RU2798086C1 - Marking of objects, manufacturing and authentication method - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: marking.

SUBSTANCE: invention relates to methods for creating and reading markings. The technical result consists in increasing the reliability of marking by reducing the probability of erroneous identification of the marked object. The technical result is achieved due to the fact that the marking of objects contains the first protective element and the second protective element, each protective element is associated with a set of data segments, and each protective element, depending on the capture conditions, in particular the viewing angle and/ or lighting direction, shows a code segment which is an optoelectronic readable representation of one of the data segments of the set associated with the corresponding security element, wherein different individual data segments are represented by different code segments, and the set associated with the first security element differs by at least one data segment from set associated with the second security element.

EFFECT: increasing the reliability of marking by reducing the probability of erroneous identification of the marked object.

14 cl, 6 dwg

Description

The invention relates to marking objects containing a first security element and at least a second security element, each security element is associated with a set of data segments, and each security element shows, depending on the capture conditions, in particular, the viewing angle and / or direction illumination, a code segment that is an optoelectronic readable representation of one of the data segments of the set associated with the respective security element. In addition, the invention relates to a set of object markings.

In addition, the invention relates to a base material for making object markings, comprising a first security element and at least a second security element, each security element is associated with a set of data segments, and each security element shows, depending on the capture conditions, in in particular the viewing angle and/or illumination direction, a code segment which is an optoelectronic readable representation of one of the data segments of the set associated with the respective security element. The invention also relates to a method for authenticating an object tag and a method for creating an object tag.

The prior art has proposed several types of object markings for authentication or verification and the basic materials from which these object markings can be made, as well as methods for authenticating or verifying these object markings. For example, WO 2018/046746 A1 shows a sheet-like article containing markers and security features. The markers are machine readable codes. The security features are implemented by security devices separate from the tokens. They consist of two Optically Variable Devices (OVDs) side by side which are, for example, different diffraction gratings showing, for example, different color changes seen from a camera or to the naked eye. Thus, the presence of a security feature can be easily recognized and verified by a programmable device containing a camera, ensuring that the two OVDs look different. All security elements show essentially the same optically variable image, but with different starting angles. The sheet product has several different markers, each of which has a randomly selected security element next to it.

The effect of optical diffraction, i.e. The image that an optically variable device "emits" or seems to depict depends on the lighting conditions and viewing angle. Typically, a point source of light is assumed, and the response of the diffraction grating forming the security element is designed for this particular lighting scenario. During the design process, physical structures are designed in such a way that they refract the incident light in the required way, that is, they represent a certain image at a certain (azimuth) angle. More specifically, it is assumed that the point source of light is in a certain place, and the diffraction grating is designed to show certain images, for example, certain colors or shapes at different specific viewing angles. Therefore, the known behavior of the security element is limited to this particular lighting scenario. Since the displayed image of an optically diffractive security device is inherently dependent on the lighting conditions as well as the viewing angle, reading the actual content of the security features becomes difficult in practice if certain environmental conditions cannot be met. Thus, under uncontrolled conditions, the optically diffractive security element reacts at least to a certain extent unpredictably. A typical approach to this task is to provide some apparatus or other means (eg user manual, special movements, training, etc.) to provide conditions at least similar to the environmental conditions used in the process. design. The problem of the present invention is to overcome the limitation for verification associated with a controlled environment.

The sheet-like product of WO 2018/046746 A1 is particularly optimized for testing with programmable devices containing a camera, with markers being used to determine the desired behavior of the surrounding security features. However, in practical - uncontrolled - conditions, it is rare, if ever, that the specified lighting can be established during the inspection process. Consequently, the protective devices will react differently than intended during the design process. Therefore, the light-invariant feature has to be extracted from the optically variable light-dependent security device. Unsurprisingly, this problem is difficult to solve, and there must always be a trade-off between the rigor or accuracy of verification/authentication and robustness to account for uncontrolled lighting conditions and the influence of external, unforeseen factors. This becomes especially difficult if more than one point light source is present in the test conditions. Diffused lighting can also be understood as an indefinite number of (weak) point light sources. In such a multi-light environment, different diffracted light beams inevitably overlap the programmable device containing the camera, eventually generating multiple superimposed images viewed from the same angle due to the lack of collimated incident light. There is no reliable way to filter and distinguish between superimposed reflections, so checking the correctness of the image emitted at a certain angle is a serious problem.

Traditionally, optically variable devices are designed primarily to provide optically pleasing effects. The security of such devices mainly lies in the use of structures that no one else can produce, i.e. making playback difficult. Verification requires expertise, and usually micro- and nanostructures are evaluated in a laboratory setting to verify the correct physical structure of the lattices. Possibility of automatic verification on a macroscopic scale, i.e. on the basis of displayed images, for example by means of computer vision, as a rule, are not considered at all. Prominent examples of modern optically variable devices are iridescent holograms (zero/first order diffraction gratings, usually with colored reflections) or animation of geometric shapes, such as rotating or moving objects, zoom effects (often created using nanostructures, micromirrors, etc.) and etc. Because of the primary purpose of such OVDs, namely to be optically pleasing to the eye and lab verifiable, smooth animation and continuous color change are often attempted. In the so-called ideal case, traditional optically variable devices have an infinite number of images, represented as images in the same color region, fading into each other as the viewing angle changes, to provide smooth optically variable effects. In particular, for rainbow holograms, this is achieved physically, since the incident white light is simply diffracted by the grating. Because they contain only one "pixel" that exhibits a smooth color transition, these OVDs are not capable of storing or encoding any form of distinct or distinct data segments.

On the other hand, US 2012/0211567 A1 shows animated barcodes, in particular a series of sequential barcodes encoding a string of information. An optical layer is provided to affect the display of different barcodes at different viewing angles so that each barcode is displayed at a different viewing angle. The purpose of this solution is to increase the capacity of the data stored in the area of a single barcode. To achieve this goal, ideal lighting conditions are implicitly assumed and actually required. However, as mentioned above, such lighting conditions may be acceptable for data storage applications, but unacceptable for security marking applications, where strong and convenient authentication is the key to user acceptance and is ultimately required to detect fraud and counterfeiting.

The purpose of the present invention is to overcome the problem associated with unpredictable images in an uncontrolled inspection environment. In particular, the present invention should provide a special design of optically variable object marking security elements that provides more reliable verification using a programmable device containing a camera, with fewer compromises in verification reliability and reproducibility.

The invention provides the object marking mentioned at the beginning, in which different individual data segments are represented by different code segments, and in which the set associated with the first security element and the set associated with the second security element differ by at least one data segment. Therefore, each security element displays (ie displays according to its light reflection characteristics) depending on the capture conditions at least two different code segments. Capture conditions may include viewing angle and/or illumination direction, and any or both of these must be changed to reveal different code segments. Each code segment is an optoelectronic readable representation of a data segment. The same data segment can be represented by one or more code segments. Each code segment represents exactly one data segment. The data segments represented by the code segments belong to a limited set of data segments associated with the respective security element. The first security element is associated with the first set of data segments. The second security element is associated with the second set of data segments. Each set may contain at least two data segments. The first set of data segments is different from the second set of data segments. For example, there may be at least one data segment that is in either the first set or the second set, but not both. Therefore, the code segments displayed by the security elements, and ultimately the security elements themselves, are different. An object marking may contain more than two security elements that differ in the same sense; that is, it may contain three or more security elements associated with a corresponding number of sets of data segments, where each pair of sets is different in accordance with the above definition. Thus, in this group of security elements, each security element can be distinguished from another security element. Depending on how similar the sets in question are (for example, the number or ratio of data segments in more than one set), any two security elements in such a group can be distinguished by reading one or more of their code segments under the appropriate number of capture conditions. The maximum number of code segments displayed by each security element can be predetermined, so that at least if this number of code segments is read from any two security elements, they can be distinguished.

Without limiting the scope of the present invention, the object marking may also contain similar security features, ie two or more security features that are associated with the same set of data segments. In the case of more than one group of identical security elements, these groups may differ in size (i.e. number of security elements) and/or the relative position between their elements (e.g. distance between security elements from one group or the direction of the nearest neighbor from the same groups). These properties and measures ensure that separate but similar security features can be distinguished from their respective adjacent (or continuous) dissimilar security features. In other words, even similar security elements can - in most cases - be distinguished from each other if it is possible to count an adjacent (or continuous) dissimilar security element. Essentially, two or more sets of data segments are combined based on the geometric distance between their associated security features. Then the first combined set and the second combined set differ by at least one data segment. To facilitate understanding in this case, we refer to different "neighborhoods" of security elements.

Distinguishing between different security features or different neighborhoods can be used to increase the variety of object markings that can be obtained from a given base material. Increased diversity means that the likelihood that any two markings of genuine objects will be identical or even similar is reduced. The effort to forge an object's marking is proportional to the number of different instances that need to be forged, because reproducing the same instance usually requires comparatively less effort. In the preferred embodiment, this can be achieved by observing the relative frequency of marking inspected objects with the same indistinguishable pattern - that is, essentially physical authentic copies. This observation can be done either by capturing all tests from a single test device containing a camera, or from a database where test data from multiple programmable devices containing a camera is captured. Due to the low probability of authenticity of replicas, the threshold for replica frequency can be low, and thus a forgery can be easily detected if it has been used to generate above average replicas. Therefore, more variety makes counterfeiting without the risk of trivial detection more costly and ultimately less attractive.

The invention also provides a set of object markings, wherein the set comprises a number of object markings as defined above. For example, a set contains two or more object markings of the above type. A set of object labels, especially when it includes more than 100, more than 1000 or more than 10000 object labels, exhibits the statistical properties of a single object label. In particular, for example, the average repetition rate of security elements with any particular set of data segments or the repetition rate of any particular neighborhood or combined set of data segments can be determined from the set of object markings, or in other words, the size of the set defines an upper bound for such repetition rate. In other words, the statistical properties of a set are quantitative and measurable expressions of the diversity described above.

In addition, the invention provides the base material mentioned at the beginning, wherein different individual data segments are represented by different code segments, and the set associated with the first security element and the set associated with the second security element differ by at least one data segment. The base material is intended for the manufacture of marking objects. Alternatively, the base material contains a sufficient number of security elements to create at least two object markings or at least three or more object markings. For example, the base material may comprise a two-dimensional array of security features in which there are significantly more than two security features, such as an array of at least 5x5 security features or at least 10x10 security features, or at least 20x20 security features. Without limiting the scope of the present invention, the base material as described above for marking a single object may also contain similar security features, ie two or more security features that are associated with the same set of data segments. Everything that has been explained above for labeling a single object in relation to recognizable "neighborhoods" applies as a similar possibility to the base material. In addition, and again without limiting the scope of the present invention, the base material may have repeating sequences of security features, while the repetition period, that is, the distance between repeated instances of security features, is significantly larger than the dimensions of the marking of one object, for example, at least ten times more, or at least a hundred times more.

In addition, without limiting the scope of the invention, the invention provides a method for creating object markings by randomly or pseudo-randomly combining at least two different security elements. The random combination can be achieved by changing the configurations of the "neighborhoods" of the distinguishable guards, i.e. their different location for different markings of objects. For the manufacture of security devices containing at least two different security elements, using the present method, a device configured to randomly or pseudo-randomly select from a limited set of distinguishable security elements and place them randomly or pseudo-randomly in certain geometric configurations can be used using the present method. More specifically, the security elements may be prefabricated by any means suitable for the manufacture of optically variable devices. In addition, any registered transfer process suitable for transferring prefabricated security features to the carrier material (forming the object marking) or to the object itself can be used. For example, in accordance with the present invention, registered hot or cold stamping, digital cold foil stamping, etc. can be used to transfer at least two security features like an OVD onto a carrier material or object to make a security device and mark the object.

The invention also proposes a corresponding method for authenticating the object marking, wherein the object marking contains a limited area of the base material that is distinguishable by an optoelectronic method (for example, forming the object marking, as an option, on the base material or directly on the object), while the base material is a base material as described above, wherein the region comprises a first security element and at least a second security element, the method comprising the following steps:

capturing a first object marking image at a first angle or at a first illumination direction;

identifying the first code segment represented by the first security element in the first image;

decoding the first code segment to obtain the first data segment;

capturing a second object marking image at a second angle and/or with a second illumination direction;

identifying a second code segment represented by the first security element in the second image;

decoding the second code segment to obtain a second data segment;

determining from the model storing the sets of data segments associated with the protective elements of the base material, whether there is a set of data segments containing the first data segment and the second data segment.

The above method essentially checks if the combination of data segments contained in the first security elements has a corresponding set of data segments according to a stored model containing the definitions of all valid data segment sets. If matches, i.e. the corresponding set is not found, then the security element most likely refers to a fake marking of the object.

For purposes of authenticating a particular security element, it may be sufficient to observe only a subset of at least two code segments out of all possible code segments for that particular security element. In a preferred configuration, the authentication method can be configured to authenticate when N code segments out of M possible code segments (known from the model) for that particular security element are viewed from different angles or under different capture conditions (eg, lighting). Examples of N and M parameters: N = 2 (N must be greater than or equal to 2), M = 5 (M must be greater than or equal to N, e.g. M = N+1, M = N+2, M = N +3 , M = N+4). Since all code segments are independent, it does not matter which N = 2 of M = 5 segments are decoded. Any combination is sufficient.

Typically, to view two or more different code segments for a particular security element, it may be sufficient to change the viewing angle while the illumination direction (eg, the location of the light source and the security element) remains unchanged.

Finally, the invention proposes a method for marking an object, comprising the following steps:

randomly, pseudo-randomly, or deterministically, an area of the base material is selected, wherein the base material is the base material described herein, the selected area comprising a first security element and at least a second security element, and

in an optoelectronic way, the selected area is clearly delimited from the non-selected part of the base material.

The way in which the area of the base material is selected can contribute to the diversity of the object markings obtained. Random as well as pseudo-random selection ensure that no unintentional repetitions are created at a relatively high repetition rate tolerable. Thus, these measures further increase diversity. The shape, dimensions of the discharge, or any other optoelectronic readable properties may vary. Highlighting can be done by cutting or stamping from the base material, combining several security features directly on the object, or partially printing over the base material and using a negative highlight mask so that the base material is only visible in that area under the mask.

In another preferred embodiment, since the position of the release in the carrier material is known due to the model, the proposed carrier material is particularly suitable for use in the manufacture of security devices, as proposed in WO 2015/079014 A1, and/or for use in security systems, such as presented in WO 2013/188897 A1. In such a particular embodiment, the randomness introduced in the selection process, i.e. due to manufacturing tolerances, combined with a priori known geometric information from the model, which, in fact, represents the base material.

By displaying code segments representing data segments in an optoelectronic manner instead of, for example, security elements with a rainbow effect, i.e. with a smooth color change, the authentication of the object marking becomes much more reliable. The reason for this is that it can be determined whether code segments represent valid data segments. The likelihood that random or diffuse lighting conditions will cause an invalid security element to accidentally display a code segment representing a valid data segment is much lower than the likelihood that an invalid color-changing image or simple geometry will accidentally display a valid image. In addition, with security features showing code segments representing data segments, the position of that code segment in the underlying base material (or one of a small number of valid positions) can be determined by scanning a code segment and validated using a set-linking model. data segments (or neighborhoods) with positions. In other words, the security features are used as reference points in the model (which, for example, represents the base material from which the object marking is made). Since the security elements differ in at least one data segment, the position can be determined by changing the capture conditions. Alternatively or in addition, depending on the sets, the position can also be determined by capturing the first security element and the second security element under only one capture condition and searching for corresponding combinations of adjacent sets (adjacent or adjacent security elements). In this case, the "neighborhood" can serve as a reference point in the model. It should be noted that in order to check at least one security element in this embodiment, it is necessary to observe at least the second code segment (and the corresponding data segment) under at least a second other capture conditions in order to verify that there is indeed an OVD (and not, for example, hard copy representing OVD under the same capture conditions). It should also be noted that the marking of the object described in this document, in particular the security elements, does not allow the use of an animated barcode to encode more information than a conventional barcode. Instead, it allows you to use animated barcodes for authentication.

By displaying depending on the capture conditions of a code segment is meant that the corresponding code segment is physically displayed in at least some form. In particular, there is at least one capture condition for each code segment such that this code segment can be distinguished from other code segments of this security element and/or can be optoelectronically identified among the code segments representing the data segments of the set of this security element. The viewing angle is understood to mean the viewing angle of the marking of an object, in particular of the respective security element. For practical applications, it is important to note that, strictly speaking, viewing angles and capture conditions are already slightly different for neighboring security elements. This problem is difficult to solve with traditional optically variable devices. One can either design optically variable devices with such reliable characteristics that the geometric displacement can be neglected. Alternatively, and in our experience, capture conditions can be estimated from the observed display image of the first code segment and the mathematical model used to obtain an estimate of the expected display image of the second adjacent code segment.

One advantage achievable with the present invention is that authentication essentially checks whether a particular data segment belongs to a set of data segments of a particular security element. This verification method is very reliable and no longer needs to take into account the diversity of capture conditions that occur within a single captured image due to geometric distortions, across the entire security device, or more precisely across the object marking.

The code segment of the second security element preferably at least partially, more preferably completely, does not overlap with the code segment of the first security element. The code segments representing the data segments from the set associated with the first security element preferably at least partially, more preferably completely, do not overlap with the code segments representing the data segments from the set associated with the second security element. Also, the security elements themselves, ie. the first security element and the second security element may be at least partially non-overlapping or (fully) non-overlapping. That is, they can be arranged without overlapping between the first security element and the second security element. They can be located, for example, side by side, adjacent to each other, or at a distance from each other.

Alternatively, the set of data segments associated with each security element is a plurality of data segments, optoelectronically readable by a plurality of code segments displayed under a plurality of capture conditions. Alternatively, for each data segment in the set of data segments associated with each security element, there is at least one code segment that is optoelectronically readable by said data segment under at least one specific capture condition. That is, each code segment, representing an optoelectronic readable data segment in the set of data segments associated with each security element, is displayed by said security element under at least one specific capture condition.

In accordance with a particular embodiment of the present object marking, for a fixed illumination direction, each data segment in the set associated with the security element (and therefore each code segment displayed by the corresponding security element) is associated with a separate viewing angle region within which the contrast code segment representing the corresponding data segment is higher than the contrast of code segments representing all other data segments from the same set. In other words, code segments are associated with ranges of viewing angles or areas under which they can be read. Conversely, each viewing angle only refers to one particular code segment (and thus the data segment), but each code segment can be seen from several different viewing angles. Viewing angle ranges are generally dependent on actual illumination and may actually overlap in the case of multiple distributed light sources. It should also be noted that, in practical application, a particular data segment may be associated with several different viewing angles or viewing angle regions, and each viewing angle or viewing angle region may be assigned to only one data segment, i.e. there may be a mutually exclusive distribution of viewing angles or viewing angle areas among the data segments of a particular set associated with the security element.

In this context, alternatively, there may be at least one viewing angle region associated with the data segment of the first security element set that is different from each of the viewing angle regions associated with the data segments of the second security element set. Therefore, there may be at least one viewing angle at which the first security element changes the displayed code segment, while the second security element does not change the displayed code segment. More generally, the switching characteristics for the first security elements and the second security elements may be different. For example, switching characteristics may differ due to different sizes of the first data segment set and the second data segment set: for example, the first data segment set may consist of nine data segments, and the second data segment set may consist of 18 data segments, with the first protection the element has a different code segment (i.e. switches) every 20° between viewing angles from 0° to 180°, and the second security element shows a different code segment (i.e. switches) every 10° between 0° and 180° review.

Each code segment may be a structured image, in particular a barcode-like structure, preferably a two-dimensional code, more preferably a two-dimensional matrix code. These types of images are relatively easy to read optoelectronic. In particular, structured images can provide sufficient contrast to distinguish patterns under different lighting conditions.

More specifically, each code segment may be a two-dimensional matrix code, where each code segment is a matrix of cells and the data segment is represented by a code segment with each cell of the code segment being in one of at least two optically distinguishable states (e.g., dark or light, black or white), wherein the code segments displayed by the first security element are adjacent to the code segments displayed by the second security element. The two-dimensional matrix code may dispense with the distinction between cells of adjacent code segments and/or without searching for patterns.

According to an embodiment of the present invention, each code segment may represent a corresponding data segment in a predetermined code, the predetermined code preferably containing error detection or correction information.

Alternatively, the predefined code may allow a maximum number of possible distinct data segments, and the number of data segments in each security element's data segment set may be less than 1/100, preferably less than 1/1000, more preferably less than 1/10000 of the maximum possible number of distinct data segments. In other words, only a fraction of the possible data segments (and therefore code segments) can actually be used. Assuming that read errors will affect all parts of the code segments approximately equally, this can be used to detect read errors, because they are likely to cause the read data segment to not be used. In this regard, the data segments used can be chosen such that, for example, the code segments representing them differ by more than one cell (in the case of two-dimensional matrix codes), preferably by more than two cells, so that one inverted cell will result in an unused segment. data and hence a detectable read error.

The positions of the security elements relative to each other can be predetermined. These positions, for example, can be stored in the model and can be used to identify and distinguish neighborhoods of otherwise (at least partially) similar security devices, thereby increasing the variety of distinguishable object markings.

Accordingly, with respect to the base material, the positions of the security elements relative to each other on the base material can be predetermined according to the model, and the data segments of the sets associated with the security elements can be predefined according to the model.

Accordingly, if the marking of an object is carried out by random, pseudo-random or deterministic placement of security elements in a geometric configuration, then the positions of said security elements can be recorded in the model or in the database. This information may be available at the time of verification.

Alternatively, each code segment may represent a corresponding data segment in a predefined code, where the predefined code preferably contains information for detecting or correcting errors. Error detection is especially useful for triggering rereads (i.e. rereads) of the corresponding code segment, where such rereads would typically be performed under different lighting conditions, increasing the likelihood that the same read error will not be repeated. . Error correction provides more reliable optoelectronic reading of code segments, where frequent errors can be made when reading small portions of code segments. Thus, both error detection and error correction contribute to read reliability. This reduces the likelihood that a genuine item label will be rejected (false rejection). It is worth noting that especially the use of known error-correcting codes, such as the Reed-Solomon code, is known to be prone to false decoding when applied to a very small data segment, such as 16 bits, but has a high error-correction capability.

In addition to what was discussed above for marking individual objects, the predefined code may allow a maximum number of possible individual data segments, and the number of individual data segments in the data segment sets of all security elements (i.e., on the base material) may be less 1/100, preferably less than 1/1000, more preferably less than 1/10000 of the maximum possible number of individual data segments. This infrequent use of data segments can be applied to further reduce false positives for a known vulnerability with very small data segments in error correcting codes as mentioned above.

As for the object mark authentication method, the method may further comprise the following steps:

identifying a third code segment represented by a second security element in the first image or in the second image;

decoding the third code segment to obtain a third data segment;

determine from a model that stores sets of data segments associated with the security elements of the base material, and also stores the relative positions of the security elements of the base material relative to each other, whether the second security element, located relative to the first security element, is associated with a set of data segments containing the third data segment. In this case, the optically variable nature of the second security element is verified and, additionally, the information contained is used to increase the variety of object markings.

In accordance with a specific embodiment of the present authentication method, the security elements of the base material, the area of which contains the object marking, can be tiled, and each code segment displayed by the security elements is an array of cells, and the code segments displayed by one security element, are placed continuously with code segments displayed by other security elements so that a larger array of fragments is formed, the method further comprising the following steps:

a) identifying the first sample cell in the first image;

b) decoding a first sample code segment in a first picture formed by a first sample cell array including said first sample cell at a predetermined position to obtain a first sample data segment;

c) determining from a model storing sets of data segments associated with security elements of the base material, whether there is at least one set of data segments containing said first sample data segment;

d) if such a set cannot be determined in step c), then repeat steps a) to c) with other first sample cells until such a set is found in step c); And

l) identifying the current first sample code segment as the first code segment.

Alternatively, more specifically, the method may further comprise the following steps prior to step 1):

e) identifying the first sample cell in the second image;

f) decoding a second sample code segment in a second picture formed by the first sample cell array to obtain a second sample data segment;

g) determining from the model storing the sets of data segments associated with the security elements of the base material, whether at least one set of data segments of the sets of segments containing the first sample data segment, the second sample data segment;

h) if such a set cannot be determined in step g), then steps a) to g) are repeated until such a set is found in step g); And

m) identifying the current second sample code segment as the second code segment.

Finally, to optionally further improve the authentication method, the method may further comprise the following steps before step 1) and, if applicable, before step m):

i) decoding a third sample code segment formed by a second sample cell array located relative to the first sample cell array to obtain a third sample data segment;

j) determining from a model storing sets of data segments associated with the security elements of the base material and storing the positions of the security elements of the base material relative to each other, whether the third sample data segment is contained in the set of data segments that belong to the security element located accordingly with respect to the security element to which the set previously identified in step e) belongs;

k) if such a set cannot be determined in step j), then repeat steps a) to d) and steps i) to j) and preferably steps e) to h) until such a set is found in step j );

n) identifying the current third sample code segment as the third code segment.

Let us now turn to the drawings, in which the figures are intended to illustrate the present invention and not to limit it.

In FIG. 1a schematically shows a first embodiment of a base material for making an object mark according to the present invention with six complete security features, and below the object mark visually indicates two sets of data segments associated with two security features;

in fig. 1b schematically shows the marking of the object and shows the displayed code segments at three different viewing angles;

in fig. 2 schematically shows a second embodiment of a base material in accordance with the present invention for creating object markings with sixteen security devices displaying two-dimensional matrix codes as code segments, where the code segments are indicated at different viewing angles; And

in fig. 3a-c schematically show a method for authenticating an object mark in accordance with the present invention.

As the main building block of the base material 1 and hence the object marking 8 according to the present invention, the first embodiment provides security elements 2 optimized for verification by a programmable device containing a camera. Each of the security elements 2 of the base material 1 can only display a very limited discrete set of recognizable images. This means that due to the indefinite number of possible lighting and viewing angle combinations, each image in this limited set will be visible from many different viewing angles. In practice, such security devices 2 can be created by creating optical elements that show a specific image for a range of (azimuth) angles, i.e. show the same image when deviated by +/-5 degrees. This can be realized using biconvex lenses, diffraction gratings, micromirrors and microlenses, nanostructures, etc.

The depictions of the security elements shown may be depictions in the "traditional" sense, i. e. geometric shapes, shape combinations, different colors, pixelated images, etc. In the present invention, these images are also referred to as code segments. In the following, we will illustrate various possible structures of the base material (typically a sheet product) and various embodiments of the present invention.

To outline the main functionality of the present invention, we assume in FIG. 1a for illustrative purposes, a variant in which the set of available images consists of images of lowercase Latin characters, that is, {a ... z}. In FIG. 1 and also shows as an example a part of the proposed base material 1 containing several security elements 2. For ease of understanding, we will focus the explanation on the first security element 3 and the second security element 4. The first security element 3 is made with the possibility of demonstration - depending on the viewing angle – one picture (or more generally code segment) 5 from the first set of pictures 6 (or more generally code segments representing data segments from the first set of data segments). The second security element 4 is configured to display - depending on the viewing angle - one image (or, in general, a code segment) 5 from the second set of images 7 (or, in general, code segments representing data segments from the second set of data segments) . The number of images, as well as the angular coherence in the two sets 6, 7, may differ; the images in the first set 6 may have different switching characteristics than the images in set 7. In addition, certain images may appear in several sets, such as 6 and 7, provided that the sets themselves are distinguishable, i. not all elements are the same.

As mentioned earlier, various manufacturing processes are possible for making a highlight or marking of an object 9 from the base material 1.

In FIG. 1b shows, by way of example, an object marking 9, which comprises a first security element 3 and a second security element 5, after being separated from the base material 1. FIG. 1b also shows the displayed images (or code segments) 5 of said selection, when viewed from different angles 10. When viewed from the first angle 10b, the first security element 3 displays the image (or code) "a", which is included in the set of images 6 corresponding to to the first security element 3. At the same viewing angle, the second security element 4 displays the image (or code) "z", which is included in the set of images 7 corresponding to the second security element 4.

Similarly, at an angle of 10 to the first security element 3 shows "s" and the second security element 4 shows "v", both being included in the respective image sets 6, 7. We would like to point out that due to the very limited set of available images and of an indefinite number of possible lighting/perspective scenarios, various or all combinations of images may become possible. For example, at a viewing angle of 10 g, the first security element 3 again shows the image "a" 5 (similar to that at an angle of 10 b), and the second security element 4 displays the image "b" 5. Such a scenario can also occur if in The designs of the base material 1 use different switching characteristics for different security elements 2, i. e. different optical elements and characteristics. The first security element 3, in addition to having a different set of images, can also have switching characteristics/switching angles different from those of the second security element 4.

As a notational note, for clarity in the following figures we will use the capital letters A…P to designate the various security elements 2. We will designate the first security element 3 with the letter "A", and the second security element 4 with the letter "B", etc. . The first picture (or code segment) 5 in the set of pictures 6 will hereinafter be referred to as A_1, the second as A_2, and so on. Similarly, images (or code segments) 5 for the second security element 4 from the corresponding second set of images 7 will be denoted as B_1, the second - B_2, and so on. In the simplest case, each code segment has a 1:1 relationship with the corresponding data segment. However, the scope of the present invention extends to situations where multiple code segments (eg, A_1.1, A_1.2, etc.) may represent the same data segment (eg, A_1). The set-relevant is the data segment. In the description of the following figures, for simplicity, we will use the terms image, code segments and data segments as synonyms and denote by the number 5.

In practical applications, when using computer vision tools on programmable devices containing a camera to check or read certain images, the correctness of reading/decoding the images themselves is always a concern. Although the above introductory example of a color-changing image sounds simple, reading and classifying (absolute and even relative) colors is still a very difficult task in computer vision. Therefore, it is not recommended to select different colors as different displayed images. Geometric shapes or generally structured images with good contrast are more reliable for reading and decoding, but still - without taking any additional measures - it is almost impossible to completely avoid decoding errors. Thus, in a practical application, the use of generic images or even letter images (as in FIG. 1) creates a non-trivial task if virtually error-free reading is required. And this is indeed desirable for the present purpose, since we need a reliable way to determine from a decoded image whether its data segment representation is a member of the data segment set for that particular security element or not. And we certainly don't want to prevent consumers from putting objects on the market by rejecting genuine object markings due to reading errors.

In a preferred embodiment, the images 5 are designed so that they can be read easily and almost error-free by an automatically programmed device containing a camera. One possible measure to ensure correct readability is to embed structures like checksum/parity in each of the possible images. This concept is well known in the field of telecommunications. The image contains at least two separately readable/decodable parts, and there is a relationship between these parts. In the field of information technology, these parts are often referred to as "codewords", respectively "payload" and "parity". The codewords/parts are separately read and decoded, and the decoding results are then compared with each other. If they match, they confirm the correct reading. Known methods implemented in the field of information technology are checksums, cyclic redundancy check codes (CRC) or error correction codes (EC). In the field of visually decodable barcodes, the Reed-Solomon code, an example of EC codes, is especially popular.

Therefore, we propose as one of the possible embodiments of the present invention to use images 5 that are optimized for reliable reading/decoding using programmable devices containing a camera. An intuitive choice is to use barcode-like structures, such as 2D codes, or a pixel structure representing codewords encoded with EC codes, such as the Reed-Solomon code.

Such codes make it possible to encode any segment of digital data (eg numbers, alphanumeric characters, binary data, etc.). In the preferred embodiment, numeric or alphanumeric identifiers may be encoded in a two-dimensional structure, and the set of possible images corresponds to the set of encoded identifiers.

While it would be possible to use standard barcode structures such as DataMatrix codes, QR codes, etc., we suggest customizing the structure and arrangement of codewords using an error-correcting code such as the Reed-Solomon code. This is more efficient in terms of space and data volume, i.e. increases the number of possible images. This is because these standard barcode structures use special structures or patterns to encode version information, lookup patterns to localize and size codes in images, and so on. Later in this document, we propose a way to localize and decode such structures without using conventional search patterns, etc.

The use of optical diffraction layers to display - depending on the viewing angle - different, spatially overlapping - coupled barcode structures is already known, for example from US 2012/0211567 A1. US 2012/0211567 A1 proposes the use of an optical layer that functions in such a way that different barcodes are displayed when viewed from different angles. In addition, it is proposed to use a code to associate these at least two viewing angle dependent codes with each other and determine their order. The main purpose of this invention seems to be to increase the storage capacity of data, hence establishing links to assemble data into one data segment when reading different codes.

We want to note that in the present invention, the viewing angle-dependent images/code segments/data segments are independent of each other. In addition, the present invention, unlike data storage applications, is designed to decode only a portion of data segments from a specific set of data segments. The decoding order does not matter, as long as the decoded data segment belongs to a certain set of data segments that identify a particular security element. Finally, the subject of the present invention is the identification of the position of a security element in the host material by determining the identity of a particular security element by decoding at least one data segment from at least one viewing angle and determining the position in the host material, preferably considering the decoding of other code segments when various capture conditions and determine their respective membership in the set using a priori knowledge from the model that stores sets of data segments that identify security elements, as well as their geometric relationship to each other. Therefore, unlike, for example, US 2012/0211567 A1, the relationship between different data segments/code segments is defined using a predefined model instead of (physical) encoding of the communication and order information within the data segments/code segments themselves.

In FIG. 2 shows a preferred embodiment of the present invention. The range of possible images is limited to 6x6 pixels, which can be black or white. The base material 1 contains several security elements 2 arranged in a mosaic pattern. For example, the first security element 3, designated security element A, is adjacent (or directly adjacent) to the second security element 4, designated security element B. Each of the security elements 2 comprises an optically variable element that displays one of N different images when viewed from different angles or under different lighting conditions. Thus, the first security element 3 identified as security element A can switch between N different images A_1, A_2, ... A_N (5) in the set of possible images 6 for that particular security element under different capture conditions b, c, ... n. A similar second set of images 7 with available images B_1, B_2, ... B_N is assigned to the second security element 4.

It is important to note that, in practical terms, a compromise must be found between switching sensitivity, i.e. the “speed” of the switching effect, and reliability. In particular, if there is diffuse illumination or several point sources of light with the same intensity, then crosstalk between several images may occur, that is, two or more of the N images in the set of M possible images may overlap each other with different intensities. In this case, the error correction function becomes particularly useful, since it allows to some extent to filter out superimposed images, or at least to determine that under these conditions the image cannot be reliably read.

In practical terms, more than one illumination source (light) is often present during reading. For example, there may be a dedicated light source associated with a verification device containing a camera. In real-world operation, there is always some residual background light, or there may even be point light sources (lamps, sun, etc.) superimposed on the dedicated light source. In another practical setting, there may be no dedicated light source, but a superposition of several "natural" light sources. In addition, it may be useful to equip the inspection device containing the camera with several dedicated lights, which can either be turned on and off individually, or, preferably, can be turned on simultaneously, creating a mixture of different more or less directional lights.

Crosstalk between multiple images, caused by multiple light sources or stray light, can be exploited during reading. Based on the information known from the model and using the error correction function, the overlaid images can be decomposed and multiple code segments can be decoded. This allows, under certain circumstances, the security element to be verified against a single captured image if the overlay image can be successfully decomposed into at least two different code segments belonging to the set of available code segments for a particular security element. A very simple way to achieve this decomposition is as follows:

- from the superimposed image, the intensity of the dominant code segment in the superimposed image is determined (for example, using grayscale values and histogram analysis);

- filter out all other intensities to isolate a noticeable segment of the code;

- decode the isolated noticeable segment of the code;

- determine the appropriate security element and, therefore, the set of available code segments for a particular security element;

- act similarly with other possible intensity levels and attempt decoding;

- if there is a second code segment that can be decoded and matches the set of available code segments for a particular security element, then the security element can be considered valid and authentic.

In another preferred embodiment, one may not try to find the strength of the predominant code segment, but simply iterate over all possible strengths. For each intensity, a “possible” code segment is allocated. If it is decodable, i.e. error correction and error detection are successful, then consider that this is a valid code segment, and determine the appropriate protective element. Then iterate over the remaining possible intensities, filter each intensity and try to decode the possible code segments for these intensities. If there is at least a second rate at which a code segment can be decoded, and this code segment belongs to the set of available code segments of the corresponding security elements, then the security element can be considered authentic.

In each of these cases, the identity of the security element (and therefore at least part of the security device) can be verified from a single captured image, provided that the illumination contains a suitable overlay of light sources suitable for isolating and filtering different code segments.

In this example, containing 6x6 pixels, the number of distinguishable images is theoretically 2 ³⁶ . Simply put, this would mean that we can encode ²³⁶ different identifiers. However, in this case, there is no room for error correction, and correct decoding cannot be ensured. If an error correction code is used, then 12 bits for error correction and 24 bits for payload can be used, for example, so the number of distinguishable images can be reduced to 2 ²⁴ .

If we have chosen a small number, for example, N = 5 images, for each set of images 6, 7 for the first security element 3 and the second security element 4, then this already allows no. to "encode" a sufficiently large area of the sheet product by simply placing the security elements in a mosaic on a sheet product. However, practical applications require an even more robust error correction capability, especially if smartphones or tablet computers with poor capture quality are used as the verification programmable device containing the camera. In such an acceptable case with a lot of redundancy (e.g. 16-bit payload, 20-bit error correction) it is possible to correct a fairly large amount of "destroyed" data (e.g. due to poor capture quality, incorrect binarization and classification, etc.). ). This is due to the fact that false reads, that is, the decoding of an incorrect identifier, become much more likely or even likely.

Verification can benefit from the creation of a model of a sheet product, i.e. sets of possible images for each security element available to the checking programmable device containing the camera. The model is known a priori, as it is a drawing for the design of a sheet product. Although under conditions of high redundancy a single false read as described above can occur - admittedly already with a fairly low probability - it is extremely unlikely that a second decoding will again lead to a false read, and in particular that these two false reads correspond to two images included in the same set of N = 5 images (for example, out of 2 ¹⁶ available images). Thus, false reads can be further reduced or virtually eliminated by using two images of the same security element from different angles and checking if both identifiers are part of the set of images that define that particular security element.

Alternatively or in addition, the spatial relationship of the various security elements with respect to each other can be used. Thus, if, for example, in the first security element (with a simulated set of available pictures A_1 ... A_N (6)) an incorrect picture is decoded, i.e. P_2, and in the neighboring second security element (with set 7: B_1 ... B_N) the correct image B_2 is decoded, it is clear from the model that one of the two must be falsely decoded. If the first region 3 is decoded into picture 5 from set 6: A_1 ... A_N, and the second region 4 is decoded into picture 5 from set 7: B1 ... B_N, it is safe to assume that these are two correct reads. Note that this geometric relationship built into the model can be particularly useful in minimizing the chance of false decoding when using images without error detection/correction capabilities.

Typically, for example, for standard 2D code formats, small codes such as 6x6 elements do not exist - simply because the risk of false decoding with such short payloads is usually too high to be used in practice. However, similarly to that described above, the present invention allows such small codes to be used with substantially error-free reading using the angular and/or spatial relationship of the images. This is made possible by improving decoding accuracy by using a priori knowledge available from a predefined sheet product model in a programmable device containing a camera. The advantage of using such small codes over more appropriately sized codes (e.g. 10x10 and above) is that security devices that must contain at least one security element can be made smaller and still decode almost error-free. .

In such an embodiment, namely when using the decoding of at least two security elements and using the model of the base material to confirm the correct decoding, it is practically impossible for a false decoding to occur.

Having a nearly error-free way to decode images, or rather determine an appropriate set of possible images, allows for two useful options:

- Security elements, characterized by their set of possible images, can act as identifiers (unique or nearly unique) referring to an absolute position in the base material. It is important to note that not all N pictures need to be decoded in order to determine the set of possible pictures and identify the corresponding security element. For example, it is sufficient if two images are decoded from different angles, and a set containing these two images can be determined from the available model of the sheet product. Considering the fact that the sets are structured such that no set can contain the same image pair as any other set, so the image pair is unique among all sets in the base material in this contemplated embodiment.

- Encoding in security elements does not require typical 2D code structures such as search patterns, frequency patterns, or any other segmentation/localization measures. The security elements can be placed next to each other in a tiled manner without any indication of where one security element ends and the next begins. High specificity (low false readings) allows the window to slide pixel by pixel over the currently displayed image. Each possible position is decoded. If it can be decoded (ie, an identifier can be extracted), then all possible sets containing this particular image/identifier are predetermined from the model. At the second stage, an image is decoded, either spatially different or from a different angle. In the case of a picture from a different angle (ie, from the second captured picture), the second decoded identifier is searched in all predetermined sets. All sets that do not contain this second image with this ID are no longer candidates. If these steps are performed multiple times, only one set will remain, which identifies the security element and at the same time allows the boundary of this security element to be determined for subsequent readings in other captured images. In the case of using a spatially different image, the same captured image can be used. Assuming the use of 6x6 codes: For each candidate position at which an identifier can be decoded, the firmware containing the camera is also configured to attempt to decode neighboring 6x6 areas. If any of these regions is decodable, then all possible sets for that region are determined, leaving us with the set of possible identifiable security elements. By using the spatial relationship of two observed security features with respect to each other and comparing it with respect to sets of identifiers with a predefined model, one can find a matching combination (e.g. a pair of adjacent sets) and again identify two adjacent security features as well as security feature boundaries - because they are arranged in a mosaic pattern. Naturally, if the code allows, unused bits can be set to a specific bit pattern that can be used to develop heuristics and speed up the process of finding decodable areas, ie positions and boundaries of security elements.

The present invention is in no way limited to relatively small image sizes, i. 6x6 pixels. The above identification strategies may not be necessary for large images because the error correction codes are specific enough to prevent false reads from starting at a certain size in the first place, i.e. Nr bits, and so on. For larger codes with greater capacity, additional strategies may not be required by using a priori knowledge from a predefined model to avoid incorrect decoding. In such a larger code situation, it is possible to encode the sheet product such that each identifier occurs exactly once or does not occur twice in a particular local environment, provided that pairs of adjacent codes are used to determine the position in the host material. Thus, due to the high specificity/virtually error-free decoding provided by codes with a sufficiently large capacity/size, and the fact that each identifier can be contained in at most one set of possible images, one successful decoding is sufficient to determine the boundaries of security elements, as well as to identify a specific security element (and therefore to determine the exact absolute position within the sheet product).

One of the main purposes of using programmable devices containing a camera with optically variable devices is to provide an automated way to check their presence and therefore authenticity. Without any additional hardware other than a camera, this is usually achieved with computer vision and a computer program configured to evaluate multiple images, i.e. video stream taken from different angles and/or under different lighting conditions. Alternatively, multiple simultaneously captured images from multiple cameras can be processed. The state of the art here is to evaluate color changes (zero/first order diffraction devices) or certain animation effects of images or shapes, switching contrasts, etc. Due to the uncontrolled environment, the trade-off between security and reliability/readability is significant, i.e. only moderate specificity can be achieved - hence safety. Typically, if a high level of security is required, the authentication process uses a second line of evaluation with forensic equipment or special reading equipment that evaluates the physical structure of the OVD instead of reflection characteristics.

At the same time, applications using standard hardware, such as firmware containing a camera, are often aimed at allowing untrained users to verify the identity of a security device, with the user expecting a convenient (and therefore secure) authentication process. Therefore, OVD, or even the presence of OVD, can at best be estimated. In the context of color change OVD, this means, for example, that accepting "any" color change is often a way to confirm at least the presence of an OVD. Confirmation of the presence of an OVD is often necessary in order to distinguish the three-dimensional OVD that forms the security device from its image/photocopy. More often than not, adverse changes in lighting or capture artifacts cause a larger change in terms of color change, blurring, etc. in a captured image of a printed copy of the OVD (“photocopy”) than the original OVD would have shown under adverse capture conditions of another kind, such as ambient light. Thus, the decision thresholds for detecting the presence or absence of an OVD (yes/no) often approach the point where, under certain conditions, a printed copy is mistaken for an OVD, while real OVDs are rejected due to the lack of significant variance (for example, has place only a slight color change) in the captured images.

Also the subject of the present invention is a method for very reliable confirmation of the presence of an optically variable device. When capturing at least two images from different angles/under different lighting conditions and decoding at least two images for the same security element, which should naturally be present in the set of possible images for that particular security element, in combination with error correction OVD is almost certainly present, since a photocopy or hard copy cannot exhibit this image switching behavior. In addition, code switching is corrected by marker coding, which means that if images change is observed, the chance for error can be neglected.

In FIG. 3a-c show a method for authenticating an object marking made from a base material 1 according to FIG. 2. In this example, the marking of the object contains a section of the base material 1, while the section is partially covered by a masking layer. The security elements 2 of the base material 1 are arranged in a mosaic pattern. Each code segment represented (shown) by guards is an array of (quadratic, single color) cells. The code segments represented by one security element are contiguous with the code segments represented by other security elements, so as a whole to form a larger array of (quadratic, single color) cells. The masking layer covers a limited area of the base material 1 that can be seen in an optoelectronic way. This area contains the first security element 3 and the second security element 4.

The method for authenticating this object marking comprises the following: capturing the first object marking image 12 at a first angle or at a first illumination direction. The first image 12 shown in FIG. 3a depicts the appearance of the optoelectronically recognizable limited area under first capture conditions (eg, at the first viewing angle). The method comprises: identifying the first sample code segment 13 shown by the putative first security element in the first image 12 (where "selective" means that it is a candidate for the first code segment). In order to identify the actual first code segment, the first sample code segment 13 is decoded to obtain the first sample data segment 15 . In more detail, in step a) in the first picture 12, the first sample cell 11 is identified. a predetermined position, to obtain the first sample segment 15 data. Based on this first sample data segment 15, in step c) it is determined from the model 16 storing the sets of data segments associated with the security elements of the base material 1 whether there is at least one set of data segments 6 containing said first sample data segment 15 ( i.e. data segment candidate). If such a set cannot be determined in step c), then the data segment candidate is discarded and steps a) to c) are repeated with other first sample cells until such a set is found in step c). For example, the next cell to the right of the first sample cell 11 can be identified as the new "first sample cell" and the above steps are repeated. This can be repeated until the number of steps corresponding to the given (known) width of the security elements in terms of cells (here the width is six cells) has been completed, after which the cell immediately below the original first sample cell 11 can be identified as a new one. "first sample cell", and repeat the above steps and so on. Once at least one set of data segments 6 is found that contains the first sample data segment 15 (ie, a data segment candidate), for example in FIG. 3a set A contains A_1, the current first sample code segment 13 is previously identified as the first code segment.

Without any particular sequence or order, the method also comprises capturing a second object marking image 17 under different capture conditions (eg, at a second angle and/or under a second illumination direction). This is shown in FIG. 3b. The second code segment shown by the first security element in the second image 17 is identified. In order to identify the second code segment, the second sample code segment 18 is decoded to obtain the second sample data segment 19. This can be done in the same way as for the first data segment. That is, in step e) in the second image 17, the first cell 11 is identified (usually randomly, for example, the cell closest to the upper left corner of the second image 17); step f) decoding the second sample code segment 18 in the second picture 17 formed by the first sample cell array 14 to obtain the second sample data segment 19; step g) determines from the model 16 whether at least one of the sets of the model 16 containing the first sample data segment 15 also contains the second sample data segment 19; if such a set cannot be determined in step g), step h) indicates a cycle, and that steps a) to g) are repeated until such a set 6 is found in step g). In effect, this means that the first sample code segment is discarded if no matching second sample code segment can be identified, so that both sample code segments are discarded by scanning different cell positions and boundaries until a valid combination of sample code segments is found. If, on the other hand, a set containing both sample data segments is found, in step m) the current second sample code segment 18 is identified as the second code segment. That is, the method determines from the model 16 storing the sets of data segments associated with the security elements of the base material 1 whether there is a data segment set containing the first sample data segment 15 and the second sample data segment 19. Only with a positive answer, i.e. if such a set of 6 data segments is part of the model 16, the marking of the object can be determined to be genuine.

In addition, as shown in FIG. 3c, the method comprises: identifying the third sample code segment shown by the intended second security element in the first image 12 (but the second image 17 or both may likewise be used). The identified third code segment is decoded to obtain a third sample data segment. Based on the decoded third sample data segment from the model, it is determined if there is a second security element located relative to the first security element (as identified by the first and second sample data segments) that is associated with the data segment set containing the third sample data segment. Therefore, the model 16 stores not only sets of data segments associated with the security elements of the base material, but also the relative positions of the security elements of the base material relative to each other. Thus, before validating the object marking, the method comprises the following: in step i) decoding the third sample code segment 20 formed by the second sample cell array 21 positioned relative to the first sample cell array 14 to obtain the third sample data segment 22, in step j) it is determined from the model 16 containing sets 6, 7 of data segments associated with the security elements 2 of the base material 1 and the position of the security elements 2 of the base material 1 relative to each other 23 whether the third sample data segment 22 is contained in the set 7 of data segments, which belong to the security element 4 appropriately positioned relative to the security element 3 to which the set previously identified by searching for the set with the first and second sample data segments belongs; if such a set cannot be determined, then return to step k) and repeat steps a) to j) until such a set is found; and after the set has been found, step n) identifies the current sample code segments 13, 18, 20 as valid code segments. Therefore, model 16 contains information about which sets of data segments are associated with adjacent security devices on base material 1.

To summarize, the method described above essentially scans (at least) two cell array images 12, 17, starting at an arbitrary cell and selecting a different cell at each step, until the data segments represented by the code segments offset from the given cell and their corresponding the location will not produce a match in model 16. If no such match is found, then the item's label is rejected (ie, authenticity cannot be verified).

Claims (50)

1. A method for authenticating the marking (9) of objects containing a limited area of the base material (1), distinguishable by optoelectronic means, wherein the base material contains: the first security element (3) and at least the second security element (4), wherein each security element (3, 4) is associated with a set of data segments, and each security element (3, 4) depending on the capture conditions shows a segment (5 ) code, which is an optoelectronic readable representation of one of the data segments of the set associated with the corresponding security element (3, 4), wherein different individual data segments are represented by different code segments (5), and the set associated with the first security element (3) differs by at least one data segment from the set associated with the second security element (4); moreover, the specified limited area, distinguishable by optoelectronic means, contains the first protective element (3) and at least the second protective element (4), the method comprises the steps of: capturing the first image (12) of marking (9) of the object at the first angle (10) or at the first lighting direction; identifying in the first image (12) the first code segment shown by the first security element (3); decoding the first code segment to obtain the first data segment; capturing a second image (17) of the object marking (9) at a second viewing angle (10) different from the first viewing angle (10) and/or with a second illumination direction different from the first illumination direction; identifying in the second image (17) the second code segment shown by the first security element (3); decoding the second code segment to obtain a second data segment; determined from the model (16) storing sets (6, 7) of data segments associated with the protective elements (3, 4) of the base material (1) and storing the relative positions of the protective elements (3, 4) of the base material (1) , relative to each other, whether there is a set of data segments containing the specified first data segment and the second data segment; identifying on the first image (12) or on the second image (17) the third code segment shown by the second security element (4); decoding the third code segment to obtain a third data segment; determine from the model (16) storing sets of data segments associated with the protective elements (2) of the base material (1), and storing the relative positions of the protective elements (2) of the base material (1), relative to each other, whether the second protective an element (4) positioned relative to the first security element (3), with a set of data segments containing a third data segment. 2. The method according to claim 1, in which each security element (3, 4), depending on the viewing angle (10) and/or on the illumination direction, shows a code segment (5), which is an optoelectronic readable representation of one of the segments set data associated with the respective security element (3, 4). 3. The method according to claim. 1 or 2, in which the security elements (2) of the base material (1), the area of which contains the marking (9) of the object, are arranged in a mosaic manner, and each segment (5) of the code shown by the security elements (2 ) is a cell array, and the code segments (5) shown by one security element immediately follow the code segments shown by other security elements so that a larger cell array is formed, the method also comprising the steps of: a) in the first image, the first sample cell (11) is identified; b) decoding the first sample segment (13) of the code in the first image (12) formed by the first sample cell array including said first sample cell (11) at a predetermined position to obtain the first sample segment (15) of data; c) determining from the model (16) storing sets of data segments associated with the security elements (2) of the base material (1) whether there is at least one set of data segments containing said first sample data segment (15); d) if such a set cannot be determined in step c), then repeat steps a) to c) with other first sample cells until such a set is found in step c); And l) identifying the current first selective code segment (13) as the first code segment. 4. The method according to p. 3, characterized in that before step l) contains steps in which: e) identifying the first sample cell (11) in the second image (17); f) decoding the second sample segment (18) of the code in the second picture (17) formed by the first sample cell array to obtain the second sample segment (19) of data; g) determining from the model (16) storing the sets of data segments associated with the protective elements (2) of the base material (1) whether the second sample data segment (19) is contained in at least one of said at least one set, containing the first sample segment (15) data; h) if such a set cannot be determined in step g), then repeat steps a) to g) until such a set is found in step g); And m) identifying the current second sample code segment as the second code segment. 5. The method according to claim 3 or 4, characterized in that up to step l) and preferably up to step m) comprises the steps in which: i) decoding a third sample segment (20) of code formed by a second sample cell array positioned relative to the first sample cell array to obtain a third sample segment (22) of data; j) determine from the model (16) storing the sets of data segments associated with the security elements (2) of the base material (1) and storing the positions of the security elements (2) of the base material (1) relative to each other, whether the third sample is contained a data segment (22) in the set of data segments that belongs to the security element appropriately positioned relative to the security element that owns the set previously identified in step e); k) if such a set cannot be determined in step j), then repeat steps a) to d) and steps i) to j) and preferably steps e) to h) until such a set is found in step j ); n) identifying the current third sample code segment as the third code segment. 6. A method for manufacturing marking (9) of objects, comprising the steps of randomly, pseudo-randomly or deterministically selecting the area of the base material (1), while the base material contains: the first security element (3) and at least the second security element (4), wherein each security element (3, 4) is associated with a set of data segments, and each security element (3, 4) depending on the capture conditions shows a segment (5 ) a code which is an optoelectronic readable representation of one of the data segments of the set associated with the respective security element (3, 4), wherein the set of data segments associated with the first security element (3) includes the first data segment associated with the first code segment (5), which shows the first security element (3) depending on the capture conditions, and the second data segment associated with the second code segment that shows the first security element (3) depending on the capture conditions, and the set of data segments associated with the second security element (4) includes a third data segment associated with the third code segment (5) that shows the second security element (4) depending on the capture conditions, moreover, different individual data segments are represented by different code segments (5), and the set associated with the first security element (3) differs by at least one data segment from the specified set associated with at least the second security element (4); wherein the selected area contains the first protective element (3) and at least the second protective element (4), delimiting the selected area, distinguishable by optoelectronic means, from the unselected part of the base material (1), while the specified delimited, distinguishable by optoelectronic means, the selected area constitutes the marking (9) of the object, and save sets of data segments associated with the protective elements (3, 4) of the base material (1), and save the relative positions of the protective elements (3, 4) of the base material (1), relative to each other, in the model, so that to it can be addressed during the verification of the marking (9) of the object using a programmable device. 7. The method according to claim 6, in which the base material contains a sufficient number of security elements (3, 4) to obtain at least two markings (9) of the object. 8. The method according to claim 6 or 7, wherein the base material contains a two-dimensional array of security elements (3, 4), the size of the array is at least 5×5. 9. The method according to any one of paragraphs. 6, 7, in which the base material contains repeating sequences of security elements (3, 4), and the repetition period is greater than the dimensions of one marking (9) of the object. 10. The method according to any one of paragraphs. 6-9, in which the region of the base material (1) is chosen randomly or pseudo-randomly. 11. The method according to any one of paragraphs. 6-10, in which each protective element (3, 4) of the base material (1), depending on the viewing angle (10) and/or on the direction of illumination, shows a segment (5) of the code, which is a representation read by optoelectronic means , one of the data segments of the set associated with the corresponding security element (3, 4). 12. A method according to any of the preceding claims, wherein each code segment that is read by optoelectronic means represents a data segment (6, 7) in a set of data segments (6, 7) associated with each security element (3, 4), and is shown by said protective element (3, 4) under at least one specific gripping condition. 13. A method according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein each code segment (5) represents a corresponding data segment in a predefined code, the predefined code preferably containing error detection or error correction information. 14. The method according to claim 13, wherein the predetermined code allows the maximum number of possible individual data segments, and the number of individual data segments in the data segment sets of all security elements is less than 1/100, preferably less than 1/1000, more preferably less than 1/10000 from the maximum possible number of individual data segments.

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