TW200822670A - Content control system and method using versatile control structure - Google Patents

Abstract

At least one software application is stored in a memory device, where a security data structure controls access to information obtainable from data stored in the device and to the at least one software application. A set of protocols control communication between a host and a memory device. Invocation of at least one software application stored in the memory device modifies the protocol. A security data structure controls access to data stored in the memory device according to an access policy. Invocation of at least one software application stored in the memory device imposes at least one condition in addition to the access policy for accessing the data. A data object storing data in the memory device is associated with at least one software application. Accessing the object will invoke the at least one software application which processes the data in the object. Individual ones of a plurality of first sets of protocols are selectable for enabling data to be provided and stored in a data object. A second set of protocols can be used to retrieve data from the data object, or data derived from such data, irrespective of which of the first set of protocols was used to enable the provision and storing of data in the object.

Description

200822670 IX. Description of the Invention: TECHNICAL FIELD OF THE INVENTION The present invention relates generally to memory systems, and more particularly to a memory system having multi-purpose content control features. [Prior Art] A storage device such as a flash memory card has become a choice for storing a storage medium such as digital content of a photo. Flash memory cards can also be used to distribute other types of media content. Moreover, an increased variety of host devices (such as computers, digital cameras, mobile phones, personal digital assistants, and media players such as Sat.) now have the ability to present media content stored in a flash memory card. Therefore, for flash memory cards and other types of mobile storage devices, there is a great potential to become a widely used medium for distributing digital content. As storage devices (such as smart cards) for various uses grow, it is desirable to have more control and processing capabilities. Therefore, in some applications it may be desirable to store certain control structures in a storage device. This = system. The implementation of 4 storage devices controls access to data stored in such devices. For example, smart cards have been used to store banking related assets such as authentication for accessing bank accounts or health insurance related information. The control structure is installed in the smart card to prevent unauthorized access to such assets. For information on the smart card, please refer to the 2nd edition of the Smart Card Manual by 2〇年英袼兰 J〇hn her 7 & S〇ns Inc. Rankl and Effing. Currently, smart card systems have been used primarily for single use or use, such as for telephone prepaid cards, bank cards or health insurance cards. 122366.doc 200822670 Among other applications, it is desirable to store software applications in storage devices. These software applications enable the storage devices to process the data stored in the devices. For example, some smart cards called JAVA cards contain software applications for supporting services such as banking services. For information on the JAVA card, see c. Enrique 〇rtiz, published on Sun Devel〇per Netw〇rk on May 29, 2003, in the Java Card Technical Brief, Part I article. By virtue of it, smart cards containing JAVA cards are used to control access to data or access applications, but not both. Due to many of the above disputes and problems, the systems currently used in storage and host devices are not available. Either one is completely satisfied. Therefore, it is desirable to provide an improved system with better characteristics. [Summary of the Invention] In the Xu Xi application, it is advantageous to perform data processing activities on the storage device. The solution for data processing work will be safer, more efficient, and less dependent on the host. In addition, at least one software application is stored in a non-volatile system. The towel 'at least _software application system can be used by the main body to perform processing of data in the memory system. The security data structure control pair stored in the 4-body system can be Access from the information and access to the at least one software application. In the embodiment, a data storage device is used to provide data in the field, and the host is stored in the data storage device. Volatility record 122366.doc 200822670 At least one software application in the memory system can be called by a host to process the data in the memory system. A set of protocols stored in the memory system is used to introduce Communicating between the host and the data storage device. When the at least one software application is invoked, modifying the agreement to the y is implemented between the host and the data storage device The communication becomes more flexible and controlled by the at least one software application.

In still another embodiment, the security data structure within the non-volatile memory system controls access by the host to data stored in the memory system in accordance with the access principle. The software application stored in the memory system is called (4), and at least one additional condition different from the access principle is added for the host to access the data. In one embodiment of the invention, at least one software application and at least a lean material are stored in a non-volatile memory system. Establishing a _linkage between the at least-data object and the at least-software application such that when accessing the at least the data object, the at least the software application privately processes the at least the data object Information within. In yet another embodiment, a plurality of software applications are stored in the _ non-volatile memory device. One of the plural software-applications should be created to create a data object for storing data or derived data from the source. This information is associated with the second software application of the plurality of software applications. 2. The second software application is invoked when accessing the nurturing object. In another embodiment, at least one software application is stored in the -122366.doc 200822670:: volatile memory system, wherein the at least one software application system can be called by the host to implement storage. Or the processing of the beakers to be stored in a memory system to obtain information. A security data structure stored in the memory system includes: a first control structure for controlling access of the host by the host; and a second control structure for controlling the at least one The software application is invoked, wherein the first control structure and the first control structure adopt substantially the same control mechanism. In still another embodiment of the invention, at least the data item is stored in a non-volatile memory system. A plurality of first sets of different agreements are also stored in the -memory system, wherein individual group agreements among the first set of agreements are available for host selection to derive or derive data from the host Derivative materials can be provided to and stored in the at least one data item. A second set of agreements stored in the memory system enables the data or derivative material to be extracted from the data item. The second set of agreements enables the retrieval of the information or derivative information, regardless of which of the first set of agreements (one of which enables the provision and storage of the data or derivative materials. The above characteristics can be used individually in the storage system) Or the above features may be combined in any combination to provide a broader versatility for the content owner to control and/or protect. All patents, patent applications, articles, books, specifications, standards, other publications referenced herein. Matters, documents and things are hereby incorporated by reference in their entirety as a reference. When there is a certain degree of inconsistency or conflict between any referenced publication, document or thing and the content of this document. The definition and usage of the terms in this document shall prevail. 122366.doc •10- 200822670 [Embodiment]

The block diagram of Figure 1 shows an exemplary memory system in which the various aspects of the present invention can be implemented. As shown in FIG. 1, the memory system 10 includes a central processing unit 12, a buffer management unit (BMU) 14 iM interface module (HIM) 16 and a flash memory interface module (FIM) 18, - Flash memory 2 and a peripheral device access module (PAM) 22. The memory system 1 communicates with a host device 24 via the host interface bus 26 and port 26a. Flash memory 2 (which may be of the NAND type) provides data storage for the host device 24, which may be a digital camera, a personal computer, a PDA, and a A digital media player (such as an Mp3 player, a mobile phone, a video converter, or other digital device or device. The software code system for the central processing unit 12 can also be stored in the flash memory. The flash memory interface module 18 is connected to the flash memory 2 via a flash memory interface bus 28 and port 28. The host interface module 16 is suitable for connection to a host device. The peripheral device access module 22 selects an appropriate controller module for communicating with the central processing unit 12, such as a flash memory fe, a body interface module, a host interface module, and a buffer management unit. In the example, all components of the system 1 within the dashed box may be enclosed in a single unit, such as a memory card or memory strip 10, preferably encapsulated. System 10 is removably connected The main set 24' allows the contents of the system 1 to be accessed by each of a number of different host devices. Hereinafter, the memory system 10 is also referred to as a memory device 10, or only 122366.doc 200822670 Called memory device or dream aunt to interpret the invention by citing flash memory, the female body of γ曰 County, such as magnetic male applied to other types of memory systems. /, 'CD, and Other types of rewritable non-volatile memory The buffer management unit 14 includes - host direct memory access 3HDMA) j2 'a flash direct memory access (FDMA) 34, an arbiter 36 \ a buffered random access memory Body (BRAM) 38 and a cryptographic compilation engine 40 4 arbiter 36-shared bus arbitrator, such that only one master (four) call or initiator (which can be the host direct memory access 32, work The flash memory direct memory access 34 or the central processing unit 12) can be active at any time, and the slave or target buffers the random access memory 38. The arbiter is responsible for channelizing the appropriate initiator request to This buffer is random access. It has been hidden 3 8 . The host direct memory access 32 and the flash direct memory access 34 are responsible for the host interface module 16, the flash memory interface module 18, the buffer random access memory 38 or the central processing unit. The data transmitted between the random access memory cells (CPU RAM) 12a. The operation of the host direct access 32 and the flash direct memory access 34 is conventional and will not be described in detail herein. The buffered random access memory 38 is used to store the body between the host device 24 and the flash memory. The host direct memory access 32 and the flash direct memory access 34 negative are in the host interface module i 6 / the flash memory interface module i 8 /, s buffer h machine access memory 3 § or the central processing unit transfers data between the random access memories 12a and is used to indicate the completion of the sector. In one embodiment, the memory system 10 generates a key value for encrypting and/or resolving 122366.doc -12-200822670, wherein the key value is preferably τ only and cannot be externally Accessed by a device, such as host device 24. Alternatively, the key value may also be generated outside of the system 10 (such as by a usage server (1) coffee server) and transmitted to the system (4). Regardless of how the key value is generated, once the key value is stored in line 1G, only the authenticated entity will be able to access the key value 1 and 'encryption and decryption is typically a file-by-file Method implementation 'This is because the host device reads and writes data to the memory system 10 in the form of a file. Similar to many other types of storage devices: the memory device 10 does not manage files. Although the memory 2 does store a file configuration table (FAT) (where the logical addresses of the buildings are identified), the file configuration table is typically accessed by the host device 24 and Management 'is not accessed and managed by the controller 12. Therefore, in order to encrypt the data in a particular file, the serial controller 12 must rely on the host device to transfer the logical address of the data in the file in the memory 20 so that it can be used by the system 10. It is only necessary to prepare and encrypt and/or decrypt the data of the specific file by the cipher value that is difficult to obtain. In order to provide control code for both the host device 24 and the memory system 1G (the handlewx points to the same key used to process the data within the archive in a cryptographically compiled manner, the host device is provided for generation by the system 10 or Reference is made to each of the key values of system 10 (4)(10)(4), wherein such reference frame may be only one size. Therefore, the host device 24 is associated with the cryptographically compiled method by system 1G with 1(10). Each file, and the system 1G is associated with each key value used to process the data with the secret cipher cryptography provided by the host. Therefore, when the 122366.doc 200822670 host is cryptographically compiled When the data is processed, it will transmit the request with the same key m and the logical address of the data that will be taken from or stored in the memory 2 to the system 10. The system ίο generates or receives - dense Key 2, and (4) the secret (four) provided by the host device 24 is associated with the key value and performs cryptographic processing. In this way, there is no need to change the manner in which the memory system 10 operates, while allowing It uses the secret to fully control the f-code compilation process, including the material (four) value m access. In other words, once the key value is stored in the system 10 or generated by the system, the system continues to allow The host device 24 manages the files by having exclusive control over the playlist configuration table while maintaining exclusive control over the values of the (four) values used in the cryptographic compilation process. After being stored in the memory system 10, the host device 24 has no responsibility for managing the key value used for the data cryptographic process. The privilege provided by the host device 24 is transferred to the memory system. Or the key value generated by the memory system is formed - two attributes of the quantity 'hereinafter referred to as "content encryption key (c〇phase Encryption Key, CEK)" or "CEK" The host device 24 may associate each key m with - or multiple files, but the host device 24 may also associate each key ID with unorganized material or data organized in any manner, and Not limited to the organization Archives. In order for a user or application to gain access to protected content or areas within the system, an authentication (credentiaD) pre-registered with the system 1 will be required to authenticate the user or application. An authentication is associated with access granted to a particular user or application having the authentication. 122366.doc -14- 200822670 In the pre-recording sequence, System 1 stores a mm ^ ^ record, which contains The identity and identity of the user or application privately associated with the identity and authentication as determined by the user or application and linked through the host device Access rights. After the pre-login has been completed, the program requests the device to provide its identity and authentication, and the key ID and the encrypted data that are also used to encrypt the data are stored through the 5H master. Logical bit

糸, first 10 generates or receives a 密=, and causes the key value to be associated with the key value provided by the host device and the key value to be used for the data to be written by the host device In the record or table of the user or application. The asset is then encrypted and the encrypted data is stored at the address specified by the host and the key value received. When the Tianyi user or application requests to read the encrypted data from the memory 20: it will need to provide its identity and authentication, the key ID used for the key used to encrypt the requested data, and the encrypted data. The logical address to be stored. System 1G then compares the identity of the user or application provided by the host and the identity and authentication stored in its records. If the match is matched, then the system 10 will then retrieve the key value associated with the key ID associated with the user or μ by the user or μ, and use the secret value to store the key value. The data at the address specified by the host device and transmitting the decrypted data to the user or application. By separating the authentication of the authentication and the key used for cryptographic processing, then sharing the right to access the data without sharing the authentication is possible. Therefore, a group of users or applications with different authentications can access the same password for accessing the same data for 122366.doc -15-200822670, and users outside the group are not accessing this. Although all users or applications in a group can access the same bedding, they can still have different rights. Thus, some users may have read-only accesses while other users may have write-only accesses while other users may have both read-only access and write-only access. Because the system ίο maintains a record containing the identity of the user or application and the access keys associated with the user's access key and the key associated with each key, for the system 10 , add or remove the secret of a particular user or application and change the access rights associated with the key, delegate from the user or application to another user or application, or even delete Or the addition of records or representations for the user or application may be controlled by a suitably authenticated host device. A stored record can refer to the secure channel required to access certain cryptograms. A symmetric or asymmetric algorithm and a password can be used to perform the authentication. Of particular importance is the portability of the protected content within the memory system 10. In the embodiment of accessing the age of the material (4) memory (four) system (4), when the memory system or storage device of the system is transferred from an external system to another external system, the security of the content in the storage material is maintained. . Whether the key is generated by the memory system or originated outside the memory system, the external system cannot access such content in the system 1 unless it has been authenticated in a manner completely controlled by the memory system. External system. Even after this ticking, the access system is completely controlled by the memory system, and the external system can be accessed only in a manner controlled by the memory (4) (4) preset recording. If the request does not comply with such a record, then 122366.doc -16 - 200822670 the request will be rejected. In order to provide greater flexibility in protecting content, it is conceivable that only a properly authenticated user or application can access certain areas of the memory (hereinafter referred to as partitions). The system 10 provides greater data protection capabilities when combined with the above-mentioned (four)-based (4) additions. As shown in Fig. 2', the flash memory 2G system can divide its storage capacity into a plurality of partitions: a user area or a partition and a custom partition. All users and applications can access the user area or partition pQ without authentication. Although the user or the user can read or write all the bit values of the data stored in the user area, if the data read is encrypted, the user or application without authorization decryption The program cannot access the information represented by the bit values stored in a user area. For example, it is displayed by files 1〇2 and 1〇4 stored in the user area P0. Also stored in the user area is an unencrypted file, such as 106, which can be read and understood by all applications and users. Thus, symbolically, the encrypted file system is shown as having a lock associated with it, such as for files 102 and 104. Although an unauthorized application or user cannot know the encrypted file in a user area P0, such an application or user can still delete or destroy the file, which may not be suitable for some applications. Expected. For this purpose, the memory 20 also contains protected custom partitions, such as partitions P1 & P2, which are inaccessible from the beta partition without prior authentication. The authentication procedures allowed in the examples in this application are described below. 122366.doc 200822670 As also shown in Figure 2, various users or applications can access files in the cryptographic file. 0, Figure 2 shows the user 】 and 2 and (executed on the device) applications 1-4. In the case of the inner valleys whose entities are allowed to access the memory 2, they are first identified (10) by an authentication procedure in the manner described below. In this process, the entity that is requesting access is identified on the host side for role-based access control. Therefore, the entity that is requesting access first identifies itself by providing information such as "I am application 2 and / I want to see the file 1,1. Next, the controller 12 compares the records of the data stored in the memory 2 or the controller 12 with respect to the data. If all the conditions are met, the access system is granted to this type of entity. As shown in Fig. 2, the user " skin allows reading and writing of the file ι〇ι to the partition P1, except that the user 1 has the unrestricted right to read and write the file to the partition P0. It can only read the broadcasts 1〇2 and 104. On the other hand, the user 2 is not allowed to access the files ι〇ι and 1〇4, but can read and write the access broadcasts 1〇2. As shown in Figure 2, the user (4) has (the same login algorithm (AES)' and the applications 1 and 3 have different login algorithms (for example, RSA and coffee G1), which are also related to the user (1) The login algorithm is different. The Secure Storage Application (SSA) is a security application of the Memory System (4) and illustrates an embodiment of the present invention that can be used to implement many of the above features. Secure Storage Application It can be constructed as a software or computer code having a database stored in the memory 2G or the central processing unit 12 in a non-floating body (not shown), and the read person (4) takes the memory of the heart and is The central processing unit 12 is used. The reference to the 122366.doc -18 - 200822670 secure storage application is described in the following table: Definitions, acronyms and abbreviations ACR Access Control Records AGP ACR Group ( Access Control Record Group) CBC Chain Block Cipher CEK Content Encryption Key ECB Electronic Codebook ACAM ACR Attributes Management (Access Control Record Attribute Management) PCR Permissions Control Record SSA Secure Storage Application Entity Entity 'Everything with 5 real simplifications and thus utilizing its functions / Ai Wang Xiaozi Application ^

Safe Storage Application System Description Data Security, Integrity and Access Control Secure Storage Application Main role. The data is clearly stored in a large number of storage dreams, not the "slots". The secure storage application system is located at the top of the storage line and is added to the security level of the host file to be stored, and provides security functions through security, owing to the structure, as described below. The primary job of the secure storage application is to manage the different rights associated with the stored (and secure) content in the ticker. Enlightenment (丨~, the application needs to manage multiple users and content rights for multiple stored content. The host application from its side sees such applications visible drivers and partitions, and Manage and map the file configuration table (FAT) of the storage device on the storage device. @ In this case, the storage device uses a memory chip that is divided into partitions and shutters 122366.doc -19- 200822670, However, other mobile storage devices may also be used and fall within the scope of the present invention. These partitions are consecutive logical byte sequences in which a start and an end address define their boundaries. Therefore, 'if desired' The restrictions may be imposed on the access to the hidden partition by software, such as software stored in memory 2, such software associating such restrictions with addresses within such boundaries. The partition logical address boundary managed by the secure storage application enables the secure storage application to fully recognize the partition ^ the secure storage application system uses the partition To actually protect data from unauthorized host applications. For hosts, these partitions are a mechanism for defining the exclusive space for storing data files. These partitions can be: public, where 'can be saved Anyone of the storage device can see and know that the partition exists on the device; or private or hidden, wherein only the selected host application can access and know that it exists on the storage device.

Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of a memory showing partitions of memory: p 〇, P1, P2, and P3 (obviously, less than or more than * partitions may be employed), which: ' PG - public points (d), it can be accessed by any entity without the need for a private partition (such as P1, PUP3) to hide the second for the broadcast within it. The security zone for preventing the host from accessing the partition 1 flash memory device is to transfer the data file in the partition within the protected area by additionally restricting access to the address stored in the partition. The data, while engulfing the file that resides in the hidden partition. In other words, the restrictions are related to the logical address 122366.d〇 ( -20- 200822670 range. All users/hosts that can access the partition can access unrestricted access. All of P File. A separates different files and another - different ^ or group of broadcasts, the secure storage application system makes secret and key reference or key ID, and provides each file or file group another Hierarchical security and integrity. One of the key record values used to encrypt data at different memory addresses can be analogized to a container containing the encrypted data or Define the domain (d〇main). = This, in Figure 4, the key references or keys 11) (for example, , key 丨, and π key 2) are displayed in a graphical manner around An area of the file encrypted using the key value associated with the key IDs. Referring to Figure 4, for example, file a can be accessed by all entities without any authentication because it is shown as not being Any key m is enclosed. Even if all entities can read or overwrite the public partition File B, however, file B contains information encrypted with a key with an ID, key 丨", so that the information contained in file B cannot be accessed by an entity unless such entity has the right Accessing such keys. In this way, the use of key values and key references or key IDs provides only logical protection relative to the type of protection provided by the partitions described above. Any host (public or private) can read or write data from the entire partition, including encrypted data. However, because the data is encrypted, unauthorized users can only destroy the dog. Preferably, the information cannot be changed without debt testing. By restricting access to the encryption and/or decryption key, this feature may only allow the authorized entity to use the material. The file B&c is also encrypted using a key with the key IDn key 2, 122366.doc -21- 200822670 Data confidentiality and integrity can be provided by symmetric encryption, and the symmetric encryption method is used. Content encryption Record (Content EnCryption Key; CEK), each in the valley plus (four) key _ a. In the secure storage application package in the inner valley, the key value in the remainder is flash memory device (such as ' The flash memory card is generated or received. The key value is only used internally and is kept as a secret of the world of the avoidance surface. It is encrypted or compiled with a password: the shell material can also be hashed. Such as # or password compile the key block to ensure data integrity. Not all data in the segment is encrypted with different (4) and associated with different keys. In public or user files Certain logical addresses within or within the operating system area (ie, the file configuration table) may be unrelated to any key or key reference, and are therefore available to any entity that has access to the partition itself. use. It is required to establish a drawing and partitioning area to & write and read data from or use the secret system to require an over-access control record (ACR) and enter the female full storage application system. In this safe storage should be. The special privilege of '糸,,, and the first access control record is called the action'. Each access control record has the authority to perform the following three categories of actions: creating partitions and keys/keys, accessing partitions and keys, and establishing/updating other access control records. , access control. The recorded systems are organized into groups called Access Control Record Groups or AGPs. Once an access control record has been successfully authenticated, the secure storage application is opened for a session (sessi〇n) through which any access control record action can be performed. Access Control Record and Access Control Record Group 122366.doc -22- 200822670 Q and the security information of the group are used to control the access segmentation structure according to the principle. The user partitions the one or more public partitions, which are also present on the storage device and are tied to one or more of the accesses and their presence on the device.

This secure storage application system is referred to as the user partition. This partition can read the write partition through the standard of the storage device. Obtaining information about the partition is preferably not possible for the host system - the secure storage application system is able to access the partition via the standard read writer command or the secure storage application command. Therefore, it is preferred that the access partition cannot be restricted to a particular access control record. However, the secure storage should allow the host devices (4) to restrict access to the user partition. Can be individually enabled / stopped (four) to access and write access. All four combinations are allowed (for example, read only, write only (anti-write protection), read and write, and no access). The secure storage application system enables the access control record to associate the secret (1) with the file in the user partition and encrypt the job using (4) associated with such a secret ID. The encrypted file in the access user partition and the setting of access rights to those partitions will be implemented using the secure storage (4) command set. The listing is also based on information that has not been organized into a file. Safely store application partitions There are hidden partitions that can be accessed only by the secure storage application command (avoiding the absence of the 2, 4, ...). Preferably, the secure storage system 122366.doc -23. 200822670 will not allow the host device to access a secure and erroneous application partition, except that it is built by logging in to an access control record. Beyond the meeting period. Similarly, preferably, the secure storage application will not provide a message regarding the existence, size and access rights of a securely stored application partition, unless the request is made through an established session. Access to the partition is derived from the access control record authority. Once an access control record is logged into the secure storage application, it can be shared with other access control records (described below). When a partition is established, the host provides a reference name or ID for the partition (e.g., p()_p3 in Figures 3 and 4). This reference is used among further read and write commands for the partition. Partition of the storage unit The vehicle's all available storage capacity is configured for the user's split area and the currently configured secure storage application partition. Therefore, any re-cutting operation can involve reconfiguration of existing partitions. The net change in the capacity of the device (the sum of the sizes of all partitions) will be zero. The z D of the device (m) (four) zone is defined by the host system. The host system can re-segment the existing partition into two smaller cut areas, or merge two existing partitions (which may or may not be adjacent) into a partition. The bedding material in the divided or merged zone can be deleted or left untouched, based on the judgment of the host. Because the re-segmentation of the memory device can result in the loss of data (because the data is deleted or the bedding material moves within the logical address space of the storage device), the re-segmentation is strictly limited (4) by the secure storage application system 122366 .doc •24- 200822670 Management of the Institute. Only - resides in the __ root access control record group (4) access record (described below) is allowed to issue - re-segment command, and the basin can only refer to the partition owned by it. Since the secure storage application system does not know how the data is organized in the partitions (file configuration table or other file system structure), it is the responsibility of the host to rebuild these structures every time the device is re-segmented. The user divides the dragon's re-segmentation to change the size and other attributes of this partition viewed by the master (4).

After splitting, it is ensured that the secure storage application system 19 and the access control record are not referring to the non-existing partitions of the host system. If these access control records are not properly deleted or updated, future attempts to access non-existing partitions on behalf of these access control records will be detected and rejected by the system. A similar consideration is taken with regard to the deleted key and the key j d . Key, Key ID, and Logic Protection When an archive is written to a hidden partition, it is hidden from the public. However, if the entity (hostile or invulnerable) gains knowledge and access to the partition, the file system becomes available and easy to understand. In order to further secure the file, the secure storage application can encrypt the file in the hidden partition, and the authentication for accessing the key for decrypting the file is preferably different from that for accessing the segment. District certification. Since the file system is controlled and managed by the host, a content encryption key is associated with the file system. Attaching the file to an object (the key m) recognized by the secure application corrects the problem. Therefore, when 122366.doc -25-200822670 establishes a secret transmission by the secure storage application, the host associates the key ID used by the secure storage application with the key ID used for the key. Encrypted data. If the secret material is transmitted to the secure storage application, the secret and secret transmission (1) can be easily associated with each other. i The dexterity and the (four) ID provide logic (four) fullness. (d) (d) all the information (regardless of its location) of a given key ID is eiphered with the same key value in the content encryption key (CEK), the content of which is encrypted with the reference name or The key ID is provided by the host application when it is created. If the entity (by authenticating through an access control record) obtains access to the hidden partition and wants to read or write an encrypted broadcast in the partition, it needs to be available for storage. Take the key ID associated with the slot. When the access for the secret key is granted, the secure storage application carries the secret value associated with the secret encryption key of the secret (10) and decrypts the data before transmitting the data to the host. Data, or encrypt the data before writing it to the flash memory. In one embodiment, the value of the secret key associated with the encrypted content in a secret 1D is randomly established and maintained by the female full storage application system. Any entity outside the secure storage application system does not know or can't access the secret in the encryption key. The external (4) world only provides and uses a multi-photo or key 1D ’ instead of the secret value in the content encryption key. The key value is thoroughly managed and preferably only accessible by the secure application. The key can be provided to the secure storage system. The Far Girl Full Storage Application System uses either (user-defined) following 122366.doc -26- 200822670 Secret Mode (the real cryptographic compilation algorithm used and the key value system control within the content encryption key) , and is not disclosed to the outside world): Block mode - the data is divided into blocks, each of which is individually encrypted. This mode is generally considered less secure and vulnerable to dictionary attacks. However, it will allow the user to randomly access any of the data blocks. Chain mode - the data is divided into blocks, which are chained during the encryption process. Each block is used as one of the inputs to the next encryption program. In this mode, although it is considered It is safer, but the data is written and read sequentially from start to finish, creating an over-capture that may not be accepted by the user. Hash--A chain model with an additional data summary, the data summary Can be used to confirm data integrity. Access Control Record and Access Control The Secure Storage Application is designed to handle multiple applications, each of which is represented in the (4) database. a tree with nodes. The mutual exclusion between the applications is achieved by ensuring that there is no crosstalk between the branches of the trees. In order to gain access to the secure storage application system, an entity needs to One of the access control records of the system establishes a connection. The secure storage application system is based on a definition built into the access control record of the user to be connected. Log in to the program. = Access Control Recording System _ For the secure storage application system, the access control record is protected by login authentication and authentication method. 122366.doc -27- 200822670 Also resides in the record (4) The login right π in the secure storage application system is used to retrieve and write special permissions. This is shown in Figure 5, which shows (n) n access control records in the access control record group. ~ Ming "At least some of the access control records can share the same access, therefore, access control record #1 and access control record #n share the access to the key with the key ID "(4) 3" , wherein the access control record #1 and the access control record are the access control record ID, and the "key 3" is used to encrypt the key associated with the "key 3". (10). The same key can also be used to encrypt and/or decrypt multiple files, or multiple sets of data. The secure storage application system supports several types of login systems, including authentication algorithms and user authentication. Can be changed because once it is made If the user successfully logs in, the user's special permissions in the system can be changed. Figure 5 shows the different login algorithms and authentications. The access control record specifies a password login algorithm and password for authentication, and access control. Record "refer to a public key infrastructure (PKI) login algorithm and public key for authentication. Therefore, in order to log in, an entity will need to submit a valid access control seven-record ID and correct login algorithm and authentication. Once an entity logs into an access control record of one of the secure storage application systems, its permissions are defined in the Rights Control Record (PCR) associated with the access control record (its right to use secure storage application commands) In FIG. 5, based on the displayed rights control record, the access control record #1 grants read-only access to the material associated with "key 3", and the access control record #2 grants the association to the associated "Key 5, the reading and writing of the data 122366.doc -28- 200822670 permissions. "Different access control records share common interests and special privileges within the system, such as keys that are read and written. To achieve this, access control records with a certain # thing are grouped in access. In the control record group (ACR group), the access control record #1 and the access control record share the access to a key having the key m, the key 3, and the access control record. The group and its access control records are organized in a tree hierarchy, and therefore, in addition to establishing a security key to maintain sensitive data security, an access control record may preferably be associated with Other access control record entities whose key IDs/partitions. These access control record children will have the same or fewer limits as their parent (founder) and can be given any of the parent's established The authority of the key. No need to increase the power. The sub-generational sub-generation obtains access to any secrets it establishes. This is shown in Figure 6. Therefore, all access control records in the access control record group 12 Access control record 122 is established, and both of such access control records are inherited from the access control record 122 for access to the data associated with the π key 3" access control record group login to the security The storage application system is implemented by specifying an access control record group and an access control record in the access control record group. Each access control record group has a unique ID (reference name), It is used as an index to point to its project in the secure storage application database. When the access control record group is created, the access control record 122366.doc -29- 200822670 group name is provided to The secure storage application system. If the provided access control record group name is already present in the system, the secure storage application will reject the setup operation. The access control record group is in (4) access rights. And (iv) the limitation of the delegation of authority, as will be described below. The functions provided by the two trees in Figure 6 are the management of completely separate entities (such as two different applications, or Access by two different computer users. For this purpose, it may be important that the two access procedures are substantially independent of each other (ie, substantially free of crosstalk), even if both occur simultaneously. This means that the identification, authority, and establishment of additional access control records and access control record groups in each tree are not connected to other trees and are not dependent on other trees. Therefore, when used in memory Securely storing the application system allows the memory system H) to simultaneously serve multiple applications. It also allows two applications to access two separate sets of data independently (eg, a set of photos and a set of songs). The figure is shown in Figure 6. Therefore, the application or user is accessing the node (access control record) access in the tree in the upper part of Figure 6 by "crypt 3", "Xi"X" And the information of "密瑜z" can include photos. : The program or user is accessing the information associated with "Miyo 5" and "Yuyu Y" via the node (access control record) in the tree in the lower part of Figure 6. The access control record establishing the access control record group only has the authority to delete the access control record group when the access control record group has no access control record item. ^ Secure storage application entry point (kiss point): access control 122366.doc -30- 200822670 The secure storage should be system (4) _ access control record to cite the way the entity is allowed to log into the system. When an entity logs into the secure storage application system, it needs to specify the access & system corresponding to the clock program it will execute. An access control record contains a rights control record (CR)' which indicates the user's executable action that can be performed by the user once it has been identified in the old access control record. The entity at the host side provides all access control record data blocks. p When a real system successfully logs into an access control record, the entity will

It is sufficient to query the partition and access permissions of all access control records and access control record attribute management (ACAM) permissions (described below). Access Control Record ID When a secure storage application system entity initiates a login procedure, it is required to specify an access control record corresponding to the login method (as when the host access control record is received) Provided), when the enabler has met all the login requirements, the secure storage application will set = YES (the algorithm and select the correct permission control record. When the access control record is created, the access control record mountain Provided to the secure storage application system. Login/Authorization Algorithm This authentication algorithm specifies which login program will be used by the entity and which authentication system is required to provide proof of the identity of the user. The application system supports several standard login algorithms, ranging from::: (and innocent) and password-based programs to a two-way authentication protocol based on symmetric or cryptographic compilation., 122366.doc - 31 - 200822670 Certification of the entity's authentication corresponds to the login algorithm and is used by the secure storage application to verify and authenticate the user. The authentication example can be a password/personal identification number for password authentication, a login algorithm key for login algorithm verification, etc. Such authentication (ie, personal identification number, symmetric key) The type/format of the system is pre-defined and derived from the authentication mode; when the access control record is created, the authentication is provided to the secure storage application system. The secure storage application The system does not have a subscription exception based on public key infrastructure for defining, distributing, and managing these authentications, where the device (such as a flash memory card) can be used to establish the RSA or other type of key. Yes, and the public key can be exported for authentication establishment. The Rights Control Record (PCR) permission control record shows the matter granted to the entity after logging in to the secure storage application system, and successfully transmits the access control. Recording authentication procedure. There are two types of permission categories: partition and key establishment authority; partition and key access rights; and entity access control The administrative rights of the record attribute. Accessing the partition The permission control record of this paragraph contains a list of partitions that the entity can access when successfully completing the access control recording phase (using the provided to the secure storage application system) ID). For each partition, the access type is defined as write-only or read-only or can refer to rights. Therefore, the access (4) record (4) can be accessed == 122366.doc -32- 200822670 and not Access to partition #1. The restriction set in the permission control record is used for such secure storage application partitions and public partitions.

The public partition can be accessed by a regular read and write command to a device (e.g., a flash memory card) that loads the secure storage application system or accessed via a secure store application command The disclosed partition. When an access control record (described below) is established to have the authority to make the public partition, it can transfer the right to its child's preferred x, and an access control record can only limit the regular read. And write command save = the open partition. Preferably, the access control record within the secure storage application system can only be restricted when it is established. Once the access control record has the right to read/write the public partition, its permissions cannot be removed.

Access Key ID The access control record for this paragraph contains the information associated with the list of keys m that the entity can access when the entity's login procedure conforms to the access=recording principle. The specified key ID is associated with one or more files residing in the partitioning area present in the rights control record. Because the key mountains are not associated with logical addresses within the device (eg, a flash memory card), when more than one partition is associated with a particular access control record, the files are Can be located in any of the partitions. The keys 10 specified in the rights control record may each have a different set of access rights. Access to the material pointed to by the key ID can be restricted to write-only or read-only, or a full write/read right can be specified. Control Record Attribute Management (ACAM) 122366.doc -33- 200822670 This paragraph describes the attributes of the system in some cases. How to change the access control record in the secure storage application management system · The allowable access control record in the program system is to create/delete/update access control record groups and access control records. 2. Create/delete partitions and keys. 3 · Delegate access to keys and partitions.

The generation access control record preferably does not have the ability to edit the access control record attributes. (4) (4) ° preferably 'This requires the deletion and re-establishment of the access control record. Further, preferably, access rights to one of the key IDs established by the access control record cannot be removed. The access control system can have the capacity to create other access control records and access control record groups. Establishing an access control record may also mean delegating some or all of the access control record attributes held by its creator to manage their access L f "recorded. The authority to establish an access control record means that the following Permissions for actions: 1 • Authentication of the derogatory and editing progeny. Preferably, the authentication method cannot be edited once set by the established access control record. The authentication system can be defined for the child. The boundary of the authentication algorithm is changed. 2. Delete an access control record. 3. Delegate the permission to the child access control record (and thus have grandchildren). Access with permission to create other access control records The control record has the authority to delegate the unblocking permission to the access control record it establishes (although it may not have the right to unblock the access control record 122366.doc -34- 200822670) A reference to the unblocker is placed in the child access control record. ^ 4 The generation access control record has a unique access control that deletes the permissions of its child access control records. When an access control record deletes one of its lower-level access control records, all access control records that are propagated by the lower-level access control record are automatically deleted. If the control is deleted, all key IDs and partitions created by it will be deleted. f One-to-one access control record can update its own record system with two exceptions · 1 · Post code / personal identification Code, although the password/personal identification code is set by the establishment of the access control record, the password/personal identification code can be updated only by the access control record containing the password/personal identification code. 2·-root access control record system You can delete yourself and the group of access control records that it resides in. Delegate access rights to keys and partitions (access control records and their access control record groups are combined in a tree hierarchy, where The root access control record group and the access control records therein are located above the tree (eg, root access control record groups 130 and 132 in FIG. 6) in the secure storage application system. Can have a number Access control record group, although the access control record groups are completely separated from each other. An access control within an access control record group records the access rights delegated to it. All access control records within the same access control record group, and delegated to all access control records established by them. Preferably, the authority to establish the secret contains delegated use 122366.doc -35- 200822670 Permissions for access rights to the key. There are three categories of permissions for the record: 1. Access - This defines the access rights to the key, ie, read, write.权 敎 敎 , — 建立 建立 建立 建立 建立 建立 建立 建立 鍮 鍮 鍮 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取 存取The same access control (recording group towel or in the child access control record group) a key 'ownership' provides the right to delete it and delegate permissions to it. 3. Access Rights Delegation - This permission enables the access control record to delegate the tweeting it holds. An access control record can delegate access to the partition it establishes and other partitions to which it has access. The delegation of authority is carried out by adding the names and keys (1) of the divisions to the authority control record of the specified access control record. The delegation key (the access authority can be implemented by the key ID or by arguing that the access authority is used to delegate all the established keys of the access control record. The access control record is blocked and unblocked. The fetch control record may have a lock counter that is accumulated when the entity's access control record authentication procedure for the system is unsuccessful. When a certain maximum number of unsuccessful authentications is reached, the secure storage application The system will block the access control record. The blocked access control record can be unblocked by another access control record. The access control record is blocked by the blocked access control record. 122366.doc -36 - 200822670 The reference to the unblocking access control record is δ 疋 疋 疋 疋 疋. Preferably, the unblocking access control record is located in the same way as the creator of the 4 blocked access control record Access control record group, and has the "unblock" permission. The second system, any other access control records in the first can not unblock the blocked latch Taking control records. An access control record can be configured to have a lock "ten number n' but no-unblocker access control record. In this case, if the access control record is blocked, then Cannot be unblocked. Root Access Control Record Group_Building an Application Database The Secure Storage Application System is designed to handle multiple applications and to isolate data for each of the multiple applications. The tree structure of the control record group system is the primary tool for identifying and isolating application specific entities. The root access control record group is at the top of an application secure storage application database tree, and A number of different behavior rules are followed. Several root access control record groups can be configured in the secure storage application system. Two root access control record groups 13 and 132 are shown in Figure 6. Obviously, More or fewer access control record groups can be used and are within the scope of the present invention. Login to a device for a new application (eg, a flash memory card) / / Issue a new application for the device is authenticated by adding a new access control record group / access control record tree to the device's program. The secure storage application system supports three different Mode root access control record group establishment (and all access to the root access control record group 122366.doc -37- 200822670 control record and its permissions): 1 · Open: no need for any kind of authentication Any user or entity, or a user/entity (described below) that accesses the control record authentication through the system, can create a new root access control record group. The root access control record group is established under any security measures, and all data transmission is performed on an open channel (that is, in the security environment of an issue agency) or π is transmitted through The 5H system access control record is authenticated by the established secure channel (ie, through air (OTA) and post-release procedures). If the system access control record is not configured (this is an optional feature) and the root access control record group setup mode is set to, open, then only the open channel option is available. 2. Controlled: Only entities that access control record authentication through the system can create a new root access control record group. If the system access control record is not configured, the (4) Secure Storage program (4) cannot be set to. 3. The blocked root establishment control record group is deactivated, and no additional root access control record group can be added to the system. Two Queen Storage Application commands control this feature (these commands can be used by any user/entity without having to authenticate) · · 'L Method Configuration Command m state This secure storage application system to use three roots The access control records any of the group establishment modes. Only the following mode changes are allowed: Open + Controlled, Controlled - Blocked (ie 'If the Secure Storage Application System is currently configured 122366.doc -38- 200822670 is controlled, then its The system can only be changed to blocked.) 2 • Method Configuration Lock Command - Used to deactivate the method configuration command and permanently lock the currently selected method. When an access control record group is created, it is in a special initialization mode that enables the establishment and configuration of its access control record (using the same access restrictions as applied to the root access control record group). . At the end of the root access control record group configuration program, when the entity explicitly switches it to the operating mode, the existing access control record can no longer be updated and additional access control records can no longer be created. . Once an access control record group is placed in the standard mode, it can only be logged in by accessing an access control record assigned to the access control record with the authority to delete the root access control record group. The system can delete the j root access control record group. In addition to the special initialization mode, the root access control records another exception to the record group; preferably, it may contain only one access control record with its own set of access control records deleted. Access control record group, which is relative to the access control record group within the next tree level. The third and final difference between the root access control 5 record and a standard access control record is that it is the only access control record in the system that has the authority to create and delete partitions. Secure Storage Application System Access Control Record The system access control record can be used for the following two secure storage application operations: Create an access control record 122366 under the protection of a secure channel in the enemy's brother .doc -39- 200822670 Record/Access Control Record Group Tree. 2. Identify and identify the device that loads the secure storage application system. Preferably, there may be only one system access control record within the #full storage application system' and, once defined, preferably, it cannot be changed. When the system access control record is established, system authentication is not required; only a secure storage application command is required. "Create system access control record" feature can be used (similar to "establish root access control record group" feature p in the system (system access control record system is established, then, establish The system access control record "unique command" has no effect, because preferably only one system access control record is allowed. In the established program, the system access control record is not operated. A special command system needs to be issued indicating that the system access control record is established and ready to proceed. After this point, the system access control record is preferably not updated or replaced. The control record is created in the secure storage application to establish the root (access control record/access control record group. It has the authority to add/change the root level until the host is satisfied and the time is blocked. Blocking the root access control record group basically cuts off its connection to the system and presents its tamper proof (tamper pr〇〇f). At this time, neither can change/edit The root access control records the group and its access control records. This is done through a secure storage application command. The establishment of the disabled root access control record group has a permanent effect and cannot be restored. The above features relating to the access control record of the system are shown in Figure 7. The system access control record is used to establish three different root access controls 122366.doc -40 - 200822670 = Π. After the record group is established, the command to transfer the secure storage application from the host to block the root access control record group from the second control record, thereby stopping 2 establishing the root access control record The group "feature" is shown in the dotted line in Figure 7, the sub-fetch control record and the dashed line of the root access control record group. This presents the tamper proof of the three root access control record groups. The three roots (access control record groups are used to establish child access (4) record groups to form three individual trees before or after the root access control record group is blocked. Above, the feature system For content owners to configure the security of the content of the big bomb! Health products need to be "published". The release system is placed in the process of identifying the secret 'by the knowledge, the device can be recognized (4) The host, and vice versa, identifies the device (eg, a flash memory card) to enable the host to determine whether it believes it has its secret. On the other hand, identifying the host system limits the 4 device 4 to only The host is allowed to enforce the security principle (grant and execute a specific host command). The product that is counted as a servo majority application will have several identification keys. The product can be: "pre-released" ", store your key before shipment, or 'post release', to add a new key after shipment. For post-release, the memory device (for example, memory card) needs to contain some kind of master A control or device level key that is used to identify the entity that is allowed to add an application to the device. The above features enable a product to be configured to be enabled/disabled for release. In addition, this post-release configuration can be safely performed after shipment. The device 122366.doc -41 - 200822670 can be purchased as a retail product that does not have a key other than the above-mentioned master or device level key, and is then configured by the new owner. 'To enable or disable further post-release applications.

Thus, the features of the system access control record provide the ability to accomplish the above objectives: T - A memory device that does not have a system access control record will allow unlimited and no control to add an application. - A memory device that does not have a system access control record can be configured to deactivate the system access control record establishment, which means that there is no way to control the addition of a new application (unless a new root access control record is created) The characteristics of the group are also disabled). - The memory device with the system access control record will only allow the application to be added in a controlled manner via a secure channel established by the authentication program using the system access control record authentication. • Memory devices with system access control records can be configured to respond

Sign. Key ID list

The record is provided or provided to establish an access control record: Remember, use • Key ID. The 10 is provided by the entity through the host to refer to the key and to encrypt or decrypt the data using the secret 122366.doc -42-200822670 key in all further read or write accesses. 2. Key Encryption and Data Integrity Mode (the above-mentioned blocked, chained and hashed modes are described below). In addition to the properties provided by the host, the following information is maintained by the secure storage application system: 1. The key ID owner. The ID of the access control record is the owner. When a key ID is established, the creator access control record is its owner. However, the key ID ownership can be transferred to another access control record. Preferably, only the key ID owner is allowed to transfer ownership of a key ID and delegate a key ID. Delegate access rights to associated keys and revoke these rights can be managed by the key ID owner or any other access control record assigned to delegate authority. The secure storage application system grants this attempt whenever an attempt is made to perform any of its operations only if the access control record of the request is authorized. 2. Content Encryption Key (CEK). This is the key value used to encode the content encryption key associated with the key ID or the content to which the key ID is directed. The secret gun value can be randomly encrypted by a 128-bit login algorithm established by the secure storage application system. 3. MAC and IV values. Dynamic information (message identification code and start vector) used in the Chain Block Coding (CBC) encryption algorithm. The various features of the secure storage application are shown with reference to the flowcharts of Figures 8A through 16, wherein the "H" on the left of the step means that the operation is performed by the host, and the "C" This operation is implemented by the memory card. Although these secure storage applications are shown with reference to the memory card, it is understood that these features can also be applied to other physical forms. In order to establish a system access control record, the host issues a command to the secure storage application in the memory device 10 to establish a system access control record (block 2〇2). The system responds by checking if a system access control record system already exists (block 2〇4, diamond 206). If the system already exists, the device 1 transmits a failure and stops (oval 208). If it is not already present, the memory 1 checks whether the system access control record establishment is allowed (diamond 21〇), and if it is not allowed, the port fails state (block 212). Therefore, there may be several Case, wherein the device issuer does not allow establishment of a system access control record, such as where the required security profile has been predetermined so that the system does not require access to the control record. The device then transmits back to the system access control record authentication (block 214) from the host. The host checks the status of the secure storage application and whether the device is already Instructing the establishment of a system access control record is permitted (block 216 and diamond 218). If the establishment is not allowed or a system access control record already exists, the host is stopped (oval 22 〇). If the device 10 has indicated that the establishment of a system access control record is permitted, then the host issues a secure storage application command to define its login authentication and transmits the login authentication to the device (block 222). The device 10 updates a system access control record with the received authentication and returns, determining the status (block 224). In response to this status signal, the host issues a secure storage application command indicating that the system access control record is ready (block 226). The device 1 is responsive to lock the system access control 122366.doc • 44- 200822670 so that it cannot be updated or replaced (block 228). This locks the features of the system access control record and its identity for identifying the device to the host. The procedures used to create new trees (new root access control record groups and access control records) are determined by the manner in which these functions are configured within the device. Figure 9 illustrates these procedures. Both the host 24 and the memory system 10 follow this. If a new root access control record group is completely disabled, then a new root access control record group (diamond 246) cannot be added. If it is enabled but requires a system access control record, the host authenticates through the system access control record, and establishes a secure channel before issuing the root access control record group command ( Block 254). If the system access control record (diamond 248) is not required, then the host 24 can issue the "Create Root Access Control Record Group" command without authentication and proceed to block 254. If the system access control record does exist, the host can use it even if it is not required (not shown in the flowchart). If the feature is disabled, the device (eg, a flash memory card) will reject any attempt to establish a new root access control § recorded group, and if the system access control record is required, it will reject one Create a new root access control record group without identifying the attempt (diamonds 246 and 250). The newly established access control record group and access control record in block 254 are now switched to the operational mode such that access control records within such access control record group cannot be updated or changed, and are not stored. The fetch control records can be added to their access control record group (block 256). The system is then optionally locked so that no additional root access control record groups can be established (block 25 8). 122366.doc -45- 200822670 The dashed box 258 is a convention that indicates the steps selected for this step. All the dashed lines in the flow chart in the diagram of this claim are the steps selected. This allows the content owner to block the use of the device 1 for other illegal purposes that can mimic a genuine memory device with legitimate content. In order to establish an access control record (in addition to the access control record within the root access control record group, as described above), any access control record having the right to establish an access control record may begin (block 27) As shown in Figure 10. Any entity may attempt to enter through the host 24 by providing access control records for the access point and access control records having all of the attributes necessary to establish (block 272). The secure storage application checks for the identity of the access control record and the access control with such identity. The permission to establish an access control record has been recorded (block Μ). If the request is verified as authorized, the secure storage application of the device_ establishes an access control record (block 276). Figure 11 shows two groups of access control records, the money of which is loyal to the method of Figure 10; the secret m 1 ^__

In conjunction with the key ID, the sales information, the read permission for accessing the key associated with the key ID key without access to the key required to access the associated material. 122366.doc • 46 - 200822670 In this way, the real system with the access control record slAs2 can only read and not change the pricing data, and the row lock data will not be accessible. In another aspect, the access control record m2 does not have the authority to establish an access control record, and has only the associated information for access (1) "price list" and associated key ID "marketing information" The right to read the key of the data. Therefore, 'the access method can be delegated in the above way, where (1) the right to read the pricing data is delegated to _s2. In the case of large row locks and sales groups, This is particularly useful. Under only one or a few sales people, it is not necessary to use the method of Figure 1. Instead, the access rights can be delegated to the same access control record by the access control record. Within the group, at the lower level or the same level of access control records, as shown in Figure 12, first, the entity enters the tree for such access control record groups by using one of the above The method specifies one access control record (block fan) in the tree through the host. Then, the host will specify the access control record and the rights delegated to it. The secure storage application checks for this control record. The tree and the access control record have delegated rights, the authority to deny another access control record (block 282), if it is, then the right (four) is delegated (block 284); if * is, The result is shown in Figure 13. In this case, the access control record... has the authority to delegate access to the access control record si, so that after the delegation, it is sufficient to access the price data. Key. If ml is the same or a larger right to access, negative, and such delegated authority, then this can be implemented. In the implementation of the item, ml maintains its access after the delegation. 'Access can be delegated under restricted conditions (rather than permanently), 122366.doc -47- 200822670 as limited time, limited number of accesses, etc. Figure 14 shows the key used to establish a key and The procedure of the key ID. The entity authenticates through an access control record (block 3〇2). The entity requests to establish a key establishment with the ID specified by the host (block 3〇4). The application checks and views the specified access control record Whether or not there is permission to do so (diamond 306). For example, if the key is used to access data in a particular partition, the secure storage application will check and view the access control record. The partition can be accessed. If the access control record is authorized, the memory device 10 establishes a key value associated with the key ID provided by the host (block 308) and stores the key. 1)) in the access control record, and storing the key value in its memory (controller-associated memory or memory 20), and assigning rights based on information provided by the entity Permissions (block 310), and such assigned rights and permissions are used to modify the access control records for such access control records (block 312). Thus, the creator of the key has all available rights 'such as item fetch and write permissions, delegates and other access control records in the same access control record group or a lower level access control record The right to share and the right to transfer ownership of the key. An access control record can be changed to another access control record (or fully present) within the secure storage application system, as shown in Figure 5. A real system can enter a tree through an access control record as before; in the case where the entity is authenticated and then it specifies an access control record (blocks 330, 332). It requests a deletion of a target access control record or a permission within a target access control record (block 334). If the specified access control record or the access control record in the active state at this time has the right to do so (diamond 336), the target access control record is deleted, or The rights control record for the target access control record is changed to delete such rights (block 338). If this is not authorized, the system stops. After the above procedure, the target will no longer be able to access the data it was able to access before the program. As shown in FIG. 16, a real system may attempt to enter the target access control record (block 350) and find that the authentication procedure failed because the pre-existing access control record ID is no longer present in the secure storage application. In the program, access rights are denied (diamond 352). Assuming that the access control record ID has not been deleted, the entity specifies an access control record (block 354) and a key (1) and/or data within a particular partition, and then the secure storage application is based on this The access control record of the class access control record checks to permit the key m or the minute (four) access request (diamond 358). If the permission has been deleted or has expired, the request is rejected again. Otherwise, the request is granted (box 36〇). ^ The above procedure describes how the device (eg, a flash memory card) manages access to the conserved beaker, regardless of whether the access control record and the basin's access control record are just being controlled by another access control. The record is initially configured as such.幵 The period of the king's storage should be designed as a user. When this feature is used, only the control record with the ...: input is used for the "sentence": the storage of a specific entity for the requested action, the full storage application receives TM All orders are related to the entity and are executed by 122366.doc -49- 200822670. Multiple real systems are supported through the concept of the session. - (iv) is built during the authentication process and is secured by The storage application system assigns a session I. The session (4) is internally associated with the access control record used to log into the system and is exported to the entity for use in all further secure storage application commands. The secure storage application system supports two types of sessions, an open session and a security session. The session type associated with a particular authentication process is defined in the access control record. The secure storage application system The session build will be enforced in a manner similar to the enforcement of the challenge itself. Because the access control record defines these entity permissions, this mechanism makes the system designer The secure channel is associated with accessing a specific key ID or invoking a specific access control record management operation (ie, establishing a new access control record and setting authentication). The open session open session is for one session. The period ID identifies but does not encrypt the bus. All the prints and > items are publicly transmitted. This mode of operation is preferably used in a multi-user or multi-entity environment, where the real systems are not The threat model is not part of the eavesdropping on the bus. Although it is not guaranteed that the transmission of the data does not implement an efficient firewall between the host-side applications, the open session mode makes the security The storage application system can only access the information allowed by the currently authenticated access control record. The open session can also be used in a partition or a key system 122366.doc -50- 200822670 To be protected. However, after a valid authentication procedure, access is granted to all entities on the 5H host. Various host applications are required to obtain access to the authenticated access control record. The only thing shared is the session ID. This is not shown in Figure 17A. The steps above line 400 are the steps taken by the host 24. After a real system has authenticated the access control record (block 402) And requesting access to a file associated with a key ID X in the memory device 1 (blocks 4〇4, 406, and 408). If the access control

The permission control record of record 1 allows such access, and the device grants the request (diamond 410). If not allowed, the system returns to block 4〇2. After the authentication is completed, the memory system 1 identifies the entity that is issuing a command only by the assigned session ID (and not the access control record authentication). Once the access control record is associated with the key m associated with the access control record in an open session, any other application or user may specify the host On the 24th, the correct duration of the application is shared by different applications to access the same data. This feature is advantageous in applications where it is more convenient for the user to log in once and have access to all of the accounts associated with different applications for logging in. Therefore, a user of a mobile phone can (4) access the memory (4) _ stored f sub-mail and listen to the stored music ' without multiple logins. On the other hand, the data not contained in the access control record 1 is not accessible. Thus, the same mobile phone user can have valuable content, such as games and photos that can be accessed via the __ separate account access control record 2. This is the information that he does not want to access other people who borrowed his phone, even though he may not mind other people can 122366.doc 200822670 to access the control spleen through his first account. Hey. In the open 曰, the access to the bait is separated into two separate accounts and the access control record is provided for easy use and provides valuable protection. J, in order to make it easier for the program to share the session ID between the host applications, 'when the access control record is requesting—open session, it can explicitly request that the session will be Assign "G" ID. In this way, the application can be designed to use a predefined duration m. The only limit ^, for obvious reasons, is only identifiable at a specific time - is requesting a period of time Take control records. - Zhong recognizes another - is attempting to access the G. The attempt to record the second system will be rejected. In order to add a layer of security during the security session, the session can be used, as shown in the figure. 17B. Next, the memory 1〇 also stores the session ID of the active session. In FIG. 17B, for example, in order to be able to access a file associated with the key ID X, the entity is allowed in the entity. Before accessing the file, the entity will also need to provide a session ID, such as the session ID "A" (blocks 4〇4, 406, 412, and 414). In this way, unless the request system knows the correct Session ID, otherwise it cannot access the memory. The session is deleted after the end of the session and is different for each session, so a real system can only be accessed if it has been able to provide the session number. By using the session number, the program system tracks whether a command is actually from a properly authenticated entity. For those who have an attack of 122366.doc -52. 200822670, an attempt will be made to use an open channel to transmit malicious In the case of threatening applications and usage, the host application uses a security session (a secure channel). When using a secure channel, the session ID and the entire command are encrypted with a secure channel. The key is added, and the security level is as high as the host implementation.

In any of the following cases, a session is terminated and the access control record is logged out: 1 • The real system issues a clear end of session command. 2. The communication time is overdue. A particular entity has not issued any commands during a period of time (as defined by one of the access control record parameters). 3 • Terminate all open sessions after a reset (eg flash memory card) reset and/or power cycle. The Data Integrity Service prostitute full storage application system verifies that the secure storage application data contains all access control records, permission control records, etc., in addition to providing physical data through the secret ID mechanism. If the reading group mismatches its encryption algorithm, the hash value is stored in the content encryption and encryption with the content encryption key. During the write operation period, the value is #^^, and the hash value is stored. The hash system is stored again during the master operation and compared to the value of the previous write operation. Whenever I talk about the secret ID being accessed by each μ topic, 122366.doc -53· 200822670 Additional data (in cryptographic compilation) is concatenated to the old data and updated (for reading or writing) Into the appropriate value of the hash. Since only the host knows about a key ID or a beacon file pointed to by a key ID, the host explicitly manages several aspects of the data integrity function in the following manner: A data file pointed to by a key ID or by a key ID is written or read from beginning to end. Any attempt to access a portion of the file will confuse it because the secure storage application system is using a chain block cipher encryption method and generates a hash message digest of the entire data. 2. There is no need to process data in a continuous stream (the data stream can be interleaved with data streams of other key IDs, and can be divided over multiple sessions), because the middle of the hash value is the security Stored by the application system. However, if the data stream is restarted, the entity will need to explicitly instruct the secure storage application system to reset the hash values. 3. When a read operation is completed, the host explicitly requests the secure storage application system to confirm the hash of the read by comparing the hashes that were read during the hash and the write operation. 4 · The prostitute full storage application system also provides one, set read, and operate. This feature will stream the data through the encryption engine, but will not transfer it to the host. This feature can be used to confirm data integrity before the data is actually retrieved from the device (e. g., a flash memory card). The random number generation of the secure storage application system will enable the external entity to use the internal random number generator and request that the random number be used for the secure storage application. 122366.doc -54- 200822670 Program system is recognized as 0. This service system can be used. Any host uses 'and does not need to authenticate the RSA key pair to generate the secure storage application RSA key pair to create a feature storage application system without authentication. An alternative embodiment would be to enable an external user to use the internal moon-length pair and the key pair to be used outside of this security. This service can be used by any host, and

It does not use the hierarchical structure, as shown in Figure 18. Similar results can be stored in the controller 12 or in memory using a database format shown in Figure 18 containing the maximum number of authentications, authentication methods, failed attempts, and the minimum number of authentications required to unblock the entity. Among the databases in the body 20, the list relates the authentication requirements to the principles implemented in the database implemented by the controller 12 of the memory (for the reading and writing of keys and partitions)

Take, secure channel requirements). Also stored in the database are constraints and restrictions on access keys and partitions. Therefore, some entities (e.g., system administrators) can be on a white list, which means that these entities can access all keys and partitions. Other real systems can be on a black list and their attempts to access any information will be blocked. This restriction may be global' or key and/or partition specific. This means that only certain entities have access to certain keys and partitions, and some entities cannot do so. Constraints can also be placed on the content itself, regardless of the partition in which the content resides or the key used to encrypt or decrypt the content. Therefore, some materials 122366.doc -55- 200822670 (eg 'songs') may have attributes that they can only be accessed by the first 5 devices, or other f-materials (eg, electricity: the gate's _ is read a limited number of times Attributes, regardless of ^ only enough to authenticate 实体 - the entity has access. Password protection code means that you need to submit a password, ^ AL 乂 access to the party protected area. Unless it can not exceed a password, No Μ # 描 心 则 则 则 则 则 则 则 则 则 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码 码The password provided by the host can be checked, that is, the device also has a password stored in the secure memory area of the device. 2. Release and restriction. The password is limited to the replay attack because after each submission The six-code system does not change, so it can be retransmitted in the same way. It means that if the protected data is valuable, then the password should not be used, and the communication bus system is easy to access. The password can be stored in (4) the stored information. The system does not (4) is used to protect data (not a key). In order to increase the security level associated with the password, it can be diversified using a master-controlled gun. The result is (4) - please do not峥The entire system.- A secure communication channel based on the session key can be used to transfer the password. Figure 19 shows the process of using a password for authentication - account ID and password to system 10 (for example, fast) Flash Memory Card 122366.doc -56- 200822670 Check to see if the password matches the password in its memory. If it matches ', then it returns the authenticated status. Otherwise, accumulate the error for the account. Counter, and the real system is required to re-enter - account 1 and secret: If the counter is overflowing, then the system returns the access denied access

Symmetric Key A symmetric key algorithm is meant to be a key. It means that the key should be implemented at each end of the communication by performing an inverse calculation of each other and a decryption algorithm at the other end to communicate. 4 Supervisor The same secret is used at both ends of the secret and decryption. In addition, the law, that is, the encryption at one end. The two ends do not need to implement the two. The symmetric_authentication means that the device (for example, the flash (four) card) and the host share the same secret record and have the same cryptographic compilation algorithm (direct and reverse 'for example, DES and DES-1). Symmetric key authentication means challenge-response (protection prevents replay attacks from being attacked. The protected device generates a challenge for other devices, and both respond to the response. The proof device returns the response, And the protected device checks "Hui response, and accordingly confirms the authentication. Then, the right related to the authentication can be granted. The clock can be: • External: the device (such as a flash memory card) Identifying the external world's, that is, the device confirms - the authentication of a given host or application. • Mutual: creates a challenge on both ends. 122366.doc -57 · 200822670 • Internal · The host application Recognize the device (ie, 1 flash memory card), that is, the host checks whether the device is true for its application. To increase the security level of the entire system (ie, damage) Non-destructive all): • Symmetric key systems usually use a master key to differentiate them. • Mutual authentication uses challenges from both ends to ensure that the challenge is a real challenge. Compilation is also used for encryption because it is a very efficient algorithm, that is, it does not require a powerful central processing unit to handle cryptographic compilation. When used to make a communication channel secure: • Both ends The session key used to secure the channel (ie, encrypt all outgoing data and decrypt all incoming data) must be known. It is usually built using a pre-shared secure symmetric key or using a public key infrastructure. This session key. • Both devices must know and implement the same cryptographic compilation algorithm. The signature symmetric key can also be used for signature data. In this case, the signature is part of the result of Kaohsiung. Part of the allowed signature is as many times as needed without revealing the key value. The release and restriction of the symmetric algorithm is very efficient and secure, but it is based on a pre-common 122366.doc -58- 200822670 Based on this, the release is safely used in a dynamic manner, and may be used to share this secret to make it random (like a one-session key for this sharing secret). You I 0 /T> eve personal. The period is kept safe and it is almost impossible for blood to be shared by multiple people. This /, in order to facilitate this operation, a public key algorithm has been invented, allowing the secret father to change without sharing These secrets. ” Asymmetric authentication procedures based on asymmetric key identification using a series of transmission commands / the final construction of the session key for secure channel communication. The basic agreement for this secure storage application The program system authenticates the user. The protocol change allows for mutual authentication, #, the user must remember the access control record he wants to use; and two-factor authentication. Preferably, the secure storage The application's asymmetric authentication protocol uses the public key infrastructure (ΡΚΙ) and the RSA algorithm. As defined by these algorithms, each party in the program is allowed to establish its own Rs A key pair. Each RSA key pair is composed of a public key and a private key. Because these keys are anonymous, they cannot provide proof of identity. The public key infrastructure layer seeks for a third party and a trusted party's to sign each of the public keys. The public key of the trusted party is pre-shared between the parties who are acquainted with each other 4 and is used to verify the public secrets of such parties. Once the trust is established (the two parties decide that the public key provided by the other party can be trusted), the agreement is continuous authentication (verifying each party to hold the matching private key) and key exchange. This can be implemented by the challenge back shown in Figures 22 and 23, 122366.doc -59-200822670, as described below. The structure of the publicly recorded record containing the signed signature is referred to as a voucher. Signing Trusted parties to these credentials are referred to as Credential Authorization Units (CAs). In order for a party to be authenticated, it has an RS A key pair and a certificate proving the authenticity of the public key. The voucher is signed by a voucher authority that is authorized by another (authenticated) party. The authentication party is expected to have a public key for its trusted certificate authority on its property. The secure storage application system allows a credential chain. This means that the public key of the identified party can be signed by a different credential authority that is trusted by the identifying party. In this case, in addition to providing its own credentials, the identified party also provides credentials for the publicly signed and signed certificate authority. If the second level of credentials is still not trusted by another party (not signed by its trusted certificate authority), a third level of credentials may be provided. In this voucher chain algorithm, each party will hold a complete list of documents that need to be authenticated for their public key. This is shown in Figures 23 and 24. The authentication required for mutual authentication of this type of access control record is the RSA key pair of the selected length. Secure Storage Application Credentials The Secure Storage application uses the [X.509] version 3 digital certificate. [X.509] is a general purpose standard; the secure storage application voucher data file described herein further describes and limits the content of the voucher definition block. The voucher data file is also defined for the credential chain, the confirmation of the secure storage application voucher, and the management of the certificate revocation list (CRL) data file. 122366.doc -60 - 200822670 Trusted hierarchy. The voucher is considered to be public information (as is the internal disclosure secret) and is therefore not encrypted 'however' it contains an RSA signature which verifies that the public key and all other information fields have not been tampered with. [Χ·5〇9] defines each field-field system to be formatted and then uses the DER format for data encoding. Secure Storage Application Credential Overview

The embodiment of the secure storage application credential management architecture shown in Figures 20 and 21 includes an infinite hierarchical hierarchy for the host and for the device up to a three-tier hierarchy for more or less use of the device The number of levels in 3. Host credential hierarchy The device authenticates the host based on two factors: the root credential authorization unit voucher stored in the device (as an access control record authentication, stored when the access control record is created) and f Trial access to the credentials/documents (10) provided by the entity of the device to the particular access control record). For per-access control records, the host credential authority is the root credential authority (this is the credential that resides in the access control record credentials). For example, for a-access control record, the second-hearted authorized unit can also be a "host" certificate authority (level 2) voucher", and for another-access control record, the certificate (4) Unit H Department "Host Root Certificate Authorization Unit Voucher." For each access control record, hold one of the certificates signed by the root certificate authority (or D_ connect the root certificate authority to the terminal entity certificate) Each of the voucher chains - entity 122366.doc • 61 - 200822670 can log in to the access control record, and the corresponding private secrets, such as Bu, ~, are used for the terminal entity and are not kept secret. ― “The knowledge of 1”, the private key issued by the authority of the root certificate can be logged in. The U-owned person (and the corresponding-specific fact-finding system means that the identification of the records in the execution is Stored in the access control record 2:: Author: The issuer of the unit decides. In other words, the root two can manage the storage - ^ host root certificate eight, the root certificate is the secure storage application Being used to start The trusted credential authorization unit of the public key of the entity attempting to verify and enter (host) is full 2. When the access control record is established as the access control record, the P knife is available for this credential. The root of the trust used for the public key infrastructure system' and, therefore, is assumed to be provided by a trusted entity (-parent access control record or manufacturing/configuration trusted environment). The storage application verifies the voucher using its public key to verify the voucher signature. The host root voucher is stored encrypted in a non-volatile memory (not shown) and the device's secret key Preferably, the second system is accessible only by the central processing unit 12 of the system 10 of Figure 1. The host credential key host credential chain is the credential provided to the secure storage application during authentication. Upon completion of the processing of the host credential chain The memory of the host credential key should not be stored in the device. 122366.doc -62- 200822670 Figure 20 illustrates the host certificate hierarchy level architecture of several different host credential chains, as shown in Figure 20. The host certificate can have many different credential chains, of which only three are displayed: A1 · Host Root Credential Authorization Unit Credentials 5〇2, Host i Credential Authorization Unit (Second Level) Credentials 5〇4 and Host Voucher 506; ★ B1·Host root certificate authority unit certificate 5〇2, host n certificate authority unit (second level) certificate 508, host 1 certificate authority unit (third level) certificate 5 10 and host certificate 512; ci·host Root certificate authority unit certificate 5.2, host n certificate authority unit (second level) certificate 508 and host certificate 514. The above three certificate chains A1, B1AC1# display can be used to prove that the host's public key system is There are only two possible host credential chains that are true. Referring to the above-mentioned voucher chain A1 and FIG. 2〇, the public key system in the voucher 504 of the host authority (second level) voucher 504 is made up of the private after And being signed (that is, the funeral is ^. \ an 曰 by adding a summary of the public key),

The host root certificate authority's public key is within the host root certificate authorization 'Xun 502'. In the host Feng ^ i ^ ^ ^ movement from the host public key in 506 is connected by the δ 主机 host 1 vouchers - name, 兮 苐 苐 layer, and) the private key signed The public key of the host 1 credential authorization unit (the -jg button, from the level of \1 ^ ^ ^.) is provided in the certificate of the host 1 certificate authority - and the ancient #, (the first level) voucher 504 . Therefore, the authenticity system of the voucher chain A1 with the host root certificate authorizing the Xingyi right early public key will be able to verify that it owns t Μ > $ is the Vth step, the real system After the host root certificate is used, the host sends the host to the host, and the key is issued to decrypt the key by the & also x unit (second level) voucher 504 122366.doc -63 - 200822670 a public key of the U-name, and comparing the decrypted signed public secret and the unsigned public key of the host 1 certificate authority (second level) voucher 504 transmitted by the host . If the two match ', then the public secret of the host i certificate authority (second level) is authenticated, and the entity will then use the host 1 certificate authority (second level) The public key is recognized to decrypt the public key of the host signed by the private key of the host 1 credential authority (second level) in the host credential 506 transmitted by the host. If the decrypted signature value matches the value of the digest of the public key in the host credential 5 〇 6 transmitted by the host, the public key of the host is then also authenticated. The credential chains B 1 and c丨 can be used in a similar manner for authentication. As noted by the above-described procedure involving the voucher chain gossip, the first public key from the host that needs to be verified by the 4 entity is tied to the key within the host device and the authorized unit (second level), and The early credentials are not authorized for the host root certificate. Therefore, the host only needs to transmit the host credential authority unit (second level) credential 5〇4 and the host credential 5〇6 to the entity, so that the host 1 credential authorization unit (second level) credential will be the credential The first credential to be transmitted in the chain. As shown above, the sequence of voucher verification is as follows. The verification entity (in this case, the memory device 1) first verifies the authenticity of the public key in the first voucher in the voucher chain, which in this case is the voucher below the root voucher authorization unit Credential 504 of the authorized unit. After the public key within such a voucher is verified to be authentic, device 10 proceeds to verify the next voucher, in which case the host is also 506. With the same token, a similar verification sequence can be applied. In 122366.doc -64 - 200822670, the credential chain contains the ancient AM, $, 上 SSE, the certificate of the starting party, and ^ ^ , immediately after Under this root, the interface of the Fengzuo device credential hierarchy of the entity to be authenticated is structured.忒The host system authenticates the device root certificate authority of the device according to two factors: “Fenxu deposits in the host certificate/voucher chain# in the Seto 2 4 & Control record establishment / as - authentication). Used by the host to authenticate the device::: set the above device to identify the host (4), similar device credential chain; device credential chain The access control records the key pair of the record. When the access control record is created, the data is stored separately by the field and the field type, and the certificate is provided to the host one by one during the authentication. The storage application uses these credentials to authenticate the host. The device is capable of processing a voucher chain with 3 credentials, however several credentials other than 3 can be used. The number of credentials varies depending on the access control record. The decision is made when the access control record is created. The device can transmit the credential chain to the host, however, it does not need to analyze them 'because the system does not use the credential chain data. Figure 21 shows the device credential A schematic diagram of a hierarchical structure for displaying different credential chains using a secure storage application for devices such as storage devices. The n different credential chains shown in Figure 21 are as follows: Α2·Device Root Credential Authorization Unit Credentials 520, device 1 voucher authorization unit (manufacturer) voucher 522 and device voucher 524; Β 2 · device root voucher authorization unit voucher 520, device n voucher authorization unit 122366.doc -65- 200822670 (manufacturer) voucher 526 and device voucher 528 The secure storage application cleavage system can be manufactured by In different manufacturers, each manufacturer has its own certificate of the voucher authorization unit. Therefore, it is used in the vouchers for a particular device. The public secret is signed by the manufacturer's private key, and then the manufacturer's public key is signed by the device's root certificate authority's private secret. The public secret of the device is verified. The mode is similar to the case of the public key of the host mentioned above. When the reef is used for the verification of the certificate chain A1 of the host, 'no transfer is required. The device root certificate authorizes the unit voucher, and the first voucher in the voucher chain needs to be transmitted by the device authorization unit (manufacturer) voucher, followed by the device voucher, i is an integer from ...;; In 16 cases, the device will submit two voucher i certificate authority (manufacturer) voucher, followed by its own device; the horse certificate. The device 1 voucher authorization unit (manufacturer) voucher is manufactured as: The manufacturer and the certificate providing the private secret to sign the public key of the device: When the device i certificate authority (manufacturer) certificate is received by the host, the host uses the root it owns The public key of the certificate authority unit is used to decrypt and verify the device i certificate authority (the public key is created. If the verification fails, the host is in the program), and the device is notified that the device has failed.徊 ‘ I % 2, 匕夭 作 又 又 又 又 又 鉴 鉴 鉴 鉴 鉴 鉴 鉴 鉴 主机 主机 主机 主机 主机 主机 主机 主机 主机 主机 主机 主机 主机 主机Then, the similar way 'transfers its own device to be verified by the host... The above verification program is also more detailed "and 23. In Figure 22 122366.doc -66 - 200822670 '" security service model "Group System" is a software module that implements the secure storage application system described herein and other functions described below. The security service module system can be constructed as a software or computer code that is stored in memory 20 Or a database in a π ^ non-volatile memory (not shown) in the central processing unit 12, and is read from the central office at the center of the Τ Τ 敁 早 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 And as shown in Figure 22, there are three phases in the program, wherein the security service module system 542 in the device 1 identifies a host system 54. In the first public security verification phase, the primary (4) The system 54 transmits the security service module: the host credential chain to the security service module system 542. The security service group system 542 uses the host root certificate 548 located in the access control record 55 Root inside The credential authorization unit publicizes the key and verifies (block 55 checks the authenticity of the host credential 544 and the host public key 546. If an intermediate credential authorization unit between the root credential authorized unit and the host is involved 549 Then, at block 552, the intermediate voucher authorization unit 549 is also used for the cousin. If the verification or procedure (block 552) is successful, then the security service module system 542 proceeds to the second phase. The security service module system 542 generates a random number 554 and transmits the random number 554 as a challenge to the host system 54. The system 54 signs the random number 554 using the private key 547 of the system (block 556). And transmitting the signed random number as a response to the challenge. The response is decrypted using the host public key 546 (block 558) and compared to the random number 554 (block 560). Assuming the decryption The challenge response is successful in response to matching the random number 554. 122366.doc -67- 200822670 In the third phase, the random number 562 uses the host public key 546 to The random number 562 is then the session key. The host system 540 can decrypt (block 564) the encrypted random number 562 from the secure service module system 542 by using its private key. Obtaining the session key. With this session key, secure communication between the host system 540 and the security service module system 542 can then be initiated. Figure 22 shows a one-way asymmetric authentication. The host system 540 is authenticated by the security service module system 542 within the device 10. Figure 23 is a protocol diagram showing a two-way mutual authentication procedure similar to the one-way authentication protocol of Figure 22. The security service module system 542 in FIG. 23 is also authenticated by the host system 540. 24 is a diagram of a credential chain 590 in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention. As mentioned above, the credential chain that needs to be submitted for verification can contain several credentials. Thus, the voucher chain of Figure 24 contains a total of nine credentials, all of which may need to be verified for authentication. As explained in the prior art section above, in an existing system for credential verification, an incomplete voucher chain is transmitted, or if the entire voucher is transmitted, and the voucher is not transmitted in any particular order, The recipient will not be able to analyze the credentials until the entire credential group has been received and stored. This is because the number of voucher in a voucher chain is not known in advance. A large amount of storage space may need to be reserved for storing credential chains of unknown length. This can be a problem with the storage device that performs the verification. An embodiment of the present invention is based on the recognition that the problem can be mitigated by the host device transmitting a system of its credential chain in the same order that the credential chain will be verified by the storage device at 122366.doc -68 - 200822670 . Thus, as shown in Figure 24, the voucher chain 590 of the voucher begins with voucher chain 590 (1), which is the voucher immediately below the host root voucher; and ends with voucher 590 (9), which is the host certificate. Thus, device 10 will first verify the public key in voucher 590(1), followed by the verification of the public key in voucher 590(2), and so on, until the host public key in voucher 590(9) It is verified. Next, this completes the verification process for the entire credential chain 590. Thus, if the host device transmits the credential chain 590 to the memory device 10 in the same order or sequence as the credential chain will be verified, the memory device 1 can begin verifying each of the voucheres as they are received. Credentials, without waiting until all nine credentials in the credential chain 590 have been received. Thus, in one embodiment, the host device transmits a credential in the credential chain 590 to the memory device 10 at a time. Next, the memory device 1 will have to store a single voucher at a time. After the voucher has been verified, it can be overwritten by a voucher sent by the host, except for the last voucher in the voucher chain. In this way, at any time, the memory device 1 需要 will need to reserve space for storing only a single credential. The memory device will need to know when the entire credential chain 590 has been received. Therefore, preferably, the last voucher 59 (9) contains an indication or an indication that it is one of the last voucher in the voucher chain. This feature is shown in Figure 25, which shows a table of information for a control section that is transmitted by the host to the credential buffer of the memory device 10. As shown in Figure 25, the control section of voucher 590 (9) contains an argument name, "" is the 'flag' after 122366.doc • 69-200822670. Next, the memory device 10 can check by The "last" flag is set, and the verification voucher 590 (9) is the last voucher in the voucher chain to determine whether the received voucher is the last voucher in the voucher chain. In an alternate embodiment The voucher in the voucher chain 590 may not be transmitted one by one, but may be transmitted in groups containing one, two or three voucher. Obviously, groups or groups with other numbers of voucher may be used. The same number of credentials. Thus, the credential chain 590 contains 5 consecutive credential strings 591, 593, 595, 597, and 5 99. Each of the credential strings contains at least one credential. A continuous credential string contains the following The voucher string of the voucher: the voucher (starting voucher) of the voucher string immediately preceding the voucher string in the voucher chain; the voucher of the voucher string following the voucher string in the voucher chain (end) Voucher) All the voucher between the start voucher and the end voucher. For example, voucher string 593 contains three voucher 590 (2), 590 (3), and 590 (4). The five voucher strings are from the memory device. 10 is verified by the following sequence: 591, 593, 595, 597 and ending with 599. Therefore, if the five credential strings are transmitted and received in the same sequence as the verification performed by the memory device, the memory After the device has been verified, the device will not need to store any of the voucher strings, and all but the last voucher string can be overwritten by the next voucher string from the host. As in the previous implementation For example, it is expected that the last voucher in the voucher chain contains an indication such as a flag, which is set to a specific value to indicate that it is the last voucher in the voucher chain. In this embodiment, the memory The device will only need to reserve enough space to store the maximum number of credentials in the 5 certificate strings 122366.doc -70- 200822670. 5 The device 1 is intended to be transmitted only for the longest credentials, so if the host First of all The credential informs the longest string, the memory device 10 of the tandem enough space.

Preferably, the length of the token θ transmitted by the host and the length of the token in the chain does not exceed 4 times the length of the sacred mountain determined by the certificate. Similarly, preferably, the tagging device 10 transmits to a host device to verify that the length of the public key of the self-remembering device does not exceed 4 of the length of the public key verified by the voucher. Times. The above-described embodiment for verification of the 5 € chain is shown in the flow chart of Fig. 26 wherein, for the sake of simplicity, the number of vouchers per __group (four) is assumed to be i. As shown in FIG. 26, the host sequentially transmits the voucher in the voucher key to the voucher after the voucher voucher, and the host is authenticated as the first voucher in the credential chain (typically, Beginning as described above, the card sequentially receives the credential chain (block 602). Then, the card is checked

Each received certificate is verified, and if any of the certificates fails verification, the program is aborted. If any of the credentials fails to be verified, the card notifies the host (blocks 604, 606). Next, the card detects if the last credential has been received and verified (diamond 608). If the last credential has not been received and verified, the card returns to block 6〇2 to continue receiving and verifying credentials from the host. If the last voucher has been received and verified, the card proceeds to the next stage (610) after the voucher is verified. Although the features in Figure 26 and the following figures refer to memory cards as an example, it should be understood that these features can also be applied to memory devices having a physical form other than a memory card. 122366.doc -71- 200822670 The program implemented by the host while the card is authenticating the host is shown in Figure 27. As shown in Figure 27', the host transmits the voucher to the card (block 620), typically starting with a credential following the root credential. Next, the host determines whether an abort notification (diamond 622) from one of the cards indicating that the authentication failed has been received. If an abort notification has been received, the host stops (block 624). If an abort notification has not been received, the host checks to see if the final flag has been set in the last voucher being transmitted, and checks to see if the voucher chain has been transmitted. A voucher (block 626). If the last voucher has been transmitted, then the host proceeds to the next stage (block 628). As shown in Figures 22 and 23, &#; Then, the session key is established. If the last voucher in the voucher chain has not been transmitted, the host returns to block 620 to transmit the next voucher in the voucher chain. The card is authenticated when the card is being authenticated. And the actions taken by the host are shown in Figures 28 and 29. As shown in Figure 28, after the start, the card waits for a request from the host to transmit one of the credentials in the voucher chain (block 63). 〇, diamond 632). If a request from the host is not received, the card will return to diamond 632. If a request is received from the host, the card will then transmit the next voucher in the voucher chain. Should be The transmission begins (also typically begins with a credential following the root credential) (block 634). The card determines whether a failure has been received from the host (block 636). If received Upon a failure notification, the card is stopped (block 637). If no failure notification is received, the card determines whether the last certificate has been transmitted (diamond 638). If the last document has not been transmitted, then 122366.doc -72 - 200822670 The card returns to diamond 632 and waits until it receives the next request from the host for transmitting the next voucher in the voucher chain. If the last voucher has been transmitted, the card proceeds to the next stage (Block 639) Figure 29 shows the action taken by the host when the card is being authenticated. The host transmits a request for the next voucher in the voucher chain to the card, which is for the The request for the first credential begins (block 640). Next, the host verifies each credential received, and if the verification fails, the program is aborted and the card is notified (block M2). If so, the host checks to see if the last credential has been received and successfully verified (diamond 644). If the last credential has not been received and successfully verified, the host returns to block 640 to transmit an inbound for the credential chain. A request for a voucher. If the last voucher has been received and successfully verified, the host proceeds to the next stage after verification of the voucher (block 646). Voucher Revocation When a voucher is issued, it is expected to be used throughout its validity period. However, various circumstances may result in a voucher becoming 'invalid' before the expiration of the validity period. Such cases include name changes, subject-matter and certificate authority units; and association changes (eg 'one employee terminates an employment relationship with an organization') : and endanger or suspect that the corresponding private key is compromised. In such cases, the certificate authority is required to revoke the certificate. ;^ The secure storage application enables credential revocation in different ways, and each access control record can be configured for a specific method for revoking the voucher. An access control record can be configured to not support an abolition scheme. In this case, the #-voucher is considered valid until its expiration date is 122366.doc -73 - 200822670. Alternatively, a voucher revocation list can be used. As yet another alternative, the two-way scheme may be specific to a particular application, or the features of the application features will be described below. An access control record specifies the abolition scheme used in the three abolition schemes by specifying an abolition value. If the access control record is established to have no abolition scheme, then it is possible for the factory to adopt an abolition scheme that can be initiated by the access control record owner. The abolition of the memory device credentials is enforced by the host: 'not enforced by the secure storage application security system... the access control record owner is responsible for management - the abolition of the host root credentials, with the host root certificate The mechanism of implementation is implemented by updating the credentials of the access control records. The Credential Revocation List (CRL), which uses an abolition scheme, involves the periodic issuance of each credential authority unit called a signed data structure called a voucher revocation list. A voucher revocation list is a time-stamped list that identifies the revoked voucher signed by a voucher authority (the same voucher authority that issued the voucher in question) and is implemented to be freely available to the public. Each-deactivated voucher is identified in a voucher revocation list by its voucher number. The size of the voucher revocation list is arbitrary and depends on the number of revoked unexpired vouchers. When a device uses a credential (e.g., 'for verifying the identity of a host'), the device not only checks the credential signature (and validity)' but also verifies the credential against a list of serial numbers received through a credential revocation list. If the voucher for issuing the voucher authorizes the identification of a document such as a voucher number 122366.doc -74-200822670 identified on the voucher revocation list issued earlier, this indicates that the voucher has been revoked and is no longer valid. The voucher revocation list will also need to be verified as authentic for the purpose of confirming the voucher. The voucher revocation list is signed using the private key of the voucher authority that issued the voucher revocation list, and can be verified as authentic by decrypting the signed voucher revocation list using the voucher authority's public key. If the decrypted voucher revocation list matches the digest of the unsigned voucher revocation list, this means that the voucher revocation list has not been tampered with and is true. The voucher revocation list is usually hashed using a hash algorithm to obtain a summary thereof, and the digests are encrypted by the private key of the voucher authority. In order to verify whether a voucher revocation list is valid, the signed voucher revocation list (ie, the hashed and encrypted voucher revocation list) is decrypted using the voucher authority's public key to obtain a decrypted And a hashed voucher revocation list (ie, a summary of the voucher revocation list). It is then compared to the hashed vouchers list. Therefore, the verification procedure can often involve the step of hashing the voucher revocation list for comparison with the decrypted and hashed voucher revocation list. One of the characteristics of the voucher revocation list scheme is that the confirmation of the voucher (for the voucher revocation list) can be implemented separately from obtaining the voucher revocation list. The voucher revocation list is also signed by the issuer of the appropriate voucher, and in the manner described above, using the public key of the voucher authority that issued the voucher revocation list, the voucher is verified in a similar manner to voucher verification. Abolish the list. The memory device verifies that the signature belongs to the voucher revocation list and the issuer of the voucher revocation list matches the issue of the voucher 122366.doc -75- 200822670. Another feature of the voucher revocation list scheme is that the voucher revocation list can be distributed by means of exactly the same as the voucher itself, i.e., via an untrusted server and untrusted communication. The list of revoked documents and their characteristics are detailed in the X.5〇9 standard. Secure Storage Application Infrastructure for Credential Revocation List The Secure Storage Application uses this voucher to abolish the inventory scheme to provide an infrastructure for host abolition. When an RSA-based access control record is authenticated by the voucher revocation list abolition scheme, the host system will act as one of the additional fields for the voucher revocation list (if the issuer certificate authority does not revoke any voucher, it may be An empty voucher revocation list is added to a set of voucher commands. This field will contain a list of vouchers that are signed by the issuer of the voucher. When this field is present, the memory device 10 first verifies the credentials within the set of credentials commands. Obtaining and accessing the voucher revocation list repository is entirely the responsibility of the host. The voucher revocation list is issued during the period in which it is valid (Certificate Revocation List Expiration Period (CET). During the verification period, if the current time is found to be out of the time period, the voucher revocation list is considered to have Defective, and can not be used for credential verification. Then, the result is that the credential's authentication failed. In the traditional credential verification method, the authentication or verification entity is expected to hold the voucher revocation list or be able to self-certify the unit (CA) extracting the voucher revocation list and comparing the serial number of the voucher submitted for verification to determine whether the submitted voucher has been revoked. In the authentication or verification system, a memory device In this case, the memory device may not have been used by 122366.doc -76- 200822670 for self-certification authority to retrieve the certificate revocation list. If a voucher revocation list is pre-stored in the device, such a list is A voucher that can become expired will not appear on the list after the date of the women's wear. This will enable the user to use the waste. The voucher accesses the storage device. This is undesirable. In one embodiment, the above problem can be solved by a system in which an entity that is to be authenticated submits a voucher revocation list along with the identification to be authenticated. The voucher is given to the authenticating entity, and the authenticating entity can be a memory device 1. The authenticating entity then verifies the authenticity of the received voucher and the voucher revocation list. The authenticating entity checks whether the voucher is identified by checking (such as the serial number of the voucher) appears on the voucher revocation list, and checks if the voucher is on the voucher revocation list. In view of the above, an asymmetric authentication scheme can be used between a host device and memory. Mutual authentication between the body devices 10. The host device that is to be authenticated for the memory device 10 will need to provide its credential chain and corresponding voucher revocation list. On the other hand, the host device has been used. Connecting to the voucher authority to obtain a voucher revocation list, so that when the memory device 10 is to be authenticated by the host device, the memory device does not need to be The certificate revocation list is submitted to the host devices along with its voucher or voucher chain. In recent years, there have been an expanded number of different types of portable devices that can be used to play content, such as different built-in or stand-alone music players, -3 Players, mobile phones, personal digital assistants, and notebook computers. Although it is possible to connect such devices to the World Wide Web (WWW) to access the voucher verification list from a voucher authority, typically many users do not connect daily. 122366.doc -77- 200822670 Only connect to b疋 to get new content or update order (such as every few weeks) from one or two so 'for such users, it must be more frequent:: Abolishing the list may be cumbersome. For the user, 'the storage device itself can be stored in the lower area and the voucher revocation list and: ", and it will need to be raised $ = storage device to access the The key to the health of the time.

Among the storage devices (e.g., flash memory), the unprotected areas of the storage devices are managed by the host device rather than being managed by the storage devices themselves. In this way, it is not necessary for the user (to the host device) to be connected to the network to obtain more up-to-date voucher revocation lists. The host device may only retrieve such a beacon from the unsecured area of the storage device and then redirect and submit such credentials and lists to the health or memory device to access the protected device. content. Because the credentials used to access the protected content and their corresponding voucher revocation list are typically valid for a certain period of time, the user will not need to obtain the most recent voucher or voucher revocation list as long as the system is still valid. . The above features enable the user to conveniently access the voucher and voucher revocation list for a relatively long period of time when the voucher and voucher revocation list are valid, without the need to connect to the voucher authority for updated information. The above procedure is shown in the flowcharts of Figs. As shown in Figure 3, the host 24 reads from the unsecure open area of the memory device 10 a certificate revocation list that the host will submit to the memory device for authenticating one of the credentials (block 652). Since the voucher revocation list is stored in an unsafe area of the memory, it is not required to be authenticated if the voucher revocation list can be known by the main machine. Since the voucher revocation list is stored in the public area of the memory device, the reading of the voucher revocation list is controlled by the host device 24. Next, the host transmits a voucher revocation list along with the voucher to be verified to the memory device (block 654) and proceeds to the next stage 'unless it receives a failure notification from the memory device 10 (block 656). Referring to Figure 31, the memory device receives a voucher revocation list and credentials from the host (block 658) and checks if the voucher number is on the voucher revocation list (block 660), and other aspects (e.g., whether The voucher revocation list has expired). If the serial number of the voucher is found on the voucher revocation list or fails for other reasons, the memory device transmits a failure notification to the host (block 662). In this way, different hosts can obtain a list of voucher revocations stored in the public area of the memory device, since the same voucher revocation list can be used for identification by different hosts. As described above, for the convenience of the user, the certificate to be verified using the voucher revocation list may preferably be stored in the unsafe area of the memory device 1 together with the voucher list. However, the system can be used for authentication of the memory device by the host that is only issued by the voucher. In the case where the voucher revocation list is included in the field for the next update time, as shown in FIG. 32, the secure storage application system in the device 10 also checks the current time against the time to see See if the current time is after this time; if it is, then the recognition will also fail. Therefore, in a good manner, the secure storage application checks the time of the update 122366.doc -79-200822670 and the abolition of the voucher against the current time (or the time received by the memory device 10 against the child voucher list). The expiration date of the list. It is time consuming. The applicant system recognizes that the procedure can be quickly executed by processing (searching for and expediting) the portion of the voucher when it is received, so that when the last part of the voucher revocation list is received, The program is about to be completed. As stated in the article, if the voucher revocation list contains long-term abolition voucher identification, it is possible to process (eg, hash) and search the list for the serial number of the voucher submitted by the host. The situation and implementation of the search system are τ. Therefore, in order to speed up the process, the processing and search system can (4) the day building m. If the whole (four) certificate abolition list needs to be received before it is processed and searched, the program can also

Figures 33 and 34 show the features of the abolition scheme described above. At the authentication entity (e.g., - such as a memory card memory), the voucher and voucher revocation list is received from the entity that is to be authenticated (block 7〇2). The portion of the unencrypted voucher revocation list is processed (e.g., hashed) and the identification of the voucher (e.g., serial number) in the submitted portion is also searched for. The processed (e.g., hashed) voucher revocation list portion is compiled into a hashed complete voucher revocation list that is compared to the complete decrypted and hashed voucher revocation list, the complete decrypted and The hashed vouchers list is formed by the portion of the revoked vouchers that are compiled from the portions of the entity that are to be authenticated. If the comparison indicates that there is no match in the comparison, the authentication system fails. The authenticating entity also checks the next-update (four) and the expired maturity period (block 706 708) against the current time. For example, the identification of the submitted voucher 122366.doc 200822670 is found on the voucher revocation list, or if the current time is not good enough, you are not within the expiration date of the o'clock certificate revocation list, or if the next time has expired The dispute, % tour, and the time when the certificate is abolished (block 710), the authentication also fails. In some embodiments, the portion of the quarantine list that is stored for compilation and the portion of the cryptographic vouchers that are decrypted may not require a large amount of memory space. , ~

When an entity (e.g., the host) wants to be authenticated, it will transmit its voucher and voucher revocation list to the authenticating entity (block 722) and proceed to the next stage (block 7 2 4). This is shown in Figure 34. If the real system submits a credential chain for authentication, a procedure similar to that described above can be implemented. In this event, the above procedure will need to be repeated for each voucher in the voucher chain along with its corresponding voucher revocation list. Each voucher and its voucher revocation list can be processed as it is received, without waiting to receive the remaining voucher in the voucher chain and its corresponding voucher revocation list. Identity Object (IDO) An identity object is a protected object that is designed to allow a memory device, such as a flash memory card, to store an RSA key pair or other type of weight compilation ID. The identity object contains any type of cryptographic compilation m that can be used to sign and verify identity, as well as encrypt and decrypt data. The identity object also contains a voucher from a voucher authority (or a voucher chain from a plurality of trusted authorities) to verify that the public key within the pair is authentic. The identity object can be used to provide identification of an external entity or an internal card entity (i.e., the device itself, an internal application, etc., known as the owner of the legacy identity object). Therefore, the card is not transparent to 122366.doc -81- 200822670 (a challenge response mechanism uses the RSA key pair or other type of password to compile the ID to authenticate the host, but instead uses the signature to provide the data stream to it as In other words, the identity object contains the cryptographic ID of its owner. In order to access the cryptographic compilation within the identity object, the host will first need to be authenticated. As described above, the authentication program is Controlled by an access control record. After the host system has been successfully authenticated, the identity object owner can use the password to compile the ID to establish the identity of the owner for another party. For example, the password The compiled ID (eg, a private key of a public-private key pair) can be used to sign information submitted by other parties through the host. The signed material and the credentials in the identity object represent the identity object. The owner submits to the other party. The certificate authority (ie, a trusted authority) verifies that the public key of the public-private key pair in the certificate is true. So that other parties can trust the public key to be true ^ then 'other parties can use the public key in the voucher to decrypt the signed material, and compare (10) the decrypted material with the other party If the information of the solution matches the information transmitted by other parties, it means that the owner of the identity object really has the right to access the real private secret, and thus the entity it represents The authenticity of the identity object - the second use of the password is used to compile the information such as the secret key itself to protect the owner of the identity object. The poor material is expected to be encrypted using the identity object to disclose the secret wheel. The memory device 10, such as a memory card, will use the private secret record to decrypt the object of the asset 122366.doc-82-200822670. Object system - can be established for any type of access control record. In the embodiment of the product / I, an access control record can have only - i stomach read signature and protection features are both secure storage applications

\ HSupply, " Any entity that is sufficient to authenticate the access control record. The protection level of the injured object is the same as the login identification of the access control record. For the warp to have - identity object - access control * table can & select any authentication algorithm. The creator (host) decides and evaluates (4). The algorithm can best protect the identity object usage. An access control record of an injurious article provides its credential chain in response to an order to obtain the public key of the identity object. When the identity object is being used for data protection, the decrypted data output from the card may require further protection. In this case, the host is encouraged to use a secure channel built by any of the available authentication algorithms. When the field establishes the identity object, the key length and the PKCS#1 version are selected. In one embodiment, the public key and the private key are being represented using (index, modulus) as defined by PKCS #1 version 2.1. In one embodiment, the data contained during the establishment of an identity object is an RSA key pair of a selected length and a credential chain that reverts to prove the authenticity of the public key. An access control record with this identity object will allow the user to sign the profile. This is implemented through two secure storage application commands: • Set user profile • Provide a free-form data buffer that will be signed. 122366.doc -83- 200822670 • Obtain a secure storage application signature: The card will provide an RSA signature (using the access control to record the private key). Depending on the type of object, the format and size of the signature can be set according to PKCS#1 version 1.5 or version 2.1. The operation of using an identity object is shown in Figures 35 through 3 7, wherein the memory device 10 is a flash memory card and the card is the owner of the identity object. Figure 35 is a diagram showing the procedure for implementing the data transmitted by the card to a host. Referring to FIG. 35, after a host is authenticated (block 8〇2), as controlled by one of the access control records at one of the nodes of the tree structure, the card is waiting for one of the credentials of a host request ( Diamond 8〇4). After receiving the request, the card transmits the voucher and returns to diamond 8〇4 for the next host request (block 806). If a voucher chain needs to be transmitted to verify the public key of the identity object owned by the card, the above action is repeated until all credentials in the voucher chain have been transferred to the host. After each voucher has been transferred to the host, the card waits for its command (diamond_) from the host. If the command from the host is not received during the pre-set period, then the card returns to the data (10) 4β when receiving the data from the host and the - command checks to see if the command is used for signature data ( Diamond 8Η)). If the command is for signature data, the card signs the material with the private key in the identity object and then transmits the signed material to the host (block 812)' and returns to diamond 8.4. If the command from the host is not used to sign material from the host, the card uses the private (4) in the identity object to decrypt the received data (block 814) and returns to diamond 8.4. 122366.doc -84 - 200822670 Figure 3 6 shows the program implemented by the host when the card signature data is transferred to the host. Referring to Figure 36, the host transmits authentication information to the card (block 822). After successful authentication controlled by one of the access control records at one of the nodes of one of the tree structures above, the host transmits a request to the card for use in the credential chain and receives the credential chain (block 824). After the public key of the card has been verified, the host transmits the data to the card for signature and receives the information signed by the private key of the card (block 820). Figure 37 is a diagram showing the procedure implemented by the host when the host decrypts the material using the card's public key and transmits the decrypted material to the card. Referring to Figure 37, the host transmits authentication information to the card (block %2). After successfully implementing the authentication by the access control record control, the host transmits a request to the card to request a credential chain (block 864) that is required to verify the public key of the card within the identity object. And send a request to the card to request information. After the public key of the card in the identity object has been verified, the host encrypts the material from the card using the verified public key of the card and transmits it to the card (blocks 866, 868). Query Hosts and application systems need to hold certain information about the memory devices or cards they are working together to perform the system operations. For example, the host and the application may need to know that the application is stored on the card (4) (4) and the application system is available for calling (-). The information required by the host is sometimes not public = 'the knowledge' means that not every real system has the right to own it. : To identify authorized and unauthorized users, you need to provide two methods that can be used by the host. 122366.doc -85- 200822670 General Information Enquiries This inquiry discloses system public information, and 1 ... restricts the confidential information stored in these memory devices to include two parts. # m * 丨U 丨 · · · · · And a non-shared part. Part of this confidential information contains information that may be specific to an individual entity, such that each entity is allowed to access only its own proprietary information and not to access proprietary confidential information of other entities. Such confidential information types are not shared and form an unshared portion of the confidential information. Certain information that is often thought of as being public is in some cases a name that may be considered confidential, such as the name of an application residing on the card and its life cycle state. Another example of this is the root access control record name, which is considered public #, but can be confidential for some secure storage application usage. For these cases, the Xiao system should provide an option in response to the general Beixun query. This information can only be used by all authenticated users, but it cannot be used by unidentified users. Such information constitutes a common part of the confidential information. An example of a shared portion of the confidential information may include a list of access control records, i.e., a list of all root access control records currently present on the device. Accessing the public information through the general information inquiry does not require the host/user to log in to an access control record. Therefore, any entity with knowledge of secure storage application standards can execute and receive this information. In the case of a secure storage application, this query command is placed under a no-session number. However, if it is desired to have access to the shared portion of the confidential information by an entity, then the entity must first be authenticated by any control structure (e.g., any access control record) that controls access to the data within the memory device. After successful identification, 122366.doc 86 - 200822670, the entity will be able to access the shared portion of the confidential information through general information enquiries. As explained above, the authentication procedure will result in accessing one of the secure storage application session numbers or IDs. Cautious Information Enquiries Private information about individual access control records and their system access and assets is considered prudent and requires identification. Therefore, such an inquiry is required to perform an access control record entry and authentication (if the authentication is specified by the access control record) before receiving the authorization for the information inquiry. This query requires a secure storage application session number. Before describing two types of queries in detail, it would be useful to first describe the concept of index groups as a practical solution for implementing such queries. Index Group The application executed on the possible secure storage application host is specified by the operating system and system driver requirements on the host. Next, this means that the host application needs to know how many segments need to be read for each secure storage application read operation. Because the nature of the query operation is intended to supply information that is not normally known to an entity requesting information, it is difficult for the host application to publish the query and guess the number of segments required for the operation. To solve this problem, the female full storage application query output buffer contains only one section (512 octets) per query request. Objects that are part of the output information are organized into groups called index groups. Each type of object can have a different byte size from 122366.doc -87-200822670, taking into account the number of objects that can be adapted to a single segment. This defines the object to be dry < 宗弓I group. If an object has a size of a fine byte, then the object is used for 25 objects. If there are a total of 56 such objects, it will have been organized into 3 index groups, where the object "〇,, (the first object) starts the first index group, the object "25" The second index group and the object "5〇" starts with the third and is the last index group. System Enquiry (General Information Enquiry) This inquiry provides general public information about the supported secure storage application system and the current system being set up in the device, such as the tree and application executed in the installation. Similar to the access control record query (careful query) described below, the system query is structured to give the number: Query Options: • General - Secure Storage Application Support Version. i. • Secure Storage Application - A list of all security storage applications currently appearing on the device, including their execution status. The information listed above is public information. As the access control record query 'in order for the host to not need to know how many segments to read for the query output buffer' will have - the segment returned from the device, while still enabling the host to step into the query Additional index group. Therefore, if the number of root access control record objects exceeds the number of output buffer sizes used to index the group "〇, then the host can send another query request to the next index group "丨. Access Control Record Query (Cautious Information Query) 122366.doc -88 - 200822670 The Secure Storage Application Access Control Record Query command is intended to provide information about the system resources of the access control record user regarding the access control record. Is a secret record and application Π), partition and child access control records. The query information is only about the login access control record and not about other access control records on the system tree. In other words, the access is limited to the portion of the confidential information that is accessible only under the authority of the access control record involved. The user can query the following three different access control record objects: • Partition - Name and access rights (owner, read, write). • Key 1D and application ID - name and access rights (owner, read 'write). • Child Access Control Record - The access control record and access control record group name of a direct child access control record. • Identity objects and security data objects (names and access rights (owner, read, write) are described below. The number of objects connected to an access control record can vary, and the number of funds: may exceed 512 a byte (a segment). Without knowing the number of objects in advance: s, the user cannot know how many segments need to be read from the secure storage application system in the device to obtain all Each item list provided by the secure storage system m (4) is a right-hand index group, which is similar to the above-mentioned system query. The cable 51 group is adapted to the number of objects in the segment. How many items are transferred from a secure storage application system within the device to a remote host in a segment. This enables the female storage application system 122366.doc -89-200822670 to transmit a requested request. A segment of the index group. The host/user collects a buffer of the object to be queried, and the number of objects in the buffer. If the buffer is full, the user can query Next thing Index Group Figure 38 shows a flow diagram of operations involving a general information query. Referring to Figure 38, when the secure storage application system receives a general information query from an entity (block 902), the system determines whether the entity is the entity. Has been authenticated (diamond 904). If the entity has been authenticated, the system supplies the entity with the public information and the shared portion of the confidential information (block 9〇6). If the entity has not been authenticated, then The system supplies the entity with only public information (block 908). Figure 39 is a flowchart that illustrates the operation of a cautious information query. Referring to Figure 39, when the secure storage application system receives a cautious from an entity When the information is queried (block 922), the system determines if the entity has been identified (diamond 924). If the entity has been authenticated, the system supplies the entity with confidential information (block 926). If the entity has not been In the case of authentication, the system denies the entity access to confidential information (block 928). Feature Group Extension (FSE) owes in many cases, the security is performed on the card The two-batch processing activity within the application (eg, 'DRM usage rights object confirmation) is very advantageous compared to all data processing work performed on the host's alternative solution, the resulting system will be more secure, More efficient and less dependent on the host. The θH Secure Storage Application Security System consists of a set of authentication algorithms and the 122366.doc 200822670 authorization principle, which is designed to control access and use by the memory. a collection of objects stored, managed, and protected by the card. Once a host gains access, the host will then process the data stored in the memory device, wherein accessing the memory device is controlled by the security Save the application. However, it is assumed that the data is very application-specific and, therefore, the data format and data processing system are not defined in the secure storage application. Information on such devices. One embodiment of the present invention is based on the recognition that the secure storage application system can be enhanced to allow the host to perform some of the functions typically performed by hosts within the memory card. Thus, some of the software applications of such hosts can be split into two parts: still part of the implementation of the host; and another part of the implementation now implemented by the card. For many applications, this enhances the security and efficiency of data processing. For this purpose, a mechanism called feature set extension can be added to enhance the capabilities of the secure storage application. In this context, the feature level extension performed by the card in this way

The host application in /V is also known as an internal application or an internal application. ... The enhanced secure storage application system provides a mechanism for extending the basic secure storage application command group, which provides authentication and access control of the card through the import card application. _ card should be assumed to be = a service other than the service of the money storage application (for example, 眶 mechanism, e-commerce). The application line feature extension system is a mechanism designed to enhance the security system of a quasi-secure storage application with a data processing software/hardware module, which can be exclusive to 122366.doc-91. 200822670. The card can be queried by using the information obtained by the above query for the service to enable the host device to use, select and communicate with a specific 庑田= expression. The above-mentioned general query and cautious query can be used to secure the feature of the secure storage application feature group extension of the target group extension card. • Provide the service - this feature is implemented by allowing the authorized entity to use, a communication channel The (pipe) command channel communicates directly with the internal application, and the communication pipe can be proprietary. 1 1 Extension of the standard access control principle for secure storage applications - The way to implement this specialization is by associating internal protected data objects (eg, secrets, security data objects (SD〇) described below) Two applications. Whenever such an object is accessed, if the safe storage system is used, then the heartbeat is in addition to using the standard safe storage application principles = at least one condition. Preferably, this condition will not conflict with the standards of these standard security application principles. It is only necessary to be able to access it under the conditions of this additional stop. Before proceeding with further details on the extension of the feature set, the feature set extension and the architectural aspect of the communication tube will now be explained. ^ and with Wang Bei Security Service Module (SSM) and related modules = memory device, such as a flash memory card, connected to the machine block 24 heart, Qian Zicong's functional block diagram, to release the hair 122366.doc -92- 200822670 An embodiment of the invention. The main components of the software module in the memory device of the card 20 are as follows: Secure Storage Application Transport Layer 1002

The secure storage application transport layer is card-dependent. It handles the host-side secure storage application request (command) on the protocol layer of the card and then relays it to the security service module API. All host-card synchronization and secure storage application command identification is implemented within this module. The transport layer is also responsible for all data transfers between the host 24 and the card 10. Security Service Module Core (SSM Core) 1004 This module is an important part of this secure storage application implementation. The security service module core implements the secure storage application architecture. More specifically, the security service module core implements the secure storage application tree and the access control record system, and all the corresponding rules constituting the system, the full-service module core module uses a password compilation library. 2, to support the secure storage application security and password compilation features, such as encryption, decryption and hashing. Security Service Module Core API ι〇〇6 This host and (4) application will be interfaced to the core of the security service module to implement a secure storage application layer. As shown in Figure, the host 24 and device (4) applications will use the same port. The security application administrator module (samm) i〇〇8 security application program is not part of the secure storage application system, but it is the internal application of the control interface system. The + meat recognizes an important module in the 9th & & & 122366.doc -93- 200822670 The application of the security application administrator module, which includes: internal execution of all devices 1. Application lifecycle monitoring and control. 2 · Application initialization. 3. Application/Host/Security Services Module Interface. The device internal application 1010 ί \ device internal application is approved for execution on the card side of the application. The internal applications of these devices are managed by the security application administrator module, and the security storage application can be accessed. The core of the security service module also provides a communication channel between the host applications and the internal applications. Examples of such internal execution applications are DRM applications and single-passwords (〇ne time passw〇rd; applications, as further explained below. Device Management System (DMS) lll 1 This module contains one after the other The system and application firmware for updating the card and the processing procedures and agreements required to add/remove the service in the shipping (commonly referred to as post-release) mode. Figure 40B is the internal software module of the security service module core 1004. As shown in FIG. 40B, the core 1004 includes a secure storage application command handler handler 22. The processing routine 1〇22 is transmitted to the secure storage application administrator. Prior to 1024, the secure storage application commands originating from the host or originating from the device internal application 1010 are parsed. All securely stored application security data structures (such as access control record groups and access control records) and 122366.doc -94- 200822670 There are secure storage application rules and principles stored in the secure storage application database. The misplaced application administrator performs the control exercised by the access control records and access control record groups and other control structures in the database 1. Other objects (such as identity objects) and security information The objects are also stored in the secure storage application database 1 〇 26. The secure storage application manager 1 实行 24 implements the access control record and access control record group and stores it in the database 1026. Control by other control structures. The secure storage application non-secure operating module 1028 handles non-secure operations that do not involve a secure storage application. The secure storage application security operating module 1030 handles the secure storage application. The security operation in the program architecture. The module 1032 is a connection module 1〇3〇 to the interface of the password compilation library 1〇12. The module 1034 is a connection module 1026 and 1〇28 to the flash in FIG. Layer 2 of memory. Communication (or Pass-Through) pipelines are controlled by the security service module core and the security application administrator module. The track object enables an entity on the authorized host to communicate with the internal application. The data transfer between the host and the internal application is performed via the SEND and RECEIVE commands (defined below). The actual command is applied. Program-specific. The entity that created the pipeline (access control record) will need to provide the pipe name and the ID of the application that will open a channel to it. As with all other protected objects, the access control record becomes Its owner, and is permitted to delegate usage rights and ownership rights to other access control records according to standard delegation rules and restrictions 122366.doc -95- 200822670. If the crEATE_pipe privilege is set in the access control record attribute management of the authenticated entity, then the ciphered entity will be allowed to build: the pipe object. Communication with internal applications is allowed only if the entity's permission control record (4) is written or read pipe permissions. ^ Ownership and access delegation are allowed only if the pipeline owner of the real system or delegate access is set in the entity's privilege control record. As with all other rights, when delegated ownership to another access control record, preferably, the owner has all rights to the application (4). Preferably, for a specific application, only one communication pipe is established. Preferably, the attempt to establish a second pipe and connect the second pipe to the already connected application private will be rejected by the security service module system. Therefore, preferably, there is a one-to-one relationship between one of the internal application programs of the devices and a communication pipe. However, multiple access control records can be communicated to an internal application (through a delegation mechanism). A single access control σ has been recorded to communicate with several device applications (through delegation or ownership of multiple pipes connected to different applications). Preferably, the access control records that control different official channels are located on nodes of a completely separate tree such that there is no crosstalk between the communication pipes. Transferring data between the host and a particular application is performed using the following commands: • WRITE pASS THROUGH - An unformatted data buffer will be transferred from the host to the internal application of the device. 122366.doc -96· 200822670 • READ PASS THROUGH - An unformatted data buffer will be transferred from the host to the internal application of the device, and once. Hai. The P processing is completed and an unformatted data buffer is output back to the host. The write transfer command and the read transfer command provide a means for the host to communicate with the internal application 1010 as a parameter. The entity authority will be confirmed, and if the requesting entity (that is, the access control record that the master is using the session) has the right to use the pipe connected to the requested application, then The data buffer will be interrupted and the command will be executed. The communication method allows the host application to access the control record session channel to transmit the vendor/specific specific command to an internal device application through the secure storage application. Safety Data Object (SDO) A useful item that can be used in conjunction with a feature set extension is a safety data item. ' [The prostitute data item is used as a general purpose container for the safe storage of sensitive information. Similar to a content encryption key object, it is owned by an access control record and can delegate access and ownership between access control records. The safety data item contains information that is protected and used in accordance with pre-defined principles and, optionally, has a link to an internal application 1 〇〇8. Preferably, the sensitive material is not used or interpreted by the secure storage application system, but is used or interpreted by the owner and user of the object. In other words, the secure storage application system does not identify the information in the data it disposes. In this way, when the data is transferred between the host and the data object such as 122366.doc-97-200822670, the owner and user of the data in the object can be attributed to the secure storage application. Loss of sensitive information caused by the system. Therefore, the host system (or internal application) of the secure data object system is established and assigned—(d), similar to the way in which content encryption is established. At the time of establishment, the host provides an application linked to the secure data object in addition to the name.

The type of ID and the data block that will be stored, integrity verified and received by the secure material program. Similar to content encryption secrets, security data objects are preferably created only during a secure storage application session. The access control record used to open the session becomes the owner of the secure data object, and has the right to delete the secure data object, write and read sensitive data, and delegate ownership and access to the secure data object. Permission to another access control record (for its children or within the same access control record group). These writers and read operations are reserved exclusively for the owner of the secure data item. - For write operations, provide a data buffer to overwrite the object data of the existing security data object. - The read operation will retrieve a complete data record of the safety data item. Allowing appropriate access rights (4) Owner access control records for secure access to the operating system. The following operations are defined: • SDO Set, the application is defined: the data will be processed by the internal secure storage application with the application. By associating with the safety data item. As the option (4), (4) the program will use the safety data 122366.doc -98- 200822670 pieces 0 SDO Set (safe data object setting), application system null (null) · This option is invalid, and will prompt one Inappropriate command error. This is an internal application that is executed on the card at π 7. • The SD Email Security Profile is obtained), the application ID is defined • The request will be processed by the device's internal application with the application ID. The application is associated with the security data object. The output (although not defined) will be passed back to the requester. The application will optionally read the security data object. SDO Get, the application is null: This option is invalid 'and will prompt - illegal command error. The Get command requires an internal application to execute on the card. Queen > Item related permissions: an access control record can be a security data object owner or just have access rights (Set, Gd, or both) In addition, an access control record can be allowed to pass for Access to the secure data item owned by the owner to another access control record. If an access control record has access control record attribute management rights, the access control record can be explicitly permitted to establish a secure data object and delegate access rights. Session Keys An internal access control record is similar to any access control record that has an access control record, except that an entity outside the device cannot log into the access control record. Rather, when the object under the control of the secure storage application manager 1024 of FIG. 4B or the application associated with it is invoked 122366.doc -99-200822670, the secure storage shore of FIG. 40B W-Tip Application Manager 1〇24 automatically logs in to the internal access control record. Because the qi μ 触 触 触 触 为 为 θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ 获得 获得 获得 获得 获得 获得 获得 获得 θ 获得 θ 获得 获得 θ θ 获得 θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ The Security Application Administrator 1024 will only delay the internal key to the internal access control record to enable internal communication. Two examples will be used to show the ability to extend feature sets: single-password generation, digital rights management. Before describing the example of a single (four) generation, the first

Explain the release of two-factor authentication. Two-factor authentication (DFA) Two-factor authentication is a recognition agreement designed to add an additional secret-second factor to standard user authentication (ie, User name and password), and Xiao Qiang personally logs in (for example, the security of the service server. The third (four) is typically something stored by the user in the physical entity of the poem. During the boarding process, the user is required to provide a proof of possession as part of the boarding pass. A common way of proof is to use a single password, which is only suitable for a single-login password. It is generated and output by the security token. If the user can provide the correct one-time password, it is considered to be sufficient to prove the possession of the token C, because there is no password compilation under the token. Calculating the single password is not practicable. Since the single password is only suitable for single sign-on, the user should have the token when logging in, because the old password captured from a previous login is used. will Valid again. The products described in the following paragraphs use the Secure Storage Application Security 122366.doc -100- 200822670 data structure, plus a feature set extension design to calculate the next password in the single password series to Implementing a multiple-, virtual "security token, the Shanyin Jishen card, each token generates a different series of passwords (which can be used to log in to different web sites). One of the system's block diagrams The complete system 1050 shown in FIG. 41 includes an authentication server 1〇52, an internet server 1054, and a user 1〇56 having a token 1058. The first step is to agree with the authentication server and A shared secret (also known as seed provisioning) between the users. The user 1056 will request a secret or seed to be posted and will store it in the security token 1 58. Next step The system issues a secret or seed to a specific web service server. Once the system is completed, the authentication takes place. The user will instruct the token to generate a single password. With the username and password. The secondary password is transmitted to the Internet server 1054. The Internet server 1〇54 forwards the single password to the authentication server 1052, requesting it to verify the user's m. The authentication server A single password will also be generated, and since the single password is generated from a shared secret along with the token, it should match the single password generated from the token. If a match is found, then The user's ID is verified, and the authentication server will send back a positive confirmation to the internet server 1054, and the internet server 1 54 will complete the user login procedure. The feature set extension implementation for single-password generation has the following characteristics: • Securely store (encrypt) the single-password seed within the card. 122366.doc -101 - 200822670 After the code generation algorithm is attached to the card Execution inside. One: The π! device 10 can simulate the presence of multiple virtual tokens, each of the virtual tokens, and can generate algorithms using different passwords. The 亥 装置 装置 1 提供 提供 提供 提供 提供 提供 提供 提供 提供 提供 提供 提供 提供 提供 提供 提供 提供 提供 宁 女王 女王 女王 女王 女王 女王 女王 女王 女王 女王 女王 女王 女王 女王 女王 女王= Single-Pass Seed Provisioning and Single-Secure Secure Storage Application: The style feature is shown in Figure 42, where the solid arrow indicates ownership or access, and the dashed arrow indicates relevance or link. As shown in FIG. 42, in the secure storage application feature group extension system _, the software code feature group extension 1102 can be accessed through one or more communication pipes 1104, and the communication pipe U04 is controlled by an application access. Control each of the records. In the following embodiments, only the feature set extension software application is shown, and for each feature set extension application, there is only one communication pipe. However, it should be understood that more than one feature set extension application can be utilized. Although Figure 42 shows only one communication pipe, it should be understood that a plurality of communication pipes can be used. All such changes are possible. Referring to Figures 40A, 40B, and 42, the feature set extension 11〇2 can be used for a single-mass supply application and form a subset s of the device internal application 1010 of Figure 4GA. The control structure (access control records 11 〇 1, 11 (10), 1106, mo) is part of the secure data structure within the secure storage application and is stored in the secure storage application database 1 〇 26. The data structures such as the identity object 1120, the identity object 1122, and the communication channel 11〇4 are also stored in the secure storage application database 1〇26 366122366.doc -102-200822670 > Figure 4GA and 4GB' are involved These access control records and data structures: security-related operations (such as data transfer during the session, and operations such as adding and hashing) are supported by interfaces such as 2 and password compilation libraries. Dispose of in 〇3〇. The security service module core API 1 does not distinguish between the operation of the access control record (external access control record) that interacts with the host and the internal access control that does not interact with the host. There is no difference in the operation involving the host relative to the operation of the internal application ΠΠ0. In this way, the access controlled by the host entity and the access control implemented by the internal application __ use the same control mechanism. This results in a resiliency for (4) data processing between the host-side application knowledge and the device internal application 1010. The internal applications 1010 (e.g., the feature set extensions in Figure 42 are associated with the internal access control records (e.g., access control records 1103 in Figure 42) and are traversed by the internal access control records. The control is invoked. Furthermore, the security data structures of the access control records and access control record groups with associated security storage application rules and principles preferably control access to important information. Information such as content in a secure data item or information that can be derived from content within a secure data item enables an external or internal application to access the content or information only in accordance with the rules and principles of the secure storage application. In other words, if two different users can call an individual device internal application of the device internal application 1010 to process the data, the internal access control records located in a separate tree hierarchy are used to control the two. The user implemented the two 122366.doc -103 - 200822670 to take 'so that there is no crosstalk between them. In this way, the two users The ability to access a common set of device internal applications for processing data without fear of loss of control over the content or information by the owner of the content or information within the secure data object. For example, Access to the secure data object data accessed by the device internal application 1010 can be controlled by access control records located within a separate tree hierarchy such that there is no crosstalk between them. Similar to the manner in which the secure storage application controls access to data. This provides security for the content owner and user to store the data stored in the data object. Referring to Figure 42, for the single password related host application A portion of the software application code required by the program is stored (eg, pre-stored prior to the memory card is issued or loaded after the memory card is released) in the memory device 10 as an application system within the feature set extension 1102. Possibly. In order to execute such a code, the host will first need to access one of the N authenticated access control records 1106. Authentication (N is a positive integer) to gain access to pipe 1104. The host will also need to provide an application m for identifying the application associated with the single password associated with it. After recognition, such code can be accessed for execution via the pipeline 11〇4 associated with the single password-related application. As noted above, preferably, between a pipe 1104 and A specific application (such as a single-password-related internal application) has a 丨-parallel relationship. If not in Figure 42, multiple access control records 11 〇 6 may share control of a common pipe 1104. Control records can also control more than one pipe. Figure 42 shows the safety data object, collectively referred to as object 1114, safety information 122366.doc • 104· 200822670 object 2 and safety data item 3, each containing data, such as for A single password produces a seed that is valuable and preferably encrypted. The link or association between the three data objects and the feature set extension 1102 indicates that the attributes of the objects are: when accessing any of the objects, the attributes of the secure data object The application within the feature set extension 1102 of the internal application ID will be invoked and the application will be executed by the central processing unit 12 of the memory device without receiving any further host commands (Figures). Referring to FIG. 42, the female full data structure (access control records 丨丨〇丨, 丨丨〇3, 丨丨〇6, and 1110) has been established before a user can start the single cryptographic program. There is a permission control record for controlling the single cipher program. The user will need to have access rights to invoke a single cryptographic device internal application 1102 through one of the authentication server access control records 1106. The user will also need to have access to a single password generated by accessing one of the N users. The secure data item 1114 can be created during the single male seed seeding process. Preferably, the internal access control record 丨1〇3 has established and controlled the body article 1116. The internal access control record 11〇3 also controls the secure data items 1114 after it has been created. When the secure data item 1114 is accessed, the secure storage application administrator in Figure 40B automatically logs into the internal access control record (1). This internal access control. The 1103 series has been associated with the feature group extension 11〇2. During the single cipher seed supply & order period, the security data object i 14 may become associated with the feature group extension as indicated by the dashed line (10). After the association is ready, when the host accesses the secure data objects, the association 丨(10) will cause the special group extension 1102 to be invoked without requiring a further request from the host. When the communication pipe 1104 is accessed through one of the N access control records 11〇6, the secure storage application manager 1〇24 in Fig. 4B also automatically enters the access control record 丨〇3. In both cases (access to secure bedding object 1114 and pipe 11〇4), the secure storage application administrator will transmit a session number to the feature set extension 〇1〇2, which will identify the session number The channel to the internal access control record 1103. The single cryptographic operation involves two phases: a seed supply phase shown in Figure 43; and a single cryptographic generation phase shown in Figure 44. Reference will also be made to Figures 4A through 42 to aid in the description. Figure 43 is a diagram showing the cooperation of the seed supply program. Various actions are taken by the host (such as the host 24) as shown in Figure 43 and by the card. The security service module system of the real system of FIG. 4, 8 and 4B on the card of various actions includes the security service module core 1〇〇4. Another real system on the card that takes various actions is shown in Figure 42 as the feature set extension 11 02 . In two-factor authentication, the user requests a child to be published, and once the seed is published, the seed is stored in a security token. In this example, the security token is the memory device or card. The user authenticates one of the authentication access control records 11 〇 6 in Figure 42 to gain access to the security service module system (arrow 1122). Assuming the authentication is successful (arrow 1124), the user requests a child (arrow 1126). The host transmits the request to sign the seed request to the card by selecting a particular application 1102 for signing the seed request. If the user 122366.doc -106- 200822670 does not know the ID of the particular application that needs to be called, the information can be obtained from the device 10, for example, through a cautious query for the device. Then, the user inputs the application ID of the application to be called, thereby selecting a communication channel corresponding to the application. Then, through the corresponding communication pipeline, the user command is forwarded to the application specified by the application ID of the user in a transfer command (arrow

Head 112 8). The called application requests a signature by the public key in the specified identity object (identity object 1112 in Figure 42). The security service module system signs the seed request using the public key of the identity object and notifies the application that the signature is complete (arrow 1132). The invoked application then requests the credential chain of the identity object (arrow 1134). In response, the security service module system provides a credential chain (arrow 1136) of the identity object controlled by the access control record 11〇3. Then, the called application provides the signed seed request and the credential chain of the identity object to the security service module system through the communication pipeline, and the security service module system forwards the signed seed request And the credential chain of the identity object is linked to the host (arrow 1138). The signed seed request and the credential chain of the identity object are transmitted through the communication pipeline through the security application administrator group 1008 and the security service module core constructed in FIG. 40A! The call back (3)^^) function between 〇〇4, wherein the callback function will be explained below. Next, the signed seed request received by the host and the credential chain of the identity object are transmitted to the authentication servo as shown in Figure 4: 1052. The signed seed request system is verified by the credential chain provided by the card. 122366.doc -107- 200822670

Originating from the trusted token, the authentication server 丨 052 wants to provide the secret seed to the card. Accordingly, the authentication server 1 〇 52 transmits the seed encrypted with the public key of the identity object to the host along with the user access control record information. The user information indicates an access control record that gives the user the right to access the single password to be generated in the N user access control records. The host invokes the feature group extension 11 () 2 - single password application by providing the application ID, thereby selecting a communication channel corresponding to the application, and transmitting the user access control record information To the security service module system (arrow 114〇). The filtered seed and the user access control record information are then forwarded through the communication conduit to the selected application (arrow 1142). The called application transmits a request to the security service module system for decrypting the seed using the private key of the identity object (arrow i "sentence." the security service module system decrypts the seed and transmits A notification that the decryption has been completed is given to the application (arrow 1146). The invoked application then requests the establishment of the secure data object and the storage of the seed in the secure data object. It also requests that the secure data object be associated with the object. Connected to the 1D (arrow 1148) of the single-password application (which may be the same as the application being used) for generating the single-password. The security service module system establishes the security data objects 1114. And storing the seed in the secure data item 'and associating the secure data object with the single program (1)' and transmitting a notification to the application when completed (;: 1150). The application requests the user information provided by the host, and the m service I group uses the internal access control record 122366.doc -108- 200822670 for access according to the subscription. The security data object 1114 has access to the appropriate user access control record (arrow 1152). After the delegation has been completed, the security service module system notifies the application (arrow 1154). Then, the application The name of the security data (slot ID) is transmitted to the security service module system (arrow ιΐ56) through the communication pipe by means of the callback function. Then, the security service module system transmits the installation data. The name of the object is to the host (arrow 1158). The host then binds the p-name of the secure data item to the access control record so that the (4) person can now " access the secure data item. The procedure for single password generation will now be described with reference to the protocol diagram of Figure 44. To obtain the single password, the user will log in to the user access control record with access (arrow 1172). Upon successful completion, the security service module system notifies the host, and the host transmits an , SDO "Get Secure Data Object" command to the security service module (arrows 1174, 1176). As described above, the security material storing the seed (the piece has been associated with an application for generating the single password. Because of this, instead of selecting an application through the communication pipe as before, The one-time password generation application is invoked by the association between the security material object (arrow 1176) accessed by the command and the single password generation application (arrow U78). Then, the single password generation The application requests the security service module system to read the content (ie, the seed) from the security data object (arrow 1180). Preferably, the security service module does not know the content contained in the content of the security data object. Information, and the information in the security data object will only be processed according to the feature group extension. If the seed is incremented by 122366.doc -109 - 200822670 then this may involve de-pushing the seed prior to reading by the feature set extension command. The security service module system reads the seed from the security data object, and provides the seed to the single password generation application (arrow Gan 'the single password generation application $ generates the single password - mention t ° The single-person password is given to the security service module system (arrow 1184). Then "Hai-man-person is forwarded to the host by the security service module at 35 (arrow 1186), and then the host forwards the single The password is sent to the authentication server ^ to form the two-factor authentication and identification procedure. ^ The callback function μ is between the security service module core chest and the security application Luri module 1GG8 Build-general callback function. 2 applications and communication pipes in different devices can be logged in to have such functions. Therefore, when calling a device internal application, the application can use this callback month. The processed data is transmitted to the security service module system by using the same host command to send the host command to the application. DRM system embodiment 1. FIG. 45 shows the DRM system. Functional block diagram, the DRM system is adopted Communication Ludao 1 1 04, with the feature group extension application 11 02, the inner valley encryption key 1114 of the connection 1 1〇8, and the control structure for controlling the functions to implement the DRM function 丨1〇1 , i 1〇3, and 丨1〇6. As will be noted, the architecture in Figure 45 is quite similar to the architecture of Figure 42, but the security lean structure now includes usage rights server access control. Record 1106, and play access control record 1110, (instead of authentication server access control record and user access control record) and content encryption key 1114, (instead of security data 122366.doc -110-200822670) In addition, the identity object is not involved, and thus the identity object is omitted in Figure 45. The content encryption key 1114' can be created in the usage rights provisioning program. The agreement diagram of Figure 46 shows one for usage rights. A program for provisioning and content downloading in which a password is provided in a right-of-use object. As in the embodiment of the single-password, a user who wants to obtain an authorization will first need to access the N access control records. 6, one and N deposits The access is controlled under one of the controls δ1110' so that the content can be presented by a media player (such as a media player software application). As shown in Figure 46, the host is directed to a usage right servo. The device access control record 1106' (arrow 1202) is authenticated. Assuming the authentication is successful (arrow 丨 204), the usage right server provides a usage rights file (license 6) with the same inner valley encryption key (density Recording the ID and key value to the host. The host also selects the called application by providing the application ID to the security service module system on the card. The host also transmits the player information (eg , information on a media player software application) (arrow 12〇6). The player > will indicate which of the N player access control records 1 1 1 〇, the player has access. The security service module system forwards the usage rights file and the content encryption key to the DRM application (arrow 1208) via a communication channel corresponding to the selected application. The invoked application then requests the security service module system to write the usage rights file into the hidden partition (arrow 1210). When the usage rights file is thus written, the security service module system notifies the application (arrow 1212). Next, the DRM application requests an established content encryption key object 1114, and stores the key value from the usage rights file 122366.doc -111 - 200822670 on the created content encryption key object 11丨4, among them. The DRM application also requests that the content encryption key object be associated with an ID of a DRM application (the DRM application checks the authorization associated with the provided secret) (arrow 1214). The security service module system does the work and thus informs the application (arrow 1216). Next, the application requests to delegate read access to the content encryption key 1114' to a player access control record based on the player information transmitted by the host (the player has the player stored in the player) Take permission to control the access content of the record) (arrow 1218). The security service module system enforces the delegation and thus notifies the application (arrow 1220). The application transmits a message for completing the storage of the authorization to the security service module system through the communication pipeline, and the security service module (4) forwards the message to the usage right server (arrows 1222 and 1224). Using the ί ph function to perform this action through the material pipeline... Upon receiving the notification, the usage right server then provides the content file encrypted by the key value in the content encryption key provided to the card. The content is stored by the host in the public area I. The storage of the (4) (4) (4) and (4) materials is fully functional, so that the security service module system does not involve the storage. : Broadcast #作系 is not shown in Figure 47. The user listens to the play access control record (that is, the arrow η above and the read access control record to the play access control record) through the host through the host (arrow 2) Long. = Success (arrow 1244), the user then transmits the request & takes the content associated with the key ID (arrow 1246). Upon receiving the request, the security service module (4) will discover - The ID of the face 122366.doc - 112 - 200822670 is associated with the content encryption key object being accessed, and thus will result in the call of the identified DRM application (arrow 1248). The drm application requests the The security service module system reads the data associated with the key ID (ie, usage rights) (arrow 1250). The security service module does not know the information in the data it is requested to read, and only processes the information from The feature group extends the request to implement the data reading process. The security service module system reads data (ie, usage rights) from the hidden partition and provides the data to the DRM application (arrow 1252) Then, the 011]^ application interprets the And checking the usage right information in the data to see if the usage right is valid. If the usage right is still valid, the DRM application will notify the security service module system to permit content decryption (arrow 1254). Next, the security service module system decrypts the content of the request using the key value in the content encryption object and provides the decrypted inner valley to the host for playback (arrow 1256). If the usage right is no longer valid, then the request for content access is rejected. If no key is provided within the usage right from the usage server, the usage rights and content download will be slightly different. In the manner of Fig. 46, such different schemes are shown in the agreement diagram of Fig. 48. The same steps between Fig. 46 and Fig. 48 are identified by the same component symbols. Therefore, the host and the security service module The group system first performs authentication (arrows 1202, 1204). The usage right server provides the usage rights file and the key ID (but no such key value) to the host, and the host will transmit Providing 4 usage rights and the ID to be downloaded to the security service module system together with the ID of the drm application that the host wants to call. The host also transmits the information 122366.doc -113- 200822670 (arrow 1206) And then, the Security King's Service Group system transmits the use of the rights 4 case and the "detailed selection of the application" through the communication channel for the selected application (arrow) In addition, the DRM application requests that the system (4) be hidden from the system: _21〇). When the usage right file has been written, the full service module system notifies the DRM. Application (arrow (2) 2). The DRM application requests the security service module system to generate a key value, a context-encryption key object, and stores the secret value therein: associating the content encryption key object with a DRM application Program ι (arrow 12U'). After the request has been met, the security service module system transmits a notification to the DRM application (arrow 1216). Next, the drm application will request the security service module system to delegate read access to the content encryption key object to the player access control record based on the player information transmitted by the host (arrow 1218). . When the system is completed, the security service module system thus notifies the DRM application (arrow 122). Then, the DRM application notifies the security service module system that the usage right has been stored. The notification is transmitted through the communication pipe by a callback function (arrow 1222). This notification is forwarded to the usage server (arrow 1224). The usage rights server then transmits a content profile associated with a key ID to the security service module system (arrow 1226). The security service module system encrypts the content with the key value identified by the key ID without involving any application. The content so encrypted and stored on the card can be played using the protocol of Figure 47. In the single-password and DRM embodiments described above, the feature set extensions 02 122366.doc 114-200822670 f and (10) may contain a number of different single-password and face-to-face applications for machine 4 selection. The user has the opportunity to select and invoke the internal deer = program of the desired device. _ Thus, the overall relationship between the material safety material module extensions remains the same, allowing users and data providers to use standard protocol groups for interaction with the security service module and for invoking This feature set extends. Users and providers do not need to be traits that involve many different internal applications of the device, and some of the internal applications of such devices can be proprietary. Furthermore, these supply agreements may be slightly different, as in the case of Figures 46 and 48. In the case of Fig. 46, the usage right object contains a secret value, whereas in the case of Fig. 48, the usage right object has no secret value. This difference requires a slightly different agreement as described above. However, the play in the picture is the same 'however the right to use is supplied. Thus, this difference will only be with respect to content providers and distributors' however, typically it is independent of the consumer, who typically only involves the playback phase. Therefore, the structure provides a great flexibility for content providers and distributors to customize the agreement, while maintaining the customer's ease of use. Information that is deduced from the information supplied by the two or more supply agreements can still be used. Two agreement access. Another advantage provided by the above embodiments is that although external entities (such as users) and internal applications of the devices can share the use of data controlled by the security data structure, the user can only save Take the results derived from the stored f material by the application (4) application. Therefore, in the embodiment of the single-password, the user passing through the host devices can only obtain the single-password and cannot obtain the seed value. In the DRM embodiment, the user of the host device is only able to obtain the presented content, but does not access the usage rights file or password compilation key. This feature allows the consumer to be convenient without compromising security. In the DRM embodiment, the internal application and the host of the device do not access the cryptographic key such as 月; only the security data structure can access the cryptographic key. In other embodiments, the real system other than the security data structure can also access the cryptographic key. Such secret records can also be generated by the internal applications of the devices and then controlled by the security data structure. Access to such device internal applications and access to information (eg, a single password and presented content) is controlled by the same security data structure. This reduces the complexity of the control system and cost. a delegate access to an access control record by providing a self-existing internal access control record (which controls access to such devices/applications) (its control/etc host access is invoked by the call The funds obtained by the internal application of the device are powerful. This special feature makes it possible to achieve the above characteristics and functions. The application-specific abolition scheme j can also be modified when it is invoked - the internal application of the device. Access control agreement for shell material, and structure. For example, the voucher abolishes the agreement: to - use the standard agreement or a proprietary agreement to revoke the list. Because: a fault is extended by a feature set, the standard abolition list abolition can be replaced by a feature group extension exclusive agreement. * 2 Support for the voucher abolition list abolition scheme, the secure storage application resides in the specific internal application within the skirt, which can be passed between 122366.doc -116- 200822670! The host is abolished by the private communication channel between the internal application and the certificate authority or any other abolition authority. This internal application exclusive abolition scheme is limited by the host_application relationship. When configuring the application material abolition scheme, the secure storage application system will reject the certificate revocation list (if provided), otherwise the certificate and the dedicated application data will be used (previously through an application-specific communication channel) Provided) to determine whether the given certificate is revoked. As described above, the access (4) record specifies which of the three abolition schemes (no abolition scheme, standard certificate abolition list scheme, and application specific abolition scheme) is adopted by specifying the abolition value. When selecting the private system and then supporting the exclusive application specific abolition (4) of the internal application, the access (4) record will also specify an ID for managing the internal application ID of the abolition scheme. And the value of the voucher revocation list to the (4) secret PP_ID block will correspond to the internal application ID that manages the abolition plan. When the device is authenticated, the secure storage application does not replace a set of agreements with another set of protocols, and the invocation of an internal application of the device may impose additional access conditions on the access control that has been exercised by the secure storage application (4). For example, the right to access one of the key values in the content encryption key can be further examined in detail by a feature set extension. After the secure storage application system determines that an access control record has access to a key value, the feature set extension is queried prior to granting the access. This feature allows the content owner to control the large elasticity of access to the content. Although the present invention has been described above with reference to various embodiments, it will be understood that the modifications and modifications can be made without departing from the scope of the invention, and the scope of the invention is only attached. The scope of the patent is defined by the scope of the patent and its equivalent. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS Figure 1 is a block diagram of a memory system that facilitates communication with a host device in accordance with the present invention. 02, 2, and 2 help to explain the different partitions of the memory of different embodiments of the present invention and the unencrypted and encrypted files stored in different partitions, for some partitions Access to encrypted files is controlled by access principles and authentication procedures. FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram showing the memory of different partitions in the memory. 4 depicts a schematic diagram of a file location table that does not contribute to the interpretation of the different partitions of the memory of FIG. 3 in accordance with various embodiments of the present invention, wherein certain files within the partitions are encrypted. 5 is a schematic diagram of an access control record and associated key reference in an access control record group that facilitates the release of one of the various embodiments of the present invention. 6 is a schematic diagram of a tree structure formed by access control record groups and access control records that facilitates the interpretation of various embodiments of the present invention. Figure 7 depicts a schematic diagram of a tree of three tree hierarchy architectures that do not access control record groups to illustrate the formalities of the tree. 8A and 8B are flow diagrams showing the execution of a program for establishing and using a system access control record by a host device and a memory device such as a memory card. 9 is a flow chart showing a procedure for facilitating the use of a system access control record to establish an access control record group in a different embodiment of the present invention. 122366.doc -118- 200822670 FIG. A flow chart for a program that is used to access control records. Figure i, u is a schematic diagram of two access control record groups for a particular application of a tree-like hierarchy. Figure 12 is a flow chart showing the procedure for delegating a specific right. Figure θ τ # takes a schematic diagram of the control record group and an access control record to illustrate the delegated procedure of Figure 12.

Figure 14 depicts a flow chart for establishing a _ program. Figure 15 depicts a flow diagram for a procedure for removing access rights and/or data access rights based on an access control record. Figure 16 depicts a flow diagram of a procedure for requesting access when access rights and/or access rights have been deleted or have expired. Figures 17 and 17 are not intended to illustrate the organization of the different embodiments of the present invention for the purpose of identification and material access (4). Figure 1 is a block diagram showing the data structure of an alternative method for controlling access to protected information based on raw materials. Figure 19 is a flow chart showing the authentication procedure using the password. Figure 20 shows the diagram of the right-hand host credential chain. Figure 21 illustrates a diagram of a number of device credential chains. The agreement diagram for the unidirectional and mutual authentication schemes of Fig. 22 and Fig. 23 (including Figs. 23Α and 23Β). 24 is a table 162. doc-119-200822670 that illustrates one of the credential chains of an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 251 shows a table of resources in one of the control sections before the credential buffer. The information is transmitted by the host for transmitting the last voucher to a memory device 'it indicates that the voucher is an indication of the last voucher in the voucher chain to illustrate another embodiment of the present invention. Port diagrams 26 and 27 show a private diagram of the card and host program for the authentication scheme, respectively, in which a memory card is authenticating a host device. (Figures 28 and 29 are flowcharts showing the card and host program for the (4) scheme, respectively, wherein the host device is authenticating a memory card. I and 31, θ are not separated by a host device and a memory device. A private map of the implemented spears, wherein the host device retrieves a voucher revocation list stored in the memory device to explain another embodiment of the present invention. Figure 32 shows the list of voucher revocation lists. The fourth (four) voucher revocation list schema is used to explain another embodiment of the present invention. Figures 33 and 34 respectively show a flow chart for verifying the voucher card and the host program using the voucher revocation list. Figure 35 depicts (4) the card A flowchart of a card program for signing data to the host and for decrypting the data from the host. Figure 36 is a flow diagram of the host program in which the card signs the data transmitted to the host. 37 depicts a flow chart of a host program in which the host transmits the depleted data to the memory card. Figures 38 and 39 respectively illustrate flowcharts for a general information query and a cautious information query procedure. Doc 20 0822670 is a functional block diagram of a system architecture in which a memory device (such as a flash memory card) is coupled to a host device to illustrate an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 40B illustrates the security service module of Figure 40A. Functional block diagram of the internal software module of the core group. Figure 41 is a block diagram of a system for establishing a single password. Figure 42 is a functional block diagram showing a single password seed supply and a single password generation.

Figure 43 shows the agreement diagram for the seed supply phase. Figure 44 shows the agreement diagram for the single-password generation phase. Figure 45 is a functional block diagram of the DRM system. Figure 46 depicts a map of the procedure not used for the right to use and content download, where the 'rights of use' are provided. Figure 47 depicts a protocol diagram of a program not used for a playback operation. 〇 , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , [Main component symbol description] 12 12a 14 Memory card or memory bank Central processing unit Central processing unit Random access memory buffer management unit (BMU) Host interface module (HIM) Flash memory interface module (FIM) 122366.doc •121-200822670 20 22 24 26 26a 28 28a 32 34 36 38 40 101 102 and 104 106 130 132 502 504 506 508 510 512 Flash Memory Peripheral Access Module (PAM) Host Device Host Interface Convergence埠 埠 ό ό ό 介 介 汇 汇 埠 埠 埠 埠 埠 埠 埠 Direct Memory Access (HDMA) Flash Direct Memory Access (FDMA) Arbiter Buffer Random Access Memory (BRAM) Password Compilation Engine Archive Unencrypted Slot root access control record group root access control record group host root credential authorization unit credential host 1 credential authorization Han right early (second level) credential host credential host n voucher authorization unit (second level) credential Host 1 certificate authority unit U three-level) certificate host certificate host certificate 122366.doc -122- 514 200822670 f

520 Device Root Certificate Authorization Unit Document 522 Device 1 Document Authorization Unit (Manufacturer) Document 524 Device Document 526 Device n Document Authorization Unit (Manufacturer) Document 528 Device Document 542 Security Service Module System 540 Host System 550 Access Control Record 548 Host Root Credentials 544 Host Credentials 546 Host Public Key 549 Intermediate Credential Authorization Unit 554 Random Number 547 Private Key 562 Random Number 590 Credential Chain 590(1) Credential Key 590(2) Credential 590(9) Credential 591, 593, 595 , 597 and 599 Credential String 1000 System Architecture 1002 Secure Storage Application Transport Layer 1004 Security Service Module Core 1012 Password Compilation Library 122366.doc 123- 200822670 1006 Security Service Module Core API 1010 Device Internal Application 1008 Security Application Administrator Module 1011 Device Management System 1022 Secure Storage Application Command Processing 1024 Secure Storage Application Administrator 1026 Secure Storage Application Database 1028 Secure Storage Application Non-Security Operation Module 1030 Secure Storage Application Security Operation Module 1032 Module 1034 Module 1050 System 1052 Authentication Server 1054 Internet Server 1058 Symbol 1056 User 1100 Secure Storage Application Feature Group Extension System 1102 Software Code Feature Group Extension 1104 Communication Pipeline 1106 Application Access Control Record 1101 Access Control Record 1103 Access Control Record 1106 Access Control Record 1110 Access Control Record 122366.doc -124- 200822670 1120 Identity Object 1122 Identity Object 1114 Security Data Object 1116 Identity Object 1104' Communication Pipe 1102' Feature Group Extension Application 1108f Link (Affinity) 11141 Content Encryption Keys 1101, 1103, and 1106f Control Structure 1110f Access Control Record

122366.doc 125·

Claims (1)

200822670, the scope of patent application: a data storage device that provides data processing services to the host, including - non-volatile memory system, which is configured to be removably connected to individual hosts of the hosts, and Capable of storing data; - a security data structure stored in the non-volatile memory system; and at least a software application stored in the non-volatile memory system, at least one software application being Waiting for the host to call 'to perform the processing of the data, the security data structure controls: the memory system obtains information available from the data and the at least one software by one of the hosts connected by an authentication program Application access. 2. The data storage device of the requester, wherein at least one of the host applications is authenticated by the at least one host after the at least one of the hosts has been authenticated in the authentication program. 3. Request a R data storage device, wherein the at least one software application processes at least some of the data to obtain the information. 4. The information storage device of claim 3, after the towel has been authenticated in the authentication process, at least the host, the information may be revealed to the at least one host. 5. The data storage device of claim 4, the security data structure comprising a first control structure and a second control structure, the first control structure being associated with the at least _software application, wherein the first The control structure/, has the right to delegate access to the information to the second control structure. 122366.doc 200822670 The first control structure controls the access of the information by the host by the authentication program. Wherein the at least one host is not available. 6. The data storage device of claim 4 accesses the data. The data storage device of claim 3, wherein the data comprises a sub-value generated by the at least one software application of the 5 HAI to generate a single-person code, and the information includes the single password. 8_ Shiming Item 3 of the poor material storage device, wherein the data relates to at least the right to use the at least one usage right for accessing the encrypted content stored or to be stored in the non-volatile memory system, And the information refers to whether or not the at least one usage right is valid. The poor storage device of claim 8, wherein the non-volatile memory system stores the encrypted data, and the security data structure controls the decryption of the encrypted data in response to the information. I 〇 如 π 求 8 8 data storage device, the device comprising a plurality of Drm software applications stored in the non-volatile memory system, the DRM software applications can be selected by the host and can be The host calls to process the data. II. The data storage device of claim 1, which comprises a plurality of software applications stored in the non-volatile memory system. 12. The data storage device of the present invention, wherein the host calls the plurality of software applications by a data processing request, the device further comprising one of the plurality of software applications corresponding to the plurality of software applications a communication channel 'for transmitting such data processing from the host 122266.doc 200822670 to the applications 'the security data structure control material communication channel' to correspond to the corresponding responsibilities The communication channel of the _ is transmitted: one of the I data processing requests from one of the host hosts to the application. 13. The data storage device of claim 12, wherein the security tributary structure does not identify information within the data processing request when the data processing request is within the communication channel corresponding to the application. 14. ^ The data storage device of claim 12, the security data structure controls the communication channels such that there is no crosstalk between the communication channels. • a data storage device of a request amount, wherein at least some of the software applications are selectable by the host by selecting the communication channel corresponding to each software application . 16. The data storage device of claim 15, wherein each of the communication channels is authenticated after the host has been authenticated by the security lean structure in the authentication process. The system can be selected by these hosts. 17. The data storage device of claim 12, the security data structure comprising at least one control structure that controls access by at least one of the communication channels by the hosts. 18. The data storage device of the request item, further comprising an interface between the security cradle structure and the host and between the security data structure and at least one software application. The data storage device of claim 18, wherein the at least one software application transmits a request to the security data structure, and the interface does not distinguish between requests from the hosts and requests from the at least one software application 122366. Doc 200822670 seeks to make the security data structure unknown to the host or from the at least one application. The request is from 2〇. If the data storage device of claim 1 is broken into two pieces of characters, it can be accessed by the host and stored in the data U-system. And (4) storing at least one of the at least one data item and the at least one "5<1> software application, such that when the host transmits a request for the security (four) to the security Data Structure ° The at least one software application. The data storage device that calls 21. = item 2° is less-related, and the further step includes the encrypted content stored in the non-memory system, wherein the data includes: a decryption key value and the information Containing the decrypted content obtained from the encrypted content by the at least-software application and the decryption pin value. 22. The data storage device of claim 20, wherein the data includes a sub-value that is generated by the at least one software application to generate a single password and the information includes the single password. 23_ The data storage device of the request item, further comprising an object, the object comprising a key pair, the key pair comprising a private key and a public key, wherein at least one voucher contains the public key, wherein And the at least one software application uses the at least one credential for verifying that the public key is authentic for at least one of the hosts and for obtaining data encrypted with a public key. 24. The data storage device of the method, further comprising encrypted data stored in the non-volatile memory system, wherein the encrypted data 122366.doc 200822670 can be stored in the non-volatile memory (four) system At least the solution - the value of the key is decrypted 'and the security data structure is an exclusive access to the value of the at least one decryption key. 25. The data storage device of claim 24, wherein the at least one software application and the host are inaccessible to the value of the at least one decryption secret. % - A data storage device that provides data processing services to the host, including: - a non-volatile memory system that is configured to be individually connected to individual hosts of the hosts; - a security data structure Stored in the non-volatile memory system', the security data structure controls access by the host connected to the memory (4) to the data stored in the non-volatile memory system; / at least - the software application' Stored in the non-volatile memory system 'the at least-software application can be invoked by the host to perform processing of the data; and a set of protocols stored in the non-volatile memory system, the set of agreements Used to communicate between the host and the data storage device; wherein at least one of the agreements can be modified by the at least one software application. 27. The data storage device of claim 26, wherein the invoking of the at least one software application replaces the at least one agreement with a different agreement. 28. The data storage device of claim 27, wherein the different agreement is related to a certificate abolition scheme. 29·- A data storage device that provides data processing services to the host, including · · 122366.doc 200822670 A non-volatile memory system, 1 牦 牦 德 德 德 德 德 德 德 德 德 德 连接 连接 连接 连接The individual host of the temple host; < drinking king a security data structure, complex # system, 9 ^ into # k 八 stored in the non-volatile memory system, first "full data structure control non-volatile memory (4) The capital H sub-H is to be stored in the at least one software application, i #李统中 m Λ 〃 is stored in the non-volatile memory 糸,, 死, the at least one software should be ^ ^ ^ ^ % Called by one of the hosts connected to the memory system; wherein the security data structure controls access to the data by using the . And the call to the ^^^ software application _ ^ the additional condition is different from the access principle for accessing the data by the 4 host. 3〇·If the data storage device of claim 29, At least one additional condition relates to a right to use 3! The data storage device of claim 29, wherein the host will need to comply with the first access principle and the second access principle before accessing the material. A data processing device for processing a service to a host, comprising: - a non-volatile memory system configured to be removably connected to an individual host of the host; - a security data structure 'separately stored in the non-volatile In the memory system, the security data structure controls access to data stored in or to be stored in the non-volatile memory system; at least a software application stored in the non-volatile memory 122366.doc 200822670 system , at least _ #0 ^ » &, -w can be invoked by the machine to which the memory system is connected to perform processing of the data; and the bedding object 'is (4) stored in the non-volatile memory The system object and its 3 have at least some of the materials, and at least one of the at least one data to the at least one software application, so that at least the data object is saved by the memory When the host connected to the body system accesses, the at least-software application is invoked through the at least-association Privately, to process at least the at least some of the information in the data object for information. 33. The data storage device of claim 32, wherein the security data structure controls, by an authentication program, at least one of the hosts to access the data stored in the non-volatile = memory system (4) After the at least one host is authenticated by the authentication program by the security data structure, the information may be revealed to the at least one host without stepping through (four) at least one application. 34. The data storage device of claim 33, wherein at least one of the hosts is inaccessible to the at least some of the at least one of the data items. 3 5. A data storage device for providing data processing services to a host, comprising: a non-volatile memory system configured to be removably connected to individual hosts of the hosts; a security data structure, Stored in the non-volatile memory system, the security data structure includes a first control structure for controlling the host pair to which the memory system is connected to be self-storing or to be stored in the non-volatile memory The information obtained by the information in the system is 122366.doc 200822670 access; and at least one software application, A. ^, is stored in the non-volatile memory system, the at least one soft I# is connected... The type can be connected by the memory system, and the host calls to execute the processing of the data. The security data structure includes m for controlling the at least one software 雍1, and the calling of the 应用body application. Wherein, the control structure and the second control unit σ capture the same control machine on the shell. 36. A data storage device for providing data processing services to the host, including A non-volatile memory system configured to be removably coupled to individual hosts of the host and store data; - a security data structure 'stored in the non-volatile memory; at least - a data object that is stored in the non-volatile memory system; a plurality of first different sets of protocols stored in the non-volatile secret system; the first set of protocols are One of the hosts to which the memory system is connected is individually selected to enable the data from the host or derivative data derived from the data to be provided to and stored in the control data structure under the control of the security data structure. At least one of the data items; a second set of agreements stored in the non-volatile memory system and under the control of the security data structure to enable the data to be retrieved or derived from the data object Information; 122366.doc 200822670 where '彡海第, a group of agreements broadcasted ^ ι χ χ 疋 疋 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍 侍Evening ship. ^, Bend the piece goods which delivers this by providing information or derivative and storage of information. 37. The data storage device of claim 36, wherein the difference between the first set of agreements is an identification of the non-volatile memory system or an encryption of the data. 38. The data storage device of claim 36, further comprising a plurality of different software applications, the plurality of different software applications being stored in the non-volatile memory system, wherein the different software applications Each of at least some of the programs corresponds to one of the first set of agreements such that when one of the first set of agreements is selected to effect the provision and storage of the data or derivative material, Corresponding to the software application of the first set of agreements to process the data or derivative materials. 39. The data storage device of claim 38, wherein the at least some different software applications generate different results by processing the data or derivative data. 40. The data storage device of claim 38, wherein the data or derivative material comprises one of a plurality of seed values, wherein each of the at least some different software applications processes one of the plurality of seed values Corresponding to the seed value to generate a corresponding one-time password. 41. The data storage device of claim 38, wherein the non-volatile memory stores encrypted data, the material or derivative material comprising one of a plurality of decryption keys for decrypting the encrypted content, and the at least Some of the soft 122366.doc -9-200822670 applications use the plurality of decrypted keys for decrypting the encrypted content. 42. A method for providing a data processing service to a host by means of a device, the device comprising: a non-volatile memory system having data stored therein; - a security data structure, Stored in the non-volatile memory system; and at least a software application stored in the non-volatile memory system; the method comprising: removably connecting the non-volatile memory system to the host; Using the host to invoke the at least one software application to process the data for information; and A > accessing the information by the host, wherein the call and the access are controlled by the security data structure. 43. The method of claim 42, the security data structure comprising: a first control structure and a second control structure 'the first control structure associated with the at least one software application' The host accesses the information. The method further includes the first control structure delegating control to access the information to the second control structure. 44. The method of claim 42, wherein the host is unable to access the material. 45. The method of claim 42, wherein the f-material comprises a seed value and the shell. Fi has a single-person weight that causes the at least one software application to generate the single password from the seed value. The method of claim 42, wherein the data is related to at least - the right to use - the at least - usage rights are used to access the encrypted or stored or stored in the non-volatile memory system, and the Causing the at least 122366.doc -10- 200822670 a software application to produce a clear indication of the e π #生的疋不 at least - the use of the right is an indication. 4 7 - According to the method of claim 4, the basin is configured to store the encrypted data by the non-volatile memory, and the method includes the security data structure responding to the information to determine whether the Decryption of encrypted data is permitted. 48. A method for providing a data processing service by a non-volatile memory device. The device stores a plurality of software applications therein, the method comprising: a non-volatile § memory device Receiving data from a source through the host; in response to a request from the master dragging machine, calling the plurality of software application-the software application in the private application Establishing a data item in the non-volatile memory device, storing the data in the data object or derivative data derived from the data; and associating the data object with the second software of the plurality of software applications The application causes the second software application to be called when accessing the data object. 49. The method of claim 48, wherein the first software application and the second software application are the same software application. 50. The method of claim 48, wherein the non-volatile memory device is configured to be removably coupled to each of the hosts, the method further comprising removably connecting the non-volatile memory device with One of these hosts. The method of claim 48, the non-volatile memory device includes a security 122366.doc 200822670 data structure, wherein the security data structure includes a first control structure and a second control structure, the first The control structure is associated with the first software application and controls access to the data object, the method further comprising the first control structure assigning access control to the data object to the first control structure. 52. The method of claim 51, further comprising accessing the data item by one of the hosts, wherein the access system is controlled by the second control structure. 53. The method of claim 48, wherein the data relates to a seed value for generating a single password. The method further comprises the first software application creating the data item and the material is Seed value. 54. The method of claim 53, wherein the method further comprises: accessing the data item by an entity different from the source, and invoking the second software application by using the second software application Μ The value λ tone { owes each value to the actual processing, to generate the single cipher. The method step includes providing the single password to the entity. The method of claim 48, wherein the data includes a usage right object, the method further includes a $1 software application to create a storage-decryption secret in the material item, the decryption secret can be interpreted Stored in the non-volatile memory loaded with encrypted content. 56. The method of claim 55, wherein the usage right object contains the decryption key: s is stored in the data object to store the decryption key in the usage right object. With the initial piece 5 7 · The method of claim 5 5, the non-volatile memory device includes _ security 122366.doc -12- 200822670 data structure 'where the use right object does not contain the decryption key, the method further #包含(4) A software application requesting the security data structure to generate the decryption key 'where' the storage is stored in the data object to store the decryption secret record generated by the security data structure. 58. A method for providing a data processing service to a host using a data storage device, the device comprising: - a non-volatile memory system configured to be removably connected to individual hosts of the hosts Storable data; - a security data structure stored in the non-volatile memory system; at least one data item stored in the non-volatile memory system; a plurality of different sets of different protocols' Stored in the non-volatile memory system; a second set of protocols stored in the non-volatile memory system and under the control of the security data structure, enabling at least - the data item is derived from or derived from the data; the method comprises: selecting, under the control of the composition of the first group of agreements, the source or derivative material from which it is provided; 'using the second set of agreements for the host connected to the security data link system or for storing the at least one data item, enabling the Which of the materials or derivatives is to be realized, regardless of the provision and storage of such data," as in the method of claim 58, Injury in the first place; 加密 in the encryption between the first set of agreements. 鉴 Identification of the hidden system or the information 60. The method of claim 58, wherein the different software application is one of at least one set of agreements stored in the non-volatile memory software application, such that the data or derivative is selected Soft derivative material in the first set of agreements. The material storage device further includes a plurality of the plurality of different software application system systems, wherein each of the different ones is selected according to one of the first group agreements When providing and storing, the relative application is invoked to process the data or 61. The method of claim 60, wherein the at least some different software applications automatically process the data or derivative data to produce different results. . The method of claim 60, wherein the data or derivative data comprises one of a plurality of seed values, wherein the invoked software application processes one of the plurality of seed values corresponding to the seed value to generate a correspondence Single password. The method of claim 60, wherein the non-volatile memory stores the added material 'the data or derivative data includes one of a plurality of decrypted secrets for decrypting the encrypted content, wherein the The invoked software application uses one of the plurality of decryption keys to use the key for decrypting the encrypted content. 122366.doc -14·