RU2746300C1 - Method for rapid detection of small hidden means, which facilitate information leakage, unauthorized installed on mobile object - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: physics.

SUBSTANCE: invention relates to means for rapid detection and elimination of technical channels of leakage of confidential information. Method of rapid detection, which consists in the fact that database (B₁) is formed, after each movement of object on location screening object with metal mesh, excluding passage of signals with wavelength from formed database (B₁), receiving and recording signals from radio and other radiation sources on the terrain to a device, forming a second database (B₂) on selected spectra of said signals on the ground, removing the screen from the object, continuously receiving and recording signals of the radio electronic environment, selecting spectral components of the signals, comparing them with spectra from databases (B₁) and (B₂), in case of coincidence, the signal is excluded from further consideration, and when receiving at least one signal whose spectrum does not coincide with the spectrum from databases (B₁) and (B₂), object is screened, and conclusion is made on availability of hidden means facilitating information leakage at object.

EFFECT: technical result consists in improvement of reliability of detection of unauthorized hidden means.

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Description

The invention relates to a means of monitoring the operation of electronic equipment and can be used for the rapid detection and elimination of technical channels of information leakage, formed with the help of unauthorized hidden means installed on a mobile object that facilitate information leakage.

State of the art.

a) description of analogs

The known "Method for detecting unauthorized installation of electronic devices at the facility" implemented by RF patent No. 2392746, class G01R 29/08, H04K 3/00 App. 04/27/2009. The method consists in the fact that electromagnetic signals are received in a predetermined frequency range. Measure the parameters of the received signals - the carrier frequency f ₀ and the signal amplitude U ₀ at this frequency and store them, each of the signals is sequentially received at the frequencies of the n-th harmonic f _n , where n = 1, 2, 3 ... m. Measure the amplitude of the received signal U _n at the n-th harmonic and store it. After that, the amplitudes of the electromagnetic signal are compared at the frequencies corresponding to the harmonics, when U ₀ <U _{1, the} received signal is excluded from further analysis. If the condition U ₀ > U ₁ > U ₂ >… U _{m is} met, it is concluded that there is an unauthorized installed electronic device. The disadvantages of this method are: limited scope (only for identification of unauthorized installed devices with unsuppressed harmonics); a relatively long time of signal identification, as dangerous, since for its identification it is necessary to carry out not one, but a whole series of measurements on doubled, tripled, etc. frequencies; the method lacks a description of the actions to determine the true location of the identified unauthorized installed hidden device.

The known "Method for detecting and identifying unauthorized installation of electronic devices at the facility" implemented by RF patent No. 2309416, class G01R 29/08, Appl. 19.06.2006. The method consists in the fact that a database on the spectral components of side generator radiation of known unauthorizedly installed electronic devices for intercepting information and a database on the spectral components of radio emissions authorized at the object of electronic devices with a schedule of their operation is preliminarily formed. During the operation of the object, all radio signals from electronic installations at the object are received in a given frequency range, amplified, spectral components of signals exceeding a given threshold level are isolated and compared with data from pre-formed databases. Based on the comparison results, it is concluded that there are unauthorized electronic devices installed at the facility. The disadvantages of this method lie in the limited scope (only for stationary objects), in the low reliability of detecting unauthorized installed devices, due to the fact that the comparison of the spectra of signals detected during operation is performed with the spectra of only known electronic devices, without taking into account the electromagnetic environment at each new location work of the moved object. The main disadvantage of this method is that only spectral components of signals exceeding a given threshold amplitude level are analyzed (compared). This makes it impossible to use it for moving, constantly moving objects, when the dimensions of the controlled area are not constant (at some points in time, the dimensions of the controlled area are unknown), which creates the prerequisites for information leakage through a channel that satisfies the conditions for the correct operation of the object described in the specified way. b) description of the closest analogue (prototype)

The closest to the claimed technical solution in terms of the scope and the set of actions performed is the "Method for the dynamic detection of small-sized hidden means that facilitate the leakage of information unauthorizedly installed on a mobile object" described in RF patent No. 2503023, class G01R 29/08, app. 12/15/2010. The prototype method consists in the fact that in order to increase the reliability of detecting unauthorized devices installed (excluding false alarms to radiation sources that are not hidden means that contribute to information leakage outside the controlled area, but within electromagnetic accessibility), the following actions are additionally performed: form a database on the spectra of known and authorized hidden means installed on a mobile object that contribute to information leakage, pre-set a distance (Rzpr), outside of which the reception of signals emitted by hidden means unauthorizedly installed on a mobile object, contributing to information leakage, is preset, the number of auxiliary means for detection of electromagnetic signals of other hidden means that contribute to information leakage, which may be located in the reception area of the main detection tool and deploy them along the ma The route of the object's movement, the main means of detecting unauthorizedly installed hidden means that contribute to the leakage of information on the moving object is installed, the moving object is moved, the distance (R) between the auxiliary detection means and the moving object is measured during the movement, the measured distance (R) is compared with the specified one (Rzpr ), if necessary, change the route of movement of the moving object, form a channel for remote control and synchronization between the main and auxiliary detection means, measure simultaneously (synchronously) electromagnetic signals by the main and auxiliary detection means, transmit the signals received by the auxiliary detection means to the main detection means according to the formed remote control and synchronization channel. At the same time, in the main means of detection: they amplify the signals received by the main and auxiliary means of detecting hidden means that are unauthorizedly installed on a moving object, contributing to the leakage of information, highlight the spectral components of the signals received by the main and auxiliary means of detecting hidden means that are unauthorizedly installed on a moving object, contributing to leakage information. In addition, the spectral components of signals received by the main and auxiliary means of detecting hidden means that are unauthorizedly installed on a moving object and contributing to information leakage are compared in the PC of the main detection tool, based on the results of the comparison of the spectral components, a decision is made on whether the signal belongs to authorized electronic devices installed on the moving object, signals from external electronic devices or hidden means unauthorizedly installed on a moving object, contributing to information leakage.

The enumerated set of features of the prototype method provides, in comparison with the described analogs, an increase in the reliability of detection of unauthorized installed devices by eliminating false alarms, as well as expanding the scope of the method for various types of moving objects.

However, the prototype method has the following disadvantages:

1. In conditions of constant movement of objects, when the dimensions of the controlled area are not constant (at some moments of time, the dimensions of the controlled area are unknown), it is impossible to adequately set the distance (Rzpr), beyond which the reception of signals emitted by unauthorized hidden on the moving object is excluded. means.

2. Low efficiency of decision-making on the exact location of newly discovered radiation sources subject to further analysis, i. E. from the moment a new source of radiation is discovered and until it is identified as a hidden device unauthorizedly installed on the object, some time passes, during which a leak of information of limited access is possible.

3. The need for additional equipment - a given number of auxiliary means for detecting electromagnetic signals placed along the route of the object's movement; the appropriate number of people who are engaged in their deployment, maintenance, and roll-up; the need to create channels for remote control and synchronization between the main and auxiliary means of detecting electromagnetic signals, which is not always possible based on the situation.

These disadvantages significantly limit the scope of the prototype method for different conditions, for example, in the military field.

Disclosure of the essence of the invention

b) the technical result, the achievement of which the invention is aimed at

The objective of the invention is to create a method for the rapid detection of small-sized hidden means that contribute to the leakage of information unauthorizedly installed on a mobile, periodically moved on the ground object, allowing to eliminate the disadvantages of the prototype method:

to exclude the dependence of the reliability of detection of unauthorizedly installed hidden means on the unknown (constantly changing) value of the size of the controlled area;

to increase the efficiency of decision-making on the exact location of newly discovered radiation sources and their identification as hidden means installed at the facility, contributing to information leakage with the simultaneous exclusion of non-hazardous radiation sources;

to expand the scope of application of the method for various conditions of the situation (for example, in the military field) by eliminating the need for the deployment and maintenance of auxiliary means for detecting electromagnetic signals placed along the route of movement of the object, creating channels for remote control and synchronization between the main and auxiliary means for detecting electromagnetic signals and attracting for this appropriate number of people.

b) a set of essential features

The technical result is achieved by the fact that the prototype method for the dynamic detection of small-sized hidden means that contribute to the leakage of information unauthorizedly installed on a mobile, periodically moved on the ground object, which consists in the fact that they form a database about the spectra of known authorized hidden means installed on the object, contributing to leakage information, receive electromagnetic signals in a given frequency range to a radio receiving device located relative to the monitored object at a distance within which it is possible to receive signals emitted by hidden means unauthorizedly installed on a moving object that facilitate information leakage, amplify the received signals, isolate the spectral components of the received signals, compare the allocated spectra with the previously formed spectra in the database of hidden means authorized at the facility that contribute to the leakage of information used on object of control, decide on the presence of hidden means that facilitate information leakage, complement the following actions:

after each movement of the object on the ground to the area of operation for its intended purpose, the object is shielded with a metal mesh with a cell size, which significantly attenuates the transmission of signals with a wavelength from the formed database (B ₁ ) on the allocated spectra of known authorized hidden means installed on the object, the shield is grounded, and register signals from radio engineering and other radiation sources on the ground to a device located next to the shielded object, form a second database (V ₂ ) about the selected spectra of these signals on the ground in the area of operation of the object, remove the screen from the object, continuously receive and signals are recorded in a given frequency range to a device located next to a working object, the spectral components of the signals received during the operation of the object are isolated, these spectra are compared with the spectra from the database (B ₁ ) about the allocated spectra of known authorized installed on the object hidden from redstv and the spectra from the database (B ₂₎ of the allocated spectrum radio and other radiation sources in the area, in case of coincidence exclude signals from further consideration, and upon receiving at least one signal, whose spectrum does not coincide with any of the allocated spectrum from the databases of hidden means (B ₁ ) authorized at the object and radio or other emitting means on the ground in the area of the object (B ₂ ), the object is shielded with a metal mesh with a cell size that significantly attenuates the transmission of signals with a wavelength from the generated database (B ₁ ) about the allocated spectra of known authorized hidden means installed on the object, ground the shield, receive and record signals to the device located next to the shielded object, in case of significant signal attenuation, the spectrum of which did not coincide with the spectra from the databases (B ₁ ) and (B ₂ ) conclude that there are hidden funds at the facility, leaking information.

The set of essential features can also include:

shielding the object with a metal mesh with a cell size, which excludes the passage of signals with a wavelength from the generated database on the allocated spectra of the known hidden means installed on the object in two layers;

comparison of the selected spectra of the signals received during the operation of the object on the ground with the selected spectra entered in the pre-formed databases (B ₁ ) and (B ₂ ) is carried out using a special software tool;

detection of a signal, the selected spectrum of which does not coincide with any selected spectrum from the pre-formed databases (B ₁ ) and (B ₂ ) are automatically accompanied by audio and visual alarms (on the prohibition of information processing) displayed to the operator and (or) the head of the facility working for terrain;

reception of signals during the operation of the monitored unshielded object is conducted to a device located at the object.

A comparative analysis of the proposed solution with the prototype shows that the proposed method differs from the known one in that at each new place of operation of the mobile object an additional database of spectral components of the surrounding radio-electronic situation is created, a special method is used to determine the location of a suspicious radiation source for whether its location is dangerous or not. , i.e. on the object, or outside the object, by shielding the object with a metal mesh at a certain point in the measurement time. Also, the proposed method differs from the prototype in that there is no need for additional equipment located on the route of movement of the object, in the formation of remote control and synchronization channels, in an additional number of people who will deploy, maintain and move additional equipment.

c) a causal relationship between features and technical result

thanks to a new set of essential features in the method, it is possible to take into account the surrounding radio-electronic situation, to accurately determine the location of the source of suspicious radiation on an object on the object or outside the object, regardless of the size of the controlled area, including when the size of the controlled area is not known, which increases reliability of the technical result.

Due to the fact that there is no need for additional equipment placed on the route of movement of the object, in the formation of channels of remote control and synchronization, in attracting an additional number of people who will deploy, maintain and move additional equipment, the method can be applied, for example, in conditions where there is not enough equipment and people, and (or) it is forbidden (impossible) to form remote control and synchronization channels, which expands the scope for various conditions of the environment.

Evidence of compliance of the claimed invention with the conditions of patentability "novelty" and "inventive step".

The analysis of the prior art made it possible to establish that analogues characterized by a set of features identical to all features of the claimed method are absent, which indicates that the invention meets the “novelty” requirement of patentability.

The search results for known solutions in this and related fields of technology in order to identify features that match the distinctive features of the prototype of the features of the claimed object have shown that they do not follow explicitly from the prior art. The prior art also did not reveal the influence of the transformations envisaged by the essential features of the claimed invention on the achievement of the specified technical result. Therefore, the claimed invention meets the “inventive step” requirement of patentability.

"Industrial applicability" of the claimed method is due to the presence of an element base, on the basis of which devices for receiving, spectral analysis, formation, storage and processing of databases, as well as technologies and materials for the manufacture of a screen, realizing the claimed method, can be made.

Brief Description of Drawings

The claimed method is illustrated by drawings, which show:

fig. 1 is a block diagram of an algorithm of a method for prompt detection of small-sized hidden means that facilitate information leakage, unauthorizedly installed on a mobile object;

fig. 2 is a diagram of the mutual arrangement of an object on the ground, a device for receiving signals from radio emission sources, spectral analysis and a PC for forming, storing and processing databases;

fig. 3 is a diagram of the mutual arrangement of an object on the ground, a shield, a grounding device, a device for receiving signals from radio emission sources, spectral analysis and a personal computer for the formation, storage and processing of databases;

fig. 4 - metal mesh, the maximum cell diameter of which excludes (significantly weakens) the passage of signals with a wavelength from any of the radio-electronic equipment authorized at the facility.

Implementation of the invention

Description of the algorithm (Fig. 1):

In block 1, a database (B ₁ ) is formed on the spectra of known, authorized, hidden means installed at the facility that facilitate information leakage. In block 2, a range of controlled frequencies, routes of movement of an object on the ground, a schedule of radio electronic means are set. In block 3, the object is moved on the ground to the area of work for its intended purpose. In block 4, means for detecting radio emission sources are installed near the object. In block 5, the object is shielded with a metal mesh with a cell size, which excludes the passage of signals with a wavelength from the generated database (B ₁ ) about the allocated spectra of known authorized hidden means installed at the object (after each movement of the object on the ground to the area of operation for its intended purpose). In block 6, the shield is grounded. Block 7 receives and records signals from radio engineering and other radiation sources on the ground to a device located next to the shielded object. In block 8, a second database (V ₂ ) is formed about the selected spectra of these signals on the ground in the area of operation of the object. In block 9, the screen is removed from the object. In block 10, during the operation of the object on the ground, signals are continuously received and recorded in a given frequency range to a device located next to the working object. In block 11, the spectral components of the signals received during the operation of the object are separated. In block 12, these spectra are compared with the spectra from the database (B ₁ ) on the allocated spectra of known authorized hidden means installed at the facility, and in block 13 with the spectra from the database (V ₂ ) on the allocated spectra of radio engineering and other radiation sources on the ground. In block 14, the signal is excluded from further consideration if it matches any selected spectrum from the database (B ₁ ). In block 15, the signal is excluded from further consideration if it coincides with any selected spectrum from the database ( _B2 ). When receiving at least one signal, the spectrum of which does not coincide with any allocated spectrum from the databases of hidden means (B ₁ ) authorized at the object and radio or other emitting means on the ground in the area of the object (B ₂ ), block 16 is screened an object with a metal mesh with a cell size, which excludes the passage of signals with a wavelength from the generated database on the allocated spectra of known, authorized hidden means installed on the object (B ₁ ). In block 17, the shield is grounded. In block 18, signals are received and recorded to a device located near the shielded object. In block 19, it is checked whether the signal has disappeared (significantly weakened) or not, the spectrum of which did not coincide with the spectra from the databases (B ₁ ) and (B ₂ ). In block 20, the object continues to operate if the signal has not disappeared (has not weakened), since it is identified in this case as being outside the object. In block 21, in case of loss (significant attenuation) of the signal, a decision is made on the presence of a hidden means at the facility that facilitates information leakage and measures are taken to physically search for and destroy it. In block 22, the condition for the end of the movement of the object is checked, if the object is intended to be moved to a new area of operation, then they return to block 3 and perform all actions starting from block 4 in the new place of operation of the object as intended. In block 23, if there is no need to move the object, a condition is checked for completing the process of detecting unauthorizedly installed hidden means that facilitate information leakage. If the detection process is not completed, then go to block 10 and continue to sequentially perform actions from continuous reception and registration of signals in a given frequency range to a device located next to a working object until a decision is made on the presence of hidden means at the object that contribute to information leakage ... In block 24, the final processing of data on the results of the detection process of unauthorizedly installed on the object hidden means that contribute to information leakage is carried out

The possibility of technical implementation of the claimed method is explained by the following:

The means of detecting signals in a given frequency range is a panoramic receiver, described, for example, in the book "Panoramic receivers and spectrum analyzers" (edited by V. Martynov and Yu.I. Selikhov - Moscow: Sov. Radio, 1980, p. . 314-329). FIG. 2 shows a diagram of the relative position of an object on the ground, a device for receiving signals from radio emission sources, spectral analysis and a PC for forming, storing and processing databases of spectral analysis results. The technical capabilities of receiving electromagnetic signals are described, for example, in the book "Panoramic receivers and spectrum analyzers" (edited by VA Martynov and Yu.I. Selikhov - Moscow: Sov. Radio, 1980, pp. 134-148). Methods of signal transformation in order to form primary features for solving problems of signal recognition are described, for example, in the books: Alekseev A.A. and Kirilov A.B. "Technical analysis of signals and recognition of radio emissions." - SPb .: VAS, 1998, pp. 24-31; Marple Jr. S.L. "Digital Spectral Analysis and its Applications". - M .: Mir, 1990, pp. 43-67. The method for separating the spectral components of the signal is described, for example, in the book by Vollerner N.F. "Instrumental Spectral Analysis of Signals". - M .: Sov. Radio, 1977, pp. 39-78, 142-148, 159-178. Comparison of spectral components can be performed by the method described, for example, in the book "Detection of changes in the properties of signals and dynamic systems" (edited by M. Bassville and A. Banveniste. - M .: Mir, 1989, pp. 28-43).

The metal mesh, designed to screen a mobile object located on the ground (Fig. 3), in order to accurately determine the location (on-site / outside the object) of the signal source, which is considered as an unauthorized device that facilitates information leakage, can be made of a material with a high electrical conduction in order to reflect (partially absorb and scatter) or significantly attenuate electromagnetic signals from authorized radiation sources installed on the object.

The metal mesh, in contrast to the metal shields, was chosen as a screen due to the fact that it has a relatively lower weight, flexibility, relatively smaller dimensions and can be deployed / rolled up by a small number of people in a short time, which ensures the promptness of performing actions according to the claimed method. The maximum cell diameter (Fig. 4) of the metal mesh should be less than the wavelength of any signal from authorized on-site electronic devices to ensure complete shielding (significant attenuation) of all signals to ensure reliable identification of the radiation source. For example, in most cases, unauthorized devices that leak information use VHF and microwave ranges of meter (from 30 to 300 MHz, with a wavelength of 1 to 10 meters), decimeter (from 300 MHz to 3 GHz, with a wavelength of 10 centimeters up to 1 meter), centimeter (from 3 to 30 GHz, with a wavelength from 1 to 10 centimeters) and millimeter (from 30 to 300 GHz, with a wavelength from 1 mm to 1 cm) waves. Therefore, in order to eliminate false alarms, a metal mesh that does not transmit (significantly attenuates) signals with a wavelength of 1 millimeter to 1 centimeter, i.e. with a cell diameter of 1 millimeter, will be preferable. For shielding, meshes made of tinned steel and brass wire with mesh sizes from fractions (0.25) millimeters to units (3-6) millimeters are widely used. The shielding properties of the mesh are mainly determined by the reflection of an electromagnetic wave from its surface. The efficiency of a screen made of tinned low-carbon steel mesh with cells of 2.5-3 mm is 55-60 dB in the HF range (hundreds of MHz), and from a double mesh with a distance between layers of 100 mm, the efficiency of screens made of steel sheets is about 90 dB. Screening processes are considered, for example, in the book by A.A. Titov. "Technical methods and means of information protection." - Tomsk: Tomsk State University of Control Systems and Radioelectronics, 2010, pp. 188-192. The characteristics of screens and materials are described, for example, in the book by N.N. Kharlov. "Electromagnetic compatibility in the electric power industry". - Tomsk: Tomsk Polytechnic University, 2007, pp. 103-111.

Thus, the proposed method provides prompt detection of small-sized hidden means that facilitate information leakage, unauthorizedly installed on a mobile object with the required reliability and in various conditions of the situation, thereby achieving a new technical result.

Claims (6)

1. A method of prompt detection of small-sized hidden means that facilitate information leakage, unauthorizedly installed on a mobile, periodically moved on the ground object, which consists in the fact that they form a database on the spectra of known authorized hidden means installed on the object that contribute to information leakage, receive electromagnetic signals in a given frequency range to a radio receiver located relative to the monitored object at a distance within which it is possible to receive signals emitted by hidden means unauthorizedly installed on a mobile object that facilitate information leakage, amplify the received signals, isolate the spectral components of the received signals, compare the selected spectra with previously generated spectra in the database of hidden means authorized at the facility that contribute to the leakage of information used at the controlled object, make a decision on the presence of a hidden of well-known means contributing to the leakage of information, characterized in that: after each movement of the object on the ground to the area of work for its intended purpose, the object is shielded with a metal mesh with a cell size, which significantly attenuates the transmission of signals with a wavelength from the generated database (Bi) about the allocated spectra of known authorized hidden means installed on the object, the shield is grounded, received and recorded signals from radio engineering and other radiation sources on the ground to the device located next to the shielded object, form a second database ( _B2 ) about the allocated spectra of these signals on the ground in the area of operation of the object, remove the screen from the object, continuously receive and record during operation signals in a given frequency range to a device located next to a working object, select the spectral components of the signals received during the operation of the object, compare these spectra with the spectra from the database (B ₁ ) about the allocated spectra of known authorized hidden media installed on the object dstv, and with spectra from the database ( _B2 ) on the allocated spectra of radio engineering and other radiation sources on the ground, in case of coincidence, the signal is excluded from further consideration, and when at least one signal is received, the spectrum of which does not coincide with any selected spectrum from the databases of hidden means (B ₁ ) authorized at the facility and radio or other emitting means on the ground in the area of the object (B ₂ ), shielding the object with a metal mesh with a cell size that significantly attenuates the transmission of signals with a wavelength from the generated database ( B ₁ ) on the allocated spectra of known authorized hidden means installed on the object, ground the shield, receive and record signals to the device located next to the shielded object, in case of significant signal attenuation, the spectrum of which did not coincide with the spectra from the databases (B ₁ ) and (B ₂ ), conclude that there are hidden funds at the facility, joint venture specific to information leakage. 2. The method according to claim. 1, characterized in that the object is shielded with a metal mesh with a cell size, which excludes the passage of signals with a wavelength from the generated database of the allocated spectra of the known hidden means installed on the object in two layers. 3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the comparison of the selected spectra of the signals received during the operation of the object on the ground with the selected spectra entered in the pre-formed databases (B ₁ ) and (B ₂ ) is carried out using a special software tool. 4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the detection of a signal, the selected spectrum of which does not coincide with any selected spectrum from the pre-formed databases (B ₁ ) and (B ₂ ), is automatically accompanied by audio and visual alarms about the prohibition of information processing , brought to the operator and the head of the facility working on the ground. 5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the reception of signals during the operation of the monitored unshielded object is conducted to a device located at the object.

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