TH41409A - Pre-loaded IC cards and methods for certifying them. - Google Patents

Abstract

DC60 (25/05/42) A system that at least consists of a card reader (1) with terminals (3) and a security module (4) which accepts a portable pre-programmed IC card (2) with integrated circuits (8) and an insert (9) to prevent unauthorized use of the IC card (2) and a cash counter (10) which represents the cash value and is devalued during transaction changes at an independent point of sale. The IC card (2) generates a random card number, whereby the security module (4) generates a random security module number. The IC card (2) encrypts the random security module number into the card signature, and the security module (4) decodes the card signature to verify the validity of the IC card (2). The security module (4) creates a security module signature from the random card number decoded by the IC card (2) to verify the validity of the IC card (2). The validity of the security module (4) is confirmed if the mutual validity is correct. The insert (9) allows for a change of payment transaction (Figure 1). The system consists of at least a card reader (1) with a terminal (3) and a security module (4) which accepts a portable pre-programmed IC card (2) on the integrated circuit (8) with an insert (9) to prevent unauthorized use of the IC card (2) and a cash counter body (10) which represents the cash value and is devalued during a change of payment transaction at an independent point of sale. The IC card (2) generates a random card number, whereby the security module (4) generates a random security module number. The IC card (2) encrypts the random security number into the card signature, and the security module (4) decodes the card signature again to verify the validity of the IC card (2). The security module (4) generates a security module signature from the number. A random number is decoded by the IC card (2) to verify the validity of the security module (4). If the validity is correct, the interceptor (9) will allow the payment change transaction (Figure 1).

Claims (19)

1. A system that consists of at least one card reader (1) with electronic terminals (3) and at least one security module (4) and a portable pre-recorded IC card (2) with an integrated circuit (B) with a lock (9) to prevent unauthorized use of the IC card (2) and a non-volatile memory (20) to store the existing IC card value (10) with a means to decrement the existing IC card value sequentially during changes at an independent unit point (56) connected to terminal (3) of the card reader, (1) and such terminal 3 provides communication channels (5, 6, 7) between the IC card (2) and the security module (4) with the special characteristic that the IC card (2) has means (9, 21, 28, 29) to generate random card numbers and card signatures and offer them to the module. Security Module (4) contains the following paths (11,12) to generate a security module random number and a security module signature line and offers these to IC Card (2), which contains the K encryption key and paths (29) to generate the card signature based on at least the security module random number and to decrypt the security module signature to verify the validity of Security Module (4), which contains the K encryption key and paths (11) to generate the security module signature from at least the card random number and to decrypt the card signature to verify the validity of IC Card (2), which contains the following integrated circuit (8) and at least: The multipurpose memory (16) contains space (49) that stores at least a random number and a random number security module and lock (9) which can allow a change of payment entry to occur when the mutual authentication of the IC card (2) and the security module (4) is correct. 2. The system under claim 1 is characterized by the IC card (2) and the security module (4) containing at least one algorithm circuit (29) and a T-DES unit (11), respectively, for performing T-DES conversion operations with a K-key cryptographic key on which data is to be exchanged and verified. 3. A system under one of the claims of claim 1 or 2 is of a special nature in which the security module (4) has a means of replacing the obsolete cryptographic key K14 of the IC card (2) with a new cryptographic key K. An auxiliary key AK is stored in memory location (BO) of the IC card (2) and such auxiliary key AK is independently used to decrypt the new cryptographic key K embedded in the IC card (2). 4. Pre-programmed IC cards (2) with integrated circuits (8) with locking (9) to prevent unauthorized use of IC cards (2), non-volatile memory (17 to 20) to store at least the actual IC card value (10) which is depreciated sequentially during payment changes, and communication channels (5, 21) to provide information to the outside world, non-volatile programmed data memory (14, 15), area (80) of the general-purpose memory (16) and random number generator circuit (28) which generates random numbers, with the special characteristic that the general-purpose memory (16) contains at least a path to store at least temporary random numbers, card signatures, and security module random numbers. The security module's signature, and the non-volatile data memory (17, 18, 19, 20), contain at least a path to store at least the defective access number (48), the K cryptographic key, and the previous IC card value (10'). The lock (9) contains at least a path to prevent card access depending on the defective access number (48), and it also contains at least a path to update the defective access number (48) in case the access attempt expires. The algorithm (29) that uses the K cryptographic key to encrypt the card signature and to decrypt the security module's signature contains a comparator (47) to verify the acquired security module's signature. 5. The IC card (2) under claim 4 is of a special nature in which the nonvolatile data memory (20) contains at least a defective access area (86) with a defective access number (48) and an authorization area (87) that indicates an abnormally terminated prior access, and such integrated circuit (8) is provided with a means (9, 13) to provide the authorization area (87) and to update the defective access number (48) in the event that the authorization area (87) indicates an abnormal access. 6. IC Card (2) under one of the claims of claim 4 or 5 is of a special nature in which the non-volatile data memory area contains at least a reserve counter area (74) which divides at least two counter recorders (70), each recorder containing at least a counter value (76) in place of the actual IC Card value (10) or at least the previous IC Card value (10'), and management data (75,77) indicating the order of the change entry stored in the counter recorder (70), and such pathways are arranged to update the management data (75, 77) of the actual IC Card value (10) and to use the previous IC Card value (10') for the change entry. If the updated management data and the management data of the actual IC Card value (10) stored in the respective counter recorders (70) differ, 7. The IC card (2), according to one of the claims of claims 4 through 6, is characterized in that the cells of the non-volatile memory (17 through 20) are physically covered by a protective enclosure (27), and the integrated circuit (8) has a means (13) to erase the active data stored in the non-volatile memory (17 through 20) if any damage to the protective enclosure (27) is detected. 8. The IC card (2), pursuant to one of the claims of claims 4 through 7, is of a special nature in which the non-volatile data memory (19) allocates memory for the auxiliary key AK used to decode the new cryptographic key K, and the controller (13) can replace the obsolete key K14 with a new key. 9. IC card (2) under one of the claims of claims 4 through 8 is of a special nature in which the non-volatile data memory (17) contains at least one independent card number and such independent card number is a parameter in the calculation of the encryption of the encryption. 10. The method for mutual authentication between IC card (2) and the security module (4) contained in the card reader (1) has a terminal (3) for exchanging data between IC card (2) and security module (4) that at least consists of the following steps: - generation of a random card number by IC card (2) and transfer of it to the security module (4); - generation of a random security module number by the security module (4) and transfer of it to IC card (2); - calculation of the card signature by the IC card using at least the K secret code generating key and the security module random number, transferring it to the security module; - calculation of the card signature by the security module and comparison of it to the transferred card signature. The process stops if the two signatures are different - The signature calculation module provides security by the security module (4) by using at least the key to generate a K secret code, a random card number and a card signature and transfer it to the IC card (2) - The signature calculation module provides security by the IC card (2) by using at least the key to generate a K secret code, a random card number and a card signature and compare it to the transferred signature module. The process stops if the two signatures are different. 11. The method under claim 10 is characterized by the fact that a random card number is transferred from the IC card along with at least the unique serial number of the IC card. The key generating the K code is determined by the security module using the unique serial number of the IC card. 12. The method under claims 10 and 11 is of a special nature in that it includes at least a procedure for updating the defective access number (48) in the event that the comparison fails. 13. The special procedure under claim 12 is such that, prior to the commencement of the mutual authentication procedure, IC Card (2) will examine the contents of the defective access number (48) in place of the number of the expired access attempt and block access to IC Card (2) in the event that the defective access number (48) is a pre-defined restricted number. 14. The methods under claims 10 through 13 are characterized by the fact that, at a minimum, they consist of an IC card marking procedure in the authoritative area of the non-volatile data memory when the first card signature is transferred and retain the authoritative area value after successful signature comparison. 15. The method under claim 14 is unique in that one of the procedures for updating the permit area consists of the following steps: performing the card verification (331) and prior to the generation of the random number card; verifying the bit (881) stored in the permit area (87); updating the defective access number (48); and maintaining the bit (88) of the permit area (87) in the event that the permit area points to an incomplete section; marking the bit (88) in the permit area (87) to indicate the beginning of such section; and maintaining the bit (88) in the permit area (87) in the event that the section ends successfully. 16. The method under claim 15 is of a special nature in which the marking and retention of the twist (88) in the permitted area (87) is done by inverting the twist after doing the other. 17. The method under one of the claims of Claims 10 through 16 is characterized by the following: the change of payment entry shall at least consist of the following steps: Calculation by security module (4) creation of a cryptographic code based on at least the previous exchange cryptographic code creation and the amount to be reduced by transferring it to IC card (2); with the amount to be reduced by IC card calculation (2); creation of a cryptographic code based on at least the previous exchange cryptographic code creation and the amount to be reduced by comparing it to the received cryptographic code creation and reducing the internal counter if the two cryptographic code creations are equal; Calculation by IC card (2); creation of a cryptographic code based on at least the previous exchange cryptographic code creation and the existing IC card value by transferring it to security module (4); Calculation by security module (4); creation of a cryptographic code based on at least the previous exchange cryptographic code creation and the existing IC card value as determined by comparing it to the received cryptographic code creation and successfully completing the change of payment entry and updating the IC card value if the two cryptographic code creations are equal. 18. The method under claim 17 is of a special nature in which the updating of IC card values consists at least of the following steps: The The The The The The The The The The updating and The The updating of the IC card values in the The The updating and The The updating of the IC card values in the The The updating and The updating of the IC card values in the The updating and ... 19. The procedure under claims 10 through 18 is such that if the security module (4) recognizes that the IC card (2) still uses the outdated K14 cryptographic key, the following steps of the key replacement procedure are performed: The security module (4) transmits the new K cryptographic key using the auxiliary key AK to the IC card (2), and generates the authentication key (MAC) which is at least based on the new K key or the new encrypted K key and the previously transferred card signature. The IC card (2) then decrypts the new K cryptographic key using the auxiliary key AK. The MAC construct is calculated which is at least based on the new K key or the new encrypted K key and the previously transferred card signature. The transferred and calculated MAC constructs are compared, and if they are identical, the original K14 key is replaced with the new K key.