RU2488965C1 - Method of receiving/transmitting cryptographic information - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: radio engineering, communication.

SUBSTANCE: method of receiving/transmitting cryptographic information through global quantum key distribution employs an apparatus for synthesising a single-photon or a high-dimensional secret photon quantum key (SPQK) on Earth through an operation for input thereof into a fibre-optic line for transmitting the SPQK to a centre for directed secure transmission thereof to a low-orbiting spacecraft over a directed atmosphere channel with a coherent beam in the terahertz range, with another operation for transmitting the SPQK over a highly directional channel also with a coherent beam in the terahertz range or an optical laser beam to other spacecraft. Further, the final target secret operation is used to transmit the SPQK over the atmosphere channel in the terahertz range to ground-based parts for receiving information. During all operations for transmitting cryptographic information, SPQK are created using a random number generator.

EFFECT: creating a fast, non-intercepted quantum key with its transmission and reception time shorter than its encryption time.

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Description

The method of receiving and transmitting cryptographic information (SPPCI) includes a series of sequentially cumulative operations in various communication subsystems, namely: creating a hidden quantum key (CCM) on Earth with the operation of transmitting it to a point of directed hidden communication with a low-orbit spacecraft (ON), with the next operation of covert transfer of the CCM to another NA, and from it the final sighting covert operation of transfer to stationary and moving ground, underground, surface, underwater, flying objects that need to be Troy constant change of the JCC.

The hidden coded information itself, after the above sequence of operations, can be transmitted over any open communication channel. Thus, a system of global quantum key distribution (SGRC) is created.

Partial analogs of the satellite part of the subsystem are space communications subsystems of the “Gonets” type (“Gonets-D1M”) and space systems for determining coordinates of the “Glonass” type. In the ground part, partial analogues are the well-known fiber-optic and atmospheric key quantum distribution systems (SCR) of the “Plag and Play” type, as well as the “Method for generating the sync sending of the cryptographic algorithm in communication systems with ensuring the security and confidentiality of transmitted messages” in patent No. 2287222, Н04К 1/00, patent holder GUN SPC "SPURT".

All the above methods of receiving and transmitting cryptographic information to date are based on the theoretical foundations of radio engineering using a mathematical apparatus (various algorithms) and other methods of temporal-spatial communication systems and their separation. All of them have a fundamental flaw - the ability to select a key, including “hacking” by hackers over time, and the more memory and computer speed, the faster this takes place.

Rationale for solving the problem.

When transmitting hidden information over existing communication lines, there is a problem of not only unauthorized, but also undetected interception by an attacker. And, above all, key interception. This drawback will be absent in the systems of quantum key distribution (SCR) being developed in the world, for example, using single-photon transmission lines.

The quantum properties of a single photon provide both covert information transfer and immediate detection of even attempts to intercept information by an attacker.

In quantum cryptography, an absolutely stable key is simultaneously generated and distributed via an unprotected fiber optic communication channel in the form of a sequence of single light quanta (photons). The laws of quantum mechanics under this condition ensure the creation of a channel for transmitting information in such a way that an intruder intrudes into the optical transmission channel of a quantum key in order to copy the key and relay it inevitably is detected by legitimate communication participants. In case of intrusion detection, the transmission session is canceled. If the intrusion is not detected, then it is absent with a quantum probability arbitrarily close to unity. Accordingly, the transmitted quantum key is known only to the legitimate participants of the transmission. Further, the key can be used to encrypt texts and securely transfer these texts over any other open channel with the information transfer speed inherent in this channel. The same open channel is used for open discussion by legitimate participants in the transmission of their transmission and reception protocols. As a result, an intruder’s intrusion into the first channel is detected before the application of the transferred key, i.e. actual transfer of hidden information.

Due to its physical, constructive and technological nature, SPPKI provides timely detection of attempts of unauthorized access to a key in the process of its transfer, timely eliminates key interception and is based on a complex combination of quantum and satellite technologies.

The most important and unsolved problem is the absolutely hidden transmission of the CCM from the ground to the NA and from the NA to the ground object in any weather.

The above reasoned shows that the proposed SPPKI meets the criterion of "pioneer" invention, which in world practice currently has no prototype.

At present, Russia has developed an interactive algorithm for the protocol of quantum key distribution, which provides unconditional secrecy. Moreover, the developed algorithm can be successfully used in the protocols of quantum cryptography, which is characterized by a high level of errors in the keys after quantum signal transmission (SPbU AP).

There are many SCR schemes based on the use of the quantum properties of a single photon. In addition to single-photon systems, two- and three-photon systems are developed on coupled (coupled, entangled) states, called high-dimensional ones. In principle, they have high secrecy and are implemented so far in laboratory experiments on short lines.

Within the framework of the European project SECOQC, the efforts of forty-one European research and industrial organizations from 12 countries are currently developing a network of quantum cryptography. It will be formed of eight nodes, the distances between which will be from 6 to 30 km, and the longest section will be 83 km. Specialists from the Austrian Institute of Technology, Quantique, Toshiba Research in the UK, the University of Geneva, the University of Vienna, Siemes, and many others participate in the creation of this network. Prior to this project, quantum cryptography was technically implemented only with a direct connection between two participants. This project will connect 6 participants in the vicinity of Vienna. At the presentation of the method, a VoIP-telephone conversation was made using one-time-pad technology, in which the keys of the participants are equal in size to the amount of encrypted information. It is important that for the first time it was possible to implement the mechanism of quantum cryptography in an existing commercial network using the already available components of the element base for network nodes and conventional fiber-optic data transmission channels.

The cost of the encryption system for October 2008 was estimated at 100,000 euros, and the commercial system will cost about 10,000 euros. The creation of the system itself is expected in the period of 3-4 years. The main problems are the low data transfer rate, the inability to transmit data over a distance of more than 100 km without an amplifier. SCRK lines with a length of up to several tens of kilometers, based on the transmission of information at the phase shift of the frequency of one photon, were studied.

The use of a subcarrier of the frequency modulation of the signal allows the use of radio frequency technology instead of bulky optical interferometers (Yu.T. Mazurenko, J.-M. Merolli, J.-P. Goghebir. Quantum transmission of information using the subcarrier frequency. Application to quantum cryptography. “Optics and spectroscopy ", 1999, No. 2, p.181-183).

Brought to commercial implementation is the SCRK, which operates using the BB84 protocol, called the Plag and Play system. In this system, both the source of single photons and the single-photon receiver are located only on one side of the system. This significantly reduces the material costs of creating and operating the entire SCRC (M. Bourennan, F. Gibson, A. Karlsson, A. Hening, P. Jonson, T. Tsegaye, D. Lyundgren and E. Sunberg “Experiments on long wavelength (1 , 55 nm); “Plag and Play” quantum cryptography systems ”Opt. Express 4, 383387 (1999); M. Bourennan, D. Lyundgren, A. Karlsson, P. Jonson, A. Hening, JP Cisear.“ Experimental long wavelength quantum cryptography from single phpton transmission to key extraction protocols ”J. Mod. Optics, 47, 563579, (2000); http://www.idquatique.com).

Sources of individual photons in all systems are semiconductor or fiber optic lasers at a wavelength of 1300 or 1550 nm, which are produced on a commercial basis.

Also on a commercial basis, single-mode fiber optic cables with low losses at the corresponding wavelength are produced. Almost all electronic and optical components of the SCRK and equipment for their assembly are also produced.

Toshiba has developed security for video conferencing on the Web using quantum cryptography. Single-photon cryptography technology is fully compatible with the IP protocol and can be implemented in commercial networks. For this, the company's scientists developed a quantum key server (Quantum Key Server), capable of generating up to 100 single-photon cryptographic keys per second. This made it possible to encrypt with a unique key each frame of the video transmitted over the network. The server is equipped with an automatic control system for continuous monitoring of the system and regulation of its optical properties, providing reliable continuous operation without human intervention. The system operates in the 1.55 µm wavelength range used in telecommunications using standard optical fiber.

In Russia, the State Unitary Enterprise SPC “SPURT” (Zelenograd), together with a group of scientists from St. Petersburg State University ITMO and St. Petersburg State University AP, carried out a preliminary study of the domestic system of quantum key distribution using ground-based fiber-optic technology. The work reached the level of the developed technical specifications for the creation of the current layout of the SCRK.

In St. Petersburg State University ITMO, a laboratory model of a quantum cryptography line has been created for transmitting quanta through the air.

The least developed air communication channel from the earth to a low-orbit spacecraft (SC). Los Alamos in America is developing methods for transferring a quantum key from the earth to a low-orbit spacecraft. All published results of the transmission of single photons through the air have been achieved under conditions of an ultrapure atmosphere and are unsuitable for transmitting information from the ground to scientific research equipment in a real atmosphere and, especially, in the presence of clouds.

We propose to carry out the transfer of a hidden quantum key from the ground to the HA using an aimed beam of radiation from a terahertz laser. The terahertz range has a combination of a number of unique properties compared to the optical and radio bands. Firstly, Rayleigh scattering in terahertz waves is 8–9 orders of magnitude smaller than in optical. Secondly, terahertz radiation can be focused like optical radiation. Thirdly, the divergence of a terahertz laser beam is comparable to the divergence of an optical laser beam, which means that it is much smaller than that of the radio range due to another method of exciting laser radiation. For the latter reason, the terahertz beam does not have side lobes in the radiation pattern. In addition, water vapor, fog and dispersed media with a particle size of tens of microns are transparent for a range of about 5 THz.

Several types of sources of laser (coherent) radiation in the terahertz range are known.

Coherent (USA) has developed the first terahertz laser, which is designed to work in space. A radiation source with a frequency of 2.5 THz was the first methanol vapor laser to meet the requirements for devices whose lifetime in orbit should exceed 5 years. Laser power - 31 mW (2002).

At the University of Leeds (UK), a technique has been developed for obtaining radiation in the terahertz range of adjustable frequency. The generator consists of a titanium-sapphire laser, a glass Fabry-Perrot frequency standard and a photoconductive antenna that generates terahertz radiation when generating difference frequency (difference frequency generation, DFG). The operating frequency range can cover several terahertz. The generation of 0.3 and 0.5 THz at 1 μW continuous mode was demonstrated.

At Harvard University (USA), a semiconductor laser pumped by a cascade of electric cascades, operating at room temperature, emitting a frequency of several hundred nanowatts at a frequency of 5 THz, was developed. When cooled, power can reach milliwatts.

In Russia, the Institute of Solid State Physics of the Russian Academy of Sciences is developing a miniature semiconductor generator and a terahertz radiation detector. Preliminary experiments on AlGaAs / GaAs semiconductor structures have shown the successful operation of the mechanisms for generating and detecting terahertz radiation in the frequency range 10 GHz - 0.5 THz, the generated power 0.1 mW, the width of the generation and detection line 0.1 GHz, and the operating temperature 180 ° K and higher.

However, the power of single semiconductor-type sources is clearly insufficient for further transmission. There are already working sources of powerful terahertz radiation - up to 400 watts in a single beam in the form of a free-electron laser. Such a tunable source can be created for conducting experiments or as a constant point for transferring a quantum key to an AT in Zelenograd based on the synchrotron under construction. The development of the source itself was carried out at the Institute of Nuclear Physics. G.I. Budker of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Novosibirsk (Visualization of the radiation of a high-power free-electron terahertz laser using a heat-sensitive interferometer. N.A. Vinokurov et al. ZhTekhF, 2007, Volume 77, Issue 7, pp. 91-100). As for other terahertz radiation receivers, many of their types are known.

The hardware composition of the global quantum key distribution system SGKRK consists of several parts (Figure 1), namely:

1. The ground part for the transmission of information, which includes:

1.1 a set of equipment for controlling the electronic component of the functioning of low-orbit spacecraft (HA1);

1.2 a set of equipment with which a quantum key is created and an optical fiber or atmospheric communication line is inserted into a single-photon or coupled photon state;

1.3 land (or underground) fiber-optic or atmospheric communication line, designed to transmit a quantum key from the place of generation to the place of transfer of the key to HA1;

1.4 a set of equipment that receives a signal from a fiber optic or atmospheric communication line and turns it into a terahertz laser signal aimed at the desired (necessary) HA1;

1.5 a set of equipment for high-precision determination of the position of HA1 and pointing a terahertz laser beam onto it.

2. The space part of the next HA2, which includes:

2.1 receiver of signals of the coherent terahertz range;

2.2 equipment for converting a signal received from the earth into a signal of a terahertz laser directed to the earth to an object receiving a quantum key;

2.3 terahertz laser with variable wavelength;

2.4 equipment for precision high-precision aiming of a beam of a terahertz laser on an object receiving a quantum key;

2.5 equipment for high-precision location of an object receiving a terahertz laser signal;

2.6 subsystem for controlling this equipment.

3. The ground part for receiving information, which includes:

3.1 highly sensitive terahertz laser signal receiver;

3.2 equipment for converting a laser signal into a hidden quantum key.

If necessary, the signal can be transmitted from one HA1 to another HA2 using the developed subsystems. At the Federal Scientific Research Center Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Scientific Research Institute of Precision Instrumentation”, a unified terminal for an inter-satellite highly directional laser information transmission system has been developed to transmit hidden information between satellites where there is no atmosphere. It is intended for installation on spacecraft in order to ensure the transfer of measurement, communication, command and other information between low-orbit spacecraft and from low-orbit to geostationary spacecraft. Information about the possibility of covert information transmission using such devices due to the exact directivity of the laser beam was published in the journal Radio Engineering, 2004, No. 10-11, article by A. Troitsky

It is most advisable to use as a HA from the GLONASS system and the GONETS system. In this case, you can significantly reduce the cost of developing the proposed system.

The technical result of the proposed method is the use of modern technological means of transmitting the key, which eliminates the possibility of its timely decryption, which requires the duration of the public or private key to make less time needed to decrypt it. This decryption in the near future will be carried out using ultra-fast (by several orders of magnitude), including quantum qubit, computing means. The first successful attempts are made. It is also known that it became possible to decompose both the symmetric and asymmetric key into factors to reduce to a binomial distribution.

In the optical range, the possibility of synthesizing a hidden one-, two- or more photon quantum key (SFCS), which is a synthesis of linked (coupled, entangled) states called high-dimensional, has been revealed.

Frequent change of CCM based on the use of random numbers eliminates the possibility of betrayal in the transmission of information. Unauthorized submission of a CCM that operates for the minimum necessary time (for example, of the order of 1 second) and which is created automatically using a random number generator (RNG), leads to the senselessness of such a provision. The provision of the principle of operation of the RNG is impossible, since it is known, but gives unpredictable results.

Currently, the impossibility of an undetected eavesdropping attempt on a single-quantum fiber optic line has been proven. It is impossible to intercept a narrowly directed terahertz laser signal, since Rayleigh scattering for this range is 8–9 orders of magnitude smaller than for the visible and infrared (IR) ranges, and there is no usual radiation pattern with side lobes for non-laser radio waves. As for the passage of this range through the atmosphere, there is a window in the 5THz region in the spectrum of water vapor, and dispersed particles with sizes of tens and hundreds of microns do not impede its passage. As for the American Echelon radio information interception system, it is not suitable for intercepting both narrowly focused information in the optical range and, especially, in the terahertz range.

Thus, SPPKI allows you to create a fast, non-interceptible quantum key with a time of its transmission and a time of its application less than the time of its decryption.

From the foregoing, an important conclusion follows about the inappropriateness of filing an application for a patent for SPPKI closed, because it is more expedient to sell licenses for legal use, making profit from this. In addition, it is known that it was created in one country, it will be created in others. At the same time, state and commercial interests will be respected, i.e. operational cryptographic information of each subject is guaranteed, the reliability of electronic signatures, too. Hackers can relax. The claimed solution is characterized by the following features: a method of receiving and transmitting cryptographic information via global quantum key distribution (SCRC), which contains equipment for the synthesis of a single-photon or high-dimensional hidden photon quantum key (SPCC) at some point, for example, on the ground through the operation of introduction it to the SFKK optical fiber transmission line to the point of directed covert transmission of it and from this point to the low-orbit spacecraft (HA) via a directional atmospheric channel, for example, to with a terahertz range, with the next operation of transmitting a hidden quantum key (CCM) through a highly directional channel, for example, also with a terahertz range coherent beam or an optical laser beam to another (other) HA, and from it to the final (next) targeted covert transmission operation CCM on the atmospheric channel, for example, in the terahertz band to the ground (ground) part (s) for receiving information, characterized in that the SPKI allows you to create a fast, non-intercepting CCM with its lifetime knowledge, that is, the operation of transmission and the time of its use, less than the time of its decryption, while the encoded information itself can be transmitted via any open channel to any other points equipped with the appropriate equipment, to stationary or moving ground, underground, surface, underwater and flying objects needing a quick and constant change of the CCM; the frequent change of the CCM, based on the use of a random number generator (RNG), eliminates the possibility of betrayal in the operation of transmitting information, since the unauthorized provision of the CCM, which operates for the minimum necessary time, for example, of the order of 1 s or less, and which is created automatically using the RNG, leads to the pointlessness of such a provision; providing the principle of operation of the RNG is impossible, since it is known and gives unpredictable results.

Claims (1)

A method of receiving and transmitting cryptographic information through global quantum key distribution, which uses equipment for the synthesis of a single-photon or high-dimensional hidden photon quantum key at any point on Earth through the operation of introducing it into a fiber-optic transmission line of a hidden photon quantum key to a point of directed hidden transmission of it and from this point to the low-orbit spacecraft along the directional atmospheric channel with a coherent beam in the terahertz range, with another opera by transmitting a hidden quantum key through a high-directional channel also by a coherent beam of the terahertz range or by an optical laser beam to other low-orbit devices, then by means of a final targeted covert operation of transmitting a hidden photon quantum key through an atmospheric channel in the terahertz range to terrestrial parts for receiving information, characterized in that during all operations of transmitting cryptographic information, a hidden photon quantum key is created using a generator of words tea numbers, the duration of the hidden photon quantum key less time to decrypt it.