RU2634455C2 - System and detecting method of modeling errors - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: information technology.

SUBSTANCE: invention relates to systems and protection methods of critical infrastructure objects by monitoring the status of such critical infrastructure object as a process system, through a cybernetic control system. The invention is intended for testing a cybernetic control system for the presence of modeling errors. Testing of the cybernetic control system that determines the ideal states of the technological system is carried out by recognizing the ideal state of the technological system defined by the cybernetic system for the time point and deviating from the real state of the technological system, the modeling error based on the confirmed preservation of the functional interrelation of the elements of the technological system.

EFFECT: quality of cybernetic control system testing that determines the ideal conditions of the technological system is increased.

19 cl, 8 dwg

Description

Technical field

The invention relates to systems and methods for protecting critical infrastructure facilities by monitoring the status of such a critical infrastructure facility as a technological system through a cybernetic monitoring system.

State of the art

The interest of attackers in critical infrastructure over the past few years has grown exponentially. Therefore, the task of protecting vulnerable critical infrastructure objects, such as denial of service attacks, has become urgent.

The most popular methods for protecting technological objects of critical infrastructure are modeling and filtering control parameters that affect technological objects. The options for implementing these methods are diverse.

For example, publication US 20060034305 describes methods for detecting anomalies in the operation of critical infrastructure facilities. The described invention allows to detect falsification of control parameters used to control infrastructure. An anomaly (deviation from normal functioning) is detected by monitoring traffic. To detect anomalies, a model of normal activity of critical infrastructure objects is created.

Publication US 20140189860 describes methods for detecting attacks by detecting deviations in the functioning of the system from the norm, where various methods are used to detect deviations, and attack vectors are also determined. Also, ways to distinguish anomalies from "noisy" are written off, causing deviations in the particular case by setting threshold values.

Thus, many methods of protection are known from the prior art, namely, different methods for constructing models and methods for monitoring, different methods for combining models are known. But none of the proposed methods uses a control system that allows controlling and other influences in ACS TP, for different subsystems / levels at a given point in time.

Disclosure of invention

The present invention is intended to test a cybernetic control system for the presence of simulation errors.

The technical result of the present invention is to improve the quality of testing a cybernetic control system that determines the ideal state of the technological system by recognizing the ideal state of the technological system defined by the cybernetic system for a point in time and deviating from the real state of the technological system by a modeling error based on confirmation of the preservation of the functional relationship of the elements of the technological system .

The system for recognizing the ideal state of a technological system defined by a cybernetic system as a modeling error when implementing control actions by control entities of a multi-level control subsystem of a technological system on a control object contains: a technological system that implements a change in the state of the control object through a change in the state of control subjects, while the technological system is functionally interconnected collection of elements such as an object is managed Oia and the subjects of management, which form a multi-level subsystem of management of the control object; a cybernetic control system consisting of interconnected cybernetic blocks, where each cybernetic block individually models the state change of an individual element of the technological system, while the interconnection of cybernetic blocks in the cybernetic system repeats the interconnection of the elements of the technological system, the state of which the blocks are simulated, the cybernetic control system is designed to determine ideal condition of the technological system and its elements for a moment in time by modeling, as well as to determine the ideal state of the elements of the technological system by modeling at a given state one of the elements of the technological system; and a control module associated with the technological system and with the cybernetic control system, intended for:

- obtaining the real state of the technological system and its elements at an arbitrary point in time, where the real state of the technological system is determined by the set of states of its elements;

- initialization of the cybernetic control system by synchronizing the cybernetic control system with the technological system in time or as one of the elements of the technological system;

- comparing the obtained real state of the technological system and its elements with the ideal state of the technological system and its elements, determined by the cybernetic control system;

- detection, as a result of comparison, of deviations of the real state of the technological system from the ideal state determined by the cybernetic control system;

- checking the integrity of the functional relationship between the states of the elements of the technological system, which compares the ideal state of the control subjects of the technological system determined by the cybernetic system for a given state of the control object with the real state of the control subjects of the technological system with the same state of the control object;

- recognition of the ideal state of the technological system, defined by the cybernetic system for a moment in time, as a modeling error based on the confirmed preserved functional relationship of the technological system elements.

A method for recognizing the ideal state of a technological system determined by a cybernetic system as a modeling error when implementing control actions by control subjects of a multi-level control subsystem of a technological system on a control object, where control subjects and control object are functionally interconnected elements of the technological system, and a set of functionally interconnected states of control subjects and object controls determine the real state of technological system at the point in time at which the cybernetic control system is initialized in the first step by synchronizing the cybernetic control system with the technological system in time or according to the state of the technological system element. Then get the real state of the technological system and its elements at an arbitrary point in time; determine the ideal state of the technological system and its elements for the same moment in time by modeling the control performed by the cybernetic system. The obtained real state of the technological system is compared with the ideal state of the technological system by a specific cybernetic system for the same moment in time. As a result of comparison, the deviation of the real state of the technological system from the ideal state determined by the cybernetic control system is detected, and if the deviation is not detected, the steps from obtaining the real state are repeated. After detecting deviations, check the integrity of the functional relationship of the states of the elements of the technological system, where:

- initialize the cybernetic model with the real state of the control object obtained earlier;

- determine the ideal state of the control subjects with the state of the control object obtained in step b), by modeling performed by the cybernetic control system;

- compare the ideal state of the control entities of the technological system defined by the cybernetic system for the state of the control object obtained in step b) with the real state of the control entities of the technological system obtained earlier;

- detect the absence of a functional relationship between the elements of the technological system when, as a result of comparing the ideal state of the control subjects of the technological system defined by the cybernetic system for the real state of the control object obtained earlier with the real state of the control subjects of the technological system obtained at the same time, the deviation is not detected.

The ideal state of the technological system determined by the cybernetic system for a point in time earlier is recognized as a modeling error based on the confirmed preservation of the functional relationship of the elements of the technological system.

Brief Description of the Drawings

The accompanying drawings are included to provide a further understanding of the invention and form part of this description, show embodiments of the invention, and together with the description serve to explain the principles of the invention.

The claimed invention is illustrated by drawings:

FIG. 1a schematically shows an example of a technological system;

FIG. 1b schematically shows a special case of the implementation of a technological system;

FIG. 2 schematically depicts a cybernetic control system;

FIG. 3 schematically shows a control system over the operation of a technological system by means of a cybernetic system;

FIG. 4 shows a method of operating a control system;

FIG. 5 depicts a method for checking the integrity of the functional relationship of the states of elements of a technological system.

FIG. 6 shows an example of a control system.

FIG. 7 shows an example of a general purpose computer system.

Although the invention may have various modifications and alternative forms, the characteristic features shown by way of example in the drawings will be described in detail. It should be understood, however, that the purpose of the description is not to limit the invention to its specific embodiment. On the contrary, the purpose of the description is to cover all changes, modifications that are included in the scope of this invention, as defined by the attached formula.

The implementation of the invention

The objects and features of the present invention, methods for achieving these objects and features will become apparent by reference to exemplary embodiments. However, the present invention is not limited to the exemplary embodiments disclosed below, it can be embodied in various forms. The above description is intended to help a person skilled in the art for a comprehensive understanding of the invention, which is defined only in the scope of the attached claims.

Control object - a technological object, to which external influences (control and / or disturbing) are directed in order to change its state, in the particular case, such objects are a device or a technological process (or part of it).

Technological process (TP) - the process of material production, which consists in the sequential change of states of a material entity (subject of labor).

External impact - a method of changing the state of the element that the impact is directed to (for example, an element of a technological system (TS)) in a certain direction, the effect from the TS element to another TS element is transmitted in the form of a signal.

The state of the control object is a set of its essential properties expressed by the parameters of states that are changed or held under the influence of external influences, including control actions from the control subsystem. A state parameter is one or more numerical values characterizing an essential property of an object; in a particular case, a state parameter is a numerical value of a physical quantity.

The formal state of the control object is the state of the control object that corresponds to the flow chart and other technological documentation (if it is a TP) or a timetable (if it is a device).

Control action - targeted (the purpose of the impact is the impact on the state of the object) is the legitimate (provided by TP) external impact from the control entities of the control subsystem on the control object, leading to a change in the state of the control object or to the state of the control object.

Indignant impact - targeted or unfocused illegitimate (unintended TP) external impact on the state of the control object, including from the control subject.

Management subject - a device that directs a control action to a control object or transfers a control action to another control subject for conversion before directing it to an object.

A multi-level management subsystem - including several levels of a set of management entities.

A technological system (TS) is a functionally interconnected set of control subjects of a multilevel control subsystem and a control object (TP or device) that implements, through a change in the state of control subjects, a change in the state of the control object. The structure of the technological system is formed by the basic elements of the technological system (interconnected control subjects of a multi-level control subsystem and the control object), as well as the relationships between these elements. In the case where the control object in the technological system is a technological process, the ultimate goal of control is: through changing the state of the control object to change the state of the subject of labor (raw materials, billets, etc.). In the case when the control object in the technological system is a device, the ultimate goal of control is to change the state of the device (vehicle, space object). The functional relationship of the elements of the TS implies the relationship of the states of these elements. In this case, there may not be a direct physical connection between the elements, for example, there is no physical connection between the actuators and the technological operation, but the same cutting speed is functionally related to the spindle speed, despite the fact that these state parameters are not physically connected.

The state of the subject of control is the totality of its essential properties, expressed by the parameters of states that are changed or held under the influence of external influences.

The essential properties (respectively, and the essential state parameters) of the control subject are properties that directly affect the essential properties of the state of the control object. In this case, the essential properties of the control object are those that have a direct impact on the controlled factors (accuracy, safety, efficiency) of the functioning of the vehicle. For example, the correspondence of cutting modes to formally specified modes, the movement of the train in accordance with the schedule, and the retention of the temperature of the reactor within acceptable limits. Depending on the controlled factors, the state parameters of the control object and, accordingly, the associated state parameters of the control entities that have a control effect on the control object are selected.

The state of the element of the technological system is the state of the subject of control, the control object.

The real state of the element of the technological system is the state of the element of the technological system at some point in time of the impact on the control object, determined by measuring the state parameters and intercepting signals (traffic) between the elements of the vehicle. The measurement of state parameters is carried out, for example, using sensors installed in the vehicle.

The real state of the technological system is a set of interconnected real states of the elements of the technological system.

A cybernetic block is an element of a cybernetic control system that describes the functioning process (simulating a state change) of an element of a technological system.

The ideal state of an element of a technological system (state of a cybernetic block) is the state of an element of a technological system at some moment of time affecting a control object determined by a cybernetic block as a result of modeling.

A cybernetic control system is a set of interconnected (state relationships) cybernetic blocks, simulating a change in the state of the technological system as a whole, the interconnection of cybernetic blocks in a cybernetic system repeats the interconnection of the corresponding blocks of elements in the technological system. Cybernetic blocks are connected by links, the connection is of a signal nature. The signal between the cybernetic blocks is the ideal equivalent of the external influence on the element in the vehicle, identical to the block (signal between the elements of the vehicle).

The ideal state of the technological system (the state of the cybernetic control system) is the state of the technological system determined by the cybernetic control system as a result of modeling.

The state space is a way of formalizing changes in the states of a dynamic system (technological system or cybernetic system).

Simulation error - an ideal state obtained as a result of modeling that does not correspond to the real state, while the real state corresponds to the formally given state. For example, the temperature in the furnace is 1000 ° С (real state), the technology also provides for a temperature in the furnace at 1000 ° С (formal state) at the given moment, and as a result of the simulation, the predicted temperature in the furnace at the given time should be equal to 1200 ° С. Thus, the simulated temperature value in the furnace at a given time (ideal state) is erroneous or a simulation error occurs.

In FIG. 1a, an example of a technological system 100 is schematically shown, the technological system includes elements 110a and 110b, where the elements of the vehicle are: control object 110a; control entities 110b forming a multi-level control subsystem 120; horizontal ties 130a and vertical ties 130b. Management entities 110b are grouped into 140 levels.

In FIG. 1b schematically shows a particular case of the implementation of the technological system 100 '. The control object 110a 'is a TP or device, control actions that are generated and implemented by the automated control system (ACS) 120' are directed to the control object 110a ', three levels 140' are distinguished in the ACS, consisting of control entities 110b 'interconnected as horizontally by horizontal ties (ties within a level are not indicated in the figure), and vertically by vertical ties 130b '(ties between levels). Relationships are functional, i.e. in the general case, a change in the state of the control subject 110b 'at one level causes a change in the states of the associated control subjects 110b' at this level and other levels. Information about the change in the state of the control subject is transmitted in the form of a signal along the horizontal and vertical links established between the control subjects, i.e. information about the change in the state of the control subject under consideration is an external impact in relation to other control subjects 110b '. Levels 140 'in ACS 120' allocate in accordance with the purpose of the subjects of control 110b '. The number of levels may vary depending on the complexity of the automated control system 120 '. Simple systems can contain one or more lower levels. For physical communication between the elements of the TS (110a, 110b) and subsystems of the TS 100, wired networks, wireless networks, integrated circuits are used, for logical communication between the elements of the TS (110a, 110b) and subsystems of the TS 100, Ethernet, industrial Ethernet, and industrial networks are used. Industrial networks and protocols are used in various types and standards: Profibus, FIP, ControlNet, Interbus-S, DeviceNet, P-NET, WorldFIP, LongWork, Modbus, etc.

The upper level (supervisory control and data acquisition, SCADA) is the level of dispatch and operator control, includes at least the following control entities: controllers, control computers, human-machine interfaces (human human-machine interface, ΗΜΙ ) (in Fig. 1b are depicted within one SCADA control entity). The level is designed to track the state of the elements of the vehicle (110a ', 110b'), receive and accumulate information about the state of the elements of the vehicle (110a ', 110b') and, if necessary, adjust them.

The middle level (CONTROL level) is the level of controllers, includes at least the following control subjects: programmable logic controllers (English programmable Logic Controller, PLC), counters, relays, controllers. The control entities 110b 'of the "PLC" type receive information from the control entities of the type "control and measuring equipment" and the control entities 110b' of the type "sensors" about the status of the control object 110a '. Control entities of the “PLC” type generate (create) a control action in accordance with the programmed control algorithm for control entities of the “executive mechanisms” type. Executive mechanisms directly implement it (apply to the control object) at the lower level. The actuator is part of the actuator (equipment).

The lower level (Input / Output level) is the level of such control subjects as: sensors (English sensors) and measuring devices that monitor the state of the control object 110a ', as well as actuators (actuators). Actuators directly affect the state of the control object 110a ', to bring it into line with the formal state, i.e. the state corresponding to the technological task, the technological map or other technological documentation (if it is a TP) or a timetable (if it is a device). At this level, signals from control entities 110b 'of the “sensor” type are matched with inputs of middle-level control entities, and the control actions generated by control entities 110b' of the PLC type are matched with control entities of the 110b type of actuators that implement them. The actuator is part of the actuator. The actuator moves the regulatory body in accordance with the signals from the controller or control device. Actuators are the last link in the automatic control circuit and generally consist of blocks:

- amplification devices (contactor, frequency converter, amplifier, etc.);

- an actuator (electric, pneumatic, hydraulic) with feedback elements (sensors of the position of the output shaft, alarm end positions, manual drive, etc.);

- regulatory body (valves, valves, dampers, gates, etc.).

Depending on the conditions of use, actuators can be structurally different from each other. The main blocks of actuators usually include actuators and regulatory bodies.

In a particular case, the actuator is generally called the actuator.

In FIG. 2 shows a cybernetic control system (KSK) 200. KSK consists of cybernetic blocks (KB) 210. KSK 200 simulates a change in the state of a vehicle by modeling changes in the state of elements of a vehicle (110a and 110b). Each cybernetic block 210 KSK unambiguously corresponds (is identical) to a TS element. Horizontal communications 230a and vertical communications 230b between cybernetic blocks uniquely correspond to horizontal communications 130a and vertical communications 130b between identical TS elements (110a, 110b). The cybernetic block 210 establishes a causal relationship (dependency) between the input and output signals. The input signal of the cybernetic block 210 is the output signal of the cybernetic block 210, which is logically or structurally higher in relation to the considered cybernetic block 210. In the particular case of the upper level cybernetic blocks 210, the input signal is the feedback of the lowest level block. For example, there is a cybernetic unit that describes the processes of an electric heating furnace. The input signal of this block is information about the voltage of the heater (heater voltage is a parameter of the state of the heater), and the output signal of this block is information about the temperature of the furnace (the temperature of the furnace is a parameter of the state of the furnace), the input-output relationship is described by a functional operator (differential equation). The output signal of KB 210 is uniquely determined by the state of this KB 210, i.e. the state parameters of KB 210 and the output signal are functionally or correlated, in turn, the state parameters are uniquely determined by the input signal (control action), thus, to describe the KB 210, one of the forms for describing the relationship of input and output parameters is used, such forms are models. Variants of models and, accordingly, modeling methods (descriptions of a causal relationship) can be varied. In determining the modeling method, at least between:

- a mathematical model;

- a logical model;

- numerical model;

- a physical model;

- a simulation model.

When choosing a modeling method, at least the following criteria are taken into account:

- the essence of the TS element (110a or 110b), the simulation of the change of state of which is carried out by a cybernetic block;

- the required accuracy of the simulation (the tolerance of the simulated processes from real processes) changes in the state of the TS element (110a or 110b);

- a set of source data about the elements of the vehicle (the number of elements of the vehicle, the type of elements of the vehicle, the method of physical and logical connection between the elements of the vehicle, etc.);

- the complexity of the formal description of the processes in the technological system 100, where the process is a change in the state of the elements of the technological system (precisely in such conditions when it is impossible or relatively difficult to uniquely describe the system or its behavior using mathematical formulas, simulation models and, accordingly, correlation relationships between design bureaus are used).

Therefore, KSK 200 may include cybernetic blocks 210 that use different models. Also, for the cybernetic block 210, more than one model can be used, and depending on the situation, a choice is made between one or another ready-made (trained) model for the cybernetic block (described later). In a particular case, a data-driven approach is used for training, in another case, a formal description of the technological process and technological system is used (technological documentation, software projects, description of finite and cellular automata, etc.).

In FIG. 3, the control system 300 is shown. The control system 300 is designed to control the functioning of the TS 100 by means of KSK 200 when implementing control actions by the control entities 110b of the multi-level control subsystem 120 of the TS 100 on the control object 110a. In this case, the control entities 110b and the control object 110a are functionally interconnected elements of the technological system 100, and the set of functionally interconnected states of the control entities 110b and the control object 110a determine the real state of the vehicle 100 at a time. The control system 300 contains a TS 100 that implements, through a change in the state of control subjects 110b, a change in the state of a control object 110a, while the TS 100 represents a functionally interconnected set of elements, namely:

- control object 110a;

- management entities 110b, forming a multi-level subsystem for managing the control object 120.

The control system 300 also contains KSK 200, consisting of interconnected cybernetic blocks 210, where each KB 210 individually models the state change of an individual TS element (110a or 110b), while the interconnection of cybernetic blocks 210 in KSK 200 repeats the interconnection of TS elements (110a, 110b ), the state of which the blocks model, but in contrast to the relationships in the TS 100 (the dependence of the state of one TS element on the state of another TS element), the relationships between the blocks in KSK 200 can be correlated, functional actor mixed character (part blocks associated correlation, other functionally). KSK 200 within the control system 300 is used for:

- determining the ideal state of the technological system and its elements for a point in time by modeling;

• in this case, in a particular case, the modeling process itself is carried out continuously, and the results are stored in the base of ideal states (LSI) 330, and for a point in time the state is provided upon request to LSI 330;

- determining the ideal state of the elements of the vehicle by modeling for a given state of one of the elements of the vehicle.

The control system 300 includes a control module 310 associated with the TS 100 and with the KSK 200, designed for:

- obtaining the real state of the vehicle and its elements at an arbitrary point in time or continuously, where the state of the vehicle is determined by the set of states of its elements;

• in this case, while continuously receiving real states of TS elements, the results are recorded in the database of fixation of control methods in the technological system and real states (BFMUiRS) 340, and for a point in time the state is provided upon request to BFMUiRS 340;

- initialization of KSK 200 by synchronizing KSK 200 with TS 100 in time or as one of the elements of the technological system;

- comparing the obtained real state of the TS 100 and its elements with the ideal state of the TS 100 and its elements as determined by KSK 200;

- detection, as a result of comparison, of the deviation of the real state of the TS 100 from the ideal state of the TS 100 determined by KSK 200;

- checking the integrity of the functional relationship between the states of the elements of the TS (110a, 110b), where the ideal state of the control entities of the TS 110b, determined by the KSK 200 for a given state of the control object 110a, is compared with the real state of the control entities of the TS 110b with the same state of the control object 110a;

- recognition of the ideal state of the TS 100, defined by the cybernetic system 200 for a point in time, as a modeling error based on the confirmed preserved functional relationship of the elements of the technological system (110a, 110b);

- completion of testing the cybernetic control system 200;

- detection of anomalies in the controlled TC 100 based on the disturbed functional relationship of the elements of the technological system (110a, 110b).

In the particular case, the control module 310 before initializing the KSK 200 selects the models (modeling method) that will be initialized from the available ones for each cybernetic block 210. For example, mathematical, simulation, etc. The selection is made on the basis of the criteria mentioned above, the criteria for each case are indicated in the technical task (English product requirements document, PRD) in the form of quality requirements (control accuracy, control efficiency, control speed, etc.) to the control system 300 and essential properties of the elements of the TS (110a, 110b), the control of which must be carried out. In a formalized form, the terms of reference are stored in the database 320.

The control system 300 may further comprise a database 320 storing a formal description of the state changes of the control object 110a. A formal description of such a control object 110a as a technological process, for example, can be formalized (transformed from one form of presentation of information, for example, in the form of electronic technological documentation, into another form understandable to the control system 300, for example, into a database or state space) based on the technological documentation coming from the automated enterprise management system (ACSM) 120a ', and stored in database 320 as a state space. Moreover, the state space is a particular way of formalizing the change in state of the control object 110a.

Additionally, BFMUiRS 340 stores information about all the impacts that change the state of the vehicle 100 and its elements. BFMUiRS 340 is connected both with the control module 310 and with the TS 100.

The possibility of obtaining (measuring, taking) the real states of the elements of the vehicle (110a, 110b) and obtaining information about external influences is provided by the connections of the control module 310 of the control system 300 with control entities 110b and with interceptors (not shown in the figures) installed on horizontal connections 130a and vertical ties 130b. It is implemented by software, hardware and software and hardware. Interceptors intercept signals (traffic) between the elements of the vehicle. Also, interceptors (in the form of agents) are installed on the HMI and intercept keyboard input, button presses, operator reaction to some event in the technological system. States are also obtained from monitoring systems (for example, many PLCs can tag status via SNMP or HTTP), event logs, message and application logs, etc. In the general case, interceptors do not inhibit the operation of vehicle elements (110a, 110b) and interception is carried out without delay.

In FIG. 4 shows the method of operation of the monitoring system 300. The monitoring system 300 operates in two modes, in the testing mode of KSK 200 for detecting errors in the simulation and in the testing mode of the vehicle for detecting anomalies (deviations from normal functioning) in the functioning of the vehicle. Both modes operate in parallel in the process of implementing control actions by the control entities 110b of the multilevel control subsystem 120 TS 100 on the control object 110a. In this case, the control entities 110b and the control object 110a are functionally interconnected elements of the TS 100, and the set of functionally interconnected states of the control entities 110b and the control object 110a determine the real state of the TS 100 at a time. At step 410, the KSK 200 is initialized by synchronizing the KSK 200 with the vehicle 100 in time. Since the KSK model is an ideal description of real processes in the TS 100, the states of the TS 100 (real state) and the state of KSK 200 (ideal state) should coincide as a result of initialization. The deviation of the values of real states from the corresponding values of ideal states is admissible, where the admissibility is established on the basis of the technical specifications for the control system, and the deviation value is calculated as:

where Q _id is the ideal state of the technological system (KSK state);

Q _r - the real state of the technological system;

Δ is the tolerance.

Thus, synchronization is a combination of the state spaces of the TS 100 and KSK 200. In the described case, initialization is carried out by combining the state space of the TS 100 and the state space of KSK 200, according to one of the state parameters, namely time. The synchronization of the entire KSK 200 is carried out by synchronizing each cybernetic block 210 of the KSK 200 with the identical TS element (110a or 110b).

Next, at step 420, the real state of the technological system 100 and its elements (110a, 110b) is obtained at an arbitrary point in time, and at step 430, the ideal state of the technological system 100 and its elements (110a, 110b) is determined for the same point in time by modeling KSK. The ideal state of TS 100 will be the state of KSK 200 for the same time, since both systems must operate synchronously, and KSK 200 is isolated from external influences unlike TS 100. Therefore, the state received from TS 100 is the real state of TS 100 (subject to disturbances), and the state determined by KSK 200 is the ideal state of the TS 100 (unaffected by disturbances). After obtaining the real state at step 420 and determining the ideal state of the vehicle 100 at step 430, these states are compared at step 440 (state parameters are compared). For comparison, the set of state parameters should be expressed in a certain way. The set of parameters can be expressed as an unordered set of state parameters, an ordered set (tuple) of state parameters, or as a function whose value will reflect the state of the system. For example, when considering such a control object as a technological operation of machining on a lathe, its condition is characterized by the following state parameters: cutting depth (t), feed (s) and cutting speed (V). Accordingly, the set can be represented in the form of an unordered set (t, s, V), an ordered set (tuple) <t, s, V> or power P (t, S, V), which is a function of the listed state parameters. Accordingly, the state of the technological system 100 is a set of states of TS elements (110a, 110b), expressed in a certain way. In turn, the state of the TS 100 can be expressed in the form of a sequence (both ordered and disordered) or a function of the state of the elements of the TS (110a, 110b).

After comparing, at step 440, the obtained real state of the technological system 100 with the ideal state of the technological system 100 determined by the cybernetic control system 200 for the same time, if a deviation is detected (step 450), the integrity of the functional relationship of the state of the elements of the vehicle is checked at step 460, otherwise they return to step 420.

Checking the integrity of the functional relationship between the states of the elements of the TS (110a, 110b) is based on the unity of the states of the elements of the TS (110a, 110b). As mentioned above, the elements of the TS (110a, 110b) are interconnected, and the interconnections are functional, i.e. in the general case, a change in the state of the control subject 110b at one level causes a change in the states of the associated control subjects 110b at this and other levels, as well as the control object 110a. With the normal functioning of the TS 100, the relationship should not be violated, i.e. the unity of the state of the elements of the TS (110a, 110b) should be maintained and at the time point all the states of the elements of the TS (110a, 110b) should be strictly defined and interconnected. In FIG. 5, a method for checking the integrity of the functional relationship between the states of the elements of the vehicle (110a, 110b) is described. At step 461, the KSK 200 is initialized with the real state of the control object 110a obtained at step 420. As a result of the initialization of the KSK 200 with the real state of the control object, the ideal state of the control subjects 110b is determined (step 462) by modeling performed by the cybernetic control system 200 at a given state of the control object 110a . At step 463, the specific states of the control entities of the TS 110b determined by the KSK 200 are compared with the real states of the control entities of the TS 110b obtained at step 420.

In the event that as a result of comparing the ideal states of the control entities of the technological system 110b determined by the KSK 200 with the given state of the control object 110a at step 462, with the real states of the control entities of the TS 110b obtained at step 420, no deviations are detected (or they are acceptable) , confirm the preservation of the functional relationship between the elements of the TS (110a, 110b) (the unity of states is not broken). Thus, the deviation detected at step 450 is a modeling error and, accordingly, the ideal state of the TC 100 determined by the KSK 200 at step 430 is recognized as a modeling error. Testing of the KSK ends for the subsequent adjustment of the models (step 481) of KB 210 (retraining or retraining), and other models are selected for testing of the KSK 200 (step 410). In the particular case, KB 210 KSK 200 is additionally determined, the model of which provoked a modeling error, and the model of this KB 210 is corrected or replaced, the models for the remaining KB 210 are kept unchanged. The specified KB 210 is determined by alternately comparing the real states of the control entities 110b obtained in step 420 with the ideal states of the control entities 110b determined in step 463.

In the event that, as a result of comparing the ideal states of the control entities of the technological system 110b determined by the KSK 200 with the given state of the control object at step 462, with the real states of the control entities of the TS 110b obtained at step 420, a deviation is detected (or it is higher than the permissible), the preservation of the functional relationship between the elements of the TS (110a, 110b) is not confirmed (the unity of states is violated), and the deviation detected at step 450 indicates a deviation of the TS 100 from normal operation, i.e. detect an anomaly in the TC 100.

In FIG. 6 depicts an example of a monitoring system 300 ', which is designed to monitor the functioning of the vehicle 100' 'through KSK 200'.

The control system 300 'contains an example TC 100' '. The following control subjects 110b '' are distinguished in ТС 100 '': SCADA, HMI, PLC, lathe actuators (IM), in particular, a spindle drive, a support of longitudinal movement of a support (carriage), a drive of transverse feed (a drive for moving a slide) (cross-slide) caliper). SCADA and HMI form the upper level of the multi-level control subsystem 120 '', PLC - the middle level of the control subsystem, actuators form the lower level of the control subsystem. The control object 110 a ″ is a technological operation of turning. The control entities 110b ″ and the control entity 110a ″ are characterized by a number of essential properties, i.e. properties that are important from the point of view of exercising control over the functioning of the TS 100 ’, the change of which changes the course of functioning of the TS 100’ and, accordingly, affects the functioning factors. The set of essential properties of control entities 110b ″ or control entity 110a ″ expressed by state parameters is, respectively, the state of control entity 110b ″ or state of control entity 110a ″. As a controlled factor for the functioning of the TS 100 '' within the framework of a technological operation, accuracy and safety are specified, namely, the correspondence of cutting modes to formally specified modes and the correspondence of cutting power (P) to maximum permissible power. Therefore, the state parameters of the control object are feed (s), cutting speed (V), cutting depth (t) and power (P). The state parameters for control entities of the type actuators, respectively, are: spindle drive rotation speed (directly affects the cutting speed), rotational speed of the caliper longitudinal movement drive (directly affects the feed), rotational speed of the transverse caliper slide drive (directly affects the cutting depth) . State parameters for other control entities 110b '' are presented abstractly for the sake of simplicity of the described example:

S (s ₁ , s ₂ , s ₃ ), where s _i are some state parameters expressing the essential properties of SCADA, the SCADA state at time is S (t _S ), where t _S is time;

H (h ₁ , h ₂ , h ₃ ), where h _i are some state parameters expressing the essential properties of the HMI (displayed information and commands), the HMI state at the point in time is Η (t _H ), where t _H is the time;

Ρ (p ₁ , p ₂ , p ₃ ), where p _i are some state parameters expressing the essential properties of the PLC (state of tags, registers), the PLC state at the time is P (t _p ), where t _p is the time;

M (n _S , n _C , n _CS ), where n _i are some state parameters expressing the essential properties of the actuators (n _S is the spindle drive rotational speed, n _C is the rotational speed of the caliper longitudinal drive, n _CS is the rotational speed of the drive lateral movement of the caliper slide), the state of the actuators at time is M (t _M ), where t _M is the time;

O (P (s, V, t)) - the purpose of these state parameters is described above, O (t _O ) is the state of the control object at a time;

Q (S (t _S ), H (t _H ), P (t _p ), M (t _M ), O (t _O )) is the state of the vehicle, with t _S = t _H = t _p = t _M.

The states of the control subjects and the control object are functionally interconnected and there is a superposition (composition) of functional relationships (mappings) of states and inverse functional relationships (mappings) of states, as well as transitivity. For example, if

P (t _p ) = Ф ₁ [S (t _S ), t] and M (t _M ) = Ф ₂ [P (t _p ), t], then

M (t _M ) = Ф ₃ [S (t _S ), t], a

S (t _S ) = Ф ₃ ^-1 [M (t _M ), t].

This is true for the same point in time,

t = t _S = t _H = t _p = t _M

The control system 300 'also contains KSK 200', consisting of interconnected cybernetic blocks 210 ', where each KB 210' individually models the state change of an individual TS element (110a 'or 110b'), while the relationship of cybernetic blocks 210 'to KSK 200' repeats the relationship of the elements of the vehicle (110A ', 110b'), the state changes of which the blocks are modeled. The number of cybernetic blocks 210 'in KSK 200' corresponds to the number of TS elements (110a 'and 110b'). To model (determine the states of elements), design bureaus use different models, and accordingly, a mixed method of relationships (dependencies between the states of elements) is used. In the particular case, in the example under consideration, the CB MOT uses a mathematical model, and for all other blocks simulation models. Accordingly, the relationship between the CB TO and the IM CB is functional, all other relationships are correlation. Simulation models must first be trained. In the simplest case, training is storing the states of TS elements (data-driven learning) for times during technological operations, while the measurement interval is, for example, 0.5 s. The stored results are stored in the BIS 330 'database. As a result, we obtain the state of the elements of the vehicle.

As a result, the operation of the simulation model in a particular case is a sequential change of states (state machine or cellular machine) with a certain tact (determined by the measurement interval during training or the frequency of steps 420-450, Fig. 4). The state of the control object is determined based on the state of the actuators, since in this case the mentioned states have functional dependencies O _i (M _i ) = Ф [M _i ].

KB HMI: H ₁ → H ₂ → H ₃ → H ₄ → H ₅ → H ... → H _n

KB SCADA: S ₁ → S ₂ → S ₃ → S ₄ → S ₅ → S ... → S _n

KB PLC: P ₁ → P ₂ → P ₃ → P ₄ → P ₅ → P ... → P _n

KB IM: M ₁ → M ₂ → M ₃ → M ₄ → M ₅ → M ... → M _n

KB TO: O ₁ (M ₁ ) → O ₂ (M ₂ ) → O ₃ (M ₃ ) → O ₄ (M ₄ ) → ... → O _n (M _n )

When detecting modeling errors, the simulation model is retrained / corrected (described below) or, in other words, states that are not remembered or not taken into account are added. Thus, for functional relationships, the states of related elements are defined earlier; for correlation relationships, the states of related elements are not known in advance, and with such relationships, preliminary training is necessary.

Consider the method of operation of the monitoring system 300 ', the KSK 200' of which is previously trained, a general view of the method is shown in FIG. 4. Initialize the KSK 200 ', in one particular case, take the time point of the operation at which the KSK is synchronized, and for this moment, obtain the state of the TS elements 110a' and 110b 'from the LSI 200' and start the KSK 200 '. For example, the model is initialized after 1.5 s (time synchronization) after the start of the operation, therefore, S ₄ , H ₄ , P ₄ , M ₄ are obtained from the LSI 320 'and the model is launched:

KB HMI: H ₄ → H ₅ → H ... → H _n

KB SCADA: S ₄ → S ₅ → S ... → S _n

KB PLC: P ₄ → P ₅ → P ... → P _n

KB IM: M ₄ → M ₅ → M ... → M _n

KB TO: O ₄ (M ₄ ) → O ₅ (M ₅ ) → ... → O _n (M _n )

In another particular case, the control module 310 'receives the state of one of the elements of the vehicle (synchronization by state) at the time of the operation at which synchronization is performed, and the corresponding states of the elements of the vehicle are obtained from the LSI 320'. For example, the control module 310 'received a state value of the control entity of the PLC type equal to or permissible close (the admissibility is determined by the threshold) to the value of P ₃ , therefore, S ₃ , H ₃ , M ₃ are obtained from the LSI 320' and the model is launched:

KB HMI: H ₃ → H ₄ → H ₅ → H ... → H _n

KB SCADA: S ₃ → S ₄ → S ₅ → S ... → S _n

KB PLC: P ₃ → P ₄ → P ₅ → P ... → P _n

KB IM: M ₃ → M ₄ → M ₅ → M ... → M _n

KB TO: O ₃ (M ₃ ) → O ₄ (M ₄ ) → ... → O _n (M _n )

After initialization, the models are launched, and the KSK 200 'operates synchronously with the vehicle 100''. Next, the control module 310 'receives the real state of the vehicle (step 452, Fig. 4), for this the control module 310' receives the real state of all elements of the vehicle S _r , H _r , P _r , M _r , O _r , and then the state of the vehicle will be is equal to Q _r (S _r , H _r , P _r , M _r , O _r , t) (the real state of the vehicle is 100``). Next, the control module 310 'determines the ideal state of the TS 100''by obtaining the ideal states of the elements of the vehicle S _id , H _id , P _id , M _id , O _id from each cybernetic block KSK 200', and then the ideal state of the TS 100 '' is Q _id (S _id , H _id , P _id , M _id , O _id , t). The ideal state Q _id TC 100 '' and the real state Q _r TC 100 '' are compared if the states coincide (Q _r = Q _id ), or the deviation of the real state Q _r TC 100 '' from the ideal state Q _id TC 100 '' does not exceed the permissible deviation (Δ), for example, equal to 0.05, control continues. In this case, the deviation is calculated by the formula: (Δ):

If the conditions do not coincide, or the deviation exceeds the permissible threshold, find out the reason for the deviation. There can be at least two reasons for the deviation: a modeling error or an anomaly in the TS 100 ''. To determine the cause, first of all, the real state of the control object (O _r ) is compared with the formal state of the control object (O _f ) (step 451, Fig. 4), the formal state of the control object is obtained from the LSI 320 '. If the conditions do not match or the deviation exceeds the tolerance:

then, therefore, the actual cutting conditions do not correspond to the cutting modes specified by the technology (formal cutting modes), and this means that an anomaly has occurred in the TC 100 ''. The cause of the anomaly is a disturbing effect on one of the elements of the vehicle, and this effect affects the controlled functioning factors.

In the case when the states coincide, or the deviation does not exceed the permissible deviation, check the integrity of the functional relationship of the elements of the vehicle (step 460, Fig. 4). For this, KSK 200 'is re-initialized, for initialization, the real state of the control object O _r obtained at step 420 is used, as it was previously verified (step 452, Fig. 4) that this state corresponds to a given state (formal state). In the particular case, the real state of another element of the vehicle can also be used if it is known for certain that this element was not subject to disturbing effects, and elements located hierarchically higher were not affected by disturbing effects. The initialization and simulation procedure for KSK 200 'in this case is as follows:

- get the real state of the control object Q _r ;

- determine the ideal state M _id of the control subject of the type "actuators" based on the dependence O _i (M _i ) = Ф [M _i ], whence M _id (O _r ) = Ф ^-1 [O _r ];

- find in LSI 320 'among the stored states of control units of the type "actuators" (M _i ) a certain value M _id (or closest, proximity is determined by an acceptable discrepancy and is, for example, 0.96), while, for example, this value corresponds to M ₂ ;

- determine the conditions associated with the detected M _i of other control entities, namely S _i , H _i , P _i , for example, for M ₂ , these are the states S ₂ , H ₂ , P ₂ (they will be ideal states S _id , H _id , P _id , M _{id of the} control subjects).

After determination, the ideal states of the control subjects S _id , H _id , P _id , M _id are compared in pairs with the real states of control subjects S _r , H _r , P _r , M _r obtained earlier (step 452, Fig. 4). In the event that, for at least one control entity, the value of the ideal state does not coincide with the value of the real state, the integrity of the functional relationship is considered broken, otherwise the integrity of the functional relationship is considered unbroken. In that case, if the integrity is not broken, the deviation of the states Q _r from Q _id is a consequence of the error in modeling the state of Q _id , and the KSK 200 'model needs to be adjusted. In the event that the integrity is violated, the deviation of the states Q _r from Q _id is a consequence of the anomaly of the vehicle.

In a particular case, when searching in the LSI 320 '(step 465, Fig. 5), among the stored states of the control subjects, the state of the control subject characterized by a certain value (or an acceptable value close to that obtained) obtained as a result of the initialization of KSK 200' (step 462, Fig. 5) the real state of the control object O _r , the desired state of the control subject is not detected. In this case, the deviation of the states Q _r from Q _id is a modeling error, and the model needs to be adjusted (retrain). The correction consists in saving the states S _r , H _r , P _r , M _id in the LSI 320 'database. In this case, M _id (O _r ) = Ф ^-1 [O _r ], the states S, H, P corresponding to M _{id are} defined.

Under the control module 310 and KSK 200 in the present invention refers to a real device, system, component, group of components implemented using hardware such as integrated circuits (English application-specific integrated circuit, ASIC) or programmable gate arrays (English field -programmable gate array, FPGA), or, for example, in the form of a combination of software and hardware, such as a microprocessor system and a set of software instructions, as well as on neuromorphic chips (English neurosynaptic chips). The functionality of the control module 310 and KSK 200 can be implemented exclusively in hardware, as well as in the form of a combination, where part of the functionality of the control module 310 and KSK 200 is implemented in software and part in hardware. In some embodiments, part of the module 310 or the entire module 310 may be executed on a processor of a general-purpose computer (for example, which is shown in Fig. 6).

FIG. 7 is an example of a general purpose computer system, a personal computer or server 20 comprising a central processor 21, a system memory 22, and a system bus 23 that contains various system components, including memory associated with the central processor 21. The system bus 23 is implemented as any prior art bus structure comprising, in turn, a bus memory or a bus memory controller, a peripheral bus and a local bus that is capable of interacting with any other bus architecture. The system memory contains read-only memory (ROM) 24, random access memory (RAM) 25. The main input / output system (BIOS) 26, contains basic procedures that ensure the transfer of information between the elements of the personal computer 20, for example, at the time of loading the operating ROM systems 24.

The personal computer 20 in turn contains a hard disk 27 for reading and writing data, a magnetic disk drive 28 for reading and writing to removable magnetic disks 29, and an optical drive 30 for reading and writing to removable optical disks 31, such as a CD-ROM, DVD -ROM and other optical information carriers. The hard disk 27, the magnetic disk drive 28, the optical drive 30 are connected to the system bus 23 through the interface of the hard disk 32, the interface of the magnetic disks 33 and the interface of the optical drive 34, respectively. Drives and associated computer storage media are non-volatile means of storing computer instructions, data structures, software modules and other data of a personal computer 20.

The present description discloses an implementation of a system that uses a hard disk 27, a removable magnetic disk 29, and a removable optical disk 31, but it should be understood that other types of computer storage media 56 that can store data in a form readable by a computer (solid state drives, flash memory cards, digital disks, random access memory (RAM), etc.) that are connected to the system bus 23 through the controller 55.

Computer 20 has a file system 36 where the recorded operating system 35 is stored, as well as additional software applications 37, other program modules 38, and program data 39. The user is able to enter commands and information into personal computer 20 via input devices (keyboard 40, keypad “ the mouse "42). Other input devices (not displayed) can be used: microphone, joystick, game console, scanner, etc. Such input devices are, as usual, connected to the computer system 20 via a serial port 46, which in turn is connected to the system bus, but can be connected in another way, for example, using a parallel port, a game port, or a universal serial bus (USB). A monitor 47 or other type of display device is also connected to the system bus 23 via an interface such as a video adapter 48. In addition to the monitor 47, the personal computer can be equipped with other peripheral output devices (not displayed), for example, speakers, a printer, etc. .

The personal computer 20 is capable of operating in a networked environment, using a network connection with another or more remote computers 49. The remote computer (or computers) 49 are the same personal computers or servers that have most or all of the elements mentioned earlier in the description of the creature the personal computer 20 of FIG. 7. Other devices, such as routers, network stations, peer-to-peer devices or other network nodes, may also be present on the computer network.

Network connections can form a local area network (LAN) 50 and a wide area network (WAN). Such networks are used in corporate computer networks, internal networks of companies and, as a rule, have access to the Internet. In LAN or WAN networks, the personal computer 20 is connected to the local area network 50 via a network adapter or network interface 51. When using the networks, the personal computer 20 may use a modem 54 or other means of providing communication with a global computer network such as the Internet. The modem 54, which is an internal or external device, is connected to the system bus 23 via the serial port 46. It should be clarified that the network connections are only exemplary and are not required to display the exact network configuration, i.e. in reality, there are other ways to establish a technical connection between one computer and another.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the information provided in the description are examples that do not limit the scope of the present invention defined by the claims. One skilled in the art will recognize that there may be other embodiments of the present invention consistent with the spirit and scope of the present invention.

Claims (53)

1. The system for recognizing the ideal state of a technological system defined by a cybernetic system as a modeling error when implementing control actions by control entities of a multi-level control subsystem of a technological system on a control object contains: a) a technological system that implements through a change in the state of control subjects a change in the state of the control object, while the technological system is a functionally interconnected set of elements: - management object; and - subjects of management, forming a multi-level subsystem for managing the control object; b) a cybernetic control system, consisting of interconnected cybernetic blocks, where each cybernetic block individually models the state change of an individual element of the technological system, while the interconnection of cybernetic blocks in the cybernetic system repeats the interconnection of the elements of the technological system, the state of which the blocks are modeled, designed to: - determining the ideal state of the technological system and its elements for a point in time by modeling; - determining the ideal state of the elements of the technological system by modeling for a given state one of the elements of the technological system; c) the control module associated with the technological system and with the cybernetic control system, intended for: - obtaining the real state of the technological system and its elements at an arbitrary point in time, where the real state of the technological system is determined by the set of states of its elements; - initialization of the cybernetic control system by synchronizing the cybernetic control system with the technological system in time or as one of the elements of the technological system; - comparing the obtained real state of the technological system and its elements with the ideal state of the technological system and its elements, determined by the cybernetic control system; - detection, as a result of comparison, of deviations of the real state of the technological system from the ideal state determined by the cybernetic control system; - checking the integrity of the functional relationship between the states of the elements of the technological system, which compares the ideal state of the control subjects of the technological system determined by the cybernetic system for a given state of the control object with the real state of the control subjects of the technological system with the same state of the control object; - recognition of the ideal state of the technological system, defined by the cybernetic system for a moment in time, as a modeling error based on the confirmed preserved functional relationship of the technological system elements. 2. The system according to claim 1, in which the cybernetic system is designed to determine, for a given state of the control object, the ideal state of the control subjects. 3. The system according to claim 1, in which the cybernetic system is designed to determine, with a given state of the control subject, the ideal state of other control subjects and control object. 4. The system according to claim 1, in which a change in the state of the control object through a change in the state of the control entities is implemented through control actions. 5. The system according to claim 1, in which the state of the element of the technological system is a combination of its essential properties described by the state parameters. 6. The system according to claim 1, in which for each block different methods are available for modeling the states of elements of the technological system. 7. The system according to claim 1, in which the control module before initializing the cybernetic system selects the method of the used simulation method for each cybernetic block. 8. The system according to claim 1, in which the control object is a technological process, to which the control action of the control entities of the multilevel control subsystem of the technological system is directed. 9. The system according to claim 1, in which the control object is a device to which the control action of the control entities of the technological system control subsystem is directed. 10. The system according to claim 1, which further includes a database that is used to store a formal description of the technological process generated on the basis of electronic technological documentation. 11. A method for recognizing the ideal state of a technological system defined by a cybernetic system as a modeling error when implementing control actions by control entities of a multi-level control subsystem of a technological system on a control object, where control subjects and control object are functionally interconnected elements of the technological system, and a set of functionally interconnected states of the subjects the control and the control object determine the real state of the technologist cal system at the time, in which: a) initialize the cybernetic control system by synchronizing the cybernetic control system with the technological system in time or according to the state of the element of the technological system; b) receive the real state of the technological system and its elements at an arbitrary point in time; c) determine the ideal state of the technological system and its elements for the same moment in time by modeling the control performed by the cybernetic system; d) compare the obtained real state of the technological system with the ideal state of the technological system by a specific cybernetic system for the same moment in time; e) as a result of comparison, a deviation of the real state of the technological system from the ideal state determined by the cybernetic control system is detected; - in this case, if the deviation is not detected, repeat steps b) to e); f) check the integrity of the functional relationship of the states of the elements of the technological system, where: - initialize the cybernetic model with the state of the control object obtained in paragraph b) - determine the ideal state of the control subjects with the state of the control object obtained in paragraph b), by modeling, performed by the cybernetic control system; - compare the ideal state of the control subjects of the technological system defined by the cybernetic system for the state of the control object obtained in paragraph b) with the real state of the control entities of the technological system obtained in paragraph b); - confirm the preservation of the functional relationship between the elements of the technological system when, as a result of comparing the ideal state of the control subjects of the technological system defined by the cybernetic system for the state of the control object obtained in paragraph b) with the real state of the control subjects of the technological system obtained in paragraph b) no deviations were found; g) recognize the ideal state of the technological system defined by the cybernetic system for the point in time in point c) as a modeling error based on the confirmed preservation of the functional relationship of the elements of the technological system. 12. The method according to claim 11, in which upon initialization of the cybernetic model, a modeling method for each block of the cybernetic system is additionally determined. 13. The method according to item 12, in which when determining the modeling method choose between: - a mathematical model; - a logical model; - numerical model; - a physical model; - a simulation model. 14. The method according to p. 13, in which the choice of model is determined: - the essence of the element of the technological system, the simulation of state changes which is carried out; - the required accuracy of state modeling; - sets of initial data on the technological system; - the complexity of the formal description of processes in a technological system, where the process is a change in the state of the elements of the technological system. 15. The method according to claim 11, in which at least one control subject is isolated from each level of the multi-level control subsystem, while the distinguished level subjects are functionally interconnected. 16. The method according to claim 11, where additionally the real state of the control object obtained in paragraph b) is compared with the state of the control object for a given point in time specified in the formal description of the technological process formed on the basis of electronic technical documentation. 17. The method according to clause 16, which recognizes the ideal state of the technological system defined by the cybernetic system for the point in time in point c) a modeling error based on the confirmed stored functional relationship of the elements of the technological system and the coincidence of the real state of the control object for a given point in time with the state the control object specified in the description of the technological process for the same point in time as a result of comparison. 18. The method according to claim 11, in which the state comparison is carried out by comparing the state parameters. 19. The method according to claim 11, in which the elements are functionally interconnected when the state of these elements is functionally interconnected.

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