RU2459375C2 - Coding of planned message of upperlink in random access procedure - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: information technologies.

SUBSTANCE: method to apply a random access procedure in a wireless communication environment includes stages, where: a random access preamble is sent to a basic station, a response of random access is received from the basic station on the basis of the random access preamble, and a message is sent of planned transfer, which includes at least a part, which is not coded, to the basic station, as random access permitted by the response, using random access on a competitive basis.

EFFECT: prevention of failures in operation of a basic station, related to impossibility to decode a coded message.

72 cl, 14 dwg

Description

Links to related applications

This application claims the priority of provisional application US No. 60/945465 entitled “METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR ENCRYPTING UPLINK SCHEDULED MESSAGE IN RANDOM ACCESS PROCEDURE”, filed June 21, 2007, and provisional application US No. 60/955867 called “A METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR ENCRYPTING UPLINK SCHEDULED MESSAGE IN RANDOM ACCESS PROCEDURE ”filed August 14, 2007. The above applications are hereby incorporated by reference in their entirety.

Technical field

The following description relates, in general, to wireless communications and, in particular, to the management of encryption of uplink messages in a random access procedure in a wireless communication system.

State of the art

Wireless communication systems are widely used to provide various types of communication; for example, through such wireless communication systems, voice and / or data can be transmitted. A typical wireless communication system or network may provide multi-user access to one or more shared resources (eg, bandwidth, transmitted power, ...). For example, the system can use various multiple access methods, in particular, frequency division multiplexing (FDM), time division multiplexing (TDM), code division multiplexing (CDM), orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM), and others.

In general, a multiple access wireless communication system can simultaneously support communication for multiple access terminals. Each access terminal communicates with one or more base stations via transmissions on the forward and reverse links. A forward (or downward) communication line is a communication line from base stations to access terminals, and a reverse (or upward) communication line is a communication line from access terminals to base stations. This communication line can be established through a system with one input and one output, with many inputs and one output and with many inputs and multiple outputs (MIMO), etc.

. Каждый из N _S независимых каналов соответствует отдельному пространственному измерению. Кроме того, системы MIMO могут обеспечивать повышенную производительность (например, повышенную эффективность использования спектра, повышенную пропускную способность и/или повышенную надежность), в случае использования дополнительных пространственных измерений, созданных множественными передающими и приемными антеннами.MIMO systems typically employ multiple ( N _T ) transmit antennas and multiple ( N _R ) receive antennas for data transmission. A MIMO channel formed by N _T transmit and N _R receive antennas can be decomposed into N _S independent channels, which can be called spatial channels, where

. Each of the N _S independent channels corresponds to a separate spatial dimension. In addition, MIMO systems can provide increased performance (for example , increased spectrum efficiency, increased throughput, and / or increased reliability) when using additional spatial measurements created by multiple transmit and receive antennas.

MIMO systems can support a variety of duplex methods to separate forward and reverse link transmissions over a common physical medium. For example, frequency division duplex (FDD) systems may use different frequency ranges for forward and reverse link transmissions. In addition, in time division duplex (TDD) systems, forward and reverse links can be transmitted in the common frequency range, so the reversibility principle allows you to set the forward link channel from the reverse link channel.

Wireless communication systems often use one or more base stations that provide coverage. A typical base station may transmit multiple data streams for broadcast, multicast and / or unicast services, the data stream may be a data stream that may be of independent interest for reception at the access terminal. An access terminal in the coverage area of such a base station can be used to receive one, more than one or all of the data streams carried by the composite stream. Similarly, an access terminal may transmit data to a base station or other access terminal.

The access terminal may use the random access procedure to gain access to the system (for example, to obtain the allocation of the communication channel and / or related resources, ...). For example, the random access procedure can be used for initial access to the system, for transferring services from the source base station to the terminal base station, for time synchronization on the uplink for data transmission, etc. Typically, the access terminal transmits a random access preamble on the uplink when the access terminal needs to access the system. The base station may receive a random access preamble and transmit a random access response over the downlink. Based on the random access response, the access terminal may attempt to transmit the scheduled uplink transmission to the base station. However, in the case of competitive random access, the base station may not know the identity of the access terminal attempting to transmit the scheduled transmission. Therefore, traditional approaches often do not allow for the fact that the base station is not able to determine the identification of the source from where the planned transmission was sent, which can cause certain difficulties when such a planned transmission is encrypted.

Disclosure of invention

The following is a simplified summary of one or more embodiments to provide an understanding of the nature of such embodiments. This brief description is not an extensive overview of all conceivable embodiments, and is not intended to identify key or critical elements of all embodiments, nor to limit the scope of any or all embodiments. Its sole purpose is to present some concepts of one or more embodiments in a simplified form as a prelude to the more detailed description that follows.

According to one or more embodiments and corresponding disclosure thereof, various aspects are described in connection with facilitating the application of a random access procedure that uses encrypted and / or unencrypted data in a scheduled uplink message. The random access preamble can be transmitted from the access terminal to the base station, and the random access response can be transmitted from the base station to the access terminal. The scheduled transmission message can be transmitted from the access terminal to the base station based on the permission included in the random access response. When using random access on a competitive basis, the message of the planned transmission or part of it may not be encrypted. In addition, non-security-critical information can be transmitted unencrypted in a scheduled transmission message, while security-critical information can be encrypted for transmission (for example, included in the encrypted part of a scheduled transmission message and / or transmitted in a subsequent encrypted normal scheduled transmission message).

According to relevant aspects, a method is described herein that facilitates the application of a random access procedure in a wireless communication environment. The method may include transmitting a random access preamble to the base station. Furthermore, the method may comprise receiving a random access response from a base station based on a random access preamble. In addition, the method may include transmitting a scheduled transmission message that includes at least a portion that is not encrypted to the base station as a random access allowed response using competitive access random access .

Another aspect provides a wireless communications device. A wireless communication device may include a memory that stores instructions related to transmitting a random access preamble to a base station for at least one of the initial access, returning from an unsynchronized state, or transferring service from the source base station to the base station receiving a random access response from a base station based on a random access preamble, transmitting a scheduled transmission message that includes at least a portion of which the paradise is not encrypted to the base station provided by a random access response when using random access on a competitive basis and receiving a conflict resolution message from the base station in response to a scheduled transmission message. In addition, the wireless communication device may include a processor coupled to the memory and configured to execute instructions stored in the memory.

Another aspect provides a wireless communication device that allows the use of a random access procedure in a wireless communication environment. A wireless communication device may include means for transmitting a random access preamble, which includes a common random access signature, to a base station when using competitive random access. In addition, the wireless communication device may include means for receiving a random access response from the base station based on the random access preamble. In addition, the wireless communication device may include means for sending the scheduled transmission, including at least the unencrypted part, to the base station provided by a random access response when using random access on a competitive basis.

Another aspect provides a computer program product, which may contain computer-readable media. A computer-readable medium may include code for transmitting a random access preamble to a base station. In addition, the computer-readable medium may include code for receiving a random access response from a base station based on a random access preamble. In addition, the computer-readable medium may contain a code for sending a scheduled transmission, including at least the unencrypted part, to the base station as permitted by the random access response when using random access on a competitive basis.

According to another aspect, a device in a wireless communication system may include a processor, the processor may be able to transmit a random access preamble to the base station. The processor may also be able to receive a random access response from a base station based on a random access preamble. In addition, the processor may be able to send the scheduled transmission, including at least the unencrypted portion, to the base station as permitted by the random access response when using random access on a competitive basis.

According to other aspects, a method is provided that facilitates decrypting data obtained during a random access procedure in a wireless communication environment. The method may include receiving a random access preamble from the access terminal. Furthermore, the method may include transmitting a random access response to the access terminal based on the random access preamble. The method may also comprise the step of receiving a scheduled transmission message that includes at least a portion that is not encrypted from the access terminal when using random access on a competitive basis. In addition, the method may include recognizing the identity of the access terminal based on information included in the portion of the scheduled transmission message that is not encrypted when using random access on a competitive basis.

Another aspect provides a wireless communication device, which may include a memory that stores instructions related to receiving a random access preamble from an access terminal, transmitting a random access response to an access terminal based on a random access preamble, receiving a scheduled transmission message that includes at least the part that is not encrypted from the access terminal, when using random access on a competitive basis, recognition of identifier the access terminal based on the information included in the part of the scheduled transmission message that is not encrypted when using random access on a competitive basis, and determining the security context associated with the access terminal, based on the recognized identification of the access terminal. In addition, the wireless communication device may include a processor connected to the memory and configured to execute instructions stored in the memory.

Another aspect provides a wireless communication device that allows the application of random access in a wireless communication environment. The wireless communication device may include means for receiving a scheduled transmission message including at least an unencrypted portion from the access terminal when using competitive random access. The wireless communication device may further include means for recognizing the identification of the access terminal based on information included in the unencrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message. The wireless communication device may also include means for retrieving a security context associated with the access terminal based on the recognized identification of the access terminal. In addition, the wireless communication device may include means for decrypting the encrypted, normal scheduled transmission message or the encrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message, which includes the unencrypted portion received from the access terminal based on the extracted security context.

Another aspect provides a computer program product, which may contain computer-readable media. The computer-readable medium may include code for receiving a scheduled transmission message including at least an unencrypted portion from an access terminal using competitive random access. The computer-readable medium may also include code for recognizing the identification of the access terminal based on information included in the unencrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message. The computer-readable medium may further include code for retrieving the security context associated with the access terminal based on the recognized identification of the access terminal. In addition, the computer-readable medium may include code for decrypting an encrypted, normal scheduled transmission message, or an encrypted portion of a scheduled transmission message that includes an unencrypted portion received from an access terminal based on the extracted security context.

According to yet another aspect, an apparatus in a wireless communication system may include a processor, the processor may be able to receive a scheduled transmission message including at least an unencrypted portion from an access terminal using competitive random access; recognize the identity of the access terminal based on information included in the unencrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message; retrieve the security context associated with the access terminal based on the recognized identification of the access terminal; decrypt the encrypted, normal scheduled transmission message, or the encrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message, which includes the unencrypted portion received from the access terminal based on the extracted security context.

In order to achieve the foregoing and related ends, one or more embodiments comprise the features fully described below and specifically set forth in the claims. In the following description and accompanying drawings, some illustrative aspects of one or more embodiments are presented in detail. However, these aspects indicate only some possible ways of applying the principles of various embodiments, and the described embodiments are intended to include all such aspects and their equivalents.

Brief Description of the Drawings

Figure 1 is a diagram of a wireless communication system in accordance with various aspects presented here.

2 is a diagram of an illustrative system that controls the encryption of uplink messages in a random access procedure.

3 is an illustrative signaling diagram of a basic random access procedure in accordance with various aspects of the present invention.

4 is an illustrative uplink radio resource control (RRC) signaling signaling diagram by an unsynchronized access terminal in accordance with various aspects of the present invention.

5 is an illustrative signaling diagram illustrating a handover scenario in accordance with various aspects of the present invention.

6 is a diagram of an illustrative system that transmits encrypted and / or unencrypted messages as part of a random access procedure.

7 is an illustrative signaling diagram of a random access procedure that provides for the transmission of encrypted and unencrypted information in message 3 in accordance with various aspects of the present invention.

8 is a flowchart of an illustrative method that facilitates the application of a random access procedure in a wireless communication environment.

9 is a flowchart of an illustrative method that facilitates decrypting data obtained during a random access procedure in a wireless communication environment.

10 is a diagram of an illustrative access terminal that transmits encrypted and / or unencrypted uplink scheduled messages in a wireless communication system.

11 is a diagram of an illustrative system that evaluates unencrypted and / or encrypted scheduled messages received on the uplink during a random access procedure in a wireless communication environment.

12 is a diagram of an illustrative wireless network environment that can be used in conjunction with the various systems and methods described herein.

13 is a diagram of an illustrative system that allows the use of a random access procedure in a wireless communication environment.

Fig. 14 is a diagram of an illustrative system that enables the application of random access in a wireless communication environment.

The implementation of the invention

Various embodiments of the invention are described below with reference to the drawings, in which like reference numerals are used to refer to like elements. In the following description, for purposes of explanation, numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of one or more embodiments. However, it is obvious that such implementation option (s) may be practiced without these specific details. In other instances, well-known structures and devices are shown in block diagram form in order to provide a description of one or more embodiments.

The terms “component”, “module”, “system”, etc., used in this application. refer to a computer facility, hardware, firmware, a combination of hardware and software, software, or running software. For example, a component may be, but is not limited to, a process running on a processor, a processor, an object, an executable module, a thread of execution, a program, and / or a computer. By way of illustration, the component can be either an application running on a computing device or a computing device. One or more components may be located in the process and / or thread of execution, and the component may be located on one computer and / or distributed between two or more computers. In addition, these components can be executed from various computer-readable media on which various data structures are stored. Components can communicate through local and / or remote processes, for example, according to a signal having one or more data packets (for example, data from one component interacting with another component in a local system, distributed system and / or over a network, such as the Internet, with other systems via signal).

The methods described here can be used for various wireless communication systems, for example, code division multiple access (CDMA), time division multiple access (TDMA), frequency division multiple access (FDMA), orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA), single-carrier frequency division multiple access (SC-FDMA) and other systems. The terms “system” and “network” are often used interchangeably. A CDMA system may implement a radio technology such as UTRA (Universal Terrestrial Radio Access), CDMA2000, etc. UTRA includes Broadband CDMA (W-CDMA) and other CDMA options. CDMA2000 covers IS-2000, IS-95, and IS-856 standards. A TDMA system may implement a radio technology such as GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications). An OFDMA system may implement a radio technology, for example, E-UTRA (Advanced UTRA), UMB (Ultra Mobile Broadband System), IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi), IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX), IEEE 802.20, Flash-OFDM, etc. UTRA and E-UTRA form part of UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System). 3GPP LTE is the upcoming release of UMTS that uses E-UTRA, which uses OFDMA in the downlink and SC-FDMA in the uplink.

Single Carrier Frequency Division Multiple Access (SC-FDMA) utilizes single carrier modulation and frequency equalization. SC-FDMA has similar performance and essentially the same overall complexity as an OFDMA system. The SC-FDMA signal has a lower peak to average power ratio (PAPR) due to its single carrier structure. SC-FDMA can be used, for example, on the uplink, where a lower PAPR is favorable for access terminals in terms of transmit power savings. Accordingly, SC-FDMA can be implemented as an uplink multiple access scheme in 3GPP LTE or developed UTRA.

In addition, various embodiments of the invention are described herein with respect to access terminals. An access terminal may also be called a system, subscriber module, subscriber station, mobile station, mobile phone, remote station, remote terminal, mobile device, user terminal, terminal, wireless device, user agent, user device, or user equipment (UE). The access terminal may be a cell phone, a cordless telephone, a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) telephone, a wireless local access station (WLL), a personal digital assistant (PDA), a handheld device with wireless capability, a computing device or other processing device connected to the wireless modem. In addition, various embodiments are described herein with respect to a base station. A base station can be used to communicate with access terminal (s) and can also be referred to as an access point, node B, developed node B (eNodeB), or some other terminology.

In addition, the various aspects or features described herein can be implemented as a manufacturing method, device, or product using standard programming and / or design methods. As used herein, the term “article of manufacture” is intended to encompass a computer program accessible from any computer-readable device, carrier, or medium. For example, a computer-readable medium may include, but is not limited to, a magnetic storage device (e.g., hard disk, floppy disk, magnetic strips, etc.), an optical disk (e.g., compact disc (CD), digital versatile disk (DVD), etc.), smart cards and flash memory devices (for example, EEPROM, card, ruler, flash key, etc.). Additionally, the various storage media described herein may represent one or more devices and / or other computer-readable media for storing information. The term “computer-readable medium” may include, without limitation, wireless channels and various other media capable of storing, containing and / or transferring instructions and / or data.

1 shows a wireless communication system 100 in accordance with various embodiments presented herein. System 100 comprises a base station 102, which may include multiple groups of antennas. For example, one antenna group may include antennas 104 and 106, another group may comprise antennas 108 and 110, and an additional group may include antennas 112 and 114. Two antennas are shown for each antenna group; however, more or fewer antennas can be used for each group. Base station 102 may further include a transmitter circuit and a receiver circuit, each of which may comprise a plurality of components associated with transmitting and receiving a signal (e.g. , processors, modulators, multiplexers, demodulators, demultiplexers, antennas, etc.), which is obvious to a person skilled in the art.

Base station 102 may communicate with one or more access terminals, for example, access terminal 116 and access terminal 122; however, it is obvious that base station 102 can communicate with essentially any number of access terminals similar to access terminals 116 and 122. Access terminals 116 and 122 can be, for example, cell phones, smartphones, laptop computers, handheld communication devices, handheld computing devices, satellite radio stations, navigation devices, PDAs and / or any other devices capable of communicating in the wireless communication system 100. As shown, access terminal 116 communicates with antennas 112 and 114, where antennas 112 and 114 transmit information to access terminal 116 on the forward link 118 and receive information from access terminal 116 on the reverse link 120. In addition, access terminal 122 provides communication with antennas 104 and 106, where antennas 104 and 106 transmit information to access terminal 122 on a forward link 124 and receive information from access terminal 122 on reverse link 126. In a frequency division duplex (FDD) system, for example, direct communication line 118 may use a different frequency band than the reverse link 120, and the forward link 124 may use a different frequency band than the reverse link 126. In addition, in a time division duplex (TDD) system, the forward link 118 and the return link communications 120 may use a common frequency band, and forward link 124 and reverse link 126 may use a common frequency band.

Each group of antennas and / or the area in which they communicate can be referred to as a sector of the base station 102. For example, groups of antennas can be designed to communicate with access terminals in the coverage area of the base station 102. When communicating on forward links 118 and 124, the transmit antennas of base station 102 may use beamforming to increase the signal-to-noise ratio of the forward links 118 and 124 for access terminals 116 and 122. In addition, in the case where the base station 102 uses beamforming to transmit to access terminals 116 and 122 randomly distributed over its coverage area, the access terminals in neighboring cells may experience less interference than when the base station transmits through one antenna to all access terminals.

The random access procedure can be used in the system 100. For example, the random access terminals 116 and 122 can use the random access procedure for initial access, handover to and / or from base station 102, time synchronization (for example, returning from unsynchronized mode, ...) and etc. A random access procedure typically involves transmitting a random access preamble (e.g., message 1, ...) by an access terminal (e.g., access terminal 116, access terminal 122, ...) to an uplink base station 102, transmitting a random access response (e.g. messages 2, ...) from the base station 102 to the downlink access terminal based on the received random access preamble, and sending the scheduled transmission (for example, messages 3, ...) from the access terminal to the base station 102 by oskhodyaschey link, wherein such given scheduled transmission message of the random access response. Used the term “message 3” means a scheduled transmission sent by the access terminal to the base station 102, as allowed by the random access response message from the base station 102.

In addition, there are two types of random access procedures that can be used in system 100: random access on a competitive basis and random access on a non-competitive basis. According to the illustration, with random access on a competitive basis, two or more access terminals 116, 122 can transmit random access preambles to the base station 102, essentially simultaneously, through a shared resource (eg, channel), competing for access to the system. However, the base station 102 is usually not able to identify access terminals 116, 122 that transmit these random access preambles (for example, a common random access signature may be transmitted as at least part of the random access preamble from more than one access terminal 116, 122). Base station 102 may transmit a random access response on a downlink based on a received random access preamble, and receive a scheduled transmission from the access terminal in response to a grant included in the random access response; and again, the base station 102 may not be able to identify the access terminal sending the scheduled transmission (eg, message 3, ...) if the identifier associated with the access terminal is not provided in such a scheduled transmission. In addition, with random access on a non-competitive basis, a random access signature associated with the access terminal may be provided, determined, etc. the access terminal before transmitting the random access preamble, and the access terminal can transmit this random access signature associated with the access terminal (for example, as at least part of the random access preamble, message 1 in the random access procedure, ...) to the base station 102 Thus, by accepting the random access signature associated with the access terminal for random access on a non-competitive basis, the base station 102 can identify the access terminal transmitting the arbitrary signature Foot access. In addition, the base station 102 may use this identification information to identify the source of the received scheduled transmission (eg, message 3, ...), which is a response to the random access response transmitted by the base station 102.

According to the illustration, when using random access on a competitive basis, the scheduled transmission (for example, message 3, ...) may be unencrypted. According to another example, when using random access on a competitive basis, at least part of the scheduled transmission message (for example, message 3, ...) may be unencrypted. The transmission of unencrypted message 3 or a part of such message 3 in unencrypted form may be due to the fact that the network (for example, base station 102, ...) is not able to determine which access terminal transmitted message 3 after receiving. On the contrary, the contents of message 3 can be evaluated to recognize the corresponding source of such a message. This evaluation is performed on unencrypted data (for example, unencrypted message 3 or its unencrypted part), because the base station 102 is not able to decrypt the encrypted message without knowing the identity of the access terminal that transmitted the encrypted message. With random access on a non-competitive basis, this restriction does not exist. Accordingly, when using random access on a competitive basis, the access terminal can transmit information not critical to security (for example, the identifier of the access terminal, message discriminator, ...) in an unencrypted message of the planned transmission (for example, in message 3, ...) and / or the unencrypted part of the scheduled transmission message (for example, in message 3, ...). In addition, the access terminal can transmit security-critical information in another, encrypted message and / or in the encrypted part of the scheduled transmission message (for example, in message 3, ...).

2, a system 200 is shown that controls the encryption of uplink messages in a random access procedure. System 200 includes an access terminal 202 and a base station 204; however, it will be appreciated that system 200 may include any number of access terminals similar to access terminal 202 and / or any number of base stations similar to base station 204. Access terminal 202 and base station 204 may transmit and / or receive information, signals , data, instructions, commands, bits, characters, etc.

Access terminal 202 may further include a random access request module 206, an unencrypted message generator 208, and an encrypted message generator 210. In addition, base station 204 may include a random access permission module 212, a message source identification module 214, and a security context determination module 216. The random access request module 206 transmits the random access preamble to the base station 204. In the case of competitive random access, the random access request module 206 can transmit a common random access signature as at least part of the random access preamble. Furthermore, in the case of random access on a non-competitive basis, the random access request module 206 may transmit a specific random access signature from a plurality of random access signatures as at least part of the random access preamble. For example, a particular random access signature may be assigned to the access terminal 202, while at least one other random access signature from the plurality may be assigned to at least one other access terminal (not shown). According to another illustration, it can be seen that the random access request module 206 can determine which particular signature from the random access set to use when operating in random access mode on a non-competitive basis. A particular random access signature may be a particular signature that includes a bit pattern unique to access terminal 202 (for example, other access terminals (not shown) will not use this particular signature, ...).

As another illustration, the random access request module 206 (and / or, in general, the access terminal 202) can determine whether the random access system 200 is used on a competitive basis or random access is used on a non-competitive basis. For example, the random access request module 206 may identify the type of random access procedure used based on whether the random access procedure is used for initial access, return from unsynchronized mode, handoff, etc. (for example, the type of random access procedure can be predefined based on the use of such a procedure, ...). However, the claimed invention is not limited to the foregoing.

The random access request module 206 may transmit the uplink random access preamble whenever access terminal 202 needs access to the system (for example, if access terminal 202 has data to transmit, if access terminal 202 is paged by the system, if access terminal 202 receives a command handoffs for transition from a source base station to an end base station, ...). The random access preamble may also be called an access request, an access signature, an access probe, a random access probe, a signature sequence, a random access channel signature sequence (RACH), etc. The random access preamble may include various types of information, and it can be transmitted in different ways.

In addition, the base station 204 may receive a random access preamble, and the random access permission module 212 may in response send a random access response to the access terminal 202. A random access response may also be called an access grant (AGCH), an access response, etc. A random access response can carry various types of information, and it can be transmitted in different ways. For example, a random access response may include control channel resources, uplink resources, control information, etc. for access terminal 202. By way of illustration, control channel resources may include channel quality indicator (CQI) resources used for uplink CQI transmission by access terminal 202, power control resources used for transmitting downlink power control corrections to access terminal 202, etc. In addition, the control information may include timing information used to adjust the timing of the gears of the access terminal 202, power control adjustments used to adjust the transmitted power of the access terminal 202, and the like.

Access terminal 202 may receive a random access response transmitted by random access permission module 212 of base station 204. The random access response may provide uplink resources for use by access terminal 202. In addition, access terminal 202 (e.g., unencrypted message generator 208, encrypted message generator 208, resolution estimator (not shown) included in access terminal 202, ...) can recognize uplink resources provided to access terminal 202 in a random access response. Then, the unencrypted message generator 208 and / or the encrypted message generator 210 can provide uplink messages or portions of the uplink messages that can be transmitted from the access terminal 202 to the base station 204. For example, the provided uplink resources can be used to send message 3 issued by an unencrypted message generator 208 and / or an encrypted message generator 210.

According to an example, when using random access on a competitive basis, the unencrypted message generator 208 can issue an unencrypted message 3 for transmission to the base station 204. An unencrypted message 3 can be transmitted to the base station 204 instead of the encrypted message, since the network (for example, the base station 204, ... ) may not have information about the sender of message 3 (for example, the message source identification module 214 may not be able to determine the identification of the access terminal 202 from the preamble random access transmitted on the uplink by the random access request module 206 of the access terminal 202 when using random access on a competitive basis, ...). If the sender of message 3 is not known to the base station 204, and message 3 is assumed to be encrypted, then the base station 204 will not know what security configuration to use to decrypt such an encrypted message (for example, base station 204 will not be able to decrypt the encrypted message 3 using random access on a competitive basis ...). Thus, the access terminal 202 cannot apply encryption to the uplink message 3 transmitted in a random access mode on a competitive basis, even if the RRC protection mode is active. Instead, access terminal 202 may transmit message 3 in unencrypted form due to the above limitations in various scenarios, including, but not limited to, when transmitting a handover complete message in a target cell, when transmitting a handover failure message in a source cell, when time synchronization on the uplink for data transmission, etc.

According to this example, the unencrypted message generator 208 may produce an unencrypted message (e.g., unencrypted message 3, ...) that includes information, parameters, etc. that do not need to be encrypted. For example, an unencrypted message constructed by an unencrypted message generator 208 may include a temporary identifier, for example, C-RNTI (temporary identifier of a radio network cell) corresponding to an access terminal 202; however, it is obvious that any other type of identifier can be used in place of or in addition to C-RNTI. In addition, the unencrypted message generator 208 may determine other information, parameters, etc. (for example, information not critical to security, ...) that can be transmitted as part of an unencrypted uplink message (for example, unencrypted message 3, ...). In addition, information critical to security may be included in the encrypted message (s) issued by the encrypted message generator 210 and transmitted after random access according to this example. Additionally, access terminal 202 may transmit message 3 using the transparent radio link control (RLC-TM) mode.

By transmitting the unencrypted message 3 provided by the unencrypted message generator 208 according to the above example, the message source identification module 214 can evaluate the unencrypted message 3 to determine that the access terminal 202 has transmitted such unencrypted message 3. The message source identification module 214 can similarly analyze at least , one other unencrypted message 3 transmitted from at least one other access terminal (not shown) to identify corresponding (e) source (s). For example, an unencrypted message 3 issued by an unencrypted message generator 208 and transmitted by an access terminal 202 may include a temporary identifier (eg, C-RNTI, ...) associated with the access terminal 202. In addition, the message source identification module 214 may analyze this temporary identifier to recognize that such an identifier corresponds to the access terminal 202.

After the message source identification module 214 identifies the source of the unencrypted message, the security context determination module 216 can recognize the security context associated with the identified source. For example, when the message source identification module 214 determines the access terminal 202 as the source of the unencrypted message 3, the security context determination module 216 can identify, retrieve, generate, etc. security context corresponding to access terminal 202. By way of illustration, the base station 204 may be pre-associated with the access terminal 202 with this security context when the access terminal 202 was in a connection mode at an earlier time, and this given security context may be stored in a memory associated with the base station 204, for later extraction during the random access procedure. Alternatively, in the handover scenario, the security context associated with the access terminal 202 can be obtained from another base station (not shown) when the access terminal 202 receives a handover command from another base station to initiate a handover to the base station 204. The recognized context security can then be used to decrypt the encoded message (s) generated by the encrypted message generator 210 and transmitted by the access terminal 202.

In addition, the message source identification module 214 and / or the base station 204 can generally transmit a conflict resolution message (e.g., message 4, ...) to the access terminal 202 after determining the source identification of the unencrypted message 3. Then, the encrypted message generator 210 may issue a normal scheduled encrypted transmission that can be transmitted on the uplink. In addition, it can be seen that the encrypted message generator 210 can use an encryption technique of essentially any type. In addition, the security context corresponding to the access terminal 202 recognized by the security context determination module 216 may be used by the base station 204 to decrypt the encrypted messages issued by the encrypted message generator 210 and transmitted on the uplink.

As another illustration, when using random access on a non-competitive basis, the message source identification module 214 can identify the access terminal 202 as the source of the random access preamble transmitted by the random access request module 206 of the access terminal 202. For example, message source identification module 214 may recognize a given random access signature associated with an access terminal included in a random access preamble as being associated with an access terminal 202. Thus, the access terminal 202 can transmit the encrypted message 3 issued by the encrypted message generator 210 on the uplink to the base station 204, because the security context determination module 216 of the base station 204 can identify the security context associated with the access terminal 202 to be used for decryption based on the random access preamble (and not based on, for example, message 3, as in the case of random access on a competitive basis). According to an aspect, the access terminal 202 may transmit an encrypted RRC message issued by the encrypted message generator 210 when possible (for example, with random access on a non-competitive basis, message 3 is encrypted if the security mode is active, ...). Unlike competitive random access, access terminal 202 does not have a specific limitation on what it can transmit in message 3 according to a random access scenario on a non-competitive basis. Thus, the access terminal 202 may apply different restrictions (for example, perform different actions, ...) depending on the type of random access procedure used. However, the claimed invention is not limited to the above examples.

FIG. 3 shows an illustrative signaling diagram 300 of a basic random access procedure. A random access procedure may be performed between an access terminal (eg, access terminal 202 in FIG. 2, ...) and a base station (eg, base station 204 in FIG. 2, ...). At step 302, the access terminal transmits a random access preamble to the base station. The random access preamble may be called message 1. At step 304, the base station transmits a random access response to the access terminal. The random access response may be called message 2. At step 306, the access terminal transmits the scheduled transmission to the base station in accordance with the provision provided in the random access response. The scheduled transmission may be called message 3. In addition, the scheduled transmission can be transmitted using RLC-TM. At step 308, the base station transmits a conflict resolution message to the access terminal. The conflict resolution message may be called message 4. In addition, the conflict resolution message may indicate the end of the random access procedure.

FIG. 4 illustrates an example signaling circuit 400 for transmitting uplink Radio Resource Control (RRC) messages by an unsynchronized access terminal. The signaling circuit 400 demonstrates the use of competitive random access to return the access terminal from unsynchronized mode. At step 402, the access terminal transmits a random access preamble to the serving base station. For example, a common random access signature may be included as at least a portion of the random access preamble, and thus the serving base station may not be able to determine the source of the random access preamble. At 404, the serving base station may transmit a random access response to the access terminal. The random access response may be a response to the random access preamble and / or may provide uplink provision to the access terminal.

At 406, the access terminal may use uplink provisioning to send message 3, which is not encrypted, to the serving base station. By way of example, message 3 may include an identifier corresponding to an access terminal. In addition, message 3 may indicate to the serving base station that the procedure relates to uplink data, message transmission, etc. (for example, message 3 may include a message discriminator, ...). At 408, in response to message 3, the serving base station may transmit a conflict resolution message to the access terminal. For example, a conflict resolution message may include another uplink grant for an access terminal. In addition, the conflict resolution message may indicate to the access terminal that the return to synchronized mode is completed and / or that the access terminal may use encryption for subsequent uplink transmissions (for example, a conflict resolution message may indicate the end of a random access procedure, ...). At step 410, the access terminal transmits a normal scheduled transmission message, which is encrypted, to the serving base station. For example, the access terminal may use the uplink provisioning included in the conflict resolution message to transmit this encrypted message. Unlike an unencrypted message 3, which may include an identifier associated with the access terminal and / or an indicator of the type of data to be transmitted by the access terminal, the encrypted normal message of the scheduled transmission may be an actual RRC message (e.g., a measurement report including information critical to safety, ...). In addition, subsequent scheduled uplink transmissions from the access terminal to the serving base station, when the access terminal remains in synchronized mode, can be encrypted in a similar manner.

5 is an illustrative signaling diagram 500 illustrating a handover scenario. The handover can be performed so that the access terminal moves from the service area of the source base station to the service area of the end base station. The handover may include changing the security configuration, and therefore the access terminal may need to transmit security-critical information to the end base station.

At 502, the source base station may transmit a handover command to the access terminal. A handover command may initiate a handover of an access terminal to an end base station. Furthermore, although not shown, it can be seen that the source base station can communicate with the terminal base station before the access terminal starts the random access procedure. For example, the source base station may use this interaction to transmit the security context associated with the access terminal to the destination base station.

At step 504, the access terminal transmits a random access preamble to the end base station in response to receiving a handover command from the source base station. Since competitive access can be applied, the end base station may not be able to determine the source identification of the random access preamble. At 506, a random access response can be transmitted from the end base station to the access terminal. At step 508, the access terminal transmits an unencrypted message 3 to the end base station in response to a received random access response. The access terminal can use unencrypted message 3 to transmit information that is not critical to security (for example, information that is not critical to complete the handover, an identifier associated with the access terminal, for example, C-RNTI, message discriminator, ...). At step 510, the end base station transmits a conflict resolution message to the access terminal. At 512, the access terminal sends a normal scheduled transmission, which is encrypted, to the end base station. For example, this encrypted, normal scheduled transmission may include information critical to security (for example, information critical to complete a handover, ...).

As follows from the examples shown in figures 4 and 5, with random access on a competitive basis, message 3 may be unencrypted. In addition, the access terminal may transmit non-critical information in message 3, which is not encrypted. In addition, the access terminal may use another message (for example, normal scheduled transmission at 410 or 512, ...) to transmit information that needs to be encrypted after a random access procedure on a competitive basis. In addition, with random access on a non-competitive basis, message 3 can be encrypted if security mode is active. Accordingly, the access terminal may perform different actions depending on the type of random access procedure (for example, to encrypt or decrypt message 3 depending on the type of random access procedure, to include or exclude the identifier in / from message / I 3 depending on the type of random access procedure, control information included in message 3 based on the type of random access procedure, security critical delay information to be included in the encrypted message based on type of random access procedure, ...). Although the above examples describe message 3 as being completely or almost completely unencrypted for random access on a competitive basis, it can be seen that part of message 3 can be unencrypted, while the remainder of message 3 can be encrypted, as described in the examples below.

6, a system 600 is shown that transmits encrypted and / or unencrypted messages as part of a random access procedure. System 600 includes an access terminal 202 and a base station 204, wherein the access terminal 202 may include a random access request module 206, an unencrypted message generator 208, and an encrypted message generator 210, and a base station 204 may include a random access permission module 212 , a message source identification module 214 and a security context determination module 216. Although not shown, it is apparent that system 600 may include any number of additional access terminals similar to access terminal 202 and / or any number of additional base stations similar to base station 204.

According to an example, access terminal 202 may transmit message 3 to base station 204 as part of a random access procedure described herein. When using competitive random access, message 3 transmitted by the access terminal 202 may include an unencrypted portion (e.g., issued by an unencrypted message generator 208) and an encrypted portion (e.g., issued by an encrypted message generator 210). Access terminal 202 may include a message concatenation module 602 that can combine the unencrypted portion provided by the unencrypted message generator 208 and the encrypted portion provided by the encrypted message generator 210 to receive message 3. In addition, the unencrypted portion of message 3 generated by the generator 208 unencrypted messages may include an identifier corresponding to the access terminal 202, which can be used by the message source identification module 214 for p recognizing the access terminal 202 as the source of the message 3. Then, the security context determination module 216 can recognize the security context associated with the access terminal 202 based on a specific identification, and the security context can be used to decrypt the encrypted part of message 3 (as well as the subsequent encrypted part thereof) (s) of the message (s)) issued by the encrypted message generator 210 and transmitted by the access terminal 202 to the base station 204 on the uplink.

In addition, in message 3, you can use the mode without confirmation of the control of the radio link (RLC-UM) and / or the mode with confirmation of control of the radio link (RLC-AM). RLC-UM does not provide feedback from the receiver side, while RLC-AM uses acknowledgment from the receiver side (for example, if acknowledgment is not received on the transmitter side, then the transmitter can resend the packet (s), ...). In addition, RLC-AM supports segmentation, as described below. Note that, with the exception of the first RRC message, when transitioning from the LTE_IDLE state to the LTE_ACTIVE state, the access terminal 202 can use RLC-UM and RLC-AM in message 3. Accordingly, the access terminal 202 can use the opaque RLC mode to transmit non-critical information for security that is not encrypted. Additionally, message concatenation module 602 may concatenate encrypted information in message 3.

The behavior of the network may be complicated if the access terminal 202 uses RLC-AM before the message source identification module 214 identifies the access terminal 202 as the sender of message 3, because the RLC-AM has a context for the access terminal 202. Thus, for this reason, the access terminal 202 may use an RLC-UM with a special length indicator for the first RRC message, since the RLC-UM provides information on the size of the RLC protocol data unit (PDU). In addition, it can be seen that RLC-TM can be used if media access control (MAC) provides size information for the RLC-TM PDUs. In addition, the subsequent normal RRC message may use RLC-AM.

Encrypted message generator 210 may further include segmentation module 604. Since message size 3 may be limited, an encrypted message (eg, an RRC message, ...) issued by an encrypted message generator 210 may not be included in the encrypted portion of message 3. Thus, segmentation module 604 can segment this encrypted message (eg, RRC message , ...) into separate parts, which allows the access terminal 202 to transfer part of the encrypted message in the encrypted part of message 3 and the rest of the encrypted message in normal scheduled transmission.

Base station 204 may further include a buffer 606. Buffer 606 can be used to store the encrypted portion of message 3 and beyond, until the first unencrypted portion of message 3 is processed at the RRC level in the network. Thus, the PDCP layer (packet data convergence protocol) in the network can be a stand-by protocol, at least for message 3. Thus, message 3 can be transmitted using RLC-TM in accordance with the rules defining which the access terminal 202 can transmit, and without special RRC message processing for subsequent RRC messages. This can lead to a decrease in latency in terms of management, (C-plan).

In addition, in the case of random access on a non-competitive basis, the random access request module 206 may transmit a random access preamble that allows the message source identification module 214 (eg, network, ...) to identify the access terminal 202. This allows the access terminal 202 to encrypt the entire message 3 and enables the network to use the correct security configuration for message 3. In addition, unlike competitive random access, the access terminal 202 does not have a specific restriction as to what it can transmit in post 3 in this scenario.

According to an example, the access terminal 202 may behave differently depending on the type of random access procedure (eg, on a competitive or non-competitive basis); however, the claimed invention is not limited to this. For example, when not all message 3 is encrypted for random access on a competitive basis, as described with reference to FIGS. 2, 4 and 5, the transmission of security-critical information in message 3 with random access on a non-competitive basis can reduce the latency of the C-plan Compared to competitive random access. In such a scenario, the ability of the access terminal 202 to behave differently depending on the type of random access procedure can reduce latency in the case of random access on a non-competitive basis. According to an example, where message 3 includes an unencrypted part and an encrypted part, as described in FIG. 6, it is possible to use or not use different styles of behavior for random access on a competitive basis and random access on a non-competitive basis.

7 shows an illustrative signaling scheme 700 of a random access procedure that provides for the transmission of encrypted and unencrypted information in message 3. The signaling scheme 700 depicts the use of random access at the access terminal to return to synchronized mode from unsynchronized mode. However, it is obvious that a signaling similar to that described below can be used with respect to handover from the source base station to the terminal base station (for example, the signaling shown in diagram 700 can be made between the terminal base station and the access terminal after the access terminal will receive a handover command from the source base station, as shown in FIG. 5, ...).

At 702, a random access preamble may be transmitted from the access terminal to a serving base station. At 704, the serving base station may transmit a random access response to the access terminal. At step 706, message 3 can be transmitted from the access terminal to the serving base station. Message 3 may include an unencrypted part and an encrypted part. The unencrypted part may include an identifier (eg, C-RNTI, ...) associated with the access terminal, a message discriminator, a special length indicator for the unencrypted part of message 3, etc. For example, the unencrypted portion may be transmitted using RLC-UM. According to another illustration, the unencrypted portion can be transmitted using RLC-TM. As another example, for the unencrypted part of message 3, you can use MAC PDUs. In addition, an RRC message that includes security-critical information, such as a measurement report (or part thereof), can be transmitted in the encrypted part of message 3. The encrypted part can be transmitted using RLC-AM, which supports segmentation. For example, this measurement report can be segmented so that the first part of the measurement report can be concatenated with the unencrypted part and transmitted as message 3, and the remaining part of the measurement report can be transmitted in the subsequent transmission (s) of the uplink. At 708, the serving base station may transmit a conflict resolution message to the access terminal. At block 710, the access terminal may transmit a normal scheduled transmission, which is encrypted, to a serving base station. This normal scheduled transmission may include the remainder of the measurement report. In addition, normal scheduled transmission can be transmitted using RLC-AM.

According to an example, the signaling shown in scheme 700 can be used for random access on a competitive basis and random access on a non-competitive basis (for example, message 3 may include an unencrypted part and an encrypted part for random access on a competitive basis and random access on a non-competitive basis , ...). According to another illustration, for random access on a competitive basis, a signaling scheme 700 may be used, and for random access on a non-competitive basis, another signaling may be used. According to this illustration, for random access on a non-competitive basis, message 3 can be encrypted completely or almost completely and / or can be transmitted using RLC-AM instead of encrypting and / or using RLC-AM for only part of message 3.

On Fig-9 shows how to use encrypted and unencrypted messages for random access procedures in a wireless communication environment. Although, for simplicity of explanation, the method is presented in the form of a sequence of actions, it is obvious and understandable that the method is not limited to the order of actions, since some actions can, according to one or more embodiments, occur in other orders and / or simultaneously with the others shown and described here actions. For example, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that the method can alternatively be represented as several interrelated states or events, for example, in a state diagram. In addition, not all illustrated acts may be required to implement a method according to one or more embodiments.

FIG. 8 shows a methodology 800 that facilitates the application of a random access procedure in a wireless communication environment. At 802, a random access preamble may be transmitted to the base station. For example, a random access preamble may include a random access signature that is commonly used by access terminals in a wireless communication environment (for example, a common random access signature can be used for competitive random access, ...). According to another illustration, the random access preamble may include a random access signature associated with an access terminal (eg, used for random access on a non-competitive basis, ...). The random access preamble can be transmitted to the base station to initiate, for example, initial access or return from an unsynchronized state. As a further example, a random access preamble may be transmitted to a base station (eg, an end base station) in response to receiving a handover command from another, the original base station.

At 804, a random access response may be received from the base station based on the random access preamble. The random access response may provide for a subsequent scheduled uplink transmission.

At 806, a scheduled transmission message that includes at least a portion that is not encrypted can be transmitted to the base station as a random access allowed response using competitive access random access. As illustrated, the unencrypted portion may include a temporary identifier (eg, C-RNTI) of an access terminal that sends a scheduled transmission. The temporary identifier may allow the base station to recognize the identity of the access terminal, determine the security context associated with the access terminal, and use this security context to decrypt the subsequent uplink transmission (s) from the access terminal. In addition, the unencrypted part may include information not critical to security (for example, a message discriminator). In addition, a conflict resolution message may be received from the base station in response to a scheduled transmission message.

According to an example, a scheduled transmission message, in full or almost completely, may be unencrypted using competitive access random access. In addition, this scheduled transmission message can be transmitted using RLC-TM; however, the claimed invention is not limited to this. In addition, the subsequent normal scheduled transmission message, which is encrypted, can be transmitted to the base station after receiving a conflict resolution message from the base station. This subsequent normal scheduled transmission message may include security-critical information (e.g., critical data associated with an RRC measurement report, handover completion, handover failure, etc.). Furthermore, when using random access on a non-competitive basis, in this example, the scheduled transmission message may be encrypted. Thus, the type of random access procedure used can be identified, and whether the scheduled transmission message sent in response to the grant included in the random access response is encrypted or unencrypted may depend on the identified type of random access procedure.

In another example, a scheduled transmission message may include an unencrypted part and an encrypted part when using random access on a competitive basis. Thus, the unencrypted part and the encrypted part can be concatenated in a scheduled transmission message. For example, the non-encrypted part can be transmitted using RLC-UM or RLC-TM, and the encrypted part can be transmitted using RLC-AM. In addition, the unencrypted portion may include non-security critical information, and the encrypted portion may include security critical information (e.g., critical data associated with an RRC measurement report, completion of a handover, transmission failure, etc.) .d.). Non-critical safety information, for example, may include a specific length indicator with RLC-UM. According to another illustration, instead of an RLC-UM, a medium access control (MAC) protocol data unit (PDU) can be used. In addition, the security-critical information included in the encrypted part can be segmented so that the first part is included in the encrypted part of the scheduled transmission message and the remaining part is included in at least one subsequent normal scheduled transmission message that is encrypted and transmitted to the base station after receiving a conflict resolution message. In addition, according to this example, it can be seen that a similar use of the unencrypted part and the encrypted part for the scheduled transmission message sent in response to the provision included in the random access response can be applied when using random access on a non-competitive basis (for example, similar terminal behavior competitive access for random access and non-competitive random access). Additionally or alternatively, random access on a non-competitive basis may provide for different behavior for such a scheduled transmission message, and therefore, the scheduled transmission message is completely or almost completely (for example, message 3) is encrypted.

FIG. 9 shows a method 900 that facilitates decrypting data obtained during a random access procedure in a wireless communication environment. At 902, a random access preamble may be received from the access terminal. The random access preamble may include a common random access signature (for example, for random access on a competitive basis), and thus, recognition of the identification of the access terminal may not be possible. In addition, for random access on a non-competitive basis, the random access preamble may include a random access signature that is unique to the access terminal from which the random access preamble was received. At 904, a random access response may be transmitted to the access terminal based on the random access preamble. At 906, a scheduled transmission can be received, which includes at least a portion that is not encrypted, from the access terminal when using random access on a competitive basis. For example, the unencrypted portion may include an access terminal identifier (e.g., C-RNTI). In another illustration, for random access on a non-competitive basis, a scheduled transmission can be encrypted; however, the claimed invention is not limited to this (for example, a similar behavior of the access terminal can be used for random access on a competitive basis and random access on a non-competitive basis). In addition, a conflict resolution message may be transmitted to the access terminal in response to a received scheduled transmission. At 908, an identification of an access terminal can be recognized based on information included in a portion of a scheduled transmission that is not encrypted when using random access on a competitive basis. In addition, the security context of the access terminal can be determined based on the recognized identification of the access terminal. In addition, this security context can be used to decrypt subsequent encrypted information received from the access terminal. For example, subsequent encrypted information may be included in the encrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message (as well as in the subsequent normal scheduled transmission message, which is encrypted). According to this example, the encrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message (and / or the subsequent normal scheduled transmission message) can be buffered until the unencrypted portion is processed (for example, to determine the identity of the access terminal). According to another example, subsequent encrypted information may be included in a subsequent normal scheduled transmission message.

Obviously, according to one or more of the aspects described herein, it can be concluded regarding the use of encrypted and / or unencrypted uplink scheduled messages in a random access procedure. As used herein, the term “conclude” or “conclusion” refers, generally, to the process of reasoning about or determining the states of a system, environment, and / or user based on a combination of observations made on the basis of events and / or data. The conclusion can be used to identify a specific context or action, or, for example, to generate a probability distribution over states. The conclusion may be probabilistic, i.e. rely on the calculation of the probability distribution for the desired states based on the study of data and events. The conclusion may also relate to methods used to compose higher level events from multiple events and / or data. This conclusion leads to the construction of new events or actions from the set of observable events and / or stored event data, depending on whether events are correlated in close time proximity, and on whether events and data come from one or more sources of events and data .

According to an example, one or more of the above methods may include drawing conclusions regarding the determination of the type of random access procedure used. By way of further illustration, a conclusion can be made in connection with determining whether the encryption operation for message 3 changes depending on the type of random access procedure used. Obviously, the above examples are illustrative and are not intended to limit the number of conclusions that can be drawn, or the manner in which such conclusions are drawn in connection with the various embodiments and / or methods described herein.

10, an access terminal 1000 that transmits encrypted and / or unencrypted uplink scheduled messages in a wireless communication system. The access terminal 1000 comprises a receiver 1002 that receives a signal, for example, from a receiving antenna (not shown), and performs typical actions (e.g., filters, amplifies, lowers the frequency, etc.) on the received signal, and digitizes the converted signal for receiving samples. The receiver 1002 may be, for example, an MMSE receiver, and may comprise a demodulator 1004 that can demodulate received symbols and provide them to a processor 1006 for channel estimation. The processor 1006 may be a processor for analyzing information received by the receiver 1002 and / or generating information for transmission by the transmitter 1016, a processor that controls one or more components of the access terminal 1000, and / or a processor that analyzes the information received by the receiver 1002, generates information for transmission by the transmitter 1016 and controls one or more components of the access terminal 1000.

The access terminal 1000 may further comprise a memory 1008, which is operatively connected to the processor 1006 and in which data to be transmitted, received data, and any other suitable information relating to the implementation of various actions and functions indicated herein can be stored. For example, an identifier associated with access terminal 1000, a random access signature to be included in a random access preamble, etc. may be stored in memory 1008. The memory 1008 may additionally store protocols and / or algorithms associated with determining the type of random access procedure used, generating a random access preamble to be transmitted to the base station, generating uplink messages, concatenating encrypted and unencrypted messages, and the like.

Obviously, the data store described here (for example, memory 1008) may be either volatile memory or non-volatile memory, or may include volatile and non-volatile memory. By way of illustration, but not limitation, non-volatile memory may include read-only memory (ROM), programmable ROM (EPROM), electrically programmable ROM (EEPROM), electrically erasable EPROM (EEPROM), or flash memory. Volatile memory may include random access memory (RAM), which acts as an external cache. By way of illustration, but not limitation, RAM is available in various forms, for example, synchronous RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), SDRAM with double data rate (DDR SDRAM), extended SDRAM (ESDRAM), Synchlink DRAM (SLDRAM) and Rambus Direct Access RAM (DRRAM). The memory 1008 of the considered systems and methods is intended to contain, without limitation, these any suitable types of memory.

The receiver 1002 is further operatively coupled to an unencrypted message generator 1010 and / or an encrypted message generator 1012, which may be substantially identical to the unencrypted message generator 208 shown in FIG. 2 and the encrypted message generator 210 shown in FIG. 2, respectively . An unencrypted message generator 1010 and / or an encrypted message generator 1012 may issue message 3 for uplink transmission to a base station. For example, access terminal 1000 may transmit a random access preamble and receive a random access response based on it. When using competitive random access, the unencrypted message generator 1010 may issue at least a portion of message 3 for uplink transmission, and this portion is not encrypted. According to an example, message 3 can be generated by an unencrypted message generator 1010, and thus can be unencrypted. According to another illustration, the unencrypted message generator 1010 may provide the unencrypted portion of message 3, while the encrypted message generator 1012 may provide the encrypted portion of message 3. In addition, a subsequent normal uplink scheduled transmission message may be provided by the encrypted message generator 1012. In addition, unencrypted message generator 1010 may include non-security critical information, for example, an identifier associated with access terminal 1000, message discriminator, etc., in unencrypted messages, and encrypted message generator 1012 may include information critical to security in encrypted messages. The access terminal 1000 further comprises a modulator 1014 and a transmitter 1016 that transmits a signal, for example, to a base station, another access terminal, etc. Although they are described separately from the processor 1006, it is obvious that the generator 1010 unencrypted messages, the generator 1012 encrypted messages and / or modulator 1014 can be part of the processor 1006 or several processors (not shown).

11 shows a system 1100 that evaluates unencrypted and / or encrypted scheduled messages received on an uplink during a random access procedure in a wireless communication environment. System 1100 comprises a base station 1102 (e.g., an access point), where a receiver 1110 receives signal (s) from one or more access terminals 1104 through a plurality of receiving antennas 1106, and a transmitter 1122 transmits to one or more access terminals 1104 through a transmitting antenna 1108. A receiver 1110 may receive information from receive antennas 1106 and is operatively coupled to a demodulator 1112 that demodulates received information. The demodulated signals are analyzed by a processor 1114, which may be similar to the processor described above with reference to FIG. 10, and which is connected to a memory 1116 that stores data to be transmitted to or received from access terminal (s) 1104 (or another base station) (not shown)), and / or any other suitable information relating to the implementation of the various actions and functions indicated herein. The processor 1114 is further connected to a message source identification module 1118, which evaluates the received message 3, which includes at least an unencrypted portion, from one specific access terminal 1104 to recognize the identification of a particular access terminal. Such message 3 can be received when a particular access terminal uses competitive random access; however, the claimed invention is not limited to this. Message source identification module 1118 can be operatively associated with a security context determination module 1120 that decrypts the security context corresponding to the identified specific access terminal from which message 3 was received. In addition, the identified security context can be used to decrypt subsequent encrypted uplink scheduled transmissions communication. It can be seen that the message source identification module 1118 can be substantially similar to the message source identification module 214 shown in FIG. 2 and / or the security context determination module 1120 can be substantially similar to the security context determination module 216 shown figure 2. In addition, the message source identification module 1118 and / or the security context determination module 1120 may provide information to be transmitted to the modulator 1122. The modulator 1122 may multiplex the frame for transmission by the transmitter 1126 through antennas 1108 to the access terminal (s) 1104. Although it is shown that they are separate from the processor 1114, it is obvious that the message source identification module 1118, the security context determination module 1120, and / or the modulator 1122 may be part of the processor 1114 or several processors (not shown).

12 shows an exemplary wireless communications system 1200. In the wireless communication system 1200, for simplicity, one base station 1210 and one access terminal 1250 are shown. However, it will be appreciated that system 1200 may include more than one base station and / or more than one access terminal, wherein additional base stations and / or access terminals may be substantially the same or different from illustrative base station 1210 and access terminal 1250, described below. In addition, it is obvious that the base station 1210 and / or access terminal 1250 can use the systems described here (Figs. 1, 2, 6, 10-11 and 13-14) and / or methods (Figs. 8-9) to provide wireless communication between them.

At base station 1210, traffic data for multiple data streams is received from a data source 1212 to a transmit (TX) data processor 1214. According to an example, each data stream can be transmitted through a corresponding antenna. TX data processor 1214 formats, codes, and interleaves the traffic data stream based on a particular coding scheme selected for that data stream to provide coded data.

The coded data for each data stream can be multiplexed with pilot data using orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) techniques. Additionally or alternatively, the pilot symbols may be frequency division multiplexed (FDM), time division multiplexed (TDM) or code division multiplexed (CDM). Pilot data is usually a known data template that is processed in a known manner and which can be used at access terminal 1250 to estimate the channel response. Multiplexed pilot and encoded data for each data stream can be modulated (e.g., mapped to symbols) based on a specific modulation scheme (e.g. , binary phase shift keying (BPSK), quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK), M-ary phase shift keying (M- PSK), M-ary quadrature amplitude modulation (M-QAM), etc.) selected for this data stream to provide modulation symbols. The data rate, coding, and modulation for each data stream may be determined according to instructions provided or provided by processor 1230.

Modulation symbols for data streams may be provided to a MIMO TX processor 1220, which may further process modulation symbols (e.g., for OFDM). Then, the MIMO TX processor 1220 provides N _T modulation symbol streams to N _T transmitters 1222a-1222t. In various embodiments, the MIMO TX processor 1220 applies beamforming weights to the symbols of the data streams and to the antenna from which the symbol is transmitted.

Each transmitter 1222 receives and processes a corresponding symbol stream to provide one or more analog signals and further converts (e.g., amplifies, filters, and boosts) the analog signals to provide a modulated signal suitable for transmission over the MIMO channel. In addition, N _T modulated signals from transmitters 1222a-1222t are transmitted from N _T antennas 1224a-1224t, respectively.

At access terminal 1250, the transmitted modulated signals are received by N _R antennas 1252a-1252r, and the received signal from each antenna 1252 is supplied to a respective receiver (receiver) 1254a-1254r. Each receiver 1254 converts (eg, filters, amplifies, and lowers the frequency) the corresponding signal, digitizes the converted signal to provide samples, and further processes the samples to provide a corresponding “received” symbol stream.

An RX data processor 1260 may receive and process N _R received symbol streams from N _R receivers 1254 based on a particular receiver processing method to provide N _T “detected” symbol streams. An RX data processor 1260 may demodulate, deinterleave, and decode each detected symbol stream to recover traffic data from the data stream. The processing performed by the RX data processor 1260 is complementary to the processing performed by the TX MIMO processor 1220 and TX data processor 1214 at the base station 1210.

The processor 1270 may periodically determine which available technology to use, as discussed above. In addition, processor 1270 may generate a reverse link message comprising a portion of an index and a portion of a matrix rank value.

The reverse link message may contain various types of information related to the communication link and / or the received data stream. The reverse link message may be processed by TX data processor 1238, which also receives traffic data for multiple data streams from data source 1236, modulated by modulator 1280, converted by transmitters 1254a-1254r, and transmitted back to base station 1210.

At base station 1210, modulated signals from access terminal 1250 are received by antennas 1224, converted by receivers 1222, demodulated by demodulator 1240, and processed by RX data processor 1242 to extract the reverse link message transmitted by access terminal 1250. In addition, processor 1230 may process the extracted message to determine which precoding matrix to use for determining beamforming weights.

Processors 1230 and 1270 can direct (e.g., control, coordinate, manipulate, etc.) work at base station 1210 and access terminal 1250, respectively. Corresponding processors 1230 and 1270 may be associated with a memory 1232 and 1272 in which program codes and data are stored. Processors 1230 and 1270 can also perform calculations to obtain frequency and impulse response estimates for the uplink and downlink, respectively.

According to an aspect, logical channels are divided into control channels and traffic channels. The logical control channels include a broadcast control channel (BCCH), which is a DL (downlink) channel for broadcasting system control information. In addition, the logical control channels may include a paging control channel (PCCH), which is a DL channel carrying paging information. In addition, the logical control channels may comprise a multicast control channel (MCCH), which is a DL channel from one point to several points, used for transmitting scheduling and control information of multimedia broadcast and multicast services (MBMS) for one or more MTCHs. In the general case, after the RRC connection is established, this channel is used only by UEs that receive MBMS (note: old MCCH + MSCH). Additionally, the logical control channels may include a dedicated control channel (DCCH), which is a two-way point-to-point communication channel that transmits the dedicated control information and is used by UEs having an RRC connection. According to an aspect, the logical traffic channels may include a dedicated traffic channel (DTCH), which is a two-way point-to-point channel allocated to one UE for carrying user information. In addition, the logical traffic channels may include a multicast traffic channel (MTCH) for the DL channel from one point to several points for transmitting traffic data.

According to an aspect, the transport channels are divided into DL and UL. DL transport channels include a broadcast channel (BCH), a downlink shared data channel (DL-SDCH), and a paging channel (PCH). The PCH can support power saving of the UE (for example, the network indicates a discontinuous reception (DRX) cycle for the UE) by broadcasting throughout the cell and mapping into physical resources that can be used for other control / traffic channels. UL transport channels may comprise a random access channel (RACH), a request channel (REQCH), an uplink public data channel (UL-SDCH), and a plurality of PHY (physical) channels.

Physical channels may include a set of DL channels and UL channels. For example, downlink physical channels may include: common pilot channel (CPICH), synchronization channel (SCH), common control channel (CCCH), DL common control channel (SDCCH), multicast control channel (MCCH), channel UL General Purpose (SUACH), Acknowledgment Channel (ACKCH), DL Physical General Data Channel (DL-PSDCH), UL Power Control Channel (UPCCH), Paging Indicator Channel (PICH) and Load Indicator Channel (LICH). As a further illustration, uplink physical channels may include: a physical random access channel (PRACH), a channel quality indicator channel (CQICH), an acknowledgment channel (ACKCH), an antenna subset indicator channel (ASICH), a public request channel ( SREQCH), UL Public Physical Data Channel (UL-PSDCH), and Broadcast Pilot Channel (BPICH).

It should be understood that the embodiments described herein can be implemented in the form of hardware, software, firmware, middleware, microcode, or any combination thereof. For hardware implementations, processing modules can be implemented in one or several specialized integrated circuits (ASICs), digital signal processors (DSPs), digital signal processing devices (DSPDs), programmable logic devices (PLAs), gate programmable arrays (FPGAs) , processors, controllers, microcontrollers, microprocessors, other electronic units designed to carry out the functions described here, or combinations thereof.

When the embodiments are implemented as software, firmware, middleware or microcode, program code or code segments, they can be stored on a computer-readable medium, for example, a storage component. A code segment may represent a procedure, function, subprogram, program, procedure, subprocedure, module, software package, class, or any combination of instructions, data structures, or program statements. A code segment can be connected to another code segment or a hardware circuit by transmitting and / or receiving information, data, arguments, parameters, or memory contents. Information, arguments, parameters, data, etc. can be transferred, forwarded or transmitted using any suitable means, including memory sharing, messaging, token transfer, network transmission, etc.

For a software implementation, the methods described here can be implemented as modules (e.g., procedures, functions, etc.) that perform the functions described here. Program codes can be stored in memory cells and executed by processors. The memory cell can be implemented in the processor or outside the processor, in which case it can be connected with the ability to exchange data to the processor by various means known in the art.

FIG. 13 shows a system 1300 that allows a random access procedure to be used in a wireless communication environment. For example, system 1300 may reside, for example, at an access terminal. Obviously, system 1300 includes functional modules that can represent functions implemented by a processor, software, or a combination thereof (eg, firmware). System 1300 includes a logical grouping 1302 of electrical components that can act in conjunction. For example, logical grouping 1302 may include an electrical component 1304 for transmitting a random access preamble, which includes a common random access signature, to a base station when using competitive random access. In addition, although not shown, logical grouping 1302 may include an electrical component for transmitting a random access preamble, which includes a random access signature associated with the access terminal to the base station when using random access on a non-competitive basis. In addition, the logical grouping 1302 may include an electrical component 1306 for receiving a random access response from a base station based on a random access preamble. In addition, logical grouping 1302 may include an electrical component 1308 for sending a scheduled transmission, including at least an unencrypted portion, to a base station as permitted by a random access response when using random access on a competitive basis. For example, the unencrypted part and the encrypted part may be transmitted as part of a scheduled transmission. As another illustration, a scheduled transmission can be unencrypted, and a subsequent normal scheduled transmission can be encrypted. Additionally, system 1300 may include a memory 1310 that stores instructions for performing functions related to electrical components 1304, 1306 and 1308. Although they are shown outside of memory 1310, it is understood that one or more electrical components 1304, 1306 and 1308 may exist in memory 1310.

FIG. 14 shows a system 1400 that allows a random access procedure to be applied in a wireless communication environment. System 1400 may be located at least in part, for example, at a base station. As shown, system 1400 includes functional modules that can represent functions implemented by a processor, software, or a combination thereof (e.g., firmware). System 1400 includes a logical grouping 1402 of electrical components that can act in conjunction. Logical grouping 1402 may include an electrical component 1404 for receiving a scheduled transmission message including at least an unencrypted portion from an access terminal when using competitive random access. In addition, logical grouping 1402 may include an electrical component 1406 for recognizing identification of an access terminal based on information included in an unencrypted portion of a scheduled transmission message. For example, the unencrypted portion of a scheduled transmission message may include an identifier associated with an access terminal. In addition, logical grouping 1402 may include an electrical component 1408 for retrieving the security context associated with the access terminal based on the recognized identification of the access terminal. In addition, logical grouping 1402 may include an electrical component 1410 for decrypting an encrypted, normal scheduled transmission message or an encrypted portion of a scheduled transmission message that includes an unencrypted portion received from an access terminal based on the extracted security context. Additionally, system 1400 may include a memory 1412 that stores instructions for performing functions associated with electrical components 1404, 1406, 1408, and 1410. Although they are shown outside of memory 1412, it is understood that one or more electrical components 1404, 1406, 1408 and 1410 may exist in memory 1412.

Examples of one or more embodiments have been described above. Of course, it is impossible to describe all conceivable combinations of components or methods in order to describe the aforementioned embodiments, but it will be apparent to one skilled in the art that many additional combinations and permutations of various embodiments are possible. Accordingly, the described embodiments are intended to cover all such changes, modifications, and variations that meet the spirit and scope of the claims. Furthermore, to the extent that the term “includes” is used in the description or in the claims, such a term is intended to be inclusive in the same way as the term “comprising” as “comprising” is interpreted when used as a transition word in the claims.

Claims (72)

1. A method of applying a random access procedure in a wireless communication environment, comprising stages in which
transmit the random access preamble to the base station,
receiving a random access response from the base station based on the random access preamble, and
transmitting a scheduled transmission message, which includes at least a portion that is not encrypted, to the base station, as permitted by the random access response, using random access on a competitive basis. 2. The method according to claim 1, further comprising transmitting a random access preamble for at least one of the initial access, return from an unsynchronized state, or a handover from the source base station to the base station. 3. The method according to claim 1, wherein the part of the scheduled transmission message that is not encrypted includes non-security critical information and a temporary identifier specific to the access terminal, which allows the base station to recognize the source of the random access preamble and the scheduled message transmission. 4. The method of claim 1, further comprising receiving a conflict resolution message from the base station in response to the scheduled transmission message. 5. The method according to claim 4, in which the message scheduled transmission is completely or almost completely encrypted using random access on a competitive basis. 6. The method of claim 5, further comprising transmitting a scheduled transmission message that is not encrypted using transparent link radio link control (RLC-TM). 7. The method according to claim 5, further comprising transmitting the encrypted subsequent normal transmission message in response to the received conflict resolution message, the encrypted subsequent normal transmission message including security-critical information. 8. The method of claim 5, further comprising transmitting the scheduled transmission message as an encrypted message using random access on a non-competitive basis. 9. The method according to claim 5, further comprising stages, in which
identify the type of random access procedure used, and determine whether or not to schedule the scheduled transmission message, depending on the identified type of random access procedure. 10. The method according to claim 4, further comprising the step of concatenating the unencrypted part with the encrypted part in a scheduled transmission message. 11. The method according to claim 10, further comprising stages, in which
transmitting the unencrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message using at least one of the unacknowledged radio link control (RLC-UM) or the transparent radio link control (RLC-TM), and
transmitting the encrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message using the handshake radio link control (RLC-AM). 12. The method of claim 10, wherein the unencrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message includes security non-critical information, including a temporary identifier specific to the access terminal, and the encrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message includes security critical information . 13. The method according to item 12, further comprising stages, in which
segment security critical information into at least two parts,
include the first piece of security-critical information in the encrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message, and
include at least a portion of the remainder of the security-critical information in the encrypted subsequent normal scheduled transmission message transmitted to the base station after receiving the conflict resolution message. 14. The method according to claim 10, in which the unencrypted part uses a protocol data module (PDU) of a medium access control (MAC) layer. 15. The method of claim 10, further comprising applying the unencrypted portion and the encrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message using random access on a non-competitive basis. 16. The method of claim 10, further comprising transmitting the scheduled transmission message as an encrypted message when using random access on a non-competitive basis. 17. A wireless communication device comprising
a memory that stores instructions related to transmitting a random access preamble to a base station for at least one of the initial access, returning from an unsynchronized state, or handing over from a source base station to a base station, receiving a random access response from a base station based on the random access preamble, by transmitting a scheduled transmission message that includes at least a part that is not encrypted to the base station, as times solved by a random access response using competitive access random access and receiving a conflict resolution message from the base station in response to a scheduled transmission message, and
a processor coupled to the memory and configured to execute instructions stored in the memory. 18. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 17, wherein the portion of the scheduled transmission message that is not encrypted includes security non-critical information and a temporary identifier specific to the access terminal that allows the base station to recognize the source of the random access preamble and scheduled transmission messages. 19. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 17, wherein the scheduled transmission message is wholly or almost wholly not encrypted using competitive access random access. 20. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 19, wherein the memory further stores instructions related to transmitting an encrypted subsequent normal transmission message in response to a received conflict resolution message, wherein the encrypted subsequent normal transmission message includes information critical to security. 21. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 19, wherein the memory further stores instructions associated with transmitting a scheduled transmission message as an encrypted message when using random access on a non-competitive basis. 22. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 19, wherein the memory further stores instructions associated with identifying the type of random access procedure used and determining whether or not to schedule a scheduled transmission message, depending on the identified type of random access procedure. 23. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 17, wherein the instruction further associated with concatenating the unencrypted part to the encrypted part in a scheduled transmission message is further stored in the memory. 24. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 23, wherein the unencrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message includes security non-critical information, including a temporary identifier specific to the access terminal, and the encrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message includes critical information for safety. 25. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 24, wherein the memory further stores instructions related to segmenting information critical to security into at least two parts, including the first part of information critical to security in the encrypted part of the message the scheduled transmission, and including at least a portion of the remainder of the security critical information in the encrypted subsequent normal scheduled transmission message transmitted to the base station after receiving the message eniya conflicts. 26. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 23, wherein the unencrypted portion uses a medium access control (MAC) protocol data unit (PDU) module. 27. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 23, wherein the memory further stores instructions related to one of the use of the unencrypted part and the encrypted part of the scheduled transmission message when using random access on a non-competitive basis or transmitting the scheduled transmission message as an encrypted message using random access on a non-competitive basis. 28. A wireless communication device that allows you to use the random access procedure in a wireless communication environment, comprising:
means for transmitting a random access preamble, which includes a common random access signature, to the base station, using competitive access random access,
means for receiving a random access response from the base station based on the random access preamble, and
means for sending the scheduled transmission, including at least the unencrypted part, to the base station, as permitted by the random access response, using random access on a competitive basis. 29. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 28, wherein the portion of the scheduled transmission that is not encrypted includes security non-critical information and a temporary identifier specific to the access terminal that allows the base station to recognize the source of the random access preamble and the scheduled transmission. 30. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 28, further comprising means for sending the scheduled transmission in full or almost entirely as an unencrypted message when using random access on a competitive basis. 31. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 30, further comprising means for sending the encrypted subsequent normal transmission in response to a conflict resolution message received from the base station in response to the scheduled transmission, wherein the encrypted subsequent normal transmission includes security-critical information. 32. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 30, further comprising means for sending the scheduled transmission as an encrypted message when using random access on a non-competitive basis. 33. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 28, further comprising means for concatenating the unencrypted part with the encrypted part in the scheduled transmission. 34. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 33, wherein the unencrypted portion of the scheduled transmission includes security non-critical information, including a temporary identifier specific to the access terminal, and the encrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message includes information critical to security. 35. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 33, further comprising means for segmenting the security-critical information into at least two parts, the first part of the security-critical information being included in the encrypted portion of the scheduled transmission. 36. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 33, further comprising means for using the unencrypted portion and the encrypted portion of the scheduled transmission when using random access on a non-competitive basis. 37. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 33, further comprising means for sending the scheduled transmission as an encrypted message when using random access on a non-competitive basis. 38. A computer readable medium comprising
code for transmitting the random access preamble to the base station,
code for receiving a random access response from a base station based on a random access preamble, and
code for transmitting the scheduled transmission, including at least the unencrypted part, to the base station as permitted by the random access response when using random access on a competitive basis. 39. The machine-readable medium of claim 38, wherein the portion of the scheduled transmission that is not encrypted includes security non-critical information and a temporary identifier specific to the access terminal that allows the base station to recognize the source of the random access preamble and scheduled transmission . 40. The computer-readable medium of claim 38, further comprising a code for transmitting a scheduled transmission in full or almost entirely as an unencrypted message when using random access on a competitive basis. 41. The computer-readable medium of claim 40, further comprising a code for transmitting an encrypted subsequent normal transmission in response to a conflict resolution message received from the base station in response to a scheduled transmission, wherein the encrypted subsequent normal transmission includes information critical to security. 42. The computer-readable medium of claim 40, further comprising a code for sending a scheduled transmission as an encrypted message when using random access on a non-competitive basis. 43. The computer-readable medium of claim 38, further comprising a code for concatenating the unencrypted part with the encrypted part in the scheduled transmission. 44. The computer-readable medium of claim 43, wherein the unencrypted portion of the scheduled transmission includes security non-critical information, including a temporary identifier specific to the access terminal, and the encrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message includes security critical information . 45. The computer-readable medium of claim 43, further comprising a code for segmenting security critical information into at least two parts, the first part of security critical information being included in the encrypted portion of the scheduled transmission. 46. The computer-readable medium of claim 43, further comprising code for using the unencrypted portion and the encrypted portion of the scheduled transmission when using random access on a non-competitive basis. 47. The computer-readable medium of claim 43, further comprising a code for transmitting a scheduled transmission as an encrypted message when using random access on a non-competitive basis. 48. A wireless communications device comprising
a processor configured to:
transmit the random access preamble to the base station,
receive a random access response from the base station based on the random access preamble, and
transmit the scheduled transmission, including at least the unencrypted part, to the base station as permitted by the random access response when using random access on a competitive basis. 49. A method of obtaining data during a random access procedure in a wireless communication environment, comprising the steps of:
receive a random access preamble from the access terminal,
transmitting the random access response to the access terminal based on the random access preamble,
receiving a scheduled transmission message, which includes at least a portion that is not encrypted, from the access terminal when using random access on a competitive basis, and
recognizing the identity of the access terminal based on information included in the message portion of the scheduled transmission that is not encrypted when using random access on a competitive basis. 50. The method of claim 49, wherein the portion of the scheduled transmission message that is not encrypted includes a temporary cellular radio network identifier (C-RNTI). 51. The method of claim 49, further comprising receiving a scheduled transmission message as an encrypted message when using random access on a non-competitive basis. 52. The method of claim 49, further comprising determining a security context associated with the access terminal based on the recognized identification of the access terminal. 53. The method of claim 52, further comprising decrypting subsequent encrypted information received from the access terminal using a specific security context. 54. The method of claim 53, further comprising receiving subsequent encrypted information as the encrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message that accompanies the unencrypted portion. 55. The method according to item 54, further comprising the step of buffering the encrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message until the unencrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message is processed. 56. The method of claim 53, further comprising receiving subsequent encrypted information as an encrypted subsequent normal scheduled transmission message received in response to sending the conflict resolution message to the access terminal. 57. A wireless communications device comprising
a memory that stores instructions related to receiving a random access preamble from an access terminal, transmitting a random access response to an access terminal based on a random access preamble, receiving a scheduled transmission message that includes at least a part that is not encrypted, from the access terminal, when using random access on a competitive basis, recognition of the identification of the access terminal based on the information included in the planned message part a transmission that is not encrypted using competitive access using random access and determining a security context associated with the access terminal based on the recognized identification of the access terminal, and
a processor coupled to the memory and configured to execute instructions stored in the memory. 58. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 57, wherein the portion of the scheduled transmission message that is not encrypted includes a temporary cellular radio network identifier (C-RNTI). 59. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 57, wherein the memory further stores instructions related to receiving a scheduled transmission message as an encrypted message when using random access on a non-competitive basis. 60. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 57, wherein the memory further stores instructions related to decrypting subsequent encrypted information received from the access terminal using a specific security context. 61. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 60, wherein the memory further stores instructions related to receiving subsequent encrypted information as an encrypted part of a scheduled transmission message that accompanies an unencrypted part. 62. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 61, wherein the memory further stores instructions related to buffering at least the encrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message until the unencrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message is processed. 63. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 60, wherein the memory further stores instructions for receiving subsequent encrypted information as an encrypted subsequent normal scheduled transmission message received in response to sending a conflict resolution message to the access terminal. 64. A wireless communication device that allows you to apply the random access procedure in a wireless communication environment, comprising:
means for receiving a scheduled transmission message including at least an unencrypted part from the access terminal when using random access on a competitive basis,
means for recognizing identification of the access terminal based on information included in the unencrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message,
means for retrieving the security context associated with the access terminal based on the recognized identification of the access terminal; and means for decrypting the encrypted normal message of the scheduled transmission or the encrypted part of the message of the scheduled transmission, which includes the unencrypted part received from the access terminal based on the extracted security context . 65. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 64, wherein the unencrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message includes a temporary cellular radio network identifier (C-RNTI). 66. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 64, further comprising means for receiving a scheduled transmission message as an encrypted message when using random access on a non-competitive basis. 67. The wireless communications apparatus of claim 64, further comprising means for buffering the encrypted normal scheduled transmission message or the encrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message. 68. A computer readable medium comprising:
code for receiving a scheduled transmission message including at least an unencrypted part from the access terminal when using random access on a competitive basis,
code for recognizing the identity of the access terminal based on information included in the unencrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message,
code for retrieving the security context associated with the access terminal based on the recognized identification of the access terminal, and
code for decrypting the encrypted normal message of the scheduled transmission or the encrypted part of the message of the scheduled transmission, which includes the unencrypted part received from the access terminal based on the extracted security context. 69. The computer-readable medium of claim 68, wherein the unencrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message includes a temporary identifier associated with the access terminal. 70. The computer-readable medium of claim 68, further comprising a code for receiving a scheduled transmission message as an encrypted message using random access on a non-competitive basis. 71. The computer-readable medium of claim 68, further comprising code for buffering an encrypted normal scheduled transmission message or an encrypted portion of a scheduled transmission message. 72. A wireless communications device, comprising:
a processor configured to:
receive a scheduled transmission message, including at least the unencrypted part, from the access terminal when using random access on a competitive basis,
recognize the identity of the access terminal based on information included in the unencrypted portion of the message of the scheduled transmission,
retrieve the security context associated with the access terminal based on the recognized identification of the access terminal, and
decrypt the encrypted normal scheduled transmission message or the encrypted portion of the scheduled transmission message that includes the unencrypted portion received from the access terminal based on the extracted security context.

Images