RU2264935C1 - Method to prevent high-jacking of vehicles - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: transport engineering; security systems.

SUBSTANCE: with vehicle standing still, when ignition is switch on, electronic identification mark is irradiated by high-frequency signal by means of readout device installed on vehicle. Identification mark forms response coded high-frequency signal which is received by readout device, demodulated and unlocking code is revealed which is compared with tolerable codes and if it coincides with one of said codes, local unlocking code is transmitted to control relays along vehicle supply bus. Simultaneously coded message corresponding to event-transmission or lack of transmission of local unlocking code, is recorded in memory of central control unit. With vehicle running, after reception of message by standard communication network or paging channel containing locking code, engine locking code is transmitted to controlled relays along vehicle ignition bus and engine is locked. Simultaneously, coded message corresponding to said event is recorded in memory of central control unit. In process of operation of vehicle, coded messages on all events are read off from memory of central control unit and electronic protocol of events is formed from said coded messages which is recorded in nonvolatile memory of vehicle. At above-indicated irradiation of identification mark, in interval between moment of switching on the ignition and moment of transmission of local unlocking code along vehicle supply bus, electronic protocol of events is read out from nonvolatile memory of vehicle and corresponding coded massage is formed, and high-frequency signal is modulated by said message and is transmitted during preset time internal to identification mark, said signal is received, demodulated and coded message is recorded in nonvolatile memory of identification mark, code confirming said record is formed and introduced into response coded high-frequency signal. If said confirming code is not present in response coded high-frequency signal received by read out device, passing of local unlocking code to controlled relays is prohibited. Coded message recorded in nonvolatile memory of identification mark is sent to personal computer, is processed, and electronic protocol of events obtained in processing is displayed for visual observation on monitor screen of personal computer and/or paper carrier for presenting to insurance company by user.

EFFECT: reduced to minimum losses of insurance company caused by falsification of insurance events to help insurance company in their investigation.

2 tbl, 2 dwg

Description

The invention relates to techniques for protecting vehicles (TS) from unauthorized use, in particular to methods of dealing with vehicle theft.

To date, the Russian market of anti-theft systems can be considered established. As noted in the review "Anti-theft systems. Yesterday, today, tomorrow," published on the site www.autonews.ru November 10, 2003 signed by the chief manager of the Center for Automotive Security, among the variety of anti-theft systems, the following main groups can be distinguished:

- vehicle alarm systems;

- immobilizers;

- radio search systems.

Each of these groups has its advantages and disadvantages, which can be objectively assessed only by clearly knowing what tasks will be assigned to the chosen anti-theft system. The determining factor in assessing the effectiveness of a particular anti-theft system is the opinion of insurance companies, or rather, the size of the discount that an insurance company takes on theft risk in the event that an anti-theft system is installed on the insured vehicle.

It is known that the largest discount (up to 75%) for insurance against theft is provided by insurance companies in cases where the policyholder has an agreement with the operator of the radio search system.

A pioneer in this field is Mosvneshinform CJSC, which has been operating the American LO / JACK radio search system in Moscow since 1996 (for example, advertising materials of Mosvneshinform CJSC, Operation Manual, Moscow, 1998). The structure of this system includes the following main nodes:

- VLU transponder covertly mounted on the vehicle;

- several geographically spaced base stations containing a VAT enable transmitter and an antenna mounted on a tower;

- a central computer station VAC with a database located in the quick response center;

- the VTC tracker installed on police pursuit vehicles is a computer tracking unit that includes a four-element direction finding antenna with units for processing and displaying information about the range and bearing of the VLU transponder located on the wanted vehicle.

If the user of the vehicle (the owner of the vehicle or his authorized person) identifies the theft or theft of the vehicle, he shall apply (in writing or by phone) to the LO / JACK quick response center or to the police on-call department. The operator of the LO / JACK system activates the VLU transponder installed on the stolen vehicle (TCB) by sending him a code message with the VAT activation transmitter installed on the antenna tower. The VLU transponder turns on and begins to send a signal through which it is possible to detect the TCB from police pursuit vehicles equipped with VTC trackers. The central computer station VAC communicates with VAT enable transmitters via telephone channels (via modems).

After one of the VTC trackers detects and detects a working VLU transponder, the “Trap” operation begins to pursue and intercept the TCB. It involves several patrol vehicles equipped with VTC trackers from a specialized police unit. VTC trackers detect the radiation source. Guided by their testimonies and information obtained using standard radio stations from other crews, patrol vehicle prosecutions gradually tighten the TCB capture ring.

The disadvantages of the above radio search and interception system are:

1. High probability of TCB “leaving” from the system coverage area, associated with a long response time, that is, with the interval between the beginning of unauthorized use of the vehicle and the beginning of its search using VTC trackers, since the specified search starts only after the registration of the corresponding call from the TCB user or Police officers, or in the quick response center of the LO / JACK system.

2. The lack of initial "target designation" at the time of the beginning of the search for TCB. The location of the TCB is carried out directly from police patrol cars in the search process. This forces the police to maintain specialized units for this purpose, whose patrol cars must be on duty around the clock, moving around the city. This requires significant operational costs, while the main forces and means of militia, based in DC, are practically deprived of the opportunity to participate in operations to search for and intercept TCBs.

3. The need to intercept the TCB in traffic, which poses a threat to the safety of road users and the TCB itself, and, in addition, creates serious legal difficulties in the event of a traffic accident caused by the actions of police patrol cars.

In modern radio search systems, the most popular of which today are the Caesar Satellite and Autolocator (the review “More is at stake than a car - HIS INSURANCE” in the magazine “Master 12 Volt”, No. 47, p. 69- 80), the on-board transponder (beacon) turns on automatically immediately at the time of unauthorized exposure to the vehicle. At the same time, the global satellite radio navigation system (GPS) is used to determine the location of the TCB, the data are transmitted to the dispatcher via the standard cellular mobile network (GSM network), and the TCF is intercepted after forced remote jamming of the engine, which is important from the point of view of ensuring road safety and safety of the TCB.

However, according to the aforementioned chief manager of the Center for Automotive Safety, radio search systems of this type are most likely not to take root. The reasons for this are the relatively high cost, and most importantly, the presence of a monthly fee, which is a psychological barrier for most buyers.

A significant drawback of the existing radio search systems is that they are already fighting theft after the theft has occurred, while the success of the operation largely depends on the speed and professionalism of the actions of law enforcement agencies, which, as you know, are not always at their best.

It should also be noted that GPS and GSM channels are highly vulnerable to intentional interference.

An alternative to radio search systems is modern anti-theft alarm systems (catalog "Automotive Security Systems", Moscow, LLC "Altonika", 2004). These complexes combine the properties of alarm systems and immobilizers, the requirements of which are regulated by the state standard of the Russian Federation GOST R 41.97-99 or UNECE Rules No. 97, parts I and III, respectively.

The line of security and anti-theft systems originates with the simplest immobilizers - anti-theft systems with a ban on starting the engine of a stolen vehicle. The specified line includes, in particular, automobile anti-theft systems of the BLACK BUG PLUS family (BLACK BUG PLUS BT-71L, BT-71F, BT-71W and others), commercially available by the applicant company (certificate of conformity No. РОСС RU.MT08.B02051) .

Each of these systems contains a central control unit connected via a cable on-board network, sensors of unauthorized influence on the vehicle, alarm components, door blocking nodes, blocking units of the vehicle’s functional organs, a remote user identification unit, the output of which is connected to the start input of the central control unit, group the signal input of which is connected to the outputs of sensors of unauthorized influence on the vehicle, door blocking units and blocking units are functional x organs of the vehicle, and the outputs with the control inputs of these sensors, nodes of the alarm, nodes blocking doors and nodes of blocking the functional organs of the vehicle.

The applicant enterprise also produces anti-theft systems of the REEF SPACE family (S-300, S-301 and others) that provide the possibility of forcibly stopping the TCB engine by issuing the appropriate command via the paging communication channel.

The main operating modes and parameters of the aforementioned anti-theft systems are given in the "Automotive Security Systems" catalog, Moscow, Altonika LLC, 2003, pp. 8-11.

These anti-theft systems and methods of their operation are protected by patents RU No. 2159191, 60 R 25/00, RU No. 2160196, 60 R 25/00, RU No. 2160675, 60 R 25/00, RU No. 2172263, 60 R 25 / 00, RU No. 2221711, B 60 R 25/00, RU 2237585, B 60 R 25/00.

A high degree of vehicle protection with the help of these systems is achieved, in particular, by eliminating the identification capabilities (both visual and electrical) of the functional units of the vehicle's functional blocks, due to the use of a standard onboard power supply network (or ignition bus) for transmitting control signals, and also due to the use of remotely controlled relays produced by the applicant company under the HOOK-UP (certificate No. 170323) and WAIT UP (certificate No. 206899, 22 in the blocking nodes of the functional organs of the vehicle) 6719). Further, for brevity, these controllable relays will be referred to as HOOK-UP relay nodes and WAIT UP relay nodes. HOOK-UP relay nodes and WAIT UP relay nodes are controlled by a standard on-board ignition bus and have the appearance of standard automotive relays, so it is extremely difficult to visually detect them. In addition, the relay unit WAIT UP allows you to block the movement of the vehicle even in cases where the hijacker managed to start the engine and start moving the vehicle.

The modern anti-theft systems described above are difficult to “crack” and only the most experienced hijackers, or rather organized groups of hijackers, can hope for success. But the possibility of a criminal conspiracy of a hijacker and a car service worker or a service station employee cannot be ruled out. As practice has shown, this option is quite real.

If the vehicle is insured, then there is a very high probability of another type of criminal conspiracy - between the hijacker and the owner-insurer of the vehicle. In this case, losses are incurred by the insurance company, which is obliged to pay the cost of the TCB to the insured. The anti-theft systems described above are not able to protect against this type of fraud. This is one of the main reasons why insurance companies do not give them as high discounts as for radio search systems, whose work is controlled by dispatch centers and law enforcement agencies.

The present invention is aimed at reducing the degree of influence of this factor in insurance of the vehicle at the risk of "theft". It is designed to increase the attractiveness of security and anti-theft systems in the eyes of insurance companies, which should result in a narrowing of the gap between the size of the discounts given by insurance companies for the risk of "hijacking" when installing an autonomous operating security and anti-theft system on the vehicle, and the size of the discount given under the condition that the policyholder has entered into an agreement with the operator of the radio search system.

As a prototype of the invention, a method is implemented that is implemented in the aforementioned system for protecting the vehicle against unauthorized use according to patent RU 2237585, 60 R 25/00, having the greatest number of similar essential features with the proposed technical solution.

According to the prototype method, when the ignition is switched on, the TC is irradiated with a high-frequency signal using an electronic identification tag installed on board the tag reader, an electronic coded high-frequency signal containing a unique unlock code stored in the non-volatile memory of the electronic identification tag is generated with an electronic identification tag, this coded high-frequency signal with a tag reader, demodulate, select an unlock code, transmit it to the central control unit, they are compared with valid unlock codes previously unlocked in the memory of the central control unit — the unlock codes of personal electronic identification tags of all TS users — and a code message is generated in the central control unit that corresponds to the event that occurred — the unlock code matches one of the valid unlock codes or the absence of such a match, and if the codes match, they form a local unlock code and transmit it via the ignition bus the control inputs of the HOOK-UP relay nodes and the WAIT UP relay nodes, which are capable of blocking the TS functional bodies, and in the absence of the indicated codes coincidence, they block the TS engine, and after receiving a message containing a paging channel via a standard communication network, for example, via a paging channel blocking code, block the engine and at the same time form a code message in the central control unit corresponding to this event.

The subject of the present invention is a method of counteracting theft of a vehicle, according to which, when the ignition is switched on, a high-frequency signal is irradiated with an electronic identification tag mounted on board the tag reader, an electronic coded high-frequency signal containing a unique unlock code stored in the non-volatile memory of the electronic identification tag is formed by an electronic identification tag , take this encoded high frequency signal with a tag reader, demo they’ll verify, isolate the unlock code, transfer it to the central control unit, compare with valid unlock codes previously unlocked in the central control unit memory — unlock codes for personal electronic identification tags of all TS users — and form a code message in the central control unit that corresponds to the event that occurred - a match an unlock code with one of the valid unlock codes or the absence of such a match, and if the codes match, they form a locale a unlock code intended for transmission via the on-board ignition bus to the control inputs of the HOOK-UP relay nodes and WAIT UP relay nodes, which are capable of blocking the TS functional bodies, and in the absence of the indicated codes coincidence, they block the TS engine, and upon receipt via the standard network communication, for example via a paging channel, messages containing a blocking code, block the engine and at the same time form a code message in the central control unit corresponding to this event, and p after each code message corresponding to the event has been generated in the central control unit, the specified code message is transmitted to the electronic event protocol generator, the electronic event protocol is generated from the specified code messages and recorded in the non-volatile memory of the vehicle, and after the fact of the unlock code coinciding with one of permissible unlock codes, read the electronic protocol of events from the non-volatile memory of the vehicle, form the corresponding codes from it th package, modulate it with a high-frequency signal, transmit it to an electronic identification tag, receive this signal with an electronic identification tag, demodulate, write the code package to the non-volatile memory of the electronic identification tag, form a confirmation code for the recording made in the electronic identification tag, enter it into the generated electronic identification tag tagged response encoded high-frequency signal, receive this high-frequency signal with a tag reader, demodulation They select a confirmation code for the recording, control their compliance with the verification code for the electronic record valid for the electronic identification tag and, if the control is positive, transfer the local unlock code previously generated by the central control unit to the control inputs of the HOOK-UP relay nodes and WAIT UP relay nodes, with the help of a programmer-reader connected with a personal computer, code packages written in non-energy are read into a personal computer the independent memory of all personal electronic identification tags of vehicle users, whose unique numbers are contained in the memory of a personal computer, digitally process the read code parcels, as a result of which electronic event logs containing unique numbers of electronic identification tags are isolated, display these unique numbers on the monitor screen personal computer, compare them with the unique numbers of personal electronic identification tags of all users of the vehicle, record PC nnym in memory and - in the case of coincidence of these unique numbers - are displayed in a human-readable form of electronic records events on the screen and / or on paper.

The objective of the present invention is the creation of such a methodology to counter theft of the vehicle, which would minimize the losses of the insurance company associated with possible falsification of insurance cases (in particular, if there is a criminal conspiracy of the hijacker with the owner-insurer of the vehicle) and help the insurance company in their analysis.

The expected technical result is associated with the use of new information technology, which consists in recording in a non-volatile memory (in the form of an electronic protocol of events) on board the vehicle all "normal events" and "disturbing events" that occurred with the vehicle, followed by recording this electronic protocol of events in electronic an identification tag, which is then submitted to the insurance company for analysis and objective evaluation of the information contained therein.

The technical idea of the invention is as follows.

During the operation of the vehicle with its condition, a number of significant changes occur, the so-called "events". Examples of events include turning the ignition on and off, attempts to hijack or hijack a vehicle, attempts to electronically “crack” anti-theft equipment, receive external commands, etc. When each such event occurs, a code message about it is recorded in the non-volatile memory of the vehicle. An electronic protocol of events is formed from these code messages in non-volatile memory. If during the recording of the next code message in non-volatile memory in the area of the tag reader there is a personal electronic identification tag of one of the TS users, the electronic event log is copied to the non-volatile memory of this electronic identification tag from the non-volatile memory of the TS. At the end of copying the electronic protocol of events, the electronic identification tag generates an acknowledgment signal that arrives at the onboard part of the anti-theft equipment and is taken into account in a certain way in the operation of the onboard part of the anti-theft equipment. In particular, the electronic protocol of events is copied when the user turns on the ignition vehicle. And after the onboard part of the anti-theft vehicle anti-theft equipment receives an acknowledgment signal, the HOOK-UP relay nodes and the WAIT UP relay nodes are unlocked, as a result of which the normal functioning of the vehicle functional organs connected to the outputs of these HOOK-UP relay nodes and the WAIT UP relay nodes is ensured.

It should be noted that the number of personal electronic identification tags of vehicle users is limited. As a rule, for a given vehicle their number does not exceed three. Each such electronic identification tag has its own unique number and a unique unlock code corresponding to this number. These unlock codes are stored in the memory of the central control unit of the vehicle anti-theft equipment. The process of entering unlock codes into the memory of the central control unit is called the "prescribing" of electronic identification tags. Once the electronic identification tags are registered, it becomes impossible to replace them, since the onboard part of the vehicle anti-theft equipment works only with "their" electronic identification tags. All numbers of electronic identification tags used to record electronic protocols, as well as the number of the central control unit, are recorded by the insurance company in the insurance contract. When parsing an insured event, these electronic identification tags must be submitted (physically) to the insurance company. Using a reader programmer connected to a personal computer equipped with the corresponding program for reading unique numbers of electronic identification tags, an employee of the insurance company reads the numbers of submitted electronic identification tags to a personal computer and compares them with the numbers recorded in the insurance contract. Thus, the task of protecting against insurance fraud is solved. After reading the electronic protocol of "events" from electronic identification tags and analyzing it, the employee of the insurance company receives, in addition, very valuable and, most importantly, objective information for making decisions on each insurance event.

The essence of the invention is illustrated by the drawings of figures 1 and 2, which show one of the possible options for the hardware implementation of the proposed method.

Figure 1 shows the structural diagram of the onboard part of the anti-theft equipment.

Figure 2 shows a structural diagram of equipment for reading and analyzing an electronic protocol of events recorded in an electronic identification tag.

In figures 1 and 2, the following notation is used:

1 - electronic identification tag; 2 - tag reader; 3 - central control unit; 4 - ignition switch; 5 - on-board power source; 6 - onboard ignition tire; 7 - non-volatile memory; 8 - shaper of the electronic protocol of events; 9 - reader of the electronic protocol of events; 10 - modulator; 11 - data transmission unit; 12 - relay node HOOK-UP; 13 - relay node WAIT UP; 14 - receiver of external commands; 15 - programmer-reader; 16 - system unit; 17 - monitor; 18 - printer.

The structural diagrams shown in figures 1 and 2 contain only those elements that are necessary to clarify the essence of the proposed technical solution.

Presented in figure 1 is a structural diagram of the onboard part of the anti-theft equipment TC contains a central control unit 3 and an onboard power supply 5. The power inputs of the central control unit 3 are connected, respectively, to the plus and minus poles of the on-board power supply 5, and the control input of the central control unit 3 is connected to the on-board ignition bus 6. The control inputs of the N relay nodes 12 HOOK-UP and the M relay nodes 13 WAIT UP are connected to the same ignition bus 6. The positive pole of the onboard power supply 5 through the ignition switch 4 is connected to the onboard ignition bus 6. The minus pole of the on-board power source 5 is connected to the mass of the vehicle.

The outputs of the relay nodes 12 HOOK-UP and relay nodes 13 WAIT UP are connected to the corresponding functional bodies of the vehicle, providing the ability to move the vehicle (for example, to a gasoline pump or ignition system).

The electronic identification tag 1 is connected via radio to a tag reader 2, which, in turn, is connected to the central control unit 3.

The onboard part of the vehicle anti-theft equipment also includes an external command receiver 14 connected to one of the inputs of the central control unit 3, configured to receive remote control commands via a standard communication network, for example, via a paging or GSM network.

In addition, the on-board part of the equipment includes a series-connected shaper 8 of the electronic protocol of events, non-volatile memory 7, a reader 9 of the electronic protocol of events, a modulator 10 and a data transmission unit 11, configured to be connected over the air to the electronic identification tag 1. In this case, the input the shaper 8 of the electronic protocol of events is connected to an additional output of the central control unit 3, which is connected to the reader 9 of the electronic protocol of events, additional whose output is connected to the auxiliary input of non-volatile memory 7.

Outside the vehicle, for example, in the office of the insurance company that insured the vehicle for theft risk, there is a personal computer in the standard configuration: system unit 16 connected to the monitor 17. System unit 16 is connected to the printer 18 and also connected to a standard interface, for example, RS-232, with the programmer-reader 15. At the same time, the programmer-reader 15 is connected by radio to the electronic identification tag 1 and is configured to read the unique number of the electronic identification tag 1 and the electronic event protocol from a non-volatile memory of an electronic identification tag 1. The personal computer is also equipped with a digital processing program for a readable electronic protocol of events and a program for displaying the results of this processing in a human-readable form on the monitor screen 17 and / or on paper received at the output of the printer 18.

The central control unit 3 is an on-board microcomputer, the functions of which, in particular, include:

- the formation of the request signals of the electronic identification tag 1 and the transmission of these signals to the reader 2 tags;

- demodulation of the signals received by the reader 2 tags from the electronic identification tag 1;

- verification and control of the compliance of the unique unlock code of the electronic identification tag 1 with the valid unlock codes (previously recorded in the memory of the central control unit 3 of the unlock codes for personal electronic identification tags of all users of the vehicle);

- the formation of control signals for the reader 9 of the electronic protocol of events and for the shaper 8 of the electronic protocol of events;

- reception and control of the confirmation code of the recording of the electronic protocol of events from the electronic identification tag 1;

- the formation of control commands sent on the onboard bus 6 ignition.

The central control unit 3 can also perform a number of other functions, providing, for example, blocking the doors of the vehicle or notifying the user of the vehicle of the penetration of an attacker. However, a description of these functions is beyond the scope of this patent application and therefore is not given.

The receiver 14 of external commands is either a regular pager (if standard paging is used to transmit commands) or a cell phone receiver module (if a standard mobile cellular network is used to transmit commands). An example of such receiving modules may be Siemens A35 or A45 cell phone modules.

The construction scheme of the tag reader 2 is determined by the specific type of electronic identification tag 1, for interaction with which the tag reader 2 is intended.

The electronic identification tag 1 can be made, for example, in the form of a keyless key fob (passive transponder card) with a digital memory in which the identification code of the electronic identification tag 1 is fixed and there is free space for recording the electronic protocol of events. The tag reader 2 is equipped with a high-frequency signal generator (125 kHz) with a circuit inductively connected to the inductive circuit of the electronic identification tag 1.

The communication channel of the Central control unit 3 with relay nodes 12 HOOK-UP and relay nodes 13 WAIT UP is an onboard ignition bus 6, and the commands transmitted through it are frequency-modulated signals. The method of signal transmission on the onboard ignition bus 6 is widely known and described in the patent technical literature (for example, in patent RU No. 2090395, 60 R 25/00, previously obtained by the applicant company).

HOOK-UP relay nodes 12 and WAIT UP relay nodes 13 are described in detail in the aforementioned patents RU No. 2221711, 60 R 25/00 and RU No. 2237585, 60 R 25/00.

Examples of functional organs to which the outputs of the relay assemblies 12 HOOK-UP and relay assemblies 13 WAIT UP can be connected are a gas pump and an ignition system.

Non-volatile memory 7, the shaper 8 of the electronic protocol of events and the reader 9 of the electronic protocol of events are standard elements of microprocessor technology and can be structurally made in one housing with a central control unit 3.

Modulator 10 and data transfer unit 11 are standard high-frequency devices used in various versions of radio frequency identification (RFID) equipment using TIRIS technology from Texas Instruments (international standards ISO 14223 and ISO 11784/11785).

Thus, the possibility of practical implementation of the proposed method is not in doubt.

Presented in figure 1 and 2 blocks and devices that implement the inventive method of counteracting theft of the vehicle, operate as follows.

In order to use the vehicle, the user must have a personal electronic identification tag 1. Electronic identification tag 1 is a wearable part of the aforementioned RFID equipment that is widely used in security and anti-theft systems (review by L. Stasenko, “Modern Radio Frequency Identification Technologies in the Journal” Security Systems ", April-May 2004, p. 72-76).

Another part of the indicated RFID equipment — the 2-tag reader — is installed on board the vehicle and is controlled by commands coming from the central control unit 3.

When the ignition switch 4 is closed (that is, when the vehicle ignition is turned on), the power signal from the plus pole of the on-board power supply 5 is supplied via the on-board ignition bus 6 to the control input of the central control unit 3. This signal causes in the central control unit 3 the formation of a strictly defined and individual for a given central control unit 3 request for issuing an unlock code for the electronic identification tag 1. This request is received at the input of the tag reader 2. Having accepted this request, during the time period set during programming, the tag reader 2 periodically generates the request code for unlocking the electronic identification tag 1, which is strictly defined for this vehicle anti-theft equipment. On a high-frequency (125 kHz) carrier, these signals are broadcast. If the user has closed the ignition switch 4, then his personal electronic identification tag 1 is in close proximity to the inductive circuit of the tag reader 2 (the term "coverage" is used in this literature for technical purposes). For example, if the inductive circuit of the tag reader 2 is located in the back of the vehicle driver’s seat, then the electronic identification tag 1 lying in the pocket of the jacket of the person in this chair falls into the coverage area of the tag reader 2.

To the request signals radiated by the reader 2 tags strictly defined for this vehicle anti-theft equipment, the electronic identification tag 1 issues a response encoded high-frequency signal to the reader 2 tags containing a unique unlock code stored in the non-volatile memory of this electronic identification tag 1. The 2 tag reader transmits the received response signal to the Central control unit 3. It demodulates the response signal, extracts an unlock code from it and compares the received unlock code with a set of valid unlock codes.

This set of valid unlock codes generally corresponds to different users of the vehicle, each of which has a personal electronic identification tag 1 with a unique number and a unique unlock code corresponding to this number. The process of entering, when programming, a unique unlock code for an electronic identification tag 1 into the memory of the central control unit 3 is referred to in the technical literature as “writing” an electronic identification tag 1. For “registered” electronic identification tags 1, their unlock codes are stored in the memory of the central control unit 3 even with a temporary power failure.

When generating a request for issuing an unlock code for an electronic identification tag 1, the central control unit 3 generates a code message in which the moment of generation of this request for issuing an unlock code is recorded.

If after this, within a specified period of time, a response signal containing an unlock code matching one of the valid unlock codes is received from the tag reader 2 in the central control unit 3, then the sign “normal event” is entered into the code message of the central control unit 3. That is, the code message generated by the central control unit 3 will contain the following information: at a fixed point in time, a "normal event" of recognition of the electronic identification tag 1 occurred when the ignition was turned on.

If, for a set period of time, a response signal containing an unlock code is not received in the central control unit 3, then the sign "alarm - no response signal" is entered into the code message of the central control unit 3. That is, the code message generated by the central control unit 3 will contain the following information: at a fixed point in time, an “alarm event” of the absence of an electronic identification tag 1 occurred when the ignition was turned on. This means that at a fixed point in time an attempt was made to steal the vehicle. The central control unit 3 transfers the anti-theft equipment to the reaction mode to detect an "alarm event". This reaction includes the mandatory blocking of the vehicle engine. Otherwise, this reaction is determined by the presence of certain equipment in the vehicle and the installed work program of the central control unit 3. The subject of the present invention is the reaction of the vehicle anti-theft equipment to the detection of an "alarm event" and therefore is not specifically considered.

If a response signal is received in the central control unit 3 over the specified time period, but the unlock code contained in it does not match any of the valid unlock codes, then the sign "alarm - someone else's response signal" is entered into the code message of the central control unit 3. That is, the code message generated by the central control unit 3 will contain the following information: at a fixed point in time, an "alarm event" occurred - an attempt to crack the unlock code. That is, at a fixed point in time, the hijacker began to select an unlock code suitable for removing the protection of anti-theft equipment. The central control unit 3 also transfers the anti-theft equipment to the reaction mode to detect an "alarm event" (in particular, the engine of the vehicle is blocked).

The main difference between the proposed method and the prototype method is that the above-described code messages of the central control unit 3 (caused by the ignition on event when the electronic identification tag 1 is recognized or in the absence of such identification), as well as code messages caused by some other events, are recorded in special electronic protocol of events. This electronic event log is stored in non-volatile memory 7.

To ensure such a fixation at the end of the set period of time, the central control unit 3 transmits the generated code message to the shaper 8 of the electronic event protocol. In the shaper 8 of the electronic protocol of events, the code message is converted into a string form of the electronic protocol of events and transmitted to non-volatile memory 7.

In addition to the three events considered, several other events are recorded in non-volatile memory 7. The principle of fixation is the same:

- the central control unit 3, upon receipt of certain control signals, generates a code message in which the moment of occurrence of the occurrence of an event is recorded (the event itself can be determined later);

- the central control unit 3 starts the countdown of the set period of time;

- during a specified period of time, the Central control unit 3 awaits the receipt of a response signal from the reader 2 tags;

- when a response signal is received, the central control unit 3 demodulates it, extracts an unlock code from the response signal and determines whether this unlock code is valid;

- at the end of the set period of time, the central control unit 3 transmits a code message containing information about the moment of occurrence of the event, supplemented with data about:

- what control signal was the source of event fixation;

- whether the response signal came with a valid unlock code or did not arrive at all, or did it, but the unlock code was not recognized as valid;

- according to the code message received from the central control unit 3, the shaper 8 of the electronic protocol of events generates the next line of the electronic protocol of events and supplements with it the records of the electronic protocol of events already stored in non-volatile memory 7.

If the central control unit 3 determines the presence of a valid unlock code in the received response signal, this means that one of the personal electronic identification tags 1 of the users of this vehicle is in the range of the tag reader 2. The electronic protocol of events from the non-volatile memory 7 is completely copied to the specially designated area of non-volatile memory of this electronic identification tag 1. Subsequently, the electronic protocol of events must be read from electronic identification tag 1 to a personal computer (for presentation to the user and the insurance company).

Copying the electronic protocol of events into the non-volatile memory of the electronic identification tag 1 is carried out as follows. By a command from the central control unit 3, the electronic event log reader 9 requests the electronic event log in the non-volatile memory 7. Upon completion of the recording of a new line of the electronic event log (transferred to the non-volatile memory 7 from the electronic event log generator 8), the non-volatile memory 7 transfers electronic protocol of events on the reader 9 of the electronic protocol of events. Having received the specified electronic event protocol, the reader 9 of the electronic event protocol generates a corresponding code message and transmits it to the control input of the modulator 10. The modulator 10 converts this code message into a modulating effect supplied to the control input of the data transmission unit 11. In block 11 of data transmission, the code message is transferred to a high-frequency carrier (125 kHz) and is broadcasted in the coverage area of the tag reader 2. Since the electronic identification tag 1 is in the range of the reader 2 tags, it receives the specified code message. The code message received by electronic identification tag 1 is recorded in its non-volatile memory. Upon completion of copying the electronic protocol of events to the non-volatile memory of the electronic identification tag 1, the electronic identification tag 1 generates and broadcasts a special coded high-frequency signal (acknowledgment signal), which means that the electronic event protocol is completely received in a certain electronic identification tag (if the control coincides amount). The individualization of the acknowledgment signal with respect to the electronic identification tag 1 is not related to the subject of the present invention and is not specifically addressed.

The acknowledgment signal is received by the tag reader 2, which transmits it to the central control unit 3. After the receipt of the acknowledgment signal to the central control unit 3, the process of interaction of the electronic identification tag 1 with the onboard part of the vehicle anti-theft equipment is considered completed. In the absence of an acknowledgment signal, the central control unit 3 transmits to the reader 9 of the electronic protocol of events a command to re-copy the electronic protocol of events, etc.

The maximum possible number of consecutive feeds of this command is set when programming the operation of the central control unit 3. It should be noted that the time of the indicated copying of the electronic protocol of events is short and practically not felt by the user, as a delay in the operation of the onboard part of the anti-theft equipment.

If the acknowledgment signal is supplied to the central control unit 3 after the ignition switch 4 is closed (that is, a "normal event" of identification of the electronic identification tag 1 occurs when the ignition is turned on), then the central control unit 3 automatically issues a local unlock code to the ignition side bus 6 (in general a case other than the unlock code for the electronic identification tag 1).

The specified local unlock code is supplied to the relay nodes 12 HOOK-UP and to the relay nodes 13 WAIT UP via the onboard ignition bus 6 connected via the ignition switch 4 to the positive pole of the onboard power supply 5.

Common to the relay nodes 12 HOOK-UP and relay nodes 13 WAIT UP is that they are supplied with power from the on-board power supply 5 via the on-board ignition bus 6 only when the ignition switch 4 is closed. And after a short period of time after connecting the power to the relay nodes 12 HOOK-UP and relay nodes 13 WAIT UP may receive a local unlock code (unless, of course, the closure of the ignition switch 4 was carried out by one of the users of the vehicle, having with them "registered" in the central control unit 3 electronic identification tag 1).

In the HOOK-UP relay node 12, this local unlock code is selected from the total signal flow present on the on-board ignition bus 6, decoded and generates a control action on the functional unit of the vehicle to which this HOOK-UP relay node 12 is connected, enabling this functional body.

The local unlock code is also sent to the relay nodes 13 WAIT UP.

The signal delay in the WAIT UP relay node 13 (starting from the moment the ignition is turned on) is selected sufficient to receive the local unlock code on the on-board bus 6 of the ignition by the same WAIT UP relay node 13 WAIT UP, convert it to the required format, and decode it. After that, the corresponding functional body from the output of the relay unit 13 WAIT UP receives the unblocking signal, which is unchanged for this ignition switch.

If the hijacker has turned on the ignition, the signal at the output of the relay unit 13 WAIT UP will be determined by the signals of the motion sensor included in it. In the absence of vehicle movement (that is, when the vehicle stops), the signal will allow movement, and in the presence of vehicle movement, this movement will be prohibited.

That is, as soon as the TCB begins to move, the corresponding functional organ is blocked and further movement of the TCB becomes impossible. This event in the form of a ban on vehicle movement in the absence of an electronic identification tag 1 in it, which is “registered” in the central control unit 3, is called the AntiHiJack mode (S. Biryukov “Car Alarms”, series “Secrets of choice and application”, Moscow, “RK” ForsArt ", 2002). The need to use this mode arises from such an attack by attackers on a vehicle, as a result of which attackers take possession of the vehicle, forcibly removing the user from this vehicle. If, at the same time, the user who remains at the disposal of the user removed from the TCB remains with his personal electronic identification tag 1, then even if the user did not turn off the ignition when the user was removed from the TCB (that is, the ignition switch 4 remained unchanged), the movement of the TCB will be blocked after the next request to interrogate the electronic tags 1, since the corresponding unlock code will not be received in the central control unit 3.

If, when attacking the vehicle, the attackers, removing the user from the TCB, took the electronic identification tag 1 from him, then a ban on the movement of the TCB in AntiHiJack mode cannot occur. However, the user removed from the TCB can block the movement of the TCB with an external command if he has at his disposal the means of transmitting commands over a standard communication network. Such a standard communication network can be either a paging channel or a cellular mobile network. When a command is sent over a standard communication network, the signal carrying this command is received by the external command receiver 14, which extracts a code message carrying the specified command in the received signal and transmits it to the central control unit 3. Upon receipt of such a code message, the central control unit 3 acts on the functional nodes of the TCB, causing them to block, preventing the movement of the TCB. At the same time, depending on the command submitted by the user, the central control unit 3 can generate either an alarm mode or a panic mode in the TCB.

The difference between these modes is that the user can remove the TCB from the alarm mode, having at its disposal an electronic identification tag 1 "registered" in the central control unit 3 and knowing the required passwords and external commands. And the user cannot remove the TCB from the panic mode, since in this mode the central control unit 3 erases from its memory the codes of all “registered” electronic identification tags 1. Only the special, so-called “red” electronic identification tag remains in the memory of the central control unit 3 1. Under the terms of the insurance contract, the "red" electronic identification tag 1 must be stored in the absence of free access to the users of the vehicle (for example, in the safe of the insurance company).

When choosing an external command for submitting 14 external commands to the receiver, the user should be guided by the specific situation created by attackers on his TCB.

Blocking the movement of the TCB in AntiHiJack mode, receiving an external alarm command or an external panic command belong to those "alarm events" that should be recorded in the electronic event log stored in non-volatile memory 7 and copied to the non-volatile memory of electronic identification tags 1.

It should be noted that in addition to "normal events" and "disturbing events", some "service events" are also subject to the inclusion in the electronic protocol of events. Such "service events" include, for example, the transfer of anti-theft equipment from the guard mode to the auxiliary service mode of temporary partial disarming, which must be set before sending the vehicle to a service center for repairs or maintenance. This mode in the technical literature has received the name "VALET mode". The return of the vehicle anti-theft equipment from this mode to the normal security mode also constitutes a “service event” and must be recorded in the electronic protocol of events stored in non-volatile memory 7.

Tables 1 and 2 below provide some examples of possible “normal events” and “disturbing events” recorded (in the form of an electronic protocol of events) in non-volatile memory 7 and comments on them.

Table 1
"Normal events" Events recorded in non-volatile memory 7 Comments 1 The ignition is on (that is, the ignition switch 4 is closed). Electronic identification tag 1 recognized This event is recorded every time the ignition is turned on, if the electronic identification tag 1 is in the range of the tag reader 2 2 Ignition off (ignition switch 4 open). With respect to the identification of electronic identification tag 1, any option is acceptable This event is recorded every time the ignition is turned off. At the same time, this event means the inclusion of all anti-theft properties of anti-theft equipment

Moreover, the sequential alternation of "normal events" indicated in Table 1 by numbers 1 and 2 means that the vehicle is operated by the user in a normal environment.

table 2
"Disturbing events" Events recorded in non-volatile memory 7 Comments 1 Ignition ON. No electronic identification tag 1 This event is recorded if, when the ignition is turned on, there is no electronic identification tag 1 in the range of the tag reader 2 2 Ignition ON. Code Hacking Attempt This event is recorded if the central control unit 3 during the dialogue with the electronic identification tag 1 detects an error in the response signal 3 AntiHiJack Alarm The event is recorded when a deletion from the vehicle of a user equipped with an electronic identification tag is detected 1 4 Alarm over standard communication network The event is recorded when 14 external commands of an external alarm command are received by the receiver 5 Panic over standard communications network The event is recorded when 14 external commands of an external panic command arrive at the receiver

Continuation of table 2 Events recorded in non-volatile memory 7 Comments 6 The power of the anti-theft equipment is turned on in the guard mode This event is recorded if there was an attempt to steal a vehicle during which all on-board electronic units were turned off.

The sixth row in table 2 requires additional comment. It refers to the case when the connection between the onboard power supply 5 and the central control unit 3 was previously interrupted. Such a power interruption could be caused either by actions on the vehicle in the service center, or by the actions of a hijacker who disconnected the onboard power supply 5 in the vehicle in order to avoid interference from anti-theft systems powered by the onboard power supply 5 during the hijacking. After a power interruption, the hijacker must try to either turn off the anti-theft equipment, or hijack the vehicle by towing it. Obviously, if the power was turned off at the service center, then at the end of the protocol of events stored in non-volatile memory 7 there should be a line indicating the transfer of anti-theft equipment to the "VALET mode". In this case, the power-on event is a technological “normal event”. The “alarm event” is when the power is turned on when the anti-theft equipment at the time the power was turned off was in its normal operating security mode. Therefore, immediately after turning on the power, the central control unit 3 sends a read command to the reader 9 of the electronic event protocol. The electronic protocol of events comes from the non-volatile memory 7 through the reader 9 of the electronic protocol of events in the central control unit 3. The central control unit 3 controls the last line in the electronic event log. If the last line contains a message about the transfer of anti-theft equipment to "VALET mode", then a technological "normal event" has occurred that should not be entered in the electronic protocol of events. Otherwise, it is an alarming event.

Let us now consider the technical implementation of reading the electronic protocol of events from electronic identification tags 1, whose unique numbers (as well as the central control unit 3) are recorded by the insurance company in the insurance contract. When analyzing an insured event, all electronic identification tags 1 specified in the contract must be submitted to the insurance company. Using the programmer-reader 15 connected to the system unit 16 of the personal computer (figure 2), an employee of the insurance company reads from each electronic identification tag 1 into the system unit 16 a unique number and an electronic protocol of events. The numbers of all submitted electronic identification tags 1 are displayed on the monitor screen 17. If among the submitted electronic identification tags 1 there is an electronic identification tag 1, the number of which does not coincide with the one recorded in the insurance contract, this number is highlighted on the monitor screen 17 in a special color (for example, red ) The user is prompted to replace the extraneous electronic identification tag 1 with a complete one.

After all personal electronic identification tags of 1 users have been entered into the personal computer, the personal computer starts reconciling the electronic event protocols read from the non-volatile memory of these electronic identification tags 1. For each electronic identification tag 1, there must be a time point of the last copy in its non-volatile memory of the electronic event log. If, for example, for some of the first of the electronic identification tags 1, the last copying took place at the moment T ₁ , and for the second - at the time T ₂ and the moment T ₂ later than T ₁ , then the electronic protocol of events from the first electronic identification tag 1 should be completely repeated in the second electronic identification tag 1. In this case, the events that occurred in the interval between the times T ₁ and T ₂ should be additionally reflected in the second electronic identification tag 1. The absence of such coincidences of electronic event protocols, read from various electronic identification tags 1, indicates the presence of attempts to falsify electronic event protocols.

If the reconciliation of electronic event protocols indicates the absence of falsification, then the system unit 16 displays on the monitor screen 17 that electronic event protocol, the last record in which occurred at the latest time. After that, an analysis of the electronic protocol of events is carried out and its comparison with the information presented in the written application of the vehicle user to the insurance company. The information necessary for documenting the insured event, as well as any other necessary information reflecting the history of the operation of the vehicle over the past period, using the printer 18 is displayed on paper. It can be very useful in deciding to conclude a second insurance contract (extension of the previous contract).

Thus, the proposed technical solution allows us to solve the problem, create a technology to counter vehicle theft that would reliably protect the insurance company that has concluded an insurance contract with the user from various types of falsification of insurance cases and help in the analysis of such cases, keeping in mind minimization possible losses of the insurance company.

The technical result is due to the use in the proposed method of a new information technology, which consists in fixing (in the form of an electronic protocol of events) all "normal events", "disturbing events", as well as "service events" that occurred with the vehicle, in non-volatile memory 7 and subsequent copying this electronic protocol of events into the non-volatile memory of electronic identification tags 1, the unique numbers of which are reflected in the insurance contract. The indicated electronic event logs (from various electronic identification tags 1) are objective evidence of the actions of vehicle users before and during the occurrence of an insured event and can help the insurance company make a quick and correct decision for each insured event.

Thus, the proposed technical solution is characterized by a new set of essential features, technically feasible, practically useful, and therefore can be classified as an invention.

Claims (1)

A method of counteracting theft of a vehicle, according to which, when the ignition is turned on, a high-frequency signal is irradiated with an electronic identification tag mounted on board a tag reader, an electronic coded high-frequency signal containing a unique unlock code stored in a non-volatile memory of the electronic identification tag is generated by an electronic identification tag, this encoded high-frequency signal tag reader, demod They unlock, release the unlock code, transfer it to the central control unit, compare with the valid unlock codes of personal electronic identification tags of all vehicle users previously stored in the memory of the central control unit, and generate a code message in the central control unit that corresponds to the event that occurred - the unlock code coincides with one of the valid unlock codes or the absence of such a match, and if the codes match, they form a local an unlocking code designed to transmit on-board the ignition bus to the control inputs of the HOOK-UP relay nodes and the WAIT UP relay nodes, which are capable of blocking the vehicle’s functional organs, and in the absence of the indicated codes coincidence, they block the vehicle’s engine, after which, according to communication networks, for example via a paging channel, messages containing a blocking code block the engine and simultaneously form a code message in the central control unit, Corresponding to this event, characterized in that after the formation of each code message corresponding to the event in the central control unit, the specified code event is transmitted to the electronic event protocol generator, the electronic event protocol is generated from the indicated code messages and recorded in the non-volatile memory of the vehicle, and after the fact of the coincidence of the unlock code with one of the valid unlock codes is established, the electronic protocol of the it from the non-volatile memory of the vehicle, form the corresponding code packet from it, modulate it with a high-frequency signal, transmit it to the electronic identification tag, receive this signal with the electronic identification tag, demodulate it, write the code package into the non-volatile memory of the electronic identification tag, form it in the electronic identification tag confirmation code of the recording, enter it into the response encoded by the electronic identification tag high-frequency signal, this high-frequency signal is received by the tag reader, demodulate, a confirmation code for the recording is made, its compliance with the verification code valid for the electronic identification tag is recorded, and if the control is positive, the local unlock code previously generated by the central control unit is transmitted to the relay control inputs HOOK-UP nodes and WAIT UP relay nodes, while using a programmer-reader associated with using a personal computer, code parcels are written to a personal computer, recorded in the non-volatile memory of all personal electronic identification tags of vehicle users, whose unique numbers are stored in the personal computer's memory, digitally process the read code parcels, as a result of which electronic event logs containing unique numbers of electronic identification tags, display these unique numbers on the personal computer monitor screen puter, compare them with the unique numbers of personal electronic identification tags of all users of the vehicle recorded in the memory of a personal computer and, if these unique numbers coincide, they display electronic protocols of events in a format convenient for human perception on the monitor screen and / or on paper.

Images