RU2807058C1 - Method and apparatus for authentication of identification information, device, microcircuit, information storage media and program - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: data storage.

SUBSTANCE: means for authenticating identification information. Confidential processing is performed on the identity information of the supplicant and access controller during authentication in such a way as not to reveal the identity information of the supplicant and access controller during authentication during the transmission process, thereby ensuring that an attacker cannot obtain the personal and confidential information of the supplicant and access controller during authentication by using an authentication server, mutual authentication of the identity information of the supplicant and the access controller during authentication is realized, while ensuring the confidentiality of information related to the identity information of the object.

EFFECT: increasing the confidentiality of information related to the identification information of an object.

11 cl, 16 dwg

Description

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION

[0001] This application claims priority to Chinese Patent Application No. 202011569219.5, filed December 26, 2020, entitled "METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR AUTHENTICATION OF IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION, DEVICE, ICIC, STORAGE MEDIUM AND PROGRAM", the full disclosure of which is included incorporated into this document by reference.

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0002] The present disclosure relates to the technical field of network communication security, and in particular to a method and apparatus for authenticating identity information, as well as to a device, chip, storage medium and program.

BACKGROUND OF THE ART

[0003] In a communications network, a Requester (REQ) can access the network through an Authentication Access Controller (AAC). In some cases where a high level of security is required, the authentication access controller must authenticate against the requestor's identity, and the requestor must also authenticate against the authentication access controller's identity to ensure that the requester accessing the network belongs to to a legitimate user, and the network being accessed by the requester is a legitimate network. In addition, for point-to-point transmission in blockchain technology, it is also necessary to establish trust relationships between different nodes, which is also very important for authenticating the identity information of nodes.

[0004] In the process of performing Mutual Identity Authentication (MIA) between the requester and the access controller, both parties must provide their own identity information to authenticate the identity. However, such identification information typically contains personal and confidential information, such as identification numbers, home addresses, credit card information, geographic location information, and affiliated institution information. Moreover, in practical applications, such identification information is generally included in a physical digital certificate, and the digital certificate is used as a physical identification certificate.

[0005] If, during mutual authentication of the identity information of the requester and the authentication access controller, the identity information of the requester and the authentication access controller is intercepted by an attacker for illegal use, a serious security threat arises to the authentication access controller, the requestor and the network.

DISCLOSURE OF THE INVENTION

[0006] The present disclosure provides a method and apparatus for authenticating identity information, as well as a device, a chip, a storage medium, and a program. By using an authentication server, the identity information is mutually authenticated between the requester and the access controller during authentication, while ensuring the confidentiality of information related to the entity's identity, thereby ensuring that only a legitimate user can communicate with the legitimate network.

[0007] According to a first aspect, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a method for authenticating identity information. This method includes the following operations.

[0008] The authentication access controller receives a ciphertext message of identity information sent by the requester. The identity ciphertext message includes the ciphertext of the requester's identity and the ciphertext of the requester's identity is generated by using the public key of the encryption certificate to encrypt data to be encrypted, including the requestor's digital certificate and a first one-time random security number.

[0009] The authentication access controller sends a first authentication request message to the first Authentication Server (AS) that the authentication access controller trusts. The first authentication request message includes a ciphertext of an authentication identity of a requester and a ciphertext of an authentication access controller identity, and a ciphertext of an authentication access controller identity is generated by using a public key of an encryption certificate for encrypting data to be encrypted, including a digital access controller certificate for authentication and a second one-time random security number.

[0010] The authentication access controller receives the first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server. The first authentication response message includes a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, a first digital signature, a ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and a second digital signature, wherein the ciphertext of the first authentication result information is generated by using a second one-time random security number for encryption. information including first authentication result information, wherein the first authentication result information includes a first verification result for a digital certificate of the access controller upon authentication, the first digital signature is a digital signature generated by the second authentication server trusting the requester , calculations on the data to be signed, including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the ciphertext of the second authentication result information is generated by using the first one-time random guard number to encrypt the information including the second authentication result information, wherein the second information about the authentication result includes a second verification result for the requestor's digital certificate, and the second digital signature is a digital signature generated by the first authentication server performing a calculation on the data to be signed including the ciphertext of the second authentication result information.

[0011] The authentication access controller verifies the second digital signature by using the public key of the first authentication server; when verification of the second digital signature is successful, the authentication access controller sends a third authentication response message to the requester. The third authentication response message includes a ciphertext of the authentication result information, and a ciphertext of the authentication result information is generated by using a message encryption key to encrypt data to be encrypted, including a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, a first digital signature, and a second one-time random security number.

[0012] The requester decrypts the ciphertext of the authentication result information by using the message encryption key to obtain the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the first digital signature, and the second one-time random security number.

[0013] The requester verifies the first digital signature by using the public key of the second authentication server and, if the verification is successful, the requester decrypts the ciphertext of the first authentication result information by using a second one-time random security number to obtain the first authentication result information, determines the result authentication of the access controller identity information in the authentication according to the first verification result in the first authentication result information, and when the requester determines that the authentication result of the access controller identity information in the authentication is "legitimate", sends a fourth authentication response message to the access controller when authentication.

[0014] Either the requester verifies the first digital signature by using the public key of the second authentication server and, if the verification is successful, the requester sends a fourth authentication response message to the access controller upon authentication, decrypts the ciphertext of the first authentication result information by using the second one-time random a security number to obtain the first authentication result information, and determines an authentication result of the access controller identification information in the authentication according to the first verification result in the first authentication result information.

[0015] Either the requester verifies the first digital signature by using the public key of the second authentication server and, if the verification of the first digital signature is successful, the requester decrypts the ciphertext of the first authentication result information by using a second one-time random security number to obtain the first result information authentication, determines the authentication result of the authentication access controller's identity information according to the first verification result in the first authentication result information, and the requester sends a fourth authentication response message to the authentication access controller.

[0016] The fourth authentication response message includes the ciphertext of the first one-time random security number, and the ciphertext of the first one-time random security number is obtained by using a message encryption key to encrypt information including the first one-time random security number.

[0017] After receiving the fourth authentication response message, the authentication access controller decrypts the ciphertext of the first one-time random security number by using the message encryption key to obtain the first one-time random security number, decrypts the ciphertext of the second authentication result information by using the first one-time random security number numbers to obtain the second authentication result information, and determines the authentication result of the requester's identification information according to the second verification result in the second authentication result information.

[0018] According to a second aspect, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides an authentication access controller. The authentication access controller includes a receiving portion, a first sending portion, a first receiving portion, a first verifying portion, a second sending portion, a second receiving portion, a decrypting portion, and a first determining portion.

[0019] The receiving part is configured to receive a ciphertext message of identification information sent by the requester. The identity ciphertext message includes the ciphertext of the requester's identity and the ciphertext of the requester's identity is generated by using the public key of the encryption certificate to encrypt data to be encrypted, including the requestor's digital certificate and a first one-time random security number.

[0020] The first sending part is configured to send a first authentication request message to a first authentication server that is trusted by the access controller for authentication. The first authentication request message includes a ciphertext of an authentication identity of a requester and a ciphertext of an authentication access controller identity, and a ciphertext of an authentication access controller identity is generated by using a public key of an encryption certificate for encrypting data to be encrypted, including a digital access controller certificate for authentication and a second one-time random security number.

[0021] The first receiving portion is configured to receive a first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server. The first authentication response message includes a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, a first digital signature, a ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and a second digital signature, wherein the ciphertext of the first authentication result information is generated by using a second one-time random security number for encryption. information including first authentication result information, wherein the first authentication result information includes a first verification result for a digital certificate of the access controller upon authentication, the first digital signature is generated by the second authentication server performing a calculation on the data to be signed, including an encrypted the first authentication result information text, the ciphertext of the second authentication result information is generated by using a first one-time random security number to encrypt information including the second authentication result information, the second authentication result information including a second verification result for the digital certificate requestor, and a second digital signature is generated by the first authentication server performing a calculation on the data to be signed, including the ciphertext of the second authentication result information.

[0022] The first verification portion is configured to verify the second digital signature by using the public key of the first authentication server.

[0023] The second sending part is configured, when verification of the second digital signature is successful, to send a third authentication response message to the requester. The third authentication response message includes a ciphertext of the authentication result information, and a ciphertext of the authentication result information is generated by using a message encryption key to encrypt data to be encrypted, including a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, a first digital signature, and a second one-time random security number.

[0024] The second receiving portion is configured to receive a fourth authentication response message sent by the requester. The fourth authentication response message includes the ciphertext of the first one-time random security number, and the ciphertext of the first one-time random security number is obtained by using a message encryption key to encrypt information including the ciphertext of the first one-time random security number.

[0025] The decryption portion is configured to decrypt the ciphertext of the first one-time random security number by using a message encryption key to obtain the first one-time random security number, and decrypt the ciphertext of the second authentication result information by using the first one-time random security number to obtain second information about the authentication result.

[0026] The first determination portion is configured to determine an authentication result of the requester's identity information in accordance with the second verification result in the second authentication result information.

[0027] According to a third aspect, in an embodiment of the present disclosure, a requester is proposed. The requester includes a first part to send, a first part to receive, a first part to decrypt, and a first part to verify.

[0028] The first sending part is configured to send a ciphertext message of the identification information to the access controller upon authentication. The identity ciphertext message includes the ciphertext of the requester's identity and the ciphertext of the requester's identity is generated by using the public key of the encryption certificate to encrypt data to be encrypted, including the requestor's digital certificate and a first one-time random security number.

[0029] The first receiving portion is configured to receive a third authentication response message sent by the access controller upon authentication. The third authentication response message includes encrypted text information about the authentication result; an authentication result information ciphertext is generated by using a message encryption key to encrypt data to be encrypted, including a first authentication result information ciphertext, a first digital signature, and a second one-time random security number; a ciphertext of the first authentication result information is generated by using a second one-time random security number to encrypt information including the first authentication result information, the first authentication result information including a first verification result for the digital certificate of the access controller in the authentication, and the first the digital signature is a digital signature generated by a second authentication server trusted by the requester performing a calculation on the data to be signed, including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information.

[0030] The first decryption portion is configured to decrypt the ciphertext of the authentication result information by using a message encryption key to obtain the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the first digital signature, and the second one-time random security number.

[0031] The first verification part is configured to verify the first digital signature by using the public key of the second authentication server, wherein, if the verification is successful, the first decryption part decrypts the ciphertext of the first authentication result information by using the second one-time random security number to obtain the first authentication result information, the first part to determine determines the authentication result of the access controller identity information when authenticated according to the first verification result in the first authentication result information, and when the first part to determine determines that the authentication result of the access controller identity information when authenticated: "legitimate", the second part to send sends the fourth authentication response message to the access controller when authenticated.

[0032] Either the first verification portion is configured to verify the first digital signature by using the public key of the second authentication server. If the verification is successful, the second sending part sends a fourth authentication response message to the access controller upon authentication, the first decryption part decrypts the ciphertext of the first authentication result information by using a second one-time random guard number to obtain the first authentication result information, and the first the determining part determines the authentication result of the access controller identification information in the authentication according to the first verification result in the first authentication result information.

[0033] Either the first verification portion is configured to verify the first digital signature by using the public key of the second authentication server. If the verification of the first digital signature is successful, the first decryption part decrypts the ciphertext of the first authentication result information by using a second one-time random security number to obtain the first authentication result information, the first determination part determines the authentication result of the access controller identity information when authenticated according to with the first verification result in the first authentication result information, and the second sending part sends a fourth authentication response message to the access controller upon authentication.

[0034] The fourth authentication response message includes the ciphertext of the first one-time random security number, and the ciphertext of the first one-time random security number is obtained by using a message encryption key to encrypt information including the first one-time random security number.

[0035] According to a fourth aspect, in an embodiment of the present disclosure, a first authentication server is provided. The first authentication server is an authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication, and includes a first receiving part and a first sending part.

[0036] The first receiving portion is configured to receive a first authentication request message sent by the access controller upon authentication. The first authentication request message includes a ciphertext of an authentication identity of a requester and a ciphertext of an authentication access controller identity, and a ciphertext of an authentication access controller identity is generated by using a public key of an encryption certificate for encrypting data to be encrypted, including a digital the authentication access controller certificate and the second one-time random security number, and the ciphertext of the requestor's identification information are generated by using the public key of the encryption certificate to encrypt data to be encrypted, including the requestor's digital certificate and the first one-time random security number.

[0037] The first sending part is configured to send a first authentication response message to the access controller upon authentication. The first authentication response message includes a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, a first digital signature, a ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and a second digital signature, wherein the ciphertext of the first authentication result information is generated by using a second one-time random security number for encryption. information including first authentication result information, wherein the first authentication result information includes a first verification result for a digital certificate of the access controller upon authentication, the first digital signature is a digital signature generated by the second authentication server trusting the requester , calculations on the data to be signed, including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the ciphertext of the second authentication result information is generated by using the first one-time random guard number to encrypt the information including the second authentication result information, wherein the second information about the authentication result includes a second verification result for the requestor's digital certificate, and the second digital signature is a digital signature generated by the first authentication server performing a calculation on the data to be signed including the ciphertext of the second authentication result information.

[0038] According to a fifth aspect, in an embodiment of the present disclosure, a second authentication server is provided. The second authentication server is an authentication server that is trusted by the requester. If the first authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication and the second authentication server trusted by the requester are two different authentication servers, the second authentication server includes a receiving part, a first verification part, a decryption part, a second part for verification, part for generation and part for sending.

[0039] The receiving portion is configured to receive a second authentication request message sent by the first authentication server. The second authentication request message includes a ciphertext of a first authentication result information, a ciphertext of a requestor's identification information, and a third digital signature; and the third digital signature is a digital signature generated by performing, by an authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, a calculation on the data to be signed, including a ciphertext of the first authentication result information and a ciphertext of the requestor's identification information.

[0040] The first verification portion is configured to verify the third digital signature by using the public key of the first authentication server.

[0041] The acquisition portion is configured, when verification of the third digital signature is successful, to decrypt the ciphertext of the requestor's identity information using a private key corresponding to the encryption certificate to obtain the requestor's digital certificate and the first one-time random security number.

[0042] The second verification part is configured to perform legitimacy verification against the digital certificate of the requester to obtain a second verification result.

[0043] The generating part is configured to generate second authentication result information in accordance with the information including the second verification result, generating a ciphertext of the second authentication result information by using the first one-time random security number to encrypt the information including the second information about the authentication result, performing a calculation on the to-be-signed data including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information to generate a first digital signature, and performing a calculation on the to-be-signed data including the ciphertext of the second authentication result information to generate fourth digital signature.

[0044] The sending portion is configured to send a second authentication response message to the first authentication server. The second authentication response message includes a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, a first digital signature, a ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and a fourth digital signature.

[0045] According to a sixth aspect, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides an authentication access controller. The authentication access controller includes a processor and a storage device. The storage device is configured to store a computer program; and the processor is configured to call and run a computer program stored in the storage device to carry out steps performed by the access controller in authentication in the identity information authentication method as described in the first aspect.

[0046] According to a seventh aspect, in an embodiment of the present disclosure, a requester is proposed. The requester includes a processor and a storage device. The storage device is configured to store a computer program; and the processor is configured to call and execute a computer program stored in the storage device to carry out steps performed by a requester in the identity information authentication method as described in the first aspect.

[0047] According to an eighth aspect, in an embodiment of the present disclosure, a first authentication server is provided. The first authentication server is an authentication server that is trusted by the access controller for authentication, and includes a processor and a storage device. The storage device is configured to store a computer program; and the processor is configured to call and execute a computer program stored in the storage device to carry out steps performed by the first authentication server in the identity information authentication method as described in the first aspect.

[0048] According to a ninth aspect, in an embodiment of the present disclosure, a second authentication server is provided. The second authentication server is an authentication server that is trusted by the requester. If the first authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication and the second authentication server trusted by the requester are two different authentication servers, the second authentication server includes a processor and a storage device. The storage device is configured to store a computer program; and the processor is configured to call and execute a computer program stored in the storage device to carry out steps performed by the second authentication server in the identity information authentication method as described in the first aspect.

[0049] According to a tenth aspect, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a microcircuit. The chip includes: a processor configured to call and execute a computer program from a storage device to enable an authentication access controller in which the chip is installed to perform steps performed by the authentication access controller in an identity information authentication method, as described in first aspect.

[0050] Either the challenger in which the chip is installed is configured to perform the steps performed by the challenger in the identity information authentication method as described in the first aspect.

[0051] Either the first authentication server in which the chip is installed is configured to perform the steps performed by the first authentication server in the identity information authentication method as described in the first aspect.

[0052] Either the second authentication server in which the chip is installed is configured to perform the steps performed by the second authentication server in the identity information authentication method as described in the first aspect.

[0053] According to an eleventh aspect, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a computer storage medium for storing information. The computer storage medium is configured to store a computer program. The computer program allows the authentication access controller to perform the steps performed by the authentication access controller in the identity information authentication method as described in the first aspect.

[0054] Or, the computer program allows a challenger in which the chip is installed to carry out the steps performed by the challenger in the identity information authentication method as described in the first aspect.

[0055] Or, the computer program allows the first authentication server in which the chip is installed to carry out the steps performed by the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication in the identity information authentication method as described in the first aspect.

[0056] Or, the computer program allows the second authentication server in which the chip is installed to perform the steps performed by the second authentication server in the identity information authentication method as described in the first aspect.

[0057] According to a twelfth aspect, an embodiment of the present disclosure provides a computer program. The computer program allows the authentication access controller to perform the steps performed by the authentication access controller in the identity information authentication method as described in the first aspect.

[0058] Or, the computer program allows a challenger in which the chip is installed to carry out the steps performed by the challenger in the identity information authentication method as described in the first aspect.

[0059] Or, the computer program allows the first authentication server in which the chip is installed to perform the steps performed by the first authentication server in the identity information authentication method as described in the first aspect.

[0060] Or, the computer program allows the second authentication server in which the chip is installed to perform the steps performed by the second authentication server in the identity information authentication method as described in the first aspect.

[0061] From the above technical solutions, it can be concluded that by performing confidential processing of the identity information of the requester and the access controller during authentication, it can be prevented from disclosing the identity information of the requester and the access controller during authentication during the transmission process. In addition, when the first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller and the second verification result of the digital certificate of the requestor are transmitted between the first authentication server and the authentication access controller, and between the authentication access controller and the requestor, disclosing the first verification result and the second result verification during transmission can be prevented by performing confidential processing of the first and second verification results. Therefore, as the requestor accesses the network through the access controller, authentication ensures that an attacker cannot obtain personal and sensitive information. In addition, through the use of an authentication server, real-time mutual authentication of identity information is ensured between the requester and the access controller during authentication, while ensuring the confidentiality of information related to the identity of the entity, thus ensuring that only the legitimate user can exchange data with a legitimate network.

[0062] To make the above objects, features and advantages of the present disclosure more obvious and easier to understand, preferred embodiments are described in detail below with reference to the drawings.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0063] To more clearly illustrate embodiments of the present disclosure or technical solutions in the prior art, drawings used in the description of embodiments or prior art will be briefly described below. It will be appreciated that the drawings in the following descriptions represent only some embodiments of the present disclosure. Other drawings may be suggested by those skilled in the art based on these drawings without the expenditure of any creative effort.

[0064] In FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a method for authenticating identity information according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0065] In FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a method for negotiating a message encryption key between a Requester (REQ) and an Authentication Access Controller (AAC) according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0066] In FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a method for authenticating identity information in the case of non-roaming according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0067] In FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of yet another method for authenticating identity information in a non-roaming situation according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0068] In FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of a method for authenticating identity information in the case of roaming according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0069] In FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of yet another method for authenticating identity information in the presence of roaming according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0070] In FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of yet another method for authenticating identity information in the case of non-roaming according to an embodiment of the present disclosure, in which the symbol “*” represents an optional field or optional operation.

[0071] In FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of yet another method for authenticating identity information in the case of non-roaming according to an embodiment of the present disclosure, in which the symbol “*” represents an optional field or optional operation.

[0072] In FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram of yet another method for authenticating identity information in the presence of roaming according to an embodiment of the present disclosure, in which the symbol “*” represents an optional field or optional operation.

[0073] In FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram of yet another method for authenticating identity information in the presence of roaming according to an embodiment of the present disclosure, in which the symbol “*” represents an optional field or optional operation.

[0074] In FIG. 11 is a block diagram of an authentication access controller according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0075] In FIG. 12 is a block diagram of a requester according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0076] In FIG. 13 is a block diagram of a first authentication server (an authentication server trusted by an access controller for authentication) according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0077] In FIG. 14 is a block diagram of a second authentication server (an authentication server trusted by a requester) according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0078] In FIG. 15 is a schematic block diagram of a structure of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0079] In FIG. 16 is a schematic block diagram of a chip design according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INVENTION

[0080] The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present disclosure will be described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present disclosure. It will be appreciated that the described embodiments represent only a portion of the embodiments of the present disclosure and not all embodiments. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments in the present disclosure without the expenditure of creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present disclosure.

[0081] The technical solutions described in the embodiments of the present disclosure can be arbitrarily combined without conflict.

[0082] In a communication network, a requester can access the network through an access controller upon authentication. To ensure that the requester accessing the network is a legitimate user, the authentication access controller must authenticate the requester's identity. Likewise, to ensure that the network being accessed by the requester is a legitimate network, the requester also needs to authenticate the access controller's identity upon authentication.

[0083] Taking the current wireless and mobile communications scenario as an example, in a scenario in which a supplicant accesses a wireless network through an access controller for authentication, the supplicant may be a terminal device such as a mobile phone, personal digital assistant (Personal Digital Assistant, PDA) and tablet computer; and the authentication access controller may be a network device such as a wireless access point and a wireless router. In a scenario where a requester accesses a wired network through an access controller for authentication, the requester may be a terminal device such as a desktop computer and a laptop; and the authentication access controller may be a network device such as a switch and router. In a scenario where the requester accesses a 4th/5th generation (4G/5G) mobile network through an access controller for authentication, the requester may be a terminal device such as a mobile phone and a tablet computer, and the authentication access controller may be a network side device such as a base station. Of course, the present disclosure is also suitable for various data transmission scenarios, for example, over other wired networks and near-field networks.

[0084] However, the identity of the requester and the access controller during authentication can typically be included in a physical digital certificate and typically contains personal and confidential information. During mutual authentication of the identity information of the requester and the authentication access controller, if the identity information of the requester and the authentication access controller is intercepted by an attacker for illegal use, a serious security threat arises to the authentication access controller, the requester and the network.

[0085] To solve the above technical problems, an embodiment of the present disclosure proposes a method for authenticating identity information. The authentication access controller receives an encrypted message of identity information sent by the requester. The identity ciphertext message includes the ciphertext of the requester's identity and the ciphertext of the requester's identity is generated by using the public key of the encryption certificate to encrypt data to be encrypted, including the requestor's digital certificate and a first one-time random security number. Therefore, the security of transmission of the requestor's identity information between the requestor and the access controller during authentication is guaranteed. The authentication access controller then sends a first authentication request message to the first Authentication Server (AS) that the authentication access controller trusts. The first authentication request message includes a ciphertext of an authentication identity of a requester and a ciphertext of an authentication access controller identity, and a ciphertext of an authentication access controller identity is generated by using a public key of an encryption certificate for encrypting data to be encrypted, including a digital access controller certificate for authentication and a second one-time random security number. Therefore, the security of transmission of the supplicant identification information and the authentication access controller identification information between the authentication access controller and the first authentication server is guaranteed. The authentication access controller receives the first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server. The first authentication response message includes a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, a first digital signature, a ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and a second digital signature, wherein the ciphertext of the first authentication result information is generated by using a second one-time random security number for encryption. information including first authentication result information, wherein the first authentication result information includes a first verification result for a digital certificate of the access controller upon authentication, the first digital signature is a digital signature generated by the second authentication server trusting the requester , calculations on the data to be signed, including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the ciphertext of the second authentication result information is generated by using the first one-time random guard number to encrypt the information including the second authentication result information, wherein the second information about the authentication result includes a second verification result for the requestor's digital certificate, and the second digital signature is a digital signature generated by the first authentication server performing a calculation on the data to be signed including the ciphertext of the second authentication result information. Consequently, the security of transmitting verification results of the corresponding digital certificates of the access controller and the requester is guaranteed. After receiving the first authentication response message, the authentication access controller verifies the second digital signature using the public key of the first authentication server, and after successful verification, sends a third authentication response message to the requestor; wherein the third authentication response message includes a ciphertext of the authentication result information, and the ciphertext of the authentication result information is generated by using a message encryption key to encrypt data to be encrypted, including a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, a first digital signature, and second one-time random security number. The requester decrypts the ciphertext of the authentication result information by using the message encryption key to obtain the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the first digital signature and the second one-time random security number, verifies the first digital signature by using the public key of the second authentication server, after successful verification decrypts the ciphertext of the first authentication result information by using a second one-time random guard number to obtain the first authentication result information, and determines the authentication result of the access controller identification information in the authentication according to the first verification result in the first authentication result information. The requestor sends a fourth authentication response message to the access controller upon authentication; the fourth authentication response message includes the ciphertext of the first one-time random security number; and the ciphertext of the first one-time random security number is obtained by using a message encryption key to encrypt information including the first one-time random security number. The authentication access controller decrypts the ciphertext of the first one-time random security number by using the message encryption key to obtain the first one-time random security number, decrypts the ciphertext of the second authentication result information by using the first one-time random security number to obtain the second authentication result information, and determines an authentication result of the requester's identification information in accordance with the second verification result in the second authentication result information.

[0086] The first authentication result information mentioned in this embodiment of the present disclosure is obtained by performing, by an authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, a legitimacy verification against the digital certificate of the authentication access controller; information about the second authentication result is obtained by performing, by an authentication server trusted by the request initiator, verification of legitimacy using the digital certificate of the request initiator. The authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication and the authentication server trusted by the requester may be two independent identity authentication servers or the same identity authentication server. The above are only examples of the requestor, authentication access controller and authentication server and should not be considered as a limitation for the requestor, authentication access controller and authentication server. In other possible embodiments of embodiments of the present disclosure, the requester, the authentication access controller, and the authentication server may be other devices.

[0087] The identity authentication method proposed in embodiments of the present disclosure is designed to implement mutual identity authentication between a requestor and an access controller in authentication.

[0088] For ease of presentation, in embodiments of the present disclosure, a method for authenticating identity information according to the present disclosure is presented by using a requester, an authentication access controller, and an authentication server as examples.

[0089] The authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication is referred to as AS-AAC, and the authentication server trusted by the requester is referred to as AS-REQ. The authentication server, which is trusted by the access controller during authentication, has the ability to verify the legitimacy of the digital certificate of the access controller during authentication; and the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication has a digital certificate conforming to the requirements of ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509, other standards or other technical systems, and a private key corresponding to the digital certificate. The authentication server, which is trusted by the requester, has the ability to verify the legitimacy of the digital certificate of the access controller during authentication; and the authentication server, which is trusted by the requester, has a digital certificate conforming to the requirements of ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509, other standards or other technical systems, and a private key corresponding to the digital certificate. The authentication server, which is trusted by the access controller during authentication, and the authentication server, which is trusted by the requester, have the ability to transmit the digital certificate to other authentication servers for verification, and also have the ability to transmit information about the results of verification of the digital certificate to other authentication servers. When the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication is different from the authentication server trusted by the requester, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication and the authentication server trusted by the requester trust each other and know each other's digital certificates or the public key in a digital certificate. The Certificate Sever-Decrypt (CS-DEC) server contains an encryption certificate that conforms to ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509, other standards, or other technical frameworks, and a private key that matches the encryption certificate. There may be one or more encryption certificates. The certificate server for decryption may be an independent server or may be located in an authentication server that is trusted by the access controller for authentication.

[0090] The requester may be an endpoint participating in the identity authentication process, establishes a connection with the authentication access controller to provide services, and accesses the authentication server through the authentication access controller. The requester has a digital certificate that complies with ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509, other standards or other technical systems, and a private key corresponding to the digital certificate, and knows the digital certificate of the authentication server that the requestor trusts, or the public key in that digital certificate, and it knows the encryption certificate of the certificate server to decrypt, or the public key in that encryption certificate. The authentication access controller may be another endpoint that participates in the identity authentication process, establishes a connection with the requester to provide services, accesses the requester, and is configured to directly contact an authentication server that the authentication access controller trusts. The authentication access controller has a digital certificate that complies with the requirements of ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509, other standards or other technical systems, and a private key corresponding to this digital certificate, it knows the digital certificate of the authentication server that the authentication access controller trusts authentication, or the public key in this digital certificate, and it knows the decryption certificate server's encryption certificate, or the public key in this encryption certificate.

[0091] Below, in conjunction with FIG. 1, a method for authenticating identity information proposed in embodiments of the present disclosure is described. This method includes the following steps.

[0092] In step S101, the authentication access controller receives the REQInit signal sent by the requester.

[0093] The REQInit signal includes the EncPub _{AS_REQ} ciphertext of the requester's identification information. The EncPub _{AS_REQ} is generated by the requester by using the public key of the encryption certificate to encrypt the data to be encrypted, which includes the requester's Cert _REQ digital certificate and a first one-time random security number. Therefore, during the transmission of identity information between the requestor and the access controller during authentication, the identity information of the requester is subjected to confidential processing to prevent disclosure of the identity information of the requester during network access. In the present disclosure, the object to be encrypted is referred to as data to be encrypted.

[0094] In step S102, the authentication access controller sends a signal AACVeri to the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

[0095] The AACVeri signal includes EncPub _{AS_REQ} and the EncPub _{AS_AAC} ciphertext of the access controller authentication identification information. EncPub _{AS_AAC} is generated by the authentication access controller by using the public key of the encryption certificate to encrypt the data to be encrypted, including the authentication access controller's Cert _AAC digital certificate and a second one-time random security number. Therefore, during the transmission of identity information between the authentication access controller and the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, the corresponding identity information of the requester and the authentication access controller is subjected to confidential processing to prevent the disclosure of the corresponding identity information of the requester and the authentication access controller during the transfer.

[0096] It should be noted that if the authentication server trusted by the requester and the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication are the same authentication server, i.e. The requester and the authentication access controller typically trust the same authentication server, in which case the authentication server that the requester and the authentication access controller typically trust can be represented by the authentication server that the authentication access controller trusts (or, of course, authentication server that is trusted by the requester). In this case, the authentication server that is trusted by the authentication access controller (which can also be thought of as an authentication server that is trusted by the requester) can send EncPub _{AS_REQ} and EncPub _{AS_AAC} to the decryption certificate server that communicates and has a trust relationship with the authentication server. trusted by the access controller for authentication to decrypt, and obtain the Cert _REQ , the first one-time random security number, the Cert _AAC and the second one-time random security number obtained by decryption. Alternatively, the certificate server for decryption may be in an authentication server that is trusted by the authentication access controller (which can also be represented as an authentication server that is trusted by the requester) and an authentication server that is trusted by the authentication access controller (which can also be represented as authentication server trusted by the requester) uses the private key corresponding to the decryption certificate server's encryption certificate to respectively decrypt EncPub _{AS_REQ} and EncPub _{AS_AAC} to obtain Cert _REQ , the first one-time random security number, Cert _AAC , and the second one-time random security number. The authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller (which can also be thought of as the authentication server trusted by the requester), verifies the legitimacy of the Cert _AAC to obtain the first verification result, verifies the legitimacy of the Cert _REQ to obtain the second verification result, generates the first information about the authentication result in accordance with the information including the first verification result, generates second authentication result information in accordance with the information including the second verification result, encrypts the information including the first authentication result information by using a second one-time random a security number to generate a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, encrypts information including the second authentication result information by using a first one-time random security number to generate a ciphertext of the second authentication result information, performs a calculation on the data to be signed, including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information to generate a first digital signature Sig _{AS_AAC1} (which may also be represented as Sig _{AS_REQ1} ) performs a computation on the data to be signed including the ciphertext of the second authentication result information to generate the second digital signature Sig _{AS_AAC2} (which may also be represented as Sig _{AS_REQ2} ) and generates a first authentication response message ASVeri according to information including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, Sig _{AS_AAC1} (which may also be represented as Sig _{AS_REQ1} ) , the ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and Sig _{AS_AAC2} (which can also be represented as Sig _{AS_REQ2} ).

[0097] If the authentication server trusted by the requester and the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller are two different authentication servers, the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller may send EncPub _{AS_AAC} to the certificate server for decryption, performing interaction and having a trust relationship with the authentication server, which is trusted by the access controller for authentication, for decryption, and obtain the Cert _AAC and a second one-time random security number obtained by decryption. Alternatively, the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller first obtains the Cert _AAC and a second one-time random security number by using the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate of the decryption certificate server located in the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller to decrypt EncPub _{AS_AAC} . The authentication server, which is trusted by the access controller for authentication, verifies the legitimacy of the Cert _AAC to obtain the first verification result, generates the first authentication result information in accordance with the information including the first verification result, and encrypts the information including the first result information authentication by using a second one-time random security number to generate a ciphertext of the first authentication result information. The authentication server, which is trusted by the access controller for authentication, then sends an AS-AACVeri signal to the authentication server, which is trusted by the requester. The AS-AACVeri signal includes the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, EncPub _{AS_REQ} and Sig _{AS_AAC3} . Sig _{AS_AAC3} is generated by having the authentication server, which is trusted by the authentication access controller, compute on the data to be signed, including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information and EncPub _{AS_REQ} . Upon receiving AS-AACVeri, the authentication server trusted by the requester verifies Sig _{AS_AAC3} by using the public key of the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller. After successful verification, the authentication server trusted by the requester can send the EncPub _{AS_REQ} to the certificate server for decryption, which communicates and has a trust relationship with the authentication server trusted by the requester for decryption, and receives the Cert _REQ and the first one-time random guard number, obtained by decryption. Alternatively, the authentication server trusted by the requester first obtains the Cert _REQ and the first one-time random security number by using the private key corresponding to the decryption certificate server encryption certificate residing in the authentication server trusted by the requester to decrypt the EncPub _{AS_REQ} . The authentication server, which is trusted by the requester, verifies the legitimacy of the Cert _REQ to obtain the second verification result, generates the second authentication result information in accordance with the information including the second verification result, encrypts the information including the second authentication result information by using the first one-time random security number to generate the ciphertext of the second authentication result information, performs a computation on the to-be-signed data including the ciphertext of the second authentication result information to generate Sig _{AS_REQ4} , and performs a computation on the to-be-signed data including itself the ciphertext of the first authentication result information to generate Sig _{AS_REQ1} . The authentication server trusted by the requester sends a second AS-REQVeri authentication response message to the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller. The AS-REQVeri message includes the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, Sig _{AS_REQ1} , the ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and Sig _{AS_REQ4} . The authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication verifies Sig _{AS_REQ4} by using the public key of the authentication server trusted by the requester, after successful verification, performs a calculation on the data to be signed including the ciphertext of the second authentication result information to generate Sig _{AS_AAC2} , and generates ASVeri according to information including a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, Sig _{AS_REQ1} , a ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and Sig _{AS_AAC2} .

[0098] In step S103, the authentication access controller receives the first authentication response message ASVeri sent by the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

[0099] ASVeri includes a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, a first digital signature, a ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and a second digital signature.

[00100] In step S104, the authentication access controller verifies the second digital signature by using the public key of the authentication server that is trusted by the authentication access controller.

[00101] If verification is successful, subsequent operations are performed.

[00102] In step S105, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication sends a third AACAuth authentication response message to the requester.

[00103] AACAuth includes EncData _AAC ciphertext information about the authentication result. The EncData _AAC is generated by the authentication access controller by using a message encryption key by using a symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt the data to be encrypted, including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the first digital signature, and the second one-time random security number. The message encryption key may be obtained by negotiation between the requester and the authentication access controller, or may be shared in advance between the requestor and the authentication access controller. An implementation option for agreeing on a message encryption key between the requester and the access controller during authentication is presented below.

[00104] In step S106, the requester decrypts the EncData _AAC by using the message encryption key to obtain the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the first digital signature, and the second one-time random security number.

[00105] Since the EncData _AAC ciphertext is obtained by the authentication access controller by using the message encryption key to calculate using a symmetric encryption algorithm, after receiving the EncData _AAC , the requestor can decrypt the EncData _AAC using the symmetric encryption algorithm by using the message encryption key to obtain the ciphertext of the first information about the authentication result, the first digital signature and the second one-time random security number.

[00106] In step S107, the requester verifies the first digital signature by using the public key of the authentication server trusted by the requester.

[00107] In step S108, the requester decrypts the ciphertext of the first authentication result information by using the second one-time random guard number to obtain the first authentication result information, and determines the authentication result of the access controller identity information in the authentication according to the first verification result in the first information about the authentication result.

[00108] In step S109, the requestor sends a fourth REQAuth authentication response message to the authentication access controller.

[00109] The REQAuth message includes the ciphertext of the first one-time random security number. The ciphertext of the first one-time random security number is obtained by the requester by using a message encryption key to encrypt information including the first one-time random security number.

[00110] It should be noted that the order of execution of steps S107-S109 does not affect the implementation of the present disclosure, and in practical application, the order of execution of S107-S109 can be set according to requirements. It is preferably recommended that step S107 be performed first, and when the requester cannot verify the first digital signature, AACAuth is discarded; when the first digital signature is verified by the requester, step S108 is executed; when the requester determines that the authentication access controller is legitimate, step S109 is executed; and when the requestor determines that the authentication access controller is not legitimate, the requestor selects, in accordance with the local policy, whether to execute step S109. From an efficiency standpoint, it is preferable not to perform or complete this authentication process.

[00111] In step S110, the authentication access controller decrypts the ciphertext of the first one-time random security number by using the message encryption key to obtain the first one-time random security number, and decrypts the ciphertext of the second authentication result information by using the first one-time random security number to obtain second information about the authentication result.

[00112] In step S111, the authentication access controller determines the authentication result of the requester's identity information according to the second verification result in the second authentication result information.

[00113] From the above technical solutions, it can be concluded that when the identity information is transmitted between the requester and the access controller during authentication, and between the access controller during authentication and the authentication server, confidential processing of the identity information of both the requester and the access controller is performed during authentication, such that the corresponding identification information of the requester and the access controller can be prevented from being disclosed during authentication during transmission. In addition, when the first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller and the second verification result of the digital certificate of the requestor are transmitted between the authentication server and the authentication access controller, and between the authentication access controller and the requester, disclosing the first verification result and the second verification result during transmission can be prevented by performing confidential processing of the first and second verification results. Therefore, while the requester is accessing the network, it is ensured that an attacker will not be able to obtain personal and confidential information. In addition, through the use of an authentication server, real-time mutual authentication of identity information is ensured between the requester and the access controller during authentication, while ensuring the confidentiality of information related to the identity of the entity, thus ensuring that only the legitimate user can exchange data with a legitimate network.

[00114] In some embodiments, the REQInit at step S101 may further include a digital signature Sig _REQ of the requester; and the Sig _REQ data to be signed includes other fields before the Sig _REQ in the REQInit. Before step S111, the authentication access controller must further determine whether the Sig _REQ verification is successful, and step S111 can only be executed if the verification is successful. It should be noted that if the authentication server trusted by the requester and the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller are the same authentication server, the Sig _REQ can be verified by the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller (which is also may be represented as an authentication server that is trusted by the requester), or may be verified by the access controller during authentication; and if the authentication server trusted by the requester and the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller are two different authentication servers, the Sig _REQ may be verified by the authentication server trusted by the requester or may be verified by the authentication access controller. The authentication access controller determines, using the following methods, whether the Sig _REQ verification is successful.

[00115] As an option for verifying a Sig _REQ with a requester, if the authentication server trusted by the requester and the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication are the same authentication server (not roaming), when the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller (which can also be represented as an authentication server trusted by the requester) verifies the Sig _REQ , the Sig _REQ can be passed to the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller (which can also be represented as an authentication server trusted by the requester) by transmitting in the AACVeri signal in step S102, and the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller (which may also be represented as an authentication server trusted by the requester) verifies the Sig _REQ by using Cert _REQ obtained by decrypting EncPub _{AS_REQ} ; if the verification is successful, subsequent operations continue to perform the steps of generating and sending the first authentication response message; and if the verification was not successful, subsequent operations are not performed and thus the steps of generating and sending the first authentication response message are not performed. Therefore, the authentication access controller is configured to determine, depending on whether the first authentication response message can be received, whether the Sig _REQ verification is successful. If the authentication access controller can receive the first authentication response message, the authentication access controller can determine that the Sig _REQ verification is successful.

[00116] As another embodiment of Sig _REQ verification using an authentication server, if the authentication server trusted by the requester and the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication are two different authentication servers (roaming), when the authentication server, trusted by the requester verifies the Sig _REQ , the Sig _REQ may be sent to the authentication server trusted by the requester by transmitting in the AACVeri signal in step S102, and AS-AACVeri will be sent to the authentication server trusted by the requester by the authentication server, trusted by the access controller for authentication, and the authentication server trusted by the requester verifies the Sig _REQ by using the Cert _REQ obtained by decrypting the EncPub _{AS_REQ} ; if the verification is successful, subsequent operations continue to perform the steps of generating and sending a second authentication response message and a subsequent first authentication response message; and if the verification is not successful, subsequent operations are not performed and thus the steps of generating and sending the second authentication response message and the subsequent first authentication response message are not performed. Therefore, the authentication access controller is configured to determine, depending on whether the first authentication response message can be received, whether the Sig _REQ verification is successful. If the authentication access controller can receive the first authentication response message, the authentication access controller can determine that the Sig _REQ verification is successful.

[00117] As an embodiment of verifying the Sig _REQ by the authentication access controller, when the authentication access controller verifies the Sig _REQ , the second authentication result information generated by the authentication server further includes a Cert _REQ . After receiving the REQAuth in step S109, the authentication access controller may verify the Sig _REQ by using the Cert _REQ in the second authentication result information, which is obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the second authentication result information, to determine whether the verification of the Sig _REQ is successful.

[00118] In some other embodiments, the REQAuth at step S109 may further include the requestor's Sig _REQ ; and the Sig _REQ data to be signed includes other fields before the Sig _REQ in REQAuth. In this case, the second authentication result information generated by the authentication server further includes a Cert _REQ . Before step S111, the authentication access controller must further verify the Sig _REQ by using the Cert _REQ in the second authentication result information and determine whether the verification of the Sig _REQ is successful; and step S111 can only be executed if the verification is successful.

[00119] In some embodiments, the AACVeri at step S102 may further include an authentication access controller digital signature Sig _AAC ; and the Sig _AAC data to be signed includes other fields before Sig _AAC in AACVeri. Before step S108, the requester must further determine whether the Sig _AAC verification is successful, and step S108 can only be executed if the verification is successful. The requester determines, using the following methods, whether the Sig _AAC verification is successful. The authentication server, which is trusted by the access controller for authentication, verifies the Sig _AAC by using the Cert _AAC obtained by decrypting EncPub _{AS_AAC} into AACVeri, and subsequent processes are executed after successful verification such that if the requester can accept AACAuth in step S105, the requester determines that Sig _AAC verification is successful.

[00120] In some other embodiments, the AACAuth at step S105 may further include an authentication access controller Sig _AAC ; and the Sig _AAC data to be signed includes other fields before the Sig _AAC in AACAuth. Accordingly, the first authentication result information generated by the authentication server further includes a Cert _AAC . Before the requester determines the authentication result of the access controller identity in step S108, the requester must also determine whether the Sig _AAC verification is successful, and the authentication result of the access controller identity in the authentication can only be determined according to the first verification result. , when verification is successful. The requester determines, using the following methods, whether the Sig _AAC verification is successful. The requester verifies the Sig _AAC by using the Cert _AAC in the first authentication result information, which is obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, and determines whether the Sig _AAC verification is successful according to the verification result.

[00121] With reference to FIG. 1, messages transmitted between the requestor, the authentication access controller, and the authentication server may further include parameter information, such as nonces random numbers generated by the authentication access controller and/or the requestor, and corresponding identification identifiers. Typically, when authenticating identity information, these one-time random numbers and/or identity identifiers should remain unchanged during transmission through messages, but in the case of network jitter or network attacks, etc. this may result in loss or corruption of parameter information such as nonces and/or identification identifiers in messages. Therefore, consistency between identity identifiers and/or nonce random numbers in messages can be further verified during identity authentication to ensure the reliability and currency of the authentication results.

[00122] For example, in REQInit in step S101, the EncPub _{AS_REQ} data to be encrypted may further include a requester ID _REQ and a third one-time random guard number Nonce _REQID ; and Nonce _REQID are used to encrypt ID _REQ . Accordingly, ASVeri at step S103 may further include the ciphertext of the requester's identification identifier. For example, the ciphertext of the requester ID could be the text: "ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID ", which is the result of an exclusive or operation (XOR) of ID _REQ and Nonce _REQID . In AACAuth, in step S105, the EncData _AAC data to be encrypted further includes an encrypted text of the requester's identity ID. The requester also obtains the ciphertext of the requester's identity ID by decrypting the EncData _AAC . The requester must also verify, against its own _REQ ID and Nonce _REQID , the ciphertext of the requester's identity ID obtained by decrypting the EncData _AAC . For example, verification may include the following. The requester encrypts information including the requester's own _REQ ID by using the Nonce _REQID to generate the requester ID ciphertext and perform consistency verification on the generated requester ID ciphertext and the requester ID ciphertext that is obtained by EncData _AAC transcripts. Alternatively, the requester decrypts the ciphertext of the requester ID by using the Nonce _REQID to obtain the _REQ ID, and performs consistency verification between it and the requester's own _REQ ID; and if the verification is successful, the requester then performs the step of determining the authentication result of the authentication identity of the access controller in step S108.

[00123] Similarly, in AACVeri in step S102, the EncPub _{AS_AAC} data to be encrypted may further include an authentication access controller _AAC ID and a fourth one-time random security number Nonce _AACID , and the Nonce _AACID is used to encrypt _{the AAC} ID. Accordingly, ASVeri at step S103 may further include the ciphertext of the access controller identification identifier when authenticating. For example, the ciphertext of the authentication access controller identity may be the text: " _AAC ID ⊕Nonce _AACID ", which is the result of the "exclusive or" operation of _AAC ID and Nonce _AACID . Before determining the authentication result of the requester identity, the authentication access controller must further verify the ciphertext of the authentication access controller identity against its own _AAC ID and Nonce _AACID . For example, verification includes the following. The authentication access controller encrypts information including the authentication access controller's own _AAC ID by using the Nonce _AACID to generate the authentication access controller ID ciphertext, and performs consistency verification between the generated authentication access controller ID ciphertext and the received ciphertext. an access controller identification ID when authenticating to ASVeri in step S103; or the authentication access controller may decrypt the ciphertext of the authentication access controller's identity by using the Nonce _AACID to obtain the _AAC ID, and performs consistency verification between it and the authentication access controller's own _AAC ID. The authentication access controller then performs the step of determining an authentication result of the requester's identity in step S111 if the verification is successful.

[00124] In some embodiments, if the REQInit in step S101 further includes a Nonce _REQ generated by the requester, then the AACVeri in step S102 further includes a Nonce _AAC generated by the authentication access controller and a Nonce _REQ . Accordingly, ASVeri at step S103 may further include Nonce _REQ and Nonce _AAC ; and in AACAuth in step S105, the EncData _AAC data to be encrypted further includes a Nonce _REQ . After receiving the ASVeri in step S103, the authentication access controller must further verify the consistency between the Nonce _AAC in the ASVeri and the Nonce _AAC (which is the Nonce _AAC sent by the authentication access controller via AACVeri) generated by the authentication access controller; and if the verification is successful, the authentication access controller then performs the step of determining the authentication result of the requester's identity in step S111. After receiving the AACAuth in step S105, the requester must also verify the consistency between the Nonce _REQ obtained by decrypting the EncData _AAC and the Nonce _REQ (which is the Nonce _REQ sent by the requester via REQInit) generated by the requester; and if the verification is successful, the requester then performs the step of determining the authentication result of the authentication identity of the access controller in step S108.

[00125] In some embodiments, to ensure the reliability of the authentication results, the access controller may generate a message integrity verification code upon authentication. For example, the AACAuth at step S105 may further include a first MacTag _AAC message integrity verification code. MacTag _AAC is generated by the access controller during authentication by using the message integrity key to perform calculations on fields in AACAuth other than MacTag _AAC . The requester must also verify the MacTag _AAC ; and after successful verification, the step of determining the authentication result of the access controller identification information in the authentication is then performed in step S108. When verifying a MacTag _AAC, the requester must use the message integrity key to perform a calculation on fields in AACAuth other than MacTag _AAC to generate a MacTag _AAC and compare the calculated MacTag _AAC with the accepted MacTag _AAC in AACAuth; if these MacTag _AACs are consistent, verification is successful; and if these _AAC MacTags are inconsistent, the verification was not successful.

[00126] Likewise, the requester may also generate message integrity verification code. For example, the REQAuth at step S109 may further include a second message integrity verification code MacTag _REQ . A MacTag _REQ is generated by the requester by using a message integrity key to perform a calculation on fields in REQAuth other than MacTag _REQ . The access controller must also verify the MacTag _REQ during authentication; and after successful verification, the step of determining the authentication result of the requester's identity information is then performed in step S111. When verifying a MacTag _REQ, the authentication access controller must use the message integrity key to perform a computation on fields in the REQAuth other than the MacTag _REQ to generate a MacTag _REQ and compare the computed MacTag _REQ with the received MacTag _REQ in the REQAuth; if these MacTag _REQs are consistent, verification is successful; and if these _AAC MacTags are inconsistent, the verification was not successful. A method for generating a message integrity key used by a requester and an access controller for authentication is described in the following embodiment.

[00127] The message encryption key in the above embodiments can be obtained by performing negotiation between the requester and the access controller during authentication. Thus, this embodiment further provides a method for negotiating a message encryption key between a requester and an access controller during authentication. With reference to FIG. 2 this method includes the following steps.

[00128] In step S201, the authentication access controller sends AACInit to the requester.

[00129] AACInit includes an access controller key exchange parameter for authentication, KeyInfo _AAC , and KeyInfo _AAC includes a temporary public key for the access controller for authentication. Key exchange refers to a key exchange algorithm such as the Diffie-Hellman (DH) algorithm. AACInit may optionally include an _AAC Nonce generated by the access controller upon authentication.

[00130] AACInit may further include _AAC security features; and the _AAC security features represent information about a security parameter supported by the authentication access controller, including an identity authentication package (which includes one or more identity authentication methods) supported by the authentication access controller, one or more symmetric encryption algorithms , one or more integrity checking algorithms and/or one or more key generation algorithms to enable the requester to select a particular security policy to use. Therefore, the requester can choose, in accordance with the _AAC security controls, the specific security policy ( _REQ security controls) used by the requester. _REQ security controls indicate an identity authentication method, a symmetric encryption algorithm, an integrity verification algorithm, and/or a key generation algorithm, which are respectively defined for use by the requester.

[00131] In step S202, the requester performs key exchange calculation in accordance with the temporary private key corresponding to the requestor's key exchange parameter KeyInfo _REQ and the temporary public key included in the KeyInfo _AAC to generate the first key, and calculates the message encryption key by using the algorithm generating a key in accordance with the information including the first key.

[00132] If the AACInit in step S201 further includes a Nonce _AAC generated by the access controller upon authentication, the requestor may perform a key exchange calculation in accordance with the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo _REQ and the temporary public key included in the KeyInfo _AAC so that generate the first key K1; wherein K1 is combined with information including a Nonce _AAC and a Nonce _REQ generated by the requester; and the message encryption key is calculated by using a consensus or predetermined key generation algorithm. The negotiated key generation algorithm may be a key generation algorithm that the requestor selects to use in accordance with the _AAC security measures sent by the access controller upon authentication. The KeyInfo _REQ is a key exchange parameter generated by the requester and includes the requester's temporary public key. The temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo _REQ is a temporary private key that is generated by the requester, and corresponds to the temporary public key of the requester, i.e. A temporary public key and a temporary private key are a pair of temporary public and temporary private keys.

[00133] In step S203, the requester sends a REQInit to the access controller upon authentication.

[00134] REQInit includes a KeyInfo _REQ such that the authentication access controller obtains a message encryption key by performing a calculation according to information including a temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo _AAC and a temporary public key included in the KeyInfo _REQ . The temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo _AAC is the temporary private key that the access controller generates upon authentication, and corresponds to the temporary public key of the access controller upon authentication, i.e. A temporary public key and a temporary private key are a pair of temporary public and temporary private keys.

[00135] REQInit may further include _REQ security features. The REQInit may further include a Nonce _REQ such that the authentication access controller obtains a message encryption key by performing a calculation in accordance with information including a temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo _AAC and a temporary public key included in KeyInfo _REQ Nonce _AAC and Nonce _REQ .

[00136] The REQInit may further include a Nonce _AAC such that, before computing a message encryption key, the authentication access controller may verify consistency between the Nonce _AAC in the REQInit and the Nonce _AAC generated by the authentication access controller to ensure that the REQInit received by the controller access during authentication, is a response message to AACInit.

[00137] In step S204, the authentication access controller performs key exchange calculation in accordance with the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo _AAC and the temporary public key included in the KeyInfo _REQ to generate the first key, and calculates the message encryption key by using the key generation algorithm according to the information including the first key.

[00138] If the REQInit further includes a Nonce _REQ , the authentication access controller may perform a key exchange calculation in accordance with the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo _AAC and the temporary public key included in the KeyInfo _REQ to generate the first key K1; wherein K1 is combined with information including Nonce _AAC and Nonce _REQ ; and a message encryption key is calculated using a consensus or predetermined key generation algorithm. The negotiated key generation algorithm may be a key generation algorithm that the authentication access controller selects to use in accordance with the security _REQ sent by the requester.

[00139] It should be noted that in the embodiment of FIG. 2, the requester and the authentication access controller are also configured to generate a message integrity verification key. The implementations of the requester and the authentication access controller for, respectively, generating the message integrity verification key are the same as the implementations of the requester and the authentication access controller for, respectively, generating the message encryption key in the embodiment of FIG. 2. For example, the authentication access controller may obtain the key data string by using a key generation algorithm in the same manner as in the embodiment of FIG. 2. The key data can be used as a message encryption key, and can also represent a message integrity verification key. Alternatively, one portion of the key data is used as a message encryption key and another portion of the key data is used as a message integrity verification key. The authentication access controller is also configured to obtain two identical or different key data strings separately by using a key generation algorithm in the same manner as in the embodiment of FIG. 2, where one line is used as a message encryption key, and the other line is used as a message integrity key. The requester can obtain the key data string by using the key generation algorithm in the same manner as in the embodiment of FIG. 2. The key data can be used as a message encryption key, and can also represent a message integrity verification key. Alternatively, one portion of the key data is used as a message encryption key and another portion of the key data is used as a message integrity verification key. The requester is also configured to obtain two identical or different key data strings separately by using a key generation algorithm in the same manner as in the embodiment of FIG. 2, where one line is used as a message encryption key, and the other line is used as a message integrity key.

[00140] An embodiment of the present disclosure further provides a method for determining an authentication server trusted by an authentication access controller and/or an authentication server trusted by a requester used during an ongoing authentication process by using communication between the authentication access controller and the initiator of the request.

[00141] With reference to FIG. 2, the authentication access controller adds to AACInit in step S201 the ID _{AS_AAC} of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller; and the requester determines, in accordance with the _{AS_AAC} ID, _{the AS_REQ} ID of at least one authentication server that the requester trusts. During implementation, the requester selects from the _{AS_AAC} ID the identification identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requester as the _{AS_REQ} ID; and if the selection is not successful, the requester uses the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requester as the _{AS_REQ} ID (a successful selection corresponds to the non-roaming case, and an unsuccessful selection corresponds to the roaming case), and the _{AS_REQ} ID is added to REQInit in step S203 and sent to the access controller upon authentication. Therefore, the authentication access controller is configured to determine the first authentication server in accordance with the _{AS_AAC} ID and the _{AS_REQ} ID. For example, the authentication access controller is configured to determine whether there is at least the same authentication server in ID _{AS_REQ} and ID _{AS_AAC} ; if this is the case, i.e. in the case of no roaming, the authentication access controller determines the authentication server that is trusted by the authentication access controller involved in authenticating the identity information by the identification identifier of the authentication server that is generally trusted by at least one requestor and the authentication access controller; and if this is not the case, i.e. in case of roaming, the authentication access controller shall determine, according to the ID _{AS_AAC} , the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller involved in identity authentication, and send the ID _{AS_REQ} to the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, such Thus, the authentication server that the access controller trusts for authentication determines the authentication server that the requester trusts according to the ID _{AS_REQ} .

[00142] As another embodiment, the authentication access controller may not send the _{AS_AAC} ID to the requestor, and the requestor adds, in REQInit in step S203, the _{AS_REQ} ID of at least one authentication server trusted by the requester. Determining the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication and/or the authentication server trusted by the requester involved in the authentication process of identity information, in accordance with the ID _{AS_REQ} and ID _{AS_AAC} of the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication, is implemented in the same way , as in the previous implementation.

[00143] For ease of description, in the following embodiments, the first verification result obtained by verifying the legitimacy of the Cert _AAC is represented as Res _AAC ; the first information about the authentication result is presented as Pub _AAC ; the second verification result, obtained by verifying the legitimacy of the Cert _REQ , is represented as Res _REQ ; the second information about the authentication result is represented as Pub _REQ .

[00144] Since the authentication servers trusted by the requester and the access controller for authentication may be the same server or different servers, it is the case that the authentication servers trusted by the requester and the access controller for authentication are the same the same server corresponds to the absence of roaming, and the case when the authentication servers trusted by the requester and the access controller during authentication are different corresponds to the presence of roaming.

[00145] In the case of non-roaming, an authentication server that is trusted by the access controller for authentication (or an authentication server that is trusted by the requestor) can be used to represent the authentication server that is generally trusted by the requester and the access controller for authentication, and can also verify Sig Requester's _REQ and Access Controller's Sig _AAC during authentication during identity authentication. For example, an authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication (or an authentication server trusted by the requester) can be used to verify Sig _REQ and Sig _AAC ; or the authentication access controller may be used to verify the Sig _REQ and the requester verifies the Sig _AAC .

[00146] In FIG. 3 shows an embodiment of a method for authenticating the identity of an access controller in an authentication verifying Sig _REQ and a requester verifying Sig _AAC in the case of non-roaming. Before executing this embodiment, both the requester and the authentication access controller have a message encryption key, and the message encryption key may be shared in advance by both parties or may be obtained by negotiation in the manner shown in FIG. 2. This identity information authentication method includes the following steps. This method of authenticating identity information includes the following steps.

[00147] In step S301, the authentication access controller receives the REQInit signal sent by the requester.

[00148] The REQInit includes the requester's EncPub _{AS_REQ} and the requester's Sig _REQ .

[00149] In step S302, the authentication access controller sends AACVeri to the authentication server that the authentication access controller trusts.

[00150] The AACVeri signal includes EncPub _{AS_REQ} and the EncPub _{AS_AAC} ciphertext of the access controller authentication identification information.

[00151] In step S303, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication decrypts EncPub _{AS_REQ} and EncPub _{AS_AAC} by using the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate to obtain Cert _REQ , Nonce _REQPub , Cert _AAC and Nonce _AACPub , respectively, performs legitimacy verification by Cert _AAC and Cert _REQ to obtain Res _AAC and Res _REQ , generates Pub _AAC according to the information including Cert _AAC and Res _AAC , generates Pub _REQ according to the information including Cert _REQ and Res _REQ , encrypts information including Pub _AAC by using Nonce _AACPub to generate the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, encrypts information including Pub _REQ by using Nonce _REQPub to generate the ciphertext of the second authentication result information, generating Sig _{AS_AAC1} by performing calculation on the to-be-signed data including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, and generates Sig _{AS_AAC2} by performing calculation on the to-be-signed data including the ciphertext of the second authentication result information.

[00152] In step S304, the authentication access controller receives the first authentication response message ASVeri sent by the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

[00153] The ASVeri message includes a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, Sig _{AS_AAC1} , a ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and Sig _{AS_AAC2} .

[00154] In step S305, the authentication access controller verifies Sig _{AS_AAC2} by using the public key of the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, if the verification is successful, encrypts the data to be encrypted, including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, Sig _{AS_AAC1} and Nonce _AACPub by using the message encryption key to generate EncData _AAC , and generates Sig _AAC by performing a calculation on the data to be signed including EncData _AAC .

[00155] In step S306, the authentication access controller sends a third AACAuth authentication response message to the requestor.

[00156] AACAuth includes EncData _AAC and Sig _AAC .

[00157] In step S307, the requester decrypts the EncData _AAC by using the message encryption key to obtain the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, Sig _{AS_AAC1} and Nonce _AACPub .

[00158] In step S308, the requester decrypts the ciphertext of the first authentication result information by using Nonce _AACPub to obtain Pub _AAC .

[00159] In step S309, the requester verifies Sig _AAC by using Cert _AAC in Pub _AAC and verifies Sig _{AS_AAC1} by using the public key of the authentication server that is trusted by the access controller for authentication.

[00160] If all verifications are successful, then step S310 is executed.

[00161] In step S310, the requester determines the authentication result of the access controller identity when authenticating in accordance with Res _AAC in Pub _AAC .

[00162] When the requester determines that the authentication access controller is legitimate, step S311 is executed; and when the requester determines that the authentication access controller is not legitimate, the current authentication process is terminated.

[00163] In step S311, the requester encrypts the information including the Nonce _REQPub by using the message encryption key to obtain the EncData _REQ .

[00164] In step S312, the requestor sends a fourth REQAuth authentication response message to the authentication access controller.

[00165] REQAuth includes an EncData _REQ .

[00166] In step S313, the authentication access controller decrypts the EncData _REQ by using the message encryption key to obtain the Nonce _REQPub , and decrypts the ciphertext of the second authentication result information by using the Nonce _REQPub to obtain the Pub _REQ .

[00167] In step S314, the authentication access controller verifies the Sig _REQ by using the Cert _REQ in the Pub _REQ .

[00168] If the verification is successful, step S315 is executed.

[00169] In step S315, the authentication access controller determines the authentication result of the requester's identity information in accordance with the Res _REQ in the Pub _REQ .

[00170] It should be noted that the REQInit in step S301 may not include a Sig _REQ , but the Sig _REQ is added to the REQAuth in step S312. In other words, in step S312, the requester first generates a Sig _REQ by performing a calculation on the data to be signed including the EncData _REQ in the REQAuth. In this case, the Sig _REQ verified by the access controller during authentication in step S314 is the Sig _REQ in REQAuth in step S312.

[00171] In FIG. 4 shows yet another embodiment of a method for authenticating the identity of an authentication server trusted by an access controller for authentication, verifying Sig _REQ and Sig _AAC in the case of non-roaming. Before executing this embodiment, both the requester and the authentication access controller have a message encryption key, and the message encryption key may be shared in advance by both parties or may be obtained by negotiation in the manner shown in FIG. 2. This identity information authentication method includes the following steps. This method of authenticating identity information includes the following steps.

[00172] In step S401, the authentication access controller receives the REQInit signal sent by the requester.

[00173] The REQInit includes the requester's EncPub _{AS_REQ} and the requester's Sig _REQ .

[00174] In step S402, the authentication access controller sends AACVeri to the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

[00175] AACVeri includes REQInit, EncPub _{AS_AAC} Authentication Access Controller, and Sig _AAC Authentication Access Controller. Sig _AAC is generated by performing calculations in other fields before Sig _AAC in AACVeri.

[00176] In step S403, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication decrypts EncPub _{AS_REQ} and EncPub _{AS_AAC} by using the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate to obtain Cert _REQ , Nonce _REQPub , Cert _AAC and Nonce _AACPub , verifies Sig _REQ by using Cert _REQ , and verifies Sig _AAC by using Cert _AAC .

[00177] If all verifications are successful, step S404 is executed.

[00178] In step S404, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication performs legitimacy verification of Cert _AAC and Cert _REQ to obtain Res _AAC and Res _REQ , generates Pub _AAC according to the information including Res _AAC , generates Pub _REQ according to the information including the Res _REQ , encrypts the information including the Pub _AAC by using the Nonce _AACPub to generate the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, encrypts the information including the Pub _REQ by using the Nonce _REQPub to generate a ciphertext of the second authentication result information, generates Sig _{AS_AAC1} by performing calculation on the data to be signed including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, and generates Sig _{AS_AAC2} by performing calculation on the data to be signed including the ciphertext of the second information about the authentication result.

[00179] In step S405, the authentication access controller receives the first authentication response message ASVeri sent by the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

[00180] The ASVeri message includes a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, Sig _{AS_AAC1} , a ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and Sig _{AS_AAC2} .

[00181] In step S406, the authentication access controller verifies Sig _{AS_AAC2} by using the public key of the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, if the verification is successful, encrypts the data to be encrypted, including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, Sig _{AS_AAC1} and Nonce _AACPub by using the message encryption key to generate EncData _AAC .

[00182] In step S407, the authentication access controller sends a third AACAuth authentication response message to the requestor.

[00183] AACAuth includes EncData _AAC .

[00184] In step S408, the requester decrypts the EncData _AAC by using the message encryption key to obtain the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, Sig _{AS_AAC1} and Nonce _AACPub .

[00185] In step S409, the requester verifies Sig _{AS_AAC1} by using the public key of the authentication server that is trusted by the access controller for authentication.

[00186] If the verification is successful, step S410 is executed.

[00187] In step S410, the requester decrypts the ciphertext of the first authentication result information by using Nonce _AACPub to obtain Pub _AAC .

[00188] In step S411, the requester determines the result of authentication of the identity of the access controller when authenticating in accordance with Res _AAC in Pub _AAC .

[00189] When the requester determines that the authentication access controller is legitimate, step S412 is executed; and when the requester determines that the authentication access controller is not legitimate, the current authentication process is terminated.

[00190] In step S412, the requester encrypts the information including the Nonce _REQPub by using the message encryption key to obtain the EncData _REQ .

[00191] In step S413, the requestor sends a fourth REQAuth authentication response message to the authentication access controller.

[00192] REQAuth includes an EncData _REQ .

[00193] In step S414, the authentication access controller decrypts the EncData _REQ using the message encryption key to obtain the Nonce _REQPub , and decrypts the ciphertext of the second authentication result information using the Nonce _REQPub to obtain the Pub _REQ .

[00194] In step S415, the authentication access controller determines the authentication result of the requester's identity information in accordance with the Res _REQ in the Pub _REQ .

[00195] In the case of roaming, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication and the authentication server trusted by the requester trust each other and know each other's digital certificates or the public key in the digital certificate. The requestor's Sig _REQ and the authentication access controller's Sig _AAC may also be verified during identity authentication. For example, an authentication server trusted by the requester may be used to verify the Sig _REQ , and an authentication server trusted by the access controller to authenticate may be used to verify the Sig _AAC ; or the authentication access controller may be used to verify the Sig _REQ and the requester verifies the Sig _AAC .

[00196] In FIG. 5 illustrates an embodiment of a method for authenticating the identity of an access controller in an authentication verifying Sig _REQ and a requester verifying Sig _AAC in the case of roaming. Before executing this embodiment, both the requester and the authentication access controller have a message encryption key, and the message encryption key may be shared in advance by both parties or may be obtained by negotiation in the manner shown in FIG. 2. This identity information authentication method includes the following steps. This method of authenticating identity information includes the following steps.

[00197] In step S501, the authentication access controller receives the REQInit signal sent by the requester.

[00198] The REQInit includes the requester's EncPub _{AS_REQ} , the _{AS_REQ} ID of at least one authentication server trusted by the requester, and the requester's Sig _REQ .

[00199] In step S502, the authentication access controller sends AACVeri to the authentication server that the authentication access controller trusts.

[00200] AACVeri includes the EncPub _{AS_REQ} , ID _{AS_REQ} , and EncPub _{AS_AAC} of the access controller when authenticating.

[00201] In step S503, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication decrypts EncPub _{AS_AAC} to obtain Cert _AAC and Nonce _AACPub .

[00202] In step S504, the authentication server that the access controller trusts for authentication performs Cert legitimacy verification_A.A.C.to get Res_A.A.C., generates Pub_A.A.C. according to information including Cert_A.A.C.And Res_A.A.C., encrypts information including Pub_A.A.C., by using Nonce_AACPubto generate the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, and generates Sig_{AS_AAC3} by performing a calculation on the data to be signed, including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information and EncPub_{AS_REQ}.

[00203] In step S505, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication sends an AS-AACVeri signal to the authentication server trusted by the requester.

[00204] The authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication is configured to determine, in accordance with the ID _{AS_REQ} , an authentication server trusted by the requester used during the current authentication process, and send AS-AACVeri to the trusted authentication server requester. The AS-AACVeri signal includes the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, EncPub _{AS_REQ} and Sig _{AS_AAC3} .

[00205] In step S506, the authentication server trusted by the requester verifies Sig _{AS_AAC3} by using the public key of the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

[00206] If the verification is successful, step S507 is executed.

[00207] In step S507, the authentication server trusted by the requester decrypts the EncPub _{AS_REQ} to obtain the Cert _REQ and Nonce _REQPub .

[00208] In step S508, the authentication server trusted by the requester performs legitimacy verification of the Cert _REQ to obtain the Res _REQ , generates a Pub _REQ according to the information including the Cert _REQ and the Res _REQ , encrypts the information including the Pub _REQ , by using Nonce _REQPub to generate the ciphertext of the second authentication result information, generates Sig _{AS_REQ1} by performing calculation on the data to be signed including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, and generates Sig _{AS_REQ4} by performing calculation on the data to be signed, including the encrypted text of the second information about the authentication result.

[00209] In step S509, the authentication server trusted by the requester sends an AS-REQVeri signal to the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

[00210] The AS-REQVeri message includes a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, Sig _{AS_REQ1} , a ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and Sig _{AS_REQ4} .

[00211] In step S510, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication verifies Sig _{AS_REQ4} by using the public key of the authentication server trusted by the requester.

[00212] If the verification is successful, step S511 is executed.

[00213] In step S511, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication generates Sig _{AS_AAC2} by performing calculation on the data to be signed including the ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and generates ASVeri according to the ciphertext of the first result information authentication, Sig _{AS_REQ1} , the ciphertext of the second information about the authentication result and Sig _{AS_AAC2} .

[00214] In step S512, the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller sends an ASVeri signal to the authentication access controller.

[00215] In step S513, the authentication access controller verifies Sig _{AS_AAC2} by using the public key of the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, if the verification is successful, encrypts the data to be encrypted, including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, Sig _{AS_REQ1} and Nonce _AACPub by using the message encryption key to generate EncData _AAC , and generates Sig _AAC by performing a calculation on the data to be signed including EncData _AAC .

[00216] In step S514, the authentication access controller sends a third AACAuth authentication response message to the requestor.

[00217] AACAuth includes EncData _AAC and Sig _AAC .

[00218] In step S515, the requester decrypts the EncData _AAC by using the message encryption key to obtain the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, Sig _{AS_REQ1} and Nonce _AACPub .

[00219] In step S516, the requester decrypts the ciphertext of the first authentication result information by using Nonce _AACPub to obtain Pub _AAC .

[00220] In step S517, the requester verifies Sig _AAC by using Cert _AAC in Pub _AAC and verifies Sig _{AS_REQ1} by using the public key of the authentication server trusted by the requester.

[00221] If the verification is successful, then step S518 is executed.

[00222] In step S518, the requester determines the authentication result of the access controller identity when authenticating in accordance with Res _AAC in Pub _AAC .

[00223] When the requester determines that the authentication access controller is legitimate, step S519 is executed; and when the requester determines that the authentication access controller is not legitimate, the current authentication process is terminated.

[00224] In step S519, the requester encrypts the information including the Nonce _REQPub by using the message encryption key to obtain the EncData _REQ .

[00225] In step S520, the requestor sends a fourth REQAuth authentication response message to the authentication access controller.

[00226] REQAuth includes an EncData _REQ .

[00227] In step S521, the authentication access controller decrypts the EncData _REQ by using the message encryption key to obtain the Nonce _REQPub , and decrypts the ciphertext of the second authentication result information by using the Nonce _REQPub to obtain the Pub _REQ .

[00228] In step S522, the authentication access controller verifies the Sig _REQ by using the Cert _REQ in the Pub _REQ .

[00229] If the verification is successful, step S523 is executed.

[00230] In step S523, the authentication access controller determines the authentication result of the requester's identity information in accordance with the Res _REQ in the Pub _REQ .

[00231] It should be noted that the REQInit in step S501 may not include a Sig _REQ , but the Sig _REQ is added to the REQAuth in step S520. In other words, in step S520, the requester first generates a Sig _REQ by performing a calculation on the data to be signed including the EncData _REQ in the REQAuth. In this case, the Sig _REQ verified by the access controller in the authentication in step S522 is the Sig _REQ in the REQAuth in step S520.

[00232] In FIG. 6 illustrates yet another embodiment of a method for authenticating the identity of an authentication server trusted by an authentication access controller, a SigAAC verifier, and an authentication server trusted by a requester verifying a SigREQ in the case of roaming. Before executing this embodiment, both the requester and the authentication access controller have a message encryption key, and the message encryption key may be shared in advance by both parties or may be obtained by negotiation in the manner shown in FIG. 2. This identity information authentication method includes the following steps. This method of authenticating identity information includes the following steps.

[00233] In step S601, the authentication access controller receives the REQInit signal sent by the requester.

[00234] The REQInit includes the requester's EncPub _{AS_REQ} , the _{AS_REQ} ID of at least one authentication server trusted by the requester, and the requester's Sig _REQ .

[00235] In step S602, the authentication access controller sends AACVeri to the authentication server that the authentication access controller trusts.

[00236] AACVeri includes REQInit, EncPub _{AS_AAC} Authentication Access Controller, and Sig _AAC Authentication Access Controller. Sig _AAC is generated by performing calculations in other fields before Sig _AAC in AACVeri.

[00237] In step S603, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication decrypts EncPub_{AS_AAC}to get Cert_A.A.C. and Nonce_AACPub, and verifies Sig_A.A.C. by using Cert_A.A.C..

[00238] If the verification is successful, step S604 is executed.

[00239] In step S604, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication performs Cert _AAC legitimacy verification to obtain Res _AAC , generates Pub _AAC according to the information including Res _AAC , encrypts the information including Pub _AAC , by using Nonce _AACPub to generate a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, and generates a third digital signature Sig _{AS_AAC3} by performing a calculation on the data to be signed including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information and REQInit.

[00240] In step S605, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication sends an AS-AACVeri signal to the authentication server trusted by the requester.

[00241] The authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication is configured to determine, in accordance with the ID _{AS_REQ} , an authentication server trusted by the requester used during the current authentication process, and send AS-AACVeri to the trusted authentication server requester. The AS-AACVeri signal includes REQInit, the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, and Sig _{AS_AAC3} .

[00242] In step S606, the authentication server trusted by the requester verifies Sig _{AS_AAC3} by using the public key of the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

[00243] If the verification is successful, then step S607 is executed.

[00244] In step S607, the authentication server trusted by the requester decrypts the EncPub _{AS_REQ} into the REQInit to obtain the Cert _REQ and Nonce _REQPub , and verifies the Sig _REQ by using the Cert _REQ .

[00245] If the verification is successful, step S608 is executed.

[00246] In step S608, the authentication server trusted by the requester performs legitimacy verification of the Cert _REQ to obtain the Res _REQ , generates a Pub _REQ according to the information including the Res _REQ , encrypts the information including the Pub _REQ by using Nonce _REQPub , to generate the ciphertext of the second authentication result information, generates Sig _{AS_REQ1} by performing computation on the to-be-signed data including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, and generates Sig _{AS_REQ4} by performing computation on the to-be-signed data including ciphertext of the second information about the authentication result.

[00247] In step S609, the authentication server trusted by the requester sends an AS-REQVeri signal to the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

[00248] The AS-REQVeri message includes a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, Sig _{AS_REQ1} , a ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and Sig _{AS_REQ4} .

[00249] In step S610, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication verifies Sig _{AS_REQ4} by using the public key of the authentication server trusted by the requester.

[00250] If the verification is successful, step S611 is executed.

[00251] In step S611, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication generates Sig _{AS_AAC2} by performing calculation on the data to be signed including the ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and generates ASVeri according to the ciphertext of the first result information authentication, Sig _{AS_REQ1} , the ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and Sig _{AS_AAC2} .

[00252] In step S612, the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller sends an ASVeri signal to the authentication access controller.

[00253] In step S613, the authentication access controller verifies Sig _{AS_AAC2} by using the public key of the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, if the verification is successful, encrypts the data to be encrypted, including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, Sig _{AS_REQ1} and Nonce _AACPub by using the message encryption key to generate EncData _AAC .

[00254] In step S614, the authentication access controller sends a third AACAuth authentication response message to the requestor.

[00255] AACAuth includes EncData _AAC .

[00256] In step S615, the requester decrypts the EncData _AAC by using the message encryption key to obtain the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, Sig _{AS_REQ1} and Nonce _AACPub .

[00257] In step S616, the requester verifies Sig _{AS_REQ1} by using the public key of the authentication server trusted by the requester.

[00258] If the verification is successful, then step S617 is executed.

[00259] In step S617, the requester decrypts the ciphertext of the first authentication result information by using Nonce _AACPub to obtain Pub _AAC .

[00260] In step S618, the requester determines the authentication result of the access controller identity when authenticating in accordance with Res _AAC in Pub _AAC .

[00261] When the requester determines that the authentication access controller is legitimate, step S619 is executed; and when the requester determines that the authentication access controller is not legitimate, the current authentication process is terminated.

[00262] In step S619, the requester encrypts the information including the Nonce _REQPub by using the message encryption key to obtain the EncData _REQ .

[00263] In step S620, the requestor sends a fourth REQAuth authentication response message to the authentication access controller.

[00264] REQAuth includes an EncData _REQ .

[00265] In step S621, the authentication access controller decrypts the EncData _REQ by using the message encryption key to obtain the Nonce _REQPub , and decrypts the ciphertext of the second authentication result information by using the Nonce _REQPub to obtain the Pub _REQ .

[00266] In step S622, the authentication access controller determines the authentication result of the requester's identity information in accordance with the Res _REQ in the Pub _REQ .

[00267] In FIG. 7 shows another embodiment of a method for authenticating identification information in the absence of roaming. The authentication server that the authentication access controller trusts (or the authentication server that the requestor trusts) can be used to represent the authentication server that the requester and the authentication access controller typically trust. In this embodiment, the message encryption key negotiation process between the requester and the authentication access controller is combined with the identity authentication process in parallel, thereby facilitating the implementation of the design. Sig _REQ is verified by the access controller during authentication, and Sig _AAC is verified by the requester. This method includes the following steps.

[00268] In step S701, the authentication access controller generates Nonce _AAC and KeyInfo _AAC , and generates _AAC security means as required.

[00269] In step S702, the authentication access controller sends AACInit to the requestor.

[00270] AACInit includes Nonce_A.A.C.,KeyInfo_A.A.C. and safety equipment_A.A.C.. Security features field_A.A.C.» is optional, represents information about a security parameter supported by the access controller when authenticating, and includes an identity authentication packet supported by the access controller when authenticating, one or more symmetric encryption algorithms, one or more integrity checking algorithms, and/or one or more key generation algorithms (which also applies to the entire text).

[00271] In step S703, the requester generates the Nonce _REQ , KeyInfo _REQ , Nonce _REQID and Nonce _REQPub , generates the security _REQ as required, and performs key exchange calculation in accordance with the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo _REQ and the temporary public key, included in KeyInfo _AAC to generate the first K1 key; wherein K1 is combined with the Nonce _AAC , Nonce _REQ and other information (other information used by the requester and the access controller in authentication is the same and optional, such as a specific string) to compute a message encryption key and a message integrity verification key by using a negotiated or a predetermined key generation algorithm, of course, this step can also be performed when the message integrity check key and/or the message integrity check key needs to be used later; the public key of the encryption certificate is used to calculate the requester's EncPub _{AS_REQ} ; and calculate Sig _REQ .

[00272] The " _REQ security controls" field is optional and indicates the choice of a particular security policy made by the requester in accordance with the _REQ security controls, i.e. the identity authentication method, symmetric encryption algorithm, integrity checking algorithm, and/or key generation algorithm (which also applies to the entire text) that are determined to be used by the requester. Whether the requester generates a _REQ security depends on whether the _AAC security is contained in the AACInit sent by the authentication access controller to the requester.

[00273] In step S704, the requester sends a REQInit to the access controller upon authentication.

[00274] REQInit includes Nonce _AAC , Nonce _REQ , Security _REQ , KeyInfo _REQ , EncPub _{AS_REQ} , and Sig _REQ . The "Nonce _AAC " and " _REQ security" fields are optional; and the Nonce _AAC must be identical to the one in the corresponding field in AACInit. The EncPub _{AS_REQ} data to be encrypted includes ID _REQ , Cert _REQ , Nonce _REQID , and Nonce _REQPub . The Sig _REQ data to be signed includes other fields before the Sig _REQ in REQInit. For example, when REQInit sequentially includes Nonce _AAC , Nonce _REQ , Security _REQ , KeyInfo _REQ , EncPub _{AS_REQ,} and Sig _REQ , the Sig _REQ data to be signed includes Nonce _AAC , Nonce _REQ , Security _REQ , KeyInfo _REQ , and EncPub _{AS_REQ} ; in addition, when the REQInit does not include a Nonce _AAC field, the Sig _REQ data to be signed further includes a Nonce _AAC field in the AACInit. In the present disclosure, the object to be signed is referred to as data to be signed.

[00275] In step S705, after receiving REQInit, the authentication access controller performs the following operations (unless there is a special explanation or logical relationship, the actions numbered (1), (2),... in this description are not necessarily in a sequential order corresponding their numbering, which also applies to the entire text).

[00276] (1) If REQInit contains a Nonce _AAC , checks whether this Nonce _AAC is the same as the Nonce _AAC generated by the access controller during authentication; and if this Nonce _AAC is different from the Nonce _AAC generated by the access controller during authentication, discard REQInit.

[00277] (2) Performs key exchange calculation in accordance with the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo _AAC and the temporary public key included in the KeyInfo _REQ to generate the first key K1; wherein K1 is combined with the Nonce _AAC , Nonce _REQ and other information (other information used by the requester and the access controller in authentication is the same and optional, such as a specific string) to compute a message encryption key and a message integrity verification key by using a negotiated or a predetermined key generation algorithm. Of course, this step may be performed when the message integrity key and/or the message integrity key are to be used by the access controller for authentication.

[00278] (3) Generates Nonce _AACID and Nonce _AACPub .

[00279] (4) Uses the public key of the encryption certificate to calculate EncPub _{AS_AAC} .

[00280] In step S706, the authentication access controller sends AACVeri to the authentication server that the authentication access controller trusts.

[00281] AACVeri includes EncPub _{AS_REQ} , Nonce _REQ , EncPub _{AS_AAC} and Nonce _AAC . EncPub _{AS_AAC} data to be encrypted includes _AAC ID, Cert _AAC , Nonce _AACID and Nonce _AACPub ; and EncPub _{AS_REQ} and Nonce _REQ , respectively, must be identical to those present in the corresponding fields in REQInit.

[00282] In step S707, after receiving the AACVeri, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication performs the following operations.

[00283] (1) Uses the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate to decrypt, respectively, EncPub _{AS_REQ} and EncPub _{AS_AAC} to obtain ID _REQ , Cert _REQ , Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQPub , ID _AAC , Cert _AAC , Nonce _AACID and Nonce _AACPub .

[00284] (2) Verifies the legitimacy of Cert _AAC and Cert _REQ , respectively, to obtain Res _AAC and Res _REQ ; generates Pub _AAC according to information including Cert _AAC and Res _AAC ; generates a Pub _REQ according to information including a Cert _REQ and a Res _REQ ; for ID _REQ and Nonce _REQID, performs an exclusive-or operation to generate ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID ; for a Pub _REQ and a Nonce _{, REQPub} performs an exclusive-or operation to generate a Pub _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQPub ; for _AAC ID and Nonce _AACID, performs an exclusive-or operation to generate the _AAC ID ⊕Nonce _AACID ; and with respect to Pub _AAC and Nonce _AACPub, performs an exclusive-or operation to generate Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub .

[00285] (3) Generates Sig _{AS_AAC1} and Sig _{AS_AAC2} by calculation.

[00286] In step S708, the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller sends an ASVeri signal to the authentication access controller.

[00287] ASVeri includes ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ , Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub , Sig _{AS_AAC1} , ID _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACID , Nonce _AAC , Pub _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQPub , and Sig _{AS_AAC2} . _REQ ID, Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ , Nonce _AACPub , _AAC ID, Nonce _AACID , Nonce _AAC and Nonce _REQPub , respectively, must be identical to those found in the corresponding fields in AACVeri. The Sig _{AS_AAC1} data to be signed includes ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ and Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub ; and the data to be signed Sig _{AS_AAC2} includes _AAC ID ⊕Nonce _AACID , Nonce _AAC and Pub _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQPub .

[00288] In step S709, after receiving the ASVeri, the authentication access controller performs the following operations.

[00289] (1) For Nonce _AACID and _AAC ID, ⊕Nonce _AACID performs an XOR operation to recover the _AAC ID, and checks whether the _AAC ID is the same as the access controller's own _AAC ID when authenticating.

[00290] (2) Checks whether the Nonce _AAC is the same as the Nonce _AAC generated by the access controller during authentication.

[00291] (3) Verifies Sig _{AS_AAC2} by using the public key of the authentication server that is trusted by the access controller for authentication.

[00292] (4) If the check and verification are successful, calculates the EncData _AAC by using the message encryption key; and if any of the verification and verification steps are not successful, immediately discards ASVeri.

[00293] (5) Calculates Sig _AAC .

[00294] (6) Calculates MacTag _AAC as required.

[00295] In step S710, the authentication access controller sends a third AACAuth authentication response message to the requester.

[00296] AACAuth includes Nonce _REQ , Nonce _AAC , EncData _AAC , Sig _AAC , and MacTag _AAC . The "Nonce _REQ ", "Nonce _AAC " and "MacTag _AAC " fields are optional; and the Nonce _REQ and Nonce _AAC , respectively, must be identical to the Nonce _REQ in REQInit and the Nonce _AAC generated by the access controller during authentication. EncData _AAC data to be encrypted includes ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ , Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub , Sig _{AS_AAC1} and Nonce _AACPub ; and ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ , Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub and Sig _{AS_AAC1} , respectively, must be identical to those found in the corresponding fields in ASVeri. The Sig _AAC data to be signed includes other fields before the Sig _AAC in AACAuth. The MacTag _AAC calculation process involves: Using a message integrity check key to calculate information including fields in AACAuth other than MacTag _AAC by using an integrity check algorithm to generate a MacTag _AAC .

[00297] In step S711, after receiving the AACAuth, the requester performs the following operations.

[00298] (1) If the AACAuth contains a Nonce _REQ and/or a Nonce _AAC , checks whether the Nonce _REQ is the same as the Nonce _REQ generated by the requester; and/or performs a check to see if the Nonce _AAC is the same as the accepted Nonce _AAC in AACInit.

[00299] (2) If the AACAuth contains an _AAC MacTag, performs an _AAC MacTag verification.

[00300] The verification process includes: using a message integrity check key to locally calculate information including fields in AACAuth other than MacTag _AAC by using an integrity check algorithm to generate MacTag _AAC (the calculation method is the same as the method in which the authentication access controller computes a MacTag _AAC ), and the computed MacTag _AAC is compared with the received MacTag _AAC in AACAuth.

[00301] (3) Uses the message encryption key to decrypt the EncData _AAC by using a symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ , Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub , Sig _{AS_AAC1} and Nonce _AACPub .

[00302] (4) For _REQ ID, ⊕Nonce _REQID performs an XOR operation by using Nonce _REQID to recover the _REQ ID, and checks whether the _REQ ID is the same as the requester's own _REQ ID.

[00303] (5) Performs a check to see if the Nonce _REQ is the same as the Nonce _REQ generated by the requester.

[00304] (6) Regarding the Nonce _AACPub and Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub obtained by decryption, performs an exclusive or operation to recover the Pub _AAC .

[00305] (7) Verifies Sig _{AS_AAC1} by using the public key of the authentication server that is trusted by the access controller for authentication, and verifies Sig _AAC by using Cert _AAC in Pub _AAC .

[00306] (8) If any of the verification and verification steps are not successful, discard AACAuth immediately; if the check and verification are successful, determines the result of authenticating the requester's identity in accordance with Res _AAC in Pub _AAC ; and if it determines that the authentication access controller is not legitimate, terminates the current authentication process.

[00307] (9) Uses the message encryption key to calculate the EncData _REQ .

[00308] (10) Calculates MacTag _REQ .

[00309] In step S712, the requestor sends a fourth REQAuth authentication response message to the authentication access controller.

[00310] AACAuth includes Nonce _REQ , Nonce _AAC , EncData _REQ , and MacTag _REQ . The "Nonce _REQ " and "Nonce _AAC " fields are optional; and, accordingly, must be identical to the Nonce _REQ generated by the requester and the Nonce _AAC in AACInit. The EncData _REQ data to be encrypted includes the Nonce _REQPub . The MacTag _REQ calculation process includes: Using a message integrity check key to calculate information including fields in the REQAuth other than the MacTag _REQ by using an integrity check algorithm to generate the MacTag _REQ .

[00311] In step S713, after receiving REQAuth, the authentication access controller performs the following operations.

[00312] (1) If the REQAuth contains a Nonce _REQ and/or a Nonce _AAC , checks whether the Nonce _REQ is the same as the Nonce _REQ in REQInit; and/or checks whether the Nonce _AAC is the same as the Nonce _AAC generated by the access controller during authentication.

[00313] (2) Performs MacTag _REQ verification.

[00314] The verification process includes: using a message integrity check key to locally calculate information including fields in REQAuth other than MacTag _REQ by using an integrity check algorithm to generate a MacTag _REQ (the calculation method is the same as the method in which the requester computes a MacTag _REQ ), and the computed MacTag _REQ is compared with the received MacTag _REQ in REQAuth.

[00315] (3) Uses the message encryption key to decrypt the EncData _REQ by using a symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain the Nonce _REQPub .

[00316] (4) For Nonce _REQPub and Pub _REQ , ⊕Nonce _REQPub performs an exclusive-or operation to recover Pub _REQ .

[00317] (5) Verifies the Sig _REQ in the REQInit by using the Cert _REQ in the Pub _REQ .

[00318] (6) If any of the validation and verification steps are not successful, discard REQAuth immediately; if the check and verification are successful, determines the result of authenticating the requester's identity according to the Res _REQ in the Pub _REQ .

[00319] It should be noted that the REQInit in step S704 may not include a Sig _REQ , but the Sig _REQ is added to the REQAuth in step S712. In other words, in step S712, the requester first generates a Sig _REQ by performing calculation on the data to be signed including the Nonce _REQ , Nonce _AAC and EncData _REQ . In this case, the Sig _REQ verified by the access controller during authentication in step S713 is the Sig _REQ in REQAuth in step S712.

[00320] In FIG. 8 shows another embodiment of a method for authenticating identification information in the absence of roaming. The authentication server that the authentication access controller trusts (or the authentication server that the requestor trusts) can be used to represent the authentication server that the requester and the authentication access controller typically trust. In this embodiment, the message encryption key negotiation process between the requester and the authentication access controller is combined with the identity authentication process in parallel, thereby facilitating the implementation of the design. Sig _REQ and Sig _AAC are verified by the authentication server, which is trusted by the access controller for authentication. This method includes the following steps.

[00321] In step S801, the authentication access controller generates the Nonce _AAC and KeyInfo _AAC , and generates the _AAC security as required.

[00322] In step S802, the authentication access controller sends an AACInit to the requestor.

[00323] AACInit includes Nonce _AAC , KeyInfo _AAC , and _AAC security features. The _AAC security features field is optional.

[00324] In step S803, the requester generates the Nonce _REQ , KeyInfo _REQ , Nonce _REQID and Nonce _REQPub , generates the security _REQ as required, and performs key exchange calculation in accordance with the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo _REQ and the temporary public key, included in KeyInfo _AAC to generate the first K1 key; wherein K1 is combined with the Nonce _AAC , Nonce _REQ , and other information (other information used by the requester and the access controller in authentication is the same and optional, such as a specific string) to compute a message encryption key and a message integrity verification key by using a negotiated or a predetermined key generation algorithm, of course, this step can also be performed when the message integrity check key and/or the message integrity check key needs to be used later; the public key of the encryption certificate is used to calculate the requester's EncPub _{AS_REQ} ; and calculate Sig _REQ .

[00325] In step S804, the requester sends a REQInit to the access controller upon authentication.

[00326] REQInit includes Nonce _AAC , Nonce _REQ , Security _REQ , KeyInfo _REQ , EncPub _{AS_REQ} , and Sig _REQ . The "security features _REQ " field is optional; and the Nonce _AAC must be identical to the one in the corresponding field in AACInit. The EncPub _{AS_REQ} data to be encrypted includes ID _REQ , Cert _REQ , Nonce _REQID , and Nonce _REQPub . The Sig _REQ data to be signed includes other fields before the Sig _REQ in REQInit.

[00327] In step S805, after receiving REQInit, the authentication access controller performs the following operations.

[00328] (1) Checks whether the Nonce _AAC in REQInit is the same as the Nonce _AAC generated by the access controller during authentication; and if it is not, discards REQInit.

[00329] (2) Performs key exchange calculation in accordance with the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo _AAC and the temporary public key included in the KeyInfo _REQ to generate the first key K1; wherein K1 is combined with the Nonce _AAC , Nonce _REQ , and other information (other information used by the requester and the access controller in authentication is the same and optional, such as a specific string) to compute a message encryption key and a message integrity verification key by using a negotiated or a predetermined key generation algorithm. Of course, this step may be performed when the message integrity key and/or the message integrity key are to be used by the access controller for authentication.

[00330] (3) Generates Nonce _AACID and Nonce _AACPub .

[00331] (4) Uses the public key of the encryption certificate to calculate EncPub _{AS_AAC} .

[00332] (5) Calculates Sig _AAC .

[00333] In step S806, the authentication access controller sends AACVeri to the authentication server that the authentication access controller trusts.

[00334] AACVeri includes REQInit, EncPub _{AS_AAC} and Sig _AAC . EncPub _{AS_AAC} data to be encrypted includes _AAC ID, Cert _AAC , Nonce _AACID , and Nonce _AACPub . The Sig _AAC data to be signed includes other fields before the Sig _AAC in AACVeri.

[00335] In step S807, after receiving the AACVeri, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication performs the following operations.

[00336] (1) Uses the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate to decrypt, respectively, EncPub _{AS_AAC} and EncPub _{AS_REQ} in REQInit to obtain ID _AAC , Cer _tAAC , Nonce _AACID , Nonce _AACPub , ID _REQ , Cert _REQ , Nonce _REQID and Nonce _REQPub .

[00337] (2) Verifies the Sig _REQ in the REQInit by using the Cert _REQ ; and verifies Sig _AAC by using Cert _AAC .

[00338] (3) If verification is successful, verifies the legitimacy of Cert _AAC and Cert _REQ , respectively, to obtain Res _AAC and Res _REQ ; generates Pub _AAC according to information including Res _AAC ; generates a Pub _REQ according to the information including the Res _REQ ; for ID _REQ and Nonce _REQID, performs an exclusive-or operation to generate ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID ; for a Pub _REQ and a Nonce _{, REQPub} performs an exclusive-or operation to generate a Pub _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQPub ; for _AAC ID and Nonce _AACID, performs an exclusive-or operation to generate the _AAC ID ⊕Nonce _AACID ; and with respect to Pub _AAC and Nonce _AACPub, performs an exclusive-or operation to generate Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub .

[00339] (4) Generates Sig _{AS_AAC1} and Sig _{AS_AAC2} by calculation.

[00340] In step S808, the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller sends an ASVeri signal to the authentication access controller.

[00341] ASVeri includes ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ , Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub , Sig _{AS_AAC1} , ID _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACID , Nonce _AAC , Pub _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQPub , and Sig _{AS_AAC2} . _REQ ID, Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ , Nonce _AACPub , _AAC ID, Nonce _AACID , Nonce _AAC and Nonce _REQPub , respectively, must be identical to those found in the corresponding fields in AACVeri. The Sig _{AS_AAC1} data to be signed includes ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ and Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub ; and the data to be signed Sig _{AS_AAC2} includes _AAC ID ⊕Nonce _AACID , Nonce _AAC and Pub _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQPub .

[00342] In step S809, after receiving the ASVeri, the authentication access controller performs the following operations.

[00343] (1) For Nonce _AACID and _AAC ID, ⊕Nonce _AACID performs an XOR operation to recover the _AAC ID, and checks whether the _AAC ID is the same as the access controller's own _AAC ID when authenticating.

[00344] (2) Checks whether the Nonce _AAC is the same as the Nonce _AAC generated by the access controller during authentication.

[00345] (3) Verifies Sig _{AS_AAC2} by using the public key of the authentication server that is trusted by the access controller for authentication.

[00346] (4) If the check and verification are successful, calculates the EncData _AAC by using the message encryption key; and if any of the verification and verification steps are not successful, immediately discards ASVeri.

[00347] (5) Calculates MacTag _AAC .

[00348] In step S810, the authentication access controller sends a third AACAuth authentication response message to the requester.

[00349] AACAuth includes Nonce _REQ , Nonce _AAC , EncData _AAC , and MacTag _AAC . The "Nonce _REQ " and "Nonce _AAC " fields are optional; and, accordingly, must be identical to the Nonce _REQ in REQInit generated by the requester and the Nonce _AAC generated by the access controller during authentication. EncData _AAC data to be encrypted includes ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ , Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub , Sig _{AS_AAC1} and Nonce _AACPub ; and ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ , Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub and Sig _{AS_AAC1} , respectively, must be identical to those found in the corresponding fields in ASVeri. The MacTag _AAC calculation process is described in the embodiment of FIG. 7.

[00350] In step S811, after receiving the AACAuth, the requester performs the following operations.

[00351] (1) If the AACAuth contains a Nonce _REQ and/or a Nonce _AAC , checks whether the Nonce _REQ is the same as the Nonce _REQ generated by the requester; and/or performs a check to see if the Nonce _AAC is the same as the accepted Nonce _AAC in AACInit.

[00352] (2) Verifies MacTag _AAC ; the verification process is described in the embodiment of FIG. 7.

[00353] (3) Uses the message encryption key to decrypt the EncData _AAC by using a symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ , Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub , Sig _{AS_AAC1} and Nonce _AACPub .

[00354] (4) For _REQ ID, ⊕Nonce _REQID performs an XOR operation by using Nonce _REQID to recover the _REQ ID, and checks whether the _REQ ID is the same as the requester's own _REQ ID.

[00355] (5) Performs a check to see if the Nonce _REQ is the same as the Nonce _REQ generated by the requester.

[00356] (6) Verifies Sig _{AS_AAC1} by using the public key of the authentication server that is trusted by the access controller for authentication.

[00357] (7) If any of the validation and verification steps are not successful, discard AACAuth immediately; if the check and verification are successful, on the Nonce _AACPub and Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub obtained by decryption, performs an XOR operation to recover the Pub _AAC ; determines the result of authenticating the requester's identity according to Res _AAC in Pub _AAC ; and if it determines that the authentication access controller is not legitimate, terminates the current authentication process.

[00358] (8) Uses the message encryption key to calculate the EncData _REQ .

[00359] (9) Calculates MacTag _REQ .

[00360] In step S812, the requestor sends a fourth REQAuth authentication response message to the authentication access controller.

[00361] REQAuth includes Nonce _AAC , Nonce _REQ , EncData _REQ , and MacTag _REQ . The "Nonce _REQ " and "Nonce _AAC " fields are optional; and, accordingly, must be identical to the Nonce _REQ generated by the requester and the Nonce _AAC in AACInit. The EncData _REQ data to be encrypted includes the Nonce _REQPub . The MacTag _REQ calculation process is described in the embodiment of FIG. 7.

[00362] In step S813, after receiving REQAuth, the authentication access controller performs the following operations.

[00363] (1) If the REQAuth contains a Nonce _REQ and/or a Nonce _AAC , checks whether the Nonce _REQ is the same as the Nonce _REQ in REQInit; and/or checks whether the Nonce _AAC is the same as the Nonce _AAC generated by the access controller during authentication.

[00364] (2) Verifies MacTag _REQ ; and the verification process is described in the embodiment of FIG. 7.

[00365] (3) If check and verification are successful, uses the message encryption key to decrypt the EncData_REQ by using a symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain a Nonce_REQPub; and if any of the validation and verification steps are not successful, immediately discards REQAuth.

[00366] (4) For Nonce _REQPub and Pub _REQ , ⊕Nonce _REQPub performs an exclusive-or operation to recover Pub _REQ .

[00367] (5) Determines the result of authenticating the identity of the requester in accordance with the Res _REQ in the Pub _REQ .

[00368] In FIG. 9 shows another embodiment of a method for authenticating identification information in the case of roaming. In this embodiment, the message encryption key negotiation process between the requester and the authentication access controller is combined with the identity authentication process in parallel, thereby facilitating the implementation of the design. Sig _REQ is verified by the access controller during authentication, and Sig _AAC is verified by the requester. This method includes the following steps.

[00369] In step S901, the authentication access controller generates Nonce _AAC and KeyInfo _AAC , and generates _AAC security means as required.

[00370] In step S902, the authentication access controller sends AACInit to the requester.

[00371] AACInit includes Nonce_A.A.C.,KeyInfo_A.A.C.,ID_{AS_AAC}and safety equipment_A.A.C.. Security Features field_A.A.C.» is optional; and the "ID" field_{AS_AAC}" is optional and represents the identification identifier of at least one authentication server that the access controller trusts for authentication, so that the requester determines, according to the ID_{AS_AAC}whether there is a general trust authentication server (which also applies to all text).

[00372] In step S903, the requester generates the Nonce _REQ , KeyInfo _REQ , Nonce _REQID and Nonce _REQPub , generates the ID _{AS_REQ} and security _REQ as required, and performs key exchange calculation in accordance with the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo _REQ and the temporary the public key included in KeyInfo _AAC to generate the first key K1; wherein K1 is combined with the Nonce _AAC , Nonce _REQ , and other information (other information used by the requester and the access controller in authentication is the same and optional, such as a specific string) to compute a message encryption key and a message integrity verification key by using a negotiated or a predetermined key generation algorithm, of course, this step can also be performed when the message integrity check key and/or the message integrity check key needs to be used later; the public key of the encryption certificate is used to calculate the requester's EncPub _{AS_REQ} ; and calculate Sig _REQ .

[00373] The "ID _{AS_REQ} " and " _AAC Security" fields are optional. _{The AS_REQ} ID is the identification identifier of at least one authentication server that is trusted by the requester, when the _{AS_AAC} ID is contained in AACInit, the requester attempts to select from among the trusted authentication servers at least one authentication server that is the same as that contained in the _{AS_AAC} ID , as ID _{AS_REQ} ; if this selection was not successful, at least one trusted authentication server as ID _{AS_REQ} ; and when AACInit does not contain the _{AS_AAC} ID, the requester uses at least one trusted authentication server as the _{AS_REQ} ID (which also applies hereafter).

[00374] In step S904, the requester sends a REQInit to the access controller upon authentication.

[00375] REQInit includes Nonce _AAC , Nonce _REQ , ID _{AS_REQ} , Security _REQ , KeyInfo _REQ , EncPub _{AS_REQ} , and Sig _REQ . The Nonce _AAC , ID _{AS_REQ} , and Security _REQ fields are optional; and the Nonce _AAC must be identical to the one in the corresponding field in AACInit. The EncPub _{AS_REQ} data to be encrypted includes ID _REQ , Cert _REQ , Nonce _REQID , and Nonce _REQPub . The Sig _REQ data to be signed includes other fields before the Sig _REQ in REQInit. When the REQInit does not include a Nonce _AAC field, the Sig _REQ data to be signed further includes a Nonce _AAC field in the AACInit.

[00376] In step S905, after receiving REQInit, the authentication access controller performs the following operations.

[00377] (1) If REQInit contains a Nonce _AAC , checks whether this Nonce _AAC is the same as the Nonce _AAC generated by the access controller during authentication; and if this Nonce _AAC is different from the Nonce _AAC generated by the access controller during authentication, discard REQInit.

[00378] (2) Performs key exchange calculation in accordance with the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo _AAC and the temporary public key included in the KeyInfo _REQ to generate the first key K1; wherein K1 is combined with the Nonce _AAC , Nonce _REQ , and other information (other information used by the requester and the access controller in authentication is the same and optional, such as a specific string) to compute a message encryption key and a message integrity verification key by using a negotiated or a predetermined key generation algorithm. Of course, this step may be performed when the message integrity key and/or the message integrity key are to be used by the access controller for authentication.

[00379] (3) Generates Nonce _AACID and Nonce _AACPub .

[00380] (4) Uses the public key of the encryption certificate to calculate EncPub _{AS_AAC} .

[00381] (5) If REQInit contains ID _{AS_REQ} and AACInit contains ID _{AS_AAC} , the authentication access controller determines whether there is an identity identifier of at least the same authentication server in ID _{AS_REQ} and ID _{AS_AAC} ; if this is the case, i.e. in the case of no roaming, the authentication access controller determines the authentication server that is trusted by the authentication access controller involved in authenticating the identity information by the identification identifier of the authentication server that is generally trusted by at least one requestor and the authentication access controller; and if this is not the case, i.e. in case of roaming, the authentication access controller shall determine, according to the ID _{AS_AAC} , the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller involved in identity authentication, and send the ID _{AS_REQ} to the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, such Thus, the authentication server that the access controller trusts for authentication determines the authentication server that the requester trusts according to the ID _{AS_REQ} .

[00382] Alternatively, if REQInit contains the _{AS_REQ} ID but AACInit does not contain the _{AS_AAC} ID, the authentication access controller determines whether the identity identifier of at least one authentication server is among the authentication servers that are trusted by _{the AS_REQ} ID and the controller authentication access; if this is the case, i.e. in the case of no roaming, the authentication access controller determines the authentication server that is trusted by the authentication access controller involved in authenticating the identity information by the identification identifier of the authentication server that is generally trusted by at least one requestor and the authentication access controller; and if this is not the case, i.e. in the case of roaming, the authentication access controller must determine, in accordance with the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller involved in authenticating the identity information, and send the ID _{AS_REQ} to the authentication server to which trusts the access controller when authenticating, so the authentication server that the access controller trusts when authenticating determines the authentication server that the requester trusts according to the ID _{AS_REQ} .

[00383] It should be noted that in this embodiment, the result of this determination is the case of roaming.

[00384] In step S906, the authentication access controller sends AACVeri to the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

[00385] AACVeri includes EncPub _{AS_REQ} , Nonce _REQ , EncPub _{AS_AAC} , Nonce _AAC , and ID _{AS_REQ} . The "ID _ASREQ " field is optional; and EncPub _{AS_REQ} , Nonce _REQ and ID _{AS_REQ} , respectively, must be identical to those found in the corresponding fields in REQInit. EncPub _{AS_AAC} data to be encrypted includes _AAC ID, Cert _AAC , Nonce _AACID , and Nonce _AACPub .

[00386] In step S907, after receiving the AACVeri, the authentication server, which is trusted by the access controller for authentication, sends the first AS-AACReq message with a decryption request to the certificate server for decryption (Certificate Sever-Decrypt, CS-DEC).

[00387] AS-AACReq includes EncPub _{AS_AAC} .

[00388] In step S908, after receiving the AS-AACReq, the decryption certificate server decrypts the EncPub _{AS_AAC} to obtain the _AAC ID, Cer _tAAC , Nonce _AACID , and Nonce _AACPub .

[00389] In step S909, the decryption certificate server sends the first decryption response message CS-DECRep to the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

[00390] CS-DECRep includes _AAC ID, _AAC Cert, Nonce _AACID and Nonce _AACPub , which are obtained by decryption.

[00391] In step S910, after receiving the CS-DECRep, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication performs the following operations.

[00392] (1) Verifies the legitimacy of the Cert _AAC to obtain the Res _AAC and generates the Pub _AAC according to the information including the Cert _AAC and the Res _AAC .

[00393] (2) For Nonce _AACPub and Pub _AAC , performs an exclusive-or operation to generate Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub .

[00394] (3) For the Nonce _AACID and the _AAC ID, performs an exclusive-or operation to generate the _AAC ID ⊕Nonce _AACID .

[00395] (4) If the _{AS_REQ} ID is contained in AACVeri, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication determines the authentication server trusted by the requester according to the _{AS_REQ} ID; and if it is not, it indicates that the authentication server trusted by the requester was known to the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication.

[00396] (5) Calculates Sig _{AS_AAC3} .

[00397] In step S911, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication sends an AS-AACVeri signal to the authentication server trusted by the requester.

[00398] AS-AACVeri includes EncPub _{AS_REQ} , Nonce _REQ , Nonce _AAC , Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub , AAC ID _{⊕Nonce AACID} , and Sig _{AS_AAC3} . The Sig _{AS_AAC3} data to be signed includes other fields before Sig _{AS_AAC3} in AS-AACVeri; Nonce _REQ , Nonce _AAC and EncPub _{AS_REQ} , respectively, must be identical to those found in the corresponding fields in AACVeri; and Nonce _REQ , Nonce _AACPub ID _AAC and Nonce _eAACID , respectively, must be identical to those found in the corresponding fields in CS-DECRep.

[00399] In step S912, after receiving the AS-AACVeri, the authentication server trusted by the requester verifies Sig _{AS_AAC3} by using the public key of the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

[00400] If the verification is successful, step S913 is executed.

[00401] In step S913, the authentication server trusted by the requester sends a second decryption request AS-REQReq message to the certificate server for decryption.

[00402] AS-REQReq includes EncPub _{AS_REQ} ; and the EncPub _{AS_REQ} must be identical to that found in the corresponding field in AS-AACVeri.

[00403] In step S914, the decryption certificate server decrypts the EncPub _{AS_REQ} to obtain the Cert _REQ , ID _REQ , Nonce _REQID , and Nonce _REQPub .

[00404] In step S915, the decryption certificate server sends a second decryption response message CS-DECRep to the authentication server trusted by the requester.

[00405] CS-DECRep includes ID _REQ , Cert _AAC , Nonce _REQID and Nonce _REQPub , which are obtained by decryption.

[00406] In step S916, after receiving the CS-DECRep, the authentication server trusted by the requester performs the following operations.

[00407] (1) Verifies the legitimacy of the Cert _REQ to obtain the Res _REQ and generates the Pub _REQ according to the information including the Cert _REQ and the Res _REQ .

[00408] (2) For Pub _REQ and Nonce _{, REQPub} performs an exclusive-or operation to generate Pub _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQPub .

[00409] (3) For _REQ ID and Nonce _REQID , performs an exclusive-or operation to generate _REQ ID ⊕Nonce _REQID .

[00410] (4) Calculates Sig _{AS_REQ1} and Sig _{AS_REQ4} .

[00411] In step S917, the authentication server trusted by the requester sends an AS-REQVeri signal to the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

[00412] AS-REQVeri includes ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ , Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub , Sig _{AS_REQ1} , ID _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACID , Nonce _AAC , Pub _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQPub , and Sig _{AS_REQ4} . ID _REQ , Nonce _REQID and Nonce _REQPub , respectively, must be identical to those found in the corresponding fields in CS-DECRep; and Nonce _REQ , ID _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACID , Nonce _AAC and Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub , respectively, must be identical to those found in the corresponding fields in AS-AACVeri. The Sig _{AS_REQ1} data to be signed includes ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ and Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub ; and the data to be signed Sig _{AS_REQ4} includes _AAC ID ⊕Nonce _AACID , Nonce _AAC and Pub _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQPub .

[00413] In step S918, after receiving the AS-REQVeri, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication performs the following operations.

[00414] (1) Verifies Sig _{AS_REQ4} by using the public key of the authentication server trusted by the requester; if verification was not successful, AS-REQVeri is discarded.

[00415] (2) Calculates Sig _{AS_AAC2} .

[00416] In step S919, the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller sends an ASVeri signal to the authentication access controller.

[00417] ASVeri includes ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ , Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub , Sig _{AS_REQ1} , ID _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACID , Nonce _AAC , Pub _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQPub , and Sig _{AS_AAC2} . ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ , Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub , Sig _{AS_REQ1} , ID _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACID , Nonce _AAC and Pub _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQPub , respectively, must be identical to those found in the corresponding fields in AS-REQVeri. The Sig _{AS_AAC2} data to be signed includes the _AAC ID ⊕Nonce _AACID , Nonce _AAC and Pub _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQPub .

[00418] In step S920, after receiving the ASVeri, the authentication access controller performs the following operations.

[00419] (1) For Nonce _AACID and _AAC ID, ⊕Nonce _AACID performs an XOR operation to recover the _AAC ID, and checks whether the _AAC ID is the same as the access controller's own _AAC ID when authenticating.

[00420] (2) Checks whether the Nonce _AAC is the same as the Nonce _AAC generated by the access controller during authentication.

[00421] (3) Verifies Sig _{AS_AAC2} by using the public key of the authentication server that is trusted by the access controller for authentication.

[00422] (4) If the check and verification are successful, calculates the EncData _AAC by using the message encryption key; and if any of the verification and verification steps are not successful, immediately discards ASVeri.

[00423] (5) Calculates Sig _AAC .

[00424] (6) Calculates MacTag _AAC as required.

[00425] In step S921, the authentication access controller sends a third AACAuth authentication response message to the requestor.

[00426] AACAuth includes Nonce _REQ , Nonce _AAC , EncData _AAC , Sig _AAC , and MacTag _AAC . The "Nonce _REQ ", "Nonce _AAC " and "MacTag _AAC " fields are optional; and the Nonce _REQ and Nonce _AAC , respectively, must be identical to the Nonce _REQ in REQInit and the Nonce _AAC generated by the access controller during authentication. EncData _AAC data to be encrypted includes ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ , Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub , Sig _{AS_REQ1} and Nonce _AACPub ; and ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ , Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub and Sig _{AS_REQ1} , respectively, must be identical to those found in the corresponding fields in ASVeri. The Sig _AAC data to be signed includes other fields before the Sig _AAC in AACAuth; and the MacTag _AAC calculation process is described in the embodiment of FIG. 7.

[00427] In step S922, after receiving the AACAuth, the requester performs the following operations.

[00428] (1) If the AACAuth contains a Nonce _REQ and/or a Nonce _AAC , checks whether the Nonce _REQ is the same as the Nonce _REQ generated by the requester; and/or performs a check to see if the Nonce _AAC is the same as the accepted Nonce _AAC in AACInit.

[00429] (2) If the AACAuth contains an _AAC MacTag, performs an _AAC MacTag verification; and the verification process is described in the embodiment of FIG. 7.

[00430] (3) Uses the message encryption key to decrypt the EncData _AAC by using a symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ , Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub , Sig _{AS_REQ1} and Nonce _AACPub .

[00431] (4) For the _REQ ID, ⊕Nonce _REQID performs an XOR operation by using the Nonce _REQID to recover the _REQ ID, and checks whether the _REQ ID is the same as the requester's own _REQ ID.

[00432] (5) Performs a check to see if the Nonce _REQ is the same as the Nonce _REQ generated by the requester.

[00433] (6) Regarding the Nonce _AACPub and Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub obtained by decryption, performs an exclusive or operation to recover the Pub _AAC .

[00434] (7) Verifies Sig _{AS_REQ1} by using the public key of the authentication server trusted by the requester, and verifies Sig _AAC by using Cert _AAC in Pub _AAC .

[00435] (8) If any of the verification and verification steps are not successful, discard AACAuth immediately; if the check and verification are successful, determines the result of authentication of the identity of the access controller when authenticating in accordance with ResAAC in PubAAC; and if it determines that the authentication access controller is not legitimate, terminates the current authentication process.

[00436] (9) Uses the message encryption key to calculate the EncData _REQ .

[00437] (10) Calculates MacTag _REQ .

[00438] In step S923, the requestor sends a fourth REQAuth authentication response message to the authentication access controller.

[00439] AACAuth includes Nonce _AAC , Nonce _REQ , EncData _REQ , and MacTag _REQ . The "Nonce _REQ " and "Nonce _AAC " fields are optional; and, accordingly, must be identical to the Nonce _REQ generated by the requester and the Nonce _AAC in AACInit. The EncData _REQ data to be encrypted includes the Nonce _REQPub . The MacTag _REQ calculation process is described in the embodiment of FIG. 7.

[00440] In step S924, after receiving REQAuth, the authentication access controller performs the following operations.

[00441] (1) If the REQAuth contains a Nonce _REQ and/or a Nonce _AAC , checks whether the Nonce _REQ is the same as the Nonce _REQ in REQInit; and/or checks whether the Nonce _AAC is the same as the Nonce _AAC generated by the access controller during authentication.

[00442] (2) Verifies MacTag _REQ ; and the verification process is described in the embodiment of FIG. 7.

[00443] (3) Uses the message encryption key to decrypt the EncData _REQ by using a symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain the Nonce _REQPub .

[00444] (4) For Nonce _REQPub and Pub _REQ , ⊕Nonce _REQPub performs an exclusive-or operation to recover Pub _REQ .

[00445] (5) Verifies the Sig _REQ in the REQInit by using the Cert _REQ in the Pub _REQ .

[00446] (6) After successful verification and verification, determines the authentication result of the requester's identity information in accordance with the Res _REQ in the Pub _REQ ; and if any one of the verification and verification steps was not successful, immediately discards REQAuth.

[00447] It should be noted that the REQInit in step S904 may not include the Sig _REQ , but the Sig _REQ is added to the REQAuth in step S923. In other words, in step S923, the requester first generates a Sig _REQ by performing calculation on the data to be signed including the Nonce _AAC , Nonce _REQ and EncData _REQ . In this case, the Sig _REQ verified by the access controller during authentication in step S924 is the Sig _REQ in REQAuth in step S923.

[00448] In FIG. 10 shows another embodiment of a method for authenticating identification information in the case of roaming. In this embodiment, the message encryption key negotiation process between the requester and the authentication access controller is combined with the identity authentication process in parallel, thereby facilitating the implementation of the design. Sig _REQ is verified by an authentication server that is trusted by the requester, and Sig _AAC is verified by an authentication server that is trusted by the access controller for authentication. This method includes the following steps.

[00449] In step S1001, the authentication access controller generates Nonce _AAC and KeyInfo _AAC , and generates _AAC security means as required.

[00450] In step S1002, the authentication access controller sends AACInit to the requestor.

[00451] AACInit includes Nonce _AAC , KeyInfo _AAC , ID _{AS_AAC} , and _AAC security. The _AAC security and ID _{AS_AAC} fields are optional.

[00452] In step S1003, the requester generates the Nonce _REQ , KeyInfo _REQ , Nonce _REQID and Nonce _REQPub , generates the _{AS_REQ} ID and security _REQ as required, and performs key exchange calculation in accordance with the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo _REQ and the temporary the public key included in KeyInfo _AAC to generate the first key K1; wherein K1 is combined with the Nonce _AAC , Nonce _REQ , and other information (other information used by the requester and the access controller in authentication is the same and optional, such as a specific string) to compute a message encryption key and a message integrity verification key by using a negotiated or a predetermined key generation algorithm, of course, this step can also be performed when the message integrity check key and/or the message integrity check key needs to be used later; the public key of the encryption certificate is used to calculate the requester's EncPub _{AS_REQ} ; and calculate Sig _REQ .

[00453] In step S1004, the requester sends a REQInit to the access controller upon authentication.

[00454] REQInit includes Nonce _AAC , Nonce _REQ , ID _{AS_REQ} , Security _REQ , KeyInfo _REQ , EncPub _{AS_REQ} , and Sig _REQ . The "ID _{AS_REQ} " and "security _REQ " fields are optional; and Nonce _AAC must be identical to that in the corresponding field in AACInit; and the EncPub _{AS_REQ} data to be encrypted includes ID _REQ , Cert _REQ , Nonce _REQID and Nonce _REQPub . The Sig _REQ data to be signed includes other fields before the Sig _REQ in REQInit.

[00455] In step S1005, after receiving REQInit, the authentication access controller performs the following operations.

[00456] (1) Checks whether the Nonce _AAC in REQInit is the same as the Nonce _AAC generated by the access controller during authentication; and if it is not, discards REQInit.

[00457] (2) Performs key exchange calculation in accordance with the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo _AAC and the temporary public key included in the KeyInfo _REQ to generate the first key K1; wherein K1 is combined with the Nonce _AAC , Nonce _REQ , and other information (other information used by the requester and the access controller in authentication is the same and optional, such as a specific string) to compute a message encryption key and a message integrity verification key by using a negotiated or a predetermined key generation algorithm. Of course, this step may be performed when the message integrity key and/or the message integrity key are to be used by the access controller for authentication.

[00458] (3) Generates Nonce _AACID and Nonce _AACPub .

[00459] (4) Uses the public key of the encryption certificate to calculate EncPub _{AS_AAC} .

[00460] (5) A method for the authentication access controller to determine an authentication server that the authentication access controller trusts is described in the embodiment of FIG. 9.

[00461] (6) Calculates Sig _AAC .

[00462] In step S1006, the authentication access controller sends AACVeri to the authentication server that the authentication access controller trusts.

[00463] AACVeri includes REQInit, EncPub _{AS_AAC} and Sig _AAC . EncPub _{AS_AAC} data to be encrypted includes _AAC ID, Cert _AAC , Nonce _AACID , and Nonce _AACPub . The Sig _AAC data to be signed includes other fields before the Sig _AAC in AACVeri.

[00464] In step S1007, after receiving the AACVeri, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication sends the AS-AACReq to the certificate server for decryption.

[00465] AS-AACReq includes EncPub _{AS_AAC} ; and EncPub _{AS_AAC} must be identical to that in the corresponding field in AACVeri.

[00466] In step S1008, after receiving the AS-AACReq, the decryption certificate server decrypts the EncPub _{AS_AAC} to obtain the _AAC ID, Cert _AAC , Nonce _AACID , and Nonce _AACPub .

[00467] In step S1009, the decryption certificate server sends the first decryption response message CS-DECRep to the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

[00468] CS-DECRep includes _AAC ID, _AAC Cert, Nonce _AACID and Nonce _AACPub , which are obtained by decryption.

[00469] In step S1010, after receiving the CS-DECRep, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication performs the following operations.

[00470] (1) Verifies Sig _AAC by using Cert _AAC ; and, if verification was not successful, discards CS-DECRep.

[00471] (2) Verifies the legitimacy of the Cert _AAC to obtain the Res _AAC and generates a Pub _AAC according to the information including the Res _AAC .

[00472] (3) With respect to Nonce _AACPub and Pub _AAC , performs an exclusive-or operation to obtain Pub _AAC Nonce _AACPub .

[00473] (4) For the Nonce _AACID and _AAC ID, performs an exclusive-or operation to obtain the _AAC ID Nonce _AACID .

[00474] (5) A method for determining by an authentication server that an access controller trusts for authentication an authentication server that is trusted by a requester is described in the embodiment of FIG. 9.

[00475] (6) Calculates Sig _{AS_AAC3} .

[00476] In step S1011, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication sends an AS-AACVeri signal to the authentication server trusted by the requester.

[00477] AS-AACVeri includes REQInit, Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub , _AAC ID ⊕Nonce _AACID , and Sig _{AS_AAC3} . Nonce _AACPub , ID _AAC and Nonce _AACID , respectively, must be identical to those found in the corresponding fields in CS-DECRep. The Sig _{AS_AAC3} data to be signed includes other fields before Sig _{AS_AAC3} in AS-AACVeri.

[00478] In step S1012, after receiving the AS-AACVeri, the authentication server trusted by the requester verifies Sig _{AS_AAC3} by using the public key of the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication.

[00479] If the verification is successful, step S1013 is executed.

[00480] In step S1013, the authentication server trusted by the requester sends a second AS-REQReq decryption request message to the certificate server for decryption.

[00481] AS-REQReq includes EncPub _{AS_REQ} ; and the EncPub _{AS_REQ} must be identical to that found in the corresponding field in AS-AACVeri.

[00482] In step S1014, the decryption certificate server decrypts the EncPub _{AS_REQ} to obtain the Cert _REQ , ID _REQ , Nonce _REQID , and Nonce _REQPub .

[00483] In step S1015, the decryption certificate server sends a second decryption response message CS-DECRep to the authentication server trusted by the requester.

[00484] CS-DECRep includes ID _REQ , Cert _AAC , Nonce _REQID and Nonce _REQPub , which are obtained by decryption.

[00485] In step S1016, after receiving the CS-DECRep, the authentication server trusted by the requester performs the following operations.

[00486] (1) Verifies the Sig _REQ in the REQInit by using the Cert _REQ ; and, if verification was not successful, discards CS-DECRep.

[00487] (2) Verifies the legitimacy of the Cert _REQ to obtain a Res _REQ and generates a Pub _REQ according to the information including the Res _REQ .

[00488] (3) For Nonce _REQPub and Pub, _REQ performs an exclusive-or operation to obtain Pub _REQ Nonce _REQPub .

[00489] (4) For the Nonce _REQID and the _REQ ID, performs an exclusive-or operation to obtain the _REQ ID Nonce _REQID .

[00490] (5) Calculates Sig _{AS_REQ1} and Sig _{AS_REQ4} .

[00491] In step S1017, the authentication server trusted by the requester sends an AS-REQVeri signal to the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

[00492] AS-REQVeri includes ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ , Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub , Sig _{AS_REQ1} , ID _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACID , Nonce _AAC , Pub _REQ Nonce _REQPub , and Sig _{AS_REQ4} . ID _REQ , Nonce _REQID and Nonce _REQPub , respectively, must be identical to those found in the corresponding fields in CS-DECRep; and Nonce _REQ , ID _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACID , Nonce _AAC and Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub , respectively, must be identical to those found in the corresponding fields in AS-AACVeri. The Sig _{AS_REQ1} data to be signed includes ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ and Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub ; and the data to be signed Sig _{AS_REQ4} includes _AAC ID ⊕Nonce _AACID , Nonce _AAC and Pub _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQPub .

[00493] In step S1018, after receiving the AS-REQVeri, the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication performs the following operations.

[00494] (1) Verifies Sig _{AS_REQ4} by using the public key of the authentication server trusted by the requester; if verification was not successful, AS-REQVeri is discarded.

[00495] (2) Calculates Sig _{AS_AAC2} .

[00496] In step S1019, the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller sends an ASVeri signal to the authentication access controller.

[00497] ASVeri includes ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ , Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub , Sig _{AS_REQ1} , ID _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACID , Nonce _AAC , Pub _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQPub , and Sig _{AS_AAC2} . The Sig _{AS_AAC2} data to be signed includes the _AAC ID ⊕Nonce _AACID , Nonce _AAC and Pub _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQPub .

[00498] In step S1020, after receiving the ASVeri, the authentication access controller performs the following operations.

[00499] (1) For Nonce _AACID and _AAC ID, ⊕Nonce _AACID performs an XOR operation to recover the _AAC ID, and checks whether the _AAC ID is the same as the access controller's own _AAC ID when authenticating.

[00500] (2) Checks whether the Nonce _AAC is the same as the Nonce _AAC generated by the access controller during authentication.

[00501] (3) Verifies Sig _{AS_AAC2} by using the public key of the authentication server that is trusted by the access controller for authentication.

[00502] (4) If the check and verification are successful, calculates the EncData _AAC by using the message encryption key; and if any of the verification and verification steps are not successful, immediately discards ASVeri.

[00503] (5) Calculates MacTag _AAC .

[00504] In step S1021, the authentication access controller sends a third AACAuth authentication response message to the requester.

[00505] AACAuth includes Nonce _REQ , Nonce _AAC , EncData _AAC , and MacTag _AAC . The "Nonce _REQ " and "Nonce _AAC " fields are optional; and, accordingly, must be identical to the Nonce _REQ in REQInit generated by the requester and the Nonce _AAC generated by the access controller during authentication. EncData _AAC data to be encrypted includes ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ , Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub , Sig _{AS_REQ1} and Nonce _AACPub ; and ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ , Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub and Sig _{AS_REQ1} , respectively, must be identical to those found in the corresponding fields in ASVeri. The MacTag _AAC calculation process is described in the embodiment of FIG. 7.

[00506] In step S1022, after receiving the AACAuth, the requester performs the following operations.

[00507] (1) If the AACAuth contains a Nonce _REQ and/or a Nonce _AAC , checks whether the Nonce _REQ is the same as the Nonce _REQ generated by the requester; and/or performs a check to see if the Nonce _AAC is the same as the accepted Nonce _AAC in AACInit.

[00508] (2) Verifies MacTag _AAC ; the verification process is described in the embodiment of FIG. 7.

[00509] (3) Uses the message encryption key to decrypt the EncData _AAC by using a symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain ID _REQ ⊕Nonce _REQID , Nonce _REQ , Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub , Sig _{AS_REQ1} and Nonce _AACPub .

[00510] (4) For _REQ ID, ⊕Nonce _REQID performs an XOR operation by using Nonce _REQID to recover the _REQ ID, and checks whether the _REQ ID is the same as the requester's own _REQ ID.

[00511] (5) Performs a check to see if the Nonce _REQ is the same as the Nonce _REQ generated by the requester.

[00512] (6) Verifies Sig _{AS_REQ1} by using the public key of the authentication server that is trusted by the requester.

[00513] (7) If any of the verification and verification steps are not successful, discard AACAuth immediately; if the check and verification are successful, on the Nonce _AACPub and Pub _AAC ⊕Nonce _AACPub obtained by decryption, performs an XOR operation to recover the PubAAC; determines the result of authentication of the identity of the access controller when authenticating in accordance with ResAAC in PubAAC; and if it determines that the authentication access controller is not legitimate, terminates the current authentication process.

[00514] (8) Uses the message encryption key to calculate the EncData _REQ .

[00515] (9) Calculates MacTag _REQ .

[00516] In step S1023, the requestor sends a fourth REQAuth authentication response message to the authentication access controller.

[00517] REQAuth includes Nonce _AAC , Nonce _REQ , EncData _REQ , and MacTag _REQ . The "Nonce _REQ " and "Nonce _AAC " fields are optional; and, accordingly, must be identical to the Nonce _REQ generated by the requester and the Nonce _AAC in AACInit. The EncData _REQ data to be encrypted includes the Nonce _REQPub . The MacTag _REQ calculation process is described in the embodiment of FIG. 7.

[00518] In step S1024, after receiving REQAuth, the authentication access controller performs the following operations.

[00519] (1) If the REQAuth contains a Nonce _REQ and/or a Nonce _AAC , checks whether the Nonce _REQ is the same as the Nonce _REQ in REQInit; and/or checks whether the Nonce _AAC is the same as the Nonce _AAC generated by the access controller during authentication.

[00520] (2) Verifies MacTag _REQ ; and the verification process is described in the embodiment of FIG. 7.

[00521] (3) Uses the message encryption key to decrypt the EncData _REQ by using a symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain the Nonce _REQPub .

[00522] (4) For Nonce _REQPub and Pub _REQ , ⊕Nonce _REQPub performs an exclusive-or operation to recover Pub _REQ .

[00523] (5) After successful verification and verification, determines the authentication result of the requester's identity information in accordance with the Res _REQ in the Pub _REQ ; and if any one of the verification and verification steps was not successful, immediately discards REQAuth.

[00524] In the above embodiments, each message may further contain a hash value HASH _{X_Y} ; and the HASH hash value _{X_Y} is obtained by the sending entity X of the message using a hash algorithm to calculate the received last previous message sent by the entity Y at the opposite end, and used for the entity Y at the opposite end to verify whether entity X has received all the latest prior message. HASH _{REQ_AAC} is the hash value calculated by the requester for the last received previous message sent by the access controller during authentication; HASH _{AAC_REQ} is the hash value calculated by the access controller during authentication for the received last preceding message sent by the requester; HASHAAC_AS-AAC is a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the received last preceding message sent by the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller; HASHAS-AAC_AAC is the hash value calculated by the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller for the received last prior message sent by the authentication access controller; HASH _{AS-AAC_AS-REQ} is the hash value calculated by the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller for the received last preceding message sent by the authentication server trusted by the requester; and HASH _{AS-REQ_AS-AAC} is a hash value calculated by the authentication server trusted by the requester for the received last preceding message sent by the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller. If the message currently sent by the sending entity X is the first communication message between entity X and entity Y, this means that entity X has not accepted a previous message sent by entity Y at the opposite end, and there may or may not be a HASH _{X_Y} in the message make sense.

[00525] Accordingly, after entity Y at the opposite end has received a message sent by entity X, if the message includes HASH _{X_Y} , entity Y ignores HASH _{X_Y} unless entity Y sent a previous message to entity X; when entity Y sent a prior message to entity X, entity Y uses a hash algorithm to locally compute a hash value for the last prior message sent to entity X and compares the hash value to the received HASH value _{X_Y} contained in the message; and if the hash value matches HASH _{X_Y} , subsequent steps are executed, otherwise a discard is performed or the current authentication process is terminated.

[00526] In the present invention, for an entity X, the previous message sent to entity X by entity Y at the opposite end refers to a received message that is sent to entity X by entity Y at the opposite end before entity X sends message M to entity Y at the opposite end; and the last preceding message sent to entity X by entity Y at the opposite end refers to the received last message that is sent to entity X by entity Y at the opposite end before entity X sends message M to entity Y at the opposite end. If the message M sent by object X to object Y at the opposite end is the first communication message between object X and object Y; and before object X sends message M to object Y at the opposite end, the previous message sent by object Y at the opposite end to object X does not exist.

[00527] Optional fields and optional operations in the respective embodiments of FIGS. 7, fig. 8, fig. 9 and fig. 10 are represented by the sign “*” in FIG. 7, fig. 8, fig. 9 and fig. 10 drawings for the description. The sequence of contents included in the messages included in all of the above embodiments is not limited. In addition, the sequence of operations with the corresponding messages after the message recipient has accepted the message, and the sequence in which the content included in the messages is processed, is not limited unless otherwise specified.

[00528] Based on the method embodiments corresponding to FIG. 1 to 10, with reference to FIG. 11, in an embodiment of the present disclosure, an authentication access controller is provided. The authentication access controller includes a receiving portion, a first sending portion, a first receiving portion, a first verifying portion, a second sending portion, a second receiving portion, a decrypting portion, and a first determining portion.

[00529] The receiving portion 1101 is configured to receive an identity information encrypted text message sent by the requester. The identity ciphertext message includes the ciphertext of the requester's identity and the ciphertext of the requester's identity is generated by using the public key of the encryption certificate to encrypt data to be encrypted, including the requestor's digital certificate and a first one-time random security number.

[00530] The first sending part 1102 is configured to send a first authentication request message to a first authentication server that is trusted by the access controller for authentication. The first authentication request message includes a ciphertext of an authentication identity of a requester and a ciphertext of an authentication access controller identity, and a ciphertext of an authentication access controller identity is generated by using a public key of an encryption certificate for encrypting data to be encrypted, including a digital access controller certificate for authentication and a second one-time random security number.

[00531] The first receiving portion 1103 is configured to receive a first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server. The first authentication response message includes a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, a first digital signature, a ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and a second digital signature, wherein the ciphertext of the first authentication result information is generated by using a second one-time random security number for encryption. information including first authentication result information, wherein the first authentication result information includes a first verification result for a digital certificate of the access controller upon authentication, the first digital signature is generated by the second authentication server performing a calculation on the data to be signed, including an encrypted the text of the first authentication result information, the ciphertext of the second authentication result information is generated by using a first one-time random security number to encrypt information including the second authentication result information, wherein the second authentication result information includes a second verification result for the digital certificate the requester, and the second digital signature is generated by the first authentication server performing a calculation on the data to be signed, including the ciphertext of the second authentication result information.

[00532] The first verification portion 1104 is configured to verify the second digital signature by using the public key of the first authentication server.

[00533] The second sending portion 1105 is configured, when verification of the second digital signature is successful, to send a third authentication response message to the requester. The third authentication response message includes a ciphertext of the authentication result information, and a ciphertext of the authentication result information is generated by using a message encryption key to encrypt data to be encrypted, including a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, a first digital signature, and a second one-time random security number.

[00534] The second receiving portion 1106 is configured to receive a fourth authentication response message sent by the requester. The fourth authentication response message includes a ciphertext of the first one-time random security number, and the ciphertext of the first one-time random security number is obtained by using a message encryption key to encrypt information including the first one-time random security number.

[00535] The decryption portion 1107 is configured to decrypt the ciphertext of the first one-time random security number by using a message encryption key to obtain the first one-time random security number, and decrypt the ciphertext of the second authentication result information by using the first one-time random security number to obtain second information about the authentication result.

[00536] The first determination portion 1108 is configured to determine an authentication result of the requester's identity information in accordance with the second verification result in the second authentication result information.

[00537] In some embodiments, the authentication access controller further includes a third sending portion and a computing portion.

[00538] The third sending part is configured to send a key request message to the requester. The key request message includes an authentication access controller key exchange parameter, and the identity ciphertext message received by the receiving portion 1101 further includes a requestor key exchange parameter.

[00539] The calculation portion is configured to perform a key exchange calculation in accordance with a temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameter of the access controller during authentication and a temporary public key included in the key exchange parameter of the requester to generate the first key and in accordance with information including the first key, calculate the message encryption key by using a key generation algorithm.

[00540] In some embodiments, the key request message sent by the third part to be sent further includes a first one-time random number generated by the access controller upon authentication; accordingly, the identity information ciphertext message received by the receiving portion 1101 further includes a second one-time random number generated by the requester.

[00541] The calculation portion is further configured to calculate a message encryption key according to information including a first key, a first one-time random number, and a second one-time random number.

[00542] In some embodiments, the identification information ciphertext message received by the receiving portion 1101 further includes a first nonce random number. The authentication access controller further includes a second part for verification.

[00543] The second verification portion is configured to verify consistency between the first nonce random number in the identity ciphertext message and the first nonce generated by the access controller upon authentication.

[00544] In some embodiments, the key request message sent by the third part to be sent further includes information about a security parameter supported by the access controller during authentication; the identity information ciphertext message received by the receiving portion 1101 further includes a specific security policy; and the specific security policy is determined by the requester according to the security parameter information.

[00545] In some embodiments, the key request message sent by the third part to be sent further includes an identification identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication; and the identity ciphertext message received by the receiving portion 1101 further includes an identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requester. The authentication access controller further includes a second part for determining.

[00546] The second part for determining is configured to determine the first authentication server in accordance with the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requester in the message with the ciphertext of the identification information and the identity identifier of the at least one authentication server trusted access controller during authentication, in the key request message.

[00547] In some embodiments, the identity ciphertext message received by the receiving portion 1101 further includes an identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requester. The authentication access controller further includes a third part for determining.

[00548] The third determination portion is configured to determine the first authentication server according to an identity ID of at least one authentication server trusted by the requester and an identity ID of the at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

[00549] In some embodiments, the authentication access controller identification ciphertext data to be encrypted further includes an authentication access controller identification identifier and a fourth nonce random number.

[00550] Accordingly, the first authentication response message received by the first receiving portion 1103 further includes a ciphertext of the authentication access controller ID, and a ciphertext of the authentication access controller ID is generated using a fourth one-time random security number for encryption information including the access controller identification identifier for authentication.

[00551] The authentication access controller further includes a third part for verification.

[00552] The third verification portion is configured to verify the ciphertext of the authentication access controller ID according to the authentication access controller ID and the fourth one-time random guard number. After successful verification, the first determination portion 1108 then performs the appropriate steps.

[00553] In some embodiments, the identity ciphertext message received by the receiving portion 1101 further includes a digital signature of the requester; and before determining the authentication result of the requestor's identity, the first determination portion 1108 is further configured to determine whether the verification of the requestor's digital signature is successful, and if it is determined that the verification of the requester's digital signature is successful, then determining the authentication result of the requester's identity at in accordance with the second verification result.

[00554] In some embodiments, the first determination portion 1108 is further configured to perform the following operations.

[00555] If the second authentication result information obtained by using, by the decryption portion 1107, a first one-time random guard number to decrypt the ciphertext of the second authentication result information, further includes a digital certificate of the requester, the first determination portion 1108 verifies the digital signature of the requester by using the digital certificate of the requester and determines, according to the verification result, whether the verification of the digital signature of the requester is successful.

[00556] Either the second authentication server verifies the digital signature of the requester by using the digital certificate of the requester obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the identity information of the requester, and if the authentication access controller receives the first authentication response message, it is determined that the digital signature of the requester is verified successful.

[00557] In some implementations, the fourth authentication response message received by the second receiving portion 1106 further includes a digital signature of the requester; the second authentication result information obtained by using the decryption portion 1107 of the first one-time random guard number to decrypt the ciphertext of the second authentication result information, further including a digital certificate of the requester; and before determining the authentication result of the requester's identity information, the first determination portion 1108 is further configured to verify the digital signature of the requester by using the requestor's digital certificate in the first authentication result information, and if it is determined that the verification of the requester's digital signature is successful, then determining the result of authentication of the requester's identification information in accordance with the second verification result.

[00558] In some embodiments, the fourth authentication response message received by the second receiving portion 1106 further includes a second message integrity verification code, wherein the second message integrity verification code is generated by the requestor using the message integrity verification key to perform a computation on the fields in the fourth authentication response message, different from the second message integrity verification code, and the authentication access controller further includes a fourth part for verification.

[00559] The fourth verification portion is configured to verify the second message integrity verification code, wherein, if the verification is successful, the first determination portion 1108 then performs the step of determining an authentication result of the requestor's identity.

[00560] In some embodiments, the message sent to the requester by the authentication access controller further includes a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the received last prior message sent by the requestor; and the message sent to the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller by the authentication access controller further includes a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the received last previous message sent by the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller.

[00561] With reference to FIG. 12, in an embodiment of the present disclosure, a requester is proposed. The requester includes a first part to send, a first part to receive, a first part to decrypt, and a first part to verify.

[00562] The first sending part 1201 is configured to send a ciphertext message of the identification information to the access controller upon authentication. The identity ciphertext message includes the ciphertext of the requester's identity and the ciphertext of the requester's identity is generated by using the public key of the encryption certificate to encrypt data to be encrypted, including the requestor's digital certificate and a first one-time random security number.

[00563] The first receiving portion 1202 is configured to receive a third authentication response message sent by the access controller upon authentication. The third authentication response message includes encrypted text information about the authentication result; an authentication result information ciphertext is generated by using a message encryption key to encrypt data to be encrypted, including a first authentication result information ciphertext, a first digital signature, and a second one-time random security number; a ciphertext of the first authentication result information is generated by using a second one-time random security number to encrypt information including the first authentication result information, the first authentication result information including a first verification result for the digital certificate of the access controller in the authentication, and the first the digital signature is a digital signature generated by a second authentication server trusted by the requester performing a calculation on the data to be signed, including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information.

[00564] The first decryption portion 1203 is configured to decrypt the ciphertext of the authentication result information by using a message encryption key to obtain the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the first digital signature, and the second one-time random security number.

[00565] The first verification portion 1204 is configured to verify the first digital signature by using the public key of the second authentication server, wherein, if the verification is successful, the first decryption portion 1203 decrypts the ciphertext of the first authentication result information by using the second one-time random security number, to obtain the first authentication result information, the first determination portion 1205 determines the authentication result of the access controller identity information when authenticated according to the first verification result in the first authentication result information, and when the first determination portion 1205 determines that the authentication result of the controller identity information authentication access: "legitimate", the second sending part 1206 sends a fourth authentication response message to the authentication access controller.

[00566] Either the first verification portion 1204 is configured to verify the first digital signature by using the public key of the second authentication server. If the verification is successful, the second sending part 1206 sends a fourth authentication response message to the access controller upon authentication, the first decryption part 1203 decrypts the ciphertext of the first authentication result information by using a second one-time random guard number to obtain the first authentication result information, and the first determination portion 1205 determines the authentication result of the access controller identification information in the authentication according to the first verification result in the first authentication result information.

[00567] Either the first verification portion 1204 is configured to verify the first digital signature by using the public key of the second authentication server. If the verification of the first digital signature is successful, the first decryption portion 1203 decrypts the ciphertext of the first authentication result information by using a second one-time random guard number to obtain the first authentication result information, the first determination portion 1205 determines the authentication result of the access controller identity information upon authentication. according to the first verification result in the first authentication result information, and the second sending part 1206 sends a fourth authentication response message to the authentication access controller.

[00568] The fourth authentication response message includes the ciphertext of the first one-time random security number, and the ciphertext of the first one-time random security number is obtained by using a message encryption key to encrypt information including the first one-time random security number.

[00569] In some embodiments, the requester further includes a second receiving portion and a first computing portion.

[00570] The second receiving part is configured to receive a key request message sent by the access controller during authentication. The key request message includes an access controller key exchange parameter for authentication.

[00571] The first calculation part is configured to perform a key exchange calculation according to a temporary private key corresponding to a key exchange parameter of the requester and a temporary public key included in the key exchange parameter of the access controller during authentication to generate the first key, and calculate a message encryption key according to the information including the first key by using a key generation algorithm.

[00572] The identity ciphertext message sent by the first part 1201 to be sent further includes a requestor key exchange parameter.

[00573] In some embodiments, the key request message received by the second receiving part further includes a first one-time random number generated by the access controller upon authentication.

[00574] The calculation portion is further configured to calculate a message encryption key according to information including a first key, a first one-time random number, and a second one-time random number generated by the requester.

[00575] The identity ciphertext message sent by the first part 1201 to be sent further includes a second nonce random number.

[00576] In some embodiments, the identity ciphertext message sent by the first part 1201 to be sent further includes a first nonce random number.

[00577] In some embodiments, the key request message received by the second receiving portion further includes information about a security parameter supported by the access controller during authentication. The requester further includes a second part for the definition.

[00578] The second part for determining is configured to determine, in accordance with the security parameter information, a specific security policy used by the requester.

[00579] The identity ciphertext message sent by the first part 1201 to be sent further includes a specific security policy.

[00580] In some embodiments, the key request message received by the second receiving portion further includes an identity identifier of at least one authentication server that is trusted by the access controller for authentication. The requester further includes a third part for the definition.

[00581] The third part for determining is configured to determine, in accordance with the identification identifier of the at least one authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication, the identification identifier of the at least one authentication server trusted by the requester.

[00582] The identity ciphertext message sent by the first part 1201 to be sent further includes an identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requester.

[00583] In some embodiments, the identity ciphertext message sent by the first part 1201 to be sent further includes an identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requester.

[00584] In some embodiments, the requestor identity ciphertext data to be encrypted further includes a requester identity identifier and a third one-time random guard number.

[00585] Accordingly, the first authentication response message further includes a ciphertext of the challenger ID, and a ciphertext of the challenger ID is generated by using a third one-time random guard number to encrypt information including the challenger ID.

[00586] The ciphertext data of the authentication result information to be encrypted in the third authentication response message further includes a ciphertext of the requester's identification identifier.

[00587] The first decryption portion 1203 decrypts the ciphertext of the authentication result information to obtain the ciphertext of the challenger identification identifier. The requester further includes a second part for verification.

[00588] The second verification portion is configured to verify the requester ID ciphertext according to the requester ID and the third one-time random guard number. After successful verification, the first determination portion 1205 then performs the step of determining the authentication result of the access controller identity information upon authentication.

[00589] In some embodiments, before determining the authentication result of the access controller's identity information during authentication, the first determination portion 1205 is further configured to determine whether the access controller's digital signature verification during authentication is successful and if it is determined that the access controller's digital signature verification during authentication is successful, then the authentication result of the access controller identification information is determined in accordance with the first verification result.

[00590] In some embodiments, the first determination portion 1205 is further configured to perform the following operations.

[00591] When the first authentication request message sent by the authentication access controller to the first authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller includes a digital signature of the authentication access controller, the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller verifies the digital signature authentication access controller by using the authentication access controller digital certificate obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the authentication access controller identity information, if the first receiving part 1202 receives the third authentication response message, the first determining part determines that the digital signature verification of the access controller authentication was successful.

[00592] Or, when the third authentication response message received by the first receiving portion 1202 further includes a digital signature of the authentication access controller, if the first authentication result information obtained by decryption by the first decrypting portion 1203, the ciphertext first information about the authentication result, further includes a digital certificate of the authentication access controller, the first determination portion 1205 verifies the digital signature of the authentication access controller by using the digital certificate of the authentication access controller, and determines, according to the verification result, whether the digital verification was successful access controller signatures during authentication.

[00593] In some embodiments, the third authentication response message received by the first receiving portion 1202 further includes a first message integrity verification code, and a first message integrity verification code is generated by the authentication access controller using a message integrity verification key to perform a calculation on fields in the third authentication response message that are different from the first message integrity check code. The requester further includes a third part for verification.

[00594] The third verification portion is configured to verify the first message integrity verification code, wherein, if the verification is successful, the first determination portion 1205 then performs the step of determining an authentication result of the access controller identity upon authentication.

[00595] In some embodiments, the message sent to the access controller upon authentication by the requester further includes a hash value calculated by the requester for the received last prior message sent by the access controller upon authentication.

[00596] With reference to FIG. 13, the embodiment of the present disclosure also provides an authentication server that is trusted by the access controller for authentication. An authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication is an authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication, and includes a first receiving part and a first sending part.

[00597] The first receiving portion 1301 is configured to receive a first authentication request message sent by the access controller upon authentication. The first authentication request message includes a ciphertext of an authentication identity of a requester and a ciphertext of an authentication access controller identity, and a ciphertext of an authentication access controller identity is generated by using a public key of an encryption certificate for encrypting data to be encrypted, including a digital the authentication access controller certificate and the second one-time random security number, and the ciphertext of the requestor's identification information are generated by using the public key of the encryption certificate to encrypt data to be encrypted, including the requestor's digital certificate and the first one-time random security number.

[00598] The first sending portion 1302 is configured to send a first authentication response message to the access controller upon authentication. The first authentication response message includes a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, a first digital signature, a ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and a second digital signature, wherein the ciphertext of the first authentication result information is generated by using a second one-time random security number for encryption. information including first authentication result information, wherein the first authentication result information includes a first verification result for a digital certificate of the access controller upon authentication, the first digital signature is a digital signature generated by the second authentication server trusting the requester , calculations on the data to be signed, including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the ciphertext of the second authentication result information is generated by using the first one-time random guard number to encrypt the information including the second authentication result information, wherein the second information about the authentication result includes a second verification result for the requestor's digital certificate, and the second digital signature is a digital signature generated by the first authentication server performing a calculation on the data to be signed including the ciphertext of the second authentication result information.

[00599] In some embodiments, the first authentication request message received by the first receiving portion 1301 further includes a digital signature of the access controller upon authentication. The authentication server, which is trusted by the access controller for authentication, further includes a first part for verification.

[00600] The first verification portion is configured to verify the digital signature of the authentication access controller by using the authentication access controller's digital certificate obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the authentication access controller's identity information.

[00601] In some embodiments, the first authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication and the second authentication server trusted by the requestor are the same authentication server. The authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication further includes a first decryption portion, a first verification portion, and a first generation portion.

[00602] The first receiving part is configured to obtain a requester's digital certificate, a first one-time random security number, an authentication access controller digital certificate, and a second one-time random security number, which are obtained by using a private key corresponding to an encryption certificate for, respectively, decrypting the ciphertext of the requester's identification information and the ciphertext of the access controller's identification information during authentication.

[00603] The second part for verification is configured to perform legitimacy verification against the digital certificate of the access controller during authentication to obtain a first verification result, and to perform legitimacy verification against the digital certificate of the requester to obtain a second verification result.

[00604] The first generating part is configured to generate first authentication result information in accordance with the information including the first verification result, generate second authentication result information in accordance with the information including the second verification result, encrypt information including including first authentication result information by using a second one-time random security number to generate ciphertext of the first authentication result information, encrypting information including second authentication result information by using a first one-time random security number to generate ciphertext second authentication result information, performing a calculation on the to-be-signed data including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information to generate a first digital signature, performing a calculation on the to-be-signed data including the ciphertext of the second authentication result information to generate a second digital signature, and generating a first authentication response message in accordance with information including a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, a first digital signature, a ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and a second digital signature.

[00605] In some embodiments, the first authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication and the second authentication server trusted by the requestor are two different authentication servers. The authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication further includes a second receiving part, a third verifying part, a second generating part, a second sending part, a second receiving part, a fourth verifying part, and a third generating part.

[00606] The second receiving part is configured to obtain the digital certificate of the access controller upon authentication and a second one-time random security number, which is obtained by using a private key corresponding to the encryption certificate to decrypt the ciphertext of the access controller identification information upon authentication.

[00607] The third part for verification is configured to perform legitimacy verification against the digital certificate of the access controller during authentication to obtain the first verification result.

[00608] The second generation part is configured to generate first authentication result information in accordance with the information including the first verification result, encrypting the information including the first authentication result information by using a second one-time random security number to generate the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, and generating a third digital signature by performing a calculation on the data to be signed, including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information and the ciphertext of the requestor identification information.

[00609] The second sending part is configured to send a second authentication request message to the second authentication server. The second authentication request message includes a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, a ciphertext of the requestor's identification information, and a third digital signature.

[00610] The second receiving portion is configured to receive a second authentication response message sent by the second authentication server. The second authentication response message includes a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, a first digital signature, a ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and a fourth digital signature, and the fourth digital signature is a digital signature generated by the second authentication server performing a calculation on the subject signing data including the encrypted text of the second information about the authentication result.

[00611] The fourth verification portion is configured to verify the fourth digital signature by using the public key of the authentication server that is trusted by the requester.

[00612] The third generation part is configured, when the verification of the fourth digital signature is successful, to perform a calculation on the data to be signed including the ciphertext of the second authentication result information to generate a second digital signature, and generate a first authentication response message in corresponding to the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the first digital signature, the ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and the second digital signature.

[00613] In some embodiments, a message sent to the authentication access controller by an authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller further includes a hash value calculated by the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller for the last preceding message received, sent by the access controller during authentication; and the message sent to the authentication server trusted by the requester by the authentication server trusted by the access controller when authenticated further includes a hash value calculated by the authentication server trusted by the access controller when authenticated for the received last previous message sent by the server authentication that the requester trusts.

[00614] With reference to FIG. 14, the embodiment of the present disclosure also provides an authentication server that is trusted by the requester. A requester-trusted authentication server is an authentication server that the requester trusts. If the first authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication and the second authentication server trusted by the requester are two different authentication servers, the authentication server trusted by the requester includes a receiving part, a first verification part, a receiving, a second part for verification, a part for generating and a part for sending.

[00615] The receiving portion 1401 is configured to receive a second authentication request message sent by the first authentication server. The second authentication request message includes a ciphertext of a first authentication result information, a ciphertext of a requestor's identification information, and a third digital signature; and the third digital signature is a digital signature generated by performing, by an authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, a calculation on the data to be signed, including a ciphertext of the first authentication result information and a ciphertext of the requestor's identification information.

[00616] The first verification portion 1402 is configured to verify the third digital signature by using the public key of the first authentication server.

[00617] The receiving portion 1403 is configured, when verification of the third digital signature is successful, to obtain the requestor's digital certificate and the first one-time random security number, which are obtained by using the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate to decrypt the ciphertext of the requestor's identity information.

[00618] The second verification portion 1404 is configured to perform a legitimacy verification against the digital certificate of the requester to obtain a second verification result.

[00619] The generating portion 1405 is configured to generate second authentication result information in accordance with the information including the second verification result, generating a ciphertext of the second authentication result information by using the first one-time random security number to encrypt the information including second information about the authentication result, performing a calculation on the to-be-signed data including the ciphertext of the first authentication result information to generate a first digital signature, and performing a calculation on the to-be-signed data including the ciphertext of the second authentication result information to generate a fourth digital signature.

[00620] The sending portion 1406 is configured to send a second authentication response message to the first authentication server. The second authentication response message includes a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, a first digital signature, a ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and a fourth digital signature.

[00621] In some embodiments, a message sent to an authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller by the authentication server trusted by the requestor further includes a hash value calculated by the authentication server trusted by the requester for the most recently received message sent by an authentication server that is trusted by the access controller for authentication.

[00622] In FIG. 15 is a schematic block diagram of a structure of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. As shown in FIG. 15, the electronic device 1500 may be an authentication access controller, a requester, an authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, or an authentication server trusted by the requester. Electronic device 1500 includes a processor 1501 and a storage device 1502. The storage device 1502 is configured to store a computer program. Processor 1501 is configured to call and run a computer program stored in storage device 1502 to perform steps in any of the above embodiments performed by an authentication access controller, a requester, an authentication server trusted by an authentication access controller, or a server authentication that is trusted by the requester. The processor 1501 and memory 1502 of the electronic device 1500 may, respectively, be the processor 1501 and memory 1502 of an authentication access controller, a requestor, an authentication server trusted by an authentication access controller, or an authentication server trusted by a requester.

[00623] Below with reference to FIG. 15 describes, by way of example, respectively, an authentication access controller, a requester, an authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, or an authentication server trusted by the requester.

[00624] An embodiment of the present disclosure also provides an authentication access controller. The authentication access controller includes a processor and a storage device. The storage device is configured to store a computer program; and the processor is configured to call and run a computer program stored in the storage device to carry out steps performed by the access controller in authentication in any of the above embodiments

[00625] It should be understood that the authentication access controller is configured to implement the corresponding flows implemented by the authentication access controller in each method according to embodiments of the present disclosure. For simplicity, detailed descriptions are omitted herein.

[00626] In an embodiment of the present disclosure, a requester is also provided. The requester includes a processor and a storage device. The storage device is configured to store a computer program; and the processor is configured to call and run a computer program stored in the storage device to carry out the steps performed by the requester in any of the above embodiments

[00627] It should be understood that the requester is configured to implement the corresponding flows implemented by the requester in each method according to embodiments of the present disclosure. For simplicity, detailed descriptions are omitted herein.

[00628] An embodiment of the present disclosure also provides an authentication server that is trusted by the access controller for authentication. The authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication is an authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication and includes a processor and a storage device. The storage device is configured to store a computer program; and the processor is configured to call and run a computer program stored in the storage device to carry out steps performed by an authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication in any of the above embodiments.

[00629] It should be understood that the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication is configured to implement the corresponding flows implemented by the authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication in each method according to embodiments of the present disclosure. For simplicity, detailed descriptions are omitted herein.

[00630] An embodiment of the present disclosure also provides an authentication server that is trusted by the requester. A requester-trusted authentication server is an authentication server that the requester trusts. If the first authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication and the second authentication server trusted by the requester are two different authentication servers, the authentication server trusted by the requester includes a processor and a storage device. The storage device is configured to store a computer program; and the processor is configured to call and run a computer program stored in the storage device to carry out steps performed by an authentication server trusted by the requestor in any of the above embodiments.

[00631] It should be understood that the authentication server trusted by the requester is configured to implement the corresponding flows implemented by the authentication server trusted by the requester in each method according to embodiments of the present disclosure. For simplicity, detailed descriptions are omitted herein.

[00632] It should be noted that the processor in the authentication access controller, the requester, the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, or the authentication server trusted by the requester in embodiments of the present disclosure may also perform the method in other embodiments. for example, other methods in the above-described method embodiments, and the embodiments of the present disclosure are not limited to these.

[00633] In FIG. 16 is a schematic block diagram of a chip design according to an embodiment of the present disclosure. As shown in FIG. 16, the chip 1600 includes a processor 1601 and a memory 1602. The processor 1601 is configured to retrieve and run a computer program from the storage device 1602 to enable an authentication access controller in which the chip 1600 is installed to perform steps performed by the access controller. when authenticating in any of the above embodiments.

[00634] Either the requester in which the chip 1600 is installed is configured to perform the steps performed by the requester in any of the above embodiments.

[00635] Either the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller in which the chip 1600 is installed is configured to perform the steps performed by the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller in any of the above embodiments.

[00636] Either the supplicant-trusted authentication server in which the chip 1600 is installed is configured to perform the steps performed by the supplicant-trusted authentication server in any of the above embodiments.

[00637] Storage device 1602 may be included in chip 1600, or storage device 1602 may be provided external to chip 1600.

[00638] An embodiment of the present disclosure also provides a computer storage medium for storing information. The computer storage medium is configured to store a computer program. The computer program allows the authentication access controller to perform the steps performed by the authentication access controller in any of the above embodiments.

[00639] Or, the computer program allows the requestor in which the chip is installed to carry out the steps performed by the requestor in any of the above embodiments.

[00640] Or, the computer program allows the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller in which the chip is installed to perform the steps performed by the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller in any of the above embodiments.

[00641] Or, the computer program allows the authentication server trusted by the requestor in which the chip is installed to perform the steps performed by the authentication server trusted by the requestor in any of the above embodiments.

[00642] An embodiment of the present disclosure also provides a computer program. The computer program is configured to store the computer program. The computer program allows the authentication access controller to perform the steps performed by the authentication access controller in any of the above embodiments.

[00643] Or, the computer program allows the requestor in which the chip is installed to carry out the steps performed by the requestor in any of the above embodiments.

[00644] Or, the computer program allows the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller in which the chip is installed to perform the steps performed by the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller in any of the above embodiments.

[00645] Or, the computer program allows the authentication server trusted by the requestor in which the chip is installed to perform the steps performed by the authentication server trusted by the requestor in any of the above embodiments.

[00646] Those skilled in the art will recognize that all or part of the steps of a method embodiment may be implemented by suitable hardware controlled by a program, the program may be stored on a computer storage medium, and the program is executed to carrying out the steps of an embodiment of the method. The computer storage medium may be at least one of a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), and various media that are configured to store program code, such as a magnetic disk or an optical disk.

[00647] Each component, chip, or processor in embodiments of the present disclosure may be an integrated circuit chip and may have signal processing capability. During implementation, each step of the method embodiments may be performed by a hardware logic chip in the processor or by an instruction in software form. Each component, chip, or processor may include a collection of one or at least two of the following: a general-purpose processor, an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), a Digital Signal Processor (DSP) , Digital Signal Processing Device (DSPD), Programmable Logic Device (PLD), Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), Central Processing Unit (CPU), GPU (Graphics Processing Unit, GPU), neural network processor (Neural-network Processing Unit, NPU), controller, microcontroller, microprocessor, programmable logic device, device with a logic element on discrete components or with transistor logic circuits; and a discrete hardware component.

[00648] It should be noted that each embodiment in this specification is described gradually, and mutual references may be made to like and similar parts among the various embodiments, and differences from other embodiments are emphasized in each embodiment. In particular, for the device and system embodiments, since the device and system embodiments are consistent with and consistent with the method embodiments, the present description is relatively simple, and the related parts refer to partial descriptions of the method embodiments. The above-described embodiments of the device and system are provided for exemplary purposes only. Parts described as separate components may or may not be physically separated. Components shown as parts may or may not be physical parts, i.e. these components may be located in one location or may be distributed across multiple parts of the network. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual requirements to achieve the objectives of the solutions of this embodiment. This may be obvious and can be implemented by those skilled in the art without the expense of creative effort.

[00649] The foregoing are merely illustrative embodiments of the present disclosure and are not intended to limit the scope of protection of the present disclosure. Any variations or substitutions obvious to those skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in the present invention are intended to be within the scope of protection of the present disclosure. Thus, the scope of protection of the present disclosure corresponds to the scope of protection of the claims.

INDUSTRIAL APPLICABILITY

[00650] Embodiments of the present invention disclose a method and apparatus for authenticating identity information, as well as a device, chip, storage medium, and program. By performing confidential processing of the authentication querier and access controller identity information, it is possible to prevent the supplicant and authentication access controller identity information from being disclosed during the transmission process. In addition, when the first verification result of the digital certificate of the authentication access controller and the second verification result of the digital certificate of the requestor are transmitted between the first authentication server and the authentication access controller, and between the authentication access controller and the requestor, disclosing the first verification result and the second result verification during transmission can be prevented by performing confidential processing of the first and second verification results. Therefore, as the requester accesses the network through the access controller, authentication ensures that an attacker cannot obtain personal and sensitive information. In addition, through the use of an authentication server, real-time mutual authentication of identity information is ensured between the requester and the access controller during authentication, while guaranteeing the confidentiality of information related to the identity of the entity, thus ensuring that only the legitimate user can exchange data with a legitimate network.

Claims (89)

1. A method for authenticating identification information, including: - receipt by the access controller during authentication of a message with encrypted text of identification information sent by the requester, wherein the identity ciphertext message contains the ciphertext of the requester's identity and the ciphertext of the requester's identity is generated by using the public key of the encryption certificate to encrypt the data to be encrypted containing the requestor's digital certificate and the first one-time random security number; - sending, through the authentication access controller, a first authentication request message to the first authentication server that is trusted by the authentication access controller, wherein the first authentication request message contains a ciphertext of the requestor's identity information and a ciphertext of the access controller's authentication identity information and a ciphertext of the access controller's authentication identity information is generated by using the public key of the encryption certificate to encrypt the data to be encrypted containing the digital certificate of the access controller at authentication and a second one-time random security number; - reception by the access controller during authentication of the first authentication response message sent by the first authentication server, wherein the first authentication response message comprises a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, a first digital signature, a ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and a second digital signature, and wherein the ciphertext of the first authentication result information is generated by using a second one-time random security number to encrypt information containing the first authentication result information, the first authentication result information contains a first verification result for the authentication access controller digital certificate, the first digital signature is a digital signature generated by a second authentication server trusted by the requester performing a calculation on the data to be signed containing the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the ciphertext of the second authentication result information is generated by using a first one-time random security number to encrypt the information containing second information about the authentication result, wherein the second authentication result information comprises a second verification result for the requestor's digital certificate, and the second digital signature is a digital signature generated by the first authentication server performing a calculation on the data to be signed containing the encrypted text of the second authentication result information; - verification by the access controller when authenticating the second digital signature by using the public key of the first authentication server; sending, when verification of the second digital signature is successful, by the access controller upon authentication a third authentication response message to the requester, wherein the third authentication response message contains a ciphertext of the authentication result information, and the ciphertext of the authentication result information is generated by using a message encryption key to encrypt data to be encrypted comprising the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, a first digital signature, and a second one-time random security number. ; - decryption by the requester of the ciphertext of information about the authentication result by using the message encryption key to obtain the ciphertext of the first information about the authentication result, the first digital signature and the second one-time random security number; - verification by the initiator of the request of the first digital signature by using the public key of the second authentication server and, if the verification is successful, decryption by the initiator of the ciphertext of the first information about the result of authentication by using the second one-time random security number to obtain the first information about the result of authentication, determining the result of the identification authentication the authentication access controller information according to the first verification result in the first authentication result information, and when the requester determines that the authentication result of the authentication access controller identity information is legitimate, sending a fourth authentication response message to the authentication access controller; or - verification by the requester of the first digital signature by using the public key of the second authentication server and, if the verification is successful, sending the requestor a fourth authentication response message to the access controller during authentication, decryption of the ciphertext of the first information about the result of authentication by using the second one-time random security number, to obtain the first authentication result information, and determining the authentication result of the access controller identification information when authenticated according to the first verification result in the first authentication result information; or - verification by the requester of the first digital signature by using the public key of the second authentication server and, if verification of the first digital signature is successful, decryption by the requester of the ciphertext of the first information about the result of authentication by using a second one-time random security number to obtain the first information about the result of authentication, definition the authentication result of the authentication access controller identification information in accordance with the first verification result in the first authentication result information, and the requester sending a fourth authentication response message to the authentication access controller, wherein the fourth authentication response message contains the ciphertext of the first one-time random security number, and the ciphertext of the first one-time random security number is obtained by using a message encryption key to encrypt information including the first one-time random security number; And - decryption, after receiving the fourth authentication response message, by the access controller when authenticating the ciphertext of the first one-time random security number by using the message encryption key to obtain the first one-time random security number, decryption of the ciphertext of the second authentication result information by using the first one-time random security number numbers to obtain second authentication result information, and determining an authentication result of the requester's identification information according to the second verification result in the second authentication result information. 2. The method of claim 1, further comprising: before the authentication access controller receives the encrypted ciphertext message of the identification information sent by the requester, sending the access controller during authentication a key request message to the requester, wherein the key request message contains a key exchange parameter of the access controller during authentication; causing the requester to perform a key exchange calculation in accordance with the information comprising a temporary private key corresponding to the key exchange parameter of the requester and a temporary public key contained in the authentication access controller key exchange parameter to generate a first key, and calculating a message encryption key according to with information containing the first key by using a key generation algorithm, accordingly, the identity ciphertext message further contains a requestor key exchange parameter; And the authentication access controller performing a key exchange calculation according to a temporary private key corresponding to the authentication access controller's key exchange parameter and a temporary public key contained in the requester's key exchange parameter to generate a first key, and calculating a message encryption key according to information containing the first key by using a key generation algorithm. 3. The method according to claim 2, according to which the key request message additionally contains a first one-time random number generated by the access controller during authentication, The requester's calculation of the message encryption key additionally includes: calculating, by the requester, a message encryption key according to information comprising a first key, a first one-time random number, and a second one-time random number generated by the requester; And accordingly, the message with the encrypted text of the identification information additionally contains a second one-time random number, The access controller's calculation of the message encryption key for authentication further includes: the access controller calculating, upon authentication, a message encryption key according to the information comprising a first key, a first one-time random number, and a second one-time random number, wherein the identification information ciphertext message further comprises a first one-time random number; And Before the access controller calculates the message encryption key for authentication, the method further includes: verifying, by the authentication access controller, consistency between the first one-time random number in the ciphertext message of the identity information and the first one-time random number generated by the authentication access controller; And, if verification is successful, the access controller calculates the message encryption key during authentication. 4. Method according to any one of paragraphs. 2, 3, according to which the key request message further contains an identification identifier of at least one authentication server that is trusted by the access controller for authentication, and the method further includes: determining by the requester, in accordance with the identity ID of the at least one authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication, an identity ID of the at least one authentication server trusted by the requester; And the identity ciphertext message further comprises an identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requester, and the method further includes: the identification by the authentication access controller of a first authentication server in accordance with the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requester, in a ciphertext message of the identity information and the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, in message requesting the key. 5. Method according to any one of paragraphs. 1-4, wherein the identity ciphertext message further comprises an identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requester, and the method further includes: determining by the authentication access controller a first authentication server according to an identity ID of the at least one authentication server trusted by the requester and an identity ID of the at least one authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller. 6. Method according to any one of paragraphs. 1-5, according to which the ciphertext data of the requester identification information to be encrypted further contains the requester identification identifier and a third one-time random security number; the authentication access controller identification ciphertext data to be encrypted further comprises an authentication access controller identification identifier and a fourth one-time random number; accordingly, the first authentication response message further comprises a ciphertext of the challenger ID and a ciphertext of the authentication access controller ID, the ciphertext of the challenger ID is generated by using a third one-time random guard number to encrypt information containing the requester ID, and the ciphertext of the authentication access controller ID is generated using a fourth one-time random guard number for encrypting information containing the authentication access controller ID; the authentication result information ciphertext data to be encrypted in the third authentication response message further comprises ciphertext of the requestor's identification identifier, and, before the requester determines the authentication result of the access controller identity information upon authentication, the method further includes: the querier decrypting the ciphertext of the authentication result information by using the message encryption key to obtain the ciphertext of the querier ID, verifying the ciphertext of the querier ID in accordance with the querier ID and the third one-time random guard number, and after successful verification then determining the result of authentication of the access controller identification information during authentication; And, before the authentication access controller determines the authentication result of the requestor's identity, the method further includes: the access controller verifying the ciphertext authentication of the authentication access controller ID according to the authentication access controller ID and the fourth one-time random guard number, and after successful verification, then determining the authentication result of the requester's identity information. 7. Method according to any one of paragraphs. 2-4, according to which: the third authentication response message further comprises a first message integrity verification code, wherein the first message integrity verification code is generated by the authentication access controller using a message integrity verification key to perform a calculation on information containing fields in the third authentication response message different from the first verification code message integrity, and a method for generating an access controller message integrity check key in authentication is the same as a method for generating an access controller message encryption key in authentication; and the method further includes: the requester verifying the first message integrity verification code and, if the verification is successful, then the requester performing the step of determining an authentication result of the access controller identity upon authentication in accordance with the first verification result; and/or the fourth authentication response message further comprises a second message integrity verification code, wherein the second message integrity verification code is generated by the requestor using a message integrity verification key to perform a calculation on the fields in the fourth authentication response message different from the second message integrity verification code, and a method generating the requester message integrity verification key is the same as the method for generating the requester message encryption key; and the method further includes: the authentication access controller verifying the second message integrity verification code and, if the verification is successful, then the authentication access controller performing the step of determining the authentication result of the requestor's identity information. 8. Method according to any one of paragraphs. 1-7, according to which the message with the encrypted text of the identification information additionally contains a digital signature of the requester; and before the authentication access controller determines an authentication result of the requestor's identity, the method further includes: determining by the authentication access controller whether verification of the digital signature of the requester is successful; and, if it is determined that the verification of the digital signature of the requester is successful, then determining, by the access controller upon authentication, an authentication result of the requester's identity information in accordance with the second verification result, wherein the method further includes: before the requester determines the authentication result of the access controller identity information upon authentication, determining by the requester whether verification of the digital signature of the access controller during authentication is successful; and, if it is determined that the authentication verification of the digital signature of the access controller is successful, then determining, by the requester, an authentication result of the authentication identity information of the access controller in accordance with the first verification result. 9. The method according to claim 8, according to which the determination by the access controller during authentication of whether verification of the digital signature of the requester is successful includes: if the second authentication result information obtained by using the access controller in authentication of the first one-time random security number to decrypt the ciphertext of the second authentication result information further comprises a digital certificate of the requester, verification by the access controller in authentication of the digital signature of the requester by using the digital certificate of the requester request and determining, in accordance with the verification result, whether verification of the digital signature of the request initiator is successful; or verifying, by the second authentication server, the digital signature of the requester by using the digital certificate of the requester obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the identity of the requester, and, if the authentication access controller receives the first authentication response message, determining that the verification of the digital signature of the requester is successful, wherein the requestor's determination of whether verification of the digital signature of the access controller during authentication is successful includes: when the first authentication request message further contains a digital signature of the authentication access controller, verification by the first authentication server of the digital signature of the authentication access controller by using the digital certificate of the authentication access controller obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the authentication access controller's identification information, and, if the initiator the requester receives a third authentication response message, determining by the requester that the authentication verification of the access controller's digital signature is successful; or, when the third authentication response message further contains a digital signature of the authentication access controller, if the first authentication result information obtained by the requestor decrypting the ciphertext of the first authentication result information further contains a digital certificate of the authentication access controller, the requestor's verification of the controller's digital signature the authentication access controller by using the digital certificate of the authentication access controller in the first authentication result information, and determining, according to the verification result, whether the verification of the digital signature of the authentication access controller is successful. 10. Method according to any one of paragraphs. 1-9, according to which the fourth authentication response message further contains a digital signature of the requester and a second authentication result information obtained by using the access controller during authentication of the first one-time random security number to decrypt the ciphertext of the second authentication result information, further comprising a digital certificate requester; and before the authentication access controller determines an authentication result of the requestor's identity, the method further includes: verification by the access controller when authenticating the digital signature of the requester by using the digital certificate of the requester in the second authentication result information and, if it is determined that verification of the digital signature of the requester is successful, then determining by the access controller when authenticating the authentication result of the identity information of the requester in accordance with the second result of verification. 11. Method according to any one of paragraphs. 1-10, according to which the first authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication and the second authentication server trusted by the requester are the same authentication server; and before the first authentication server sends a first authentication response message, the method further includes: obtaining, by the first authentication server, a digital certificate of the supplicant, a first one-time random security number, a digital certificate of the authentication access controller, and a second one-time random security number, which are obtained by using the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate to decrypt the ciphertext of the supplicant identification information and the ciphertext access controller identification information during authentication; And the first authentication server performing legitimacy verification against the digital certificate of the access controller upon authentication to obtain the first verification result, performing legitimacy verification against the digital certificate of the requester to obtain the second verification result, generating first information about the authentication result in accordance with the information containing the first verification result , encrypting the information containing the first authentication result information by using a second one-time random security number to generate the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, generating the second authentication result information in accordance with the information containing the second verification result, encrypting the information containing the second authentication result information by using the first one-time random security number to generate the ciphertext of the second authentication result information, performing a calculation on the to-be-signed data containing the ciphertext of the first authentication result information to generate a first digital signature, performing a calculation on the to-be-signed data data containing a ciphertext of the second authentication result information to generate a second digital signature, and generating a first authentication response message in accordance with the information comprising a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, a first digital signature, a ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and second digital signature; or the first authentication server trusted by the access controller for authentication and the second authentication server trusted by the requester are two different authentication servers; and before the first authentication server sends a first authentication response message, the method further includes: - receipt by the first authentication server of a digital certificate of the access controller during authentication and a second one-time random security number, which is obtained by using the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate to decrypt the ciphertext of the identification information of the access controller during authentication, performing legitimacy verification against the digital certificate of the access controller during authentication to obtain the first verification result, generating the first authentication result information according to the information containing the first verification result, encrypting the information containing the first authentication result information by using a second one-time random security number to generate a ciphertext of the first authentication result information , and performing a calculation on the data to be signed containing the ciphertext of the first authentication result information and the ciphertext of the requester identification information to generate a third digital signature; - sending by the first authentication server a second message with an authentication request to the second authentication server, wherein the second authentication request message contains ciphertext of the first authentication result information, ciphertext of the requestor's identification information, and a third digital signature; and verifying, by the second authentication server, a third digital signature by using the public key of the first authentication server, upon successful verification, performing a legitimacy verification on the requestor's digital certificate obtained by using a private key corresponding to the encryption certificate to decrypt the ciphertext of the requestor's identity information to obtain the second verification result, generating second authentication result information in accordance with the information containing the second verification result, then encrypting the information containing the second authentication result information by using a first one-time random security number obtained by decrypting the ciphertext of the requester's identification information to generate the ciphertext of the second authentication result information, performing a calculation on the to-be-signed data containing the ciphertext of the first authentication result information to generate a first digital signature, and performing a calculation on the to-be-signed data containing the ciphertext of the second authentication result information to generate a fourth digital signature. signatures; - receiving by the first authentication server a second authentication response message sent by the second authentication server, wherein the second authentication response message contains a ciphertext of the first authentication result information, a first digital signature, a ciphertext of the second authentication result information, and a fourth digital signature; And - verification by the first authentication server of the fourth digital signature by using the public key of the second authentication server; and, if the verification is successful, performing by the first authentication server a calculation on the data to be signed containing the ciphertext of the second authentication result information to generate a second digital signature and generating a first authentication response message in accordance with the ciphertext of the first authentication result information, the first digital a signature, an encrypted text of the second information about the authentication result, and a second digital signature. 12. Method according to any one of paragraphs. 1-11, according to which the message sent to the access controller upon authentication by the requester further contains a hash value calculated by the requester for the received last previous message sent by the access controller upon authentication, When receiving a message sent by the requester, the authentication access controller first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after successful verification; the message sent to the requester by the authentication access controller further contains a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the received last previous message sent by the requester, When receiving a message sent by the access controller during authentication, the requester first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after successful verification; the message sent to the first authentication server by the authentication access controller further contains a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller for the received last previous message sent by the first authentication server, when receiving a message sent by the access controller for authentication, the first authentication server first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after successful verification; the message sent to the authentication access controller by the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller further contains a hash value calculated by the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller for the received last previous message sent by the authentication access controller, when receiving a message sent by an authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, the authentication access controller first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after successful verification; the message sent to the second authentication server by the first authentication server further contains a hash value calculated by the first authentication server for the received last previous message sent by the second authentication server, when receiving a message sent by the first authentication server, the second authentication server first verifies the hash value in the received message, and then performs subsequent operations after successful verification; And the message sent to the first authentication server by the second authentication server further contains a hash value calculated by the second authentication server for the received last previous message sent by the first authentication server, When receiving a message sent by the second authentication server, the first authentication server first verifies the hash value in the received message and then performs subsequent operations after successful verification. 13. An authentication access controller, comprising a processor and a storage device, the storage device being configured to store a computer program; and the processor is configured to call and run a computer program stored in the storage device to carry out steps performed by the access controller in authentication in the identity information authentication method according to any one of claims. 1-12. 14. Requester containing a processor and storage device, wherein the storage device is configured to store a computer program; and the processor is configured to call and run a computer program stored in the storage device to carry out the steps performed by the requestor in the method for authenticating identification information according to any one of claims. 1-12. 15. A first authentication server, which is an authentication server that is trusted by the access controller for authentication, and includes a processor and a storage device, wherein the storage device is configured to store a computer program; and the processor is configured to call and run a computer program stored in the storage device to carry out the steps performed by the first authentication server in the method for authenticating identification information according to any one of claims. 1-12.