RU2710206C1 - Method of identification and evaluation of thermonuclear safety of covert camouflage nuclear explosion - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: measurement technology.

SUBSTANCE: invention relates to a method of identification and evaluation of thermonuclear safety of covert camouflage nuclear explosion. Post-explosion field parameters are measured and a judgment on the explosion is formed, wherein in the central zone of the doubtful phenomenon the wells are drilled into the cavity or from the explosion cavity, parameters of radiation fields and temperature along the well length are measured. Further, presence of extremums in parameters of radiation fields and temperature is detected, and by coincidence of coordinates of these extremums, the fact of nuclear testing is determined. In the presence of two extrema in the parameters of radiation fields and temperature, thermonuclear explosion is determined, and the ratio of amplitudes of radiation and thermal field parameters is used to estimate the thermonuclear explosion factor. Parameters of radiation fields and temperature are measured in the time interval either once or repeatedly, calculation of intensity drop of parameters of radiation fields and temperature, comparison of patterns of intensity drop of parameters of radiation fields and temperature, comparison with half-lives of chemical elements of minerals of enclosing rocks and by their coincidence confirms the fact of concealed nuclear or thermonuclear explosion.

EFFECT: possibility of identification and evaluation of thermonuclear safety of covert camouflage nuclear explosion.

1 cl, 1 dwg

Description

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The invention relates to the field of nuclear physics and may find application in monitoring the covert conduct of nuclear tests, mainly of very low power.

The technical problem to which the invention is directed.

An important contemporary international political issue is the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. One element of the solution to this problem is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Its implementation is assigned to the relevant Organization (CTBTO).

At present, at international meetings held by the CTBTO, it is noted that the existing methodological base does not allow to draw conclusions about the fact of violation of the CTBT with high reliability [1-3].

The level of technology.

One of the components of the verification (control) mechanism of the CTBT is on-site inspection (OSI) [1-4]. When conducting an OSI, it is expected to use a wide range of methods for measuring parameters of post-explosive processes, including multispectral and infrared measurements, sampling and analysis of solid, liquid, and gaseous samples, passive seismological monitoring, active seismometry, magnetometric, electrometric, and gravimetric surveys of the region [1-4].

The analogue.

Of the methods of identifying camouflage nuclear explosions (CE) that are used in world practice, methods based on recording the parameters of radiation fields and post-explosive seismic fields are most widely used.

When carrying out a NEC, a nuclear charger is placed, as a rule, in the terminal box.

For example, the method according to RF patent No. 2538243 "Method for the detection of radionuclide products obtained in an underground nuclear explosion." The invention can be used in systems for the identification of nuclear explosions based on natural radioactive gases (NORG) measured in the atmosphere.

Also known methods are: RU 2407039, RU 2068571, RU 2377597, US 6567498 V, CN 102713677 (A) CN 102713677 (B) EP 2538243 (A1) EP 2538243 (A4) EP 2538243 (B1) IL 220691 (A) JP 5703462 ( B2) 40 (C1) US 2013001431 (A1) US 8969825 (B2) WO 2011081566 (A1).

The most effective way is the "Method for identifying a nuclear explosion by the isotopes of krypton and xenon" (RU 2407039).

This method involves the release of a significant amount of the gas fraction of radioactive products.

As the main confirming fact of the CEW, drilling into a cavity (or terminal box, if it is not broken by an explosion) is used with coring and medium samples and their subsequent radiochemical analysis.

Prototype.

The generalized scheme of the procedure for identifying a covertly conducted QWF includes the sequential implementation of measures and technological operations:

receiving information about a dubious phenomenon from the CTBTO International Monitoring System (IMS);

Departure of a group of inspectors for OSI;

measurements of physical fields on the day surface;

well drilling and sampling from the cavity (end box) of the proposed CEW;

radiochemical analysis of selected samples;

formation of a judgment on a doubtful phenomenon and a conclusion on a violation (non-violation) of the CTBT.

The specified scheme of identification procedures is considered as a prototype.

At the same time, it can be logically assumed that the covert quantum well will have a sufficiently low energy release (of negligible power, less than 1 ton of TNT equivalent, or with an energy of less than 4.2 * 10 ⁹ J).

Such an insignificant amount of energy release makes it difficult to identify a dubious phenomenon, as a secretly conducted quantum well.

In this case, additional arguments are needed to increase the reliability and reliability of the identification of the covert QW.

The technical result of the invention.

The technical result of the proposed method is to expand the list and increase the number of physical fields generated by a nuclear explosion and included in the identification signs. The parameters of these fields, which are unambiguously associated with a nuclear explosion, make it possible to strengthen the argumentation in identifying a dubious phenomenon.

The purpose of the invention is to increase the reliability and evidence of the secretive conduct of the CEW.

The way to achieve a technical result.

The specified result and goal are achieved by the fact that in the proposed method, additionally, joint measurements of the parameters of thermal and radiation fields in the rock mass are carried out at a distance from the location of the nuclear explosive device (outside the cavity).

This goal is achieved by inclusion in the list of physical fields of a thermal field with an unambiguously substantiated relationship of its parameters with the parameters of radiation fields exclusively of a nuclear explosion.

The proposed method is characterized in that in the central zone of the dubious phenomenon, wells are drilled in the direction of the cavity or from the explosion cavity, measurements of radiation field parameters and temperature measurements are carried out along the length of the well, the presence of extrema in the parameters of radiation fields and temperature is detected, and the coordinates of these extrema are judged by the coincidence about the fact of a camouflage nuclear explosion. In the presence of two extrema in the parameters of radiation fields and temperature, the fact of a thermonuclear explosion is judged, and the coefficient of thermonuclear explosion is estimated by the ratio of the amplitudes of the parameters of radiation and thermal fields.

To strengthen the argument of the fact that the quantum wells are carried out, the parameters of the radiation fields and the temperature are measured once or repeatedly over a period of time, the decrease in the intensity of the parameters of the radiation fields and temperature is calculated, the regularity of the decrease in the intensity of the parameters of the radiation fields and temperature is compared, compared with the half-lives of the chemical elements of the minerals of the host rocks and by coincidence, they confirm the fact of a secretly conducted nuclear or thermonuclear explosion.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The proposed method can be implemented as follows.

During the operation of the OSI, a well is drilled in (from) the cavity of the quantum well or end box.

The parameters of radiation fields for the presence of alpha, beta and gamma radiation, as well as the parameters of thermal fields are measured along the entire length of the well.

The presence of coinciding extrema along the length of the well indicates the fact of conducting a quantum well.

If there are two such extremes, then this indicates the fact of a thermonuclear explosion.

The presence of extremes is explained by two groups of neutrons due to the fission reaction (neutrons with energies up to 2.35 MeV) and fusion reactions (neutrons with energies 12.2-14.9 MeV) [4-8]. Neutrons, as they propagate in the array, spend energy on elastic and inelastic scattering [7-10]. When the neutron energy is reduced to the “thermal” level, they are captured by the nuclei of the chemical elements that make up the minerals of the constituent rocks.

Naturally, the neutrons of the fission group are absorbed at smaller distances from the nuclear charger than the neutrons of the fusion group. Thus, two radiation belts are formed in the ground.

Removal of radiation belts is determined by the mineral composition of the constituent rocks. Estimatedly, for granite, the removal of the belt due to fission neutrons is 10 m, fusion neutrons - 14 m, and for gallite - 4 m and 7 m, respectively.

At the locations of the radiation belts, interconnected (synchronously), higher values of the parameters of thermal fields (temperature extremes) should be observed. The basis for this assumption is mainly the reaction of radiation capture of neutrons by the nuclei of chemical elements of minerals composing rocks.

To confirm the judgment on the fact of quantum wells in (from) the cavity, several wells are drilled in different directions.

In addition, the procedure for measuring the parameters of radiation and thermal fields is carried out after a period of time. According to the measurement results, a regularity of the decrease in intensity is established, which should be synchronous and correspond to the radiation characteristics of chemical elements (half-lives) of the minerals of the constituent rocks. This is an additional argument for identifying a doubtful phenomenon.

The essence of the proposed method is illustrated schematically in the figure (Fig. 1).

In the rock massif (1), wells (3) are drilled from the cavity or end box (2) of the proposed location for the CEW. Depending on the situation, the wells may also be drilled into the cavity of the proposed quantum well.

Along the length of the wells, measurements of the parameters of radiation fields (alpha, beta, and gamma radiation), as well as the parameters of thermal fields (soil temperature at the point under study) are carried out.

Based on the measurement results, graphs of changes in the parameters of radiation fields (4) and (5) and temperature (6) and (7) are built. By the presence of coinciding extrema (4) and (6) on the graphs, a nuclear explosion is judged. If there are two more coinciding extrema (5) and (7), a thermonuclear explosion is judged.

By the results of repeated (after a period of time) measurements of the parameters of radiation (8), (9) and thermal (10), (11) fields and the establishment of the synchronism of a decrease in the values of the extrema, the fact of covert QW is confirmed.

Using the ratio of the amplitudes of the parameters of radiation (4) and (5) and thermal (6) and (7) fields, taking into account the spatial divergence R1 (12) and R2 (13), the thermonuclear fusion coefficient is estimated.

When conducting a powerful quantum well, radiation and thermal belts can be in the zone of hydrodynamic processes and their identification should be carried out taking into account residual displacements of the soil [5, 11, 12].

With a very powerful QW, the belts fall into the explosion cavity and their identification is impossible [5, 11, 12].

Justification of compliance with the eligibility criterion of "novelty."

The proposed technical solution is new because publicly available sources do not have information about the identification method based on a joint analysis of the parameters of radiation fields and temperature, synchronous coincidence of the laws of change of these fields with temperature and the proximity of these laws to the half-lives of the chemical elements that make up the minerals of the rocks.

Justification of compliance with the eligibility criterion of "inventive step".

The proposed technical solution has an inventive step, since it does not explicitly follow from published scientific data and known technical solutions that the stated ratio of the parameters of radiation and thermal fields is synchronous in place and time.

In addition, the current OSI Operational Manual (CTBT-TL-18-50. Peol 13), developed as part of the CTBTO, does not include such a technical approach.

Justification of compliance with the eligibility criterion "industrial applicability".

The proposed technical solution is industrially applicable, since standard equipment, devices and materials can be used for its implementation.

The implementation of the method.

The possibility of implementing the proposed method is quite obvious, since it does not require the development of a fundamentally new technology and equipment.

The rationale for the technical and economic effectiveness of the invention.

Feasibility of the proposed method is to reduce costs, because can be carried out in parallel with standard OSI procedures.

LIST OF USED SOURCES

1. O. Dalman, S. Mikkelvayt, H. Haak. Nuclear tests in world politics. International Processes, 2014, No. 3, 5 pp.

2. Electronic resource: https://www.ctbto.org/?id=317.

3. Aleshin DB, Troyanov A.F. Analysis of nuclear activities. Strategic stability No. 3/2014, 9 pp.

4. Physics of a nuclear explosion. T. 5. Control of nuclear tests. - M .: Fizmatlit, 2017 .- 788 p.

5. Physics of a nuclear explosion. T. 1. The development of the explosion. - M .: Fizmatlit, 2009 .-- 832 p.

6. Martynenko V.P. and other Gamma-radiation products of instant fission, --L .: Gidrometeoizdat, 1971.237 p.

7. Characteristics of instant fission products. Reference book, - M .: Atomizdat, 1983. 311 p.

8. Gusev N.G., Dmitriev P.P. Radioactive chains. Directory. - M .: Energoatomizdat, 1988.112 s.

9. Levin V.E., Khamyanov L.P. Measurement of nuclear radiation. M., Atomizdat, 1969.

 S. 34-43.

10. Physical quantities: Reference book / A.P. Babichev and others; Ed. I.S. Grigoryeva, E.Z. Meilikhova. - M .; Energoatomizdat, 1991. 1232 p.

11. Rodionov V.N., Adushkin V.V., Kostyuchenko V.N. et al. The mechanical effect of an underground explosion, M., Nedra, 1971.

12. Kocharyan GG, Spivak AA, Deformation of block massifs of rock, M., ICC "Academkniga", 2003.

Claims (2)

1. A method for identifying and evaluating the thermonuclearity of a covertly camouflage nuclear explosion, which consists in measuring the parameters of post-explosive fields and in judging the fact of conducting a camouflage nuclear explosion, characterized in that in the central zone of the dubious phenomenon, wells are drilled into the explosion cavity or from the explosion cavity, measuring the parameters of radiation fields and measuring temperature along the length of the well, identify the presence of extrema in the parameters of radiation fields and temperature and the coincidence of coordinates these extrema are judged on the fact of a camouflage nuclear explosion, and if there are two extrema in the parameters of radiation fields and temperature, they are judged on the fact of a thermonuclear explosion, and the coefficient of thermonuclear explosion is estimated by the ratio of the amplitudes of the parameters of radiation and thermal fields. 2. The method according to p. 1, characterized in that the measurements of the parameters of the radiation fields and temperature measurements are carried out once or repeatedly over a period of time, the decrease in the intensity of the parameters of the radiation fields and temperature is calculated, the regularity of the decrease in the intensity of the parameters of the radiation fields and temperature is compared, compared with half-lives chemical elements of the minerals of the host rocks and by their coincidence confirm the fact of a secretly conducted nuclear or thermonuclear explosion.

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