RU2673385C1 - Method of data exchange recording control in information - telecommunication network and identification system of electron mail - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: document management tools.SUBSTANCE: invention relates to methods and means for controlling the processes of documenting and evaluating the authenticity of objects consisting of sets of data bits, and is intended to create automated systems for monitoring and monitoring the movement of objects from one storage location to another. Invention is implemented by electronic devices, called User's Mail Modules (UMM), which, when connected to electronic equipment for the exchange of electronic messages (EM), allow to send and receive in a special way additionally prepared EM in the Information and Telecommunication Network (ITN), using hardware and software of an electronic device that realizes the ability to work of all the used UMMs, called the Certifying System (CS), which has its own version of the UMM, called the Postal Certificate System Module (PCSM), and allows to combine the UMM into a single network (SUMM). And when passing the sets of EM bits through the SUMM, interconnected chains are formed from the data identifiers of the EM and the SUMM subjects, the network address of the equipment with the UMM sending the EM, the network address of the CS with the PCSM and the network address of the equipment with the UMM receiving the EM, and the sets of bits of the hash codes (HC) are created as part of the EM bit set, in which each successive HC is determined taking into account the previous one.EFFECT: technical result is a simple, convenient and reliable way to manage the processes of preparing the composition of objects transported using telecommunications.2 cl, 3 dwg

Description

The invention relates to methods and means for controlling the processes of documenting and assessing the authenticity of objects consisting of sets of data bits, and is intended to create automated systems for moving such objects from one storage location to another.

The closest analogues prototypes of the invention are systems and methods used in the exchange of electronic messages certified by an Electronic Signature (E) in the Information and Telecommunication Network (ITS), including using electronic mail (EPC).

The objective of the invention is to develop a simple, convenient and, at the same time, reliable way to control the processes of preparing the composition of objects moved using telecommunications. The invention provides the necessary level of integrity control of such objects and the identification of spatial and temporal localization parameters, after their movement in ITS or in data transmission networks (SPD), by analytical evaluation and comparative analysis of the content of memory cells of the corresponding used and control electronic equipment.

The invention consists in  that a method for managing data exchange documentation is proposed,  including the ability to manage documentation when transmitting telecommunications data in the form of emissions,  signals  voice information  written text  images  sounds or other data of any kind using the radio,  wired  optical and other systems  eg,  in the form of Electronic Messaging transmissions,  further designated by the abbreviation ES,  as part of information and telecommunication networks,  hereinafter referred to as ITS,  including email  hereinafter referred to by the abbreviation EHF,  as part of ITS,  as well as when transmitting ES,  as short text messages using a cell phone in a cellular system,  eg,  CMC on the Data Network,  hereinafter referred to as the abbreviation SPD,  known about  that at any moment of transmission and storage of electronic devices by electronic devices in ITS,  EHF or SPD,  ES are real existing material objects,  fully localized or partially distributed in the form of electrical signals,  residual induction,  electric charges  suitably prepared electromagnetic waves,  electromagnetic impulses,  magnetic polarizing or spin effects,  and it is known  what,  if necessary  without changing the essence,  ES are transformed from one such form of physical state to another according to well-known rules,  can be determined and measured,  like sets of separate electrical,  magnetic  electromagnetic and other natural phenomena,  can also be represented and quantified,  as ordered strings of bits of limited length,  and that all this allows us to consider the ES as an immutable instrumentally recorded material object,  located  either in an electronic device,  or in the process of moving from one such device to another by means of signals,  so,  Further,  speaking of the transfer  reception  moving  sending or receiving ES,  this refers to actions with ordered sets of ES bits,  like physical objects  known about  that to determine the integrity of the transmitted ordered set of bits of ES,  using the ES submission form,  like strings of bits of a fixed length,  and when implementing document management, an electronic device may be used,  able to calculate a hash code,  hereinafter referred to by the abbreviation HC,  like a string of bits,  resulting from a hash function  that is, functions  which maps a string of bits of arbitrary length to a string of bits of fixed length,  and wherein,  a properly selected hash function has these three properties,  like the first  which attributes that  that for a given value of the function it is difficult to calculate the source data,  mapped to the same function value,  like the second  such  that for given input data it is difficult to calculate other input data,  mapped to the same function value,  and like a third  such  that it’s difficult to calculate any pair of input data,  mapped to the same value,  and subject to the availability of these properties,  it’s also known that  that the value of such an XK for the same ordered set of bits,  when using the standard hash function,  independent of subjects  object or place of its calculation,  so,  such HC can be used not only to determine the integrity of ES,  but also to determine whether an ES belongs to a specific device,  which  known cryptography techniques,  using,  entered into this device or into another electronic control device connected to it,  unique secret key  can,  convert an ordered set of bits XK,  determining the integrity of the ES,  into a new set of bits,  which in this way  through this secret number,  will connect the ES with the device,  in which this secret key is entered and,  hence,  because,  that there are known methods and methods of identification and authentication of subjects and objects of telecommunication processing,  moreover, it is known  that the reliability of such methods and approaches to identification and authentication of subjects and objects of telecommunication systems is constantly increasing,  special,  with the development of mobile cellular and satellite communications,  also,  as in connection with the development of electronic payment systems,  using ATMs  electronic wallets  electronic software and hardware devices for accepting plastic cards for payment,  including with integrated microelectronic devices,  moreover,  it is known  that with identification and authentication,  eg,  mobile means of cellular communication of users or payment cards of users of payment systems,  can be used in SPD and ITS,  electronic devices  using well-known cryptography algorithms,  as,  eg,  such,  when one device  transmitting their identity  and other,  receiving this data  both have a unified secret key stored in their memory for implementing this method or,  eg,  another algorithm  when the device  transmitting identity  has his  located in it  a pair of keys  serving to implement this algorithm,  of which one key is secret,  and another open,  and wherein,  device,  receiving the identification data sent to him,  uses only the public key of the implementation of the specified algorithm,  but it is known  that the processes of device identification and authentication by the above algorithms are equivalent and are carried out using such  coupled by any of the above algorithms a pair of numbers,  that the first is transmitted unchanged,  and the second number is obtained from the first using a secret key,  recorded in the identification device during its manufacture,  and the completion of the identification and authentication process is carried out according to the results of extraction from the second of the first with a further verification of their identity,  and thus,  Considering,  that any characters can be transmitted to the ES in the form of a bit structure,  which  in its turn,  broadcast using signals  and wherein,  Telecommunication technical protection systems are known and continue to improve,  and,  provided,  that such systems use personal data of users and system operators,  such methods  technical solutions and algorithms can be used to confirm the fact of sending or receiving any ordered sets of bits,  including such  which make up the ES or are attached to the ES of the users of SPD or ITS,  e.g. EHF,  using such networks  as well as to confirm integrity,  transmission  i.e. sending  and receiving  that is, reception  and as a consequence of all of the above,  a method for managing data exchange documentation is presented,  characterized in  that to implement the management of documentation of ES and the identification of devices,  sending and receiving sets of ES bits,  securing immutability  that is, the integrity of passing bits of ES,  It is proposed to use electronic devices that control the process of documenting data and generating ES,  which in their properties are similar to those mentioned above,  and for convenience,  called Post User Modules,  hereinafter referred to by the abbreviation PMP,  allowing sending and receiving additionally specially prepared ES in ITS or SPD,  including using EHF,  organize a network  uniting PMP,  which is further denoted by the acronym SPMP,  in which ES exchange can be implemented,  and which can be built on the basis of any communication lines and channels,  including based on existing networks with their ES exchange capabilities,  eg,  ELF or CMC,  device,  allowing to realize the ability to work SPMP,  called a Certification System,  further denoted by the acronym CSS  which has its own version of PMP,  named Email Certification System Module,  hereinafter referred to by the acronym PMUS,  moreover,  PMUS has a larger  than other PMP,  memory size  a processor with a higher performance or a greater number of them,  and at the same time provided and provided,  that each PMP is connected by the commonality of the embedded properties and the uniformity of the used control and command protocols with the PMUS,  and when passing through the ES in the PSMP, chains are connected among themselves from the identifiers of the ES,  network address of the equipment  to which the PMP or PMP itself is connected,  sending ES,  network address of the US or PMUS and the network address of the equipment,  to which the PMP is connected,  receiving ES,  and at the same time, chains of HC are created as part of the ES,  in which each subsequent HC is calculated taking into account the previous one,  for all that  that each PMP is used either as an independent device,  possessing all the basic features of a portable or stationary computer with input and output devices,  able to connect to ITS or SPD,  or to ITS and SPD,  and support appropriate ES exchange protocols in such networks,  or as a necessary element of PSMP as part of other equipment,  able to work in such networks,  providing  including,  the possibility of unambiguous recognition of the PMP and the ES prepared by it,  Besides,  having,  due to its characteristics and the features laid down in it for its connection to the equipment used,  the ability to provide the use of a technical protection system for exchanging ordered sets of bits,  including registration of the operation of devices in time,  and all this provided  that PMP works,  as a standalone device or as part of the communication equipment used,  has an integrated processor or multiple processors,  built-in memory and control records recorded in it,  logical and command protocols  Besides,  provided,  that each PMP can be related by the commonality of the embedded properties and the uniformity of the used control and command protocols with other PMPs,  which allows  using ITS or SPD and related equipment,  exchange ES,  and,  in this way,  provided and provided,  that each PMP with its unique Identification Number,  hereinafter referred to by the abbreviation IN,  uniquely associated with an addressed memory area,  called in this method memory cells PMUS in the US SPMP,  which  in its turn,  due to the connection of the PMUS to it,  allows the equipment to control the exchange of various kinds of ES,  through existing communication lines,  become equipment for the functioning of the PSMP,  for what,  PMUS has access to information about all ID PMP,  with their corresponding secret,  or corresponding to their secret,  known numbers of PMP,  Besides,  PMUS has the ability to use the necessary set of memory blocks,  including those reserved in equipment for the functioning of the CSS SPMP,  corresponding to the total number of served PMP and ensures the placement of ES,  received from different PMPs,  in the respective memory cells used by each ID PMP,  moreover,  all PMP,  including PMUS,  for exchange ES can have in ITS or SPD,  or in ITS and SPD,  Temporary or permanent network address  including,  can use the network address of equipment connected to the PMP,  eg,  in the case of using existing EHF networks,  EHF addresses can be used,  and according to the rules laid down in the PMP,  using hash functions  built-in algorithms  connected equipment  all PMPs can determine the HC of any set of bits and,  then,  associate them with your secret number according to a special rule,  wherein,  for determining,  documentation and storage of ES parameters,  prepared under the management of PMP,  HCs obtained using the common for all PMP are used,  standard hash function,  moreover,  to increase security and eliminate possible coincidences of using the same HK for different ES,  several CKs from different known hash functions can be applied for each ordered set of ES bits,  forming in this case Conglomerate HC,  denoted by the abbreviation KHK,  but further  without losing the essence of the described Method,  and to simplify its presentation,  consider using only one  the hash function common to all PMPs,  which allows you to define HC bits for any ordered ES Bit Sets,  further denoted by the acronym NB ES,  and wherein,  each of HC NB ES,  as a general rule  can be included in specially created additional NS ES,  but further  without losing the essence of the described Method,  and to simplify its presentation,  considered the option of preparing to send only one NS ES,  as a result of which  if necessary, move the set of bits with the help of ES,  eg,  for comfort,  denoted by the symbols NB # 1,  and thanks to the managers contained in each PMP,  logical and command protocols  it is possible to associate NS # 1 ES with IN PMP the secret number contained in the PMP in such a way  which allows you to determine the PMP,  used in SPMP,  prepared by the PMP additional ordered NB,  called the NB Requisite Part of ES,  Further,  for comfort,  denoted by the abbreviation NBRCH or symbols NB # 2,  accompanying each of these ES,  and since NB # 2 ES contains bits of characters XK defined for NB # 1 ES,  and may also contain symbol bits of the main temporal and spatial parameters characterizing ES,  then to send the ES,  connected to the sending ES equipment PMP,  creates one in his memory,  and if necessary, two or more identical copies of NB # 1 can be created for inclusion in the ES,  However,  Further,  without losing the essence of the described Method,  and to simplify its presentation,  considered the option of creating only one instance of NB # 1 in the memory of the PMP,  and thus,  PMP for the preparation of sending ES creates NBN№2,  using XK character bits when creating it,  specific to NB # 1,  moreover,  when forming an ES in NB # 2, a set of symbol bits of the Notification of sending ES may be included,  including,  characterizing the departure time,  ID and email address of the manager of the preparation for sending the PMP or equipment connected to it in the ES exchange network,  ID and email address of the PMP or equipment connected to it,  receiving ES,  and character bits of other parameters,  necessary for the implementation of the ES regime,  and then,  PMP  having attached NB # 2 to the power unit,  as the first component of the Registration and Registration Bit Sets for ES,  further designated by the acronym URNB ES,  defines HC NB # 2,  then,  this HC NB # 2 gets the name of the Trusted Hash Code ES,  hereinafter referred to by the acronym DHC ES,  as part of an orderly NBDCK ES specially created for the purposes of its updating,  Further,  for comfort,  denoted by the symbols NB # 3,  as the second component of URNB,  in addition containing bits of characters of the second value DHK ES,  cryptographically linked by a secret number of PMP,  and wherein,  in NB # 3 may contain bits of characters of such data,  as,  eg,  conditional name of ES date and time of creation of ES,  ID and e-mail address of the manager of the preparation for sending the PMP or equipment connected to it in the ES exchange network,  ID and electronic address of the PMP or equipment connected to it receiving ES,  as well as the PMUS email address,  and,  in this way,  further bits of the characters DHK ES,  determine the integrity of the ES,  are inextricably linked with the content of ES and are unique,  a unique identifier of the ES itself,  which allows the PMP to complete the preparation of the ES for shipment,  determine his email address PMUS,  as a priority at a given time,  and,  using appropriate control and software protocols and equipment for the exchange of ES,  send NB # 1,  NB # 2,  and NB # 3 with one ES at the PMUS address through the ES exchange service,  eg,  EHF in ITS or SPD,  Where,  Further,  DC equipment for exchanging ES with PMUS connected to it,  using the available set of software and hardware  including  eg,  relevant Email Client,  denoted by the acronym PCL,  eg,  through the EHF service,  checks all incoming ES on his email address,  and,  by characteristic  such that  as,  eg,  features of the ordering of ES bit sets,  reveals among the received ES,  those,  which are formed under the control of PMP,  then,  moves them to the memory of the PMUS or to the memory of the device,  reserved for the needs of PMUS,  implements verification procedures for NBN2 and NBN3 of the received URNB ES with the help of a secret or open number corresponding to this PMP,  according to the type of algorithm used,  for the presence of a reliable connection of the set of bits DHK ES,  that is HC NB # 2,  contained in the form of bits of characters in NB # 3,  with a set of bits,  obtained from  contained in the form of bits of characters in NB # 3,  DHK ES,  associated with the secret number of the PMP that created it,  after which it places the ES in the memory cells,  relevant ID PMP,  managing the preparation of the ES for shipment,  designed to store the transmitted data ES,  and then PMUS,  using your own programs,  managers  logical and command protocols  independently determines the HC bits for NB # 1 from ES and compares with HC NB # 1 from ES,  which is contained in the form of bits of characters in NB # 2,  what,  in case of coincidence of these bit structures,  as well as the results of comparing bits DCK ES and bits,  obtained using a secret number for PMP,  managing the preparation of the ES for shipment,  from bits of characters DHK ES,  associated with the secret number of the PMP who prepared it,  contained in NB # 3,  allows the PMUS to accommodate NB # 3,  in the memory cells used by the PMUS for further storage of service data,  then,  based on bit sets,  received from ES,  NB # 1 and NB # 2,  creates one or more of its ordered NBCHK ES,  Further,  for comfort,  designated NB # 4,  using bits of characters DHK ES,  bits of characters HC NB # 2,  associated with a secret PMUS number,  and for example  bits of characters for the date and time of creation of the ES,  ID and electronic addresses of the preparing and receiving ES PMP or equipment connected to them,  and others,  However,  Further,  without losing essence  describes the creation of only one NB # 4,  and thus,  after that,  PMUS determines his electronic address of equipment with PMP,  receiving ES,  as a priority at a given time,  and,  using appropriate software and control protocols and equipment for the exchange of ES ES,  through an electronic messaging service,  eg,  through EHF to ITS or SPD,  sends to the address of the PMP or devices,  connected to PMP,  receiving ES,  one e-mail NB # 1,  NB # 2 and NB # 4,  then PMP,  receiving ES  using the equipment connected with it for the exchange of ES and,  eg,  corresponding PKL,  checks the ES coming to his address,  and by characteristic  eg,  features of the ordering of ES bit sets,  discovers prepared under the control of PMUS NB ES,  which,  moves to its memory and checks with a special known PMP number and algorithm,  by analogy with the actions of the PMUS when checking incoming ES,  and acting like that  as described above,  that is, it checks NB # 2 and NB # 4 of the received URNB ES with the help of a secret or open number with the appropriate PMUS,  according to the type of algorithm used,  for the presence of a reliable connection of the set of bits DHK ES,  that is HC NB # 2,  contained in the form of bits of characters in NB # 4,  with a set of bits,  obtained from the symbols contained in the form of bits in NB # 4 of the DHK ES,  associated with the secret number of the PMUS that created it,  then,  using your own programs,  managers  logical and command protocols  independently determines the HC bits for NB # 1 from ES and compares with HC NB # 1 from ES,  which is contained in the form of bits of characters in NB # 2,  what,  in this way,  with a positive test result,  allows PMP,  received ES,  built-in algorithms to realize free access,  equipment connected to the PMP,  to the content of the obtained ES,  that is, to NB # 1,  NB # 2 and NB # 4,  at the same time  revealing the source address of the ES,  as the electronic address of the equipment and IN PMP,  managing the preparation of the ES for shipment,  while saving in the memory cells PMP,  receiving ES,  NB # 1 and NB # 2,  created under the control of PMP,  preparing for sending ES,  and NB # 4 prepared for shipment under the control of PMUS,  and,  Now,  as it can be understood from the above text,  it can be argued,  that the proposed method for initializing the PMP,  including PMP option,  named PMUS,  used to control the preparation of ordered sets of bits,  which can be moved in the information and telecommunication network or data transmission networks,  including in the ITS “Internet” using ES exchange technologies,  eg,  EHF,  Association of PMP in SPMP,  managing the creation of additional ordered sets of bits,  such  as described above NBN2,  NB # 3 and NB # 4,  individual or unique for each PMP,  secret numbers  saving instances of NB Trusted Hash Codes,  formed under the control of PMP in memory cells,  used PMUS,  all this provides the ability to manage training,  transmitting and receiving ES,  verification of their integrity and authenticity of the source,  localization of time and address of creation,  including such ES,  which the operator is  using PMUS,  can additionally certify it with his electronic signature or, if necessary and upon request,  to accompany the EC with a Certification Sheet,  as an accompanying one represented by an ordered set of bits,  electronic document  a paper document with handwritten signatures in it.

A Method is proposed (Clause 1 of the formula), which, in addition to well-known telecommunication technologies and methods, allows quite simply, efficiently and reliably not only exchange (send and receive) electronic messages (ES), but also determine the integrity of transmitted ESs and carry out their identification and authentication, and, if necessary, record receipt by the addressee of the sent ES.

The closest analogues of the Method and System are the electronic mail systems (EPC) in the Internet telecommunication network (ITS) and the Short Message Service systems in mobile communication networks

We will accept the following definitions (see the Appendix for a List of terms used and their definitions) that ITS is a technological system designed to transmit data via communication lines that are accessed using computer equipment; SPD - a combination of three or more terminal devices (terminals) of communication, connected by data transmission channels and switching devices (network nodes), providing the exchange of messages between all terminal devices; message (message) - a string of bits of limited length; ES is a string of bits of limited length transmitted or received by a user of ITS or SPD; An ES signed with an electronic signature (ES) or another analogue of a handwritten signature may be recognized as an ED.

The number of users of telecommunication systems is growing in the world, including using the technology of "e-mail" in the information and telecommunication network (ITS) "Internet", it is known that by applying an EPC, users accompanying electronic messages (ES) with files (such as ES attachments or ES applications, etc.) can exchange electronic information (text, audio, graphic, video), including and electronic documents (ED) of various kinds, i.e. everything that is stored as a file.

In the process of transmission by telecommunication, for example, EHF, ES are real existing material objects, fully localized or partially distributed in the form of electrical signals, residual inductions, electric charges, appropriately prepared electromagnetic waves, electromagnetic pulses, magnetic polarizing or spin effects. Without changing the essence, these ES can be transformed from one such form of physical state to another according to well-known rules. They can also be defined and measured as sets of individual physical phenomena that form a bit structure, in which each of these bits corresponds to one bit in a binary number system and for the needs of electronics and digital technology is defined as one binary bit, which corresponds to one binary trigger having two mutually exclusive possible steady states or one bit of binary, such as flash memory. At the same time, every eight bits can determine the minimum addressable unit of data measured in bytes, and the named whole set of electromagnetic phenomena formed by bytes on the information carrier can be defined as a file. This allows any ES, including with various files, such as ES attachments or ES applications, to be considered as an instrumentally unchanged material object consisting of an ordered set of bits located either in an electronic device or in the process of moving from one such device to another by transmitting, first of all, electromagnetic signals and pulses. Further, speaking of the transmission, reception, movement, sending or receiving of ESs and bit sets contained in ESs and attached to ESs, we will bear in mind actions with these physical objects in particular.

It is known that in practice, to ensure the possibility of checking the integrity of ESs, for example, transmitted EHFs, as well as to determine whether ESs belong to a specific addressee, such ESs, as a rule, should be properly certified.

To date, it is difficult and from the perspective of users who do not know the methods of using means of cryptographic data protection (SKZD), the problem of the mutual exchange of ES (or ED), authenticated using an electronic signature (EP) generated on the basis of SKZD, is difficult. Although this problem is known and methods for solving it are described in many sources on the issues of creating a public key infrastructure (PKI - Public Key Infrastructure), as a set of agents and rules designed to manage keys, security policies, and actually exchange secure ES [2, 3 , 4], the creation and use of such infrastructure is a difficult task, since when exchanging ES using ES, when participants in such an exchange of ES exchange ES according to the “each” with “everyone” scheme, it is necessary that all participants in such an exchange of ES ate sufficient knowledge in working with the public key of the signature.

It is known that this problem can be solved, for example, by creating and using ES tools to automatically create and (or) automatically check ES in information systems, but such automatic tools, as a rule, do not provide instrumental tools for monitoring the results of automatic creation and verification of electronic signature.

It is known that in practical activities, the analysis of conflict cases of the use of electronic signatures is possible as part of certification centers that perform the functions of creating and issuing certificates of keys for checking electronic signatures. But such a discussion of conflict situations regarding the authentication of documentation of ES requires, in many cases, unacceptably large time or material costs associated with involving the certification center in the analysis of possible conflicts of identification of ES.

It is known that in recent years, methods and methods for identifying and authenticating subjects and objects of information systems as part of electronic payment systems using ATMs, electronic wallets, and electronic software and hardware devices for accepting plastic cards for payment have been constantly developing, simultaneously with increasing their reliability. , including with integrated microelectronic devices. But it should be noted that increasing the reliability of such methods and means is largely determined by the use of unified methods of financial control and accounting of funds, which is usually not possible in electronic document management systems in which any ES or any ED is usually not recorded and not taken into account as a material object.

The presented Method (claim 1 of the formula) is implemented by devices called user mail modules (PMPs), specially created as devices for documenting, identifying and determining the integrity of ES, which allow to manage the preparation for sending and analytical evaluation of the received ES in a Network that combines PMP, ( SPMP). SPMP can be built on the basis of any communication lines and channels, including on the basis of existing networks with their ability to exchange ES, for example, EHF. The operation of the SPMP is provided by the device named in this invention the Certification System (US). In PSMP, for use as part of the CA, there is a PMP option called the Postal Certification System Post Module (PMUS), and all PMPs manage the preparation of sending ES so that they are surely delivered to PMUS.

The PMUS by the presented Method connects the PMP with each other, thus forming for each ES passing through the network, interconnected chains of additions to the ES containing the identifiers of the PMP and the PMUS.

By the described Method, using a hash code (English hash-code) of an ordered set of bits determined by known functions, for example [5, 6], PMP and PMUS when ES passes through them, they determine and control the integrity of ES. It is known that a hash code (HC) is defined as a string of bits that is the output of a hash function (English hash-function), i.e. a function that maps strings of bits of the original length to strings of bits of a fixed length. A correctly selected function has the following three properties: 1) it is impossible to calculate the initial data mapped to this value from a given function value; 2) for the selected source data, it is impossible to find any other source data displayed with the same result; 3) it is impossible to find any pair of different source data with the same value of the hash function.

In the presence of these properties, as well as when using the standard hash function common to all users of the proposed Method, the HK does not depend on the subjects, object, or place of its calculation and can be a unique file identifier.

To increase security and eliminate possible coincidences of using the same HK for different ordered sets of bits, several HK from different hash functions for each informationally important ordered set of bits can be used and used, forming in this case Conglomerate HK (KHK). KHK, in turn, can be represented by a new KHK from an ordered set of bits containing all the KHK values, either used separately as a group of individual NBs, or as one NB constructed from a specific sequence of NB KHKs. But further, without losing the essence of the described Method, we consider the option of using only one standard, for example, see [1] or [2], a hash function common to all, which allows one to determine the CK for any NBES.

In addition, in the description of the Method for neutralizing the unlikely, but possible case of coincidence of CK for different BNs, it is proposed to use CK together with the identifier of the PMP that defines this CK, as well as with the date and time of creation (preparation for sending) of the ES.

PMP (see the variant in Fig. 1) is an independent technical electronic device having one or more built-in digital processors, built-in random access memory, built-in main memory, power controller, data exchange buses, connectors, for switching with other electronic devices, and, if necessary, other necessary blocks. In addition, instructions for the processor on the implementation of the functions described in the Method are recorded in the device’s memory during manufacture. One of the PMP processors (PMUS) can be of special purpose and, by virtue of its architecture, carry out a cryptographic change in the value of the NB CK by a unique secret number of this PMP.

In transformations of the CK value by a unique secret number of PMP (PMUS), well-known algorithms can be applied, such as, for example, when one device transmitting its identification data and the other receiving this data both have a single secret key stored in their memory. Or, for example, another algorithm, when the device transmitting its identification data has its own pair of keys located in it, which serves to implement this algorithm, of which one key is secret and the other is public, and at the same time, the device that receives sent to it identification data, uses only the public key for the implementation of the specified algorithm. But, at the same time, the processes of identification and authentication of devices by these algorithms themselves are equivalent and are carried out using such a pair of numbers connected by any of the above algorithms that the first is transmitted unchanged, and the second number is obtained from the first using a secret key recorded in the identification device when its manufacture. The completion of the identification and authentication process is carried out according to the results of extraction from the second of the first with a further verification of their identity.

PMP can be performed in any of the modern form factors, adapted including for hidden connection to the user's devices, if he is connected to the user's communication equipment. Those. PMP can be performed on the basis of devices such as a smart card or flash memory, and their terminal device can be personal computers (PCs), mobile computers (MKs) or smartphones connected, for example, to an EHF in the ITS “Internet” (or any other SPD and ITS working according to standards allowing the exchange of ES).

PMP can, accordingly, have any form, if it is made as an independent device having a developed system of control and input-output of data, that is, it must include: a processor; memory; data input / output system; data transfer unit; library of programs; case with identifiers of the PMP carrier.

It is understood that the PMP allows, using the built-in algorithms, SPD or ITS protocols, to produce only the conscious sending of the ES, which is achieved by a comprehensive user authorization procedure with this action.

PMUS functionally performs functions similar to PMP, but has more data in its memory, manages large amounts of memory and can use more powerful processors. In particular, if the PMP contains, in addition to algorithms, protocols, and network addresses, data on its own secret and open numbers, as well as the numbers necessary for recognizing the PMUS, then the PMP contains data on all the numbers, algorithms, protocols and if it will be necessary during the implementation of the method, the network addresses corresponding to each ID PMP. During the preparation of the PMUS, for cryptographic binding, it can be entered in a non-repeating secret and corresponding secret, known numbers of PMUS, designed to exchange data with each of the PMP. Moreover, the known numbers are recorded in the corresponding PMP. However, with the aim of simplification, but without loss of essence, the description of the use of either the same secret number as in the PMP with which data is exchanged, or such a secret number that corresponds to the known number of the PMUS recorded in each PMP is described. In addition, the PMUS has the ability to use the necessary set of memory blocks, including those reserved in the equipment for the functioning of the USS SPMP, corresponding to the total number of serviced PMPs. The PMUS provides the placement of the NS ES prepared under the control of different PMPs in the corresponding memory cells of each IP PMN. Moreover, all the PMF or equipment connected to it, including the DC or PMUS, for the exchange of ES have a temporary or permanent network address in the PSMP, for example, in the case of the use of existing EPC networks, the EPC address can be used. It is worth noting that the DC with the connected PMUS can have several email addresses, including those corresponding to different ITS and SPD.

It is known that methods and methods of identification and authentication of subjects and objects of electronic information processing as part of information systems involve the use of, among other things, the basic personal data of users and system operators. This allows them to be used in documenting and for certifying the transmission (sending) and receipt (reception) of NBs invested in ES (or attached to ES) obtained using SPD or ITS, incl. EHF.

Modern portable devices, as a rule, have a built-in geolocation system for these devices, which allows you to use this data in the work of the PMP.

Further, for the sake of definiteness and with the goal of permissible simplification of the text (without loss of accuracy of presentation), we will describe such transmissions and the receipt of ES for the case of the use of the EPC as part of the PSMP.

The invention is illustrated by the example implementation depicted in FIG. 1, containing functional elements 1-23. It presents a general diagram of an example of a technical implementation of the invention for the smallest possible set of PMP necessary for the organization of PSMP, allowing to understand the proposed Method.

Explanations are given on the example of two PMP, designated PMP Device "A" and PMP Device "B". Each of them is connected to a schematically depicted electronic computing device, for example, a computer (PC), which has data input and output, data transmission, power, and other blocks inherent in such devices.

The combination of PMP “A” devices and PMP “B” devices in SPMP implements the PMUS device connected to the US electronic computing device, which has the main features of a computer.

All devices that have Data Transmission Units from the created SPMP have their own email address in the SPD or ITS space corresponding to this network and operate on the protocols of this network. Those. the addresses of ES sources in the PSD are PMD identifiers, while routers, switches, transmission lines, other devices of these networks are used to move ESs to the SPD or ITS, and network addresses of devices that have Data Transmission Units in the corresponding network, for example, EHFs.

Further, for convenience, the electronic addresses of electronic computing devices to which the corresponding GTMP or PMUS is connected in the SPD or ITS network will be called the electronic addresses of the corresponding PMP or PMUS.

The PMP device “A” (paragraph 4 of Fig. 1) for sending the NB to the ES, using application software, for example, provided that the EHF is used as part of the SPMP - Mail Client (PKL) program, gets access to the Permanent Data Storage Unit ( p. 2 Fig. 1) Electronic computing device "A" containing the message object (NB # 1). If more objects are required for moving, then according to well-known rules, for example, using archiving, they can be combined into one object with a single set of bits and the corresponding XK, or used separately, with the definition of XK bits for each of the objects. If you need to move several copies of the same object, it is enough to number them and each of them can be considered as a separate object with its own bits XK, and this can do the PMP, therefore, the PMP device "A" (paragraph 4 of Fig. 1) creates one bit, and if necessary, two or more identical sets of bits similar to the objects of the content part of the ES can be created. But further, without losing the essence of the description of the Method, the option of preparing for sending only one copy of the only substantial part of ES - NB # 1 is considered. To prepare for sending the ES, the PMP Device “A” (p. 4 of Fig. 1) forms in its memory NB # 1 (p. 6 of Fig. 1), the future content of the ES, and using the Central Processor (p. 5 of FIG. 1) creates a set of bits of the requisite part (NBRCH) of the ES in the Storage Unit for operational data of the Storage device (p. 6 of Fig. 1), as an accounting and registration bit set (URNB) of the ES. Let us designate the NBRCH ES as NB # 2 as part of the ES (Fig. 1). The PMP device “A” (item 4 of Fig. 1) determines the HC NB # 1 and its bits (see FIG. 1) it is included in the NB # 2, then it can include, for example, a set of bits of the Notification sending symbols ES, the date and time of departure of the ES, ID and the electronic address of the sending ES Device PMP “A”, ID and the electronic address Device PMP “B” receiving ES and, if necessary, other bits of ES parameters, for example, if the equipment allows it, data geolocation. Then the PMP device "A" (p. 4 of Fig. 1), applies NB # 2 to the original NB # 1.

After that, the PMP Device “A” (p. 4 of Fig. 1), using the Central Processor (p. 5 of Fig. 1), creates a Trusted Hash Code in the Online Storage Unit (p. 6 of Fig. 1) ES (NBDKhK ES), we will designate it as NB # 3 (p. 6 of Fig. 1), for which it determines the HC NBRC, i.e. HC NB # 2, which is called the Trusted Hash Code of ES [5] as part of the NBDHK ES specially created for these purposes. Then the PMP device “A” (p. 4 of Fig. 1), using the Central Processor (p. 5 of Fig. 1), determines and includes in NB # 3 bits of the second value of the CC of the NBRCH ES obtained using the logical protocol and Secret Number (p . 7-1 Fig. 1) contained in the PMP. As described above, the method allows for this procedure, the use of a special processor for linking HC with the Secret Number of the PMP “A” (p. 7-2 of Fig. 1). If necessary, bits of symbols of data such as, for example, the conventional name of the ES of the date and time of the creation of the ES, ID and the electronic address of the preparation manager of the PMP Device "A", the ID and the electronic address of the PMP Device "B", may be included in NB # 3, receiving ES, as well as the email address of the PMUS. And now, when all the bits of the HC NBRCH ES, implicitly contain the date, time of creation of the ES and IN PMP, which controlled the preparation of the ES for sending, and the HC of the NBRCH ES is included in the NBCC, these bits, called the Trusted Hash Code of the ES (DCC) ES), determine the integrity of ES, are inextricably linked to the content of ES and are a unique, unique identifier of the ES itself.

NBN3 is included in URNB.

On this device PMP "A" (p. 4 of Fig. 1), completes the management of the preparation of ES for shipment. The PMP device “A” determines the electronic address of the US Electronic Computing Device, with the PMUS device connected to it, as the priority one at a given time, and using PKL and ITS or SPD (p. 22 of Fig. 1), protocols for the exchange of ES in the corresponding network, using the data transfer unit (p. 3 of Fig. 1) of the electronic computing device “A” (p. 1 of Fig. 1), gives a command to send the ES containing in its composition NB # 1, NBN2 and NBN3 at the PMUS address through the exchange service of ES in the SPD or ITS network.

The electronic computing device "CSS" (p. 8 of Fig. 1) using the application software and the Data Transmission Unit (p. 9 of Fig. 1) receives the ES from the device group "A" and moves it to the Storage device (p. 14 Fig. 1) Device PMUS (p. 12 Fig. 1).

The Storage device (p. 14 of Fig. 1) contains data on the known or secret numbers of the PMP “A” and PMP “B” devices. In addition, it may contain data on the Secret Number of the PMUS, designated (paragraph 15-1 of Fig. 1), as MF _pmus . A variant is possible when, as described above, for cryptographic binding by the Secret Number of the EMC, a special separate processor is used (p. 15-2 of Fig. 1).

In accordance with the foregoing and using application software, the PMUS device (p. 12 of Fig. 1) checks the validity of the DCC ES, independently identifying the HC NB # 2 and comparing it with the characters bits HC NB # 2, which are contained in NB # 3 and then compares it with the bits of the characters HC NB # 2, which are determined using the PMUS processor, known or secret numbers of the PMP Device "A" and using the corresponding logical protocol for the bits HC HC NB # 2, associated with the secret number of the Device PMP "A" .

If the check passed with a positive result, then the PMUS device (p. 12 of Fig. 1), using applied software, checks the compliance of NB # 1 contained in NB # 2 with the character bits HC NB # 1, for which it independently determines HC NB No. 1.

Having performed this check, the PMUS device (p. 12 of Fig. 1) creates a new NBDC (NB # 4). To do this, the PMUS device (p. 12 of Fig. 1), using applied software, connects DC DC ES (HC NB # 2) with its Secret Number (p. 15-1 of Fig. 1), including this can happen with using an additional processor (p. 15-2 of Fig. 1). Further, it includes in the NBCHC HC HC NB # 2 and, as an option, supplements it with bits of symbols of the conditional name of ES, date and time of creation of NB # 4, IN PMP “A” and the electronic address of the transmitting ES of Device Group “A”, IN PMP “B ”And the email address of Device Group B.

NB # 3 The PMUS device (p. 12 of Fig. 1) leaves either in its Storage device or moves to the Permanent Data Storage Unit (p. 10 of Fig. 1) of the electronic computing device “CSS” (p. 8 of Fig. 1 ) In FIG. 1 shows the option of moving the NB # 3 for permanent storage in the Permanent Data Storage Unit (p. 10 of Fig. 1) of the electronic computing device “CSS” (p. 8 of Fig. 1).

After that, the device PMUS (p. 12 of Fig. 1), completes the management of the preparation of ES for shipment. The PMUS device using the Data Transfer Unit (p. 9 of Fig. 1) of the electronic computing device “US” (p. 8 of Fig. 1) sends an ES containing in its composition NBN1, NBN2 and NBN4 at the address of Device Group B (see below), through an electronic messaging service, for example, an EHF in ITS or SPD.

Moreover, shown in FIG. 1 ITS or SPD (paragraph 23 of Fig. 1) may be the same as ITS or SPD (paragraph 22 of Fig. 1).

The electronic computing device "B" (p. 16 of Fig. 1), using applied software tools, such as PCL, and the Data Transmission Unit (p. 18 of Fig. 1), receives the ES from the Device Group "CSS" and moves it to Storage device (p. 21 Fig. 1) PMP device "B" (p. 19 Fig. 1).

In the Storage device (p. 21 of Fig. 1) of the PMP Device "B" (p. 19 of Fig. 1), contains information about the known or secret number of the PMUS Device (p. 12 of Fig. 1). In addition, the Storage device (p. 21 of Fig. 1) contains data on the Secret Number of the PMP “B”. It is possible that, as described above, a special separate processor can be used to link the Secret Number of the PMP “B”.

In accordance with the foregoing and, using application software, the PMP “B” device (p. 19 of Fig. 1) checks the validity of the DCC ES, independently determining the bits of the HC NB # 2 and comparing it with the bits of the characters HC NB # 2, which are contained in NB # 4, and then, with the characters bits ХК НБ№2, which are determined using the processor of the PMD Device “B” (p. 19 of Fig. 1), known or secret numbers of the PMUS Device and using the corresponding logical protocol by bits HC NB # 2, associated with the secret number of the PMUS device.

If the check was successful, then the PMP Device "B" (p. 19 of Fig. 1) of the Device Group B, using application software, checks the compliance of NB # 1 contained in NB # 2, HC NB # 1, for which determines it yourself.

If the check was successful, then NB # 2 and NB # 4 The PMP device “B” (p. 19 of Fig. 1) leaves either in its Storage device or moves to the Permanent Storage Unit (p. 17 of Fig. 1) Electronically - computing device "B" (p. 16 of Fig. 1). In FIG. 1 shows the option of moving NB # 2 and NB # 4 for permanent storage in the Long-term storage unit of the Data storage device (p. 21 Fig. 1) PMP device "B" (p. 19 Fig. 1), and NB # 1 of the message object, moves to the Permanent Storage Unit (p. 17 of Fig. 1) of the Electronic Computing Device "B" (p. 16 of Fig. 1), from where it can be displayed through the Data Output Unit of the Electronic Computing Device "B" (p. 16 of Fig. . one).

In addition to the circuit of FIG. 1 of an example implementation of the Method, FIG. Figure 2 shows a simplified schematic diagram of the linking of the PMP “A”, PMP “B” and PMUS Devices, as well as their secret and corresponding secret, known numbers with formed for sending NB # 1, NB # 2, NB # 3 and NB # 4. For convenience, NB # 1 is designated as F1, NB # 2 is designated as F2, NB # 3 is designated as F3, NB # 4 is designated as F4.

It can be seen from the diagram that the set of bits F1, which is the object of the message prepared by the PMP device "A" (p. 4 of Fig. 2), and its hash code HKF1 have an unambiguous relationship, i.e. they are uniquely mapped due to the properties of the hash function. Moreover, HKF1 is the substantial part of the set of bits F2 prepared by the PMP device "A" (p. 4 of Fig. 2).

The set of bits Ф2, and its hash code ХКФ2 have a unique connection, i.e. they are uniquely mapped due to the properties of the hash function. At the same time, HKF2 is the substantial part of the set of bits F3, which additionally contains HKF2, associated with the secret number of PMP "A". Due to this, HKF2 is defined as DHK of a message containing a set of bits F1, and the set of bits F3 itself could be prepared only by the PMP device “A”, because the secret number of PMP “A” is no longer known to anyone.

In FIG. 2 it is seen that the interdependent relationships F1 - HKF1 - F2 - HKF2 - F3 are established.

A set of bits, consisting of sets of bits F1, F2 and F3, is transmitted by a single ES message to the PMUS device (p. 12 of Fig. 2) for the PMP “B”.

The device PMUS (p. 12 of Fig. 2) checks the ES.

To do this, an independent calculation of the hash code of the set of bits of F1 is carried out using the well-known hash function and is compared with that contained in the set of bits of F1. The PMUS device (p. 12 of Fig. 2) independently calculates the F2 hash code. From the set of HKF2 bits associated with the secret number of the PMP “A” (p. 4 of Fig. 2) and contained in the set of bits F3, using the known PMUS (p. 12 of Fig. 2) of the number corresponding to the secret number of the PMP “A”, HCF2 is extracted and compared with the calculated independently. If the results of the check are positive, and the connections are not broken, then they are accepted as confirmation of the receipt of ES from the PMP “A”.

The set of bits F3 remains in the PMUS (p. 12 of Fig. 2).

Based on the above calculations, the PMUS device (p. 12 of Fig. 2) creates a set of bits F4 containing DCC ES from PMP “A” and DCC ES connected by a secret number of PMCS (p. 12 of Fig. 2). In FIG. Figure 2 shows that new interdependent relationships F1 - HKF1 - F2 - HKF2 - F4 were established.

A new set of ES bits, consisting of sets of bits F1, F2 and F4 is transmitted to the PMP device "B" (p. 19 of Fig. 2).

The PMP device "B" (p. 19 of Fig. 2) checks the ES.

To do this, an independent calculation of the hash code of the set of bits of F1 is carried out using the well-known hash function and is compared with that contained in the set of bits of F1. The PMP device "B" (p. 19 of Fig. 2) independently calculates the hash code F2. From the set of HKF2 bits associated with the secret PMUS number (p. 12 of Fig. 2) and contained in the F4 bit set, using the well-known PMP "B" (p. 19 of Fig. 2) the number corresponding to the secret PMUS number, HKF2 is extracted and compared with calculated independently. If the results of the verification are positive, and the connections are not broken, then they are accepted as confirmation of the PMUS device (paragraph 12 of Fig. 2) of receiving ES from PMP “A” for PMP “B”.

Those. the result of the implementation of the control method is:

- the ability to create a functionally dedicated closed network of SPMP, including within a public electronic messaging service;

- the possibility of independent management of SPMP, including within the public electronic messaging service;

- the opportunity for the sending and receiving parties to monitor the immutability of the passage of bits of ES in one common for all PMP, clearly defined, a point in space - the location of the PMUS;

- the ability to identify and verify, by the identifier of the ES, which is the set of bits of the DCC ES, which are stored in the memory cells of the EMC, two interconnected NBDCs of this ES;

- the ability to make sure that the substantial part of the ES bits passed through the PMUS without changes, which is achieved by the fact that the data from one stored in the PMUS cells, the NBCHC ES, are connected by a unique secret number that controlled the preparation of the EMP EMP, and therefore they can reliably determine what the source specifically This ES is the PMP of the sender. The data of another, stored in the cells of the PMUS, NBDKhK ES, are connected by a unique secret number of PMUS and allow us to reliably determine that the ES, the source of which is the equipment and the PMP of the sender, was sent PMUS in unchanged form to the recipient's PMP;

Work in SPMP becomes possible only in the presence of PMP, therefore, the method allows equipment with PMP, including one that has not previously had contact with each other, to send each other ES containing, including ED bits, which, in their queues can be encrypted and signed by their own electronic signature. With all this, the method allows you to be sure of the integrity and immutability of the items, the authenticity of the sending and receiving messages PMP, to receive confirmation of their actions from a third party (US SPMP), if desired, without revealing to her the substantial part of the messages sent.

To achieve the objectives set forth in the description of the method of documenting the reception and transmission of electronic messages by a trusted hash code in the certification system of the information and telecommunication network, a system called the Certification System of E-Mail, hereinafter referred to as the acronym for UPS, is proposed.  2 formulas)  and described in terms of the above method,  including the required number of Postal User Modules in the form of Terminals,  further denoted by the abbreviation PMPT  made as independent devices,  possessing all the basic features of a portable or stationary computer,  able to connect with known types of Data Networks,  hereinafter referred to by the acronym SPD,  or Telecommunications Information Network,  hereinafter referred to as ITS  or able to connect to ITS,  and to SPD,  support transmission protocols for ES bit sets,  hereinafter referred to as NB ES,  eg,  Email Protocols,  hereinafter referred to by the abbreviation EHF,  Besides,  including  the required number of Mail User Modules,  intended for connection to the Equipment of Users,  further designated by the acronym PMPOP,  other electronic equipment of users,  able to process the necessary for sending NB,  determine hash codes by bit strings,  provide the ability to enter and work in known types of SPD or ITS,  or capable of connecting to ITS,  and to SPD,  or,  depending on  where is the SEEC implemented,  to well-known private or public postal services of the exchange of NB ES,  eg,  EHF,  if necessary  using the information and control software products appropriate to the task of the SEEC,  provide the ability to receive and send,  prepared by PMPOP NB ES using standard protocols in SPD or ITS,  the ability to store NB ES,  and,  except for the above,  including communication networks with their equipment,  eg,  communication lines  nodal and linear substations,  routers  switches  database servers  further designated by the abbreviation DB,  equipment of exchange operators  eg,  EHF equipment,  providing this service in the SAP or ITS,  SPMP equipment,  consisting  primarily,  from known and used equipment,  necessary for services for sending ES to SPD and ITS,  including EHF,  with the PMUS connected to it,  containing uniquely defined addresses of memory areas,  each of which is associated with the corresponding individual numbers PMPT and PMPOP,  Further,  for comfort,  in the text united by one common name PMP,  and with all this,  SSEP is different in that  that implements automatic transmission and receipt of ordered NB ES,  prepared using PMP and between users of PMP,  certification of such transmissions and confirmation of the integrity of ordered NS ES,  ensures the provision of electronic receipts on the sending of the NB ES and the receipt of the NB ES by the appropriate addressee,  using for work the capabilities of SPD and ITS and ensuring the implementation of other related activities to implement the operation,  including,  eg,  EHF,  using information and control instructions for processors relevant to the SSEC task,  which allow you to automatically transmit and receive NB ES,  including through,  eg,  EHF,  save and,  if necessary  provide evidence base of receipt and integrity,  transmitted by the NB ES,  can implement authentication functions PMP and PMUS,  as well as the functions of administering the DBMSPS only using equipment of the OS SPMP,  wherein,  provided  that only PMP and PMUS can perform actions in the SEEC,  and therefore,  to the user  for the possibility of using SSEP,  under a fixed-term service agreement with the operator of the MPS, the MMP and the secret password are transmitted,  or another mechanism for activation of items recorded by the operator  and he,  using personal equipment  in automatic or manual mode,  and its commutation with PMP,  gets the opportunity  using  in its turn,  SPD or ITS and NB ES exchange protocols,  eg,  EHF,  transfer the NB ES to another user of the UPSEC,  for what,  the sender activates a special program contained in the PMP,  for ease of presentation,  named Mail Client,  hereinafter referred to as PCL,  located in the memory of the PMP,  and,  using its fields to fill in the necessary data,  using the interface and PCL instructions,  enters the email address into it,  or,  in case of work with EHF,  E-mail address,  which he wants to use to send the NB ES,  and,  if he knows  that this mail service requires special data from its user to activate work with it,  eg,  authentication data in SPD,  ITS or existing EHF networks,  that  in the absence of such data in the PMP memory,  according to the instructions provided by the PMP,  enters this data in the PMP,  then,  Enter or indicate the email address  or IN PMP,  or the email address and the IP of the recipient of the ES recipient,  and then,  in any order  at the prompt of the PMP,  moves to the PMP prepared for shipment to the ES of the National Bank or indicates a link to the storage location available for the PCL PMP,  and if he wants  then in a separate field for a description of those sent to the ES NB,  places a textual description of them,  then,  gives the PMP a command to send ES from the NB,  which confirms the password transferred to him under the contract,  or by another method of activating PMP items recorded by the operator  and from that moment on, all operations with the NB ES occur automatically and in a controlled sequence,  defined and controlled PMP,  which consists of actions for additional preparation of the National Energy System,  and which can partially be performed by user equipment according to instructions for processors,  located in the PMP,  so,  will be further described as the actions of the PMP itself,  wherein,  as described in the method of managing documentation in the exchange of data transmitted electronic messages in the information and telecommunication network,  to increase security and eliminate possible coincidences of using the same HK for different ES,  several HCs from different hash functions can be applied for each informationally important NB ES,  forming in this case Conglomerate HC,  denoted by the abbreviation KHK,  but further  without loss of essence and presentation features,  consider using only one  common to all PMPs,  hash functions  which allows you to determine HC for any set of bits,  and,  Besides,  in order to simplify  but without losing essence  describes the movement of only one prepared for dispatch  so,  PMP  having placed in its memory a copy of the ordered NB to be sent to the ES,  which, by analogy with the method of managing documentation during the exchange of data transmitted by electronic messages in the information telecommunication network,  for convenience of description,  denoted by the symbols NB # 1,  PMP can  for subsequent control,  create and save in your memory another one of the same NBN # 1 and,  then,  defines for NB # 1 HC,  then,  creates two identical copies of ordered NBRCH ES,  Further,  for convenience of description,  denoted by the symbols NB # 2 ES,  using at their creation bits of characters ХК НБ№1 and,  eg,  bits of characters of a short text set of a user-created description,  departure time  geolocation parameters  ID PMP and email address,  PMP user equipment used to send ES,  e-mail address and IN PMP,  equipment receiving NB ES,  etc,  and then,  PMP  having attached one NB # 2 to the ES,  as the first component of URNB ES,  defines the second component of URNB,  for which it creates two instances of ordered sets of bits of NBCHC,  for convenience of description,  marked by the symbols NB # 3,  which include the character bits HC NB # 2,  called DCC ES and bits of DCC ES symbols associated with a secret PMP number,  and in addition, NB # 3 may contain symbol bits of such data,  as,  eg,  Conditional name ES,  date and time of creation of ES,  PM ID and the electronic address of the PMP user equipment used to send ES,  ID PMP and electronic equipment address,  receiving ES,  as well as the PMUS email address,  which allows the PMP to complete the preparation of the ES for shipment,  save one set of NB # 2 and NB # 3,  and if an additional NB # 1 was created,  then one NB # 1,  in its memory or the memory of user equipment,  and for the second set of NB # 1,  NB # 2,  and NB # 3 to determine the electronic address of the public administration or PMUS available to him,  as a priority at a given time,  and using appropriate software and control protocols and equipment for the exchange of ES to send one ES,  at the address of the CA or PMUS through the exchange service ES,  eg,  EHF in ITS or SPD,  Where,  Further,  DC equipment for exchanging ES with PMUS connected to it,  using the available set of software and hardware  which may include the appropriate Email Client,  for comfort,  denoted by the acronym PCL,  facilitating the exchange of ES,  eg,  through the EHF service it checks all incoming messages to the corresponding electronic address of the ES,  and by characteristic  eg,  features of orderliness of the NB,  detects among the received ES,  ES prepared for shipment under the control of the PMP,  moves it to the memory for the PMUS and then,  PMUS,  using appropriate software and control protocols,  checks NB # 2 and NB # 3 of the received URNB ES using a secret or open number corresponding to this PMP,  according to the type of algorithm used,  for the presence of a reliable connection of the set of bits DHK ES,  that is, bits of the characters HC NB # 2,  contained in NB # 3,  with a set of bits,  obtained from the bits of the DCC ES symbols contained in the NB # 3,  associated with a secret number managing the preparation for sending the PMP,  after which it places the ES in the memory cells for the PMUS,  relevant ID PMP,  managing preparation for sending ES,  designed to store the transmitted data ES,  and then,  PMUS,  using your own programs,  managers  logical and command protocols  defines the bits HC NB # 1,  contained in EC NB # 1,  and compares with the character bits HC NB # 1,  contained in NB No. 2 of the obtained ES,  what,  if these bits match,  and also according to the results of a previous comparison of the bits of the DCC ES symbols and the corresponding bits,  obtained from NB # 3 using the known PMUS numbers for PMP,  managing preparation for sending ES,  allows the PMUS to accommodate NB # 3,  in the memory cells used by the PMUS for further storage of service data,  then,  based on bit sets NB # 1 and NB # 2,  transmitted from PMP,  managing preparation for sending ES,  creates two of its instances of ordered NBCHK ES,  Further,  for convenience of description,  designated NB # 4,  using the bits of the DCK ES symbols and the bits of the DCK ES symbols,  associated with a secret PMUS number,  date and time of creation of ES,  ID and email address of the sender and recipient,  contained in NB # 2 and so on,  eg,  bits of symbols of the conventional name ES,  then,  PMUS in the memory cells of the PMUS for storing service data,  in addition to the NB # 3 placed in them,  received from PMP,  managing preparation for sending ES,  places one copy of NB # 4,  then,  determines his electronic address of the equipment with the PMP connected to it,  receiving ES,  as a priority at a given time,  and through an electronic messaging service,  eg,  through the EHF to ITS,  using appropriate software and control protocols and equipment for the exchange of ES,  in one message  sends for PMP,  receiving ES,  sets NB # 1,  NB # 2 and NB # 4,  after which the PMUS based on the bits of the DCC ES symbols and the bits of the DCC ES symbols associated with the secret PMUS number,  algorithms and tools of the system log of the technical protection system for exchanging ordered sets of bits,  recording the actions of devices in time,  creates two copies of ordered NB Accounting-Electronic Electronic Receipt No. 1,  hereinafter referred to as UREC No. 1 or,  for convenience of description,  symbols NB # 5,  containing bits of characters DHK ES,  date and time of sending ES and which may contain bits of characters of a short text set Notification of sending ES,  including,  such as,  eg,  bits of symbols of the conventional name of the ES date and time of creation of the ES,  ID of the manager of the preparation for sending ES PMP and the electronic address of the equipment that sent ES,  ID PMP and electronic equipment address,  receiving ES,  then,  PMUS determines HC NBN5 and,  respectively,  HC NB # 5 gets the name of the Trusted Hash Code of UREC No. 1 as part of two ordered NBDK of UREC No. 1 specially created for these purposes,  Further,  for convenience of description,  denoted by the symbols NB # 6,  in addition, containing bits of characters DCC UREC number 1,  associated with a secret PMUS number,  creation time and other parameters,  eg,  short name ES,  then,  PMUS one copy of NB # 5 and one copy of NB # 6,  using appropriate software and control protocols and equipment for the exchange of ES,  sends in one electronic message to the address of the PMP or the equipment connected to it,  managing preparation for sending ES,  which enables the PMP to manage the preparation for sending the ES,  using appropriate software and control protocols and equipment for the exchange of ES,  by signs  specific to PMUS messages,  eg,  features of orderliness of the NB,  detect an electronic message with NB # 5 and NB # 6,  among others,  and the sequence of actions described above,  to check the availability of reliable communication NB 5 and NB 6 according to the known PMP number for PMUS,  for which it independently determines the bits of HC NB # 5,  and compares with the character bits HC NB # 5,  contained in NB # 6,  what,  if these bits match,  and also according to the results of comparing the bits of the DCC symbols UREC No. 1 contained in NB # 6 and the corresponding bits,  obtained using a known or secret number for PMUS from the set of bits associated with the secret number of PMUS,  allows PMP,  by checking the identity of the DCC bits of the sent ES,  bits of characters DCC ES contained in the received UREK No. 1,  place NB # 5 and NB # 6 in the memory cells,  intended for incoming messages,  as confirmation of sending NB # 1,  and at the same time,  PMUS places in the memory cells US  intended for storing service data,  second instance of the created message,  containing NB # 5 and NB # 6,  moreover,  simultaneously,  or later,  PMP and equipment connected to it,  receiving ES  using the available set of software and hardware  which may include the appropriate PKL,  facilitating the exchange of ES,  eg,  through the service, the EHF checks all incoming ES at its electronic address,  and by characteristic  eg,  features of orderliness of the NB,  detects among the received ES,  ES prepared for shipment under the control of PMUS,  moves to memory cells PMP ES,  containing NB # 1,  NB # 2 and NB # 4,  and then,  checks the NBN2 and NBN4 received URNB ES using the appropriate PMUS secret or open number,  according to the type of algorithm used,  for the presence of a reliable connection of the set of bits DHK ES,  i.e,  bit characters HC NB # 2,  contained in NB # 4,  with a set of bits,  obtained from DHK ES,  associated with a secret number that managed its preparation for sending the PMUS,  then,  PMP  using your own programs,  managers  logical and command protocols  determines the bits HC NB # 1 contained in the ES and compares with the bits of the characters HC NB # 1 from the ES,  which are contained in NB # 2,  what,  if these bits match,  and also according to the results of the comparison of the DCK ES bit and the DCK ES bit,  obtained from NB # 4 using the known PMP numbers for PMUS,  managing preparation for sending ES,  allows PMP to place NB # 2 and NB # 4,  in the memory cells used by the PMP for further storage of service information,  and NB # 1 to make available to the user PMP,  receiving ES,  for further use in equipment connected to the PMP,  and wherein,  PMP  received ES,  creates two identical ordered sets of bits of Receipt of receipt of ES No. 2,  hereinafter referred to by the abbreviation KPES No. 2 or,  for convenience of description,  symbols of NB # 7,  which contain,  including,  bits of characters DHK ES,  date and time of drawing up the receipt,  and which  Besides,  may contain bits of characters of a short text set Notifications on receipt of ES,  including,  such as,  eg,  bits of symbols of the conventional name ES,  date and time of creation of ES,  geolocation data  ID of the manager of the preparation for sending ES PMP and the electronic address of the equipment that sent ES,  ID PMP and electronic equipment address,  received ES,  the number of received sets of bits of ES,  then,  one of NB # 7 is located in the memory cells of the PMP or used PMP for official purposes,  and on the basis of the second NBN №7 PMP creates an ordered NBDHK KPES No. 2,  Further,  for convenience of description,  denoted by the symbols NB # 8,  for what,  Defines KPES No. 2 DHK and KPES No. 2 DHK,  associated with a secret number of PMP received ES,  includes bits of their characters in NB # 8 and may optionally include other parameters,  eg,  bits of the characters of the date and time of compilation of NB # 8 and the short name of ES,  and then,  determine his email address US and PMUS,  as a priority at a given time,  and using the appropriate software and control protocols and equipment for the exchange of ES to send one electronic message,  by electronic address US and PMUS through the exchange service ES,  eg,  EHF in ITS or SPD,  Where,  Further,  DC equipment for exchanging ES with PMUS connected to it,  using the available set of software and hardware  which may include the appropriate PKL,  facilitating the exchange of ES,  eg,  through the service, the EHF checks all incoming ES at its electronic address,  and by characteristic  eg,  features of orderliness of the NB,  among the received ES,  detects an electronic message from KPES No. 2 and NBDKK KPES No. 2,  prepared for shipment under the control of the PMP,  received ES with NB # 1,  moves it to the memory cells of the PMUS,  related to this PMP,  and then,  checks NBN7 and NBN8,  using a secret or open number corresponding to this PMP,  according to the type of algorithm used,  for the presence of reliable communication of the set of bits of the DCC KPES No. 2,  that is, the character bit of HC NB # 7,  contained in NB # 8,  with a set of bits,  obtained from DHK KPES No. 2,  associated with a secret number that managed its preparation for sending the PMP,  after which it places an electronic message from KPES No. 2 in the memory cells for the PMUS,  relevant ID PMP,  received ES with NB # 1,  then,  PMUS,  using your own programs,  managers  logical and command protocols  determines the bits HC NB # 7 contained in the received message and compares with the bits of characters HC NB # 7 from this message,  contained in NB 8,  what,  if these bits match,  and also according to the results of the comparison of the bits of DCC CPES No. 2 and bits  obtained from NB # 8 using the known PMUS numbers for PMP,  received ES with NB # 1,  allows PMUS to place NBN8,  in the memory cells used by the PMUS for further storage of service data,  then,  based on the set of bits NB # 7,  transmitted from PMP,  received ES with NB # 1,  creates two copies of its orderly NBDHK KPES No. 2,  Further,  for convenience of description,  denoted by the symbols NB # 9,  using the bits of the DCKhPKPS No. 2 characters and the bits of the DCKKPPs No. 2 characters,  associated with a secret number of PMUS,  which can be supplemented by bits of characters for the date and time of the creation of KPES No. 2,  ID and electronic addresses of the sender and recipient of ES,  contained in NB # 7 and other things,  eg,  Conditional name ES,  then,  PMUS in the memory cells of the PMUS for storing service data,  in addition to the NB 8 placed in them,  received from PMP,  received ES,  places one copy of NB # 9,  then,  determines his electronic address of the equipment with the PMP connected to it,  who managed the preparation for sending ES from NB # 1,  as a priority at a given time,  and,  using appropriate software and control protocols and equipment for the exchange of ES,  sends in one electronic message to the address of the PMP or the equipment connected to it,  who managed the preparation for sending ES from NB # 1,  which makes it possible for the PMP to manage the preparation for sending ES from NB # 1,  using appropriate software and control protocols and equipment for the exchange of ES,  by signs  specific to PMUS messages,  eg,  features of orderliness of the NB,  detect an electronic message with NB # 7 and NB # 9,  among other emails  and the sequence of actions described above,  to check the availability of reliable connection NBN7 and NBN9 according to the known PMP number for PMUS for which it independently determines the bits HC NBN7,  and compares with the characters bits HC NB # 7,  contained in NB No. 9,  what,  if these bits match,  and also according to the results of comparing the bits contained in NB # 9 of the DCC CPES symbols # 2 and the corresponding bits,  obtained using a known or secret number for PMUS from the set of bits associated with the secret number of PMUS,  allows PMP,  having checked the identity of the DCC bits of the sent ES with NB # 1,  the contained bits of the DCC ES symbols in the received CPES No. 2,  place NB # 7 and NB # 9 in the memory cells,  intended for incoming messages,  as confirmation of receipt of ES with NB # 1 addressee,  and now,  as it can be understood from the above description,  it can be argued,  that the SSEP provides  as the ability to transmit and receive ES,  eg,  with embedded NB  including,  being a bit representation of Electronic Documents,  hereinafter referred to by the abbreviation ED,  which the SSEC can additionally assure with its electronic signature,  as well as a documented certified EP of USP SEEP or not certified by EP of USP SSEP,  transmission of ES with any nested bit sets or ED to the addressee,  using ITS and SPD,  including existing services,  addresses and EHF platforms,  at the same time  Do not make yourself dependent on them and, if necessary,  use other services  or use the same email addresses for different users of the PMP,  what,  However,  and wherein,  allows you to fix the number of identical or different bits of ES created for transfer,  creation address  the fact of sending and the invariability of the content of the NB ES,  but,  subject to the presence of a PMP connection to equipment receiving ES in the ES exchange network,  record the fact of receiving ES,  the number of simultaneously accepted identical or different sets of ES bits,  their delivery address and,  wherein,  at least one set of bits of the message object from the ES and at least one set of bits of the URNB ES remains in the sending ES equipment connected to the PMP,  including NBRCH ES,  stored NB receipts for the departure of ES,  named UREC No. 1,  NBCHC receipts of departure,  NB receipts on receipt of ES,  named KPES No. 2 and NBDHK KPES No. 2,  created under the management of PMUS,  which allows you to confirm the shipment,  delivery and integrity of the NB ES,  since duplicates of all NBDCs are stored in the memory cells of the USEP UPS,  including NB  associated with secret numbers PMP,  managing preparation for sending ES,  and PMP,  managing the verification of the received NB ES,  moreover,  further,  the main criterion for a possible search for information on the passage of the NS ES through the equipment,  the component of SEEC is DHK ES,  and wherein,  fixing the passage of electronic messages,  created under the management of PMP in the SEEP,  allows the operator of the UPSEC,  on demand,  give,  including written acknowledgment of dispatch events,  the movement and delivery of NB ES on paper with handwritten signatures in it.

For the organization of the system, it is necessary to have an existing SPD or ITS with the possibility of implementing the exchange of ES in it.

The organizer of the system selects hash functions with the necessary properties and programs for working with them. Selects an algorithm for cryptographic binding of an arbitrary set of bits with secret numbers and creates (or selects an existing) computer program for this operation. In addition, processors designed specifically for this purpose can be used for this operation. Then, he prepares secret and, if necessary, open numbers corresponding to the binding algorithm. It is developed and manufactured by itself, or ordered from third-party device manufacturers, with the above described functions of the PMP, in which it writes the selected programs, protocols, algorithms, IP secret numbers, secret or open number of PMUS, the address of the PMUS in the networks selected for operation. In addition, for the cryptographic binding operation, special processors mentioned above can be used in the PMP. At the same time, it is understood that in order to use the GGMP, you need to know the activation key for the items.

The organizer prepares the device PMUS, which enters data on all existing PMP. For example, their data such as: ID, secret or corresponding to each secret - an open number. It writes to the PMUS the secret number binding and secret number checking programs prepared for use, hash code calculation programs, etc. Including for cryptographic binding operations, a special processor can be released for placement in the corresponding PMUS. When preparing the PMUS for cryptographic binding, it can contain non-repeating secret and corresponding secret, known numbers of the PMUS intended for data exchange with each of the PMPs, or for some of them, which will increase the system's resistance to unauthorized use. Moreover, the known numbers are recorded in the corresponding PMP. However, with the aim of simplification, but without loss of essence, the description of the use of either the same secret number as in the PMP with which data is exchanged, or such a secret number that corresponds to the known number of the PMUS recorded in each PMP is described.

The organizer, under a fixed-term contract, on a reimbursable or gratuitous basis transfers each SMS with the corresponding authentication key to users.

The contract specifies the period of use of the PMP, the user's email address or the admissibility of an explicit uncertainty thereof. The contract describes the possibility or conditions for transferring the PHP to third parties. Based on this agreement, the PMP becomes a Personal User Identity Module (PMIP). And information on the duration of the contract is entered in the PMUS.

The organizer connects the PMUS to equipment that automatically processes a large number of ES. Thus, the CSS and SGTMP appear. It is worth noting that the DC with the connected PMUS can have several email addresses, including those corresponding to different ITS and SPD.

The result of the preparatory work is the Certificate of Electronic Mail Certification System (UPSEP), in which the UPS users have personal user identification modules (PMIP). The output of the operation of such an SEEC is the implementation of document management of electronic data transmissions, which allows you to associate the hash code of each of the sets of bits transmitted in electronic messages in a way that allows you to define these hash codes as trusted hash codes (DCCs) owners of these modules. At the same time, USEP allows you to recognize and identify these owners by persons who prepared the transmitted bit sets in the role that they can determine for themselves in the accompanying (descriptive) part of the ES. ESs in which these NBs are embedded, and NBs of receipts that certify receipt and transmission to the addressee of ES with embedded bit sets are also recognized.

USEP for a certain period of time may store in its database NBCA for any of the ES transmitted using USEP. If necessary and upon request, USEP during this period of time for any of such NSs transferred to the ES can, including, using the electronic signature (ES) of the USPE operator, issue confirmation of NS movements with the corresponding DCC. Similarly, NB receipts that certify the receipt and transmission to the addressee of ES sets with embedded NBs are inextricably linked by the secret numbers PMIP and PMUS, and can also be presented at the request of users.

If the corresponding relationship object is determined by the ES bit sets, then the mutual exchange of the ES of even several users with the PMIP can be considered a legal contract concluded in simple written form, as unequivocally, its subjects and the time of the obligations assumed can be established, in addition, the place of stay of each of the entities can be established. And accordingly, with the described approach, the refusal of one of the parties from their obligations contained in the ES allows the other to attract the witness of the established relations of the organizer of the SEPS, even if the latter is completely uninformed about the contents of the set of bits of ES.

Thus, USEP allows the user, having received his PMIP from the organizer of the UPSEP, and connecting it to his equipment, exchange electronic data (including electronic documents) of various types (text, graphic, films), i.e. everything that is stored as an ordered set of bits, with another user of UPSEP. Moreover, the entire process described will be quite simple for the user to use. Those. the user selects the NB to be sent and, if desired, briefly characterizes them. Then, it determines the sending address and the number of instances of the objects to be sent, including the number of instances of one object. After the sending command is submitted, the PMIP requests the authentication key sent to it by the organizer, or agreed with the organizer. If the key was correct, then the user does not accept further participation in the system.

As described earlier, the PMIP creates the number of sets of bits of the message object necessary for transmission, and if the objects are different, it creates two copies of each, but if they are the same, then such a quantity that one NB can be left in its memory. Creates two identical sets of RF and DCK bits for them. In the NBCH, among other things, it includes the HK symbol bits of each of the transmitted NBs, and in the NBCHC, the ES, among other things, includes the HF RFCH symbol bits and the HF RFCH symbol bits associated with the PMIP secret number. After that, one of the created identical instances of each such set of bits is stored in its memory, and the remaining sets of bits are transferred with one message to the address of the equipment of the US and PMUS. Upon receiving the message, the PMUS identifies the received set of bits and checks its accuracy. Then it stores the NBDCA ES in its memory, creates, on the basis of the received NBDC, two sets of receipt bits (UREC No. 1) about sending ES containing bits of characters of the number of moved copies of the NB ES, their HC and DCC ES, confirming the fact of sending the ES and, creating these NBDCs receipts, sends one electronic message on one resulting set of bits of the receipt and the NBDC receipt to the PMIP user who sent the ES. The second set, consisting of NB receipts (UREC No. 1) and NBDC receipts are stored in the memory cells of the PMUS or at the disposal of the PMUS. Further, the PMUS creates and adds to its URNB ES its NBDC, containing the DCC ES bits and DCC ES bits associated with the secret PMCU number and moves this entire set of bits to the memory cells corresponding to the recipient PMIP specified in the NRCH ES, then sends this set of bits, consisting of sets of bits of ES objects and the new URNB ES, a single ES at the recipient’s email address.

If the recipient’s equipment is connected to this ITS or SPD network, then its PMIP gets the opportunity to move the bits of this ES to its memory, where, using the appropriate algorithms and software products and using the appropriate known number for the PMUS, it checks the validity of the connection between DCC ES and DCC ES associated with a secret number of PMUSs whose symbol bits are contained in the NBCHC. Checks the connection of the DCC ES bits from the NBDCC with the NBCH ES, for which it independently determines the HC NBCH, then independently determines the HC bits received by the NB from the ES and compares them with the CC NB ES symbol bits contained in the NBRC, and if everything matches, then forms two NB receipts on the receipt of ES (KPES No. 2). It places, among other things, bits of confirmation symbols, including the number of received copies of the NB ES and their HK, as well as the DCK ES, after which it forms the NBCH receipt, containing, among other things, the bits of the DCK symbols of the KPES receipt No. 2 and DCC receipt KPES number 2, associated with the secret number of the recipient PMIP. One NB of the receipt of KPES No. 2 is stored in the memory cells of the PMIP. And then, with a single ES, it sends a set of bits of the receipt of the KPES No. 2 and the NBDC of the receipt to the PMUS. In this case, the recipient PMIP provides the recipient with the opportunity to study sets of ES bits. Moreover, the user can see that the source of the ES is the sender of the ES, with the corresponding electronic address of his equipment in the SPD or ITS network, and the ID of the PMIP at his disposal.

The PMUS, having received an electronic message from the PMIP of the recipient of the ES and having stored KPES No. 2 receipts in the NBCHC memory cells, compiles two KNPP receipts No. 2 of its NBDCK containing, among other things, a DCK symbol bit set for KPES No. 2 receipts and a DCK symbol bit set for KPES No. 2 2, linked by a secret PMUS number and, having saved one created by NBDPK KhKPES No. 2 in its memory, sends the NB KPES No. 2 and the second created by NBDCK KPES No. 2 in a single electronic message to the sender of ES. There, the sender’s PMIP checks the received message and gives the user information about the delivery of his ES to the recipient.

Thanks to this approach, users will not have difficulty using SSEP, as the operation of the system will not be visible, but if it is necessary to confirm the sending, passing or delivery of sets of ES bits, any of the users will be able to apply for confirmation to the organizer of the UPS, providing, as a criterion for searching for the saved information, bits of DCK or K DCK ES. And the organizer will be able, based on his data, to issue a confirmation in a convenient form for the user.

Moreover, if PMIP users are participants in different ITS or SPD, but their PMIP data is registered in one PMUS that has addresses in these ITS or SPD, then SSEP can fulfill its function in this case too. To do this, users, as the destination address of the ES, can use not the user’s network addresses, but their PMIP IDs, and the ES will be delivered at the first convenient opportunity, for example, if the corresponding PMIP addresses from the arbitrary address to the PMUS to send their messages.

The operation of the SSEP system can be illustrated by the example of two users messaging shown in FIG. 3.

The example shows the case of sending one instance of one object.

The diagram shows two groups of devices belonging to users “A” and “B”. To illustrate in FIG. 3 deliberately selected devices and their designations repeating an example implementation of the method of FIG. 1 set forth in the description for paragraph 1 of the formula.

Each group includes the PMIP. As described above, the PMIP is a PMP, which is transferred by agreement to the user, therefore, in the diagram, the PMIP indicates the PMP Device "A" (item 4 of Fig. 3) and the Device PMP "B" (item 19 of Fig. 3) . With this designation, it becomes clear that the networks of the PSMP and SSEP, schematically depicted in FIG. 1 and FIG. 3 have the same capabilities, and the SSEP system is based on the method described above.

All the devices shown are based on well-known and standard principles of operation, therefore, the description does not give detailed attention to signal transmission within devices and between devices. But schematically, to understand the sequences of data bits, such transmissions are partially shown by arrows.

The example shows that all devices exchange messages through the same ITS or SPD network (p. 22 of Fig. 3). Although a real SSEP system can be built for users of different ITS or SPD networks, as mentioned above and can be seen in FIG. one.

The user of the device group “A”, using his Electronic Computing Device “A” (item 1. Fig. 3), PCL, software and control products stored in the memory of his PMIP, sends a command to send the Message Object NB # 1 to the address user "B". For this purpose, he indicates the storage location of NB # 1 in the memory of his equipment. In FIG. 3, for example, it is shown that this is a Permanent Storage Unit (p. 2 of Fig. 3) of the electronic computing device “A” (p. 1 of Fig. 3). The PMP device “A” (p. 4 of Fig. 3) finds this place and bitwise forms two of the same objects in the Online Storage Unit for the memory of the Storage device (p. 6 of Fig. 3) of the PMP “A” device (p. 4 of FIG. 3).

Then, it forms in the same place two identical NBRCH ES (NBN2). For these purposes, as described above, the PMP Device “A” (p. 4 of Fig. 3) determines the HC NB # 1, after which, along with the bits of the date, time, etc. characters, it is included in the NBCH (NB # 2). And on the basis of this set of bits creates NBDHK (NB # 3). Using an additional processor (p. 7-2 of Fig. 3) or a secret number (p. 7-1 of Fig. 3) recorded in the memory of the Storage device (p. 6 of Fig. 3). PMP apparatus "A" (p. 4, Fig. 3) connects HC NB№2 calculated to give a new ordered set of bits, designated NB№3 structure (FIG. 3) as SvznDHK / MF _A. Both sets of bits, HC (NB # 2) and SvznDHK / MF _A , along with the other character bits indicated above, are included in the NBDC. Moreover, as noted above, from this moment HC (NB # 2) is DHKES.

After that, one set of NB # 1, NB # 2 and NB # 3, the PMP Device "A" (p. 4 of Fig. 3) stores in its block long-term storage of data of the Storage device (p. 6 of Fig. 3) or in the Block permanent storage of data (p. 2 of Fig. 3) of the electronic computing device "A" (p. 1 of Fig. 3). In FIG. 3 shows the first case.

And the second set of bits, consisting of NB # 1 and URNB (NB # 2 + NB # 3), in one electronic message, through the Data Transfer Unit (p. 3 of Fig. 3) of the electronic computing device “A” (p. 1 of Fig. . 3), the Network (p. 22 of Fig. 3) and the Data Transmission Unit (p. 9 of Fig. 3) of the electronic computing device “CSS” (p. 8 of Fig. 3) moves to the PMUS device (p. 12 of Fig. 3). 3). In the diagram, this movement is shown by means of icons (p. 24 of Fig. 3).

The PMUS device (p. 12 of Fig. 3), using the Central processor (p. 13 of Fig. 3) and software and control products located in the Storage device (p. 14 of Fig. 3), as well as the known or secret number of the PMP device “A” ", Conducts a communication check NB # 1, NB # 2 and NB # 3. After that, it moves NB # 3 to the Permanent Data Storage Unit (p. 10 of Fig. 3) of the electronic computing device "CSS" (p. 8 of Fig. 3).

Based on NB # 2, the PMUS device (p. 12 of Fig. 3) creates two NB UREC No. 1 (NB # 5) and two NBDHK URNB (NB # 6). One NBN5, one NBN6 and the received NBN3 PMUS (p. 12 of Fig. 3) are transferred to the Permanent Data Storage Unit (p. 10 of Fig. 3) of the electronic computing device "CSS" (p. 8 of Fig. 3).

And the other two, using the Data Transmission Unit (p. 9 of Fig. 3) of the electronic computing device "CSS" (p. 8 of Fig. 3), the Network (p. 22 of Fig. 3) and the Data Transmission Unit (p. 3 of Fig. 3) . 3) Electronic computing device "A" (p. 1 of Fig. 3) are moved to the PMP device "A" (p. 4 of Fig. 3). There they are checked using the Known Number for PMUS, after which NB No. 5 is located in the Permanent Data Storage Unit (clause 2 of Fig. 3), and NB No. 6 in the Operational Data Storage Block of the Memory of the Storage Device (clause 6 of Fig. 3 ) PMP device "A" (paragraph 4 of Fig. 3).

In the meantime, the PMUS device (p. 12 of Fig. 3) creates two of its identical NBDCs (NB # 4), which partially use the data from NB # 3, but differ primarily in the fact that the PMC includes the bits of the HC characters NB # 2 and HC (NB # 2), associated with a secret number of PMUS (items 7-1 or 7-2 of Fig. 3). After that, one NB # 4 places in the Unit for permanent data storage (p. 10 of Fig. 3) of the electronic computing device "CSS" (p. 8 of Fig. 3).

The second NB # 4 and received from the PMP device “A” (item 4 of Fig. 3), NB # 1 and NB # 2, in one electronic message, consisting of NB # 1 and URNB (NB # 2 and NB # 4) using Data Transmission Unit (p. 9 of Fig. 3) of the electronic-computing device "CSS" (p. 8 of Fig. 3), the Network (p. 22 of Fig. 3) and the Data Transmission Unit (p. 18 of Fig. 3) Electronic computing device "B" (p. 16 of Fig. 3) moves to the PMP device "B" (p. 19 of Fig. 3). In the diagram, this movement is shown by means of icons (p. 26 of Fig. 3).

PMP device "B" (p. 19 of Fig. 3), using the Central processor (p. 20 of Fig. 3) and software and control products located in the Storage device (p. 21 of Fig. 3), as well as the Known or secret number of PMUS , conducts a communication check NB # 1, NB # 2 and NB # 4. After that, it moves NB # 2 and NB # 4 to the Long-Term Storage Unit of the Data storage device (p. 21 Fig. 3) PMP device "B" (p. 19 Fig. 3).

Then, the PMP device "B" (paragraph 19 of Fig. 3) forms two NB KPES No. 2 (NB No. 7) and one NBDHK KPES No. 2 (NB No. 8). This procedure, including the binding of bits of KPES KPES No. 2 by the Secret Number of PMP “B”, is similar to that described above.

One NB # 7 is moved to the Long-term storage unit of the Data storage device (p. 21 Fig. 3) PMP device "B" (p. 19 Fig. 3). And the second NB No. 7, in a single electronic message with NB No. 8, using the Data Transfer Unit (p. 18 of Fig. 3) of the electronic computing device “B” (p. 16 of Fig. 3), Network (p. 22 of Fig. 3 ) and the Data Transmission Unit (p. 9 of Fig. 3) of the electronic computing device “CSS” (p. 8 of Fig. 3) moves to the PMUS device (p. 12 of Fig. 3). In the diagram, this movement is shown by means of icons (p. 27 of Fig. 3).

PMUS device (p. 12 of Fig. 3), using the Central processor (p. 13 of Fig. 3) and software and control products located in the Storage device (p. 14 of Fig. 3), as well as the Known or secret number for the PMP device " B "(p. 19 of Fig. 3), conducts a communication check of NBN7 and NBN8. Then it moves NB # 8 to the Permanent Data Storage Unit (p. 10 of Fig. 3) of the electronic computing device "CSS" (p. 8 of Fig. 3).

Then, the PMUS device (p. 12 of Fig. 3) creates two of its identical NBDCs (NB # 9), which partially use the bits of characters from NB # 8, but differ primarily in that the PMUS includes the character bits XK NB # 7 and HC NB No. 7, associated with a secret number of PMUS (paragraphs 7-1 or 7-2 of Fig. 3). After that, one NB # 9 places in the Unit for permanent data storage (p. 10 of Fig. 3) of the electronic computing device "CSS" (p. 8 of Fig. 3).

The second NB No. 9 and received from the PMP device "B" (paragraph 19 of Fig. 3) NB KPES No. 2 (NB No. 7) using the Data Transfer Unit (paragraph 9 of Fig. 3) of the electronic computing device "US" ( p. 8 of Fig. 3), the Network (p. 22 of Fig. 3) and the Data Transmission Unit (p. 3 of Fig. 3) of the electronic computing device “A” (p. 1 of Fig. 3) are moved to the PMP device “A” "(Paragraph 4 of Fig. 3). There they are checked using the Known Number for PMUS, after which, NB No. 7 is located in the Permanent Data Storage Unit (clause 2 of Fig. 3) of the electronic computing device “A” (clause 1 of Fig. 3), and NB No. 9 in the Long-term storage unit of the memory data of the Memory device (item 6 of Fig. 3) of the PMP device “A” (item 4 of Fig. 3) or in the Unit of permanent data storage (item 2 of Fig. 3) of the electronic computing device “A” (p. 1 of Fig. 3). In FIG. 3 shows the first case.

As can be clearly seen in the diagram of FIG. 3, the message of user “A” is delivered to user “B”, and user “A” has receipts about sending and receiving sets of bits of his message, which contain bits of characters for the occasion, time and place of their creation, as well as subject identifiers their gears.

Abbreviations

Terms used and their definitions

Authorization - granting a certain person or group of persons rights to perform certain actions; and also the process of checking (confirming) these rights when trying to perform these actions. Often you can hear the expression that some person is “authorized” to perform this operation - this means that he has the right to it.

An algorithm is a system of rules formulated in a language that the executor understands, which determines the process of transition from valid input data to a certain result and has the properties of mass, finiteness, certainty, and determinism.

Authentication is a procedure for checking the user's legality or data, for example, checking whether the password entered by the user for the account matches the password in the database, or verifying the digital signature of the letter with the encryption key, or checking the file checksum for compliance with the file stated by the author. Authorization, on the other hand, controls access of legal users to system resources after successful authentication. Often, authentication and authorization procedures are combined.

A byte is a collection of bits representing a minimum addressable unit of information or a minimum independently addressable data set.

Bit is a unit of measurement of the amount of information equal to one bit in the binary number system and for the needs of electronics and digital technology is defined as one binary bit, which corresponds to one binary trigger, which has two mutually exclusive possible stable states or one bit of binary, for example, flash memory . Each of the stable states can be associated with a signal with the declared technical parameters.

Data is a parametric characteristic of an object, presented in a form suitable for processing by automatic means with the possible participation of a person.

Trusted - acting on someone's power of attorney, authority.

Trusted ES hash code (DCC ES) - a hash code of a set of bits of the requisite part of an electronic message (HC NBRCH ES) transmitted and connected to the NBCHC ES with its second value, derived from the first value using a secret number in the mail module that controlled the preparation ES.

Documentation - parametric recording on various media according to established rules.

Identifier - a lettering chain acting in a certain context as a symbol.

Identification - actions to assign identifiers to subjects and access objects, in comparison with the presented identifier with the list of assigned identifiers.

An information and telecommunication network is a technological system designed to transmit data via communication channels that are accessed using computer technology.

Receipt - an official receipt in the acceptance of money or things, values.

A computer is a device or system capable of performing a given, well-defined, variable, sequence of operations.

A material object is an object that is completely described by an energy characteristic and belongs to at least one of the forms of matter.

User’s mail module (PMP) is a device for managing the preparation, documentation, identification and determination of the integrity of electronic messages (ES), which allows controlling the process of sending and receiving ES in a data transmission network or in an information and telecommunication network, incl. using email.

Certification system mail module (PMC) is a variant of the user mail module (PMP) that allows, in an SPD or ITS environment, to connect other PMPs to a single network.

Protocol (data transfer) - a standard that describes the rules for the interaction of functional blocks during data transfer.

Requisite of electronic message of OS) - an obligatory element of registration of an official ES (for example, identifiers of the subject or object sending the ES, date and time of documenting the ES).

A network is a communications system located in some space.

The PMP network (SPMP) is a PMP and PMUS communications system located in some space that ensures the passage of sets of ES bits between the PMP and PMUS.

Data Transmission Network (SPD) - a combination of three or more terminal devices (terminals) of communication connected by data transmission channels and switching devices (network nodes), providing the exchange of messages between all terminal devices.

Communication network - a technological system that includes means and communication lines and is intended for telecommunications or postal services.

CMC (Short Message Service) is a short message service - a technology that allows you to receive and send short text messages using your cell phone.

Cell phone - a mobile phone designed to work in cellular networks.

Message (message) - a string of bits of limited length [1].

Telegram - a message transmitted by telegraph.

Telegraph is a system of technical devices for transmitting messages by wire using electric energy.

A terminal is a device for a user (or operator) to interact with a computer or computer system and with input / output and data display functions.

Technology - a set of production methods and processes in a particular industry, as well as a scientific description of production methods.

Certification system (CSS) - equipment for ensuring the operation of the ES exchange service, designed to connect a special module called the Certification System Postal Module (PMUS), which allows equipment for the exchange of ES to become equipment for the operation of the PSMP.

Certification system of e-mail (USESCH - a system that implements the management of preparation, identification, integrity control of ES, as well as the function of transferring ES between mail user modules, the formation and maintenance of interconnected NB trusted hash codes of ES, verifying the authenticity of ES sources sent using PMP.

Certification sheet - an accompanying paper document with handwritten signatures in it.

Accounting and Registration Bit Set (URNB) - additional ordered bit sets accompanying the electronic message object and represented by an ordered set of bits of the requisite part of the electronic message (NBRCH ES) and an ordered set of bits of the trusted hash code of the electronic message (NBDC ES).

An ordered set of bits is a finite number of bits grouped according to known rules, including as a set of bytes that make up a file.

A file is a named whole set of bytes on a storage medium.

The set of Bits of the Trusted HC ES (NBDHK ES) is an ordered set of bits transmitted together with the ES and containing bits of the symbols of the name assigned to the ES, XK file of the prop part of the ES with its second value obtained from the first value using the secret number of the corresponding PMP that controlled the preparation ES, date and time of creation of the ES.

Set of the Bit of the requisite part of the electronic message (NBCF ES) is an ordered set of bits containing the bits of the symbols of the main parameters of the ES, such as the hash codes of all NB message objects, electronic addresses of the equipment or the user's mail module (PMP) sending the ES, DC or PMUS and equipment or PMP receiving ES.

A hash function (English hash-function) is a function that maps strings of bits to strings of bits of a fixed length and satisfies the following properties: 1) it is difficult to calculate the source data mapped to this value from a given value of a function; 2) for given initial data, it is difficult to calculate other initial data mapped to the same function value; 3) it is difficult to calculate any pair of source data mapped to the same function value.

3) it is difficult to calculate any pair of source data displayed in the same value.

A hash code is a string of bits that is the output of a hash function.

Electronic signature - data in electronic form that are attached to the source data in electronic form (signed data) or otherwise associated with such data and which is used to determine the person signing the source data.

E-mail - technology for sending and receiving electronic messages over the information and telecommunication network (including the Internet).

Electronic message - data transmitted or received by a user of an information telecommunication network or data transmission network.

Telecommunications - any radiation, transmission or reception of signs, signals, voice information, written text, images, sounds or messages of any kind through a radio system, wire, optical and other electromagnetic systems.

Bibliography

1. GOST R 34.11-2012, Information technology, Cryptographic protection of information, Hashing function, M., 2012.

2. GOST R 34.11-94, Cryptographic information security. The hash function, M., 1994.

3. Federal Law of the Russian Federation of July 27, 2006 No. 149-ФЗ “On Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection”.

4. GOST 28147-89, Information processing systems. Cryptographic protection. Cryptographic conversion algorithm. M., 1990.

5. Scheme of using a trusted file hash code in automated systems for processing electronic technical documentation on rocket and space technology, L.I. Azbievich, L.L. Likhvintsev, "Cosmonautics and Rocket Engineering", vol. 6 (79), TsNIImash, 2014, ISSN 1994 - 3210.

6. Automated systems. Protection against unauthorized access to information. AC classification and information protection requirements, Guidance document. FSTEC of the Russian Federation.

7. GOST R 34.10-2001. Information technology. Cryptographic information security. The processes of formation and verification of electronic digital signatures.

8. GOST R 34.10-2012. Information technology. Cryptographic information security. The processes of formation and verification of electronic digital signatures.

9. Federal Law of the Russian Federation of April 6, 2011 No. 63-ФЗ "On electronic signature".

Claims (2)

one.  A way to manage data exchange documentation,  including the ability to manage documentation when transmitting telecommunications data in the form of emissions,  signals  voice information  written text  images  sounds or other data of any kind using the radio,  wired  optical and other systems  eg,  in the form of Electronic Messaging transmissions,  further designated by the abbreviation ES,  as part of information and telecommunication networks,  hereinafter referred to as ITS,  including email  hereinafter referred to by the abbreviation EHF,  as part of ITS,  as well as when transmitting ES, as short text messages using a cell phone in a cellular system,  eg,  CMC on the Data Network,  hereinafter referred to as the abbreviation SPD,  known about  that at any moment of transmission and storage of electronic devices by electronic devices in ITS,  EHF or SPD ES are real material objects,  fully localized or partially distributed in the form of electrical signals,  residual induction,  electric charges  suitably prepared electromagnetic waves,  electromagnetic impulses,  magnetic polarizing or spin effects,  and it is known  what,  if necessary  without changing the essence,  ES are transformed from one such form of physical state to another according to well-known rules,  can be defined and measured as sets of separate electrical,  magnetic  electromagnetic and other natural phenomena,  can also be represented and quantified as ordered strings of bits of limited length,  and that all this allows us to consider the ES as an immutable instrumentally recorded material object,  located either in an electronic device,  or in the process of moving from one such device to another by means of signals,  therefore further speaking of the transfer,  reception  moving  sending or receiving ES,  this refers to actions with ordered sets of ES bits as physical objects,  known about  that to determine the integrity of the transmitted ordered set of bits of ES,  using the form of representing ES as a string of bits of a fixed length,  and when implementing document management, an electronic device may be used,  able to calculate a hash code,  hereinafter referred to by the abbreviation HC,  like a string of bits,  resulting from a hash function  that is, functions  which maps a string of bits of arbitrary length to a string of bits of fixed length,  and a properly selected hash function has these three properties,  like the first  which attributes that  that for a given value of the function it is difficult to calculate the source data,  mapped to the same function value,  like the second  such  that for given input data it is difficult to calculate other input data,  mapped to the same function value,  and like a third  such  that it’s difficult to calculate any pair of input data,  mapped to the same value,  and subject to the presence of these properties, it is additionally known that  that the value of such an XK for the same ordered set of bits,  when using the standard hash function,  independent of subjects  object or place of its calculation,  therefore, such a HC can be used not only to determine the integrity of ES,  but also to determine whether an ES belongs to a specific device,  which  known cryptography techniques,  using a unique secret key entered into this device or into another electronic control device connected to it,  can convert an ordered set of bits XK,  determining the integrity of the ES,  into a new set of bits,  which in this way  through this secret number,  will connect the ES with the device,  in which this secret key is entered and,  hence,  due to the fact that there are known methods and methods of identification and authentication of subjects and objects of telecommunication processing,  moreover, it is known  that the reliability of such methods and approaches to identification and authentication of subjects and objects of telecommunication systems is constantly increasing,  especially with the development of mobile cellular and satellite communications,  same,  as in connection with the development of electronic payment systems,  using ATMs  electronic wallets  electronic software and hardware devices for accepting plastic cards for payment,  including with integrated microelectronic devices,  moreover, it is known  that with identification and authentication,  for example, mobile cellular users or payment cards users of payment systems,  electronic devices can be used in SPD and ITS,  using well-known cryptography algorithms,  as,  eg,  such,  when one device  transmitting their identity  and other,  receiving this data  both have a unified secret key stored in their memory for implementing this method,  or,  eg,  another algorithm  when the device  transmitting identity  has his  located in it  a pair of keys  serving to implement this algorithm,  of which one key is secret,  and another open,  and at the same time the device,  receiving the identification data sent to him,  uses only the public key of the implementation of the specified algorithm,  but it is known  that the processes of device identification and authentication by the above algorithms are equivalent and are carried out using such  coupled by any of the above algorithms a pair of numbers,  that the first is transmitted unchanged,  and the second number is obtained from the first using a secret key,  recorded in the identification device during its manufacture,  and the completion of the identification and authentication process is carried out according to the results of extraction from the second of the first with a further verification of their identity,  and thus,  Considering,  that any characters can be transmitted to the ES in the form of a bit structure,  which  in its turn,  broadcast using signals  and at the same time, telecommunication technical protection systems are known and continue to be improved,  and,  provided,  that such systems use personal data of users and system operators,  such methods  technical solutions and algorithms can be used to confirm the fact of sending or receiving any ordered sets of bits,  including such  which make up the ES or are attached to the ES of the users of SPD or ITS,  e.g. EHF,  using such networks  as well as to confirm integrity,  transmission  i.e. sending  and receiving  that is, reception  and as a consequence of the foregoing, a method for managing documented data exchange is presented,  characterized in  that to implement the management of documentation of ES and the identification of devices,  sending and receiving sets of ES bits,  securing immutability  that is, the integrity of passing bits of ES,  It is proposed to use electronic devices that control the process of documenting data and generating ES,  which in their properties are similar to those mentioned above,  and for convenience called the Mail User Modules,  hereinafter referred to by the abbreviation PMP,  allowing sending and receiving additionally specially prepared ES in ITS or SPD,  including using EHF,  organize a network  uniting PMP,  which is further denoted by the acronym SPMP,  in which ES exchange can be implemented,  and which can be built on the basis of any communication lines and channels,  including based on existing networks with their ES exchange capabilities,  e.g. ELF or CMC,  device,  allowing to realize the ability to work SPMP,  called a Certification System,  further denoted by the acronym CSS  which has its own version of PMP,  named Email Certification System Module,  hereinafter referred to by the acronym PMUS,  moreover, PMUS has a larger  than other PMP memory size,  a processor with a higher performance or a greater number of them,  and at the same time provided and provided,  that each PMP is connected by the commonality of the embedded properties and the uniformity of the used control and command protocols with the PMUS,  and when passing through the ES in the PSMP, chains are connected among themselves from the identifiers of the ES,  network address of the equipment  to which the PMP or PMP itself is connected,  sending ES,  network address of the US or PMUS and the network address of the equipment,  to which the PMP is connected,  receiving ES,  and at the same time, chains of HC are created as part of the ES,  in which each subsequent HC is calculated taking into account the previous one,  despite the fact that each PMP is used either as an independent device,  possessing all the basic features of a portable or stationary computer with input and output devices,  able to connect to ITS or SPD,  or to ITS and SPD,  and support appropriate ES exchange protocols in such networks,  or as a necessary element of PSMP as part of other equipment,  able to work in such networks,  providing, including the possibility of unambiguous recognition of the PMP and the ES prepared by it,  Besides,  having,  due to its characteristics and the features laid down in it for its connection to the equipment used,  the ability to provide the use of a technical protection system for exchanging ordered sets of bits,  including registration of the operation of devices in time,  and all this provided  that the PMP works as a standalone device or as part of the communication equipment used,  has an integrated processor or multiple processors,  built-in memory and control records recorded in it,  logical and command protocols  Besides,  provided,  that each PMP can be related by the commonality of the embedded properties and the uniformity of the used control and command protocols with other PMPs,  which allows  using ITS or SPD and related equipment,  exchange ES,  and,  in this way,  provided and provided,  that each PMP with its unique Identification Number,  hereinafter referred to by the abbreviation IN,  uniquely associated with an addressed memory area,  called in this method memory cells PMUS in the US SPMP,  which  in its turn,  due to the connection to it, the PMUS allows the DC equipment to ensure the exchange of various kinds of ES,  through existing communication lines,  become equipment for the functioning of the PSMP,  why PMUS has access to information about all ID PMP,  with their corresponding secret,  or corresponding to their secret,  known numbers of PMP,  Besides,  PMUS has the ability to use the necessary set of memory blocks,  including those reserved in equipment for the functioning of the CSS SPMP,  corresponding to the total number of served PMP,  and provides placement of ES,  received from different PMPs,  in the respective memory cells used by each ID PMP,  moreover, all PMP,  including PMUS,  for exchange ES can have in ITS or SPD,  or in ITS and SPD,  Temporary or permanent network address  including can use the network address of equipment connected to the PMP,  eg,  in the case of using existing EHF networks,  EHF addresses can be used,  and according to the rules laid down in the PMP,  using hash functions  built-in algorithms  connected equipment  all PMPs can determine the HC of any set of bits and then associate them with their secret number according to a special rule,  in order to determine  documentation and storage of ES parameters,  prepared under the management of PMP,  used HC,  obtained using the general for all PMP,  standard hash function,  moreover, to increase security and eliminate possible coincidences of using the same HK for different ES, several KhK from different known hash functions for each ordered set of bits of ES can be used,  forming in this case Conglomerate HC,  denoted by the abbreviation KHK,  but further  without losing the essence of the described Method and to simplify its presentation,  consider using only one  the hash function common to all PMPs,  which allows you to define HC bits for any ordered ES Bit Sets,  further denoted by the acronym NB ES,  and at the same time, each of the HC NS ES, as a general rule, can be included in specially created additional NB ES,  but further  without losing the essence of the described Method and to simplify its presentation,  considered the option of preparing to send only one NS ES,  as a result of which  if necessary, move the set of bits with the help of ES,  for example, for convenience, denoted by the symbols NB # 1,  and thanks to the managers contained in each PMP,  logical and command protocols, it is possible to associate NS # 1 ES with IN PMP a secret number contained in PMP in this way  which allows you to determine the PMP,  used in SPMP,  prepared by the PMP additional ordered NB,  called the NB Requisite Part of ES,  hereinafter, for convenience, indicated by the abbreviation NBRCH or symbols NB # 2,  accompanying each of these ES,  and since NB # 2 ES contains bits of characters XK defined for NB # 1 ES,  and may also contain symbol bits of the main temporal and spatial parameters,  characterizing ES,  then for sending ES the PMP connected to the sending ES equipment creates one in its memory,  and if necessary, two or more identical copies of NB # 1 can be created for inclusion in the ES,  However,  Further,  without losing the essence of the described Method and to simplify its presentation,  considered the option of creating only one instance of NB # 1 in the memory of the PMP,  and thus,  PMP for the preparation of sending ES creates NBN№2,  using XK character bits when creating it,  specific to NB # 1,  moreover, when forming an ES in NB # 2, a set of symbol bits of the Notification of sending ES may be included,  including those characterizing the departure time,  ID and email address of the manager of the preparation for sending the PMP or equipment connected to it in the ES exchange network,  ID and email address of the PMP or equipment connected to it,  receiving ES,  and character bits of other parameters,  necessary for the implementation of the ES regime,  and then PMP,  having attached NB # 2 to the power unit,  as the first component of the Registration and Registration Bit Sets for ES,  further designated by the acronym URNB ES,  defines HC NB # 2,  after which this HC NB # 2 gets the name of the Trusted Hash Code ES,  hereinafter referred to by the acronym DHC ES,  as part of an orderly NBDCK ES specially created for the purposes of its updating,  further, for convenience, indicated by the symbols NB # 3,  as the second component of URNB,  Besides,  containing bits of the characters of the second value DHK ES,  cryptographically linked by a secret number of PMP,  and at the same time in NB # 3 may contain bits of characters of such data,  as,  eg,  conditional name of ES date and time of creation of ES,  ID and e-mail address of the manager of the preparation for sending the PMP or equipment connected to it in the ES exchange network,  ID and electronic address of the PMP or equipment connected to it receiving ES,  as well as the PMUS email address,  and,  in this way,  further bits of the DCC ES symbols determine the integrity of the ES,  are inextricably linked with the content of ES and are unique,  a unique identifier of the ES itself,  which allows the PMP to complete the preparation of the ES for shipment,  determine his email address PMUS as the priority at a given time,  and,  using appropriate control and software protocols and equipment for the exchange of ES,  send NB # 1,  NB # 2,  and NB # 3 with one ES at the PMUS address through the ES exchange service,  eg,  EHF in ITS or SPD,  where further is the DC equipment for the exchange of ES with the PMUS connected to it,  using the available set of software and hardware  including  eg,  relevant Email Client,  denoted by the acronym PCL,  eg,  through the EHF service,  checks all incoming ES on his email address,  and by characteristic  such that  as,  eg,  features of the ordering of ES bit sets,  identifies among those received ES those  which are formed under the control of PMP,  then it moves them to the memory of the PMUS or to the memory of the USB device,  reserved for the needs of PMUS,  implements verification procedures for NBN2 and NBN3 of the received URNB ES with the help of a secret or open number corresponding to this PMP,  according to the type of algorithm used,  for the presence of a reliable connection of the set of bits DHK ES,  that is HC NB # 2,  contained in the form of bits of characters in NB # 3,  with a set of bits,  obtained from the characters contained in the form of bits in NB # 3,  DHK ES,  associated with the secret number of the PMP that created it,  after which it places the ES in the memory cells,  relevant ID PMP,  managing the preparation of the ES for shipment,  designed to store the transmitted data ES,  and then PMUS,  using your own programs,  managers  logical and command protocols  independently determines the HC bits for NB # 1 from ES and compares with HC NB # 1 from ES,  which is contained in the form of bits of characters in NB # 2,  that if these bit structures coincide,  as well as the results of comparing bits DCK ES and bits,  obtained using a secret number for PMP,  managing the preparation of the ES for shipment,  from bits of characters DHK ES,  associated with the secret number of the PMP who prepared it,  contained in NB # 3,  allows the PMUS to place the NB # 3 in the memory cells used by the PMUS for further storage of service data,  then based on sets of bits,  received from ES,  NB # 1 and NB # 2,  creates one or more of its ordered NBCHK ES,  Further , for convenience, designated NB # 4,  using bits of characters DHK ES,  bits of characters HC NB # 2,  associated with a secret PMUS number,  and for example  bits of characters for the date and time of creation of the ES,  ID and electronic addresses of the preparing and receiving ES PMP or equipment connected to them,  and others,  However,  Further,  without losing essence  describes the creation of only one NB # 4,  and thus,  after that, the PMUS determines the electronic address of the equipment with PMP available to him,  receiving ES,  as a priority at a given time,  and,  using appropriate software and control protocols and equipment for the exchange of ES ES,  through an electronic messaging service,  eg,  through EHF to ITS or SPD,  sends to the address of the PMP or devices,  connected to PMP,  receiving ES,  one e-mail NB # 1,  NB # 2 and NB # 4,  then PMP,  receiving ES  using the equipment connected with it for the exchange of ES and,  eg,  corresponding PKL,  checks the ES coming to his address,  and by characteristic  eg,  features of the ordering of ES bit sets,  discovers prepared under the control of PMUS NB ES,  which it moves to its memory and checks with a special known PMP number and algorithm,  by analogy with the actions of the PMUS when checking incoming ES,  and acting like that  as described above,  that is, it checks NB # 2 and NB # 4 of the received URNB ES with the help of a secret or open number with the appropriate PMUS,  in accordance with the type of algorithm used for the presence of a reliable connection of a set of bits of DCC ES,  that is HC NB # 2,  contained in the form of bits of characters in NB # 4,  with a set of bits,  obtained from the symbols contained in the form of bits in NB # 4 of the DHK ES,  associated with the secret number of the PMUS that created it,  then,  using your own programs,  managers  logical and command protocols  independently determines the HC bits for NB # 1 from ES and compares with HC NB # 1 from ES,  which is contained in the form of bits of characters in NB # 2,  what,  in this way,  with a positive outcome of the check allows PMP,  received ES,  built-in algorithms to realize free access to equipment connected to the PMP,  to the content of the obtained ES,  that is, to NB # 1,  NB # 2 and NB # 4,  at the same time revealing the source address of the ES as the electronic address of the equipment and IP PM,  managing the preparation of the ES for shipment,  while saving in the memory cells PMP,  receiving ES,  NB # 1 and NB # 2,  created under the control of PMP,  preparing for sending ES,  and NB # 4 prepared for shipment under the control of PMUS,  and,  Now,  as it can be understood from the above text,  it can be argued,  that the proposed method for initializing the PMP,  including PMP option,  named PMUS,  used to control the preparation of ordered sets of bits,  which can be moved in the information and telecommunication network or data transmission networks,  including in the ITS “Internet” using ES exchange technologies,  eg,  EHF,  Association of PMP in SPMP,  managing the creation of additional ordered sets of bits,  such  as described above NBN2,  NB # 3 and NB # 4,  individual or unique for each PMP secret numbers,  saving instances of NB Trusted Hash Codes,  formed under the control of PMP in memory cells,  used PMUS,  all this provides the ability to manage training,  transmitting and receiving ES,  verification of their integrity and authenticity of the source,  localization of time and address of creation,  including such ES,  which the operator is  using PMUS,  can additionally certify it with his electronic signature or, if necessary and upon request,  accompany the ES with the Certification Sheet as accompanying to the electronic document represented by an ordered set of bits,  a paper document with handwritten signatures in it. 2.  The system for implementing the method according to p.  one,  called the Email Certification System,  hereinafter referred to by the acronym USEP,  and described in terms of the above method,  including the required number of Postal User Modules in the form of Terminals,  further denoted by the abbreviation PMPT  made as independent devices,  possessing all the basic features of a portable or stationary computer,  able to connect with known types of Data Networks,  hereinafter referred to by the acronym SPD,  or Telecommunications Information Network,  hereinafter referred to as ITS  or able to connect to ITS,  and to SPD,  support transmission protocols for ES bit sets,  hereinafter referred to as NB ES,  eg,  Email Protocols,  hereinafter referred to by the abbreviation EHF,  Besides,  including  the required number of Mail User Modules,  intended for connection to the Equipment of Users,  further designated by the acronym PMPOP,  other electronic equipment of users,  able to process the necessary for sending NB,  determine hash codes by bit strings,  provide the ability to enter and work in known types of SPD or ITS,  or capable of connecting to ITS,  and to SPD,  or,  depending on  where is the SEEC implemented,  to well-known private or public postal services of the exchange of NB ES,  eg,  EHF,  if necessary  using the information and control software products appropriate to the task of the SEEC,  provide the ability to receive and send prepared PMPOP NB ES using standard protocols in SPD or ITS,  the ability to store NB ES,  and,  in addition to the above, including communication networks with their equipment,  eg,  communication lines  nodal and linear substations,  routers  switches  database servers  further designated by the abbreviation DB,  equipment of exchange operators  e.g. EHF equipment,  providing this service in the SAP or ITS,  SPMP equipment,  consisting  primarily,  from known and used equipment,  necessary for services for sending ES to SPD and ITS,  including EHF,  with the PMUS connected to it,  containing uniquely defined addresses of memory areas,  each of which is associated with the corresponding individual numbers PMPT and PMPOP,  further for convenience in the text united by one common name PMP,  and with all this, the CEP is different in that  that implements automatic transmission and receipt of ordered NB ES,  prepared using PMP and between users of PMP,  certification of such transmissions and confirmation of the integrity of ordered NS ES,  ensures the provision of electronic receipts on the sending of the NB ES and the receipt of the NB ES by the appropriate addressee,  using for work the capabilities of SPD and ITS and ensuring the implementation of other related activities to implement the operation,  including,  eg,  EHF,  using information and control instructions for processors relevant to the SSEC task,  which allow you to automatically transmit and receive NB ES,  including through,  eg,  EHF,  save and,  if necessary  provide evidence base for the receipt and integrity of the transmitted NS ES,  can implement authentication functions PMP and PMUS,  as well as the functions of administering the DBMSPS only using equipment of the OS SPMP,  it is provided  that only PMP and PMUS can perform actions in the SEEC,  and therefore to the user,  for the possibility of using SSEP,  under a fixed-term service agreement with the operator of the MPS, the MMP and the secret password are transmitted,  or another mechanism for activation of items recorded by the operator  and he,  using personal equipment  in automatic or manual mode,  and its commutation with PMP,  gets the opportunity  using  in its turn,  SPD or ITS and NB ES exchange protocols,  eg,  EHF,  transfer the NB ES to another user of the UPSEC,  why the sender activates a special program contained in the PMP,  for the convenience of presentation, called the Email Client,  hereinafter referred to as PCL,  located in the memory of the PMP,  and,  using its fields to fill in the necessary data,  using the interface and PCL instructions,  enters the email address into it,  or,  in case of work with EHF,  E-mail address,  which he wants to use to send the NB ES,  and,  if he knows  that this mail service to activate work with him,  requires its user to provide special data,  eg,  authentication data in SPD,  ITS or existing EHF networks,  that  in the absence of such data in the PMP memory,  according to the instructions provided by the PMP, enter this data into the PMP,  after which he makes or indicates an email address,  or IN PMP,  or the email address and the IP of the recipient of the ES recipient,  and then,  in any order  at the prompt, the PMP moves to the PMP prepared for shipment to the ES of the National Bank or indicates a link to the storage location available for the PCL PMP,  and if he wants  then in a separate field for a description of those sent to the ES NB,  places a textual description of them,  after which it gives the PMP a command to send ES from the NB,  which confirms the password transferred to him under the contract,  or by another method of activating PMP items recorded by the operator  and from that moment on, all operations with the NB ES occur automatically and in sequence,  managed  defined and controlled PMP,  which consists of actions for additional preparation of the NB ES and which can partially be performed by the user equipment according to the instructions for the processors,  located in the PMP,  therefore it will be further described as the actions of the PMP itself,  wherein,  as described in the method of managing documentation during data exchange,  transmitted electronic messages in the telecommunication network,  to increase security and eliminate possible coincidences of using the same HK for different ES,  several HCs from different hash functions can be applied for each informationally important NB ES,  forming in this case Conglomerate HC,  denoted by the abbreviation KHK,  but further  without loss of essence and presentation features,  consider using only one  the hash function common to all PMPs,  which allows you to determine HC for any set of bits,  and,  Besides,  in order to simplify  but without losing essence  describes the movement of only one prepared for dispatch  therefore PMP,  placing in your memory a copy of the ordered NB,  to be sent to the EU,  which, by analogy with the method of managing documentation during data exchange,  transmitted electronic messages in the telecommunication network,  for convenience, the description is indicated by the symbols NB # 1,  PMP can  for subsequent control,  create and save in your memory another one of the same NBN # 1 and,  then determines for NB # 1 HC,  after which it creates two identical copies of ordered NBRCH ES,  Further,  for convenience, descriptions denoted by the symbols NB # 2 ES,  using at their creation bits of characters ХК НБ№1 and,  eg,  bits of characters of a short text set of a user-created description,  departure time  geolocation parameters  ID PMP and email address,  PMP user equipment used to send ES,  e-mail address and IN PMP,  equipment receiving NB ES,  etc,  and then PMP,  having attached one NB # 2 to the ES,  as the first component of URNB ES,  defines the second component of URNB,  for which it creates two instances of ordered sets of bits of NBCHC,  for convenience, descriptions marked with symbols NB # 3,  which include the character bits HC NB # 2,  dubbed DHK ES,  and bits of DCC ES symbols associated with a secret PMP number,  and besides,  NB # 3 may contain symbol bits of such data,  as,  eg,  Conditional name ES,  date and time of creation of ES,  PM ID and the electronic address of the PMP user equipment used to send ES,  ID PMP and electronic equipment address,  receiving ES,  as well as the PMUS email address,  which allows the PMP to complete the preparation of the ES for shipment,  save one set of NB # 2 and NB # 3,  and if an additional NB # 1 was created,  then one NB # 1,  in its memory or the memory of user equipment,  and for the second set of NB # 1,  NB # 2,  and NB # 3 to determine the electronic address of the public institution or PMUS available to him as a priority at a given time,  and,  using appropriate software and control protocols and equipment for the exchange of ES,  send in one ES  at the address of the CA or PMUS through the exchange service ES,  eg,  EHF in ITS or SPD,  Where,  further, the equipment of the DC for the exchange of ES with the PMUS connected to it,  using the available set of software and hardware  which may include the appropriate Email Client,  for convenience, denoted by the acronym PCL,  facilitating the exchange of ES,  eg,  through the EHF service it checks all incoming messages to the corresponding electronic address of the ES,  and by characteristic  eg,  features of orderliness of the NB,  detects among the received ES ES,  prepared for shipment under the control of the PMP,  moves it to the memory for PMUS and then PMUS,  using appropriate software and control protocols,  checks NB # 2 and NB # 3 of the received URNB ES using a secret or open number corresponding to this PMP,  according to the type of algorithm used,  for the presence of a reliable connection of the set of bits DHK ES,  that is, bits of the characters HC NB # 2,  contained in NB # 3,  with a set of bits,  obtained from the bits of the DCC ES symbols contained in the NB # 3,  associated with a secret number managing the preparation for sending the PMP,  after which it places the ES in the memory cells for the PMUS,  relevant ID PMP,  managing preparation for sending ES,  designed to store the transmitted data ES,  and then PMUS,  using your own programs,  managers  logical and command protocols  defines the bits HC NB # 1,  contained in EC NB # 1,  and compares with the character bits HC NB # 1,  contained in NB No. 2 of the obtained ES,  what,  if these bits match,  and also according to the results of a previous comparison of the bits of the DCC ES symbols and the corresponding bits,  obtained from NB # 3 using the known PMUS numbers for PMP,  managing preparation for sending ES,  allows the PMUS to place the NB # 3 in the memory cells used by the PMUS for further storage of service data,  after which, based on the bit sets NB # 1 and NB # 2,  transmitted from PMP,  managing preparation for sending ES,  creates two of its instances of ordered NBCHK ES,  further for convenience, descriptions denoted by NB # 4,  using the bits of the DCK ES symbols and the bits of the DCK ES symbols associated with a secret PMUS number,  date and time of creation of ES,  ID and email address of the sender and recipient,  contained in NB # 2 and so on,  eg,  bits of symbols of the conventional name ES,  then PMUS in the memory cells of the PMUS to store service data,  in addition to the NB # 3 placed in them,  received from PMP,  managing preparation for sending ES,  places one copy of NB # 4,  then determines his electronic address of the equipment with the PMP connected to it,  receiving ES,  as a priority at a given time,  and through an electronic messaging service,  eg,  through the EHF to ITS,  using appropriate software and control protocols and equipment for the exchange of ES,  sends one message for PMP,  receiving ES,  sets NB # 1,  NB # 2 and NB # 4,  after which the PMUS based on the bits of the DCC ES symbols and the bits of the DCC ES symbols associated with the secret PMUS number,  algorithms and tools of the system log of the technical protection system for exchanging ordered sets of bits,  recording the actions of devices in time,  creates two copies of ordered NB Accounting-Electronic Electronic Receipt No. 1,  further designated by the abbreviation UREC No. 1 or for convenience of description with symbols NB No. 5,  containing bits of characters DHK ES,  date and time of sending ES,  and which may contain bits of characters of a short text set Notification of sending ES,  including,  such as,  eg,  bits of symbols of the conventional name of the ES date and time of creation of the ES,  ID of the manager of the preparation for sending ES PMP and the electronic address of the equipment that sent ES,  ID PMP and electronic equipment address,  receiving ES,  then PMUS determines HC NBN5 and  respectively,  HC NB # 5 gets the name of the Trusted Hash Code of UREC No. 1 as part of two ordered NBDK of UREC No. 1 specially created for these purposes,  further for convenience, descriptions denoted by the symbols NB # 6,  Besides,  containing bits of characters DHK UREC №1,  associated with a secret PMUS number,  creation time and other parameters,  eg,  short name ES,  after which PMUS one copy of NB # 5 and one copy of NB # 6,  using appropriate software and control protocols and equipment for the exchange of ES,  sends in one electronic message to the address of the PMP or the equipment connected to it,  managing preparation for sending ES,  which enables PMP,  managing preparation for sending ES,  using appropriate software and control protocols and equipment for the exchange of ES,  by signs  specific to PMUS messages,  eg,  features of orderliness of the NB,  detect an electronic message with NB # 5 and NB # 6 among others,  and the sequence of actions described above, to verify the presence of a reliable connection NB 5 and NB 6 according to the known PMP number for PMUS,  for which it independently determines the bits of HC NB # 5 and compares it with the bits of characters HC NB # 5,  contained in NB # 6,  what,  if these bits match,  and also according to the results of comparing the bits of the DCC symbols UREC No. 1 contained in NB # 6 and the corresponding bits,  obtained using a known or secret number for PMUS from the set of bits associated with the secret number of PMUS,  allows PMP,  having checked the identity of the DCC bits of the sent ES to the DC bits of the EC DC symbols,  contained in the received UREC No. 1,  place NB # 5 and NB # 6 in the memory cells,  intended for incoming messages,  as confirmation of sending NB # 1,  and at the same time PMUS places in the memory cells US  intended for storing service data,  second instance of the created message,  containing NB # 5 and NB # 6,  moreover, at the same time or later PMP and equipment connected to it,  receiving ES  using the available set of software and hardware  which may include the appropriate PKL,  facilitating the exchange of ES,  eg,  through the service, the EHF checks all incoming ES at its electronic address,  and by characteristic  eg,  features of orderliness of the NB,  detects among the received ES ES,  prepared for shipment under the control of the PMUS,  moves to memory cells PMP ES,  containing NB # 1,  NB # 2 and NB # 4,  and then checks the NBN2 and NBN4 received URNB ES using the appropriate PMUS secret or open number,  according to the type of algorithm used,  for the presence of a reliable connection of the set of bits DHK ES,  that is, the character bit of HC NB # 2,  contained in NB # 4,  with a set of bits,  obtained from DHK ES,  associated with a secret number that managed its preparation for sending the PMUS,  then PMP,  using your own programs,  managers  logical and command protocols  defines the bits HC NB # 1,  contained in the ES,  and compares with the bits of the characters HC NB # 1 from ES,  which are contained in NB # 2,  what,  if these bits match,  and also according to the results of the comparison of the DCK ES bit and the DCK ES bit,  obtained from NB # 4 using the known PMP numbers for PMUS,  managing preparation for sending ES,  allows the PMP to place NB # 2 and NB # 4 in the memory cells of the used PMP for further storage of service information,  and NB # 1 to make available to the user PMP,  receiving ES,  for further use in equipment connected to the PMP,  and at the same time PMP,  received ES,  creates two identical ordered sets of bits of Receipt of receipt of ES No. 2,  further designated by the abbreviation KPES No. 2 or for convenience of description with symbols NB # 7,  which contain,  including bits of characters DHK ES,  date and time of drawing up the receipt,  and which  Besides,  may contain bits of characters of a short text set Notifications on receipt of ES,  including,  such as,  eg,  bits of symbols of the conventional name ES,  date and time of creation of ES,  geolocation data  ID of the manager of the preparation for sending ES PMP and the electronic address of the equipment that sent ES,  ID PMP and electronic equipment address,  received ES,  the number of received sets of bits of ES,  after which one of NB # 7 is located in the memory cells of the PMP or used PMP for official purposes  and on the basis of the second NBN №7 PMP creates an ordered NBDHK KPES No. 2,  further for convenience of description denoted by the symbols NB # 8,  for what determines DCK KPES No. 2 and DCK KPES No. 2,  associated with a secret number of PMP,  received ES,  includes bits of their characters in NB # 8 and may optionally include other parameters,  eg,  bits of the characters of the date and time of compilation of NB # 8 and the short name of ES,  and then determine the electronic address of the public institution and the PMUS that it has as a priority at a given time  and using the appropriate software and control protocols and equipment for the exchange of ES to send one electronic message,  by electronic address US and PMUS through the exchange service ES,  eg,  EHF in ITS or SPD,  Where,  further, the equipment of the DC for the exchange of ES with the PMUS connected to it,  using the available set of software and hardware  which may include the appropriate PKL,  facilitating the exchange of ES,  eg,  through the service, the EHF checks all incoming ES at its electronic address,  and by characteristic  eg,  features of orderliness of the NB,  among the received ES,  detects an electronic message from KPES No. 2 and NBDKK KPES No. 2,  prepared for shipment under the control of the PMP,  received ES with NB # 1,  moves it to the memory cells of the PMUS,  related to this PMP,  and then checks NBN7 and NBN8,  using a secret or open number corresponding to this PMP,  according to the type of algorithm used,  for the presence of reliable communication of the set of bits of the DCC KPES No. 2,  that is, the character bit of HC NB # 7,  contained in NB # 8,  with a set of bits,  obtained from DHK KPES No. 2,  associated with a secret number that managed its preparation for sending the PMP,  after which it places an electronic message from KPES No. 2 in the memory cells for the PMUS,  relevant ID PMP,  received ES with NB # 1,  then PMUS,  using your own programs,  managers  logical and command protocols  defines the bits HC NB # 7,  contained in the received message,  and compares with the characters bits HC NB # 7 from this message,  contained in NB 8,  what,  if these bits match,  and also according to the results of the comparison of the bits of DCC CPES No. 2 and bits  obtained from NB # 8 using the known PMUS numbers for PMP,  received ES with NB # 1,  allows the PMUS to place the NB # 8 in the memory cells of the used PMUS for further storage of service data,  after which, based on the set of bits NB # 7,  transmitted from PMP,  received ES with NB # 1,  creates two copies of its orderly NBDHK KPES No. 2,  further for convenience, descriptions denoted by symbols NB # 9,  using the bits of the DCKhPKPS No. 2 characters and the bits of the DCKKPPs No. 2 characters,  associated with a secret number of PMUS,  which can be supplemented by bits of characters for the date and time of the creation of KPES No. 2,  ID and electronic addresses of the sender and recipient of ES,  contained in NB # 7 and other things,  eg,  Conditional name ES,  then PMUS in the memory cells of the PMUS to store service data,  in addition to the NB 8 placed in them,  received from PMP,  received ES,  places one copy of NB # 9,  then determines his electronic address of the equipment with the PMP connected to it,  who managed the preparation for sending ES from NB # 1 as a priority at a given time and,  using appropriate software and control protocols and equipment for the exchange of ES,  sends in one electronic message to the address of the PMP or the equipment connected to it,  who managed the preparation for sending ES from NB # 1,  which enables PMP,  who managed the preparation for sending ES from NB # 1,  using appropriate software and control protocols and equipment for the exchange of ES,  by signs  specific to PMUS messages,  eg,  features of orderliness of the NB,  detect an electronic message with NB # 7 and NB # 9 among other electronic messages,  and the sequence of actions described above, to verify the presence of reliable communication NBN7 and NBN9 by the known PMP number for PMUS,  for which it independently determines the bits of HC NB # 7 and compares it with the bits of characters HC NB # 7,  contained in NB No. 9,  what,  if these bits match,  and also according to the results of comparing the bits contained in NB # 9 of the DCC CPES symbols # 2 and the corresponding bits,  obtained using a known or secret number for PMUS from the set of bits associated with the secret number of PMUS,  allows PMP,  having checked the identity of the DCC bits of the sent ES with NB # 1,  the contained bits of the DCC ES symbols in the received CPES No. 2,  place NB # 7 and NB # 9 in the memory cells,  intended for incoming messages,  as confirmation of receipt of ES with NB # 1 addressee,  and now,  as it can be understood from the above description,  it can be argued,  that the SSEP provides  as the ability to transmit and receive ES,  eg,  with embedded NB  including being a bit representation of Electronic Documents,  hereinafter referred to by the abbreviation ED,  which the SSEC can additionally assure with its electronic signature,  as well as a documented certified ES of USEP EP or not certified by ES USEP of ES transmission of ES with any nested sets of bits or ED to the addressee,  using ITS and SPD,  including existing services,  addresses and EHF platforms,  at the same time  Do not make yourself dependent on them and, if necessary,  use other services  or use the same email addresses for different users of the PMP,  which, nevertheless, and at the same time allows you to fix the number of identical or different bits of ES created for transfer,  creation address  the fact of sending and the invariability of the content of the NB ES,  but,  subject to the presence of a PMP connection to the equipment,  receiving ES in the ES exchange network,  record the fact of receiving ES,  the number of simultaneously accepted identical or different sets of ES bits,  their delivery address and,  at the same time, at least one set of bits of the message object from the ES and at least one set of bits of the URNB ES remain in the sending ES equipment connected to the PMP,  including NBRCH ES,  stored NB receipts for the departure of ES,  named UREC No. 1,  NBCHC receipts of departure,  NB receipts on receipt of ES,  named KPES No. 2 and NBDHK KPES No. 2,  created under the management of PMUS,  which allows you to confirm the shipment,  delivery and integrity of the NB ES,  since duplicates of all NBDCs are stored in the memory cells of the USEP UPS,  including NB  associated with secret numbers PMP,  managing preparation for sending ES,  and PMP,  managing the verification of the received NB ES,  moreover, in the future, the main criterion for a possible search for information on the passage of the NS ES through the equipment,  component of the SEEC,  is DHK ES,  and at the same time fixing the passage of electronic messages,  created under the management of PMP in the SEEP,  allows the operator of the UPSEC,  on demand,  give,  including written acknowledgment of dispatch events,  the movement and delivery of NB ES on paper with handwritten signatures in it.

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