RU2666932C1 - Method of evaluating the efficiency of the physical protection system of an important state object while considering threats implemented using small unmanned aerial vehicles - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: physics, nuclear physics.SUBSTANCE: invention relates to nuclear engineering, in particular to the means for creating and improving a physical protection system (PPS) at an important state facility (ISF). Estimation of the effectiveness of PPS in countering threats realized with the help of BPLA is carried out by means of interaction modeling in the "violator-ISF" system, which includes elements of probability theory and graphical constructions. Use of graphical constructions is conditioned by the need to take into account the individual characteristics of ISFs, such as the type of terrain in the area of the location of the facility and the placement of guard posts in the security system, their radii of visual detection and BPLAs. Task, which the proposed method is aimed at, is the identification of vulnerabilities in the PPS ISF when using violators of small-size BPLAs, and also the selection of optimal ways to improve the staff PPS based on the criterion of effective counteraction to threats realized with the help of BPLA.EFFECT: invention is intended to assess the efficiency evaluation (EE) of an existing or projected PPS in order to select the most effective ways to improve it, taking into account the intruder model adopted at the site.5 cl, 4 dwg

Description

The invention relates to means for creating and improving a physical protection system (PPS) at an important state object (VGO) and is intended to conduct an assessment of the effectiveness (OE) of an existing or planned PPS in order to select the most effective ways to improve it, taking into account the model of an intruder adopted at the object.

The effectiveness of the PPS is determined by its ability to suppress unauthorized actions of violators in relation to VGO. The numerical value characterizing the effectiveness of the PPS is an indicator of the effectiveness of the system. As an indicator of the effectiveness of the system, the probability of suppressing the PPS of the offender’s share is taken. The value of the performance indicator is determined in the course of the OE of the PPS of VGO. The capabilities of any full-time PPS VGO to counter the unauthorized actions of violators are determined by the features of the construction and operation of this system. A standard physical protection system is understood to mean a system organized in accordance with the requirements of regulatory documents of Russia in the field of providing physical protection for VGO.

The emergence of new and the development of existing ways to implement threats against VGO creates the need to improve existing methods for assessing the effectiveness of PPS. The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as elements of the external impact on VGOs should be classified as new ways of implementing threats.

However, as part of the regular VGO VPS, the requirements do not provide for the availability of specialized electronic warfare (EW) means to counter UAVs. The solution to the problem of creating an effective PPS capable of detecting and suppressing UAV flights consists in choosing such a configuration of a standard PPS based on OE data that would allow providing the necessary and sufficient level of VGO protection without using electronic warfare equipment.

A known method for assessing the effectiveness of the PPS VGO (Boyarintsev A.V., Brazhnik A.N., Zuev A.G. Problems of anti-terrorism: categorization and analysis of the vulnerability of objects. - SPb .: CJSC NPP ISTA-Systems, 2006. - c . 40-44).

As an indicator of effectiveness in the known method, the probability of suppression of the shares of violators P _ave . In the general case, suppression is considered as a set of events of detection of the violator by the PPS means, its delay in moving towards the goal of committing an unauthorized action and subsequent reaction and neutralization of the violator's actions. With this approach, the probability of suppressing the unauthorized actions of the PPS violator is described by the formula

P _ol = P _obn P _ass P _neutr

where R _obn - the probability of timely detection of unauthorized actions of the violator. It is determined by the characteristics of the technical means of detection and the capabilities of the security forces: in the first case, it can be obtained using the technical characteristics of the detection means, in the second - on the basis of available statistics or as a result of modeling;

P _ass - the likelihood of delaying and slowing the progress of the offender. It is a quantile of a random value of the delay time, that is, the probability that the delay t will be not less than a given value (t _ass )

P _ass = P (t≥t _ass ),

The calculation of the P _ass , as a rule, is carried out using modeling and requires knowledge of the temporal characteristics of methods for overcoming physical barriers by various intruders, differing in tactics of action, special training, equipment with technical means, etc.

P _neutr - probability of neutralization of the offender by security forces. It is a quantile of a random variable formed on the slice of the implementation of random functions, defined as “neutralization” at a fixed moment in time t. To determine the value of P _{neutron is} usually used modeling based on special programs.

A well-known method of assessing effectiveness was proposed taking into account the requirements of regulatory documents of the Russian Federation in the field of physical protection, which determined the structure of the VGO PPS without taking into account the criterion of its effective counteraction to threats realized by UAVs. The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as elements of the external impact on VGOs should be classified as new ways of implementing threats.

The known method is selected by the applicant as a prototype.

The disadvantage of this method is its inapplicability for assessing the effectiveness of the PPS of VGO in the event of threats realized by UAVs, since the nature of the interaction of UAVs with PPS differs from the interaction of ground targets with PPS (for example, a sabotage and terrorist group carrying out a forceful breakthrough action). When using UAVs as a tool for implementing a threat, the PPS function to delay the advancement of an intruder loses its relevance.

As part of the regular VGO SFZ, the requirements of regulatory documents in the field of physical protection do not provide for the availability of specialized electronic warfare (EW) means to counter UAVs. The solution to the problem of creating an effective full-time PPS capable of detecting and suppressing UAV flights consists in choosing such a configuration based on OE data that would allow providing the necessary and sufficient level of VGO protection without using electronic warfare equipment.

The modernization of the PPS of VGO is based on an indicator of its effectiveness. The lack of a method that can reliably determine the capabilities of the system to counter current threats, including those implemented with the help of UAVs, makes it very difficult to maintain the PPS in a state of constant readiness to ensure the safe functioning of VGO. This, as a consequence, affects the antiterrorist (anti-sabotage) security of the country's strategic facilities.

The task to which the proposed method is aimed is to identify vulnerabilities in the PPS of VGO when UAV violators use them, as well as to select the most optimal ways to improve the regular PPS according to the criterion of effective counteraction against threats realized by UAVs.

To solve the problem in a known way of assessing the effectiveness of the PPS of the VGO, containing the protection lines with the sentries with different levels of preparedness (low, high) and the possibility of interaction between them, when considering threats implemented using small UAVs, including modeling, the effectiveness of the PPS, characterized by the likelihood of suppressing the unauthorized action of the intruder with the help of the UAV in relation to the VGO and which is a function that depends on the probabilities of cutting Ia unauthorized action every hour, defined as the product of probability of detection (P _obn.j) and lesion (P _porazh.j) for small-sized UAVs time is determined by the formula

where C is the interaction coefficient (equal to 0 if the interaction is not organized; equal to 1 if the interaction is organized between the sentries);

N - the number of sentry posts (for the case when the direction of the UAV trajectory is known) or the security lines (for the case when the direction of the UAV trajectory is unknown) through which the UAV trajectory will pass when moving towards the target of unauthorized actions;

P _j is the probability of an event when the UAV is detected and neutralized by the jth hour (for the case when the direction of the UAV trajectory is known) or when passing through the jth guard line (for the case when the direction of the UAV trajectory is unknown);

- вероятность наступления события, когда БПЛА обнаруживается, но не нейтрализуется j-м часовым (для случая, когда известно направление траектории БПЛА) или при прохождении через j-й рубеж охраны (для случая, когда неизвестно направление траектории БПЛА);

- the probability of an event when the UAV is detected but not neutralized by the jth hour (for the case when the direction of the UAV trajectory is known) or when passing through the jth guard line (for the case when the direction of the UAV trajectory is unknown);

- вероятность наступления события, когда БПЛА нейтрализуется j-м часовым после обнаружения (j-1)-м часовым (для случая, когда известно направление траектории БПЛА), или нейтрализуется при прохождении через j-й рубеж охраны после обнаружения на (j-1)-м рубеже охраны (для случая, когда неизвестно направление траектории БПЛА).

- the probability of an event when the UAV is neutralized by the j-th hour after detecting the (j-1) th hour (for the case when the direction of the UAV trajectory is known), or is neutralized when passing through the j-th guard line after detection on (j-1 ) -th boundary of protection (for the case when the direction of the UAV trajectory is unknown).

Using the proposed formula together with the geometrical constructions of the areas of the space for visual detection and UAV damage by small-arms fire of sentries on a scaled object diagram allows us to take into account the nature of the interaction of the UAV with the PPS of a specific VGO. In this case, the nature of UAV movement at a distance from the earth’s surface in the airspace above the VGO protected area, where the “delay” PPS function loses its relevance, is taken into account. The “response” function will significantly differ in its functional component from the case when the impact on the PPS is carried out by ground elements. In addition, the presence or absence of the possibility of interaction between sentries in the PPS is taken into account. Thus, the proposed formulas allow one to obtain reliable results of modeling the interaction in the “intruder - PPS” system and choose the most effective ways to improve the PPS of the VGO while observing the criteria of adequacy of the adopted model of violators and rational spending of money.

The following are particular cases of determining the values of the probabilities of visual detection of P _ob.j and of the defeat P of the _{defeat.j of a} small-sized flying target sentry in the PPS of the VGO.

The limiting range of visual detection of UAVs (S _P ) is defined as the distance from the sentry to the UAV, beyond which the UAV cannot be detected by the visual visual method without the use of special optical devices. The limiting range of visibility defines the boundary of the region of visual detection space formed by a central angle in the horizontal plane equal to 360 °. The probability of detection (P _n.j ) of UAVs crossing the border of the area of the sentinel visual detection space is 0.19. The maximum range of visual detection of UAVs is determined using a system of equations

where ε is the threshold of contrast sensitivity of vision;

S _M - meteorological visibility range;

K ₀ - the contrast of the object in the absence of haze;

D is the maximum linear size of the item;

L _cr - the critical distance from the sentry to the UAV, determined by angular dimensions of 15 °.

A detailed study of this system shows that the first expression for 5 is a criterion that does not take into account the size of the detected object. This indicator is responsible for the detection and recognition of UAVs based on weather conditions, as well as the threshold of contrast sensitivity of human vision. The second expression defines the visual threshold for the detection of UAVs based on its overall dimensions. As the value of the limiting range of visibility S _P , the smallest value from L _cr and S is selected. When determining the limiting range of visibility, the method of observing airspace that affects the value of ε is also taken into account.

Using the proposed formula allows you to take into account the influence of the optical properties of the atmosphere, the overall dimensions of the UAV, as well as the features of the human visual analyzer, which affect the probability of detection by the sentry. Thus, taking into account many parameters of various nature allows us to obtain reliable results of modeling the interaction in the system "intruder - PPS".

Most real aircraft have a complex shape. The probability of getting into geometrically complex targets can be calculated by replacing the target with an equivalent rectangle. As an assumption, it is assumed that the target is close in shape to the indicated correct geometric figure. The sides of the equivalent rectangle can be calculated using the formulas

where S _c - the area of the target;

2x, 2y - sides of the rectangle described around the target.

The probability of UAV damage by the sentry, subject to the condition that the average required number of hits for hitting a target is 1, is determined by the formula of academician A.N. Kolmogorova

- смещения центра рассеивания (средней точки попадания) относительно центра цели по высоте и в боковом направлении;Where

- displacement of the center of dispersion (midpoint of hit) relative to the center of the target in height and in the lateral direction;

E _vy , E _vz - limit total median shot errors;

ε (t) is a special function of the parameter t;

n is the number of shots in the automatic queue;

- постоянная величина, равная 0,0724 (ρ=0,4769 - постоянная нормального закона).

- a constant value equal to 0.0724 (ρ = 0.4769 is a constant of a normal law).

To determine the total median errors of a shot, E _vy , E _vz use shooting tables for specific weapons.

Using the proposed formula allows you to take into account the influence of the level of individual preparedness of sentries in the PPS (due to taking into account errors in firing), overall dimensions of the type of weapon and modes of its operation, speed of moving the target on the probability of UAV damage. Thus, taking into account many parameters of various nature allows us to obtain reliable results of modeling the interaction in the system "intruder - PPS".

The probability of UAV damage in several phases of the jth sentry, when the UAV trajectory is known, is determined by the formula

where q is the number of queues;

W _{n 1} , W _{n 2} , W _nk - probability of hitting the target of the first, second, etc. bursts;

s ₁ , s ₂ , s _i - the number of queues with the same values of the probability of defeat W _{n 1} , W _{n 2} , W _nk, respectively.

Using certain values of the probabilities of visual detection of P _о6н.j and neutralization of P _neutr . _J targets for the j-th sentry, the probability of the suppression of P p _{.j by the} j-th sentry of external influences on the VGO realized with the help of a small UAV

P _sp.j = P _ob.j P _neutral.j

In the course of the development of the scenario of external impact on the studied system, the UAV trajectory can cross the areas of visual detection and fire exposure of several sentries. In this case, the task of determining the values of the probabilities of suppressing external influences should be solved taking into account the fact of the absence or presence of organized interaction between sentries, as well as individual features of the construction of the PPS of the VGO.

The proposed method is carried out in the following sequence.

The proposed method is illustrated by the drawings shown in FIG. 1, FIG. 2, FIG. 3 and FIG. four:

in FIG. 1 shows the shape of the aircraft detection area by a sentry in a vertical plane;

in FIG. 2 - implementation of the principle of layered construction of a physical protection system;

in FIG. 3 - zones of detection and destruction of sentry posts in the physical protection system;

in FIG. 4 - view of the interpolating function of the dependence of the probability of hitting the target ƒ (S _neutr .) On the distance from the sentry to the target S _neutr .

The calculation of the PPS effectiveness indicator in countering the threats realized with the help of small UAVs is carried out by means of modeling the interaction in the “intruder - PPS” system, which includes elements of probability theory and graphical constructions. The use of graphical constructions is due to the need to take into account the individual characteristics of the VGO, such as the type of terrain in the area of the object's location and the placement of sentry posts in the security system, their radii of the zones of visual detection and UAV damage.

The pilot-operator of the aircraft, performing its remote control, as a rule, is located outside the VGO, on which it affects. The target is a small UAV, which has a set of properties and parameters, such as height and speed, weight and size characteristics, load capacity, maneuverability, etc. In the framework of this method, it is believed that the UAV moves rectilinearly and evenly at a constant height.

As initial conditions, an expert method determines the alleged type of unmanned aerial vehicle, its speed and altitude. In the diagram of the object under consideration, made to scale, the goals of the offender are inflicted. The PPS effectiveness indicator is determined for each of the considered goals. In the event that the alleged area outside the protected area of the object from which the intruder intends to launch the UAV is known, the trajectory of the aircraft can be uniquely determined and plotted on the object’s diagram. The arrangement of sentry posts armed with automatic small arms is also plotted. For each post, the radius of the zone of visual detection and damage to the UAV is determined. The sizes of the zones in accordance with the selected scale are applied to the object diagram, respectively, for each sentry.

The radius of the visual detection zone is determined using a system of equations. This takes into account the fact that the detection of aircraft by the sentry is carried out without the use of special equipment or optical devices. This is due to the fact that the watch units, which carry out the service for the protection of VGO, as a rule, are not equipped with instruments or equipment that allow monitoring of distant objects and areas of space. All elements of the PPS are in the same environmental conditions. The value of the limiting height of visual detection is determined based on the value of the radius of the visual detection zone and the angle γ between the horizontal and the upper boundary of the viewing sector in the vertical plane for a person (equal to 25 °).

Thus, based on the known values of the limiting heights and ranges of visual detection, the shape of the sector of the space for visual detection of UAVs is determined (Fig. 1). Any object that is within the boundaries of this sector (the central angle in the horizontal plane is 70 °) will be detected by the sentry with a probability of 1. Since the direction of visual observation for the sentry at any given time is unknown, the probability of detecting a target in each of the possible directions (the central angle in the horizontal plane is 360 °) is considered the same and takes a value equal to 0.19.

The only possible way to counter UAVs from regular security systems is to use firearms carried out by security forces. The radius of the zone of destruction by fire of automatic automatic small arms for small UAVs, due to their small overall dimensions, is taken equal to the value of the limiting detection range of UAVs S _P. The lesion zone, in contrast to the detection zone, has the shape of a hemisphere.

Due to the high importance of each element of a small UAV for the task, it is assumed that one hit of a projectile with high kinetic energy (bullet) is enough to hit an UAV. To calculate the probability of at least one hit in a rectangular target, use the formula obtained by academician A.N. Kolmogorov.

Accounting in the Kolmogorov formula of shooting errors allows you to make adjustments for the preparedness of the sentries engaged in firing from firearms to hit targets. To reduce the number of mathematical calculations, it is allowed to take the displacements of the dispersion center (midpoint of the hit) relative to the center of the target in height and in the lateral direction equal to zero.

In the course of UAV advancement in the airspace over the protected area of the object, its trajectory can cross the zones of visual detection and destruction of several sentries.

The presented method makes it possible to evaluate the effectiveness of the PPS in countering the threats realized by UAVs for two cases: when the path of the UAV is known and when the direction of the expected impact on the VGO is unknown.

1) For the first case, the UAV trajectory is plotted graphically to the intended target of the intruder. The trajectory line will cross the zone of visual detection and destruction by fire of small arms of sentries. The radii of the zones are S _P , and the UAV displacement altitude selected as the initial conditions for assessing the effectiveness of the PPS is taken into account. In the event that the trajectory line intersects the UAV detection zone at a certain height, it can be considered that the UAV was detected by the sentry with a probability of 0.19. An important role is played by the fact of the presence or absence of communication between sentries. If there is no connection between sentries, UAV detection events by each sentry should be considered independent.

If sentries have the ability to interact, when an UAV enters the airspace above the protected area of an object, information about it (overall dimensions, speed, height and direction of movement) is transmitted to the next one who discovered it. Thus, the detection of UAVs by each subsequent sentinel can be considered as a dependent event from previous events, and its probability will be conditional.

The UAV trajectory line will also cross the zones of the fire of small-arms sentries. Take into account the duration of the UAV in each specific affected area at a known speed of movement. This parameter affects the number of queues that the sentry will manage to do on a flying target. It can be defined using graphical constructions. The time between the queues is determined based on the preparedness of the sentries using the existing shooting tables.

2) The second case suggests that the direction of the impact on the VGO using the UAV is unknown. PPS are considered as a system that includes many consecutively arranged lines organized in front of the target of the violator (principle of defense in depth) (Fig. 2). At each of the lines there is a certain known number of sentry posts. Each post has areas of detection and damage to an aircraft with radius S _P (Fig. 3).

For this case, the trajectory of the target is unknown, and therefore, it is impossible to say with certainty at what distance from the sentry it will be. Based on this, it is considered true that the appearance of a target at any distance from the center of the affected area at a height H within its limits will be an equally probable event.

Consider the graph of the function ƒ (S _neutr. ), Obtained by interpolating the discrete values of the probability of hitting the target and the corresponding values of the distance from the sentry to the target. The dependence of the probability of hitting a target by sentry from the distance to the target is non-linear, and the graph function is decreasing (Fig. 4).

The function ƒ (S _neut. ) Is a function of a continuous random variable, since S value _neutr. in the case when only the endpoint of the target’s movement is known, it can take any values from the interval [0; R].

The number of queues issued by the sentry on UAVs is determined depending on the height of passage of the aircraft trajectory adopted as the initial condition. The value of W _M corresponds to a certain value of the distance from the sentry to the target S _M. To determine the probability of UAV damage, the passage of its trajectory in a vertical section of the hemisphere of the lesion area formed by the passage of the secant plane through point S _{M is considered} . The probability of neutralization of UAVs by the jth sentry will be determined in accordance with the section of the method used for a known UAV trajectory.

In accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation, the main targets of the PPS for VGO are the timely detection of unauthorized actions, delaying (slowing down) the advancement of the violator and suppressing unauthorized actions by detaining or neutralizing persons involved in the preparation or commission of unauthorized actions. Given the fact that the movement of the object of influence occurs at a considerable distance from the earth’s surface in the airspace above the protected territory of the object, the PPS function “delay” loses its relevance, and the function “response” will significantly differ in its functional component from the case when the impact on PPS is carried out by ground elements. The statement is substantiated that in the airspace there are no physical barriers capable of slowing the progress of aircraft toward their target. Based on this, we can only talk about the possibility of detection and opposition from the PPS. Then, the PPS effectiveness indicator, which has the physical meaning of the probability of suppressing the unauthorized actions of the violator in relation to the GGO, is determined on the basis of the ability of each sentry to suppress the malicious action scenario implemented with the help of a small UAV. In turn, the probability of suppressing the flight of an air target by a single sentry is defined as the product of the probabilities of detection (P _obn.j ) and defeat (P defeat _j ).

Implementation of the proposed method for assessing the effectiveness of the VGO PPS during the consideration of threats implemented with the help of UAVs will allow to reliably determine the capabilities of the system to counter actual threats, in particular those implemented with the help of UAVs. The results of the effectiveness assessment are used as initial conditions in the modernization process to maintain the PPS in a state of constant readiness to ensure the safe functioning of the VGO. Such an approach to ensuring the safe functioning of VGO is a priority and serves as the key to ensuring the security of the country as a whole.

Claims (32)

1. A method for assessing the effectiveness of the physical protection system (PPS) of an important state object (VGO), containing security lines with sentries with different levels of preparedness and the possibility of interaction between them, when considering threats implemented using small UAVs, including modeling, characterized in that the effectiveness of the PPS, which is characterized by the probability of suppressing the unauthorized action of the violator with the help of the UAV in relation to the VGO and is a dependent function t suppress unauthorized action probabilities each hour is defined as the product of the detection probabilities (P _obn.j) and lesion (P _porazh.j) for small-sized UAVs time is determined by the formula

for j = 1, where C is the interaction coefficient is 0 if the interaction is not organized; equal to 1 if interaction is organized between sentries; N is the number of sentry posts for the case when the direction of the UAV trajectory is known, or the security boundaries for the case when the direction of the UAV trajectory through which the UAV trajectory passes when moving toward the target of performing an unauthorized action is unknown; P _j is the probability of the event when the UAV is detected and neutralized by the jth hour for the case when the direction of the UAV trajectory is known, or when passing through the jth guard line for the case when the direction of the UAV trajectory is unknown;

- the probability of an event when the UAV is detected but not neutralized by the j-th guard for the case when the direction of the UAV trajectory is known, or when passing through the jth guard line for the case when the direction of the UAV trajectory is unknown;

- the probability of an event when the UAV is neutralized by the j-th hour after the detection of the (j-1) th hour for the case when the direction of the UAV trajectory is known, or neutralized when passing through the j-th guard line after detection on (j-1) - m boundary of protection for the case when the direction of the UAV trajectory is unknown. 2. The method according to p. 1, characterized in that the value of the limiting range of visual detection of UAVs used to construct a region of space with a central angle in the horizontal plane equal to 360 °, within the boundaries of which the probability of detection of R _O.j UAV will be equal to 0, 19 are determined using a system of equations

where ε is the threshold of contrast sensitivity of vision; S _M - meteorological visibility range; K ₀ - the contrast of the object in the absence of haze; D is the maximum linear size of the item; L _cr - the critical distance from the sentry to the UAV, determined by the angular dimensions of 15 '. 3. The method according to p. 1, characterized in that the probability of a UAV hitting a sentry while at least one hit by a burst of shots, taking into account the level of individual preparedness of the sentries in the PPS, overall dimensions and UAV movement speed, is determined by the formula of academician A.N. Kolmogorova

2a, 2b - the equivalent side of the rectangle;

- displacement of the center of dispersion relative to the center of the target in height and in the lateral direction; E _vu , E _vz - limit total median shot errors, for the determination of which they use firing tables for specific weapons; ε (t) is a special function of the parameter t; n is the number of shots in the automatic queue;

is a constant value equal to 0.0724, where ρ = 0.4769 is a constant of a normal law. 4. The method according to p. 1, characterized in that the probability of UAV damage by the k-th hour in several bursts, when the UAV trajectory is known, is determined by the formula

where q is the number of queues; W _{n 1} , W _{n 2} , W _nk - probability of hitting the target of the first, second, etc. bursts; s ₁ , s ₂ , s _i - the number of queues with the same values of the probability of defeat W _{n 1} , W _{n 2} , W _nk, respectively. 5. The method according to p. 1, characterized in that the probability of suppressing the j-th hour action, implemented using a small UAV, if its path is unknown, is defined as in paragraph 4 of the claims for a secant plane constructed through point S _M lying at a distance from the sentry to the target corresponding to the value of W _M equal to the average value of the function ƒ (S _neutral ) obtained by interpolating the discrete values of the probability of hitting the target and the corresponding values of the distance from the sentry to the target for given initial conditions according to the formula

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