RU2339081C2 - Intellectual identification card - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: information technology.

SUBSTANCE: identification card contains in-built memory for the storage of control data, an in-built transmitter - for reading biometric data in real time, a processor intended for the comparison of counted biometric data with written down control data within the limits of the set threshold and generating of the verifying message, including at least a part of counted biometric data and a part of control data, in case if the result of comparison is within the limits of the set threshold, and a means of transfer of the verifying message into the remote network of the control of the access for further additional checking. The method of control of recognition of the user consists in recording biometric data of the user, comparison of biometric data with the control data of the user, by transfer to the remote control system of the first message including at least a part of the recorded biometric data, recording of the information on the user from the first message and its comparison with earlier recorded ones for the given user in the remote control system of the information and transfer of the reciprocal message including the information about the right access.

EFFECT: increase in the level of security of the card.

24 cl, 11 dwg

Description

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates to smart identification cards (cards) with a high degree of protection provided by the reading and use of biometric data in real time, which can be used, in particular, as access cards, identity cards, electronic wallet, etc.

State of the art

Computerization and, in particular, Internet technologies have greatly simplified access to information, including financial information, medical information and private information, as well as created tools that accelerate financial and other operations in the process of which confidential information is changed or exchanged.

Passwords are commonly used to maintain the confidentiality of such information. Passwords, however, are often based on a date of birth or a phone number that is easy to imagine in that capacity and that does not provide protection. In addition, even a complex password generated by random sampling can be easily stolen. Therefore, data access systems using a password are vulnerable to a criminal attack, which damages industry or the economy, and even threatens people's lives. Thus, there is a need to create improved ways to ensure the security of information and protect it from unauthorized access.

Biometric data may contain small details that are difficult to obtain, but easy to analyze (for example, the location of the small details of the fingerprint), or a general pattern that is easily fixed but difficult to analyze (for example, the spatial characteristics of the fingerprint curls).

There are encryption algorithms that require a digital key, which only an authorized user possesses. In the absence of the required key, the encoded data can be decrypted with conversion to a usable form only with a large investment of time and computing resources, and then, if certain characteristics of unencrypted data are known (or, at least, predictable).

Published Japanese Patent Application JP 60-029868 dated February 15, 1985, by Tamio Shaito, describes a personal identification system that uses an identification card with built-in memory to store encoded biometric data received from the card holder. Biometric data may include phonogram (voices), fingerprint, appearance data and / or bioassay results. The data stored on the card is read and decoded to compare them with the corresponding data received from the person presenting the card. A similar system allows you to identify a registered person with high accuracy. However, since the receipt of biometric data and their processing is performed by external equipment, it is difficult to protect the information stored on the card from possible changes and / or theft of personal data.

An improved identification card was proposed that contains a data-driven multiprocessor chip to form a hardware firewall (firewai - an access protection tool), which simultaneously encodes biometric data stored on the card and isolates it, which provides significantly better protection against unauthorized changes to the stored data. However, the actual comparison procedure is performed in the same external reading terminal, which reads the submitted biometric data and therefore remains potentially vulnerable to fraudulent manipulations from the outside.

Disclosure of invention

The first embodiment of an identification card with a high degree of protection includes not only an internal memory for stored biometric data, but also an integrated sensor for reading biometric data in real time. The remote identification system contains a secure database including biometric data. The processor integrated in the card performs a preliminary comparison to verify that the obtained biometric data matches the local biometric data stored on the card. Only if a positive result of this comparison is received, is any data received or other data requiring protection stored on the card transferred to the remote identification system for additional verification and further processing. As an additional protection against malicious influences, in the preferred embodiment, the local data stored on the card is different from the data stored in the external device, and the local and external comparison procedures use different comparison algorithms. In this case, even if there was unauthorized access to the card, to the local data stored on the card and / or the local terminal to which the card is attached, it is very likely that the remote authorization system will be able to detect an intrusion attempt.

The second embodiment also includes an integrated memory for storing biometric data, and an integrated sensor for reading the submitted biometric data, and an integrated processor; in this embodiment, however, the comparison procedure is entirely performed by the embedded processor, and the read source biometric data along with other “personal” information stored in the built-in memory are not available for any processing in the external device. Instead, with a positive result of comparing the newly obtained biometric data with the previously obtained biometric data, only a verification message is generated. When a verification message appears, the card acts similarly to a regular ISO smart card with the correct / incorrect entry of a regular personal identification number (PIN), but with additional protection due to a more secure verification process. In any of these embodiments, it is desirable that the stored biometric data and any locally stored corresponding encryption algorithm or cipher key are loaded into the card at the time the card is issued to the card holder, so that any further external access is excluded, thereby enhancing the integrity of the stored biometric data and the entire verification procedure.

In one embodiment, the ISO smart card acts as a firewall to protect the security processor used to store and process secure biometric data from malicious external influences through the ISO smart card interface. In another embodiment, a security processor is inserted between the ISO smart card interface and the unmodified ISO smart card processor, which blocks any external communications until the fingerprint of the owner is compared with a previously registered fingerprint.

In one preferred embodiment of a high security ID card having a built-in fingerprint comparison function, real-time feedback is used to help find the optimal position of the owner’s finger relative to the sensor when moving the finger across the sensor. The use of this feedback not only reduces the complexity of the calculations, but also provides additional tools to distinguish an inexperienced user from a fraudster, which further reduces the likelihood of false rejections and / or false confirmations. In another preferred embodiment, the fingerprint sensor is mounted in a substrate that provides additional strength.

In one use case, the read biometric data and / or the cardholder’s identity is encrypted and entered into the operating network, which includes financial institutions and a special access control server, before providing access to confidential data or any automated process for performing a secure transaction. In another use case, the output from the card is used to gain physical access to the protected area. In both cases, a record of successful or rejected access attempts can be saved either on the card, or on an external access control server, or in both places.

Brief Description of the Drawings

Figure 1 shows one embodiment of a smart card with integrated biometric identification of the person presenting the card.

FIG. 2 is a flowchart illustrating a procedure for optimizing the location of a finger on a fingerprint sensor.

Figure 3 presents a functional diagram of a biometric verification system that provides both local and remote identity verification of a person presenting a secure identification card.

Figure 4 presents a functional diagram of an exemplary biometric verification card, which uses various physical data transmission paths when initially loading the biometric data of the card holder and when verifying the identity of the card holder when interacting with an external device with which the card is used.

Fig. 5 shows another embodiment of an exemplary biometric verification card (Fig. 4), which is intended to be used in conjunction with an unmodified ISO smart card processor.

6 is a block diagram illustrating the relationship between an example device for which a card is required and an identification card in which only local verification of the cardholder’s identity is performed.

The diagram in FIG. 7 is similar to the diagram in FIG. 6, but modified for use with the exemplary biometric verification card shown in FIG. 5.

On Fig presents a second embodiment of a smart card with built-in biometric verification, which can be connected to a local terminal either wirelessly or through an electrical connector.

Fig.9 shows a cross section of the map shown in Fig.8.

Figure 10 presents a diagram used as an example of a fingerprint sensor.

Figure 11 presents an embodiment of the holder assembly for the sensor shown in figure 10.

The implementation of the invention

Smart card

The expression “smart card” or “smart card” is used in the present description to generically denote any physical object that is small enough to be held in your hand, hung around your neck or worn on itself in a different way, and which contains a microprocessor capable of storing and processing digitally presented information relating to or otherwise associated with a particular card holder, as well as exchange this information. One well-known example of such a smart card is an ISO smart card (i.e., manufactured in accordance with the standards of the International Organization for Standardization), which has the same physical dimensions and shape as a regular credit card, but contains flash a memory for storing data about a specific user and a microprocessor that can be programmed with a complex encryption algorithm that determines whether or not the PIN code (personal identification number) received from the user terminal matches or is encrypted mu PIN-code that is stored on the card, thereby providing a lot of confidence that the person presenting the card is indeed the cardholder than in the inspection system, based only on the visual comparison of signatures and / or external similarity.

Turning to FIG. 1, an embodiment of a smart card with integrated biometric verification. Card 100 is mainly made of plastic material and resembles a regular credit card, with approximate dimensions of 53.98 × 85.6 mm and ISO 7816, and a thickness of approximately 0.76 mm or more.

By analogy with a regular credit card, card 100 has a free area 102 on top, running along the greater side of the card, to place a magnetic strip (as defined by ISO 7811-2 and 7811-6) on the back of the card, where a conventional alphanumeric coded digital information about the card holder and any corresponding account, which allows the use of card 100 with a conventional magnetic code reader. However, due to the fact that any data contained in the magnetic strip can be easily changed, such a magnetic strip is intended only for use in cases where the need to maintain compatibility with old-style terminals equipped with magnetic code readers outweighs the potential decrease in system security using magnetic stripes.

The upper region 102 can also be used to host various anti-fraud means, for example, a color-resistant photo of the holder and / or the holographic logo of the card issuer. The bottom region 104 of the card 100 can be used, as usual, for embossing information (according to ISO 7811-1), for example, the name of the holder, digital identifier of the account (or card) and the validity of the card, which allows the use of card 100 in a conventional imprinter for cards.

The upper region 102 and the lower region 104 are separated by a middle region 106 in which there are 8 eye-visible ISO smart card pads 108 that provide a normal electrical connection between the card and the corresponding contacts of the card reader. Through these contacts, not only data exchange between the reader and the card can occur, but also the supply of power, synchronization and control signals, as defined by the ISO 7816-3 standard.

On the right side of the area 106, the area of the sensor 110 (fingerprint sensor) is visible, which is used to read the fingerprint data from the finger of the card holder. In a preferred embodiment, the card is equipped with an identification code that is unique to the sensor 110 or other electronic component embedded in the card; for example, an access code in the format of conventional IP and / or MAC protocols.

Figure 1 also schematically shows several additional electronic components that interact with the pads 108 and the sensor 110 to expand functionality and, in particular, more security.

In one embodiment, an ISO smart card compatible processor (CPU) 112 is directly connected to pads 108 to provide electrical connectivity to an external ISO compatible card reader (not shown) to not only bring power to the integrated electronics, but also for the exchange of data between the card and any external control software for data transfer, protection, operations and / or other application software installed on a card reader or any other These are computing devices that are networked with a card reader.

Although in the described embodiment, the data transmission path between the card 100 and the external card reader is a wired connection using the pin configuration defined by the ISO standard for smart cards, it should be borne in mind that other embodiments and other transmission methods can be used, for example, USB or RS 232C or SPI (serial) connections, possibly via a wireless RF (radio frequency) channel, microwave and / or IR (infrared) communication channels.

In addition, although in the described embodiment, power is supplied from the card reader, other embodiments may include a built-in power source, such as a solar panel or battery. The use of such integrated power sources can be advantageous, for example, if the mechanical docking between the card 100 and a particular reader makes the fingerprint sensor 110 inaccessible to the user when the contacts 108 are connected to the corresponding terminals inside the card reader and, thus, the reading user fingerprint data may be performed when the card 100 is not connected directly to the reader.

Protection processor

As shown, a security processor (CPU) 114 is connected between the ISO processor 112 and the sensor 110 to provide protection for the processing and storage of read data, as well as a protective "firewall" function to protect data and programs stored in specialized memory from any unauthorized access attempts through the ISO processor 112, as will be described below. Such a firewall can only allow encrypted data to pass through using a code key based on an assigned unique network address or otherwise unique to a given card, for example, data extracted from a previously registered fingerprint pattern or a unique number assigned to a device, such as a processor or fingerprint sensor numbers. In another embodiment, the firewall passes only data containing unique identification data from a previous transmission or data. In yet another embodiment, the firewall uses different keys for various applications and uses these keys to transfer data to a corresponding different processor or memory segment.

In another embodiment (not shown), the security processor 114 is directly connected to the ISO pins 108 and acts as a guard between the ISO processor 112 and the ISO pins 108. An advantage of this alternative configuration is the additional protection provided by the security processor 114 and the sensor 110, without any deterioration in the protective mechanisms that may already be introduced into the ISO processor 112.

In a preferred embodiment, the protection processor 114 comprises a non-volatile semiconductor or non-semiconductor memory, for example, ferroelectric RAM (FRAM), one-time programmable ROM (OTR), electrically programmable ROM (EEPROM), magnetic RAM (MRAM), magnetic ROM (MROM), for storage a previously registered fingerprint pattern and / or other personal biometric information. In other embodiments, some or all of the functions of the protection processor 114 may be implemented in the ISO processor 112 and / or some or all of the functions of the ISO processor 112 may be performed by the protection processor 114. In such a combined configuration, a software firewall between different functions can still be formed, which is especially important when the device has implemented a procedure in which any changes to stored programs are impossible. In another embodiment, both processors 112 and 114 may be separate processors in one multiprocessor device, providing protection of each process from any interference from another process running in another processor. An example of such a multiprocessor device is DDMP (data-driven multiprocessor system) of the Japanese company Sharp.

Despite the fact that in the preferred embodiment, all of these various sensors, contacts and other electronic components, as well as the printed circuits and other electrical circuits with which they are connected, are completely integrated inside the card 100, so that they are protected from abrasion and pollution, it is desirable the location in the Central region 106 between the upper region 102 and the lower region 104 for additional protection against possible damage from various magnetic code readers, printing devices embossed it and other printing equipment, which come into contact with these other areas.

LED feedback

The LEDs 116a, 116b are controlled by the protection processor 114 and provide the user with visual feedback. In an exemplary embodiment, the preferred location is located in the bottom region 104 at the edge of the card away from the contact pads 108. In any case, the preferred location for the LEDs 116a, 116b is where they will not be damaged when embossing and where they are will be visible when the card is inserted into a conventional ISO smart card reader and / or when the user's finger is placed on the fingerprint sensor 110. For example:

In test mode

- RED blinking: waiting for finger application

- flashing stops: finger attached to the sensor

- RED flashing once: unable to get a match, slide finger

- long one-time flashing GREEN: a match is reached, the finger can be removed.

In data logging mode

- GREEN blinking: waiting for finger application

- flashing stops: finger attached to the sensor

- RED flashing once: unable to register, slide finger

- GREEN flashing once: registration completed, finger can be removed.

In erase mode

- GREEN and RED blink: ready to wipe

- GREEN flashing once: erased

In a preferred embodiment, the user is given several attempts to read the fingerprint to achieve a match, or when registering data, before a failure notification is issued. In one embodiment, a failure notification is issued to the access control server only if the user lifted his finger before receiving a confirmation green signal or if the specified time limit was exceeded. This procedure not only trains the user how to best place a finger on the sensor, which not only simplifies the calculation, but also makes it possible to use more precise decision criteria. Such visual feedback also creates a psychological basis for distinguishing between an inexperienced user (who, as a rule, will continue trying until he finds the correct finger position) and a fraudster (who usually does not want to attract attention and stops trying before his malicious intent is revealed) . The result is a significant reduction in the likelihood of false failures and / or false confirmations.

Figure 2 presents an example of a procedure that helps the user place a finger on the sensor 110. In step (flowchart cells) 150, the RED LED 116b flashes. As soon as a finger is detected (step 152), the blinking of the LED stops and a test (step 154) for image quality (distinguished elongated areas corresponding to the protrusions and grooves of the skin of the finger) is performed. If the quality is deemed insufficient (NO step 156), a one-time flashing of the RED LED 116b indicates to the user the need to change the position of the finger (step 158); otherwise (step 160 YES), a second test (step 162) is performed to determine that the same finger is placed in the same position as during user registration. As a result, a fairly simple comparison algorithm can be used to determine the correspondence of the incoming data and the data stored in the memory, taking into account the specified threshold, which confirms that the analyzed fingerprint is the same as it was originally recorded (step 164 YES), and then lights up GREEN LED 116a (step 166) for a sufficiently long time, confirming that the comparison was successful and the user can remove his finger. Otherwise, when the comparison threshold is not reached (step 170 NO), a single flash of the RED LED 116b (step 158) shows the user that it is necessary to change the position of the finger and the procedure is repeated.

Network Configuration Examples

Referring to FIG. 3, a possible embodiment of a biometric verification system is implemented, in which both local and remote verification of the identity of a person presenting a secure identification card is carried out. The system includes three main components: client terminal 200, application server 202 (application devices (cards)) and access control server 204. The client terminal 200 has functions for real-time reading and local processing of the user's fingerprint, for encrypting locally processed data and for secure data exchange with the application server and access control server, preferably via the Internet using addressing schemes and IP / TCP transmission protocol, with protection against unauthorized access by conventional IP firewalls (FW) 206. In other embodiments, firewalls 206 may be equipped with filters and an encryptor / decoder for encodings that encrypt the transmitted data after they have been verified by comparison with authorized data, and which decrypt the received data before deciding whether this data belongs to authorized data, using, for example, the DES128 encryption algorithm. Using these tools, firewall 206 can classify data as authorized or potentially malicious, based not only on the message header, but also on the content of the message.

Client terminal 200 may be implemented as a dedicated web terminal, or it may be implemented by a program installed on a programmable desktop computer, laptop or other workstation, or a personal computer controlled by a general operating system, for example, Windows XXX, OSX, Solaris XX, Linux, or freely distributed by BSD. In a preferred embodiment, the client terminal 200 contains an updated database for issuing a failure (for example, data on lost or stolen cards or restrictions on any particular card or group of cards), which provides additional security.

The application server 202 allows you to perform operations or other instructions from a remote user located at the client terminal 200, after the access control server 204 confirms the identity of the user. The access control server 204 allows a secure exchange with both the client terminal 200 and the application server 202 to store authentic fingerprint data and other information regarding previously registered users, to compare stored data with encrypted data coming in real time from the client terminal 200, and for informing the application server 202 about the correspondence of the incoming real-time data from the fingerprints stored by the particular fingerprint data s fingers.

In particular, the client terminal 200 additionally contains two main components: a stationary component - a card reader 208, including an Internet navigator (browser) terminal 210 and a card reader interface 108a (which can be a simple USB cable ending with a group of electrical contacts for making electrical connections to the corresponding pads of the ISO smart card), and the portable component 100 'in the form of a smart card. In one embodiment, the portable component 100 'may be a smart card 100 described above comprising a fingerprint sensor 110, a security processor 114, and an ISO smart card processor 112.

The application server 202 further comprises an Internet server interface, including a firewall 206 and an Internet navigator (server) 214, as well as an executive (application) module 216 ("Application") of the operating device and a data validation module 218 ("Authentication"). In the event that the application server and execution module 216 are conventional (legacy) devices that are not designed to communicate using the IP / TCP protocol, the firewall 206 can be replaced by a corresponding protocol converter, including a validation module 218 and having a fixed IP address. The application server may, for example, be managed by a third party offering online service to a registered user.

The access control server 204 further comprises an Internet server interface 220 (the “Server”), a processing (protection) module 222 containing a fingerprint comparison algorithm 224, and a database 226 for storing a fingerprint and other genuine information received from individual users when they were registered in the system and the guarantees of their identity were not in doubt by the operator. To further enhance protection, in the preferred embodiment, the registered data related to any person is not stored on the application server as a single information sequence, but instead each element is stored separately, and any necessary indexes or links combining these elements are available only using the appropriate key, which is stored as part of this private personal data in the access control server.

Coordinates

In some embodiments, the stationary reader 208 and / or portable card 100 ″ may also be equipped with an integrated global positioning satellite (GPS) receiver 212, which can provide useful information about the current location of the reader and map during this operation. In particular, the coordinate data from the GPS receiver 212 can be used to block (permanently or temporarily) the reader and / or card if this device or card is in a place where their use is not authorized. Coordinates can also be automatically determined by other than GPS means, for example, using PHS (Japanese cell phone) caller’s coordinate detection technology, or coordinate sensors that respond to local changes in the Earth’s electromagnetic fields. In the particular case of using maps equipped with GPS, it is desirable that the various components of the GPS receiver include an antenna, signal amplification, ADCs and sampling and storage devices, and a digital processor for calculating coordinates should be part of a single integrated circuit or be separate devices located on one A printed circuit board that is integrated, integrated, or laminated into the card material.

Map architecture for an ISO map with a built-in comparison circuit

ISO Processor Interfaces

Figure 4 presents a functional diagram of an exemplary biometric verification card 100 or 100 'that is compatible with an ISO smart card, which uses various physical data transmission paths when initially loading the cardholder’s biometric data and verifying the cardholder’s identity use at a remote location.

In particular, in addition to the ISO processor 112 described above, the security processor 114, the fingerprint sensor 110, the LEDs 116a, 116b and the optional GPS receiver 212, of which only the ISO processor is directly connected to the card reader 208 through the ISO pads 108 smart card, there is a separate module 300 download and the associated temporary connection 302, which provides direct communication with the processor 114 protection during the initial registration of the user. You may notice that the ISO processor 112 is connected to the protection processor 114 via I / O ports 304, 306, while the temporary download connection 302 is connected to a separate I / O port 308. In a preferred embodiment, the security processor is programmed so that access to any data related to the vulnerable protected area or program is possible only through port 308 and is not possible through ports 304 and 306, which eliminates the possibility of unauthorized access to these sensitive data after blocking the connection 302 .

Most ISO processors on the market have at least two I / O ports, and some have at least three. Only one of these ports (I / O 1) is designed for serial transmission of data through connections 108 from a conventional ISO smart card to an external ISO compatible card reader 208. In a preferred embodiment, the additional one or two I / O ports provide a dedicated, fixed connection between the ISO processor 112 and the security processor 114, which serves as a hardware firewall to block any malicious attempts to reprogram the security processor 114 or gain access to any sensitive information that could be previously read by the sensor 110 or can be stored in the processor 114. In the case of using an ISO processor with more than two input / output lines, it is possible to imagine more than yx states of static status information on the selected transmission line between ISO-processor and protection processor, such as 1) Ready, 2) Busy 3) Fail, and 4) transmission, even when the power from the protection processor is completely disabled. Of course, even if there is only one I / O port, these four states can be dynamically transferred as serial data.

Among the possible commands and data that can be transferred between the ISO processor and the protection processor via the I / O 2 and I / O 3 ISO I / O interfaces are the following:

- Commands for user registration or verification, in response to which the security processor must issue registration results or authentication results for local storage and / or transmission for use at a remote location.

- Information about the fingerprint as a reference (control) can be sent from the protection processor to the ISO processor to store the ISO smart card in memory for transmission for use at remote locations. In order to increase the security of sensitive personal information, control data can be encoded in the protection processor before being transferred to the ISO processor.

Boot connection 302 provides a direct connection to security processor 114, which bypasses any firewall protection provided by the ISO connection and associated dedicated I / O ports 304 and 306, while still maintaining connectivity between the ISO processor 112 and the ISO reader 208, so that power will also be supplied to the processor 114 protection. This is mainly used during the initial registration of a card for a specific user and requires protection against unauthorized access.

Figure 5 presents an alternative embodiment compared to the example of the biometric verification card shown in figure 4, which is intended for use with an unmodified processor of the ISO-smart card. In particular, the ISO processor 112 'no longer has to perform any protective function between the card reader 208 and the protection processor 114' both during normal use and during boot, so it can be any ISO-compliant circuit, not subjected to any modification and used in a manner fully compatible with both the card reader 208 and any external using device. In such an alternative embodiment, the security processor 114 'acts as a transparent firewall between the ISO processor 112' and any external device that uses it, if the read fingerprint matches the fingerprint stored in memory and blocks any communication if the read fingerprint does not match fingerprint stored in memory.

Map bootstrap and data protection

Pruning

In one embodiment, the manufactured card first has protruding printed circuit conductors that provide a direct connection to the security processor, as well as to at least part of the ISO interface and / or any part of the internal memory. This direct connection interface is used only for testing the card and registering fingerprint data on it and serves to supply a signal that controls the registration process. After registration is completed, these pins of the printed circuit are mechanically cut off, after which no further registration is possible, and the memory of the protection processor is accessible only through the ISO processor and the previously mentioned firewall between the ISO processor and the protection processor.

Melting

In another embodiment, the security processor has a memory that, after recording the pattern of the registered fingerprint, becomes inaccessible. One example of such a memory is a one-time programmable read-only memory (PROM), similar in design to an electrically programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), but opaque to ultraviolet radiation and therefore indelible. Another example is a flash ROM, which becomes readable only after registration is completed, for example, by supplying a sufficiently large current to the signal supply circuit UNLOCK or ADDRESS or DATA to physically destroy (melt) the circuit of this signal.

Validation example

In one embodiment, an exemplary procedure involves reading physical data of a fingerprint, for example, using optical methods, or pressure, or conductivity, or capacitance, or acoustic methods, or elastic properties, or photography, on a client terminal used by a client to obtain a connection with the service server of the application device, which are then sent (preferably in encrypted form) to a separate fingerprint access control server. The fingerprint access control server compares, using the identification program, the read fingerprint data with the fingerprint file that contains the registered fingerprint data of the user, and if the data matches, the access control server sends an unlock command to the application device service server.

In another embodiment, a user gains access to a secure web browser of a fingerprint access control server that contains fingerprint files, where all fingerprints are registered together with personal data, for example, name, address, date of birth. Then, a secure fingerprint access control server accessed by a user using a secure protocol, for example, in the format of a secure hypertext transfer protocol (HTTPS), sends a command to the client terminal to read the user's fingerprint on the client terminal. In response to the commands displayed by the navigator on the client terminal, the user places his selected finger on the fingerprint sensor, and the fingerprint reader installed in the client terminal reads the sampled fingerprint, for example, in the form of a pixel image with a resolution of 25 microns to 70 microns and an area of 12.5 mm by 25 mm and an 8-bit grayscale scale.

A secure fingerprint access control server receives fingerprint data together with user credentials, as well as the Internet IP address and / or individual fingerprint sensor code (mandatory access address), and / or cookies (password generated by the server at the first connection and sent to the user), and / or any unique code or other information identifying a particular person or terminal (for example, details of the previous contact between the client terminal and the secure access control server fingerprint), and then compares the received fingerprint data with a fingerprint file that contains previously registered fingerprint data together with user identification data, personal information, such as name, address, date of birth, information about offenses, driver’s license, number social insurance, etc., using an identification program that may include a comparison of small parts and / or a comparison using the fast Fur transformation ye.

Upon completion of the identification procedure, the web server 214 of the corresponding application device, by applying a visual or audio signal, instructs the user to place his finger on the fingerprint sensor 110 and click with the mouse button or keyboard key, thereby notifying the fingerprint reader in the protection processor 114. Then, the data of the fingerprint of the user is sent in encrypted form (for example, using a secure HTTPS communication protocol with RSA encoding) to the web server 220 of the fingerprint access control server 204 through the ISO processor 112 and the web browser 210 of the client terminal 200. If the read data matches the corresponding data in the database 226, the fingerprint access control server 204 confirms the authenticity of the user identity to both the client terminal 200 and the application server 202. Below is described, with reference to figure 3, an example of an embodiment using a three-way authentication protocol and a one-time password in the form of a coding sequence of random characters:

- The web browser 210 of the client terminal 200 accesses the corresponding web interface 214 of the application server 202 upon request for access to the application process 216.

- The web interface 214 of the application server 202 responds with an on-screen announcement of the start of the session and corresponding instructions for accessing the application process 216.

- The client terminal 200 instructs the ISO processor 112 to activate the security processor 114.

- ISO processor 112 includes a security processor 114.

- The protection processor 114 waits for the receipt of fingerprint data from the fingerprint sensor 110 and, upon receipt of reliable data, it extracts a sampled fingerprint image that is sent to the web browser 210 through the ISO processor 112.

- The web browser 210 sends the encoded version of the selected fingerprint image to the access control server 204 accompanied by associated information (or with encryption of this information) related to the involved card 100 'and card reader 208, for example, user credentials, client IP address terminal 200 and / or a fixed identification code (MAC address) of the sensor 110.

- The web interface 220 of the access control server 204, upon receipt of the selected fingerprint image along with other information from the client terminal 200, sends this information to the fingerprint comparison processor 222.

- Under the control of the comparison program 224, the fingerprint comparison processor 222 uses the received user identification or other user-specific related information to retrieve the corresponding fingerprint reference image from the database 226 and compares the read fingerprint image with the fingerprint reference image.

- The comparison result (coincidence or mismatch) is stored in the access history protocol along with related information identifying the terminal 200, the user identification card 100 'and the requested application device 216, and control returns to the web interface 220 of the access control server.

- If the result of the comparison is a match, the web interface 220 of the access control server generates a one-time password in the form of a sequence of request characters, which is sent to the client terminal 200, and uses this sequence of request characters as a random code to encrypt the associated information, which it stores as a corresponding response upon request for possible future use as a control.

- The client terminal 200 uses a sequence of request characters as a random code to encrypt a previously stored unencrypted copy of the associated information presented, which is then sent to the web interface 214 of the application server 202 as part of its response to the announcement of the start of an access session to the application device.

- The web interface 214 of the application server 202, upon receipt of the associated information encrypted with a random code, sends it to the application device 216, which associates it with a declared attempt to conduct a session from this client server, and sends the received related information in order to confirm a positive comparison result, which was encrypted with a random code in the client terminal using the request sequence generated by the access control server as a response to the request.

- The web interface 220 of the access control server 204, upon receipt of a response to the request from the application server, sends this response to the identification process 222, which compares it with its previously saved control copy of the expected response to the request to determine whether the user's identity has really been verified.

- Any information about the user with verified authenticity as a result of the comparison is then sent to the application process 216 via the web interface 220 of the access control server and the confirmation interface 218 of the application server 202.

- The confirmation interface 218 uses identification to confirm that the identity of the user in the original announced attempt to conduct the session is established.

- Once the authenticity of the user's identity is confirmed, the application (identification) process 216 switches to direct communication with the web navigator 210 of the client terminal 200 through the web interface 214 of the application server 202.

FIG. 6 shows an alternative identification process in which the entire comparison procedure is performed on the ISO-compliant card shown in FIG. 4 by the security processor 114, and no external access control server 204 is used. The left side of FIG. 6 shows the functions performed by the application server 202, while the right shows the functions performed by the ISO smart card 100.

When the smart card 100 is inserted into the card reader 208, from the reader both to the ISO processor (START step 502) and to the fingerprint protection processor 114 ("Fingerprint verification step 504"), the initial setup signal position (RST) and both processors are powered by VCC from the card reader 208 (CLK clocks; RST reset signal). After that, the ISO processor issues a message to confirm the initialization (ATR) and the necessary choice of protocol and parameters (PPS) (step 506). At the same time, the fingerprint processor goes into standby mode for receiving fingerprint data and, when the data is received from the sensor 110, performs identification (step 504).

When the initial request command is sent by the application device 216 to the ISO processor 112 (step 508), the ISO processor requests (step 510) the security processor for identification status. If the answer is yes, the ISO processor responds to the call by executing the required command (step 512). Otherwise (either an error message or a negative response from the protection processor 114), it does not give any response to the required command and expects a new first request (step 508b).

If the fingerprint was authenticated and the first response was received in a timely manner and should be followed by the response of the application device 216 (step 514), then the demand / response process continues (steps 516, 518, 520) until the specified time limit is exceeded verification during which no requirements were received from the application device (step 522), or the application device did not receive the expected response (step 524).

The block diagram of FIG. 7 is similar to the block diagram of FIG. 6, but is adapted for use with the biometric verification card shown as an example in FIG. 5. The functions performed by the application server 202 are shown on the left edge, the next column corresponds to the reader 208, the next column describes the ISO contacts 108, the next shows the functions performed by the protection processor 114, while the functions performed by an unmodified processor are shown on the right 112 ISO smart cards.

- When the smart card is either inserted into the card reader or the application program starts controlling the card reader, the reset signal (RST) 550 is sent from the card reader 208 to the security processor 114.

- Shortly after the security processor receives the reset signal 550, it sends the corresponding reset signal 552 to the ISO processor 112. At the same time, the security processor waits for fingerprint data from the fingerprint sensor.

- Upon receipt of the initialization (reboot) signal 552, the ISO processor responds with an ATR 554 (initialization confirmation), and then provides the necessary PPS (protocol and parameter selection).

- As soon as the security processor 114 receives the ATR (initialization confirmation) from the ISO processor, it transfers it to the card reader (step 556), including all associated PPS commands.

“In the meantime, if the security processor receives fingerprint data, it performs the previously described identification.” In the case of a positive identification result (PASS), this status is maintained for a certain time. If the result is NO (Failed), the security processor 114 waits for new fingerprint data.

- After the application device completes operation, the command request 558 is sent to the protection processor, which transmits the command request 560 to the ISO processor, and also transmits its correct answer 562 to the card reader only if the protection processor still has the status PASSED above or if the last correct answer contains a request code for additional data (verification step 564).

- Otherwise (there is no branch 566), the fingerprint processor generates an empty request 568 and transfers it to the ISO processor, and also transfers the resulting error response 570 (ERR) to the card reader 216, which ensures the required synchronization between sequence numbers in requirements and answers.

Encryption and Security

In a preferred embodiment, before transmission over any external network, any sensitive data and / or identification results are encrypted, possibly using the DES data encryption standard or the Two Fish cipher (256-bit block cipher). The encryption key can be based on the read or stored fingerprint data, user identification code, unique code assigned to the sensor, memory address, neighboring data in memory, other functionally related data, previous data exchange (operation), IP address, terminal code assigned password. On the other hand, sensitive data can be transmitted over the Internet using the secure HTTPS protocol.

To provide an even higher level of security, a private virtual gateway, for example, a DES encryption and decryption device, can be introduced between the secure fingerprint identification server and the network connection and, accordingly, between the application server and the network connection. Thanks to the use of such a virtual gateway or private network ("VPN"), sensitive data is provided with additional protection with another layer of encryption, for example, using both DES-128 (commonly used in VPNs) and RSA (used in HTTPS).

To provide even more secure applications, all communications may be covered by additional security measures. In particular, the message header in the lower level can be encrypted in the upper level.

Wireless connection

Other embodiments may include a dual interface that provides both wired (ISO 7816) and wireless (ISO 1443 A or B) operation, and in a preferred embodiment include a multi-interface power unit that interconnects wired ISO 7816 and legacy wireless (among others) ISO 1443 A, ISO 1443 B, ISO 15693 and HID systems, all on one card. Alternatively, the card may contain means for using other wireless technologies, for example, Bluetooth (at a short distance), or cellular communication (medium range), or a microwave channel (long-distance communication).

Next, refer to Fig. 8, which shows a smart card with built-in biometric verification, which can be connected to the local terminal either through the radio channel or through an electrical connector. In its main features, it is similar in design and architecture to the previously described embodiment shown in Fig. 1, and the same reference designation numbers (possibly differing in one apostrophe) refer to similar elements. In particular, the ISO processor 112 is shown elsewhere (under pins 108, and not away from them), but performs the same functions as in the previously described card.

The ISO antenna 132 comprises two loops, mainly located on the periphery of the card 100 and providing an ISO-compatible wireless interface with the ISO processor 112 for both data exchange and power, similar to the functions of the wired electrical interface 108. In addition, the antenna 130 protection (in the example shown is located inside the antenna 132 and consists of only one loop) provides a separate power source for the protection processor 114 through a DC-DC controller (DC / DC) 120. Since there is no direct connection For data transmitted over the air, except through ISO processor 112, sensitive data stored inside security processor 114 is not exposed to unauthorized access through such a wireless interface. Alternatively, as shown above with respect to embodiments having only wired connections with an external reader and an external network, the functions of both processors can be combined, or an external connection can be made through a protection processor 114 instead of an ISO processor 112, where therefore, security arrangements for wireless communications must be taken.

Fig.9 shows a cross section of the map shown in Fig.8. You can notice that most of the described components are contained in the Central layer 124, while only the contact pads 108 protrude through the upper protective layer 122. Access to the working area of the sensor 110 is through the upper window in the upper layer 122 and the lower window in the printed circuit board 134, which located between the upper layer 122 and the Central layer 124 and on which are located all the necessary electrical connections between the various electronic components, as well as the grounding bus for electrostatic discharge surrounding hydrochloric area sensor 110.

You can also see the bottom layer 126 and the magnetic strip 128.

Fingerprint sensor

Figure 10 shows an example of an electrical circuit of the sensor 110, in which the matrix 400 of the sensor cells 402 is organized in rows 404 and columns 406. As shown in the diagram, each cell 402 includes a read gate 410 and a transducer 412. A fingerprint is formed by ridges and grooves on the skin finger. The transducer 412 of each sensor cell experiences a change in mechanical and / or electrical characteristics when one of these ridges touches in the immediate vicinity of the cell 402 in the area of the matrix 400, which as a result creates a discrete image of a fingerprint due to micro-changes in pressure across the sensor surface from ridges and grooves at the end of the finger. It should be noted that although each transducer 412 is depicted as a single variable capacitor, there are various types of transducers that can respond to the presence of one of these ridges of the human skin: in a particular example of the use of a pressure-sensitive thin-film piezoelectric transducer, the film in the cell region undergoes deformation and produces charge stored in a capacitor connected to this cell. In this case, the voltage across the capacitor is a function of the mechanical stress arising from the deformation of the piezoelectric material, which, in turn, depends on what is above the cell — a protrusion or recess. When the signal from the corresponding column driver 414 opens the gate 410 of this cell, and the corresponding line driver 416 is grounded, a voltage appears on the output electrode 418 of the line, which is converted to an 8-bit binary signal in the output driver 420. To ensure maximum sensitivity of the piezocrystal to deformation, the piezoelectric can be applied to an elastic material, such as polyimide, or it can simply be a polyimide material with piezoelectric properties. Other methods of forming analog converters that can be used in a similar matrix configuration include variable resistances and variable capacitances. In another embodiment, each cell may contain a simple discrete key that generates only one bit of information; in this case, additional bits of information can be generated by using a larger number of cells in one place or by polling each cell with a higher frequency. In such an alternative embodiment, there is no need to use an ADC.

In an exemplary embodiment, the sensor with a thickness of only 0.33 mm is strong enough to be embedded in a smart card and is not affected by static electricity, composition and condition (wet, dry, warm, cold) of the user's skin. A typical unit cell size of the sensor 110 is from 25 μm to 70 μm, and a typical pitch is from 25 to 70 μm. An example sensor has a sensitive area of 12.5 mm × 25 mm and has an 8-bit dynamic range. Such a sensor can be created on the basis of a TFT matrix (thin film transistor) and a pressure sensitive capacitor, for example, formed by a thin film piezoelectric material, for example, mixed titanium oxide and barium oxide or strontium oxide and barium oxide, and contains an upper electrode that covers and protects the entire sensitive area . When creating mechanical stress, an appropriate charge is generated and stored in a thin-film piezoelectric capacitor. Alternatively, the pressure-using sensor can be made as a TFT matrix with a thin-film capacitor, and a pressure sensitive capacitor, for example, formed by a sheet of pressure-transmitting material, for example a rubber sheet with inclusions of carbon fiber, metal (for example, copper or tin or silver), metallized carbon fiber or fiberglass reinforced paper, or an elastic material (e.g. silicon) with metal inclusions, and an upper film electrode that covers all sensitive rhnost.

A particular fingerprint sensor element 402 outputs electrical data via row and column drivers 416, 414 to an output circuit 420, thereby converting a physical input effect representing a user's fingerprint into analog electrical data. Next, the analog-to-digital converter in the output circuit 420 converts the analog electrical signal into a digital electrical signal. Each thin-film transistor optionally connects a common combined string to the voltage on the corresponding capacitor, which ensures that the voltage is read from each capacitor and thereby measure the deformation of each cell. In a preferred embodiment, the entire column of thin-film transistors is connected at the same time, as a result of which several cells (for example, 8) in one selected column can be read in parallel to the outputs of different rows. Combining many gates into rows and columns reduces the number of joins, and parallel reading of many cells of different rows belonging to the same column reduces the time needed to poll the entire matrix. The output voltage from the sensor can be amplified by a differential amplifier. The output signal of such an amplifier is fed to a sampling and storage device before analog-to-digital conversion to ADC.

The substrate may be glass (for example, non-alkaline glass), stainless steel, aluminum, ceramic (for example, aluminum oxide), paper, epoxy with fiberglass, but it is desirable to make it from crystalline silicon. The thin film semiconductor material may be in the form of amorphous silicon, polycrystalline silicon, diamond, or any other thin film of a semiconductor. The piezoelectric material may be a piezoelectric ceramic, for example, in the form of a thin film of lead zirconate titanate (PZT), the thickness of which in a preferred embodiment is from 0.1 to 50.0 μm, or a piezoelectric polymer polyimide film. For compounds, the following materials can be used:

T / Ni / Cu, Al, Ti / Ni / Au, AI / Au, W / Cu, W / Au, WAu.

11 shows a holder assembly for a sensor formed on a thin crystalline silicon substrate. Crystalline silicon has excellent electrical properties and provides integration of the sensor matrix with the necessary driver and output circuits, however, a thin silicon wafer of relatively large size will bend and crack under the influence of pressure on its surface. An illustrative holder is a much stiffer construction than a silicon sheet of the same overall thickness.

As shown, the silicon monolithic sheet 430 has a thickness of about 0.1 mm and is surrounded by a frame 432 of the same thickness of the glass-epoxy composite, which is fixed to the support plate 434, also representing an epoxy resin structure with glass fiber and having a thickness of about 0.05 mm. The frame 432 and the support plate 434 can be easily made using conventional printed circuit board (PCB) manufacturing techniques. In particular, the upper and lower surfaces of the base plate 434 are coated with a thin layer 436 of copper, separated by an insert of a glass-epoxy composite. The frame 432 has several soldering pads 440 around its periphery for connection to a protection processor 114. A thin silicon crystal 430 is glued with epoxy to the frame 432 and the plate 434, and the active regions are electrically connected to the corresponding electrical conductors in the frame 430 by jumpers 442 from ordinary wires on parts 444 of the open edge of silicon 430 surrounding the protective upper electrode 446.

Comparison algorithms

For local processing using the card itself, when the computing capabilities are limited and only an attempt is made to simply compare 1: 1 with a single control sample, the software for comparing fingerprints can be based on a fairly direct comparison of small parts taken from two patterns. For example, a grayscale image of a fingerprint can be reduced to two levels - white and black, and three-dimensional ridges are converted into two-dimensional thin lines (vectors). The accuracy of this method, therefore, depends, among other things, on the erosion, sticking, deformation and partial absence of line sections and other factors. Although the method based on the use of small details is fundamentally less accurate, for its implementation it requires less computing resources and provides compatibility with many existing databases.

To perform processing on a remote access control server, where there is more computing power and more careful distinction may be required, a comparison algorithm based on only phase correlation (POC - Phase Only Correlation) can be used. ROS is an identification algorithm based on macroscopic comparison of images as a whole. In contrast to the one described above, ROS provides a comprehensive comparison of structural information - from details to the image as a whole. Therefore, the ROS can ensure the stability of obtaining high accuracy when exposed to interference, for example, sticking and partial prodanie pattern. This method, in principle, is free from the negative effects of spatial displacement and the difference in brightness, has high speed (about 0.1 second for offline comparisons) and high accuracy. For example, the POC software can perform spatial frequency comparisons of two fingerprint patterns using two-dimensional fast Fourier transform (“2DFFT”). 2DFFT converts a matrix of digital data representing the physical two-dimensional distribution of a fingerprint pattern into a spatial spectral distribution, in other words, an inverse spatial distribution, where a higher spatial frequency corresponds to a more frequent pattern. To perform a pattern comparison in the spatial frequency domain, a rotation transformation can be used. The POC-comparison of patterns has an additional advantage over the comparison of vectors of small details, since it does not respond to common defects in the pattern of a registered fingerprint, which POC qualifies as a hindrance, and the analysis of small details is perceived as meaningful information.

For particularly demanding applications, an even higher degree of accuracy and safety, compared to using each method separately, can ensure their joint use. For example, the methodology for comparing small parts can be applied at the location where the fingerprint is read, while the POC methodology can be used on a remote server. Alternatively, in the comparison process, an analysis of both small details and spatial relationships can be carried out to obtain a joint result that takes into account the results of both comparisons.

Applications

The technical solutions described above provide a high level of security for numerous applications both in trade and industry, as well as in financial and government institutions. Depending on the specific requirements on the same card and / or on the same access control server, protection can be performed simultaneously for several different applications. In one embodiment, a single card can provide up to 24 independent and secure applications. For example, this technology can provide access / denial of access (physical or logical), identification of the exact location and / or movement of personnel and / or monitoring the composition of individuals, while also providing services for other secure applications, each of which is completely and reliably isolated from the others.

Among the possible applications are the following:

- identification and access at airports

- ensuring the safety of buildings

- access to rooms and payment of bills in hotels

- in hospitals

- providing online gambling

- loading entertainment programs

- birth certificates

- access to a computer

- driver's license - a single identification card for transport workers (TWIC - Transportation Worker Identity Credential)

- electronic wallet

- urgent access to medical information

- license for blasting

- access to government and military institutions

- license for the transport of hazardous materials (HAZMAT - Hazardous Materials)

- Medicare and other social services service cards

- parking access

- passport

- pilot license

- port employee identification / access card

- insurance policy card

- social security card

- ID for simplified transport access for trusted persons

- visa or entry / exit card

- voter registration card

- food stamp and other social assistance program card

For many of these applications, it is desirable that the card’s internal memory also contains various personal information that is protected only when the registered cardholder has verified his identity and authorized access. Such personal information may be:

- personal data, such as name, place of residence, date of birth, place of birth, nationality, religion, membership in organizations, social security number, driver’s license number, passport number, and immigration data, such as type of visa, visa validity, citizenship and others;

- financial information, such as electronic wallet, Visa, Master Card, American Express, etc., credit card information, bank information, such as bank name, bank balance, money transfer information, TIN (IRS - Internal Revenue Service - Internal Revenue Service ), bankruptcy information, money transfer information, etc .;

- anthropometric and health data, such as biometric identification information, such as height, weight, fingerprints, iris, retina, arm size, bone structure, voice, DNA; blood type, results of medical diagnostics; medical history; prescribed treatment; insurance information; reactions to certain psychological and physiological tests, etc .;

- cases of violation of the law, such as criminal dossiers, serious crimes, non-dangerous crimes, violations;

- information for emergency circumstances, for example, about burials, relatives and other information about contacts, a lawyer, data of a religious nature;

- education, data on places of work, including educational institutions, qualifications obtained, work in companies, according to FDD - data on previous calls (data on previous entries and information retrieval is stored);

- information related to personal identification, for example, a fingerprint pattern, a processed fingerprint pattern, fingerprint processing results;

- passwords, for example a permanent password, a temporary password and / or a one-time password;

- encryption keys, for example a public key, a private key and / or a one-time key.

Next, an example of a card registration system will be described.

The applicant fills out the application and submits it, preferably with the attachment of a photograph and a fingerprint. For most applicants, verification of their basic documents - birth certificates and passports, and simply double-checking the information provided on one or more available government or commercial databases is sufficient to verify the identity of the person.

After the identity of the person has been thus verified, the applicant contacts the card manufacturing unit, where any information deemed necessary by the card issuer is loaded into the card. The applicant applies his fingerprint to the sensor on the map. After the fingerprint is correctly placed on the sensor and loaded into the card, a current pulse is applied to the contact on the card, which burns out certain jumpers, which prevents the possibility of further recording anything in this area of the card. Then this contact is cut off (like a detachable cable). After that, reading out the card or writing to it can be done only through a contact reader ISO-device or a wireless ISO-system.

If you use an access control server that is part of the network, some of the data that is downloaded to the card, or all of this data is also transmitted in encrypted form to a remote server, possibly having additional data that is usually not stored on the card, but which may be required for some applications requiring high security.

Claims (24)

1. An identification card containing built-in memory for storing control data, an integrated sensor for reading biometric data in real time, a processor designed to compare the read biometric data with the corresponding recorded control data within a predetermined threshold and generate a verification message including at least at least, part of the read biometric data and part of the control data, if the comparison result is within a given threshold, means for transmitting a verification message to the remote access control network for further additional verification. 2. The card according to claim 1, which is adapted to generate a verification message, including one that differs from locally stored control data. 3. The card according to claim 1, in which the first processor is adapted to use an algorithm different from the algorithm used in the remote access control system. 4. The card according to claim 1, which is compatible with a standard ISO smart card. 5. The card according to claim 4, which further comprises a second processor compatible with the ISO standard smart card. 6. The card according to claim 5, in which the first protection processor is functionally separated from the second processor by a firewall. 7. The card according to claim 5, in which the first processor is installed with the possibility of the passage of all incoming and outgoing external data through the second processor. 8. The card according to claim 5, in which the second processor of the ISO smart card is installed with the ability to pass all incoming and outgoing external data through the first processor. 9. The card according to claim 5, in which the first processor has a first connection for downloading data during the download process and a second connection connected to an external network. 10. The card according to claim 9, in which the first connection has an irreversible gap made after completion of the loading process. 11. The card according to claim 5, which further comprises an upper region of the magnetic strip and an embossed lower region, the biometric sensor being a fingerprint sensor, and the first processor, second processor and fingerprint sensor located in the middle region between the upper region of the magnetic strip and the lower embossed area. 12. The card according to claim 1, which captures and processes biometric data, including fingerprint data. 13. The card according to item 12, in which the first processor is adapted to the use of biometric data obtained by moving the user's finger on the sensor with the optimal location of the finger above it. 14. The card according to item 12, in which the first processor is adapted to the data capture process, which takes into account both small details and general spatial relationships in the read biometric data. 15. The card according to claim 11, in which the fingerprint sensor contains a silicon sheet resting on a support plate. 16. The card according to clause 15, in which the base plate contains a layer of a glass-epoxy composite located between two layers of metal. 17. The card according to item 12, in which the support plate is reinforced with a holder frame surrounding the silicon sheet. 18. The card according to claim 1, which further comprises means for restricting the use of the card to a predetermined location. 19. The map of claim 18, wherein the map access controls include a GPS system. 20. A method for monitoring user recognition, which consists in capturing biometric data of a user using a biometric data reading sensor, comparing biometric data with control data of a user, by transmitting to the remote control system a first message including at least part of the fixed biometric data, recording information about user from the first message and comparing it with previously recorded for this user in a remote information control system and soap has a second message, including information about the right of access. 21. The method according to claim 20, characterized in that when trying to log in to the system, a verification message of the application server is generated, a request is sent from the message server to the remote access control system, and the result of the response from the application server is transmitted to the identification card. 22. The method according to claim 20, characterized in that they form a request to the remote control system, transmit the request from the remote control system to the identification card, generate a response to the identification card, transmit the response to the application server, transmit the response of the application server to the remote control system, and conclude that there are access rights. 23. The method according to claim 20, characterized in that the output from the identification card is used to access the protected area. 24. The method according to p. 23, characterized in that they fix for an identification card attempts to receive and deny access rights.

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