167 170 202 204 206 208 210 212 214 216 憑證 公用金鑰 資訊 數位簽名 訊息或檔案 專用金鑰 數位簽章 簽名文件/簽名憑證 訊息摘要 公用金錄 解密文件 存儲器 存儲器 存儲器 存儲器 存儲器 存儲器 儲存庫 儲存庫 126995.doc -21 ·Go to the voucher issuer name and check the CA policy to determine if a warning key associated with the voucher needs to be found (step 312). If the policy requires an associated special account, then the appliance will attempt to find a matching private key in the repository 2 > 4 by the above-mentioned challenge response mechanism (arrow 314, step 310). If no matching private key is found, then device I. Go back to step 102. If a matching private key is found, then appliance 12 proceeds to step 108' to find the voucher issuer name described above with reference to Figure 4 (step 108). If the policy is checked in step 312, once the published public is found The voucher will warn the interested party, and if the associated special gold wheel is not found, after the common voucher is found, the appliance 12 proceeds directly from step 312 to step 1〇8 (diamond 304) to find the above reference to FIG. The voucher issuer ^ said 0 Regardless of the CA policy, after finding the voucher issuer name (arrow 1〇9), if not completed, the appliance 12 then parses the voucher and verifies whether the voucher is true as described above with reference to FIG. 4 ( Step 11〇). If the voucher is authentic (arrow 111), the appliance 12 warns the matching CA so that the CA can revoke the voucher as described above with reference to Figure 4 126995.doc 19 200833057 (step 112). If the other party of attention is warned instead of the warning CA, this allows the party to take precautions. While the invention has been described by reference to the embodiments of the invention, it is understood that the invention may be modified and modified without departing from the scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS Figure 1 is a block diagram showing an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 2 is a diagram showing the credentials of an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 3 is a more detailed illustration of the voucher of Figure 2. Figure 4 is a flow chart illustrating an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 5 is a flow diagram illustrating in more detail a feature within one embodiment of the present invention. Figure 6 is a flow diagram illustrating a procedure for verifying a digital signature useful for illustrating one feature of one embodiment of the present invention. Figure 7 is a block diagram illustrating different memories storing information useful for various flow diagrams of various embodiments of the present invention. Figure 8 is a flow chart illustrating another embodiment of the present invention. The same components in this application are labeled with the same numerals. [Main component symbol description] 12 Information appliance 14 Environment 16 Credential mechanism server 18 Storage 20 Connection 126995.doc -20- 200833057 50 52 54 56 152 159 160 162 166 167 170 202 204 206 208 210 212 214 216 Certificate Commons Key Information Digital Signature Message or File Dedicated Key Digital Signature Signature File/Signature Credential Message Summary Common Gold Record Decryption File Memory Memory Memory Memory Memory Storage Repository 126995.doc -21 ·

Claims (1)

200833057 十、申請專利範圍·· 種收錄可由一資訊器具執行以實行減少一環境内之偽 ^ 方法的一指令程式之電腦可讀取儲存器件,該資 訊器具連接至該環境,該方法包含·· 在該環境内搜尋憑證; 々驗證在該環境内找到之至少一些該等憑證,以決定該 等憑證是否真實;以及 /驗證在該環境内找到之該等憑證之至少一個為真實 後决定疋否警告關注該至少一個憑證之一實體。 如明求項1之電腦可讀取儲存器件,其中藉由驗證該等 至少、些憑證内之一數位簽章實行該憑證真實性驗證。 3·如請求項丨之電腦可讀取儲存器件,其中該搜尋搜尋一 憑證發行者之至少一個名稱。 4. 5. 6. 如請求項3之電腦可讀取儲存器件,其中該方法進一步 匕3在驗迅此至少一個憑證前、在此至少一個憑證内已 找到該憑證發行者之—名稱後剖析至少—個憑證。 如請求項4之電腦可讀取儲存器件,其中該驗證驗證該 口J析之至少一個憑證,以決定真實性。 -種資訊器具’其包含可由該器具執行之代碼,以實行 減少一環境内之偽造的-方法,該環境包含電腦網路及 網',該資訊器具連接至該環境,該方法包含: 在該環境内搜尋憑證; 驗證在該環境内找到之個別憑證,以決定該等憑證是 否真實;以及 126995.doc 200833057 驗證在該擇p & / %境内找到之該等憑證之至少一個為真實 後决疋是否警告關注該至少一個憑證之一實體。 7·如咕求項6之資訊器具,纟中該實體有權修改憑證之一 注銷列表,以包括對該至少一個憑證之一參考。 求項6之資訊器具,該方法進一步包含檢查在該環 &内找到並驗證為真實之該至少—個憑證是否有效,其 、疋至)部分根據該至少一個憑證是否有效來決定 是否警告該實體。 9. ^求項6之資訊器具’該方法進—步包含檢查在該環 i兄内找到並驗證為真實之該至少—個憑證是否在盘該實 體t目關聯之-憑證關列表上,其中該決定至少部分根 據疋否在该憑證註銷列表上找到該至少—個憑證來決定 是否警告該實體。 其中δ亥憑證註鎖列表係由該實 其中該驗證使用該實體之一公 其中該搜尋包括重新命名該環 其中該搜尋包括對該環境内之 ,其中該演算法壓縮或解壓縮該 其中"亥可執行代碼使該器具自 10·如請求項9之資訊器具, 體發佈或散佈。 U·如請求項6之資訊器具, 用金錄1。 12. 如請求項6之資訊器具, 境内之至少一個檔案。 13. 如請求項6之資訊器具 檔案實行演算法。 14. 如請求項13之資訊器具 等檔案。 15 ·如請求項6之資訊器具 126995.doc 200833057 動實行該搜尋、驗證及決定之至少 個 入 ’而無需人為介 月求項6之資訊器具,該方法進一 步包含搜尋用於從 〇 兄内之憑證擷取資訊的一擷取演算法。 w月求項ό之資訊器具,該方法進— 内之專用金鑰。 搜哥该環境 18. 如請求項17之資訊器具,該方法 肉# ^ ^巴含將在該環境 J之該等專用金鑰之至少一個斑 在該衣境内找到之 以等憑證之至少一個匹配。 19. =求項18之資訊器具,其中該^決定是否當在該環 '内找到之該等專用金錄之至少—個與在該環境内找到 之该等憑證之至少一個匹配時警告該實體。 2〇.如請求項6之資訊器|’該方法進—步包含檢查發行在 该環境内找到之該等憑證之至少—個的—憑證機構之一200833057 X. Patent application scope · A computer-readable storage device that can be executed by a information appliance to implement an instruction program for reducing the pseudo-method in an environment, the information appliance is connected to the environment, and the method includes Searching for credentials within the environment; verifying at least some of the credentials found within the environment to determine whether the credentials are authentic; and/or verifying that at least one of the credentials found within the environment is authentic The alert focuses on one of the at least one credential entity. The computer readable storage device of claim 1, wherein the authenticity verification of the voucher is performed by verifying at least one of the plurality of voucher signatures. 3. A computer readable storage device as claimed, wherein the search searches for at least one name of a voucher issuer. 4. 5. 6. The computer of claim 3 can read the storage device, wherein the method further analyzes the name of the voucher issuer before the at least one voucher is verified and the name of the voucher issuer is found in the at least one voucher At least - a voucher. The computer of claim 4 can read the storage device, wherein the verification verifies at least one of the credentials of the interface to determine authenticity. a type of information appliance that includes code executable by the appliance to implement a method of reducing forgery in an environment, the environment comprising a computer network and a network, the information appliance being coupled to the environment, the method comprising: Search for credentials within the environment; verify individual credentials found within the environment to determine whether the credentials are authentic; and 126995.doc 200833057 verify that at least one of the credentials found in the territory of the selection p & / % is true疋 Whether to warn about one of the at least one voucher entity. 7. If the information appliance of claim 6 is requested, the entity has the right to modify one of the voucher logout lists to include a reference to one of the at least one voucher. The information appliance of claim 6, the method further comprising: checking whether the at least one voucher found and verified as authentic in the ring & or not, the portion of the voucher being determined according to whether the at least one voucher is valid or not entity. 9. The information appliance of claim 6 wherein the method further comprises checking whether the at least one voucher found and verified in the ring i brother is on the voucher close list of the entity t-related, wherein The decision determines whether to warn the entity based at least in part on whether the at least one voucher is found on the voucher logout list. Wherein the alpha-key certificate lock list is determined by the fact that the verification uses one of the entities, wherein the search includes renaming the ring, wherein the search is included in the environment, wherein the algorithm compresses or decompresses the " The executable code causes the appliance to be released or distributed from the information appliance of claim 9. U. If the information appliance of claim 6 is used, record 1 in gold. 12. At least one file in the territory of the information appliance of claim 6. 13. Perform the algorithm as in the information appliance file of claim 6. 14. For information such as the information appliance of claim 13. 15. The information appliance of claim 6 126995.doc 200833057 carries out at least one of the search, verification and decision-making without the need for a person to propose the information device of the sixth item, the method further comprising searching for the slave brother A retrieval algorithm that captures information from a voucher. In the month of the month, the information device of the item is selected, and the method is a special key. Searching for the environment 18. In the case of the information appliance of claim 17, the method #^^ contains at least one spot of the special key of the environment J found in the territory of the garment to match at least one of the certificates . 19. The information appliance of claim 18, wherein the method determines whether the entity is warned when at least one of the special accounts found in the ring 'matches at least one of the credentials found in the environment . 2. An information device as claimed in claim 6] wherein the method further comprises checking one of at least one of the credentials found in the environment. 政策,並且根據該政策決定是否將該至少一個憑證與一 專用金錄' 匹配。 ' 21· —種減少一環境内之偽造的方法,其包含: 將-資訊H具連接至該環境,以搜尋該環境内之憑 證; 々驗證在該環境内找到之至少一些該等憑證,以決定該 等至少一些憑證是否真實;以及 驗證在該環境内找到之該等憑證之至少一個為真實 後,藉由該資訊器具決定是否警告關注該至少一個憑證 之一實體。 “ 126995.doc 200833057 22·如清求項21之方法,其中該憑證真實性之驗證驗證該等 至少一些憑證内之一數位簽章。 23.如請求項21之方法,其進一步包含該資訊器具,該資訊 器具檢查在該環境内找到並驗證為真實之該至少一個憑 證疋否仍有效,其中該決定至少部分根據找到之該至少 一個憑證是否有效來決定是否警告該實體。 24·如請求項21之方法,其進一步包含該資訊器具,該資訊 器具檢查在該環境内找到並驗證為真實之該至少一個憑 證疋否在與該實體相關聯之一憑證註銷列表上,其中該 決定至少部分根據是否在該憑證註銷列表上找到該至少 一個憑證來決定是否警告該實體。 25·如請求項24之方法,其中該憑證註銷列表係由該實體發 佈或散佈。 26·如睛求項21之方法,其中該驗證使用該實體之一公用金 餘。 27·如請求項21之方法,其中藉由該資訊器具之該搜尋係針 對一憑證發行者之至少一個名稱。 28.如请求項27之方法,其進一步包含該資訊器具,該資訊 器具在驗證此至少一個憑證前、在此至少一個憑證内已 找到該憑證發行者之一名稱後剖析至少一個憑證。 29·如請求項28之方法,其中該驗證驗證該剖析之至少一個 憑證,以決定真實性。 3〇·如請求項21之方法,其中藉由該資訊器具之該搜尋包括 重新命名該環境内之至少一個檔案。 126995.doc 200833057 31. 如請求項21之方法,复φ ^ ,、中精由該資訊器具之該搜尋句括 對該環境内之檔案實行一演算法。 32. 如請求項31之方法,1 料心安杳/ ,、中错由該資訊器具之該搜尋包括 4槽案實行—壓縮演算法或解壓縮演算法。 33^請求項21之方法’其中藉由該器具自動實行該連接、 搜尋、驗證及衫之至少ϋ無需人為介入。 34·如呀求項21之方法’其進_步包含搜尋用於從該環境内 C 之憑證擷取資訊的一擷取演算法。 35·如明求項21之方法,其進_步包含搜尋該環境内之專用 金瑜。 36.如請求項35之方法,其進—步包含將在該環境内找到之 該等專用金狀至少-個與在該環境内找収該等憑證 之至少一個匹配。 A如請求項36之方法,其中該決定決定是否當在該環境内 找到之該等專用金鑰之至少一個與在該環境内找到之該 等憑證之至少一個匹配時警告該實體。 38·如喷求項21之方法,其進一步包含檢查發行在該環境内 找到之該等憑證之至少一個的一憑證機構之一政策,並 且根據该政策決定是否將該至少一個憑證與一專用金输 匹配。 39· —種操作連接至一環境之一資訊器具的方法,其中·· 搜尋該環境内之憑證; 決定在該環境内找到之個別憑證的該真實性;以及 關於是否警告關注已決定為真實之該等憑證的至少一 126995.doc 200833057 個之實體作出決策。 40.如請求項39之方法,其中該實體有權修改憑證之一註銷 列表,以包括對該至少一個憑證之一參考。Policy, and according to the policy, decide whether to match the at least one certificate with a special account. a method of reducing forgery in an environment, comprising: connecting a - information H to the environment to search for credentials in the environment; and verifying at least some of the credentials found in the environment to Determining whether at least some of the voucher is authentic; and verifying that at least one of the voucher found within the environment is authentic, by the information appliance deciding whether to alert the entity to the at least one voucher. The method of claim 21, wherein the verification of the authenticity of the voucher verifies a digital signature in the at least some of the voucher. 23. The method of claim 21, further comprising the information appliance And wherein the information appliance checks whether the at least one credential found and verified to be authentic within the environment is still valid, wherein the determining determines whether to alert the entity based at least in part on whether the at least one credential found is valid. The method of 21, further comprising the information appliance, the information appliance checking whether the at least one credential found in the environment and verified as authentic is on a credential logout list associated with the entity, wherein the decision is based at least in part on Whether the at least one voucher is found on the voucher logout list to decide whether to warn the entity. 25. The method of claim 24, wherein the voucher logout list is published or distributed by the entity. Where the verification uses one of the entities to share the gold balance. 27. The method of claim 21, wherein the information is The search for the appliance is for at least one name of a voucher issuer. 28. The method of claim 27, further comprising the information appliance, the information appliance being found in the at least one voucher before verifying the at least one voucher The method of claim 28, wherein the verification verifies at least one of the parsings to determine authenticity. 3. The method of claim 21, wherein The search by the information appliance includes renaming at least one file in the environment. 126995.doc 200833057 31. The method of claim 21, the complex φ ^ , , and the fine search by the information appliance to the environment The file in the file implements an algorithm. 32. As in the method of claim 31, 1 the message is safe, and the error is detected by the information device including the 4-slot case-compression algorithm or decompression algorithm. The method of claim 21, wherein the connection, the search, the verification, and the shirt are automatically performed by the appliance at least without human intervention. 34. The method of claim 21 The _ step includes searching for a retrieval algorithm for extracting information from the credentials of C in the environment. 35. The method of claim 21, wherein the step _step comprises searching for a dedicated Jin Yu in the environment. The method of claim 35, the method comprising: matching at least one of the special funds found in the environment with at least one of the credentials found in the environment. A method of claim 36, wherein The decision determines whether the entity is alerted when at least one of the private keys found within the environment matches at least one of the credentials found within the environment. 38. As in the method of claim 21, further A policy of a credential authority that checks for at least one of the credentials found in the environment, and determines whether to match the at least one credential with a dedicated credit based on the policy. 39. A method of operating an information appliance connected to an environment, wherein: searching for credentials in the environment; determining the authenticity of the individual credentials found within the environment; and determining whether the warning concern has been determined to be true At least one of the 126995.doc 200833057 entities of the vouchers make a decision. 40. The method of claim 39, wherein the entity has the right to modify one of the voucher logout lists to include a reference to one of the at least one voucher. 126995.doc126995.doc
TW96145450A 2006-12-19 2007-11-29 System and method for reducing fraud TW200833057A (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US11/613,067 US8683195B2 (en) 2006-12-19 2006-12-19 System and method for reducing fraud
US11/613,095 US20080148401A1 (en) 2006-12-19 2006-12-19 System for Reducing Fraud

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
TW200833057A true TW200833057A (en) 2008-08-01

Family

ID=39745164

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
TW96145450A TW200833057A (en) 2006-12-19 2007-11-29 System and method for reducing fraud

Country Status (2)

Country Link
TW (1) TW200833057A (en)
WO (1) WO2008147397A1 (en)

Family Cites Families (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6128740A (en) * 1997-12-08 2000-10-03 Entrust Technologies Limited Computer security system and method with on demand publishing of certificate revocation lists
US20050043548A1 (en) * 2003-08-22 2005-02-24 Joseph Cates Automated monitoring and control system for networked communications

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
WO2008147397A1 (en) 2008-12-04

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
CN109845220B (en) Method and apparatus for providing blockchain participant identity binding
US10079682B2 (en) Method for managing a trusted identity
CN109067801B (en) Identity authentication method, identity authentication device and computer readable medium
US6938157B2 (en) Distributed information system and protocol for affixing electronic signatures and authenticating documents
KR101006322B1 (en) Method and system for linking certificates to signed files
AU2004239738B2 (en) Method and apparatus for authentication of users and web sites
KR101169100B1 (en) Method and system for asymmetric key security
US7568114B1 (en) Secure transaction processor
US7475250B2 (en) Assignment of user certificates/private keys in token enabled public key infrastructure system
JP3130267B2 (en) How to create a cryptographic envelope
KR102177848B1 (en) Method and system for verifying an access request
WO2020119258A1 (en) Data processing method and device
US20040003248A1 (en) Protection of web pages using digital signatures
US20040255137A1 (en) Defending the name space
JP4818664B2 (en) Device information transmission method, device information transmission device, device information transmission program
JP2004023796A (en) Selectively disclosable digital certificate
US7660981B1 (en) Verifiable chain of transfer for digital documents
CN109492424B (en) Data asset management method, data asset management device, and computer-readable medium
US7739500B2 (en) Method and system for consistent recognition of ongoing digital relationships
JP2005197912A (en) Method and program for information disclosure control and tamper resistant instrument
US20080148401A1 (en) System for Reducing Fraud
US8683195B2 (en) System and method for reducing fraud
KR20100114321A (en) Digital content transaction-breakdown the method thereof
JP2009290508A (en) Electronized information distribution system, client device, server device and electronized information distribution method
JP2004318645A (en) Radio tag security extension method, id management computer system, proxy server device, their programs, and recording medium of programs