RU2787082C2 - Systems and methods for improvement of detection of echo signal in optical ranging and detection system - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: measuring equipment.

SUBSTANCE: present disclosure relates, in general, to systems and methods for light transmission and reception and, in particular, to improvement of the safety of systems for light transmission and reception by means of use of unique and identifiable light pulse sequences to prevent substitution of reflected light detected by the system (systems). The system contains a transmitter and a receiver. The first pulse sequence can be encoded using a signature protecting from substitution and transmitted in a laser beam. An echo signal containing the second pulse sequence can be received by the receiver, and the signature protecting from substitution is extracted from the second pulse sequence. If, based on the extraction, the first and the second pulse sequences match, the receiver outputs data of the echo signal. If, based on extraction, the first and the second pulse sequences do not match, the echo signal is ignored. The system can dynamically change the signature protecting from substitution for subsequent pulse sequences. In addition, an element of chance relatively to the previous pulse sequence can be introduced into the first pulse sequence.

EFFECT: improvement of detection of an echo signal in a light detection and ranging system, including weakening an effect of a substitution attack.

19 cl, 11 dwg

Description

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED PATENT APPLICATION

[0001] This patent application claims priority under U.S. Joint Patent Application No. 15/835,983 (Ac. No. 20151-2163), filed December 8, 2017, titled “SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR IMPROVING ECHO DETECTION IN A LIGHT RANGING AND "SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR IMPROVING DETECTION OF A RETURN SIGNAL IN A LIGHT RANGING AND DETECTION SYSTEM" by David Hall and Anand Gopalan, the contents of which are incorporated herein by reference in their entirety and in all respects.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

A. Technical field

[0002] The present disclosure relates generally to systems and methods for transmitting and receiving light, and in particular to improving the security of light transmitting and receiving systems through the use of unique and identifiable light pulse sequences to prevent spoofing reflected light detected by the system(s) .

B. State of the art

[0003] Light detection and ranging systems, such as the LIDAR system, operate by transmitting a sequence of light pulses that reflect off objects. The return signal or return echo is received by the light detection and ranging system, and based on the detected time of flight (TOF), the system determines the distance (range) at which the system is located from the object. Light detection and ranging systems can have a wide range of applications, including autonomous driving and aerial photography of the surface. These applications can place a high priority on safety, accuracy and reliability. If the other side intentionally or unintentionally distorts the laser beam or echo, accuracy and reliability may be adversely affected. One form of violation can be a spoofing attack, where a malicious party distorts or mimics the characteristics of an echo signal.

[0004] Accordingly, systems and methods are needed to improve echo detection in a light detection and ranging system, including mitigating the effect of spoofing.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0005] Reference will be made to embodiments of the invention, examples of which may be illustrated in the accompanying drawings. These drawings are intended to be illustrative and not limiting. Although the invention is generally described in the context of these embodiments, it should be understood that it is not intended to limit the scope of the invention to these specific embodiments. The scale of the elements in the figures is not respected.

[0006] FIG. 1 depicts the operation of a light detection and ranging system in accordance with embodiments of the present document.

[0007] FIG. 2 illustrates the operation of a light detection and ranging system and multiple light echoes in accordance with embodiments of the present document.

[0008] FIG. 3A depicts a rotating mirror LIDAR system in accordance with embodiments of this document.

[0009] FIG. 3B depicts a LIDAR system with rotating electronics in a rotor-shaft structure comprising a rotor and a shaft, in accordance with embodiments of this document.

[0010] Each of FIGS. 4A, 4B and 4C depict an anti-spoof signature in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure.

[0011] FIG. 5 depicts a system for mitigating echo spoofing in a light detection and ranging system in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure.

[0012] FIG. 6A and 6B are flowcharts for mitigating echo spoofing in a light detection and ranging system in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure.

[0013] FIG. 7 depicts a simplified block diagram of a computing device/information processing system in accordance with embodiments of this document.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EMBODIMENTS

[0014] In the following description, for purposes of explanation, specific details are set forth in order to provide an understanding of the invention. However, the person skilled in the art will be obvious that the invention can be carried out without these details. In addition, one skilled in the art will appreciate that the embodiments of the present invention described below may be implemented in various ways, for example, as a process, apparatus, system, apparatus, or method on a tangible computer-readable medium.

[0015] The components or modules shown in the diagrams are examples of exemplary embodiments of the invention and are intended to avoid obscuring the invention. It should also be understood in the course of the current discussion that components may be described as separate functional units that may contain child units, but those skilled in the art will recognize that various components, or portions thereof, may be separated into separate components or may be combined together, in including integrated into a single system or component. It should be noted that the functions or operations discussed herein may be implemented as components. Components may be implemented in software, hardware, or a combination thereof.

[0016] In addition, connections between components or systems in the figures are not meant to be limited to direct connections. Instead, the data between these components can be modified, reformatted, or otherwise changed by intermediate components. In addition, additional connections or fewer connections may be used. It should also be noted that the terms "attached", "connected", or "communicatively connected" are intended to encompass direct connections, indirect connections through one or more intermediate devices, and wireless connections.

[0017] Reference in the description to "one embodiment", "preferred embodiment", "an embodiment", or "embodiments" means that a particular feature, structure, characteristic, or function described in connection with an embodiment is included at least in at least one embodiment of the invention and may be present in more than one embodiment. In addition, the occurrences of the phrases mentioned above in various places in the description do not necessarily all refer to the same embodiment or embodiments.

[0018] The use of certain terms in various places in the description is for illustrative purposes and should not be construed as limiting. A service, function, or resource is not limited to a single service, function, or resource; the use of these terms may refer to a group of related services, functions, or resources that may be distributed or combined.

[0019] The terms "comprises", "including", "comprises", and "comprising" are to be construed as open terms, and any following listings are examples and are not intended to be limiting to the items listed. Any headings used herein are for organizational purposes only and should not be used to limit the scope of the description or claims. Every reference mentioned in this patent document is incorporated herein in its entirety.

[0020] In addition, one skilled in the art will recognize that: (1) some of the steps may be optional; (2) steps cannot be limited to the specific order set forth herein; (3) some steps may be performed in a different order; and (4) some of the steps can be performed simultaneously.

A. Light detection and ranging system

[0021] A light detection and ranging system, such as a LIDAR system, may be a tool for measuring the shape and contours of the system's environment. LIDAR systems can have numerous applications, including autonomous navigation and aerial photography of the surface. LIDAR systems emit a pulse of light, which is then reflected from an object in the environment in which the system operates. The time it takes for each pulse to travel from when it is emitted to when it is received can be measured (i.e., "TOF" time of flight) to determine the distance between the object and the LIDAR system. Science is based on the physics of light and optics.

[0022] In a LIDAR system, light may be emitted from a laser with frequent beam emission. Laser light travels through the medium and reflects off points of objects in the environment such as buildings, tree branches, and vehicles. The reflected light energy is returned to the LIDAR receiver (detector), where it is recorded and used to map the environment.

[0023] FIG. 1 depicts operation 100 of optical detection and ranging components 102 and data analysis and interpretation system 109 in accordance with embodiments of this document. Optical detection and ranging components 102 may include a transmitter 104 that transmits an emitted light signal 110, a receiver 106 containing a detector, and a control and data acquisition system 108. The emitted light signal 110 propagates through the medium and reflects off the object 112. The light echo 114 propagates through the medium and is received by the receiver 106. The control and data acquisition system 108 may control the light emission through the transmitter 104 and the data acquisition may register the light echo 114 detected by the receiver 106. The data analysis and interpretation system 109 may receive output data via connection 116 from the control and data acquisition system 108 and perform data analysis functions. Connection 116 may be implemented with a wireless or contactless communication method. Transmitter 104 and receiver 106 may include an optical lens and mirrors (not shown). The transmitter 104 may emit a laser beam having a plurality of pulses in a particular sequence.

In some embodiments, the detection and ranging optical components 102 and the data analysis and interpretation system 109 comprise a LIDAR system.

[0024] FIG. 2 illustrates an operation 200 of an optical detection and ranging system 202 including a plurality of light echoes: (1) an echo 203 and (2) an echo 205, in accordance with embodiments of the present document. The optical detection and ranging system 202 may be a LIDAR system. Due to the divergence of the laser beam, a single laser emitting frequent pulses hits (directs radiation) into many objects, producing several reflections. The detection and ranging optical system 202 may analyze multiple reflections and may report either the strongest reflection, the last reflection, or both reflections. In FIG. 2, the optical detection and ranging system 202 provides laser radiation in the direction of the near wall 204 (walls at close range) and the far wall 208 (walls at far distance). As illustrated, most of the beam hits wall 204 at close range in region 206, resulting in echo 203, and the other part of the beam hits wall 208 at far distance in region 210, resulting in echo 205. signal 203 may have a shorter TOF and stronger received signal strength than echo 205. Light detection and ranging system 202 can detect both reflections only if the distance between two objects is greater than the minimum distance. For both single-bounce and multiple-bounce LIDAR systems, it is important for accurate TOF time-of-flight calculations that the echo be accurately associated with the transmitted light signal.

[0025] Some embodiments of a LIDAR system may collect distance data using a two-dimensional point cloud method (ie, in one plane). These LIDAR systems can often be used in industrial applications and can often be repurposed for inspection, mapping, autonomous navigation, and other uses. Some embodiments of these devices rely on the use of a single emitter/detector laser pair combined with some type of moving mirror to scan within at least one plane. This mirror not only reflects the emitted light from the diode, but can also reflect the light echo to the detector. The use of a rotating mirror in this application may be a means to achieve 90-180-360 degrees of azimuth viewing, simplifying both system design and manufacturability.

[0026] FIG. 3 depicts a rotating mirror LIDAR system 300 in accordance with embodiments of the present document. The 300 LIDAR system uses a single laser emitter/detector combined with a rotating mirror to perform efficient in-plane scanning. The distance measurements performed by such a system are essentially two-dimensional (ie, in a plane) and the captured distance points are reproduced as a two-dimensional point cloud (ie, a single plane). In some embodiments, but not limited to, the rotating mirrors rotate at very fast speeds, such as thousands of revolutions per minute. A rotating mirror may also be referred to as a spinning mirror.

[0027] The LIDAR system 300 includes a laser electronics assembly 302 (laser electronics) that includes a single light emitter and light detector. The emitted laser signal 301 may be directed to a fixed mirror 304, which reflects the emitted laser signal 301 onto a rotating mirror 306. As the rotating mirror 306 "spins", the emitted laser signal 301 may reflect off an object 308 along its propagation path. The reflected signal 303 can be applied to the detector in the laser electronics 302 via the rotating mirror 306 and the fixed mirror 304.

[0028] FIG. 3B depicts a LIDAR system 350 with rotating electronics in a rotor-shaft structure comprising a rotor 351 and a shaft 361, in accordance with embodiments of the present document. The rotor 351 may be cylindrical in shape and include a cylindrical hole in the center of the rotor 351. The shaft 361 may be placed in the cylindrical hole. As illustrated, a rotor 351 rotates around a shaft 361. These components may be included in a LIDAR system. Rotor 351 may include rotor components 352 and shaft 361 may include shaft components 366. Rotor components 352 include an upper printed circuit board (PCB), and shaft components 366 include a lower printed circuit board (PCB). In some embodiments, the rotor components 352 may include optical detection and ranging components 102, and the shaft components 366 may include the data analysis and interpretation system 109 shown in FIG. 1.

[0029] Ring 356 and ring 358 are attached to rotor components 352 via connections 354. Ring 356 and ring 358 are annular strips located on the inner surface of rotor 351 and provide electrode plate functionality for one side of the air gap capacitor. Attached to the shaft components 366 are ring 360 and ring 362 through joints 364. Ring 360 and ring 362 are annular strips located on the outer surface of shaft 361 and provide electrode plate functionality for the other side of the air gap capacitor. Capacitor C1 can be created from the space between ring 356 and ring 360. Another capacitor C2 can be created from the space between ring 358 and ring 362. The capacitance for the capacitors mentioned above can be partly determined by the air gap 368.

[0030] Ring 356 and ring 360 are components of the electrode plate of capacitor C1, and ring 358 and ring 362 are components of the electrode plate of capacitor C2. The vertical gap 370 between ring 356 and ring 358 can affect the performance of the capacitive coupling between capacitor C1 and capacitor C2 because the value of vertical gap 370 can determine the level of interference between the two capacitors. One skilled in the art will appreciate that each of rotor 351 and shaft 361 may each contain N rings, which may support N capacitive couplings.

[0031] As noted earlier, time-of-flight, or TOF, is the method that the LIDAR system uses to map the environment and provides a robust and proven technique used to detect targets. Simultaneously, as the lasers emit beams, the firmware in the LIDAR system can analyze and measure the received data. The optical receiving lens in the LIDAR system acts like a telescope, collecting fragments of light photons returning from the environment. The more lasers used in the system, the more information about the environment can be collected. Single laser LIDAR systems may be at a disadvantage compared to multiple laser systems because fewer photons can be extracted and thus less information is collected. Some embodiments of, but not limited to, LIDAR systems have been implemented with 8, 16, 32, and 64 lasers. In addition, some embodiments of LIDAR, but without limitation, may have a vertical field of view (FOV) of 30-40° with a laser beam spacing of 0.3°, and may have rotation speeds of 5-20 revolutions per second.

[0032] Rotating mirror functionality can also be implemented using solid state technology such as MEMS.

B. Echo Spoofing Protection

[0033] One goal of the embodiments of this document is to provide a tamper-resistant optical detection and ranging system. In the context of this document, a light detection and ranging system may be, but is not limited to, a LIDAR system.

[0034] A tamper-proof LIDAR system may have the ability to analyze an echo containing a pulse train and compare the received pulse train with the transmitted pulse train to distinguish it from other fake pulses. In the context of this document, an echo containing a train of pulses may be equivalent to a multiple echo or a single echo.

[0035] The tamper-proof system may be based on tamper-proof signatures. The tamper-proof signature can uniquely identify a valid reflected light signal. The tamper-proof signature can be encoded or embedded in pulses that are then emitted by the LIDAR system. When the LIDAR system receives an echo, the LIDAR system can extract the anti-spoof signature from the single or multiple echo and determine if the received echo's decoded pulses match those transmitted in the laser beam. If the pulses do match, the echo can be considered valid and data can be decoded from the echo pulses. If the pulses do not match, the echo can be considered a fake signal and the echo can be discarded. Indeed, the system authenticates or validates the echo using the characteristics of the transmitted pulses, which contain an embedded anti-tampering signature. The system can identify intentional or unintentional spoof echoes that may erroneously trigger a spoof echo calculation. Thus, the LIDAR system can distinguish transmitted pulses from fake pulses. In addition, the system may include two features to mitigate the effect of echo spoofing.

[0036] First, the LIDAR system can dynamically change the characteristics of the pulses for the next or subsequent emission of the laser beam. As discussed earlier, the characteristics of the pulses can be determined by the signature tamper-proof. This feature allows the LIDAR system to respond to fake pulse spoof attacks. A malicious party can monitor the transmitted laser beam or echoes to spoof the LIDAR system. With a static rather than a dynamic operation for a tamper-resistant signature, a malicious party can easily be able to tamper with the LIDAR system.

[0037] The LIDAR system can also dynamically change the signature for the next beam emission when the transmitted pulse sequences match the pulse echo sequences. As noted, by dynamically changing the tamper-proof signature for the next laser beam emission, the potential for intentional or unintentional tampering can be reduced. Typically, the time of flight (TOF) of a laser beam sent to an object and reflected back to a LIDAR system is on the order of 0.5-2 microseconds. In this time period, the LIDAR system can analyze the echo and decide whether to change the signature for the next laser beam emission.

[0038] In various embodiments, the LIDAR system can also dynamically change the transmitted pulse train that contains the anti-spoof signature, as well as adapt the pulse train to the environment in which it operates. For example, if the LIDAR system is used in an autonomous navigation system, weather conditions and/or traffic may affect the propagation of light signals. In this embodiment, the LIDAR system can tailor the pattern of light pulses, not only to uniquely identify it to the receiver, but also to improve system performance based on the environment in which it operates.

[0039] Second, to add another safety element, the LIDAR system can randomly change the transmitted pulses. Random coding may be initiated by an instruction from the controller. This feature can be useful for mitigating unintentional echoes. Unintentional echoes may increase with the growth of autonomous driving based on LIDAR systems.

[0040] The tamper-resistant signatures can be based on, but are not limited to, the number of pulses, the spacing between pulses, the amplitude and amplitude ratio of the pulses, and the shape of the pulses. As an example of one anti-spoof signature, the number of pulses in two beam emitting sequences may comprise X pulses in the first sequence and Y pulses in the second sequence, where X is not equal to Y.

[0041] Each of FIG. 4A, 4B, and 4C depict a tamper-proof signature 400 in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure. In these figures, A represents the amplitude of the pulses and di represents the distance on the time scale T. FIG. 4A illustrates a sequence of four pulses in which the variation in the spacing between each pulse can determine the anti-spoof signature. For example, the distance between pulse P1 and pulse P2 may be d1. The distance between pulse P2 and pulse P3 may be d2. The distance between pulse P3 and pulse P4 may be d3. As illustrated, d1>d3>d2.

[0042] FIG. 4B illustrates a three-pulse sequence in which amplitude variation can define a tamper-resistant signature. For example, pulse P5 may have amplitude a2. The pulse P6 may have an amplitude a4. The pulse P7 may have amplitude a3. As illustrated, a4>a3>a2. The signature may be based on a fixed ratio for pulse amplitudes and/or the signature may be based on variable ratios between pulses and/or the signature may be based on absolute amplitudes given by a predefined or dynamic threshold.

[0043] FIG. 4C illustrates a three-pulse sequence in which a variation in pulse shapes can define a tamper-resistant signature. In the embodiment of FIG. 4C, the pulse shape variation may be a pulse width variation. For example, pulse P8 may have a pulse width of d4. The P9 pulse may have a pulse width of d5. The P10 pulse may have a pulse width of d6, as illustrated by d5>d6>d4.

[0044] One skilled in the art will appreciate that spoofing signatures may vary based on the application and environment in which embodiments of the invention are implemented, and all of these are intended to be within the scope of the invention. Signatures that protect against substitution may be used alone or in combination. The detection of anti-spoof signatures can be implemented with fixed or variable thresholds.

[0045] FIG. 5 depicts a system 500 for mitigating echo spoofing in a light ranging and detection system in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure. In the context of this document, a "protective signature" may be referred to as a "signature". As discussed earlier, the anti-spoof signature may be based on characteristics of the pulses, such as variations in the number of pulses in two or more pulse trains, variations in pulse spacing, variations in pulse amplitude ratios, or variations in pulse width.

[0046] The signature extraction module 524 may send a signal that specifies a signature to be embedded in the pulse train to the anti-spoof encoder 506 and the controller 504. Based on the predetermined signature, the anti-spoof encoder 506 may generate a signature encoding signal 507 that contains a signature embedded pulse train to be emitted by laser 514. To create an element of randomness in the pulse trains, random encoder 508 (based on instructions from controller 504) can randomly adjust the current pulse train relative to the previous pulse train. The random encoder 508 is configured to introduce randomness into the characteristics of the transmitted laser beam pulse trains relative to the previous transmitted pulse train. The controller 504 may initiate a random adjustment of the current pulse train even if no spoofing attack has been identified. The signature extraction module 524 may provide the controller 504 with status for a tamper-proof operation.

[0047] The signature encoding signal 507 may be applied to a multiplexer 510. In turn, the multiplexer 510 combines the randomized signal 509 from the random encoder 508 and the signature encoding signal 507 from the anti-spoof encoder 506. The output of multiplexer 510 may be provided to transmitter 512, which may be coupled to laser 514. Upon receiving a pulse train from transmitter 512, laser 514 emits a laser beam 516 that includes a signature embedded pulse train.

[0048] Light echo 518 may be generated by reflection from an object by laser beam 516 and may be received by photodetector 520. Alternatively, light echo 518 may be a spoofed echo generated by another light transmitter. The spoofed echo may be an intentional or unintentional echo.

[0049] The photodetector 520 converts the signal from the optical domain to the electrical domain and provides echo information to the receiver 522. The receiver 522 may provide a digitized form of the echo signal information to the signature extractor 524 or an analog signal based on predetermined characteristics of the photodetector. The signature extraction module 524 processes the echo information and extracts the signature to confirm the authenticity or validity of the echo. If the characteristics of the echo pulse train match those of the transmitted pulse train, then the multiple echo can be considered genuine. The signature extractor may proceed to issue output 526. The signature extractor may also proceed to issue an alarm 528, which may be applied to a higher level controller.

[0050] If the characteristics of the echo sequence do not match the characteristics of the transmitted pulse sequence, then the echo signal can be considered not authentic. In response, the signature extractor 524 may dynamically direct the anti-spoof encoder 506 to select a different signature for the next laser beam emission. In other words, the signature extractor 524 can dynamically change the anti-spoof signature for the next pulse train to be transmitted relative to the previous transmitted pulse train. The threshold for determining pulse matching may be predetermined or dynamically adjusted based on variation in operating parameters.

[0051] The controller 504 receives environmental conditions 502, which may include information about weather conditions, traffic conditions, inspection/calibration/manufacturing conditions. Based on environmental conditions 502 and instructions from signature extractor 524, controller 504 may provide instructions for operating random encoder 508 and multiplexer 510.

[0052] FIG. 6A and 6B depict flowcharts 600 and 650 of steps for mitigating the effects of echo spoofing in a light ranging and detection system in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure. The method comprises the following steps in a light ranging and detection system.

[0053] Selecting an anti-spoof signature (step 602),

[0054] Encoding the Pulse Train with a Spoofing Signature (Step 606),

[0055] Activate random coding algorithm (step 604) (optional),

[0056] Modify the pulse train based on a random coding algorithm, if enabled (block 608),

[0057] Emission of a laser beam containing a modified pulse train (step 609),

[0058] In an object: generating a reliable multiple echo when the laser beam is reflected from the object (step 610),

[0059] Or in another light transmitter: fake multiple echo generation (step 611),

[0060] Receiving and decoding a received signal that contains a valid multiple echo or a fake multiple echo (block 612),

[0061] Extracting the anti-spoof signature from the received signal (block 614),

[0062] Determining whether the characteristics of the pulses in the received signal match the characteristics of the pulses in the transmitted pulse trains? (step 616)

[0063] If yes, generate output data (block 618),

[0064] If not, generate an alarm (step 617) and repeat step 602.

[0065] Embodiments of the present document may include a system comprising a signature extraction module configured to select an anti-spoof signature; a tamper-proof encoder configured to embed a tamper-proof signature in the transmitted laser beam comprising the pulse train; controller; and a decoder configured to decode the echo signal. The signature extraction module extracts the anti-spoof signature from the decoded echo and determines whether the characteristics of the decoded echo match those of the transmitted laser beam pulse trains. If the decoded echo matches the characteristics of the transmitted laser beam, the signature extractor validates the decoded echo and outputs the decoded echo data. If the decoded echo does not match the characteristics of the transmitted laser beam, the signature extraction module invalidates the decoded echo, ignores the decoded echo, and generates an alarm. For the next sequence of pulses to be transmitted, the signature extraction module dynamically changes the anti-spoof signature.

[0066] The system further comprises a random encoder configured to impart an element of randomness to the characteristics of the transmitted laser beam pulse trains relative to a preceding transmitted pulse train. The controller receives environmental conditions that determine the characteristics for the pulse train of the transmitted laser beam. The tamper-proof signature changes dynamically based on environmental conditions. The tamper-proof signature changes dynamically based on environmental conditions. The characteristics for the pulse trains of the transmitted laser beam are given an element of randomness based on environmental conditions. Ambient conditions include weather conditions, traffic congestion, or inspection/calibration/manufacturing conditions, anti-tampering signature based on pulse characteristics such as variations in the number of pulses in two or more pulse trains, variations in pulse spacing, variations in pulse amplitude ratios, or variations in pulse widths .

C. In system embodiments

[0067] In embodiments, aspects of this patent document may be directed to or implemented on information processing/computing systems. For the purposes of this disclosure, a computing system may include any tool or set of tools configured to count, calculate, determine, classify, process, transmit, receive, retrieve, create, route, switch, store, display, report, display, detect , record, reproduce, manipulate or use any form of information, knowledge or data for commercial, scientific, managerial or other purposes. For example, the computing system may be a light measurement system such as a LIDAR system that uses time of flight to map objects in its environment. A computing system may include a random access memory (RAM; RAM), one or more processing resources such as a central processing unit (CPU) or hardware or software control logic, a read only memory (ROM; ROM), and/or other types of memory. Additional computing system components may include one or more network or wireless ports for communication with external devices, as well as various input and output (I/O) devices such as a keyboard, mouse, touch screen, and/or video display. The computing system may also include one or more buses configured to communicate between various hardware components.

[0068] FIG. 7 depicts a simplified block diagram of a computing device/information processing system (or computing system) in accordance with embodiments of the present disclosure. It should be understood that the functionality shown for system 700 may be configured to support various embodiments of the information processing system - although it should be understood that the information processing system may be configured differently and include different components.

[0069] As illustrated in FIG. 7, system 700 includes one or more central processing units (CPUs) 701 that provide computing resources and control a computer. The central processing unit 701 may be implemented with a microprocessor or the like, and may also include one or more graphics processing units (GPUs) 717 and/or a floating point co-processor for mathematical calculations. System 700 may also include system memory 702, which may be in the form of random access memory (RAM; RAM), read only memory (ROM; ROM), or both.

[0070] Multiple controllers and peripherals may also be provided, as shown in FIG. 7. An input controller 703 provides an interface to various input devices 704 such as a keyboard, mouse, or stylus. There may also be a wireless controller 705 that communicates with a wireless device 706. System 700 may also include a storage controller 707 for interface with one or more storage devices 708, each of which includes a storage medium such as flash memory. or an optical medium that may be used to record programs of instructions for operating systems, utilities, and applications, which may include embodiments of programs that implement various aspects of the present invention. The storage device(s) 708 may also be used to store processed data or data to be processed in accordance with the invention. System 700 may also include a display controller 708 for providing an interface to display device 711. Computing system 700 may also include a vehicle signal controller 712 for communicating with vehicle system 713. Communications controller 714 may interface with one or more communication devices 715 that allow system 700 to communicate with remote devices over any of a variety of networks, including vehicle networks. network, Internet, cloud resource (such as Ethernet cloud, optical link over Ethernet (FCoE) / data center bridge (DCB) cloud, etc.), local area network (LAN), wide area network (WAN), storage area network (SAN) or through any suitable electromagnetic carrier signals, including infrared signals.

[0071] In the illustrated system, all major system components may be connected to bus 716, which may represent more than one physical bus. However, the various system components may or may not be in physical proximity to each other. For example, inputs and/or outputs may be remotely transmitted from one physical location to another. In addition, programs that implement various aspects of this invention can be accessed from a remote location (eg, a server) over a network. Such data and/or programs may be transferred over any variety of computer-readable media, including, but not limited to: magnetic media such as hard disks, floppy disks, and magnetic tape; optical media such as read-only CD-ROMs and holographic devices; magneto-optical media; and devices that are specifically configured to store or store and execute program code, such as application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), programmable logic devices (PLDs), flash memory devices, random access memory (RAM) and read only memory (ROM). ROM).

[0072] Embodiments of the present invention may be encoded on one or more machine-readable non-volatile storage media with instructions to one or more processors or processing units to cause steps to be performed. It should be noted that one or more machine-readable non-volatile storage media must include volatile and non-volatile memory. It should be noted that alternative implementations are possible, including a hardware implementation or a firmware implementation. The functions implemented in hardware may be implemented using an application specific integrated circuit(s) (ASIC), a programmable matrix, a digital signal processing circuit, and the like. Accordingly, the term "means" in any claim encompasses both software and hardware implementations. Similarly, the term "computer-readable medium or media" as used herein includes software and/or hardware having a program of instructions embodied thereon, or a combination thereof. With these alternative implementations in mind, it should be understood that the drawings and the accompanying description provide functional information that would be required by a person skilled in the art to write program code (i.e., software) and/or make circuits (i.e., hardware) to perform the required processing.

[0073] It should be noted that embodiments of the present invention may also relate to computer products with tangible machine-readable non-volatile storage media that have computer code recorded thereon for performing various computer-implemented operations. The media and computer code may be specially designed and constructed for the purposes of the present invention, or they may be in a form known or available to those skilled in the art. Examples of tangible computer-readable media include, but are not limited to: magnetic media such as hard disks, floppy disks, and magnetic tape; optical media such as read-only CD-ROMs and holographic devices; magneto-optical media; and devices that are specifically configured to store or store and execute program code, such as application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), programmable logic devices (PLDs), flash memory devices, random access memory (RAM) and read only memory (ROM). ROM). Examples of computer code include machine code, such as that produced by a compiler, and files containing high-level code that is executed by a computer using an interpreter. Embodiments of the present invention may be implemented in whole or in part as machine executable instructions, which may reside in program modules that are executed by a processing device. Examples of program modules include libraries, programs, routines, objects, components, and data structures. In distributed computing environments, program modules may be physically located in locations that are local, remote, or both.

[0074] One skilled in the art will recognize that neither the computer system nor the programming language is critical to the practice of the present invention. The person skilled in the art will also recognize that many of the elements described above may be physically and/or functionally divided into submodules or combined together.

[0075] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the previous examples and embodiments are illustrative and do not limit the scope of the present disclosure. All permutations, improvements, equivalents, combinations and improvements thereto that are apparent to those skilled in the art upon reading the description and studying the drawings are intended to be included within the spirit and scope of the present disclosure. It should also be noted that the elements of any claim may be arranged differently, including having multiple dependencies, configurations, and combinations.

Claims (33)

1. Light system for measuring and detecting range, containing: a signature extraction module, configured to select an anti-spoof signature; a tamper-proof encoder configured to embed a tamper-proof signature in the transmitted laser beam comprising the pulse train; controller; and a decoder configured to decode the echo, wherein the signature extractor extracts the anti-spoof signature from the decoded echo signal and determines whether one or more of the characteristics of the decoded echo match at appropriate thresholds with one or more of the characteristics of the pulse trains of the transmitted laser beam, wherein the one or more characteristics include variations the number of pulses in two or more pulse trains, the variation in pulse spacing, the variation in pulse amplitude ratios, or the variation in pulse width, or combinations thereof. 2. The system of claim 1, wherein if the decoded echo matches the characteristics of the transmitted laser beam, the signature extractor validates the decoded echo and outputs decoded echo data. 3. The system of claim 1, wherein if the decoded echo does not match the characteristics of the transmitted laser beam, the signature extraction module invalidates the decoded echo, ignores the decoded echo, and generates an alarm. 4. The system of claim 1, wherein for the next sequence of pulses to be transmitted, the signature extraction module dynamically changes the anti-spoof signature. 5. The system of claim 1, further comprising a random encoder configured to introduce an element of randomness into the characteristics of the pulse trains to be transmitted relative to the previous transmitted pulse train. 6. The system of claim. 1, in which the controller receives the environmental conditions that determine the characteristics for the pulse train of the transmitted laser beam. 7. The system of claim 6, wherein the tamper-resistant signature changes dynamically based on environmental conditions. 8. The system of claim. 6, in which the characteristics for the pulse trains of the transmitted laser beam is introduced an element of randomness based on environmental conditions. 9. The system of claim. 6, in which the environmental conditions include weather conditions, traffic congestion, or verification/calibration/manufacturing conditions. 10. A method for measuring and detecting range using light, comprising the steps of: selecting a tamper-resistant signature; encode protecting from substitution signature in the first sequence of pulses; emitting a laser beam containing a first pulse train, receiving and decoding an echo signal containing a second pulse train; extracting the tamper-proof signature from the second pulse train; and determining whether one or more of the characteristics of the second pulse train at respective threshold values coincides with one or more of the characteristics of the first pulse train, wherein the one or more characteristics include variations in the number of pulses in the two or more pulse sequences, variations in pulse distances, variations in amplitude ratios pulses or pulse width variations, or combinations thereof. 11. The method of claim 10, further comprising dynamically changing the anti-spoof signature for the next pulse train to be transmitted. 12. The method of claim 10, further comprising introducing an element of randomness into the characteristics of the next pulse train to be transmitted. 13. The method of claim 10, further comprising the step of, if the second pulse train matches the first pulse train, a decoded echo output is generated. 14. The method of claim 10, further comprising the step of, if the second pulse sequence does not match the first pulse sequence, ignore the second pulse sequence and generate an alarm. 15. The method of claim 10, further comprising adjusting the first pulse train based on environmental conditions. 16. The method of claim 15, wherein the environmental conditions comprise weather conditions, traffic congestion, verification/calibration/manufacturing conditions. 17. A machine-readable storage medium having a computer program code stored thereon, which, when executed on one or more processors implemented in an optical detection and ranging system, causes the optical detection and ranging system to perform a method, comprising steps in which : selecting a second spoofing signature for the second pulse train that is different from the first spoofing signature used in the previously transmitted first pulse train; encoding a second anti-spoof signature in a second pulse train; introduce an element of randomness into the second sequence of pulses; emit a laser beam containing the second sequence of pulses; receive and decode the echo signal containing the third sequence of pulses; extracting a second anti-spoofing signature from the third pulse train; and determining whether the third pulse train matches the second pulse train. 18. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 17, wherein the method further comprises: if the third pulse train matches the second pulse train, output data is generated based on the echo signal. 19. The computer-readable storage medium of claim 17, wherein the method further comprises: if the third pulse sequence does not match the second pulse sequence, ignore the third pulse sequence and generate an alarm.

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