SE514500C2 - Communication method for transmitting digital information over non secure network, automatically inserts receiver identity into information sequence during encryption on sender side - Google Patents

Communication method for transmitting digital information over non secure network, automatically inserts receiver identity into information sequence during encryption on sender side

Info

Publication number
SE514500C2
SE514500C2 SE0000011A SE0000011A SE514500C2 SE 514500 C2 SE514500 C2 SE 514500C2 SE 0000011 A SE0000011 A SE 0000011A SE 0000011 A SE0000011 A SE 0000011A SE 514500 C2 SE514500 C2 SE 514500C2
Authority
SE
Sweden
Prior art keywords
sequence
identity
stored
synchronization pattern
receiver
Prior art date
Application number
SE0000011A
Other languages
Swedish (sv)
Other versions
SE0000011D0 (en
SE0000011L (en
Inventor
Lars-Erik Eriksson
Per Smedberg
Original Assignee
Eriksson Lars Erik
Per Smedberg
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Eriksson Lars Erik, Per Smedberg filed Critical Eriksson Lars Erik
Priority to SE0000011A priority Critical patent/SE0000011L/en
Publication of SE0000011D0 publication Critical patent/SE0000011D0/en
Publication of SE514500C2 publication Critical patent/SE514500C2/en
Publication of SE0000011L publication Critical patent/SE0000011L/en

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)

Abstract

A very long cryptosequence stored on the sender side is used to create a unique encryption sequence, which is used to encrypt a digital information sequence, so that it can be transmitted over a non-secure network (11). Prior to encryption, a unique synchronisation pattern is inserted into the digital information sequence, the pattern being related to the stored cryptosequence and the personal identity of the sender. A unique decryption sequence is created on the receiving side, and this contains a receiver identity related to a users personal identity (7). Successive decryptions are carried out with the aid of data sent to the receiving side on portable data storage media (21) via a separate, secure route (22) and then stored on the receiving side so that they can be used to carry out successive analyses to check whether the inserted synchronisation pattern corresponds to the synchronisation pattern created from data stored on the receiver side. If the patterns match, the received sequence is decrypted and once the synchronisation pattern has been removed this sequence will be the same as the original digital information sequence, apart from it being modified with the receiver identity. At the same time, the synchronisation pattern created on the receiver side will contain the sender identity.

Description

514 500 2(3) Delcrypteringssekvensen och synkroniseringsmönstret lagrade på det flyttbara datalagret 21 förs via separat säker kanal 22 (t ex post, bud etc) till mottagarens separationsanordning 23. I separationsanordningen 23 separeras delcrypteringssekvens och synkroniseringsrnönster och lagras i respektive datalager 16 respektive 15. 514 500 2 (3) The partial encryption sequence and the synchronization pattern stored on the surface data store 21 are fed via a separate secure channel 22 (eg mail, courier, etc.) to the receiver's separation device 23.

Vid transmission av nyttosignalen 1 pekar anordningen 6 ut ett antal tidpunkter i nyttosekvensen 1 där bitmönster, hämtade enligt ett förut bestämt schema 4 ur datalagret 5, skjuts in i nyttosekvensen i anordningen 2. Den sålunda modifierade nyttosignalen 3 blir längre än den ursprungliga nyttosekvensen 1.When transmitting the utility signal 1, the device 6 points out a number of times in the utility sequence 1 where bit patterns, retrieved according to a predetermined scheme 4 from the data store 5, are pushed into the utility sequence in the device 2. The thus modified utility signal 3 becomes longer than the original utility sequence 1.

Den modifierade nyttosekvensen 3 krypteras genom modulo 2 addition i anordningen 9 med en krypteringssekvens hämtad från datalagret 8. Kryptosekvensen, som finns lagrad i datalagret 8, är mycket lång och krypteringssekvensen väljs dânir genom något förfaringssätt 26, t ex val av startpunkt Den modifierade nyttosekvensen sålunda krypterad i figuren utmärkt 10 transmitteras över ett osäkert nät 1 1.The modified utility sequence 3 is encrypted by modulo 2 addition in the device 9 with an encryption sequence retrieved from the data warehouse 8. The crypto sequence, which is stored in the data warehouse 8, is very long and the encryption sequence is selected by any method 26, e.g. encrypted in fi guren excellent 10 is transmitted over an insecure network 1 1.

Hos mottagaren finns en anordning 12, som gör succesiva deluypteringar genom modulo 2 addition med dekrypteringssekvenser hämtade från datalagret 16 enligt något förfarande 28 och samtidigt succesivt analyserar det dekrypterade resultatet för att âterfinna ett synkroniseringsmönster hämtat från 15 enligt ett fórutbestämt förfarande 30. När synkroniseringsmönstret återfinnes är den modifierade nyttosekvensen som krypterats dekrypterad 13, men förändrad på de platser, som motsvarat vari delcrypteringssekvensen mottagaridentiteten urspnmgligen inplacerats i anordningen 18. Samtidigt återfinnes sändaridentiteten i det återvunna synlcroniseringsmönsteret 29. I anordningen 14 borttages de i anordningen 2 inskjutna bitmönstren dvs synkroniseringsmönstret. Den återvurma mottagarsekvensen 24 är identisk med nyttosekvensen 1 utom på de platser där mottagaridentiteten automatiskt införts.The receiver has a device 12 which performs successive deluiptions by modulo 2 addition with decryption sequences retrieved from the data layer 16 according to some method 28 and at the same time successively analyzes the decrypted result to retrieve a synchronization pattern retrieved from 15 according to a predetermined retrieval method 30. When synchronizing the modified utility sequence encrypted is decrypted 13, but changed at the locations corresponding to where the sub-encryption sequence the receiver identity was originally placed in the device 18. At the same time, the transmitter identity is recovered in the recovered synchronization pattern 29. The rewired receiver sequence 24 is identical to the payload sequence 1 except at the locations where the receiver identity is automatically entered.

Resultatet kan användas i olika sammanhang. Här ges endast tvâ exempel.The result can be used in different contexts. Only two examples are given here.

Exempel 1: Om t ex kopior av mottagarsekvensen 24 återfinnes hos många olika användare och man kan misstänka att materialet kopierats utan tillstånd. Man kan då enkelt jämföra en lagrad kopia av den urspnmgliga nyttosekvensen och den misstänkta kopian och dänned enkelt avgöra vilken mottagare, som gjort en kopia Exempel 2: Antag att olika sändare var och en förses med en unik sändaridentitet, som i sin tur ger ett unikt synkronieringsmönster. Genom att analysera det återvunna synlcroniseringsmönstret på mottagarsidan, kan en mottagare vara säker på vilken sändare, som sänt ut nyttosekvensen.Example 1: If, for example, copies of the receiver sequence 24 are recalled by many different users and it can be suspected that the material has been copied without permission. One can then easily compare a stored copy of the original utility sequence and the suspected copy and then easily determine which receiver made a copy. Example 2: Suppose that different transmitters are each provided with a unique transmitter identity, which in turn gives a unique synchronization pattern. By analyzing the recovered synchronization pattern on the receiver side, a receiver can be sure of which transmitter transmitted the payload sequence.

Claims (8)

20 40 514 500 3(3) Patentkrav20 40 514 500 3 (3) Patent claims 1. l. Förfarande att ur en mycket lång på lagrad kryptosekvens skapa en unik krypteringssekvens och med denna kryptera en digital nyttosekvens för transmission över ett osäkert nät, där den digitala nyttosekvensen innan kryptering förlängts och försetts med ett unikt inskjutet synkroniseringsmönster, som är oberoende av den lagrade kryptosekvensen och beroende av en personlig sändaridentitet, och på den mottagande sidan återskapande av en unik dekrypteringssekvens innehållande en mottagaridentitet , som är relaterad till en användares personliga identitet, genom att succesiva dekrypteringar genomförs med hjälp av data överförda till mottagarsidan via flyttbart datalager över en separat säker kanal och lagrade på mottagarsidan och genomförande av succesiva analyser för att konstatera när det på sändarsidan i den digitala nyttosekvensen införda synkroniseringsmönstret överensstämmer med ett synlcroniseringsmönster skapad ur data, som är lagrade på mottagarsidan och i ögonblicket när överensstämmelse inträffar är den mottagana sekvensen dekrypterad och efier borttagande av synlcroniseringsmönstret överensstämmer denna sekvens med den ursprungliga digitala nyttosekvensen dock modifierad med mottagaridentiteten samtidigt som det på mottagarsidan skapade synkroniseringsmönstret innehåller sändaridentiteten.1. l. Method of creating a unique encryption sequence from a very long stored crypto sequence and thereby encrypting a digital utility sequence for transmission over an insecure network, where the digital utility sequence before encryption is extended and provided with a unique inserted synchronization pattern, which is independent of the stored crypto sequence and dependence on a personal sender identity, and on the receiving side reproduction of a unique decryption sequence containing a recipient identity, which is related to a user's personal identity, by performing successive decryptions using data transmitted to the recipient side via separate secure channel and stored on the receiver side and performing successive analyzes to determine when the synchronization pattern introduced on the transmitter side in the digital utility sequence corresponds to a synchronization pattern created from data, which are stored on the receiver side and at the moment when over If the match occurs, the received sequence is decrypted and if you delete the synchronization pattern, this sequence corresponds to the original digital utility sequence, however, modified with the receiver identity while the synchronization pattern created on the receiver side contains the transmitter identity. 2. Förfarande enligt krav 1, k ä n n e t e c k n a t a v, att synkroniseringsmönstret är oberoende av en personlig sändaridentitet.Method according to claim 1, characterized in that the synchronization pattern is independent of a personal transmitter identity. 3. Förfarande enligt krav l, kännetecknat av, att synlcroniseringsmönstret är beroende av en fiktiv sändarindetitet.Method according to Claim 1, characterized in that the synchronization pattern is dependent on an active transmitter intensity. 4. Förfarande enligt lcrav 1, k än n e t e c k n a t a v, att delcrypteringssekvensen ej är relaterad till en användares personliga identitet utan endast relaterad till en fingerad användaridentitet.4. A method according to claim 1, characterized in that the partial encryption sequence is not related to a user's personal identity but only related to an entered user identity. 5. Förfarande enligtkrav Lkännetecknat av, attmottagaridentitetens placering i delcrypteringssekvensen är beroende av nyttosekvensen.Method according to claim 1, characterized in that the location of the recipient identity in the partial encryption sequence depends on the utility sequence. 6. Förfarande enligt krav 1, k ä n n e t e c k n a t a v, att mottagaridentitetens placering i delcrypteringssekvensen är obereoende av nyttosekvensen.Method according to claim 1, characterized in that the location of the recipient identity in the partial encryption sequence is independent of the utility sequence. 7. Förfarande enligt krav l, k ä n n e t e c k n a t a v, att delcrypteringssekvensen ej innehåller någon mottagaridentitet.A method according to claim 1, characterized in that the partial encryption sequence does not contain any recipient identity. 8. Förfarande enligtkrav 1, kännete cknat av, attsändaridentiteten inkluderas i nyttosekvensen vid transmission.Method according to claim 1, characterized in that the transmitter identity is included in the useful sequence during transmission.
SE0000011A 2000-01-04 2000-01-04 Procedure for secure transmission over an unsecured network including the automatic insertion of an identity tag SE0000011L (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
SE0000011A SE0000011L (en) 2000-01-04 2000-01-04 Procedure for secure transmission over an unsecured network including the automatic insertion of an identity tag

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
SE0000011A SE0000011L (en) 2000-01-04 2000-01-04 Procedure for secure transmission over an unsecured network including the automatic insertion of an identity tag

Publications (3)

Publication Number Publication Date
SE0000011D0 SE0000011D0 (en) 2000-01-04
SE514500C2 true SE514500C2 (en) 2001-03-05
SE0000011L SE0000011L (en) 2001-03-05

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Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
SE0000011A SE0000011L (en) 2000-01-04 2000-01-04 Procedure for secure transmission over an unsecured network including the automatic insertion of an identity tag

Country Status (1)

Country Link
SE (1) SE0000011L (en)

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
SE0000011D0 (en) 2000-01-04
SE0000011L (en) 2001-03-05

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