RU2669144C1 - Method and device for spoofing resistant information through communication channels - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: cryptography.SUBSTANCE: invention relates to the field of cryptographic information protection. Information to be transmitted, represented as a symbol stream, enters the crypto code information converter, in which its preliminary processing is performed and the block ciphering procedure with non-linear bijective transformations is performed using iterative encryption keys. Based on the obtained encrypted sequence of ciphertext blocks, a verification sequence of data blocks is formed, which in turn is also subjected to the encryption procedure. Generated encrypted test sequence is combined with the information sequence of the ciphertext blocks and enters the communication channel. On the receiving side, the crypto code information converter from the received sequence makes the information sequence of the ciphertext blocks and the check sequence. Further, the received test sequence is deciphered. Resulting data block sequence and the received information sequence of the ciphertext blocks perform detection and, if necessary, recovery of the ciphertext blocks corrupted by the attacker. Corrected (recovered) information sequence of the ciphertext blocks is subjected to a block decryption procedure with nonlinear bijective transformations using iterative encryption keys, after which the flow of symbols of the received information is formed.EFFECT: technical result is to increase the stability of the transmission of encrypted information to the deliberate imitating effects of the attacker.4 cl, 6 dwg, 2 tbl

Description

Technical field

The present invention relates to the field of radio and telecommunications, and in particular to the field of methods and devices for cryptographic protection of information transmitted via open communication channels or stored on information carriers.

State of the art

- операция конкатенации, k - количество блоков открытого текста М, генерация ключа зашифрования к_е, получение блоков шифртекста Ω₁, Ω₂,…,Ω_k по следующему правилу:Known methods of cryptographic information protection, which are based on block ciphers (DES, AES, Serpent, Twofish, Grasshopper, Magma) [Ferguson N., Schneier B., T. Kohno Cryptography Engineering. Design Principles and Practical Applications, Second Edition, New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2010; GOST P 34.12-2015 Information technology. Cryptographic information security. Block ciphers], which includes the following steps: encryption of the open and, if necessary, augmented text M, presented in the form of blocks of a fixed length

- concatenation operation, k - number of plaintext blocks M, generation of the encryption key k _e , receipt of ciphertext blocks Ω ₁ , Ω ₂ , ..., Ω _k according to the following rule:

extracting plaintext M from a sequence of ciphertext blocks Ω ₁ , Ω ₂ , ..., Ω _k using the decryption key to _d :

performing the inverse complement procedure, where i = 1, 2, ..., k. Thus, the protection of information contained in the plaintext M is ensured during transmission over open communication channels. To protect against the imposition of false information, to replace the transmitted information or change the stored data, the following modes of operation are provided for in the indicated methods:

gamma mode with output feedback (Output Feedback, OFB);

simple replacement mode with gearing (Cipher Block Chaining, SHS);

gamma mode with feedback in ciphertext (Cipher Feedback, CFB);

mode of development of an imitation insert, hash code (Message Authentication Code algorithm). The disadvantages of such methods are:

the inability to correct distortions in ciphertext blocks caused by deliberate actions by an attacker or the influence of random interference during transmission over open communication channels;

the ability to propagate errors when one or more erroneous bits in one block of the cryptogram has (s) an effect on the decryption of subsequent blocks of plaintext;

the inability to restore reliable information when used in information transfer systems without feedback.

Known methods of information protection based on the theory of algebraic coding (McElice cryptosystem, Niederreiter scheme, Rao-Nama cryptosystem and their modifications) [McEliece R.J. A public-key cryptosystem based on algebraic coding theory, DSN Progress Report 42-44, Jet Prop. Lab., Calif. Inst. Technol. 1978. - pp. 114-116; Niederreiter H. Knapsack-Type Cryptosystem and Algebraic Coding Theory, Probl. Control and Inform. Theory. 1986. - pp. 19-34; Rao T.R.N., Nam K.H. Private-key algebraic-coded cryptosystem. Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 86, New York. - NY: Springer. 1986. - pp. 35-48]. The implementation of these schemes is based on the complexity of decoding full linear codes (general position codes).

The disadvantages of such methods are:

the lack of the possibility of guaranteed cryptographic strength of the protected information (for example, an attack by Sidelnikov V.M. and Shestakov S.O. on the McAlice system);

difficulty in implementation due to the high dimensions of the system;

cryptograms are significantly longer than plaintext;

rather high sensitivity of cryptogram blocks to distortions arising in the communication channel.

A known method for the secure transmission of information in multi-channel transmission systems, based on the presentation of the ciphertext block in the form of an ordered set of non-negative residues and their transmission over randomly selected channels [Belal A.A., Abdelhamid A.S. Secure transmission of sensitive data using multiple channels, The 3rd ACS / IEEE International Conference, Computer Systems and Applications, 2005. - Access mode: http://arxiv.org/ftp/cs/papers/0403/0403023.pdf. Date of appeal: 09.21.2017].

The disadvantage of this method is the lack of the ability to protect the deductions transmitted through the communication channels from the influence of random interference and deliberate exposure to an attacker. Accordingly, the distortion of at least one deduction affects the process of generating the original ciphertext block, which, in turn, will lead to an erroneous plaintext block.

The closest in its technical essence to the claimed technical solution and adopted for the prototype is the method described in [RF Patent No. 2620730, publ. 05/29/2017].

In the prototype method under consideration, to perform the encryption procedure of plaintext blocks M ₁ (z), M ₂ (z), ..., M _k (z) using the corresponding key to _e (z), k encryption procedures, ciphertext blocks Ω ₁ ( z), Ω ₂ (z), ..., Ω _k (z) are interpreted as the smallest non-negative residues with respect to the generated, ordered by value, mutually simple modules m _i (z) (i = 1, 2, ..., k), which form the information a superblock of a modular code from a sequence of ciphertext blocks Ω ₁ (z), Ω ₂ (z), ..., Ω _k (z) after the expansion operation, redundant data blocks are formed ω _{k + 1} (z), ω _{k + 2} (z), ..., ω _{k + r} (z), the resulting set of ciphertext blocks and redundant data blocks Ω ₁ (z), ..., Ω _k (z), ω _{k + 1} (z), ..., ω _{k + r} (z) forms the code vector of the modular code, transmitted to the message recipient via k + r from A information transmission channels, which on the receiving side provides detection of (intentional and unintentional) influences of the attacker on protected information and, if necessary, the restoration of reliable data transmitted over communication channels (Fig. one).

The disadvantage of this method is the lack of the ability to protect information from imitating the actions of an attacker who needs to intercept the information superblock of the modular code to calculate redundant data blocks in order to impose false messages.

The prior art device is a secure information processing. So, in [Massey J.L. An introduction to contemporary cryptology. Proc. IEEE 1988. - pp. 533-549] a device is proposed that contains, on the transmitting side, a message source generating clear text, a randomizer, an encoder, and also a key gamma generator, the output of the message source is connected to the first input of the encoder, to the second input of which the output of the randomizer is connected, respectively, to the third input of the encoder the output of the generator of the key gamma is connected, and the output of the encoder through the "open" communication line on the receiving side is connected to the first input of the decoder, to the second input of which is through a secure communication line By connecting the output gamma block key, the decoder output is connected to the input of the message source (FIG. 2). The disadvantage of this device is its low noise immunity.

The closest in technical essence is a data encryption device [US Patent No. US005539827A, publ. 07.23.1996], containing on the transmitting side an encoder (Fig. 3), consisting of a processor that implements the functions presented in the form of functional blocks: a plaintext preprocessor, an encoder (encryption block), a text block counter, a pseudo-random sequence generator (PSP), an encryption key processor (encryption key processor); plaintext input buffer, the input of which is the encoder input, to which plaintext is supplied, the output of which is connected to the first input of the plaintext preprocessor, the second input of which is connected to the output of the code block (table) of characters, while the first input of the plaintext preprocessor is connected the output of the drive (storage unit) of the encryption control parameters (N is the length of the plaintext block), the second output of which (s is the initial filling of the memory bandwidth generator) is connected to the input of the memory bandwidth generator, corresponding to the output of which is connected to the first input of the encryption control parameter storage unit (z _t is the encryption vector component), the second input of which is connected to the encryption key processor, the input of which is the secret key, respectively, the third output of the encryption control parameter storage unit is connected to the first input of the block encryption, to the second input of which the output of the plaintext preprocessor is connected, while the output of the encryption block is connected to the input of the output buffer of the ciphertext blocks, the output of which is is the encoder output, from the output of which the ciphertext blocks enter the communication channel; a block counter of text monitors the number of the block being processed, and on the receiving side, a decoder (Fig. 4), consisting of a processor that implements functions presented in the form of functional blocks: a ciphertext preprocessor, a decoder (decryption block), an inversion block, a ciphertext block counter (text ), PSP generator, encryption key generation processor (encryption key processor); ciphertext input buffer, the input of which is the decoder input, to which ciphertext blocks are received, the output of which is connected to the first input of the ciphertext preprocessor, to the second input of which the first output of the drive (storage unit) of decryption control parameters is connected (N is the length of the ciphertext block) the second output of which (s is the initial filling of the PSP generator) is connected to the input of the PSP generator, the corresponding output of which is connected to the first input of the storage unit for decryption control parameters ( z _t is a component of the encryption vector), while the third output of the decryption control parameter storage unit is connected to the inversion unit input, the corresponding output of which is connected to the second input of the decryption control parameter block, the encryption key processor is connected to its third input, the input of which is the secret key , respectively, the fourth output of the decryption control parameter storage unit is connected to the first input of the decryption unit, the preprocess output is connected to the second input of which ora ciphertext, wherein the decryption unit output is connected to the first input of the output buffer of plaintext blocks to the second input of which is connected the output of unit (table) of code symbols, the output of which is the output of the decoder, the output of which enters the plaintext; a block counter of text tracks the number of the block being processed.

The main disadvantage of the prototype device is the lack of mechanisms to ensure imitability (the ability to restore reliable encrypted data transmitted over communication channels under the conditions of intentional (imitating the actions of an attacker) interference).

The aim of the proposed technical solution is to increase the stability of the method and device for transmitting encrypted information to deliberate imitating influences of an attacker.

Disclosure of invention

The technical result of the invention is achieved by the fact that:

…,

и формирование криптокодовых конструкций - имитоустойчивой последовательности шифрованного текста, обеспечивающей «математический» разрыв процедуры (непрерывной функции) формирования элементов криптокодовых конструкций, выравнивание по длине всей совокупности элементов криптокодовых конструкций и восстановление достоверных блоков шифртекста.1. In the known method of secure transmission of encrypted information over communication channels, information is protected by presenting the message M (z) in the form of blocks of fixed length M (z) = {M ₁ (z) || M ₂ (z) || ... || M _k (z)}, by applying k encryption procedures to the plaintext blocks M ₁ (z), M ₂ (z), ..., M _k (z) using the corresponding key to _{e, i} (z) = (i = 1, 2 , ..., k), by representing the resulting ciphertext blocks Ω ₁ (z), Ω ₂ (z), ..., Ω _k (z) in the form of the smallest non-negative residues with respect to the generated, ordered by value, mutually simple modules m _i (z) ( i = 1, 2, ..., k), the formation of information th superframe modular code Ω ₁ (z), Ω ₂ (z), ..., Ω _k (z) performing extension operation information superblock modular code and receiving redundant data blocks ω _{k + 1} (z), ω _{k + 2} (z) , ..., ω _{k + r} (z), by forming the code vector of the modular code Ω ₁ (z), ..., Ω _k (z), ω _{k + 1} (z), ..., ω _{k + r} (z) and transmitting it the recipient of the message via k + r from A information transmission channels, which on the receiving side provides detection of (intentional and unintentional) influences of the attacker on the protected information. What is new is that the set of generated redundant data ω _{k + 1} (z), ω _{k + 2} (z), ..., ω _{k + r} (z) is subjected to a block encryption procedure, the algorithm of which performs non-linear bijective transformations using the corresponding key to _e (z). New is getting redundant ciphertext

...

and the formation of cryptocode constructions - an immitable sequence of ciphertext that provides a “mathematical” break in the procedure (continuous function) of forming elements of cryptocode constructions, alignment along the length of the entire set of elements of cryptocode constructions and restoration of reliable ciphertext blocks.

- итерационные ключи зашифрования, выработанные на основании секретного ключа (℘)), при этом первый выход блока шифрования подключен к входу буфера вывода блоков шифртекста, второй выход блока шифрования подключен к первой группе (первому входу) входов блока расширения модулярного кода, ко второй группе (второй, третий входы) входов которого подключен первый и второй выходы генератора неприводимых полиномов (информационных и избыточных), к входу которого подключен третий выход блока хранения управляющих параметров шифрования (N): при этом выход блока расширения модулярного кода подключен к первому входу блока шифрования избыточных блоков данных, выход которого подключен к входу буфера вывода избыточных блоков шифртекста, при этом ко второму входу блока шифрования избыточных блоков данных подключен четвертый выход блока хранения управляющих параметров шифрования (

), к первому вход которого подключен процессор ключей шифрования, на вход которого поступает секретный ключ (℘)); при этом к третьей группе (четвертый, пятый, шестой входы) входов блока расширения модулярного кода подключена группа (пятый, шестой, седьмой выходы) выходов блока хранения управляющих параметров шифрования (предвычисленные параметры B_i(z), m_i(z), m_i+r(z)); выходы буфера вывода блоков шифртекста и выходы буфера вывода избыточных блоков шифртекста подключены к первому и второму входам коммутатора объединения, выход которого является выходом криптокодового преобразователя информации, с выхода которого сформированные криптокодовые конструкции - имитоустойчивая последовательность шифрованного текста поступают в канал связи; счетчик блоков текста отслеживает номер обрабатываемого блока, а на приемной стороне введены коммутатор разделения, буфер ввода избыточных блоков шифртекста, функциональные блоки процессора: препроцессор избыточного шифртекста, блок расшифрования избыточных блоков шифртекста, генератор неприводимых полиномов, блок обнаружения и коррекции искажений, при этом коммутатор разделения, вход которого является входом криптокодового преобразователя информации, на который из канала связи поступают криптокодовые конструкции - имитоустойчивая последовательность шифрованного текста, при этом первый выход коммутатора разделения подключен к входу буфера ввода избыточных блоков шифртекста, выход которого подключен к первому входу препроцессора избыточного шифртекста, ко второму входу препроцессора избыточного текста подключен первый выход блока хранения управляющих параметров шифрования (N), при этом выход которого подключен к первому входу блока расшифрования избыточных блоков шифртекста, ко второму входу которого подключен второй выход блока хранения управляющих параметров шифрования (

- итерационные ключи расшифрования, выработанные на основании секретного ключа (℘)), при этом выход блока расшифрования избыточных блоков шифртекста подключен к первой группе (первому входу) входов блока обнаружения и коррекции искажений, ко второй группе (второй, третий входы) входов которого подключен первый и второй выходы генератора неприводимых полиномов (информационных и избыточных), к входу генератора неприводимых полиномов подключен третий выход блока хранения управляющих параметров шифрования (N); при этом второй выход коммутатора разделения подключен к входу буфера ввода блоков шифртекста, выход которого подключен к первому входу препроцессора шифртекста, ко второму входу которого подключен четвертый выход блока хранения управляющих параметров шифрования (N), при этом выход препроцессора шифртекста подключен к третьей группе (четвертому входу) входов блока обнаружения и коррекции искажений, соответствующий выход которого подключен к первому входу блок расшифрования, ко второму входу которого подключен пятый выход блока хранения управляющих параметров шифрования (

), к первому входу которого подключен процессор ключей шифрования, на вход которого поступает секретный ключ (℘)); при этом выход блока расшифрования подключен к первому входу буфера вывода блоков открытого текста, ко второму входу которого подключен выход блока (таблицы) кодовых символов, выход которого является выходом криптокодового преобразователя информации, с выхода которого поступает открытый текст; при этом к четвертой группе (пятый, шестой, седьмой входы) входов блока обнаружения и коррекции искажений подключена группа (шестой, седьмой, восьмой выходы) выходов блока хранения управляющих параметров шифрования (предвычисленные параметры B_i(z), m_i(z), m_i+r(z)); счетчик блоков текста отслеживает номер обрабатываемого блока.2. A data encryption device, comprising, on the transmitting side, an encoder consisting of a processor that implements the functions presented in the form of functional blocks: a plaintext preprocessor, an encryption block, a counter of text blocks, a memory generator, an encryption key processor; plaintext input buffer, the input of which is the encoder input, to which plaintext is supplied, the output of which is connected to the first input of the plaintext preprocessor, the second input of which is connected to the output of the code block (table) of characters, while the first input of the plaintext preprocessor is connected the output of the storage unit for the control encryption parameters (N), the second output of which (s) is connected to the input of the SRP generator, the corresponding output of which is connected to the first input of the storage unit for control pairs ters encryption (z _t), to the second input of which is connected a processor encryption keys for input of which the secret key, respectively the third output store control encryption parameter block is connected to the first input of the encryption unit, to the second input of which is connected the output preprocessor plaintext, wherein the output of the encryption block is connected to the input of the output buffer of the ciphertext blocks, the output of which is the output of the encoder, from the output of which the ciphertext blocks enter the communication channel; a text block counter keeps track of the number of the block being processed, and on the receiving side, a decoder consisting of a processor that implements functions presented in the form of functional blocks: a ciphertext preprocessor, a decryption block, an inversion block, a text block counter, a memory block generator, an encryption key processor; ciphertext input buffer, the input of which is the decoder input, to which ciphertext blocks are received from the communication channel, the output of which is connected to the first input of the ciphertext preprocessor, to the second input of which is connected the first output of the decryption control parameter storage unit (N), the second output of which (s) a generator connected to the input PSP, the corresponding output of which is connected to a first input storage unit decrypting the control parameters (z _t), wherein the third output store control parameters Decode block niya is connected to the input of the inversion block, the corresponding output of which is connected to the second input of the decryption control unit, the encryption key processor is connected to the third input of which the secret key is input, respectively, the fourth output of the decryption control storage unit is connected to the first input of the decryption unit, to the second input of which the output of the ciphertext preprocessor is connected, while the output of the decryption block is connected to the first input of the block output buffer nth text, to the second input of which the output of the code block (table) of code symbols is connected, the output of which is the output of the decoder, from which plaintext is received; a text block counter keeps track of the number of the block being processed, the processor functional blocks are introduced on the transmitting side: an irreducible polynomial generator, a modular code extension block, an encryption block for redundant data blocks; an output buffer for redundant ciphertext blocks, a combining switch, wherein the plaintext input buffer, the input of which is the input of a cryptocode information converter, which receives plaintext, the output of which is connected to the first input of the plaintext preprocessor, the second input of which is connected to the output of the block (table) code symbols, while the first output of the plaintext preprocessor is connected to the first output of the encryption control parameter storage unit (N), the plaintext preprocessor output is connected to It is connected to the first input of the encryption unit, to the second input of which the second output of the encryption control parameters storage unit is connected (

- iterative encryption keys generated based on the secret key (℘)), while the first output of the encryption block is connected to the input of the output buffer of the ciphertext blocks, the second output of the encryption block is connected to the first group (first input) of the inputs of the modular code extension block, to the second group (second, third inputs) of the inputs of which the first and second outputs of the generator of irreducible polynomials (information and redundant) are connected, the input of which is connected to the third output of the encryption control parameter storage unit (N): the output of the extension unit of the modular code is connected to the first input of the encryption unit of redundant data blocks, the output of which is connected to the input of the output buffer of the excess ciphertext blocks, while the fourth output of the encryption control unit of the redundant data blocks is connected to the fourth output of the encryption control parameter storage unit (

), the first input of which is connected to the encryption key processor, the input of which receives the secret key (℘)); at the same time, a group (fifth, sixth, seventh outputs) of the outputs of the storage unit of the control encryption control parameters (pre-calculated parameters B _i (z), m _i (z), m is connected to the third group (fourth, fifth, sixth inputs) of the inputs of the expansion unit of the modular code _{i + r} (z)); the outputs of the buffer output buffer for ciphertext blocks and the outputs of the output buffer for redundant ciphertext blocks are connected to the first and second inputs of the association switch, the output of which is the output of a cryptocode information converter, from the output of which the generated cryptocode constructions - an immitable sequence of encrypted text are sent to the communication channel; a text block counter keeps track of the number of the block being processed, and a separation switch, an input buffer for redundant ciphertext blocks, a functional block of the processor: a preprocessor for redundant ciphertext, a block for decrypting redundant ciphertext blocks, a generator of irreducible polynomials, a detection and correction block, and a separation switch are introduced at the receiving side , the input of which is the input of the cryptocode information converter, to which the cryptocode constructions come from the communication channel - is imitation I’m a sequence of ciphertext, while the first output of the separation switch is connected to the input of the input buffer buffer for excess ciphertext blocks, the output of which is connected to the first input of the redundant ciphertext preprocessor, the first output of the redundant text preprocessor is connected to the first output of the encryption control parameter storage block (N), while the output of which is connected to the first input of the decryption unit of redundant ciphertext blocks, the second output of which is connected to the second output of the control parameter storage block trov encryption (

- iterative decryption keys generated based on the secret key (℘)), while the output of the decryption unit of the excess ciphertext blocks is connected to the first group (first input) of the inputs of the distortion detection and correction block, and to the second group (second, third inputs) of the inputs of which the first and second outputs of the generator of irreducible polynomials (information and redundant), the third output of the encryption control parameter storage unit (N) is connected to the input of the irreducible polynomial generator; the second output of the separation switch is connected to the input of the ciphertext block input buffer, the output of which is connected to the first input of the ciphertext preprocessor, the fourth output of which is connected to the fourth output of the encryption control parameter storage unit (N), while the ciphertext preprocessor output is connected to the third group (fourth the input) of the inputs of the block for detecting and correcting distortions, the corresponding output of which is connected to the first input of the decryption unit, to the second input of which the fifth output of the block is stored encryption control parameters (

), the first input of which is connected to the encryption key processor, the input of which receives the secret key (℘)); the output of the decryption unit is connected to the first input of the output buffer of the plaintext blocks, the second input of which is connected to the output of the code symbol block (table), the output of which is the output of the cryptocode information converter, the output of which is plaintext; while to the fourth group (fifth, sixth, seventh inputs) of the inputs of the distortion detection and correction unit, a group (sixth, seventh, eighth outputs) of the outputs of the storage unit of the control encryption parameters is connected (pre-calculated parameters B _i (z), m _i (z), m _{i + r} (z)); a block counter of text tracks the number of the block being processed.

Thanks to the introduction of a set of essential distinguishing features into a known object, the method and device for imitationally transmitting information through communication channels allow:

to ensure the communication of information through communication channels with non-zero bandwidth;

provide guaranteed durability of the cryptographic information protection system;

ensure the detection and recovery of distorted data simulated by an attacker.

These distinctive features of the claimed invention in comparison with the prototype allow us to conclude that the claimed technical solution meets the criterion of "novelty."

Description of drawings

The drawings show:

in FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating the essence of the prototype method; in FIG. 2 shows a diagram of a secure information processing device;

in FIG. 3 shows a diagram of a prototype data encryption device (transmitting part);

in FIG. 4 shows a diagram of a prototype data encryption device (receiving part);

in FIG. 5 shows a diagram of a device for simulating information transmission (transmitting part);

in FIG. 6 shows a diagram of a device for simulating information transmission (receiving part).

The implementation of the claimed method, device

For clarity, the description of the invention, allowing the specialist to carry out the implementation of the proposed invention and showing the effect of the features given in the claims on the above technical result, will be performed as follows: first, we will reveal the structure of the device, and then describe the implementation of the method within the framework of the proposed device.

A device for simulating information transfer through communication channels contains, on the transmitting side (Fig. 5), a cryptocode information converter 30, consisting of a plaintext input buffer 200, a drive 210 of control parameters, a processor 220 that implements functions presented in the form of functional blocks: a plaintext preprocessor 221 , encryption block 222, irreducible polynomial generator 223, modular polynomial code extension block 224, encryption key generation processor 225, redundant block encryption block 226 s data counter 227 blocks of text; block (table) 230 code symbols, ciphertext output buffer 240, redundant ciphertext output buffer 250, association switch 260; and on the receiving side, the device contains (Fig. 6) a crypto-code information converter 50, consisting of a separation switch 300, a redundant ciphertext input buffer 310, control parameters storage 320, a ciphertext input buffer 330, a processor 340 that implements the functions presented in the form of functional blocks: preprocessor 341 of excess ciphertext, generator of irreducible polynomials 342, processor 343 of generating decryption keys, block 344 of decryption of excess ciphertext, block 345 of detection and correction of distortions, pre ciphertext processor 346, counter 347 text blocks, ciphertext decryption unit 348; a plaintext output buffer 350, a block (table) of 360 code symbols.

The device operates as follows.

) накопителя 210 управляющих параметров. Итерационные ключи зашифрования вырабатываются процессором 225 формирования ключей на основании введенного секретного ключа (℘). Сформированные блоки шифртекста поступают в буфер 240 вывода шифртекста и в блок 224 расширения модулярного полиномиального кода, в который также поступают неприводимые полиномы, количество которых определяется количеством блоков шифртекста и необходимым количеством избыточных блоков данных, выработанные генератором 223 в соответствии с параметром (N) накопителя 210 управляющих параметров. В блоке 224 расширения модулярного полиномиального кода вырабатываются избыточные блоки данных, которые поступают в блок 226 шифрования избыточных данных, в котором осуществляется процедура блочного шифрования с нелинейными биективными преобразованиями и с помощью итерационных ключей зашифрования (

) накопителя 210 управляющих параметров. Сформированные блоки избыточного шифртекста поступают в буфер 250 вывода избыточного шифртекста. Сформированные блоки шифртекста с выхода буфера 240 вывода шифртекста (информационные элементы) и сформированные блоки избыточного шифртекста с выхода буфера 250 вывода избыточного шифртекста (избыточные элементы) поступают на соответствующие входы коммутатора 260 объединения, в котором формируются криптокодовые конструкции - имитоустойчивая последовательность шифрованного текста. При этом счетчик блоков 227 текста отслеживает обрабатываемый блок текста для согласования с управляющими параметрами процедур зашифрования. В одном варианте реализации криптокодового преобразователя информации неприводимые полиномы и другие параметры блока 224 расширения модулярного полиномиального кода могут быть вычислены заранее и сохранены в накопителе 210 управляющих параметров.The information to be transmitted, represented as a stream of characters, enters the cryptocode information converter 30, is buffered by the plaintext input buffer 200 before its preliminary processing by the plaintext preprocessor 221. The plaintext preprocessor 221 analyzes the input stream of the plaintext characters, breaks it into blocks of fixed length in accordance with the parameter (N) of the drive 210 of the control parameters and converts the plaintext characters into numerical values coming from the block (table) 230 code characters. The generated plaintext blocks enter the encryption block 222, in which the block encryption procedure is performed with non-linear bijective transformations using iterative encryption keys (

) drive 210 control parameters. Iterative encryption keys are generated by the key generation processor 225 based on the entered secret key (℘). The generated ciphertext blocks go to the ciphertext output buffer 240 and to the modular polynomial code expansion block 224, which also receives irreducible polynomials, the number of which is determined by the number of ciphertext blocks and the required number of redundant data blocks generated by the generator 223 in accordance with the parameter (N) of the drive 210 control parameters. In block 224 of the extension of the modular polynomial code, redundant data blocks are generated, which are supplied to the redundant data encryption block 226, in which the block encryption procedure is performed with non-linear bijective transformations and using iterative encryption keys (

) drive 210 control parameters. The generated blocks of redundant ciphertext enter the buffer 250 output redundant ciphertext. The generated ciphertext blocks from the output of the ciphertext output buffer 240 (information elements) and the generated blocks of redundant ciphertext from the output of the redundant ciphertext output buffer 250 (redundant elements) are fed to the corresponding inputs of the association switch 260, in which cryptode codes are formed - an immitated sequence of ciphertext. In this case, the counter of blocks of text 227 monitors the processed block of text for coordination with the control parameters of the encryption procedures. In one embodiment of the implementation of the cryptocode information converter, irreducible polynomials and other parameters of the modular polynomial code extension unit 224 can be calculated in advance and stored in the drive 210 of the control parameters.

накопителя 320 управляющих параметров. Итерационные ключи расшифрования

вырабатываются процессором 343 формирования ключей на основании введенного секретного ключа (℘). Сформированные избыточные блоки данных поступают в блок 345 обнаружения и коррекции искажений, в который также поступают неприводимые полиномы, выработанные генератором 342 в соответствии с параметром (N) накопителя 320 управляющих параметров (количество и значения выработанных полиномов соответствуют параметрам передающей стороны). При этом со второго выхода коммутатора 300 разделения последовательность шифртекста буферизируется буфером 330 ввода шифртекста перед его предварительной обработкой препроцессором 346 шифртекста. Препроцессор 346 шифртекста анализирует входной поток шифртекста, разбивает его на блоки фиксированной длины в соответствии с параметром (N) накопителя 320 управляющих параметров. Сформированные блоки шифртекста (информационные элементы) поступают в блок 345 обнаружения и коррекции искажений, в котором осуществляется обнаружение и исправление искажений, обусловленных имитирующими воздействиями злоумышленника. Исправленная последовательность блоков шифртекста поступает на вход блока 348 расшифрования шифртекста, в котором выполняется процедура обратного преобразования последовательности блоков шифртекста в последовательность блоков открытого текста в соответствии с заданным алгоритмом шифрования и с помощью итерационных ключей расшифрования

. Расшифрованная последовательность блоков открытого текста поступает в буфер 350 вывода открытого текста, в котором осуществляется преобразование числовых значений в символы открытого текста, поступающие с блока (таблицы) 360 кодовых символов. При этом счетчик блоков 347 текста отслеживает обрабатываемый блок текста для согласования с управляющими параметрами процедур расшифрования. В одном варианте реализации криптокодового преобразователя информации неприводимые полиномы и другие параметры блока 345 обнаружения и коррекции искажений могут быть вычислены заранее и сохранены в накопителе 320 управляющих параметров.On the receiving side, the accepted cryptocode constructions — a simulated code sequence of encrypted text — are fed to the cryptocode information converter 50, to the input of the separation switch 300, from the first output of which the excess ciphertext sequence is buffered by the excess ciphertext input buffer 310 before being processed by the excess ciphertext preprocessor 341. The excess ciphertext preprocessor 341 analyzes the input ciphertext stream, breaks it into blocks of fixed length in accordance with the parameter (N) of the drive 320 of the control parameters. The generated redundant ciphertext blocks (redundant elements) are sent to the redundant ciphertext decryption unit 344, in which the redundant ciphertext blocks are converted to redundant data blocks in accordance with a given encryption algorithm and using iterative decryption keys

drive 320 control parameters. Iterative Decryption Keys

generated by the key generation processor 343 based on the entered secret key (℘). The generated redundant data blocks enter the distortion detection and correction block 345, which also receives the irreducible polynomials generated by the generator 342 in accordance with the parameter (N) of the drive 320 of the control parameters (the number and values of the generated polynomials correspond to the parameters of the transmitting side). In this case, from the second output of the separation switch 300, the ciphertext sequence is buffered by the ciphertext input buffer 330 before it is preprocessed by the ciphertext preprocessor 346. The ciphertext preprocessor 346 analyzes the ciphertext input stream, breaks it into blocks of fixed length in accordance with the parameter (N) of the drive 320 control parameters. The generated ciphertext blocks (information elements) enter the block 345 for detecting and correcting distortions, in which the detection and correction of distortions caused by imitating influences of the attacker is performed. The corrected sequence of ciphertext blocks is fed to the input of the ciphertext decryption unit 348, in which the procedure of inverting the sequence of ciphertext blocks to a sequence of plaintext blocks is performed in accordance with the specified encryption algorithm and using iterative decryption keys

. The decrypted sequence of plaintext blocks enters the plaintext output buffer 350, in which the conversion of numerical values into plaintext characters coming from a block (table) of 360 code symbols. In this case, the counter of blocks of text 347 monitors the processed block of text for coordination with the control parameters of the decryption procedures. In one embodiment of the implementation of the cryptocode information converter, irreducible polynomials and other parameters of the distortion detection and correction unit 345 can be calculated in advance and stored in the drive 320 of the control parameters.

In addition, the present invention provides a method for simulating information transmission over communication channels.

In one embodiment, a method (device) for simulating information transmission over communication channels can be implemented (o) in accordance with the provisions of modular polynomial codes (IPC).

The mathematical apparatus of the IPC is based on the fundamental principles of the Chinese remainder theorem for polynomials [Mandelbaum DM On Efficient Burst Correcting Residue Polynomial Codes. Information and control. 1970. - pp. 319-330]. Let m ₁ (z), m ₂ (z), ..., m _k (z) ∈ F [z] be irreducible polynomials ordered by increasing degrees, that is,

degm ₁ (z) ≤degm ₂ (z) ≤ ... ≤degm _k (z), where degm _i (z) is the degree of the polynomial.

Положим

Тогда отображение ϕ устанавливает взаимно-однозначное соответствие между полиномами a(z), не превосходящими по степени P(z) (deg a(z)<deg P(z)), и наборами остатков по приведенной выше системе оснований полиномов (модулей):Moreover, gcd (m _i (z), m _j (z)) = 1,

Put

Then the map ϕ establishes a one-to-one correspondence between the polynomials a (z) not exceeding in degree P (z) (deg a (z) <deg P (z)) and the sets of residuals in the above system of bases of polynomials (modules):

where ϕ _i (a (z)): = a (z) mod m _i (z) (i = 1, 2, ..., k). In accordance with the Chinese remainder theorem for polynomials, there is an inverse transformation ϕ ^-1 , which allows us to translate a set of residues from the polynomial base system to the positional representation [Mandelbaum DM On Efficient Burst Correcting Residue Polynomial Codes // Information and control. 1970.16 p. 319-330]:

(i=1, 2, …, k). Введем вдобавок к имеющимся k еще r избыточных оснований полиномов с соблюдением условия упорядоченности:where B _i (z) = k _i (z) P _i (z) are polynomial orthogonal bases, k _i (z) = P ^-1 (z) mod m _i (z),

(i = 1, 2, ..., k). Let us introduce, in addition to the available k more r redundant bases of polynomials, subject to the ordering condition:

then we get the extended IPC - a set of the form:

where n = k + r, c _i (z) = a (z) mod m _i (z)

Elements of the code c _i (z) are called symbols, each of which is the essence of polynomials from the quotient ring of polynomials modulo

рабочим диапазоном системы,

- полным диапазоном системы. При этом, если

то считается, что данная комбинация содержит ошибку. Следовательно, местоположение полинома a(z) позволяет определить, является ли кодовая комбинация a(z)=(c₁(z), …, c_k(z), c_k+1(z), …, c_n(z)) разрешенной, или она содержит ошибочные символы. Введем метрику. Весом кодового слова расширенного МПК С является количество ненулевых символов (вычетов) c_i(z), 1≤i≤n, обозначается как ω(C). Кодовое расстояние между С и D определяется как вес их разности d(C, D)=ω(C - D). Минимальное кодовое расстояние - наименьшее расстояние между двумя любыми кодовыми векторами по Хэммингу с учетом данного определения веса:

где ζ - кодовое пространство. Минимальное кодовое расстояние d_min связано с корректирующими способностями расширенного МПК. Так как два кодовых слова отличаются по крайней мере в d_min вычетах, то невозможно изменить одно кодовое слово на другое путем замены d_min - 1 или меньшего количества вычетов. Таким образом, расширенный МПК может гарантированно обнаружить любыеCall

system operating range

- the full range of the system. Moreover, if

it is believed that this combination contains an error. Therefore, the location of the polynomial a (z) allows us to determine whether the code combination a (z) = (c ₁ (z), ..., c _k (z), c _{k + 1} (z), ..., c _n (z) ) resolved, or it contains erroneous characters. We introduce the metric. The weight of the extended IPC C codeword is the number of nonzero characters (residues) c _i (z), 1≤i≤n, denoted by ω (C). The code distance between C and D is defined as the weight of their difference d (C, D) = ω (C - D). Minimum code distance - the smallest distance between any two Hamming code vectors, taking into account this definition of weight:

where ζ is the code space. The minimum code distance d _min is associated with the corrective capabilities of the extended IPC. Since the two codewords differ in at least d _min residues, it is impossible to change one code word to another by replacing d _min - 1 or fewer residues. Thus, the advanced IPC can guaranteedly detect any

erroneous deductions. If b is the largest integer less than or equal to

then for b or fewer error residues, the resulting codeword remains closer to the original, which allows the extended IPC to guarantee the correction of b error residues.

в зависимости от алгоритма шифрования (ГОСТ 34.12-2015 с блоками 64, 128 бит соответственно). Введя формальную переменную z i-й блок открытого текста M_i, представим в полиномиальной форме:The message M generated by the sender is to be encrypted, fed to the input of the cryptocode information converter 30, and buffered as characters in the plaintext input buffer 220 before being preprocessed by the plaintext preprocessor 221. The plaintext preprocessor 221 analyzes the input stream of plaintext characters, converts plaintext characters to numeric values coming from a code block (table) 230 of code characters and breaks it into blocks of fixed length in accordance with parameter (N) of drive 210 of control parameters

depending on the encryption algorithm (GOST 34.12-2015 with blocks of 64, 128 bits, respectively). Introducing the formal variable z the i-th block of plaintext M _i , we will present in polynomial form:

Where

In order to ensure the necessary level of information confidentiality, the generated sequence of plaintext blocks M ₁ (z), M ₂ (z), ..., M _k (z) is sent to the encryption block 222. To obtain a sequence of ciphertext blocks Ω ₁ (z), Ω ₂ (z), ..., Ω _k (z), k encryption operations will be required. Accordingly, the mapping (1) can be represented as:

- итерационные ключи зашифрования, выработанные процессором 225 формирования ключей на передающей стороне на основании введенного секретного ключа (℘).Where

- iterative encryption keys generated by the key generation processor 225 on the transmitting side based on the entered secret key (℘).

The generated sequence of ciphertext blocks Ω _i (z) (i = 1, 2, ..., k) is buffered in the ciphertext output buffer 240 and in parallel enters the IPC expansion unit 224. The sequence of ciphertext blocks Ω _i (z) (i = 1, 2, ..., k) adopted by the IPC extension block 224 is represented as the smallest non-negative residues on the polynomial bases m _i (z) generated by the generator 223 such that gcd (m _i (z), m _j (z)) = 1, i = 1, 2, ..., k. Moreover, deg Ω _i (z) <deg m _i (z), where deg Ω _i (z) is the degree of the polynomial (i = 1, 2, ..., k). The set of ciphertext blocks Ω ₁ (z), Q ₂ (z), ..., Ω _k (z) is represented as a single informational IPC superblock according to the base system m ₁ (z), m ₂ (z), ..., m _k (z) . In accordance with the Chinese remainder theorem for a given set of polynomials m ₁ (z), m ₂ (z), ..., m _k (z) satisfying the condition gcd (m _i (z), m _j (z)) = 1, and polynomials Ω ₁ (z), Ω ₂ (z), ..., Ω _k (z) such that deg Ω _i (z) <deg m _i (z), the comparison system

has a unique solution Ω (z).

и в соответствии с выражением (4) вырабатываются избыточные блоки данных (вычеты), которые обозначим как ω_i(z) (i=k+1, k+2, …, n). Сформированная в блоке 224 расширения МПК совокупность избыточных вычетов поступает в блок 226 шифрования избыточных блоков данных, в котором осуществляется биективное нелинейное преобразование избыточных блоков данных в избыточный шифртекст:Next, in block 224 of the IPC expansion, the generator 223 r additionally generates excess bases of polynomials m _{k + 1} (z), m _{k + 2} (z), ..., m _n (z) satisfying condition (3), such that gcd ( m _j (z), m _j (z)) = 1 for

and in accordance with expression (4), excessive data blocks (residues) are generated, which we denote by ω _i (z) (i = k + 1, k + 2, ..., n). The set of redundant residues formed in the IPC extension block 224 is sent to the redundant data block encryption block 226, in which the bijective nonlinear conversion of the redundant data blocks into redundant ciphertext is performed:

- итерационные ключи зашифрования, выработанные процессором 225 формирования ключей на передающей стороне на основании введенного секретного ключа (℘). Сформированная совокупность избыточного шифртекста

поступает в буфер 250 вывода избыточного шифртекста.Where

- iterative encryption keys generated by the key generation processor 225 on the transmitting side based on the entered secret key (℘). Formed set of redundant ciphertext

enters the buffer 250 output redundant ciphertext.

The combining switch 260, based on the ciphertext received from the ciphertext buffer output 240 of the IPC unified information superblock and the ciphertext redundant cipher received from the 250 ciphertext output buffer 250 for further information transfer, generates cryptocode constructions - an immitated sequence of ciphertext.

ввиду возможного содержания искаженных элементов, поступают в блок 345 обнаружения и коррекции искажений. Избыточная последовательность блоков шифртекста, так же возможно содержащая искажения и обозначенная как,

поступает в блок 344 расшифрования избыточного шифртекста, в котором осуществляется преобразование избыточных блоков шифртекста в избыточные блоки данных:On the receiving side, the cryptocode constructions received by the cryptocode information converter — a simulated sequence of encrypted text — are fed to the input of the separation switch 300, from the first output of which the excess ciphertext sequence enters the excess ciphertext input buffer 310, then it is preprocessed by the excess ciphertext preprocessor 341, in which the input stream the ciphertext is divided into blocks of a fixed length, in accordance with the parameter (N) of the drive 32 0 control parameters. From the second output of the separation switch 300, the ciphertext sequence (a single informational IPC superblock) is sent to the ciphertext input buffer 330, then the ciphertext preprocessor 346 is preliminarily processed and the ciphertext blocks are formed with the length specified by the value (N) of the drive 320 of the control parameters. The ciphertext blocks generated by the 346 ciphertext preprocessor, designated as

in view of the possible content of distorted elements, they enter block 345 for detecting and correcting distortions. An excessive sequence of ciphertext blocks, possibly also containing distortions and designated as,

enters the block 344 decryption of excess ciphertext, in which the conversion of redundant ciphertext blocks into redundant data blocks:

- 1) - итерационные ключи расшифрования, выработанные процессором 343 формирования ключей на принимающей стороне на основании введенного секретного ключа (℘).Where

- 1) - iterative decryption keys generated by the key generation processor 343 on the receiving side based on the entered secret key (℘).

(i=k+1, k+2, …, n) поступает в блок 345 обнаружения и коррекции искажений, в котором на основании принятого единого информационного суперблока МПК

(i=1, 2, …, k) по основаниям полиномов m_i(z) (i=1, 2, …, n), выработанным генератором неприводимых полиномов 342, формируется кодовый вектор расширенного МПК

Далее осуществляется процедура обнаружения искаженных (имитируемых) злоумышленником элементов МПК, где их количество обусловлено выражением (5), при этом критерием отсутствия обнаруживаемых ошибок является выполнение условия: Ω*(z)∈^F[z]/_(P(z)) - Критерием существования обнаруживаемой ошибки - выполнение условия: Ω*(z)∉^F[z]/_(P(z)), где Ω(z) - решение системы сравнений (7) в соответствии с выражением (2), символ «*» указывает на наличие возможных искажений в кодовом векторе. Восстановление искаженных элементов МПК осуществляется с учетом (6) путем вычисления наименьших вычетов:The resulting sequence of redundant data blocks

(i = k + 1, k + 2, ..., n) enters the block 345 detection and correction of distortion, in which, on the basis of the adopted single information superblock IPC

(i = 1, 2, ..., k) on the basis of the polynomials m _i (z) (i = 1, 2, ..., n) developed by the generator of irreducible polynomials 342, the code vector of the expanded MPC is formed

Next, the procedure for detecting IPC elements distorted (imitated) by an attacker is carried out, where their number is determined by expression (5), and the criterion for the absence of detected errors is the fulfillment of the condition: Ω * (z) ∈ ^{F [z]} / _{(P (z))} - Criterion the existence of a detected error is the fulfillment of the condition: Ω * (z) ∉ ^{F [z]} / _{(P (z))} , where Ω (z) is the solution of the comparison system (7) in accordance with expression (2), the symbol “*” indicates for possible distortions in the code vector. The restoration of distorted elements of the IPC is carried out taking into account (6) by calculating the smallest residues:

указывают на вероятностный характер восстановления.or any other known method of decoding redundant IPC, where the characters

indicate the probabilistic nature of the recovery.

поступает на вход блока 348 расшифрования шифртекста, в котором выполняется процедура обратного преобразования последовательности блоков шифртекста в последовательность блоков открытого текста:Corrected sequence of ciphertext blocks

arrives at the input of the ciphertext decryption unit 348, in which the procedure of the inverse transformation of the sequence of ciphertext blocks into a sequence of plaintext blocks is performed:

выработанных процессором 343 формирования ключей на основании введенного секретного ключа (℘). Расшифрованная последовательность блоков открытого текста

поступает в буфер 350 вывода открытого текста, в котором осуществляется преобразование числовых значений в символы открытого текста, поступающие с блока (таблицы) 360 кодовых символов.using iterative decryption keys

keys generated by the processor 343 based on the entered secret key (℘). Decrypted sequence of plaintext blocks

enters the plaintext output buffer 350, in which the conversion of numerical values into plaintext characters, coming from a block (table) of 360 code symbols.

The claimed invention can be carried out using the means and methods described in available sources of information. This allows us to conclude that the claimed invention meets the signs of "industrial applicability".

Example. For simplicity of understanding the essence of the proposed solution, the control parameters of the method (device) will differ from the original ones. At the same time, we will assume that the information to be transmitted enters the cryptocode information converter 30, in which it is preliminarily processed and the block encryption procedure is implemented by block 222. At the same time, the generator 223 has generated a specified number of information and redundant polynomial bases subject to the condition (3 ), and the IPC expansion unit 224 has generated redundant data blocks in accordance with expression (4). Table 1 presents the preliminary results of the transformations. The generated redundant data blocks arrive in block 226 encryption,

in which redundant ciphertext blocks are formed

The combining switch 260 based on ciphertext blocks and redundant ciphertext blocks generates cryptocode constructions - an immitable sequence of ciphertext to be transmitted further over communication channels under the conditions of destructive attacks by an attacker.

где

- ошибочный член степени i полинома

На приемной стороне принимаемая криптокодовым преобразователем информации 50 имитоустойчивая последовательность шифрованного текста подлежит преобразованиям, в соответствии с которыми формируются исходные данные для блока 345 обнаружения и коррекции искажений. Также последовательность избыточного шифртекста подлежит расшифрованиюLet the element be erroneous in the adopted simulated sequence of ciphertext

Where

is an erroneous term of degree i of the polynomial

On the receiving side, a simulated sequence of ciphertext received by the cryptocode information converter 50 is subject to transformations, according to which the initial data for the distortion detection and correction block 345 are generated. Also, the sequence of redundant ciphertext to be decrypted

ω ₅ (z) = z ² + z ³ + z ⁴ + z ⁵ + z ⁶ + z ⁷ ;

ω ₆ (z) = z + z ³ + z ⁴ .

При этомTable 2 presents the preliminary results of the transformations.

Wherein

P (z) = 1 + z ⁵ + z ⁷ + z ¹⁰ + z ¹¹ + z ¹⁵ .

Block 345 detection and correction of distortion performs the verification procedure of the IPC, for example, based on the calculation of projections and the search for syndromes of errors [Kalmykov I.A. Mathematical models of neural network fail-safe computing tools in a polynomial system of residue classes. M .: FIZMATLIT, 2005. - 276 p.], For this, calculating Ω (z) in accordance with the expression (2):

Ω (z) = 1 + z + z ⁵ + z ⁸ + z ¹⁰ + z ¹² + z ¹³ + z ¹⁴ + z ¹⁵ + z ¹⁷ + z ¹⁸ + z ¹⁹ + z ²³ + z ²⁴ + z ³⁰ .

Since Ω (z) ∉ ^{F [z]} / _{(P (z)),} the polynomial Ω (z) is incorrect and contains distortions.

и синдром ошибок по основанию-полиному m₁(z), для которого проекция

может быть выражена, как

We calculate the projection of the polynomial

and base-polynomial error syndrome m ₁ (z) for which the projection

can be expressed as

As a result, we obtain

whose value does not meet the criterion Ω '' (z) ∈ ^{F [z]} / _{(P (z))} .

We calculate the syndrome of errors

Where

The resulting syndromes are not zero, respectively, the projection obtained on the basis of the polynomial m ₁ (z) is incorrect.

и синдром ошибок по основанию-полиному m₂(z), для которого проекция

может быть выражена, как

We calculate the projection of the polynomial

and base-polynomial m ₂ (z) error syndrome for which the projection

can be expressed as

As a result, we obtain

whose value does not meet the criterion Ω '' (z) ∈ ^{F [z]} / _{(P (z))} .

We calculate the syndrome of errors

The resulting syndromes are not zero, respectively, the projection obtained on the basis of the polynomial m ₂ (z) is incorrect.

и синдром ошибок по основанию-полиному m₃(z), для которого проекция

может быть выражена, как

We calculate the projection of the polynomial

and base-polynomial m ₃ (z) error syndrome for which the projection

can be expressed as

As a result, we obtain

Вычислим синдром ошибок

whose value meets the criterion

We calculate the syndrome of errors

и исправить ошибку. Для этого воспользуемся проекцией

по основанию-полиному m₃(z) и вычислим значение Ω₃(z). Получим Ω₃(z)=1.As a result, r syndromes were obtained, one of which is 0, which allows us to conclude that there is an error in the residue

and fix the error. To do this, use the projection

based on the polynomial base m ₃ (z) and calculate the value of Ω ₃ (z). We get Ω ₃ (z) = 1.

Thus, the process of searching and correcting errors of higher multiplicity can occur until the detecting ability of the IPC is exceeded.

поступает на вход блока 348 расшифрования шифртекста, в котором выполняется процедура обратного преобразования последовательности блоков шифртекста в последовательность блоков открытого текста. Расшифрованная последовательность блоков открытого текста

поступает в буфер 350 вывода открытого текста, в котором осуществляется преобразование числовых значений в символы открытого текста, поступающие с блока (таблицы) 360 кодовых символов.Corrected sequence of ciphertext blocks

arrives at the input of the ciphertext decryption unit 348, in which the procedure of the inverse transformation of the sequence of ciphertext blocks into a sequence of plaintext blocks is performed. Decrypted sequence of plaintext blocks

enters the plaintext output buffer 350, in which the conversion of numerical values into plaintext characters, coming from a block (table) of 360 code symbols.

The above example showed that the method and device for simulating information transfer through communication channels is functioning correctly, we are technically feasible (o) and allows us to solve the problem.

Claims (4)

1. A method of simulating information transmission over communication channels is that information is protected by presenting the message M (z) in the form of blocks of a fixed length M (z) = {M ₁ (z) || M ₂ (z) || ... | | M _k (z)}, by applying k encryption procedures to the plaintext blocks M ₁ (z), M ₂ (z), ..., M _k (z) using the corresponding key k _{e, i} (z) (i = 1, 2, ..., k), by representing the resulting ciphertext blocks Ω ₁ (z), Ω ₂ (z), ..., Ω _k (z) in the form of the smallest non-negative residues from the generated, ordered by value, mutually simple modules m _i (z) (i = 1, 2, ..., k), the formation of information onnogo superblock modular code Ω ₁ (z), Ω ₂ (z), ..., Ω _k (z), performing extension operation information superblock modular code and produce redundant data blocks ω _{k + 1} (z), ω _{k + 2} (z ), ..., ω _{k + r} (z), by forming the code vector of the modular code Ω ₁ (z), ..., Ω _k (z), ω _{k + 1} (z), ω _{k + r} (z) and transmitting it to the recipient messages on k + r from A channels of information transfer, which on the receiving side provides detection of (intentional and unintentional) influences of the attacker on the protected information, characterized in that the set of excess GOVERNMENTAL data ω _{k + 1} (z), ω _{k + 2 (z), ..., ω k} + r (z) is subjected to procedure block encryption algorithm which performs a non-linear bijective transformation on the corresponding key k _e (z), produce excessive ciphertext ϑ _{k + 1} (z), ϑ _{k + 2} (z), ϑ _{k + r} (z) and the formation of cryptocode constructions - an immitable sequence of ciphertext that provides a “mathematical” break in the procedure (continuous function) of forming elements of cryptocode constructions, alignment with the length of the entire set of elements of cryptocode designs and recon anovlenie verified ciphertext blocks. 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the total number of redundant ciphertext blocks generated to recover the distorted ciphertext blocks is equal to a parameter that is based on the corrective properties of the multi-valued error-correcting code used. 3. A device for simulating information transmission over communication channels, comprising on the transmitting side an encoder consisting of a processor that implements functions presented in the form of functional blocks: a plaintext preprocessor, an encryption block, a text block counter, a memory generator, an encryption key processor; plaintext input buffer, the input of which is the encoder input, to which plaintext is supplied, the output of which is connected to the first input of the plaintext preprocessor, the second input of which is connected to the output of the code block (table) of characters, while the first input of the plaintext preprocessor is connected the output of the storage unit for the control encryption parameters (N), the second output of which (s) is connected to the input of the SRP generator, the corresponding output of which is connected to the first input of the storage unit for control pairs ters encryption (z _t), to the second input of which is connected a processor encryption keys for input of which the secret key, respectively the third output store control encryption parameter block is connected to the first input of the encryption unit, to the second input of which is connected the output preprocessor plaintext, wherein the output of the encryption block is connected to the input of the output buffer of the ciphertext blocks, the output of which is the output of the encoder, from the output of which the ciphertext blocks enter the communication channel; a text block counter keeps track of the number of the block being processed, and on the receiving side, a decoder consisting of a processor that implements functions presented in the form of functional blocks: a ciphertext preprocessor, a decryption block, an inversion block, a text block counter, a memory block generator, an encryption key processor; ciphertext input buffer, the input of which is the decoder input, to which ciphertext blocks are received from the communication channel, the output of which is connected to the first input of the ciphertext preprocessor, to the second input of which is connected the first output of the decryption control parameter storage unit (N), the second output of which (s) a generator connected to the input PSP, the corresponding output of which is connected to a first input storage unit decrypting the control parameters (z _t), wherein the third output store control parameters Decode block niya is connected to the input of the inversion block, the corresponding output of which is connected to the second input of the decryption control unit, the encryption key processor is connected to the third input of which the secret key is input, respectively, the fourth output of the decryption control storage unit is connected to the first input of the decryption unit, to the second input of which the output of the ciphertext preprocessor is connected, while the output of the decryption block is connected to the first input of the block output buffer nth text, to the second input of which the output of the code block (table) of code symbols is connected, the output of which is the output of the decoder, from which plaintext is received; a block counter of text monitors the number of the block being processed, characterized in that the processor's functional blocks are introduced on the transmitting side: an irreducible polynomial generator, a modular code extension block, an encryption block for redundant data blocks; an output buffer for redundant ciphertext blocks, a combining switch, and a plaintext input buffer, the input of which is the input of a cryptocode information converter, to which plaintext is supplied, the output of which is connected to the first input of the plaintext preprocessor, the second input of which is connected to the output of the block (table) code characters, while the first output of the plaintext preprocessor is connected to the first output of the encryption control parameter storage unit (N), the plaintext preprocessor output under it is connected to the first input of the encryption block, to the second input of which the second output of the encryption control parameter storage unit is connected (k _{e, i} (z) - iterative encryption keys generated based on the secret key (℘)), while the first output of the encryption block is connected to to the input of the output buffer block of the ciphertext, the second output of the encryption block is connected to the first group (first input) of the inputs of the expansion module of the modular code, to the second group (second, third inputs) of the inputs of which the first and second outputs of the non-drive generator are connected polynomials (information and redundant), the input of which is connected to the third output of the storage unit for the control encryption parameters (N); the output of the extension unit of the modular code is connected to the first input of the encryption block of redundant data blocks, the output of which is connected to the input of the output buffer of the excess ciphertext blocks, while the fourth output of the encryption block of the redundant data blocks is connected to the fourth output of the encryption control parameter storage block (k _{e, i} (z)), to the first input of which the encryption key processor is connected, the input of which is the secret key (℘)); at the same time, a group (fifth, sixth, seventh outputs) of the outputs of the storage unit of the control encryption control parameters (pre-calculated parameters B _i (z), m _i (z), m is connected to the third group (fourth, fifth, sixth inputs) of the inputs of the expansion unit of the modular code _{i + r} (z)); the outputs of the buffer output buffer for ciphertext blocks and the outputs of the output buffer for redundant ciphertext blocks are connected to the first and second inputs of the association switch, the output of which is the output of a cryptocode information converter, from the output of which the generated cryptocode constructions - an immitable sequence of encrypted text are sent to the communication channel; a text block counter keeps track of the number of the block being processed, and a separation switch, an input buffer for redundant ciphertext blocks, a functional block of the processor: a preprocessor for redundant ciphertext, a block for decrypting redundant ciphertext blocks, a generator of irreducible polynomials, a detection and correction block, and a separation switch are introduced at the receiving side , the input of which is the input of the cryptocode information converter, to which the cryptocode constructions come from the communication channel - is imitation I’m a sequence of ciphertext, while the first output of the separation switch is connected to the input of the input buffer buffer for excess ciphertext blocks, the output of which is connected to the first input of the redundant ciphertext preprocessor, the first output of the redundant text preprocessor is connected to the first output of the encryption control parameter storage block (N), while the output of which is connected to the first input of the decryption unit of redundant ciphertext blocks, the second output of which is connected to the second output of the control parameter storage block encryption keys (k _{d, i} (z)) - iterative decryption keys generated based on the secret key (℘)), while the output of the decryption unit of the excess ciphertext blocks is connected to the first group (first input) of the inputs of the distortion detection and correction block, which the second group (second, third inputs) of the inputs of which the first and second outputs of the generator of irreducible polynomials (information and redundant) are connected, the third output of the encryption control parameter storage unit (N) is connected to the input of the irreducible polynomial generator; the second output of the separation switch is connected to the input of the ciphertext block input buffer, the output of which is connected to the first input of the ciphertext preprocessor, the fourth output of which is connected to the fourth output of the encryption control parameter storage unit (N), while the ciphertext preprocessor output is connected to the third group (fourth the input) of the inputs of the block for detecting and correcting distortions, the corresponding output of which is connected to the first input of the decryption unit, to the second input of which the fifth output of the block is stored the control parameters of the encryption (k _{d, i} (z)), to the first input of which the encryption key processor is connected, the input of which is the secret key (℘)); the output of the decryption unit is connected to the first input of the output buffer of the plaintext blocks, the second input of which is connected to the output of the code symbol block (table), the output of which is the output of the cryptocode information converter, the output of which is plaintext; while to the fourth group (fifth, sixth, seventh inputs) of the inputs of the distortion detection and correction unit, a group (sixth, seventh, eighth outputs) of the outputs of the storage unit of the control encryption parameters is connected (pre-calculated parameters B _i (z), m _i (z), m _{i + r} (z)); a block counter of text tracks the number of the block being processed. 4. The device according to p. 3, characterized in that the control parameters can be calculated in advance and stored in the drive control parameters.

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