RU2748575C1 - Method and device for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: computer technology.SUBSTANCE: invention relates to the field of computer technology. Protection against unauthorized actions of computer aids (CA) and from unauthorized access to information processed and stored in CA and in computer information and computing systems is improved due to the multi-stage CA loading procedure, within which user authentication is performed and control of loading of the specified CA operating system, control of the integrity of the CA hardware and software environment, control and differentiation of access to the peripheral interfaces of CA is provided. Proposed is method for trusted booting a computer with control of peripheral interfaces in the CA, the use of which involves the creation of a trusted computing environment with control of peripheral interfaces.EFFECT: protection against unauthorized actions of computer aids (CA) and from unauthorized access to information processed and stored in CA and in computer information and computing systems is improved.34 cl, 2 dwg

Description

The invention relates to the field of computer technology and is intended for trusted download of computer technology (CBT), as well as creating a trusted execution environment for CBT software. Its use will make it possible to obtain a technical result in the form of increasing the efficiency of protection of the SVT against unauthorized actions at various stages of its operation and ensuring protection against unauthorized access (NSD) to information processed and stored in the SVT and in computer information and computing systems (ICS).

The term "computing technology" in this document means an electronic device equipped, at least, with data processing capabilities, random access memory, internal data transmission buses and peripheral data input / output interfaces with the ability to connect additional hardware modules, capable of functioning both independently and and as part of other systems. Examples of CBT are:

- stationary or portable personal computer;

- automated workstation;

- "thin client" terminal;

- server, incl. specialized, for example, a database server;

- router, etc.

In the rest of this document, the term "computer" will be used to refer to all possible variants of CBT.

State of the art

One of the most widely used products that solve the problem of protecting a computer from unauthorized actions is a hardware-software module for trusted boot (APMDZ), which is designed to protect computer resources from unauthorized access, starting from the stage of trusted boot.

A fully functional representative of this class of devices is the APMDZ, described in patent RU 2321055, publ. 03/27/2008 [1]. This device provides the following main functions of APMS, characteristic for devices of this class:

- user identification and authentication;

- delimitation and control of user access to the computer;

- blocking the computer boot from removable media;

- control of the loading of a given operating system (OS) of the computer, ensuring its continuity;

- monitoring the integrity of the software environment;

- generation of random numbers;

- sound signaling of APMDZ states;

- blocking the computer upon detection of tampering attempts;

- keeping event logs, etc.

In addition, the APMDZ, described in the patent [1], can control various time intervals (with blocking further computer loading in case of failure to reach a given goal within a controlled time interval), which are critical during the procedure for starting the APMDZ and booting the computer after it is turned on (when unauthorized intervention in the start-up procedure), including the following intervals:

- the interval from the moment the computer is turned on until the control is transferred to the expansion program of the computer's basic input-output system (BIOS);

- the time for the user to enter the system (at this time, in particular, there is a waiting and entering the user's password);

- time before the start of the authentication procedure;

- the time until the start of the APMRS shell (from the moment the authentication program is completed to the start of the system integrity control program), etc.

The APMDZ described in [1], in addition to performing a set of standard functions, implements the functions of a backbone module that provides interconnection and interaction between the components of an integrated protection system via various interfaces. The following can be cited as examples of such components (see, for example, [2]):

- devices for cryptographic data protection (UKZD), such as subscriber or pass-through encryptors;

- trusted network cards with the ability to block network interfaces by APMDZ commands;

- software protection tools operating at the computer OS level, for example, access control systems.

The AMRS described in [1] also supports the remote control mode, which implies that the protected AMRS computer is part of a distributed computer system, which also includes a remote control server that manages a certain subset of the AMRS. In this case, the remote control server is designed to perform the following functions:

- storage of the basic settings of the system and its components, including the profiles of users and computers registered in the system, access control rules (PDR) and user rights;

- interaction and management of the APMDZ within the framework of the performance of their functions, incl. providing the above information stored on the management server;

- providing an interface for centralized administration of the above data stored on the remote control server.

In addition, an important function of the management server is the logging of the operations performed and the centralized storage of the logs of the operations of all the systems controlled by the APMS.

When using the APMDZ as a backbone module of the integrated protection system and with the support of the remote control mode used by the APMDZ, as well as equipping the remote control server with the appropriate functions, the remote control server can be the central control component of the integrated protection system of the distributed computer system as a whole.

Critical operations related to the control and processing of information during the interaction of protection means are performed in a protected environment using its own trusted OS, stored in the non-volatile memory of the APMDZ and loaded from there.

The well-known APMDZ is connected to the common bus of control and data exchange of the computer and contains the following main hardware components located on the common board of the device:

- controller for data exchange with a computer;

- the main control microcontroller (hereinafter, the term "microcontroller" means both a microcontroller and any computing device of a similar purpose - for example, a microprocessor);

- optional microcontroller for user identification and authentication, its functions can be performed on the main control microcontroller;

- module for control and blocking of the device;

- block of interfaces for interaction with external devices;

- modules of non-volatile and random access memory;

- hardware random number generator (RNG);

- sound detector;

- a block of switches for selecting the operating modes of the device;

- additional sensors and control devices, which may include a power control device with the ability to lock a computer, a computer tamper sensor controller, etc.

It should be noted that the APMDZ described in [1] and its analogs have a number of disadvantages that reduce the level of security of the system as a whole. In particular, the following features of such devices can be considered disadvantages:

1) Removing the APMDZ from the protected computer does not interfere with the operation of the computer, as a result of which the protection against tampering with the computer and its components may be violated. The main method of countering the removal of the APMDZ from the protected computer is to block unauthorized opening of the computer case (for example, using an electromagnetic latch controlled from the administrative interface of the APMDZ) and / or its sealing.

2) APMDZ may not receive control from the BIOS of the computer in the event of its modification (including malicious), which excludes such a transfer of control. The main method of countering such BIOS modifications is the use of timers that control the time interval after power is applied to the computer, during which control must be transferred to the APMS, otherwise the computer is blocked by the power circuit or a reset signal.

The solution to the problems listed above looks like the integration of APMDZ with the computer motherboard. A similar device is described in patent RU 2538329, publ. November 19, 2014 [3].

To solve the set tasks, this well-known APMDZ is not implemented on a common device board connected to a standard computer bus (for example, to a PCI bus), but is integrated directly onto the computer's motherboard in the form of a set of microcircuits and other hardware components at the stage of its development. Such an implementation allows not only to ensure the performance of the above functions of the APMDZ, but also to provide a number of additional capabilities to protect the computer, including, for example, monitoring the integrity of the computer BIOS by monitoring commands from the motherboard chipset transmitted via the SPI bus, and blocking those coming from the chipset via the bus SPI of invalid or unresolved commands, in particular, BIOS write commands.

The APMDZ described in the patent [3] can be connected to the stand-by power supply of the computer power supply. With this connection, the APMDZ begins to function immediately after the computer is connected to the power supply (the network cable plug is inserted into the outlet) before it is turned on with the power button. Therefore, this APMDZ can monitor the integrity of the BIOS before starting the computer and, in case of violation of the integrity of the BIOS, restore the BIOS from a backup located in the non-volatile memory of the APMDZ.

To implement additional protective functions, incl. functions for monitoring the integrity of the BIOS of a computer, the well-known APMDZ includes the corresponding additional hardware and software modules (including those allowing to control the SPI bus and the data exchange performed through it), including the following:

- installed on the SPI bus of the computer's motherboard, a high-speed electronic key and a drive based on a flash memory chip with an SPI interface containing the computer's BIOS;

- an electronic key control channel and a communication interface with the SPI bus (from the side of the main control microcontroller APMDZ), which form a hardware node that monitors the BIOS integrity in the drive before starting it and controls commands on the SPI bus from the computer chipset to the drive with the ability to block writing to drive using an electronic key;

- additional interfaces of the main control microcontroller APMDZ, such as USB and SMBus, for the implementation of communication channels with hardware components and the chipset, as well as with the main power control channel of the computer;

- an additional service section in the non-volatile flash memory of the APMDZ for storing a BIOS backup copy.

Since this APMDZ is directly integrated into the computer's motherboard, it is non-retrievable, which guarantees the impossibility of obtaining an NSD to the protected computer by removing the APMDZ. Controlling the integrity of the computer's BIOS with placing a backup copy of the BIOS in the non-volatile memory of the APMDZ for its recovery in the event of a violation of integrity makes it possible to guarantee the transfer of control to the APMDZ during the computer boot process and to counteract various attacks on the computer based on modifying its BIOS.

It is worth noting that unauthorized BIOS modification can lead not only to the actual removal of the APMDZ from computer boot control, but also to a wide range of other possible harmful effects on the computer (including the introduction of computer viruses or covert remote computer control programs into the protected computer at the BIOS level). that do not allow for a trusted environment. In addition to classic BIOSes, bootstrap software modules that comply with modern UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) specifications are also subject to similar problems; examples of such attacks are described, in particular, in [4-6].

It is worth noting that it is not enough just to have a trusted BIOS at the boot stage, it is also necessary to ensure control of its integrity during the operation of the computer, since unauthorized changes to its code can be made during the operation of the computer. This APMDZ allows you to block such an unauthorized modification of the BIOS, since it is capable of blocking unauthorized write commands to the BIOS coming through the SPI bus.

Thus, the prototype of the claimed device, described in the patent [3], in comparison with the classical APMDZ (in particular, with the APMDZ described in the patent [1]), allows to achieve a higher level of computer protection due to the close integration of the APMDZ components with the components of the computer motherboard providing additional protective functions.

An alternative version of the APMDZ implementation, integrated with the computer motherboard, is a pseudo-retrievable APMDZ, which is made on a separate common board connected to the computer motherboard through a specialized connector placed on the computer motherboard during its development. An example of such an APMDZ is described in the patent [7].

In this case, the APMDZ board contains at least the following components:

- main control microcontroller;

- a drive based on a flash memory chip with an SPI interface containing the computer's BIOS;

- hardware DSCh;

- high-speed electronic key.

At the same time, the specialized connector of the computer motherboard, to which the APMDZ is connected, is supplied, at least, with a connection to the SPI bus of the chipset, USB and SMBus interfaces for connecting the main control microcontroller with the chipset, the APMDZ power channel from the standby power supply of the computer's power supply, as well as the channel main power management of the computer.

The APMDZ implemented in this way can be physically removed from the computer, however, when it is removed, the computer becomes inoperable, therefore, the APMDZ described in the patent [7] allows achieving virtually the same level of integration with the computer's motherboard and solving the problem of providing a trusted boot and a trusted environment the computer is similar to the APMDZ described in the patent [3].

A common disadvantage of the APMDZ discussed above is the complete or partial lack of control over the peripheral interfaces of the computer. The need to block peripheral interfaces if the authenticated user does not have the authority to work with them is due at least to the following requirements:

1) The need to ensure that there are no data leaks through peripheral interfaces. Examples of such data leaks include the following types of unauthorized actions:

- copying data to external media;

- data transmission over the network interface;

- data output to the monitor (can be considered a data leak, for example, if the protected computer is a server, and the authenticated user is responsible only for turning it on and loading it along a predefined path);

- printing data using a network or local printer, etc.

2) Prevention of attacks on the protected computer using specially prepared peripheral devices. Such attacks usually exploit known vulnerabilities in the hardware or OS of computer systems.

In particular, attacks using vulnerabilities in implementations of Direct Memory Access (DMA) technology have become widespread. The DMA controller installed in the computer allows DMA devices to transfer data directly to the computer's RAM without accessing the computer's central processor. DMA technology significantly improves the speed of data transfer between computer components and the overall performance of the computer as a whole, and DMA devices can be almost all peripheral devices that require high data transfer rates.

Since DMA technology can spread to external ports, it is possible to connect an external DMA device with special software to the attacked computer to carry out an attack by unauthorized reading from the computer's RAM or writing to it via a DMA channel; no device authentication is provided for these operations. The results of such attacks can range from theft of confidential data to the injection of malicious code into the attacked computer (see, for example, [8, 9]).

Another well-known class of peripheral attacks is USB device attacks. These attacks mainly use devices with specially prepared internal software to inject malicious code onto an attacked computer, including software for covert remote computer control; the classification and examples of such attacks are given, in particular, in [10, 11]. Various methods of countering such attacks are currently being developed. Examples of such methods are the following:

- a method for authenticating devices connected to a USB port, described in patent CN 108985112, publ. 11.12.2018 [12];

- a method for controlling access of a peripheral device to a computer system through an access control device, described in the application for invention RU 2013135240, publ. 02/10/2015 [13].

Blocking peripheral interfaces when the current user does not have permission to use them allows you to counter both data leaks and attacks using peripheral interfaces.

In the above-described APMDZ, the control of peripheral interfaces can be indirectly performed within the framework of the concept of using the APMDZ described in [2] as a backbone module of an integrated computer protection system according to one of the following options or their combination:

1) By giving commands to controlled devices to enable or disable a specific interface, depending on the authority of the user who has been authenticated in the ASGM and / or other factors. When using the APMDZ data, the controlled devices in this case can be the following [14]:

- encryptors of hard drives and USB-drives;

- network adapters with the function of blocking the reception / transmission of data by an external signal;

- network encryptors.

To implement a full-fledged blocking of peripheral interfaces, it is necessary to equip the protected computer with additional hardware modules that are connected in the gap between the computer's motherboard and the corresponding monitored or protected interface, as well as a guarantee that similar interfaces are not connected bypassing the listed hardware protection means.

2) By implementing access control to peripheral interfaces at the kernel level of the loaded computer OS, installed in which the access control software (ADS) allows or prohibits access to various external devices and / or access control objects stored on external devices (for example, to files on a hard disk or USB flash drive) depending on the authority of the user authenticated in the system. When using the appropriate settings over the OS components responsible for performing user authentication, it is possible to use unified authentication means (see, for example, [15]), which allow using the account of the user authenticated in the ASGM as the account of the user authenticated in the system.

To implement this option, it is required to equip the protected computer with additional software running in the OS loaded under the control of the APMDZ after the user is authenticated.

Depending on the existing tasks to ensure the protection of information and the required level of security, such software can be executed in different ways, for example:

- in the form of filtering drivers that control access to protected ports and differentiate access to them based on the existing PRD and the authority of the user who has been authenticated in the system (see, for example, [16]);

- in the form of full-featured DSS that provide control and access control not only to various external devices, but also to objects in the file system of the protected computer, as well as to various objects of the OS kernel, including such communication channels as pipes or mailboxes, as well as synchronization objects ( see, for example, [17]); making a decision to allow or deny access to any access object in such RANs can be based not only on the credentials of the authenticated user, but also on various additional factors (for example, on the credentials of a pair of access subjects: the user and the process requesting access to the object from username) [18, 19].

The degree of integration of such software with the ASGM can also vary.

Solutions based only on filtering drivers may not provide sufficient quality of protection due to the availability of opportunities to bypass and / or disable them due to the lack of an integral protection perimeter (see, for example, [20]), and solutions based on full-featured DRS that provide the formation of a comprehensive protection perimeter and the application of discretionary and mandatory principles of access control (see, for example, [21]) can be overly complex to configure and, most likely, redundant in many cases.

It should be noted that the main software modules of the DRS operating at the OS kernel level can theoretically be disabled or bypassed from some malicious software that also runs at the OS kernel level (for example, if an untrusted driver of a device is installed). As the main method of countering this threat, the transfer of a part of the ARS software modules to the hypervisor level is considered, from where these modules can control the rest of the ARS modules operating in the target (guest) OS, and the hypervisor must be loaded from the non-volatile memory of the APMDZ to ensure its power of attorney [22] ... All this entails a significant complication of the protection system and narrows the scope of its application.

Some incomplete analogue of control and differentiation of access to peripheral interfaces at the kernel level of a loaded computer OS is their blocking at the level of the used client OS assemblies of terminals (by ensuring that the required drivers are not in the OS assembly) operating according to the "thin client" architecture. The architecture of a "thin client" with imposed security means (see, for example, [23]) allows a certain client OS to be associated with a user who has been authenticated in the ASGM, therefore, certain peripheral interfaces in a particular assembly of the client OS can be enabled or disabled, depending on the authority of a specific user of such a system. As you can see, this approach is quite specific and has a narrow application.

Both of the above options for controlling peripheral interfaces have distinct disadvantages, including the following:

- an increase in the cost of the system as a whole due to the need to install and use additional modules, and the increase in the cost of the system as a whole due to the use of additional hardware encoders can be multiple in comparison with the cost of the APMDZ;

- narrowing the scope of the system as a whole (which can also be significant), since the use of additional hardware can significantly increase the requirements for computer equipment imposed by the protection system, and the use of additional software (especially those working at the OS kernel level) leads to dependence on a specific OS or the need to develop a line of tools that support various OS;

- a significant increase in the complexity of the protection system as a whole, which entails the complication and rise in the cost of its development, testing, certification, deployment, configuration and support, and also increases technological risks (such as, for example, failure to achieve the required functionality or the required level of protection, as well as the likelihood making mistakes during development that can lead to potential system vulnerabilities).

Therefore, a logical and correct solution from a technical point of view is the blocking of peripheral interfaces, performed directly by the APMDZ or a similar device that authenticates the user and then delimits access to peripheral interfaces.

In this case, a single device performs the entire sequence of actions: from user authentication to making a decision and implementing blocking of a specific subset of peripheral interfaces, depending on the authority of the authenticated user and / or other factors (in particular, blocking peripheral interfaces at certain stages of computer boot in conjunction with other measures can be used to ensure the continuity of the computer boot). The whole process is carried out and controlled by the hardware of the APMDZ and its trusted software, which does not provide opportunities for unauthorized interference in this process from the outside. Such a solution allows to ensure the proper quality of protection and at the same time ensures independence from the OS used on the protected computer. An additional plus is the absence of additional modules, leading to the complication and rise in the cost of the system.

APMDZ, described in patents [1, 3, 7], do not include means of blocking peripheral interfaces and to implement control and differentiation of access to peripheral interfaces require additional hardware and / or software protection. The closest device to the proposed technical solution (the prototype of the inventive device) is the APMDZ, described in patent RU 2538329 [3].

The applicant's analysis of patent and scientific and technical information on existing methods of controlling and differentiating access to peripheral interfaces at the hardware level showed the existence of a number of patents for methods of differentiating access to peripheral interfaces and devices connected to them. However, the existing patents in comparison with the claimed method have the following main limitations:

- a certain narrow subset of peripheral interfaces, access to which is subject to delimitation;

- certain specific purpose of peripheral equipment, which significantly narrows the scope of the method;

- the use of the simplest methods of user authentication (such as password authentication), which do not allow to ensure the proper quality of protection when using such access control methods.

As an example, we can cite the method of differentiating user access to multimedia devices, which is the basis of a system containing a programmable multimedia controller that allows you to interact with various multimedia devices and control them, and access to devices is given only to users who have passed password authentication based on the simplest two-level role model: the main user who has access to all ports, and additional users to whom the ports are available depending on the permissions in his profile. This system is described in the application for invention RU 2013116376, publ. October 27, 2014 [24].

Another example is a hardware blocking device for peripheral ports described in US patent 20160012258, publ. January 14, 2016 [25]. The locking device described in this patent is connected to a controlled peripheral port outside the computer and physically locks it, while the locking device is equipped with an additional port for authentication, to which any external device can be connected for entering authentication information; after entering the authentication information, in case of successful authentication, the locking device unlocks the peripheral port and allows it to be used. The main disadvantages of the method underlying the application of the device described in the patent [25] are the following:

- the need to develop a locking device for each type of interface;

- the need for a separate device to block each peripheral port;

- significant complexity (in some cases - the impossibility) of developing blocking devices for internal computer buses (for example, PCI-Express), the need to bring a port for authentication to the computer case when installing an internal blocking device;

- significant complexity of the use of a single PRD to control all peripheral interfaces;

- lack of opportunities for integration with other means of protection.

Thus, the patent search carried out by the applicant showed the absence of an obvious prototype for the claimed method of trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces.

Disclosure of the essence of the invention

The technical result of the invention is the creation of a trusted environment during the operation of a computer, and when creating a trusted environment, control and delimitation of access to peripheral interfaces is provided, which increases the efficiency of protection against tampering with hardware and software components of the protected computer and information stored and processed on it.

The technical result is achieved as follows:

1. The method of trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces consists in performing the following sequence of actions:

Step 1) The Trusted Environment Creation Device (hereinafter referred to as the “device”) receives control from the computer after it is turned on or rebooted and performs a self-test procedure.

If in the current session with the computer the self-test procedure has already been performed earlier (for example, before rebooting), then it can be skipped. In this case, the device settings can specify the time interval from the previous self-test, after which the self-test must be performed, and if the time interval from the previous self-test is set and expired, then the self-test procedure must be performed.

Step 2) The first software module of the device is launched (this may include launching the BIOS / UEFI program of the computer (or its equivalent), if necessary).

At this step, the device analyzes whether one of the special flags of the boot control modes is set, in particular:

- flag for entering BIOS / UEFI settings;

- flag for loading from removable media;

- fastboot flag.

The removable media boot flag and fastboot flag mean that basic device functions are skipped because they were performed earlier (before the last computer reboot). The reasons why these flags can be set (initially, these flags are cleared) are listed below in the description of Step 14 (the step of initiating a computer restart).

If the BIOS / UEFI settings entry flag is set, the BIOS / UEFI settings are entered. After the user finishes working with BIOS / UEFI settings, the BIOS / UEFI settings entry flag is cleared and the computer is restarted, so after that, it returns to Step 1.

If the flag is set to boot from removable media, the device after this step goes to Step 16 (the step of starting the boot of the target computer OS).

Step 3) The software module launched in Step 2 launches the OS loader program.

If the fastboot flag is set, the device after this step goes to Step 16 (the step of starting the boot of the target computer OS).

Step 4) The loader program launched in step 3 decides to load the trusted OS from the device's non-volatile memory and initiates its loading.

Step 5) The trusted OS is booted. Further actions before rebooting the computer or loading the target OS using the kexec module (a software module that allows you to load the Linux kernel without rebooting the computer by updating the kernel in RAM [26]) are performed in the trusted OS.

Step 6) If the device is used as a backbone module of an integrated security system and there are hardware encryptors among the hardware controlled by this device, the device reads the encryption keys from a removable key media and loads the encryption keys into the hardware encryptors.

Step 7) The graphical shell of the device is launched.

Step 8) If the device is used as a backbone module of a complex distributed security system and is in a remote control domain that requires authentication, then the computer is authenticated in the remote control domain.

Step 9) The device authenticates the user based on the information located on the authentication medium (AH) of the user (user credentials).

If there is more than one user identity on the user's AN (which is possible, for example, when using a role-based access model in the security system and if the user has more than one role), the user is given a choice of identity on the basis of which he will be authenticated.

Authentication can be performed based on several factors. As additional authentication factors, a sequence of characters entered by the user from the keyboard (user password), various biometric characteristics of the user, or their combinations can be used.

Step 10) Depending on the authority of the authenticated user in terms of whether they have permission or prohibition to use various peripheral interfaces of the computer, the device performs hardware blocking of those peripheral interfaces, the use of which is prohibited for the user and the hardware blocking of which is supported by the device.

Step 11) The boot menu is displayed, allowing the user to select further actions with the device. The subset of possible user actions that the user can select from the displayed menu depends on the credentials of the authenticated user.

Step 12) If the credentials of the authenticated user include allowing this user to start the device control mode and the user selects the start control mode in the boot menu, the control mode is entered.

In the control mode, the user is presented with a graphical interface for configuring the device, in which, in particular, the following actions can be performed:

- viewing and setting basic device settings, for example, the type of AN used, the number of allowed attempts for unsuccessful user authentication, the device name in the system, settings for the computer OS boot procedure, date and time, boot timers and device operation modes;

- viewing and updating the firmware of the internal software of the device;

- Managing device users, including creating users, configuring their permissions, creating user credentials, recording them on the AN and deleting users;

- viewing and clearing the operation logs recorded by the device;

- configuring the parameters for monitoring the integrity of the equipment and software environment of the protected computer;

- viewing and configuring the register of serial numbers of the AN, permitted for use with this instance of the device;

- setting parameters for controlling peripheral interfaces and their blocking.

If the start of the control mode is not available to the user or the user does not select the start of the control mode in the menu, this step is skipped.

Step 13) The device checks the integrity of the hardware and software environment of the computer.

Integrity control may include checking the integrity (compliance of current values with reference values) of the contents of the following control objects:

- objects of the file system;

- areas of memory CMOS;

- areas of computer RAM;

- sectors of hard drives of the computer.

In addition, the presence of a certain subset of the computer's hardware components can be monitored.

A specific subset of integrity monitoring objects, as well as reference values for their contents, are determined at Step 12 in the device management mode.

Step 14) If at least one of the following conditions is met:

- the target OS of the protected computer is not an OS of the Linux family;

- in the device settings, the launch of the target OS via kexec is not set;

- the OS reboot command is present in the boot menu displayed to the user and the user has explicitly selected this menu command;

- in the boot menu displayed to the user, there is a command to boot the OS from removable media and the user has explicitly selected this menu command;

- in the boot menu displayed to the user there is a command to enter the BIOS / UEFI settings of the computer and the user explicitly selected this menu command,

This device initiates a restart of the computer and thus returns to Step 1 (the step of getting the device to control after restarting the computer). Otherwise, this step is skipped.

If the user was given the opportunity to select the appropriate command in the boot menu displayed to the user and the user selected the OS reboot command or the OS boot command from removable media, or the command to enter the computer BIOS settings, then before initiating the computer restart, the device sets one of the special flags of the boot control modes, corresponding to the menu command selected by the user:

- flag for entering BIOS / UEFI settings;

- flag for loading from removable media;

- fastboot flag.

Step 15) The device initiates the boot of the target OS via kexec.

Step 16) The target OS of the computer is loaded and activated.

This step actually completes the above-described method of trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces. This completes the operation of the device while the computer is booting. However, in the case when the device is a backbone module of an integrated protection system and this protection system includes software that interacts with the device (backbone module), the device, during the operation of the loaded OS, is in the waiting mode for commands from the software running in this OS, to perform the functions provided by such commands.

The availability of the device to software operating at the OS level is ensured by the presence of the device driver installed in the OS and (optionally) a library of functions for interacting with the device, which provides the software with a certain programming interface (API) containing functions for interacting with the device. In this case, such a library of functions (if any) interacts with the device through its driver, and the application software can interact with the device both through the function library and directly through the device driver.

Based on the security requirements, the device, when operating in this mode, can provide the software with a certain limited subset of functions, and can also require the calling software to pass authentication, as a result of which the device can check the compliance of the requested actions with the current settings and access control rules; as a result of these checks, the device may refuse to execute the command.

In accordance with the above description of the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces, the sequence of steps performed during normal boot of the computer OS after the step of monitoring the integrity of the hardware and software environment of the protected computer depends on the device settings and the OS type and is reduced to the following two main options:

- for an OS of the Linux family, when the boot mode is set in the device settings, this module is launched via the kexec module, after which the target OS of the computer is loaded and activated;

- in other cases, the computer first restarts with the fastboot flag set, then (after rebooting) at the step of starting the first software module of the device in accordance with the set fastboot flag, immediately proceeds to the step of loading and activating the target computer OS.

It should be noted that during the operation of the device, various error situations may arise, which can be conditionally divided into the following two categories:

- non-fatal errors, after which it is possible to continue working at the current step of the method described above; an example of an error in this category may be a user entering an incorrect password when passing his authentication - if the maximum number of attempts to enter a password is not exceeded, then after entering an incorrect password, the user interface of the device can provide the user with the opportunity to re-enter the password and then, after entering the correct password, the device can continue to work in accordance with the method described above;

- fatal errors, after which the device turns off the power of the computer or initiates a restart of the computer; thus, if the computer is restarted, the transition to Step 1 of the described method is carried out (the step of receiving the control device from the computer); an example of such an error is an incorrect password entry with an exceeded number of maximum allowed password attempts.

There may also be errors attributable to both the first and the second of the categories described above, depending on the rights of the authenticated user. An example of such an error can be the fact of violation of the integrity of file system objects, which can be classified as fatal or non-fatal errors with corresponding consequences (the latter - if the user has the ability to recalculate the reference values of checksums of integrity control objects).

The inventive method extends to various variants of the described sequence of actions, including the device performing various kinds of additional operations, depending on the additional capabilities of the device described below or a subset of them:

- actions to ensure the integrity of the BIOS / UEFI program of the protected computer (or its analogue), within which the device, during or after the self-test procedure, compares the BIOS / UEFI program of the computer with the BIOS / UEFI reference program embedded in the device's memory; if there is a discrepancy between the BIOS / UEFI program of the computer and the BIOS / UEFI reference program, the device may completely or partially block the computer from booting or replace the BIOS / UEFI program of the computer with a reference one and continue booting with the corresponding information to the user;

- actions within the framework of remote control of the device if the device supports remote control from the side of the control server; in this case, it can be provided, in particular, to receive from the management server profiles (accounts) of users, a profile (account) of a protected computer, authorizations of an authenticated user and / or other information, as well as sending reports on the device and / or computer operations to perform the necessary modifications to the data stored on the management server (which may be necessary, for example, to update the user profile based on the results of his authentication);

- actions within the framework of using the computer protected by the device as a terminal operating in the "thin client" mode; such actions may include, for example, downloading the target operating system from a terminal server and checking its integrity before loading it further;

- actions within the framework of using the computer protected by the device as a server that does not provide the user with the possibility of interactive interaction with the device, which implies, in particular, the execution of a sequence of actions of the proposed method in an automatic mode, for example, in accordance with the preset settings of the device;

- actions to record the operations performed and their results;

- actions to collect and aggregate transaction logs from other hardware and software of the integrated protection system in the event that the device is used as a backbone module of the integrated protection system and such a system supports centralized storage and / or processing of transaction logs;

- actions to provide opportunities to interact with other hardware of the integrated protection system and / or to configure such hardware in the event that the device is used as a backbone module of the integrated protection system and other hardware of the integrated protection system does not have its own user interface, but supports the possibility of such interaction and / or customization through the user interface of the backbone module;

- other actions possible if the device is used as a backbone module of an integrated protection system;

- actions to control the time intervals for the execution of both specific steps of the described method, and any combinations thereof;

- actions if the target OS is a hypervisor, including a trusted hypervisor loaded from the device's non-volatile memory.

In all these cases, the main sequence of steps of the method described above and the basic logic of the device remains unchanged (or slightly corrected) and is only supplemented by a number of additional operations.

The inventive method also applies to various options for the described sequence of actions, in which:

- controlled peripheral interfaces are initially locked, and after the user passes authentication, those peripheral interfaces will be unlocked that the authenticated user is allowed to use;

- the sequence of steps of the method of trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces can be performed in a different order while maintaining the general logic of the implementation of the proposed method;

- the division of the method into logical stages (steps) can be done differently, for example, by combining a number of steps of the method into one or, conversely, with an additional division of complex steps into elementary ones;

- a number of logical steps (steps) of the method may be absent while maintaining the minimum sequence of actions necessary to implement a trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces; at the same time, the minimum sequence of actions includes the above-described main functions of the APMDZ characteristic of devices of this class (device self-testing, identification and authentication of users with differentiation of user access to the computer, control of the loading of a given computer OS and control of the integrity of the software environment), as access control to peripheral interfaces.

The inventive method is not limited to any specific subset of the OS used as:

- a trusted OS in which the main steps of the proposed method are performed;

- target OS;

- a hypervisor.

The claimed method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces is not limited to any specific subset of peripheral interfaces, access to which is subject to control and / or delimitation within the framework of this method.

The inventive method also extends to various combinations of factors, based on which a decision is made to allow or deny user access to controlled peripheral interfaces or a subset thereof, and these factors may or may not include the credentials of the authenticated user. Examples of such factors include:

- the stage of computer boot (in particular, a specific step of the proposed method for trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces);

- operating mode of the device;

- availability and configuration of additional hardware and / or software protection means;

- current hardware configuration of the protected computer.

The inventive method also extends to implementations in which blocking of peripheral interfaces is used to ensure continuous boot of the protected computer, including in conjunction with other measures.

The inventive method is not limited to any particular subset of the methods and factors used to authenticate users.

The inventive method can be implemented in various ways and is not limited to any specific version of its implementation, including in the form of the inventive device for trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces, which is only one of the possible examples of the implementation of the inventive method.

2. A known device for trusted computer boot (device for creating a trusted environment and protecting information from unauthorized access), containing:

- the main control microcontroller, the software of which includes a user identification and authentication module, modules for checking the integrity and state of hardware and software components, a module for controlling the time intervals of the computer startup and boot procedure, a device configuration module and optional modules for controlling the loading of keys of hardware encryptors, interaction with a system of access control, support for remote administration and device management, the client part of the "thin client" software and interaction with the servers of the information-computing system;

- non-volatile memory (of sufficient capacity) with storage units for the trusted operating system and device software, an electronic log for recording events during device operation, device settings and with optional storage units for user credentials and settings and remote control keys;

- a drive based on flash memory with an SPI interface, which includes write-protected areas and contains the computer's BIOS;

- a high-speed electronic key controlled by the software of the main control microcontroller to ensure the blocking of writing to the protected areas of the BIOS based on the control of commands from the chipset of the computer's motherboard to the drive via the SPI bus;

- a block of switches for selecting the operating mode of the device;

- a sound detector for additional information about detected abnormal situations;

- a block of interfaces for external devices, including an SPI interface for connecting to the SPI bus of a computer's motherboard chipset, a USB Host interface for connecting external devices, a 1-Wire interface for connecting a Touch Memory identifier and an intermodular interface for connecting hardware encryptors;

- control unit for the main power supply of the computer;

- random number generator,

the following components are introduced:

- an additional control microcontroller, the software of which includes a module for interaction with the main control microcontroller and a module that controls electronic components that perform the functions of electronic keys, which ensures the transmission of commands to these electronic components to connect or disconnect peripheral interfaces, depending on the authority of the user who has passed the authentication , and / or based on other factors;

- software-controlled electronic components that perform the functions of electronic keys, which are installed in the gap between the computer chipset and peripheral interfaces and provide physical connection or disconnection of peripheral interfaces, depending on commands received from an additional control microcontroller.

The inventive device for trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces is one of the possible examples of the implementation of the inventive method for trusted boot of a computer with control of peripheral interfaces.

The inventive device can be made both as a set of elements on the motherboard of a computer, and by combining the main elements on a common board of the device with the placement of software-controlled electronic components that perform the functions of electronic keys on the motherboard of a computer or in any other way that makes them possible installation in the gap between the computer chipset and peripheral interfaces to provide physical connection or disconnection of peripheral interfaces.

Any computing devices of a similar purpose, for example, microprocessors, can be used as the main and additional control microcontrollers in the claimed device.

The controlled peripheral interfaces can be interfaces such as USB, PCI-Express, SATA, HDMI, audio output, and others. The claimed technical solution also applies to other peripheral interfaces, the use of which can be monitored on the basis of the proposed method.

The decision to allow or deny user access to controlled peripheral interfaces or a subset of them can be made not only based on the credentials of the authenticated user, but also based on various additional factors, all factors influencing this decision may include the credentials of the authenticated user. , never include them.

As a result of the applicant's analysis of the state of the art, including a search for patent and scientific and technical sources of information and the identification of sources containing information about analogues of the claimed technical solution, no source was found characterized by features identical to all essential features of the claimed technical solution set out in the claims ...

Determination from the list of identified analogs of the prototype of the claimed device, as the closest analogue in terms of the totality of features, made it possible to establish a set of the above, significant in relation to the technical result perceived by the applicant, of the distinctive features of the claimed device for trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces. An additional search conducted by the applicant did not reveal known solutions containing features that coincide with the characteristics of the claimed device that are distinctive from the prototype.

Consequently, the claimed technical solution meets the "novelty" criterion.

The claimed technical solution does not follow explicitly for a specialist from the prior art and is not based on a change in quantitative features. Consequently, the claimed technical solution meets the criterion of "inventive step".

Brief Description of Drawings

FIG. 1 shows a simplified diagram of one of the possible algorithms that implement the inventive method of trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces.

The block numbering in FIG. 1 corresponds to the step numbers of the proposed method:

1 - Step 1 - the step of receiving the control device from the computer after turning it on or restarting.

2 - Step 2 - a step of starting the first software module of the device and analyzing the boot flags; includes the following main substages:

2.1 - launching the first software module of the device;

2.2 - analysis of boot flags, incl. checking if the entry flag is set to the BIOS / UEFI settings; if this flag is set, the transition to sub-step 2.3 is carried out, otherwise - the transition to sub-step 2.5;

2.3 - entering the BIOS / UEFI settings for the user to work with these settings;

2.4 - after completing work with the BIOS / UEFI settings - reset the entry flag to the BIOS / UEFI settings and initiate a computer restart, after which - go to Step 1;

2.5 - check if the boot from removable media flag is set; if this flag is set, go to Step 16, otherwise go to Step 3.

3 - Step 3 - the step of starting the OS loader program; includes the following main substages:

3.1 - launching the OS loader program;

3.2 - check if the fastboot flag is set; if this flag is set, go to Step 16, otherwise go to Step 4.

4 - Step 4 - the step of initiating the boot of the trusted OS.

5 - Step 5 - the step of loading the trusted OS.

6 - Step 6 - a step of loading encryption keys; includes the following main substages:

6.1 - analysis of whether loading of encryption keys is required; if required, go to sub-step 6.2, otherwise, go to Step 7;

6.2 - loading encryption keys.

7 - Step 7 - the step of launching the graphical shell of the device.

8 - Step 8 - step of computer authentication in the remote control domain; includes the following main substages:

8.1 - analysis of whether the computer needs to be authenticated in the remote control domain; if required, go to substage 8.2, otherwise, go to Step 9;

8.2 - performing computer authentication in the remote control domain.

9 - Step 9 is the step of user authentication by the device.

10 - Step 10 is the step of blocking peripheral interfaces according to the credentials of the authenticated user.

11 - Step 11 - a step of displaying the boot menu to the user; after the user selects a certain menu command, the transition to the next step is carried out.

12 - Step 12 - step of the user in the device control mode; includes the following main substages:

12.1 - analysis of whether the user has chosen to enter the control mode; if selected, go to sub-step 12.2, otherwise go to Step 13;

12.2 - user work in the device control mode; after completion of work in control mode, the transition to the next step is carried out.

13 - Step 13 - a step to control the integrity of the hardware and software environment of the computer.

14 - Step 14 - step of restarting the computer; includes the following main substages:

14.1 - analysis of whether a computer restart is required for further work; if required, go to substage 14.2, otherwise go to Step 15;

14.2 - setting the boot flag in accordance with the menu command selected by the user;

14.3 - initiating a restart of the computer, after which - proceeding to Step 1.

15 - Step 15 is the step of initiating the boot of the target OS through kexec.

16 - Step 16 is the step of loading the target OS of the computer.

FIG. 2 shows a simplified block diagram of one of the embodiments of the claimed device for trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces, where the components of a trusted computer boot device with control of peripheral interfaces are located on the motherboard of computer 161:

101 - APMDZ;

102 - additional control microcontroller;

103 - sound detector;

104 - electronic components that function as electronic keys.

Components of APMDZ 101:

111 - main control microcontroller;

112 - nonvolatile memory;

113 - a drive based on flash memory with an SPI interface;

114 - high-speed electronic key;

115 - block of operation mode switches;

116 - control unit for the main power supply of the computer;

117 - random number generator;

118 - block of interfaces to external devices.

Program modules running on the control microcontroller 111:

121 - user identification and authentication module;

122 - modules for checking the integrity and state of hardware and software components;

123 - module for controlling the time intervals of the procedure for starting and booting the computer;

124 - device settings module;

125 - optional module for controlling the loading of keys of hardware encryptors;

126 - optional module for interaction with the access control system;

127 - optional module to support remote administration and device management;

128 - optional module of the client part of the "thin client" software and interaction with the servers of the information-computing system.

Blocks of non-volatile memory for data storage 112:

131 — storage unit of a trusted operating system;

132 — unit for storing software of the device;

133 - block for storing an electronic log for registering events;

134 - unit for storing device settings;

135 - optional block for storing user credentials;

136 - optional storage unit for settings and remote control keys.

The SPI113 flash drive contains:

141 - storage unit for the BIOS / UEFI program of a computer or its equivalent.

Program modules running on the additional control microcontroller 102:

151 - module for interaction with the main control microcontroller;

152 - module for controlling electronic components that function as electronic keys.

Computer components:

161 - motherboard;

162 - processor module (central processor and chipset);

163 - controlled peripheral interfaces;

164 - power supply unit.

Implementation of the invention

The inventive device for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces, integrated into the computer motherboard and implementing the inventive method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces, can be implemented on the basis of known commercially available components. The applicant has developed and is in preparation for serial production of a motherboard on which the claimed device is implemented, which includes the following main components:

- hardware and software module for trusted download "APMDZ-I / M3";

- additional control microcontroller ARM Cortex-M4.

Blocking of peripheral interfaces in the claimed device is carried out using various microcircuits built into the break of the information buses of the device and used as controlled electronic keys, in particular:

- blocking of the information signal transmission via the PCI-Express bus is carried out using the CBTL02042ABQ microcircuit, which switches the information data flow from the bus to a special empty path;

- blocking of the information signal transmission via the SATA bus is carried out using the MAX4951СРТ microcircuit, which turns off the information data flow when the control signal arrives;

- blocking of the information signal transmission via the USB 2.0 bus is carried out using the USB2514B microcircuit and the TS3USB31E microcircuit, which turn off the information data flow when the control signal arrives;

- blocking of the information signal transmission via the USB 3.0 bus is carried out using the MAX4951СРТ and USB3740B microcircuits, which turn off the information data flow when the control signal arrives;

- blocking of information signal transmission via the HDMI bus is carried out using the PTN3381DBS microcircuit, which turns off the information data flow when the control signal arrives;

- blocking the transmission of the information signal via the audio bus is carried out using the ALC888S microcircuit, which turns off the flow of information data when the control signal arrives.

Thus, for the claimed method and device for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces in the form as they are described in the corresponding paragraphs of the stated claims, the possibility of carrying out the invention using the described means is confirmed.

Therefore, the claimed technical solution meets the criterion of "industrial applicability".

The inventive method of trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces is recommended to be implemented in CBT, the use of which involves the creation of a trusted computing environment with control of peripheral interfaces, and the claimed device for trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces is recommended to be implemented as part of the motherboard (system) boards of such CBT (as in both non-retrievable and pseudo-retrievable devices). Examples of CBT in which the claimed technical solutions can be used are a stationary or portable personal computer, an automated workstation, a "thin client" terminal, a server, a router, etc., including a protected version for special applications.

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Claims (34)

1. A method of trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces, which consists in performing the following sequence of actions: at the first step, the device for creating a trusted environment (hereinafter referred to as the “device”) receives control from the computer after it is turned on or rebooted and carries out a self-test procedure that can be skipped if it was performed in the current session with the computer earlier; in the second step, the first program module of the device is launched and it is analyzed whether one of the flags of the download control modes is set; if the flag of entering the settings of the basic input-output system of the computer (BIOS / UEFI) is set, the BIOS / UEFI settings are entered, after the user exits with which the flag of entering the BIOS / UEFI settings is reset and the computer is rebooted, thus returns to the first step; if the boot from removable media flag is set, then after this step, the transition to the sixteenth step is performed; at the third step, the program is launched - the loader of the computer's operating system (OS); if the fast computer boot flag is set, then after this step, the transition to the sixteenth step is performed; at the fourth step, the loader program decides to load the trusted OS from the device's non-volatile memory and initiates its loading; at the fifth step, the trusted OS is loaded; at the sixth step, if the device is used as a backbone module of an integrated security system and there are hardware encryptors among the hardware controlled by this device, then the device reads encryption keys from a removable key carrier and loads encryption keys into hardware encryptors; at the seventh step, the graphical shell of the device is launched; in the eighth step, if the device is used as a backbone module of an integrated distributed security system and is in a remote control domain that requires authentication, then the computer is authenticated in the remote control domain; at the ninth step, the device authenticates the user based on the information located on the authentication medium (AH) of the user, and authentication can also be performed by entering a password, a user's fingerprint, or a combination thereof; at the tenth step, depending on the authority of the authenticated user in terms of whether they have permission or prohibition to use various peripheral interfaces of the computer, the device performs hardware blocking of those peripheral interfaces, the use of which is prohibited for the user and the hardware blocking of which is supported by the device; at the eleventh step, a boot menu is displayed, allowing the user to select further actions with the device, and the subset of possible user actions that he can select from the displayed menu may depend on the credentials of the authenticated user; in the twelfth step, if the credentials of the authenticated user include allowing this user to start the device control mode and the user has selected the start control mode in the boot menu, the control mode is entered, in which the user is allowed to view and set various device settings, including settings of parameters for controlling peripheral interfaces and their blocking; at the thirteenth step, the device checks the integrity of the hardware and software environment of the computer; at the fourteenth step, it is checked that the target OS of the protected computer is not an OS of the Linux family, that the device settings do not set the target OS to launch via the kexec software module, which allows loading the Linux kernel without rebooting the computer by updating the kernel in RAM, and that the user has selected in the boot menu is one of the following commands: reboot the OS, boot the OS from removable media or enter the BIOS / UEFI settings, and if at least one of the checked conditions is met, the computer is restarted, thus returning to the first step, and if the user has chosen boot menu, the command to reboot the OS, or boot the OS from removable media, or enter the BIOS / UEFI settings, then before initiating the restart of the computer, the OS fast boot flag, or the OS boot flag from removable media, or the BIOS settings entry flag / UEFI; in the fifteenth step, loading the target OS through kexec is initiated; in the sixteenth step, the target OS of the computer is loaded and activated. 2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that in the process of trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces, the time intervals for execution of both specific steps of the method and any of their combinations are monitored, and / or the sequence of steps of the method can be performed in a different order while maintaining the general logic of the implementation of the proposed method, and the division of the sequence of actions of the method into steps can be done differently, in particular with the combination of a number of steps of the method in one step or, conversely, with an additional division of complex steps into elementary ones, and a number of actions or steps of the method may be absent while maintaining the minimum the sequence of actions necessary to implement a trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces, including self-testing of the device, identification and authentication of users with differentiated user access to the computer, control of the boot of a given computer OS, control of program integrity mm environment and differentiation of access to the peripheral interfaces of the computer. 3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the decision to allow or deny user access to controlled peripheral interfaces can be made at other steps of the method for trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces, including controlled peripheral interfaces may be initially blocked, and their unlocking can be performed at subsequent steps of the method, and / or based on various additional factors or their combinations, which may or may not include the credentials of the authenticated user, and such additional factors may be the current stage of computer boot or the current step execution of the method, the mode of operation of the device, the presence and configuration of additional hardware and / or software protection means, the current hardware configuration of the protected computer. 4. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that the decision to allow or deny user access to controlled peripheral interfaces can be made at other steps of the method for trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces, including controlled peripheral interfaces may be initially blocked, and their unlocking can be performed at subsequent steps of the method, and / or based on various additional factors or their combinations, which may or may not include the credentials of the authenticated user, and such additional factors may be the current stage of computer boot or the current step execution of the method, the mode of operation of the device, the presence and configuration of additional hardware and / or software protection means, the current hardware configuration of the protected computer. 5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the method of trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces also includes actions to control and / or ensure the integrity of the BIOS / UEFI program of the computer, within which the device during the self-test procedure or after it verifies the BIOS / UEFI program of the computer with the BIOS / UEFI reference program embedded in the device's memory; if there is a discrepancy between the computer BIOS / UEFI program and the BIOS / UEFI reference program, the device may completely or partially block the computer from booting or replace the computer BIOS / UEFI program with the reference program and continue booting. 6. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that the method of trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces also includes actions to control and / or ensure the integrity of the BIOS / UEFI program of the computer, within which the device during the self-test procedure or after it verifies the BIOS / UEFI program of the computer with the BIOS / UEFI reference program embedded in the device's memory; if there is a discrepancy between the computer BIOS / UEFI program and the BIOS / UEFI reference program, the device may completely or partially block the computer from booting or replace the computer BIOS / UEFI program with the reference program and continue booting. 7. The method according to claim. 3, characterized in that the method of trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces also includes actions to control and / or ensure the integrity of the BIOS / UEFI program of the computer, within which the device during the self-test procedure or after it verifies the BIOS / UEFI program of the computer with the BIOS / UEFI reference program embedded in the device's memory; if there is a discrepancy between the computer BIOS / UEFI program and the BIOS / UEFI reference program, the device may completely or partially block the computer from booting or replace the computer BIOS / UEFI program with the reference program and continue booting. 8. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that the method of trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces also includes actions to control and / or ensure the integrity of the BIOS / UEFI program of the computer, within which the device during the self-test procedure or after it verifies the BIOS / UEFI program of the computer with the BIOS / UEFI reference program embedded in the device's memory; if there is a discrepancy between the computer BIOS / UEFI program and the BIOS / UEFI reference program, the device may completely or partially block the computer from booting or replace the computer BIOS / UEFI program with the reference program and continue booting. 9. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the device is a backbone module of an integrated protection system and in the process of performing the steps of the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces, it can also perform actions to automatically and / or interactively configure the hardware of the integrated protection system, in in particular, in the event that such hardware of the integrated protection system does not have its own user interface, but supports the possibility of such adjustment through the user interface of the backbone module, and also after completing all the steps of the method, the device during the operation of the loaded OS may be in the waiting mode for commands from the hardware or software of an integrated security system running in this OS to perform the functions provided by such commands, which may also include commands that provide for the collection and aggregation of transaction logs from tacos by the device th software and hardware. 10. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that the device is a backbone module of an integrated protection system and in the process of performing the steps of the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces, it can also perform actions to automatically and / or interactively configure the hardware of the integrated protection system, in in particular, in the event that such hardware of the integrated protection system does not have its own user interface, but supports the possibility of such adjustment through the user interface of the backbone module, and also after completing all the steps of the method, the device during the operation of the loaded OS may be in the waiting mode for commands from the hardware or software of an integrated protection system running in this OS to perform the functions provided for by such commands, which may also include commands that provide for the collection and aggregation of the operation logs by the device. wow software and hardware. 11. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that the device is a backbone module of an integrated protection system and in the process of performing steps of the method for trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces can also perform actions for automatic and / or interactive configuration of the hardware of the integrated protection system, in in particular, in the event that such hardware of the integrated protection system does not have its own user interface, but supports the possibility of such adjustment through the user interface of the backbone module, and also after completing all the steps of the method, the device during the operation of the loaded OS may be in the waiting mode for commands from the hardware or software of an integrated protection system running in this OS to perform the functions provided for by such commands, which may also include commands that provide for the collection and aggregation of the operation logs by the device. wow software and hardware. 12. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that the device is a backbone module of an integrated protection system and in the process of performing steps of the method of trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces can also perform actions for automatic and / or interactive configuration of the hardware of the integrated protection system, in in particular, in the event that such hardware of the integrated protection system does not have its own user interface, but supports the possibility of such adjustment through the user interface of the backbone module, and also after completing all the steps of the method, the device during the operation of the loaded OS may be in the waiting mode for commands from the hardware or software of an integrated protection system running in this OS to perform the functions provided for by such commands, which may also include commands that provide for the collection and aggregation of the operation logs by the device. wow software and hardware. 13. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that the device is a backbone module of an integrated protection system and in the process of performing steps of the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces, it can also perform actions to automatically and / or interactively configure the hardware of the integrated protection system, in in particular, in the event that such hardware of the integrated protection system does not have its own user interface, but supports the possibility of such adjustment through the user interface of the backbone module, and also after completing all the steps of the method, the device during the operation of the loaded OS may be in the waiting mode for commands from the hardware or software of an integrated protection system running in this OS to perform the functions provided for by such commands, which may also include commands that provide for the collection and aggregation of the operation logs by the device. wow software and hardware. 14. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that the device is a backbone module of an integrated protection system and in the process of performing steps of the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces can also perform actions to automatically and / or interactively configure the hardware of the integrated protection system, in in particular, in the event that such hardware of the integrated protection system does not have its own user interface, but supports the possibility of such adjustment through the user interface of the backbone module, and also after completing all the steps of the method, the device during the operation of the loaded OS may be in the waiting mode for commands from the hardware or software of an integrated protection system running in this OS to perform the functions provided for by such commands, which may also include commands that provide for the collection and aggregation of the operation logs by the device. wow software and hardware. 15. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that the device is a backbone module of an integrated protection system and in the process of performing steps of the method of trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces can also perform actions for automatic and / or interactive configuration of the hardware of the integrated protection system, in in particular, in the event that such hardware of the integrated protection system does not have its own user interface, but supports the possibility of such adjustment through the user interface of the backbone module, and also after completing all the steps of the method, the device during the operation of the loaded OS may be in the waiting mode for commands from the hardware or software of an integrated protection system running in this OS to perform the functions provided for by such commands, which may also include commands that provide for the collection and aggregation of the operation logs by the device. wow software and hardware. 16. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that the device is a backbone module of an integrated protection system and in the process of performing steps of the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces, it can also perform actions to automatically and / or interactively configure the hardware of the integrated protection system, in in particular, in the event that such hardware of an integrated protection system does not have its own user interface, but supports the possibility of such setting through the user interface of the backbone module, and also after performing all the steps of the method, the device during the operation of the loaded OS may be in the waiting mode for commands from the hardware software or software of an integrated protection system running in this OS to perform the functions provided for by such commands, which may also include commands that provide for the collection and aggregation of the operation logs by the device from that whom software and hardware. 17. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the protected computer is a terminal operating in the "thin client" mode, and the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces includes actions to download the target OS from a terminal server and check its integrity Before further loading, or the protected computer is a server, router or computer equipment that does not provide the user with the possibility of interactive interaction with the device, and the actions of the method of trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces are performed automatically, in particular, in accordance with the preset settings of the device. 18. The method according to claim. 2, characterized in that the protected computer is a terminal operating in the "thin client" mode, and the method of trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces includes actions to download the target OS from the terminal server and check its integrity before further booting, or the protected computer is a server, router or computer equipment that does not provide the user with the possibility of interactive interaction with the device, and the actions of the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces are performed automatically, in particular, in accordance with the preset settings of the device. 19. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that the protected computer is a terminal operating in the "thin client" mode, and the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces includes actions to download the target OS from a terminal server and check its integrity before further booting, or the protected computer is a server, router or computer equipment that does not provide the user with the possibility of interactive interaction with the device, and the actions of the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces are performed automatically, in particular, in accordance with the preset settings of the device. 20. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that the protected computer is a terminal operating in the "thin client" mode, and the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces includes actions to download the target OS from a terminal server and check its integrity Before further loading, or the protected computer is a server, router or computer equipment that does not provide the user with the possibility of interactive interaction with the device, and the actions of the method of trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces are performed automatically, in particular, in accordance with the preset settings of the device. 21. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that the protected computer is a terminal operating in the "thin client" mode, and the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces includes actions to download the target OS from a terminal server and check its integrity Before further loading, or the protected computer is a server, router or computer equipment that does not provide the user with the possibility of interactive interaction with the device, and the actions of the method of trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces are performed automatically, in particular, in accordance with the preset settings of the device. 22. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that the protected computer is a terminal operating in the "thin client" mode, and the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces includes actions to download the target OS from a terminal server and check its integrity Before further loading, or the protected computer is a server, router or computer equipment that does not provide the user with the possibility of interactive interaction with the device, and the actions of the method of trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces are performed automatically, in particular, in accordance with the preset settings of the device. 23. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that the protected computer is a terminal operating in the "thin client" mode, and the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces includes actions to download the target OS from a terminal server and check its integrity Before further loading, or the protected computer is a server, router or computer equipment that does not provide the user with the possibility of interactive interaction with the device, and the actions of the method of trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces are performed automatically, in particular, in accordance with the preset settings of the device. 24. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that the protected computer is a terminal operating in the "thin client" mode, and the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces includes actions to download the target OS from a terminal server and check its integrity Before further loading, or the protected computer is a server, router or computer equipment that does not provide the user with the possibility of interactive interaction with the device, and the actions of the method of trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces are performed automatically, in particular, in accordance with the preset settings of the device. 25. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that the protected computer is a terminal operating in the "thin client" mode, and the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces includes actions to download the target OS from a terminal server and check its integrity Before further loading, or the protected computer is a server, router or computer equipment that does not provide the user with the possibility of interactive interaction with the device, and the actions of the method of trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces are performed automatically, in particular, in accordance with the preset settings of the device. 26. The method according to claim 10, characterized in that the protected computer is a terminal operating in the "thin client" mode, and the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces includes actions to download the target OS from a terminal server and check its integrity Before further loading, or the protected computer is a server, router or computer equipment that does not provide the user with the possibility of interactive interaction with the device, and the actions of the method of trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces are performed automatically, in particular, in accordance with the preset settings of the device. 27. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that the protected computer is a terminal operating in the "thin client" mode, and the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces includes actions to download the target OS from a terminal server and check its integrity Before further loading, or the protected computer is a server, router or computer equipment that does not provide the user with the possibility of interactive interaction with the device, and the actions of the method of trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces are performed automatically, in particular, in accordance with the preset settings of the device. 28. The method according to claim 12, characterized in that the protected computer is a terminal operating in the "thin client" mode, and the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces includes actions to download the target OS from a terminal server and check its integrity Before further loading, or the protected computer is a server, router or computer equipment that does not provide the user with the possibility of interactive interaction with the device, and the actions of the method of trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces are performed automatically, in particular, in accordance with the preset settings of the device. 29. The method according to claim 13, characterized in that the protected computer is a terminal operating in the "thin client" mode, and the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces includes actions to download the target OS from a terminal server and check its integrity Before further loading, or the protected computer is a server, router or computer equipment that does not provide the user with the possibility of interactive interaction with the device, and the actions of the method of trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces are performed automatically, in particular, in accordance with the preset settings of the device. 30. The method according to claim 14, characterized in that the protected computer is a terminal operating in the "thin client" mode, and the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces includes actions to download the target OS from a terminal server and check its integrity Before further loading, or the protected computer is a server, router or computer equipment that does not provide the user with the possibility of interactive interaction with the device, and the actions of the method of trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces are performed automatically, in particular, in accordance with the preset settings of the device. 31. The method according to claim 15, characterized in that the protected computer is a terminal operating in the "thin client" mode, and the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces includes actions to download the target OS from a terminal server and check its integrity before further booting, or the protected computer is a server, router or computer equipment that does not provide the user with the possibility of interactive interaction with the device, and the actions of the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces are performed automatically, in particular, in accordance with the preset settings of the device. 32. The method according to claim 16, characterized in that the protected computer is a terminal operating in the "thin client" mode, and the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces includes actions to download the target OS from a terminal server and check its integrity Before further loading, or the protected computer is a server, router or computer equipment that does not provide the user with the possibility of interactive interaction with the device, and the actions of the method of trusted computer boot with control of peripheral interfaces are performed automatically, in particular, in accordance with the preset settings of the device. 33. The method according to one (any) of paragraphs. 1-32, characterized in that the device operates in the remote control mode carried out by the control server, and the method for trusted computer booting with control of peripheral interfaces includes actions for obtaining user profiles (accounts) from the control server, the authority of a user who has passed authentication, and / or profile (account) of the computer, as well as actions to send reports on the operations performed by the device and / or computer for the management server to maintain logs of operations and / or to perform the necessary modifications stored on the data management server. 34. A trusted computer boot device containing a main control microcontroller, non-volatile memory, a flash drive with an SPI interface, a high-speed electronic key controlled by the main control microcontroller software, a high-speed electronic key to provide blocking of writing to protected BIOS areas based on command control from the motherboard chipset computer to the drive via the SPI bus, a block of switches for selecting the operating mode of the device, a sound detector for additional information about detected abnormal situations, a block of interfaces for external devices, a control unit for the main power supply of the computer and a random number sensor, and the software of the main control microcontroller includes a module user identification and authentication, modules for checking the integrity and state of hardware and software components, a module for controlling the time intervals for the procedure for starting and booting a computer, a configuration module and devices and optional modules for controlling the loading of keys of hardware encryptors, interaction with the access control system, support for remote administration and device management, the client part of the "thin client" software and interaction with the servers of the information-computing system, the non-volatile memory contains storage units of the trusted operating system and device software, an electronic log for recording events during device operation, device settings and optional storage units for user credentials and settings and remote control keys, an SPI flash drive includes write-protected areas and contains a BIOS / UEFI of a computer, and the block of external device interfaces includes an SPI interface for connecting to the SPI bus of a computer motherboard chipset, a USB Host interface for connecting external devices, a 1-Wire interface for connecting identification of the Touch Memory type identifier and an intermodular interface for connecting hardware encoders, characterized in that the device includes an additional control microcontroller and software-controlled electronic components that perform the functions of electronic keys that are installed in the gap between the computer chipset and peripheral interfaces and provide physical connection or disabling peripheral interfaces, depending on commands received from an additional control microcontroller, the software of which includes a module for interaction with the main control microcontroller and a module that controls electronic components that perform the functions of electronic keys, which ensures the transmission of commands to these electronic components for connection or disconnection peripheral interfaces depending on the authority of the user who has passed the authentication and / or on the stage of computer boot, operating mode of the device, availability i and / or configuration of hardware and / or software protection and current hardware configuration of the computer.

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