RU2259639C2 - Method for complex protection of distributed information processing in computer systems and system for realization of said method - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: computer science.

SUBSTANCE: system has center of certification, forming and distribution of keys, at least one user device and at least one distributed data processing server. Method describes operation of said system. Subsystem for forming open keys contains memory block for tables of secret substitutions of columns and rows of secret keys tables, memory block for table of symmetric substitution of columns and rows of external key table, register for sequence of transitive connection between rows of secret substitutions tables, block for logical output on sequence of transitive dependence, memory block for table of relative non-secret substitution of columns and rows of external key table, open key register, input commutation block and control block.

EFFECT: higher efficiency, broader functional capabilities.

5 cl, 15 dwg

Description

Technical field

The invention relates to the field of computer technology, information systems and means of protection against unauthorized access.

State of the art

For the effective functioning of information systems based on modern computer technologies and related to the processing and transmission of confidential data (for example, e-mail, modern payment systems, search engines), it is necessary to ensure guaranteed protection of the distributed processing process. Currently, the most secure form of distributed processing is email. Known methods for protecting e-mail (see international applications WO / 0049766 from 08.24.2000; WO / 9817042 from 04.23.1998; WO / 0001108, from 06.01.2000). Known security methods ensure the confidentiality of information transmission, digital signature, identification and authentication of the sender and recipient of information. The method of WO / 0001108 attempts to ensure the confidentiality of the address part of messages by introducing anonymous or pseudo-anonymous user identifiers. They include the name, address, financial information and are entered using an intermediary. This ensures the certification of genuine and anonymous user identifiers. However, such a system is not reliable enough, because, firstly, it is not cryptographically secure, and secondly, there are transmission areas between the user and the intermediary, where the authentic (true) identifier is transmitted in clear form and can be intercepted by an attacker to crack the entire system anonymous identification.

The main disadvantage of these methods is that in the network servers the processing of the address part of messages is carried out in open form using unprotected email programs, i.e. in the source codes of commands and data. This makes both processed address information and e-mail programs vulnerable to informational influences. As a result, programs may become infected with a virus, distort the algorithm of their work or the address part of the message, as well as unauthorized replacement (or change) of the message address.

The problem of protecting the information processing process also exists in other distributed information processing systems, for example, electronic payment systems with remote access to databases for fetching messages at the user's request, information retrieval systems, where arithmetic calculations and information processing are performed in open form. Therefore, one of the most urgent tasks of ensuring the security of such systems is protection against unauthorized access, as well as other informational influences (viruses, software bookmarks) on message processing and program execution on the computers themselves (user devices and network servers).

There is a method of comprehensive protection of the process of processing information in computers from unauthorized access, software bookmarks and viruses (see RF patent No. 2137185 dated 01/09/98), which provides the ability to process programs and data in a computer in a stochastically encoded, protected form with changing command codes, data and algorithm during the operation of programs. The known method implements two levels of protection: logical - based on the stochastic transformation of the algorithm (control structure) of the program, and physical, implemented through stochastic coding of machine instructions. Due to this conversion, bookmarks and viruses cannot find the entry point to the program to affect it. The known method allows you to process numerical information in a protected form in the process of performing arithmetic calculations. However, this method does not provide comprehensive protection for the entire circuit of the distributed information processing, including the transmission functions over communication channels. This is due to the fact that when implementing the method using existing means of cryptographic protection of data transmission in the interfaces for connecting secure communication lines to a computer, information is decrypted, as a result of which the information will be processed in open form before stochastic encoding. The resulting “window” breaks the single protection circuit of the distributed information processing and is a possible source of its “leak” through unauthorized access to it, including the use of spurious electromagnetic radiation.

Disclosure of invention

The objective of the invention is to provide a method and system for the integrated protection of distributed information processing, ensuring the formation of an end-to-end protection circuit for distributed information processing, comprehensive guaranteed protection of the distributed information processing process from unauthorized access and increasing the transmission rate of encoded messages.

The specified technical result is achieved by the fact that in the method of comprehensive protection of distributed information processing in computer systems on each user device and on distributed data processing servers access to a computer system and form a system of internal and foreign keys based on tables of secret keys received from a certification center, generation and distribution of keys, based on the obtained tables of secret keys generated in the user device and in the server distributed about works secret internal one-time keys for symmetric encryption when transmitting data in the environment of the user device and server, storing and processing information in encrypted form, encrypt the data to be processed and transmitted in the environment of the user device and server of distributed processing, including information in the database, Web pages and a table of email addresses of a distributed processing server, by stochastic encoding using received secret internal symmetric one-time keys, they send a request from a user device to a certification, key generation and distribution center for establishing a connection with a previously selected distributed data processing server to perform the specified processing function, receive from a certification, generation and distribution key center or form in the user device and distributed processing server, public keys for upgrading secret key tables to implement stochastic encoding Information transmitted from the user device to said distributed processing server, processing information in a transformed form and outputting the result of distributed processing from the said distributed processing server to the user device, is generated on the basis of the received public keys and secret key tables in the user device and in the distributed processing server secret external one-time keys for symmetric encryption mode, as well as modify tables sec keys when transmitting information and processing it in an encrypted form, the transmitted information is encrypted by stochastic encoding in the user device using the received secret external symmetric one-time keys, the information encrypted by stochastic encoding is transmitted to the distributed processing server, the received information is processed stochastically encoded using secret external symmetric keys in encrypted form after its additional encryption using m secret internal one-time symmetric keys in accordance with the type of processing determined by the format of the data mentioned, while encrypting encrypted information obtained as a result of processing in the distributed processing server stochastically using secret external symmetric one-time keys, transmit stochastically encoded encrypted information to the user device , receive stochastically encoded encrypted information in the user device and decode it for issuance to the user in clear text.

At the same time, access to the computer system and the formation of the system of internal and foreign keys is carried out by entering the data carrier into the user device with the PIN code, password, password hash value, the initial key table and the data of secret permutations of columns and rows to obtain the secret base table key and foreign key secret table.

The key system is preferably formed in the form of a set of secret base and foreign key tables generated by secret permutations of the columns and rows of the initial key table, which are obtained from a certification, key generation and distribution center.

In addition, the formation of secret internal one-time keys tables for transmitting information separately in the environment of the user device and the distributed processing server, data encryption, including database tables, Web pages and a table of server email addresses, is performed by rearranging the columns and rows of the base key tables with using secret permutations.

Public keys in the form of relative permutation tables are formed in the certification, key generation and distribution center, user device, distributed processing server by inference on a set of secret permutation tables using transitive dependencies between line elements separately for the user device and distributed processing server to bring their tables private foreign keys in a symmetric state and modifications to the secret key tables, and bringing tables ekretnyh foreign key of the user device and the server distributed processing in the symmetric state, as well as modification of tables secret keys for distributed processing encrypted information is performed by using the permutation and substitution tables, columns and rows of the secret keys of the user device, and distributed processing server using public keys.

Moreover, the generation of one-time keys is preferably carried out by stochastically changing random elements of symmetric key tables of the foreign or internal key for each transmitted block of information encrypted by stochastic encoding.

In addition, in the process of encrypting and transmitting encrypted information, symmetric key tables of the foreign key are periodically modified in the user device and in the distributed processing server using public keys generated and transmitted by the user device and the distributed processing server.

In addition, the processing of encrypted information by executing specified programs in a secure stochastically transformed form is performed in an information-logical secure computing device using a secure arithmetic processor, the interface of which is coordinated via information buses with a secret internal key table, and commands from information logical secure computing device, and before or after the stochastic transformation of each again into Qdim program information and logical secure computing system implementing antivirus protection based on the detection by the logic output to the set of program code instructions viral functions as chains of logically related command codes and destruction detected viral functions ensuring operability of the transformed program.

When determining the type of processing according to the format of the received information as arithmetic calculations, the encrypted operands and codes of arithmetic calculations are selected in the format of the received data and transferred to the protected arithmetic processor to implement the required calculations in encrypted form, and when determining the type of processing, it is searched and selected according to the request conditions information from the encrypted database tables, the encrypted data is extracted, according to which, after additional encryption, the data is extracted by comparison encrypted tables required for the sample, the implementation of compliance checks selected from the encrypted data encrypted tables required numerical parameters or arithmetic procedures with selected fields encrypted operate in a secure arithmetic processor.

In addition, when determining the type of processing as searching and selecting encrypted Web pages, the keywords of the encrypted request are additionally encrypted and the presence of identical keywords in each of the encrypted web pages of the distributed processing server is determined by comparison, and when determining the type of processing as email transmission, the encrypted message is additionally encrypted and the address of the mail recipient is compared in encrypted form with the addresses of the system servers and the server containing the mailbox is allocated To which the encrypted information is transmitted.

In addition, the hash function of the transmitted information is generated, an electronic digital signature of the sender of the information is received and transmitted, and the sender is authenticated and the integrity of the received information is verified, while the hash function of the transmitted information in the form of a random combination of a given length is formed by adding stochastically encoded blocks into a secure arithmetic processor of the user device and the distributed processing server, and an electronic digital signature is obtained by the generator sender’s secret private key in the form of random permutation of the rows of the private foreign key table and calculating the public key, which is transmitted to the certification authority, generating and distributing keys for registering the private key, with sender authentication and integrity control of the received information using the hash function and electronic a digital signature, a secret private key is used to encrypt the hash function of the transmitted information, and a public key is used to decrypt the received value x ash functions for comparison with the value generated in the distributed processing server.

The specified technical result is also achieved by the fact that the system for comprehensive protection of distributed information processing in computer systems contains a certification center, the formation and distribution of keys, at least one user device and at least one distributed data processing server, while the certification, generation and distribution center of keys contains a user certification subsystem, a subsystem for generating secret key tables, an information-logical protected computer a new system, a media storage subsystem for certified users, a public key generation subsystem, an authentication and information integrity verification subsystem, a secure arithmetic processor, a key distribution subsystem, a secure processing control unit, each user device contains a secret key table generation subsystem, an internal stochastic decoder, internal stochastic encoder, secure access subsystem, secure arithmetic process , an information-logical secure computing system, a secure processing control unit and a stochastic conversion transceiver unit, a distributed data processing server contains a secret key table generation subsystem, a stochastic conversion transceiver unit, an internal stochastic transcoding unit, a secure processing control unit, a secure access subsystem, a protected arithmetic processor, information and logic secure computing systems and a secure database, and in the center of certification, generation and distribution of keys, the information-logical secure computing system is connected to a user certification subsystem, a secret key generation subsystem, to which a user certification subsystem is connected, a protected arithmetic processor, a public key generation subsystem, a generation subsystem storage media for certified users and the key distribution subsystem to which the block is connected to secure processing control, connected to the authentication and integrity check subsystem, in the user device, the information-logical secure computing system is connected to the secure arithmetic processor, internal stochastic encoder, internal stochastic decoder and to the stochastic conversion transceiver unit, the secure access subsystem is connected to the control unit protected processing connected to the internal stochastic encoder, internal st with a decoder, a stochastic conversion transceiver, a secret key table generation subsystem and an information-logical secure computing system, in a distributed data processing server, an information-logical secure computing system is connected to a secure arithmetic processor, a secure database, an internal stochastic transcoding device and a secure control unit the processing to which the transceiver unit of the stochastic pre rofessional, internal to the stochastic transcoding tables subsystem forming secret keys and secure access subsystem, the subsystem distribution key certification center, forming and distributing keys is connected respectively with the subsystems forming tables secret key of the user device, and distributed data processing server.

Moreover, the secure access subsystem of the user device contains a subsystem for inputting information from the data medium connected to an authentication and integrity verification subsystem of the information connected to the secure processing unit of the user device.

The transceiver unit for stochastic conversion of the user device contains the first and second stochastic transcoding devices, the first stochastic transcoding device is included in the data transmission path from the distributed processing server to the information-logical secure computing system of the user device, and the second stochastic transcoding device is included in the data receiving path from the information logical user computer system th device to the distributed data processing server.

In addition, the transceiver unit of the stochastic conversion of the distributed processing server contains the first and second stochastic transcoding devices, the first stochastic transcoding device is included in the data transmission path from the secure processing processing control unit of the distributed processing server to the transceiving unit of the user device stochastic conversion, and the second stochastic transcoding device is turned on in the data receiving path from the transceiver unit stochastic user device conversion.

In addition, the secure access subsystem of the distributed processing server contains a subsystem for inputting information from a data medium connected to an authentication and integrity check subsystem connected to a secure processing unit of a distributed processing server.

The secure distributed processing server database includes a secure email address table, a secure array of Web pages, and secure data tables.

In addition, this technical result is achieved by the fact that the public key generation subsystem for the integrated protection system for distributed information processing in computer systems contains a memory unit for secret permutation tables of columns and rows of private key tables, a memory unit for a symmetric permutation table of columns and rows of a foreign key table , transitive coupling sequence register between rows of secret permutation tables, inference block on a transitive sequence the first dependency, a memory block for a table of relative non-secret permutation of columns and rows of a foreign key table, a public key register, an input switching unit, the input of which is an input input of a subsystem, an output switching unit, the output of which is an output of a subsystem public key output, and a control unit while the outputs of the control unit are connected respectively to the inputs of the memory unit for tables of secret permutations of columns and rows of tables of secret keys, the memory unit for the table is symmetrical permutations of columns and rows of a foreign key table, a register of a sequence of transitive communications between rows of tables of secret permutations, a register of a public key, input and output blocks of commutation, a block of inference on a sequence of transitive dependencies, the second and third inputs of which are connected respectively to the outputs of the memory block for a symmetric table permutations of columns and rows of a table of a foreign key and a register of a sequence of transitive connection between rows of secret secret tables is new, and the output is with the input of the memory block for the table of relative unclassified permutation of the columns and rows of the foreign key table, the output of which is connected to the input of the public key register, the output of which is connected to the input of the output switching block, the other input of which is connected to the outputs of the memory block for secret tables permutations of columns and rows of tables of secret keys connected by its input to the output of the input switching unit, and the second outputs of the input and output switching unit connected to the input of the control unit.

The indicated technical result is achieved by the fact that the stochastic encoder for the integrated protection system for distributed information processing contains an input permutation register, the input of which is an input of encoded data of a stochastic encoder, a block of column registers of a multi-alphabet encoder, the first input connected to the output of the input permutation register, a column connection circuit, outputs connected to the second inputs of a block of register registers of a multi-alphabet encoder, a cyclic permutation register, outputs with shared with the corresponding inputs of the column connection circuit, the inverter key block, the outputs of which are connected to the corresponding inputs of the cyclic permutation register, the recursive register, the outputs connected to the corresponding inputs of the inverter key block, the gamma generation circuit, the adder according to mod 2, the inputs of which are connected respectively to the outputs of the column register block of the multi-alphabet encoder and the gamma generation circuit, and the output is with the input of the output register of the code block, the output of which is the output of the encoders data of a stochastic encoder, and a control unit, the outputs of which are connected respectively to the inputs of the input permutation register, block of column registers of the multi-alphabet encoder, column connection scheme, cyclic permutation register, block of inverter keys, recursive register, gamma generation circuit, adder according to mod 2 and the output register of the code block, while the control unit to which the additional output of the recursive register is connected has additional input and output for connecting with other blocks management system for integrated protection of distributed information processing.

The gamma-forming circuit contains a block of column registers of the gamma-forming table, a column connection circuit, outputs connected to the inputs of the column register block of the gamma-forming table, a cyclic permutation register, outputs connected to the corresponding inputs of the column connecting circuit, an inverter key block, the outputs of which are connected to the corresponding inputs of the cyclic permutation register, the recurrence register, output connected to the corresponding inputs of the block of inverter keys, the register and similar gamma, adder in mod 2, a key whose input is connected to the output of the column register block of the gamma generation table, and the first and second outputs, respectively, with the adder input in mod 2 of the gamma generation circuit and with the adder input in mod 2 of the stochastic encoder, and the block control, the outputs of which are connected respectively to the inputs of the recurrence register, block of inverter keys, cyclic permutation register, column connection scheme, column register block of the gamma table, key, adder according to mod 2 of the circuit of gamma and the source gamma register output connected to the input of the control unit of the gamma formation circuit, the second input of which is connected to an additional output of the recursive register, and the third input of which is connected to the corresponding output of the control unit of the stochastic encoder. In addition, this technical result is achieved by the fact that the stochastic transcoding device for the integrated protection system for distributed information processing comprises an input code block register, a first stochastic conversion stage, the input of which is connected to the output of the code block input register, a first permutation register, the first and second inputs of which connected respectively with the first and second outputs of the first stage of stochastic transformation, the second permutation register, the first inputs of which The second stage of stochastic conversion, the input of which is connected to the output of the second register of permutation, and the first output is connected to the second input of the second register of permutation, and the output register of the code block, the input of which is connected to the second output of the second stage of stochastic conversion, respectively , each of the mentioned stages of stochastic transformation contains a block of column registers of a multi-alphabet encoder, the first input of which is an input with the corresponding stage of stochastic conversion, the column connection circuit, the outputs connected to the second inputs of the column register block of the multi-alphabet encoder, the cyclic permutation register, the outputs connected to the corresponding inputs of the column connection circuit, the inverter key block, the outputs of which are connected to the corresponding inputs of the cyclic permutation register, the recursive register , outputs connected to the corresponding inputs of the block of keys-inverters, the scheme of the formation of gamma, adder mod 2, the first input of which is connected via a key to the output of the block of register registers of the multi-alphabet encoder, and the second input is connected to the output of the gamma generation circuit, the second output of the key being the second output of the corresponding stage of stochastic conversion, the control unit, the first output of which is the first output of the corresponding stage of stochastic conversion, and the rest of the outputs are connected respectively to the inputs of the column register block of the multi-alphabet encoder, column connection scheme, cyclic register of the unit, a key block-inverters, a recursive register, an additional output connected to the corresponding input of the control unit, a gamma generation circuit, an adder mod 2 and a key, while the control unit has an additional input and output for connection with other control units of the integrated protection system of distributed processing information.

Brief Description of the Drawings

The invention is illustrated by examples of its implementation, illustrated by the drawings, which show the following:

figure 1 is a generalized block diagram of a system for integrated protection of distributed information processing in computer systems;

figure 2 is a block diagram of a certification authority, the formation and distribution of keys;

figure 3 is a block diagram of a user device;

4 is a block diagram of a distributed data processing server;

5 is a block diagram of a subsystem for generating secret key tables used in a certification authority, generation and distribution of keys;

6 is a block diagram of a subsystem for generating secret key tables used in a user device and in a distributed information processing server;

7 is a block diagram of a subsystem for generating public keys used in a certification authority, generating and distributing keys;

Fig. 8 is a block diagram of an authentication and integrity verification subsystem of information used in a certification, key generation and distribution center, user devices, and distributed processing servers;

Fig. 9 is a block diagram of a stochastic encoder used in user devices and in authentication and verification subsystems of information of a certification center, generation and distribution of keys, user devices and distributed processing servers;

10 is a block diagram of a gamma generating circuit for use in the stochastic encoder of FIG. 9;

figa, 11B is a stochastic transcoding device used in user devices and in distributed processing servers;

Fig - table certification authority, the formation and distribution of keys;

Fig - schematic representation of the process of generating public keys for users in a certification center, the formation and distribution of keys;

14 is a schematic representation of a key distribution procedure.

Preferred Embodiments

As shown in FIG. 1, a comprehensive protection system for distributed information processing in computer systems includes a center 1 for certification, generation and distribution of keys, at least one user device 2 and at least one distributed data processing server 3. The center 1 of certification, generation and distribution of keys (Fig. 2) contains a subsystem 4 of user certification, a subsystem 5 of generating secret key tables, an information-logical secure computing system 6, a subsystem of formation of media for certified users, a subsystem of 8 forming public keys, a subsystem 9 authentication and information integrity checks, a secure arithmetic processor 10, a key distribution subsystem 11, and a secure processing control unit 12.

Each user device 2 (Fig. 3) contains a subsystem 13 for generating secret key tables, an internal stochastic decoder 14, an internal stochastic encoder 15, a secure access subsystem 16, which includes a subsystem 17 for inputting information from a data medium and a subsystem 18 for authenticating and checking information integrity , a protected arithmetic processor 19, an information-logical secure computing system 20, a secure processing control unit 21 and a stochastic transceiver unit 22 are transformed ia, including the first and second devices 23, 24 of stochastic transcoding of information.

The distributed data processing server 3 (Fig. 4) comprises a secret key table generation subsystem 25, a stochastic conversion transceiver 26 including the first and second stochastic transcoding devices 27, an internal stochastic transcoding device 29, a secure processing control unit 30, secure access subsystem 31 including a subsystem 32 for inputting information from a storage medium and an authentication and verification integrity information subsystem 33, a protected arithm a processor 34, a logical-information secure computing system 35, and a secure database 36 including a secure email address table 37, secure arrays of Web pages 38, and secure data tables 39.

In the center 1 of certification, generation and distribution of keys (Fig. 2), the information-logical secure computing system 6 is connected to a user certification subsystem 4 connected to a subsystem 5 for generating secret key tables, a protected arithmetic processor 10, a subsystem 5 for generating secret key tables, a subsystem 8 of the formation of public keys, subsystem 7 of the formation of storage media for certified users and subsystem 11 of the distribution of keys to which the control unit is connected 12 secure processing, connected to the subsystem 9 authentication and verification of information integrity.

In the user device 2 (Fig. 3), the information-logical secure computing system 20 is connected to the secure arithmetic processor 19, the internal stochastic encoder 15, the internal stochastic decoder 14, the first and second stochastic transcoding devices 23, 24 and the protected processing control unit 21, to which are connected the internal stochastic encoder 15, the internal stochastic decoder 14, the first and second devices 23, 24 of stochastic transcoding of information, the subsystem 13 forming tables of secret keys and a subsystem 18 of authentication and verification of the integrity of the information with which the subsystem 17 for inputting information from the storage medium is connected.

In the distributed data processing server 3 (FIG. 4), the information-logical secure computing system 35 is connected to a secure arithmetic processor 34, a secure database 36 including a secure email address table 37, secure web page arrays 38, and secure tables 39 data, with the secure processing control unit 30, to which the first and second stochastic transcoding devices 27, 28 are connected, the internal stochastic transcoding device 29, the table generation subsystem 25 secret key and secure access subsystem 31, including a subsystem 33 authentication and integrity information, with which the subsystem 32 is connected to data input from the data carrier. Moreover, the key distribution subsystem 11 of the certification authority, key generation and distribution are connected respectively to the secret key generation subsystems 25 and 13 of the secret key tables of the distributed data processing server 3 and the user device 2, and the first and second stochastic transcoding devices of the distributed processing server 3 information are connected respectively, with the first and second devices 23, 24 of stochastic transcoding of information of the user device 2.

Figure 5 presents the subsystem 5 of the generation of secret key tables of the certification, formation and distribution center 1 of the keys, comprising a memory block 40 of the master key table, a memory block 41 of the initial key tables, a memory block 42 of the key distribution tables, a random number sensor 43 with a selection circuit 44 combinations, a column permutation register 45, a row permutation register 46, a switching unit 47 connected to the outputs of the memory block 40 of the main key table and registers 45, 46, and a control unit 48 connected to the above elements 40-47.

Figure 6 shows the subsystem 13, 25 of generating secret key tables used in the distributed processing server 3 and in the user device 2. The subsystem 13, 25 of generating secret key tables contains memory blocks 49, 50, 51, 52 of the initial, basic, and external tables and an internal key, a random number sensor 53 with a selection circuit of 54 combinations, registers 55, 56, 57, 58 of the permutation of columns and rows of the base and foreign keys, respectively, a switching unit 59 connected to the outputs of the memory unit 49 of the initial key table and the above small registers 55, 56, 57, 58, and a control unit 60 connected to the above elements 49-59.

7 shows a subsystem 8 for generating public keys of a certification, generation and distribution center 1 of keys, comprising a memory block 61 for secret permutation tables of columns and rows of private key tables, a memory block 62 for symmetric permutation tables of columns and rows of a foreign key table, register 63 sequences of transitive communication between rows of tables of secret permutations, block 64 of logical inference on a sequence of transitive dependencies, block of memory 65 for a table of relative unclassified permutations of columns and rows of the foreign key table, public key register 66, input and output switching units 67, 68 and control unit 69, the outputs of which are connected respectively to the inputs of the mentioned memory units 61 and 62, registers 63 and 66, input and output blocks 67, 68 of the switching unit and the logical output unit 64 on a sequence of transitive dependence, the second and third inputs of which are connected respectively to the outputs of the memory unit 62 for the table of symmetric permutation of columns and rows of the foreign key table and register 63 of the subsequent transitive connection between rows of secret permutation tables, and the output is with the input of a memory block 65 for a table of relative unclassified permutation of columns and rows of a foreign key table, the output of which is connected to the input of the public key register 66 connected to the input of the output switching unit 68, the other input of which connected to the outputs of the memory block 61 for tables of secret permutations of columns and rows of tables of secret keys connected by its input to the output of the input switching unit 67.

On Fig presents a subsystem 9 (18, 23) authentication and integrity checks of information used in the above center 1 certification, generation and distribution of keys, user devices 2 and servers 3 distributed processing. The authentication and integrity checking subsystem contains registers 70, 71, 72 of the password, PIN code, and private secret key, respectively, associated with the switching unit 73, an external stochastic encoder 74 connected to the memory unit 75 of the column for transcoding the characters of the code block into a numerical code, and a comparison circuit 76 of the values of the hash function associated with the control unit 77 connected to the aforementioned registers 70, 71, 72, with the switching unit 73 and with an external stochastic encoder 74.

Figure 9 presents the stochastic encoder 15 of the user device 2, containing the input permutation register 78, the input of which is the input of encoded data of the stochastic encoder, the block of registers 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n columns of the multi-alphabet encoder, the first input connected to the output of the input permutation register 78, a column connection circuit 80, outputs connected to the second inputs of the block of registers 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n columns of the multi-alphabet encoder, a cyclic permutation register 81, the outputs connected to the corresponding inputs column connection circuits 80, inverter key block 82-1, 82-2, ..., 82-n, the outputs of which are connected to the corresponding inputs of the cyclic permutation register 81, the recurrence register 83, the outputs are connected to the corresponding inputs of the inverter key block 82 -1, 82-2, ..., 82-n, gamma generation circuit 84, adder mod 2 85, the inputs of which are connected respectively to the outputs of the register block 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n columns multi-alphabet encoder and circuit 84 of the formation of the gamut, and the output is with the input of the output register 86 of the code block, the output of which is the output to encoded data of the stochastic encoder, and a control unit 87, the outputs of which are connected respectively to the inputs of the input permutation register 78, the recursive register 83, the inverter key block 82-1,82-2, ..., 82-n, the cyclic permutation register 81, Column connection circuits 80, register block 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n columns of a multi-alphabet encoder, gamma forming circuit 84, mod 2 adder 85 and code block output register 86, while control unit 87, s the corresponding input of which is connected an additional output of the recursive register has an additional input and output for communication with other control units of the integrated protection system of distributed information processing.

Figure 10 shows the gamma generation circuit 84, which is part of the stochastic encoder 15, containing a block of registers 88-1, 88-2, ..., 88-n columns of the gamma generation table, a column connection circuit 89 connected to the inputs of the block by outputs registers 88-1, 88-2, ..., 88-n columns of the gamma generation table, a cyclic permutation register 90, connected to the corresponding inputs of the column connection circuit 89 by outputs, inverter key block 91-1, 91-2, .. ., 91-n, the outputs of which are connected to the corresponding inputs of the cyclic permutation register 90, recur a clear register 92, outputs connected to the corresponding inputs of the block of inverter keys 91-1, 91-2, ..., 91-n, register 93 of the original gamma, adder mod 2 94, key 95, the input of which is connected to the output of the register block 88-1, 88-2, ..., 88-n columns of the gamma generation table, and the first and second outputs, respectively, with the adder input in mod 2 94 of the gamma generation circuit and with the adder input in mod 2 85 of stochastic encoder 15 (FIG. .9), and a control unit 96, the outputs of which are connected respectively to the inputs of the recurrence register 92, the block of inverter keys 91-1, 91-2, ..., 91-n, the clichical register 90 of the permutation, the connection diagram of the columns 89, the block of registers 88-1, 88-2, ..., 88-n columns of the gamma generation table, key 95, adder mod 2 94 and the register 93 of the original gamma, the output connected to the input a control unit 96, the second input of which is connected to an additional output of the recurrence register, and the third input of which is connected to the corresponding output of the control unit 87 of the stochastic encoder 15.

The stochastic decoder 14 (Fig. 3) is made similarly to the stochastic encoder 15, a diagram of which is presented in Fig. 9. The only difference is that the direction of the processed signal in the decoder circuit is reversed compared to the encoder circuit (Fig. 9). Thus, block 86 (the output register of the code block in Fig. 9) in the stochastic decoder circuit will receive decoded input data, and block decoded data will be output from block 78 (the input permutation register in Fig. 9).

On figa, 11B shows a stochastic transcoding device (23, 24 in figure 3, 27, 28 in figure 4), which is part of user devices 2 and servers 3 distributed processing. The stochastic transcoding device comprises series-connected input block 97 of the code block, the first stage 98 of stochastic conversion, the first and second registers 99, 100 of permutation, the second stage 101 of stochastic conversion and the output register 102 of the code block. The first and second stages 98, 101 have an identical structure that practically coincides with the structure of the stochastic encoder 15 (see elements 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87 in Fig. 9). Essentially, the difference lies in the introduction of the key 103 between the output of the block of registers 79-1, 79-2, 79-n and the input of the adder in mod 2 85, the output of the key 103 being the output of the corresponding stochastic conversion stage.

12 shows tables of a certification authority, key generation and distribution.

13 illustrates the process of generating public keys for users in a certification authority, generating and distributing keys.

On Fig shows the main steps of the key distribution procedure.

Consider in more detail the implementation of the proposed system of integrated protection of distributed information processing in computer systems (figure 1).

The main tasks of the center 1 certification of the formation and distribution of keys are the connection of user devices 2 to the security system, their certification, the formation and distribution of private and public keys between user devices 2 and servers 3 distributed data processing. In the center of certification 1, the main key of the system (master key) is generated and stored, which is a table randomly filled with codes. The structure of the certification center 1 is shown in FIG. Certification of user devices 2 and servers 3 distributed processing for connecting to a security system is carried out in subsystem 4 user certification. The formation of the master key table is performed in the subsystem 5 of the formation of secret key tables.

Based on the main secret key table in subsystem 5 of generating secret key tables by randomly rearranging its columns and rows, many different initial secret key tables for users are generated. In this case, each obtained table of the initial secret key is associated with the applied permutation of the columns and rows of the table of the main secret key. Then, in the same subsystem 5, for each table of the initial secret key, by randomly rearranging its columns and rows, tables of the base secret key and the foreign secret key are formed. Each resulting table is mapped to the used random permutations of the columns and rows of the initial secret key table. All these procedures are performed under the control of the information-logical secure computing system 6, the programs of which are executed in a protected form. The structure and operation of the information-logical secure computing system 6 is described in the patent of the Russian Federation No. 2137185 from 01/09/98.

The resulting primary key tables and random permutations of columns and rows for generating the tables of the base secret key and the external secret key are received in the subsystem 7 of the formation of media for certified users. In this subsystem, the formation of data carriers and their issuance to users who have passed the certification to connect to the protection system of distributed information processing in computer systems.

Key permutations of columns and rows that are used in the formation of each table of the initial key are stored in the key distribution table for users (Fig. 12). In addition, the table receives the random numbers received from the sensor in the authentication and verification subsystem 9 of the user information value of the PIN code and password. Using a combination of a password and a PIN code, the value of its hash function is calculated, the implementation procedure of which is described below. When a user is certified, his passport data is also entered in the table. After that, for each user in the subsystem 7 of the formation of media for certification users, a data carrier is formed - a smart card, a copy of which is stored in the certification center. It contains a complete table of the initial key, as well as a set of secret permutation keys for the tables of the user's base and foreign keys. In addition, the PIN code and the hash value of the password of this user are recorded in the smart card (Fig. 12). The resulting smart card is issued to the user for input into his computer (user device 2 or server 3 distributed processing).

To create a key system, the user enters into the computer information from a smart card received in the center 1 of certification, generation and distribution of keys. After that, the base key table is generated on the computer based on the permutation keys for columns and rows specified in the smart card. Then, using appropriate permutations, a foreign key table and the code table of the protected arithmetic processor 10 are formed. The structure and operation of the protected arithmetic processor 10 are described in: Nasypny V.V. “Protection of arithmetic calculations in computer systems”, PC World, 1999, No. 4, p. 73-74. At the same time, in the user device 2 and the distributed processing server 3, the subsystem 13, 25 for generating secret key tables and the protected processing control unit 21, 30 are used, as well as the information-logical secure computing system 20, 35 (Figs. 3, 4).

As a result, the message “Enter your personal password” is displayed on the monitor screen. After the user password is entered into the secure access subsystem 16 in the authentication subsystem 18 and information integrity check using the base key table and the secure arithmetic processor 19, the password hash value is calculated, which is compared with the same value entered from the smart card. When the compared values match, the protected processing control unit 21 is activated, and the user gains access to its functions. If, after m-times entering the password, the value of its hash function does not match the value entered from the smart card, the security system is blocked, the smart card is canceled. To obtain a new smart card, the user must contact the center 1 certification, the formation and distribution of keys.

When gaining access to the security system functions at the user's command in the user device 2, based on the initial key table and secret permutations entered from the smart card, the base secret key tables are formed, and then the foreign secret key tables. The resulting base secret key tables are subjected to random permutations of columns and rows to form an internal secret key table. Then, copies of the obtained table of the internal secret key are recorded in the internal stochastic encoder 15, the internal stochastic decoder 14, and also in the transceiver unit 22, which includes the first and second devices 23, 24 of stochastic transcoding of information in the user device 2. The described procedures are implemented by performing protected programs in the information-logical secure computing system 20 by commands of the control unit 21, 30 protected processing. After that, the secure processing control unit 21 sets up the internal stochastic encoder 15, the internal stochastic decoder 14 and ensures the availability of the intra-computer secure transmission and processing of information in the user device 2.

The same procedures for entering information from a smart card using a secure access subsystem 31, including a subsystem 32 for inputting information from a data medium and a subsystem 33 for authenticating and checking the integrity of information, are performed in the distributed processing server 3. After user authentication, the control unit 30 is protected by the processing, at the command of which, in the subsystem 25 of generating secret key tables, the tables of the foreign private key and the base secret key are generated. At the same time, based on the initial secret key table and secret permutations entered from the smart card, the base secret key tables are first generated, and then the foreign secret key tables are created. The resulting base secret key tables are subjected to random permutations of columns and rows to form the internal secret key table. Then, copies of the obtained table of the internal secret key are recorded in the internal device 29 for stochastic transcoding of information, as well as in the device 27, 28 for stochastic transcoding of information of the transceiver unit 26 of the stochastic conversion. The described procedures are implemented by executing protected programs in the information-logical secure computing system 35 by commands of the secure processing control unit 30. After that, according to the commands of the secure processing control unit 30 connected to the information-logical secure computing system 35, the table 35 of the email addresses, the protected data tables 39 and the protected arrays of Web pages 38 are encrypted. the stochastic transcoding device 29 is put into the internal stochastic encoder mode, with which the interface of the protected arithmetic processor 34 is matched.

After completing the described process of generating key tables, the user can request a center 1 for certification, generation and distribution of keys for organizing closed communication with the required distributed processing server 3 (by another user). This should be preceded by an agreement on the organization of such communications, obtained through open communications. Upon this request, the certification center 1 provides the formation and distribution of public keys between users to ensure closed communication. The structure of this process is shown in FIG.

Consider the functions of the certification center 1, the formation and distribution of keys, user device 2 (user A) and server 3 distributed processing (user B) when organizing the closed communication process.

The functions of the certification authority, the formation and distribution of keys:

1) verification of the authority of users A and B to establish a closed connection;

2) generating a public key for user device 2;

3) the formation of the public key for the server 3 distributed processing;

4) the issuance of public keys over the communication network to the user device 2 and the server 3 distributed processing to establish a symmetric closed connection;

5) after the end of the communication session, the issuance of new public keys to bring the communication system into asymmetric mode.

Functions of users A (B):

1) obtaining a public permutation key;

2) modification of the foreign key table to implement symmetric private communication;

3) forming a table for the device 23, 24 (27, 28) of stochastic transcoding of information of the transceiver unit 22 (26) of the stochastic conversion;

4) the formation of a table for a scheme for generating a gamut of stochastic transcoding devices 23, 24 (27, 28);

5) the beginning of the transfer of information in a closed mode.

Checking the user permissions of the user device 2 and the distributed processing server 3 for establishing open communication is carried out in the user certification subsystem 4 (Fig. 2) according to special tables that determine the scheme of allowed information interactions of system users in closed mode. If the user’s authority to compose a closed connection is confirmed, then in the certification, generation and distribution center of the keys, the public keys are automatically generated for the user device 2 and the distributed processing server 3.

Public key generation is based on the use of a unidirectional function that uses relative permutations on sufficiently long combinations of random characters (length n> 100). As noted above, in the center 1 of certification, generation and distribution of keys, all permutation keys of columns and rows are stored, which make it possible to form tables of initial, basic and foreign secret keys for each user from the master key table. After the system boots up, all these tables, including the table of foreign secret keys, will be asymmetric for different users. In order to organize a closed connection between users A and B, it is necessary to bring their foreign secret key tables to an identical state. This is ensured by the presence in the certification center 1 of all the above functionally related secret permutations of the tables (initial, basic, and foreign secret keys).

In the subsystem 8 for generating public keys (FIG. 2), relative permutations for users A and B are determined by means of a logical inference on a sequence of transitive relationships between rows of secret permutation tables, which allow bringing the foreign secret key tables to a symmetric state. The indicated relative permutations are public keys. Based on them, users A and B can translate tables of foreign secret keys into an identical state to organize a symmetric closed connection. To this end, in the subsystem 8 for generating public keys (FIG. 2), from the subsystem 5 for generating secret key tables, data of secret permutation tables of columns and rows of secret key tables (initial, basic, and external) are transmitted through the information-logical secure computing system 6. Then, based on these tables, sequences of transitive relationships between rows of secret permutation tables are formed. Next, using the logical inference on the transitive dependence sequence, the tables of relative unclassified permutation of the columns and rows of the external secret key table are determined separately for user device 2 and distributed processing server 3. The resulting tables are public keys, providing a translation of the external secret key tables of the user device 2 and the distributed processing server 3 into a symmetric state. The obtained public keys are sent to the key distribution subsystem 11 and brought through the computer system to the corresponding user device 2 and the distributed processing server 3.

Moreover, the function of generating public keys using relative permutation is unidirectional for any user of the system. This is due to the fact that in the center 1 of certification, generation and distribution of keys, having a complete functional diagram between the permutation keys, the function y = f (x) can be easily calculated. Here x is the value of the initial, basic or external secret key, f are the functional relationships between them, given by secret permutations, y is the relative unclassified permutation. However, by the known value of y, without knowing the whole scheme of functional relationships between tables, one cannot restore secret permutations, the original table of the initial, base or foreign secret key. Since the corresponding secret permutation tables are individual for each user, no one except him will be able to build a new symmetric table of the external secret key when organizing a private connection with a given subscriber using the received public key. Moreover, no one can calculate the initial values of the tables of the initial, basic or external secret keys of a given user using the generated key. This is due to the fact that the definition of these permutations and tables is associated with a complete exhaustive search of all possible combinations on the set V = n! (for n = 100, for example, V> 10 ^100, which is practically impossible). Therefore, the function y = f (x) is one-sided for all other users of the system. Moreover, even user B, with whom user A interacts, having after processing the public key an identical session foreign secret key, cannot open the basic and initial secret keys of user A by reverse permutation.

Based on the obtained public keys, in the subsystem 13 and 25 of generating the secret key tables of the user device 2 and the distributed processing server 3, tables of symmetric external secret keys are created. These tables are recorded in the device 23, 24 (27, 28) of stochastic transcoding of information of the transceiver unit 22 (26) of stochastic conversion of the user device 2 (server 3 distributed processing), thereby establishing a closed symmetrical connection between them. At the same time, in the devices for stochastic transcoding of information 23, 24 (27, 28), the necessary coordination of the tables of external and internal codes that provide a closed loop for transmitting and processing protected information between the user device 2 and the distributed processing server 3 occurs. This circuit extends from the internal stochastic encoder 15 of the user device 2 to the internal device for stochastic transcoding of information 29 of the distributed processing server connected to the information-logical secure computing system 35 and back through the internal device of stochastic transcoding of information 29 to the internal stochastic decoder 14 of the user device 2. When this in the transmission process based on the stochastic selection of random elements of the tables of the internal external secret keys single key mode is realized by providing the requested guaranteed level of information security.

After the close session, the certification authority sends users A and B public permutation keys to generate asymmetric tables of the original foreign secret keys.

Thus, based on the variety of information protection functions (transmission and processing), the key system is two-level. The first level is the tables of the initial, basic and foreign secret keys. The user enters these tables into the user device 2, the distributed processing server 3 using the certification obtained in the center 1, generation and distribution of keys of the data carrier. The specified secret key tables are continuously (periodically) updated using public keys generated by a certification, key generation and distribution center. Moreover, in the process of transmitting information between users A and B, a system function is implemented to periodically modify the tables of secret foreign keys used in the stochastic encoder 14 and in the gamma generation circuit 84. This function is performed using public keys generated in the user device 2 and the distributed processing server 3 (users A and B), which participate in the exchange of closed information. In the process of exchanging classified information, this system function is essentially one of the basic procedures for ensuring its reliability and security. At the same time, the choice of the modification period for tables of secret foreign keys significantly affects the level of information security.

The second level of the key system is stochastic one-time keys. They are formed on the basis of tables of the external secret key used in the stochastic encoder 14 and the gamma generation circuit 84, by stochastic selection of unique combinations of random elements of these tables. This level corresponds to the local functions of stochastic coding and gamming, implemented using stochastic one-time keys.

In the general case, the reliability and security of the process of stochastic coding of information during its transmission depends both on the frequency of implementation of the system function for modifying tables of secret foreign keys, and on the effectiveness of stochastic one-time keys of stochastic encoder 14 and gamma generation circuit 84.

In the secure processing control unit 30, the type of processing that needs to be performed in the secure information and logic computing system 35 using closed data and stochastically converted programs is determined by the format of the received message. This processing can be an email transfer, arithmetic calculations, search and selection according to the condition of requesting the required information from the encrypted database 36. These functions are performed using the internal stochastic transcoding device 29 connected to the secure processing control unit 30 and the information-logical secure computing system 35. The procedure for implementing these functions of processing protected information using secure stochastically converted programs m in the information-logical secure computing system 35 is described below.

In the process of processing information using stochastically transformed programs and data in the information-logical secure computing system 35 provides comprehensive protection against unauthorized access, software bookmarks and viruses.

When new programs are introduced before or after the stochastic transformation of each newly introduced program in an information-logical secure computing system, antivirus protection is implemented based on the detection of virus functions using the logical output on a variety of program command codes. In this case, the first is the allocation of command codes that viruses can use to implement unauthorized actions with programs, data and text files. Then, using a logical conclusion, a chain of logically connected command codes is obtained, including the above “viral” codes, and the objective function of each such chain is determined. If this objective function is viral, then this chain of logically related commands refers to viral functions. In this case, it is destroyed with the operability of the converted program.

The operation of the individual subsystems and devices of the system is described below.

Subsystem 4 user certification (figure 2)

This organizational type subsystem contains typical input / output information devices connected to the subsystem 5 for generating secret key tables. It provides input of passport data of computer users during their certification to connect to the protection system of distributed information processing in computer systems. The composition of the passport data is recorded in the key distribution tables for users (Fig. 12) stored in the subsystem 5 for generating secret key tables.

Subsystem 5 of the formation of tables of secret keys (figure 5)

This subsystem is part of the center 1 certification, the formation and distribution of keys. Its purpose is to form the main secret key on the basis of the table by randomly rearranging the columns and rows of many tables of initial secret keys for certified users of the system. In addition, in this subsystem, tables of secret permutations of columns and rows are generated, which are necessary to obtain, based on the initial secret key table, the base and external secret key tables for each user (Fig. 12). The launch of this subsystem is carried out according to the instructions received from the information-logical secure computing system 6. The processing result is fed there, which then goes to the subsystem 7 for generating media for certified users, as well as to the subsystem 8 for generating public keys. According to the received commands, the control unit 48 of this subsystem is launched, which includes a random number sensor 43. The process of generating a sequence of random numbers begins, which enters the selection scheme of 44 combinations. Here, a selection of n different random numbers entering through the control unit 48 to the column permutation register 45 is performed. After that, in the same way, n line randomization register 46 is filled with n different random numbers. Next, the random number sensor 43 is temporarily disabled. The process of forming a table of the initial secret key begins by rearranging the columns and rows of the main secret key using the filled registers 45, 46 of the permutation of columns and rows. To this end, according to the instructions of the control unit 48, the rows are first sequentially fetched from the table of the master secret key, each row is written to the column permutation register 45, where, in accordance with the recorded random sequence, the fields of this i-th row are rearranged. The obtained string data through the switching unit 47, the control unit 48 is received in the memory unit 41 of the initial secret key tables and is recorded in the generated table of the initial private key for the next user. In this case, the line number is determined by the corresponding i-th random number read from the register of permutation of lines. As a result, after reading n lines and performing the described permutations in the memory block 41 of the initial secret key tables, the initial secret key table for the next user will be formed. After that, this table through the control unit 48 enters the memory block of the key distribution tables 42 and is recorded in the corresponding key distribution table for the specified user (Fig. 12). There, through the switching unit 47 and the control unit 48, sequences of secret permutations of columns and rows from the corresponding registers are recorded. After that, the control unit 48 again turns on the random number sensor 43, which, as described above, provides random permutations of columns and rows, first to form the base secret key table, then to the external secret key table. The obtained secret permutations alternately through the switching unit 47 and the control unit 48 are received in the memory unit of the key distribution tables 42 and are entered into the copy table of the smart card of the next user (Fig. 12). There, the initial secret key tables and the corresponding secret permutations of columns and rows from the corresponding key distribution table for users are recorded. After that, at the command of the control unit 48, the random number sensor 43 generates PIN and password values for this user. The obtained values through the selection scheme 44 combinations and the control unit 48 are received in the memory block tables of the initial keys and are recorded in the key distribution table for users, generated for the specified user (Fig). From there, the values of the PIN code and password, through the control unit 48 and the switching unit 47, are supplied to the information-logical secure computing system 6. Further, these values, through the key distribution subsystem 11 and the secure processing control unit 12, are sent to the authentication and verification integrity information subsystem 9. Here, by the combinations of the PIN code and password, the values of the password hash functions are generated, which are issued in the reverse order to the subsystem for generating secret key tables and are recorded in the specified key distribution table for users. The procedure for generating the password hash function in the authentication and verification subsystem 9 is described below. Then, the PIN code and password hash functions are entered into the smart card copy table for this user (Fig. 12). After that, the generated copy of the user's smart card through the information-logical computing system 6 enters the subsystem 7 of the formation of media for certified users.

Subsystem 7 media formation for certified users (figure 3)

In this subsystem, the resulting copy of the smart card is recorded on the appropriate storage medium. The resulting media (smart card) is issued to the appropriate user. At the same time, he is verbally informed of the value of the personal password.

Subsystem 13, 25 of generating secret key tables of user device 2 (distributed processing server 3)

This subsystem is included in the work after the smart card is inserted into the subsystem 17, 32 for entering information from the data carrier of the secure access subsystem 16, 31 of the user device 2 and the server 3 of the distributed processing and user authentication using the subsystem 18, 33 of user authentication and information integrity control. After user authentication at the command from the control unit 21, 30 with secure processing through the switching unit 59 and the control unit 60, the initial key table of the user read from the smart card is received in the memory unit 49 of the initial key table. In this case, the registers 55, 56 of the permutation of columns and rows for the formation of the base key and the registers 57, 58 of the permutation of columns and rows for the formation of the foreign key, the corresponding numerical sequences are read from the smart card.

Then, the process of generating the base secret key table begins by rearranging the columns and rows of the initial key using the filled registers 55, 56 of the permutation of columns and rows to form the base secret key table. For this purpose, according to the instructions of the control unit 60, first, the rows are retrieved one by one from the initial secret key table, each row is entered into the column permutation register 55, where, in accordance with the recorded random sequence, the fields of this i-th row are rearranged. The resulting line through the switching unit 65, the control unit 60 enters the memory unit 50 of the base key table. There, it is written to the generated table of the base secret key for this user. Moreover, the line number is determined by the corresponding i-th random number read from the register 56 line permutation. As a result, after reading n lines and performing the described permutations in the memory block 50 of the base key table, the base secret key table of this user will be generated.

The resulting base secret key table is the initial one when generating the foreign secret key table based on n different random numbers recorded in the 57, 58 permutations of columns and rows to form the foreign secret key table. The procedure for generating the foreign secret key table by rearranging the columns and rows of the base secret key table is identical to the basic key generation algorithm described above. As a result of its implementation, the resulting foreign secret key table of this user will be recorded in the memory block 51 of the foreign key table.

After that, at the command of the control unit 60, the random number sensor 53 is started. As a result, through the selection scheme 54 combinations and the control unit 60, random sequences arrive at the columns and rows permutation registers 57, 58 for forming the foreign secret key table, each of which contains n different random numbers. In this case, these random sequences are used to form the internal secret key table based on the base secret key table obtained earlier. Then, the random number sensor 53 is temporarily disabled, and the above-described algorithm for rearranging the columns and rows of the base secret key table is implemented. In this case, the resulting table of the internal secret key is recorded in the memory block 52 of the internal key. Thus, the tables of basic, external and internal secret keys are formed, which are necessary for the implementation of secure transmission and processing of information in the distributed processing server 3 and user device 2.

Subsystem 8 generating public keys (Fig.7)

The purpose of this subsystem is to generate public keys for user device 2 (user A) and distributed processing server 3 (user B), ensuring the translation of their external secret keys into a symmetric state. As noted above, this function is performed every time a closed communication is established between users A and B. At the same time, public keys are generated using logical inference on functionally related tables of secret permutations of columns and rows using transitive dependencies. Before starting this process, in the center 1 of certification, generation and distribution of keys using a 43 random number sensor and a selection scheme of 44 combinations of the subsystem 5 for generating secret key tables, sequences of secret permutations of columns and rows for a symmetric foreign key are generated. These sequences allow you to create, based on the table of the main secret key, by appropriate permutations of the columns and rows, symmetric tables of the external secret key for users A and B. However, given that the generated tables of the initial, basic and foreign secret keys of each user are different, it is necessary to carry out logical processing corresponding permutations. In this case, relative non-secret permutations (public keys) are calculated for users A and B, allowing them to translate their asymmetric tables of foreign secret keys into a symmetric (identical) state. To this end, the specified secret permutation of the columns and rows tables obtained in the subsystem 5 for generating private keys is recorded through the information-logical secure computing system 6, the switching unit 67, and the control unit 69 into the memory unit 62 for the symmetric permutation table of the columns and rows of foreign key tables.

In the general case, each sequence of secret permutation has the following form:

i, 2

j, 3

l, ..., m

k, ..., n

r,one

i, 2

j, 3

l, ..., m

k, ..., n

r

where 1, 2, 3 ... n are the serial numbers of the original columns (rows) of the main secret key, i, j, l ... r are their random permutation numbers. In this case, serial numbers form the input column of the permutation table, and random numbers of permutations form its output column.

i,

j,

k, которая связывает перестановки первого элемента главного секретного ключа на множестве указанных таблиц перестановок. Данная транзитивная зависимость записывается в регистр 63 последовательности транзитивной зависимости через блок коммутации 68 и блок 69 управления, а затем поступает в блок 64 логического вывода на последовательности транзитивной зависимости. Туда же поступает значение первой строки таблицы перестановки (1

i) из блока памяти 62 для таблицы симметричной перестановки столбцов и строк таблицы внешнего секретного ключа. В результате логического вывода исходная транзитивная последовательность дополняется соотношением k

i и принимает вид 1

i,

j,

k

i=1

i. Полученный результат логического вывода совпадает с первой строкой таблицы симметричной перестановки столбцов (строк) таблицы внешнего секретного ключа. При этом формируется первая строка относительной (несекретной) перестановки открытого ключа в виде k

i. Затем такие же процедуры производятся со второй строкой таблицы секретной перестановки столбцов и строк начального секретного ключа, базового секретного ключа, таблицы симметричного внешнего ключа и т.д. В результате выполнения n процедур логического вывода будет сформирован открытый ключ в виде таблицы относительной перестановки столбцов (строк) для пользователя А (В). Отметим, что каждый открытый ключ содержит две таблицы перестановок (таблицу для столбцов и таблицу для строк). При этом для каждого пользователя формируется свой индивидуальный открытый ключ. Полученные относительные перестановки записываются в блок памяти 65 для таблицы относительной перестановки столбцов и строк таблицы внешнего ключа, а оттуда считываются в регистр 66 открытого ключа. Затем по команде блока 69 управления открытый ключ через блок коммутации 68 поступает в информационно-логическую защищенную вычислительную систему 6. Оттуда он передается через подсистему 11 распределения ключей по компьютерной системе пользователю А (В). После получения открытого ключа в пользовательском устройстве 2 или сервере 3 распределенной обработки он поступает в подсистему 13, 25 формирования таблиц секретных ключей. При этом открытый ключ, содержащий две таблицы перестановок, через блок коммутации 59 записывается в регистр 55 перестановки столбцов для формирования таблицы внешнего ключа и в регистр 56 перестановки строк для формирования таблицы внешнего ключа. Затем на основе таблицы асимметричного внешнего секретного ключа, записанного в блок памяти 51 таблицы внешнего ключа, путем соответствующей перестановки столбцов и строк производится формирование таблицы симметричного внешнего секретного ключа в пользовательском устройстве 2 и сервере 3 распределенной обработки.After that, from the subsystem 5 of the formation of private keys into the memory block 61 for tables of secret permutations of columns and rows of secret keys all the tables of secret permutations for user A (B) are rewritten. These tables, as noted above, allow, based on the table of the main secret key, using the appropriate permutations of the columns and rows, to form the table of the initial secret key, then the table of the base and foreign secret keys. These tables have functional dependencies between different rows, which can be determined by highlighting identical numbers in the output column of each previous table and in the input column of each subsequent table. Moreover, the secret permutation tables are arranged in the following order: tables for generating the initial secret key, tables for generating the base secret key, tables for generating the external secret key (Fig. 13). After that, the first row is highlighted in the secret permutation table to form the initial secret key, and the following transitive dependence is formed on the basis of functional relationships: 1

i

j

k, which links the permutations of the first element of the master secret key on the set of specified permutation tables. This transitive dependence is recorded in the register 63 of the sequence of transitive dependence through the switching unit 68 and the control unit 69, and then enters the block 64 inference on the sequence of transitive dependence. The value of the first row of the permutation table (1

i) from a memory unit 62 for a symmetric permutation table of columns and rows of a foreign secret key table. As a result of the logical inference, the initial transitive sequence is supplemented by the relation k

i and takes the form 1

i

j

k

i = 1

i. The result of the logical inference coincides with the first row of the symmetric permutation table of the columns (rows) of the foreign secret key table. In this case, the first line of the relative (unclassified) permutation of the public key is formed in the form k

i. Then, the same procedures are performed with the second row of the secret permutation table of columns and rows of the initial secret key, base secret key, symmetric foreign key table, etc. As a result of performing n logical inference procedures, a public key will be generated in the form of a table of relative permutation of columns (rows) for user A (B). Note that each public key contains two permutation tables (a table for columns and a table for rows). At the same time, an individual public key is generated for each user. The obtained relative permutations are recorded in the memory block 65 for the table of relative permutations of the columns and rows of the foreign key table, and from there are read into the public key register 66. Then, at the command of the control unit 69, the public key through the switching unit 68 enters the information-logical secure computing system 6. From there it is transmitted to the user A (B) through the key distribution subsystem 11 through the computer system. After receiving the public key in the user device 2 or server 3 distributed processing, he enters the subsystem 13, 25 of the formation of secret key tables. In this case, the public key containing two permutation tables is written through the switching unit 59 to the column permutation register 55 to form the foreign key table and to the row permutation register 56 to form the foreign key table. Then, based on the asymmetric foreign secret key table recorded in the memory block 51 of the foreign key table, by arranging the columns and rows accordingly, a symmetric foreign secret key table is formed in the user device 2 and the distributed processing server 3.

Subsystem of authentication and information integrity control (Fig. 8)

When transmitting public keys via a communication system between the certification authority 1, key generation and distribution, the user device 2 and the distributed data processing server 3, an electronic digital signature is used. It is based on the use of a hash function and a user's private secret key.

To implement the hash function, a unidirectional function is used, based on the use of stochastic coding technology. First, we consider the order of formation of the hash function in the open information transfer mode. For the rational use of resources in the synthesis of the hash function of a message (document) transmitted by user A to user B, algorithms for organizing a closed mode are used to the maximum. Therefore, in order to rationalize the receipt of the hash function, the procedures for generating public keys, translating tables of foreign private keys into symmetric mode, and adding information using a closed arithmetic processor are used. The hash function can be used not only for authentication of electronic documents, but also for user authentication when entering his password into the computer. In order to implement a hash function for authenticating transmitted electronic documents in open mode, users A and B request public permutation keys at the certification center to bring the tables of the foreign secret key into a symmetric state. In this case, the above-described algorithm for generating and transmitting the public key for users A and B is implemented. The obtained public key is sent to the subsystem 13, 25 of generating secret key tables of user device 2 (user A) and distributed processing server 3 (user B). Further, the above-described algorithm for translating the tables of external secret keys of users A and B into symmetric mode is used. The resulting table from the subsystem 13, 25 of generating the secret key tables through the secure processing control unit 21, 30 enters the control unit 77 and the external stochastic encoder 74 of the authentication and integrity check subsystem 18, 33. In this case, the external encoder of users A and B is set to a symmetric transmission mode. Then begins the transfer of information between users A and B in open mode. At the same time, each transmitted i-th data element (i = 1-N) enters the external stochastic encoder 74 of the authentication and verification subsystem 18 of the information and is subjected to stochastic encoding and gamming. Then, the obtained code block is re-encoded in the memory block of 75 columns for transcoding the symbols of the code block into a numerical code and enters the protected processing control unit 21. After that, it is supplied to the information-logical secure computing system 20 and is added to the protected arithmetic processor 19 with the previous (i-1) th code block and with the i-th code block in stochastically transformed form. As a result, after transmitting all N message data elements, a 64-byte combination will be formed in the protected arithmetic processor, which is a compressed representation of the transmitted document. In the distributed processing server 3 (user B), upon receipt of each i-th message code block, the same procedures for generating the hash function are performed. After receiving all N code blocks, the hash values obtained by the system and generated in the distributed processing server 3 are transferred to the secure processing control unit 30, and then to the authentication and information integrity verification subsystem 33. In this subsystem, at the command of the control unit 77, these combinations enter the comparison circuit 76 of the hash function values. Here, a comparison is made between the value of the hash function transmitted by user A and the hash function generated by user B. If the specified document values match, it is considered authenticated. Due to stochastic coding, the following properties are provided:

- guaranteed protection with a given probability from any changes in the text during its transmission (insertions, outliers, permutations, etc.);

- the uniqueness of the resulting hash function (the probability that the values of the hash functions of different documents are the same is negligible);

- the irreversibility of the hash function, since the task of selecting a document that would have the same value of the hash function is computationally insoluble.

The same algorithm for generating the hash function of the transmitted messages is also used in closed mode. At the same time, the generation of the hash function for user A is performed simultaneously with the encoding of the transmitted data elements, and for user B, the implementation of the hash function is performed after decoding each successive block using the re-encoding procedure.

When the password hash value is generated, the base key table is written to the external stochastic encoder of the authentication subsystem 18, 33 of the authentication and information integrity check. It provides filling in the tables of the specified encoder. In this case, the password and user PIN value entered from the subsystem 17 for inputting information from the data medium are encoded, which are recorded in the password registers 70, 71 and the PIN code of the authentication subsystem 18, 33 and verify the integrity of the information. After adding the stochastically transformed combinations in a protected arithmetic processor 19, 34, the resulting combination of length n enters the information-logical protected computing system 20, 35, where it is divided into segments of a given length m <n, which are summed over mod 2. Then, the obtained value through the control unit 21, 30, the protected processing enters the hash function value comparison circuit and is compared with the password hash value recorded on the certified user data medium (smart card). Using a digital signature, user A, using a random number sensor of subsystem 5 for generating secret key tables, generates a private secret key in the form of a permutation of the rows of the external secret key table. In this case, taking into account this combination, the external stochastic encoder 74 of the authentication and verification integrity subsystem 18 is reconstructed. Then, in the control unit 21, the protected processing of user A calculates the public key in the form of a relative unclassified permutation between the previous and new location of the rows of the foreign secret key table. This public key is transferred to user B and can be transferred to certification center 1 to register the private key of user A. Based on the received public key, user B rebuilds the foreign secret key table for decoding and verifying the electronic signature of user A. When creating this key, functional dependencies are used between secret permutations of the corresponding tables of users A and B. The public key for user B can also be calculated in the certification center 1, forms key generation and distribution when registering the private key of user A. For this, the relative unclassified permutation generated by user A and the functional dependencies between secret permutations of the corresponding tables of users A and B are used.

Using the received certified key in the external stochastic encoder 74 of the authentication and integrity verification subsystem 18 of user A, information is converted to the combination of its hash function generated when the document is transmitted. User B, upon receipt of a coded hash function at the end of the message, decodes it using the obtained public key and compares it with the previously generated hash function of the received message.

Stochastic encoder (Fig.9)

Let us consider in more detail the process of synthesis and functioning of the stochastic encoder (15, 74) of the user device 2 and the distributed processing server 3, as well as the decoder 14 based on the obtained tables of internal or external secret keys. Note that the functions of the encoder (decoder) described below can also be performed by stochastic transcoding devices (23, 24 in Figs. 3, 27, 28, 29 in Fig. 4), which are part of the user device 2 and the distributed processing server 3. Therefore, the description of the functioning process of the stochastic encoder (decoder) 15 (14) is common to a number of these devices.

The operation of the stochastic encoder is based on the use of tables of the internal (external) secret key. To do this, the table of the internal (external) secret key is divided into two parts of size (m * m / 2). The first part of the table is used to fill out the block of registers 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n columns of the multi-alphabet encoder (Fig. 9), the second is used in the gamma-forming circuit 84 (n = m / 2). The contents of the cyclic permutation registers 81, 90 are generated based on the row permutation table of the corresponding base or foreign key table. In the process of exchanging information, their contents periodically change under the influence of the random number sensor 53 of the subsystem 13 of generating secret key tables of the user device 2 of the transmitting side. In this case, the relative permutation between the previous (no more than n) and the subsequent state of the cyclic permutation registers 81, 90 received in the protected processing control unit 21 is sent to the receiving side. This combination is calculated in the protected processing control unit 21 using the public key generation algorithm based on applying inference to transitive dependencies of permutation tables. This algorithm is an analogue of the public key generation algorithm implemented in the subsystem 8 of the public key generation. The resulting relative permutation obtained is the public key that users A and B periodically exchange during the closed data transfer. At the same time, user B, having received the second public key from user A, in the secure processing control unit 30 timely calculates a new combination for writing to the cyclic permutation register 81, 90. This combination is calculated based on the value of the previous combination of cyclic permutation registers 81, 90 and the received public key. Therefore, the stochastic encoders 15 and decoders 14 of each user will have identical random combinations in the cyclic permutation registers 81, 90. In addition, during the exchange of sensitive information between users A and B, the generated random combinations transmitted using public keys can be periodically used for synchronous replacement the contents of the input (output) register 78 permutation stochastic encoder (decoder) 15, 14. The resulting random combinations can also be used in user settings Property 2 and server 3 with distributed processing to gradually replace the contents of the columns of the register block 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n columns of the multi-alphabet encoder and the register block 88-1, 88-2, .... 88-n gamma formation tables (Fig. 9).

In the general case, in the secure processing control unit 21, 30, from 1 to m new random sequences can be generated based on the next public key and secret key tables. These sequences are used to replace the required number of combinations of column registers of a block of column registers 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n of a multi-alphabet encoder and combinations of column registers of a block of column registers 88-1, 88-2, ..., 88 -n gamma generation tables.

The described procedures for the periodic replacement of the contents of cyclic permutation registers 81, 90, input (output) registers 78 and columns of the register block 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n columns of the multi-alphabet encoder and the register block 88-1, 88-2 , ..., 88-n gamma generation tables provide the actual modification of tables of internal (foreign) keys by randomly rearranging columns, rows and phasing them out. The same procedures are performed in the stochastic transcoding devices 23, 24, 25, 27, 29 of the user device 2 and the distributed processing server 3 when they perform the functions of encoders (decoders). These functions are aimed at increasing the computational stability of the system. At the same time, the guaranteed level of security of the processes of transmission and processing of information depends on the choice of the frequency of these functions of permutation and replacement. In the normal mode of operation, the described procedures for modifying the tables of foreign (internal) keys using public keys are performed after the transmission of N or more code blocks. In the mode of increasing the level of security, the period of modification of the tables of foreign (internal) keys of stochastic encoders (decoders) using public keys can be reduced up to the transition to the mode of using one-time tables of foreign (internal) keys. This mode, which has a maximum level of security, will be described below.

Thus, the periodic modification of tables of foreign (internal) secret keys using public keys is the system function described above, aimed at ensuring a given level of security of the information transfer process.

To protect the process of exchanging information on computer buses, internal stochastic encoders 15 are used. In this case, the register block 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n of the columns of the multi-alphabet encoder is filled on the basis of random information contained in the first part of the internal secret table the key. For gamma generating circuit 84, the second part of the table is applied.

Consider an example of the construction and operation of stochastic encoder 15 with specific parameters: m = 256 bytes, code block length N = 64 bytes, number of columns n = m / 2 = 128 bytes. It has a cyclic permutation register 31 of length m / 2 = 128 bytes, a column connection circuit 80, an inverter key block 82-1, 82-2, ..., 82-n and a recursive register 83, which is described by an irreducible polynomial of the form P ( x ¹²⁷ ) = x ¹²⁷ + x + 1.

For the encoder to function in accordance with the permutation of the rows of the foreign key table, the input ASCII table of the alphanumeric code containing 256 rows is rearranged. This table is written to the input permutation register 78.

When forming the input permutation table, in addition to the ASCII code (lines 1-127), lines are entered for double-byte numerical combinations (00-99), as well as for special control characters (text block, numerical block, open block, closed block, integer numerical block , with a fixed point, floating point, etc.).

When the exchange is implemented in closed mode, the information typed on the keyboard is encoded using the internal stochastic encoder 15 and converted into protected 64 byte blocks. In this case, for each block of information its own code table is formed, containing 64 columns and 256 rows. Columns of a block of register registers of columns 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n of a multi-alphabet encoder are selected using the recursive register 83 and the cyclic permutation register 81, where the next random permutation combination is written with a length of n bytes. In recursive register 83, by performing a sequence of successive shifts starting from 000 ... 1, a 127 byte combination is selected that contains N> 64 units. Position “1” in the resulting combination of the recursive register 83, taking into account the random permutation of the cyclic register 81, determines which of the columns of the register block of columns 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n of the multi-alphabet encoder are used to encode the next input data element. In this case, according to the signal of the control unit 87, a n-byte random combination recorded in each i-th column of the register block of columns 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n of the multi-alphabet encoder can be shifted by a random number of bytes, recorded in the i-th cell of the cyclic permutation register 81. After that, the character-by-character coding by the replacement method in the multi-alphabet encoder of the next information combination coming from the input permutation register 78 is performed. Moreover, to encode each j-th character written in the i-th row of the input permutation register 78, a random code is used in the i-th row of the corresponding column cyclically shifted by a random number of bytes (from 0 to 256). This column is comprised of 64 columns selected based on a combination of the recurrence register 83 and the cyclic permutation register 81. To encode the next block, successive shifts of the recursive register 83 are performed again until a new combination containing n> 64 units is obtained. In this case, a cyclic shift by one byte of a random combination recorded in the cyclic permutation register 81 is performed. After that, in accordance with the new combination in the register 81, a random cyclic shift of the combination recorded in each i-th column of the block of register registers of columns 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n of the multi-alphabet encoder is performed.

комбинацией рекуррентного регистра 83, которая включает N>64 единиц, а также содержимым циклического регистра 81 перестановки и случайной комбинацией входного регистра 87 перестановки.Since the polynomial P (x ¹²⁷ ) is irreducible, the corresponding recurrence register ensures the sequential generation of all (2 ¹²⁷ -1) possible different combinations. Therefore, to encode each next block, a new multi-alphabet code (one-time key) is used, which is determined by the next

a combination of the recurrence register 83, which includes N> 64 units, as well as the contents of the cyclic permutation register 81 and the random combination of the input permutation register 87.

If the next combination of the recurrence register 83 contains the number of units N <64, then the signal of the control unit 87 inverts this combination in the block of inverter keys 82-1, 82-2, ..., 82-n. Then it will include N> 64 units. After the transmission of N code blocks by the signal of the control unit 21 by the secure processing, the system function described above for modifying the table of internal (foreign) keys of stochastic encoders (decoders) using the public key is implemented. In this case, by the command of the control unit 87, a cyclic shift of the combinations recorded in the registers of the column register block 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n of the multi-alphabet encoder occurs to return them to their original state.

Each encoded data element can contain either a word (text element) or a number indicating the presentation form (integer, fixed or floating point).

When entering textual information, each i-th character is encoded after the initial permutation (in accordance with the foreign key table) using the i-th column of the block of registers 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n columns of the multi-alphabet encoder. In this case, the row number j of this column is determined according to the row number j corresponding to the given character in the initial permutation table.

After entering the text element, the service four-byte combination is automatically generated containing the above service characters. This combination simultaneously performs the function of imitation protection.

If the length of the text combination is less than 60, then the remaining positions are filled with encoded numeric values. They are formed by multi-alphanumeric coding of a numerical combination with number i, which is the first after the jth character to complete the text data element, if you move along the input permutation table.

посредством кодирования с использованием j-го столбца. После числовой комбинации, длина которой должна быть не более 60 байт, в состав формируемого кодового блока следует служебная комбинация. Если число меньше, чем 60 байт, то после завершения числа включается служебная комбинация (4 байта). Затем вводится переменный код буквы с номером i, которая следует по входной таблице перестановок сразу же после j-й, завершающей m-байтной числовой комбинации.When you enter a numerical data element in the input register 78 permutation is the formation of numerical combinations to the right and left of the decimal point (m = 2) digits. Then they are encoded by referring to the input table (lines 128-256) and transforming using the block of registers 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n columns of the multi-alphabet encoder. Moreover, each subsequent combination j in the composition of the number turns into a stochastic index

by encoding using the jth column. After a numerical combination, the length of which should be no more than 60 bytes, a service combination follows in the composition of the generated code block. If the number is less than 60 bytes, then after the number is completed, the service combination (4 bytes) is turned on. Then a variable code is entered for the letter with the number i, which follows the input permutation table immediately after the jth terminating m-byte numerical combination.

The resulting code blocks are sent to the adder mod 2 85 for addition to the gamma output from the gamma generation circuit 84, and then are written into the code block output register 86.

The scheme of the formation of gamma (figure 10)

In the synthesis of the gamma forming circuit 84, the second part of the table of the internal (external) code of size (m * m / 2) is used. It is used to populate the column register block of the gamma generation table 88-1, 88-2, ..., 88-n (Fig. 10). For the above example, the gamma generation circuit (Fig. 10) contains a table with parameters m = 256 bytes, n = m / 2 = 128 bytes, a similar recursive register 92, a block of inverter keys 91-1, 92-2, ... , 92-n, cyclic permutation register 90 with a length of m = 128 bytes, and also a column connection circuit 89, an adder of mod 2 94 with a length of 256 bytes and a source register of 64 bytes in length.

As noted above, after the formation of the next code block, it is gammed by adding with a 64 byte gamma in the adder mod 2 85. This random sequence is generated in the gamma generating circuit 84. In this case, first, under the control of the combination obtained in the recurrence register 92 after the next ith shift of the initial combination 000 ... 01 using the cyclic register 90 of permutation and the column connection circuit 89, the corresponding columns are selected from the column register block of the gamma table 88- 1, 88-2, ..., 88-n. Those are selected from 128 columns whose numbers in the i-th sequence correspond to "1". According to the signal of the control unit 96 of the gamma generation circuit, the procedure of cyclic shift of each random combination recorded in the column register block of the gamma generation table 88-1, 88-2, ..., 88-n by a random number of bytes can be implemented. This procedure is performed in the same way as in the stochastic encoder 15. In this case, a random permutation combination is used, recorded in the cyclic permutation register 90 after the implementation of the next cycle of modifying the table of the internal (foreign) key of the stochastic encoder. The number of units in the selected sequence must be at least the given value t (2 <t <N). This provides a control unit 95 of the gamma generating circuit. Then, the selected columns, each of which is a random 256-byte combination, are sent through the key 95 to the adder according to mod 2 94, where they are added according to mod 2. The resulting random combination is written into the register 93 of the original gamut and then sent to the block 96 control scheme of the formation of gamma. Here, the next transformation of the source gamma is performed. To do this, a permutation function can be used using another random combination of length m. This combination, obtained from the control unit 87, is used for the next modification of the table of the external (internal) secret key of the stochastic encoder 15. Moreover, this combination is used to replace the contents of a given number of columns of the column register block of the gamma table 88-1, 88-2 ,. .., 88-n, and also to replace the contents of the cyclic register 90.

The second option to convert the combination of the source gamut is to use the encryption procedure using the software implementation of the DES encryption standard (AES). At the same time, a segment of the next random combination used to modify the tables of the external (internal) secret key is used as a key for this encryption algorithm. The combination obtained as a result of the conversion of the original gamma is divided into four segments of 64 bytes and summed by mod 2. As a result, a random combination is recorded in the source gamma register 93. This combination can be directly used for gamming the next code block or can be used to form N different random sequences intended for gamming N next code blocks (N = 64). In the first case, the generated combination from the source gamma register 93 through the control unit 96 of the gamma generation circuit and the key 95 is supplied to the adder by mod 2 82 of the stochastic encoder 15.

Note that the gamma generation scheme provides the initial generation (2 ¹²⁷ -1) of various values of random combinations. Timely replacement of the contents of the gamma-formation table allows you to make the period of this DSH infinite. At the same time, the contents of the block of register registers of the gamma table 88-1, 88-2, ..., 88-n are changed when the protection systems of the initial key tables are changed in computers. This process is carried out regularly by the center 1 of certification, generation and distribution of keys using public permutation keys. In addition, as shown above, the partial replacement of the contents of the columns of the gamma table 88-1, 88-2, ..., 88-n is carried out in the process of exchanging information between users A and B using public keys when implementing the system function for modifying the table foreign (internal) key. This also replaces the contents of the cyclic permutation register 90.

используется для получения каждого из N=64 блоков гаммы. В отличие от формирования кодовых блоков, которое производится построчно с применением всех N столбцов, генерация N=64 блоков гаммы осуществляется путем кодирования исходной гаммы по столбцам. При этом для формирования j-й гаммы применяются столбцы с номером j и (j+1), образуя "таблицу распыления и замены". С целью получения гаммы для очередного блока j (j=1, N) исходная гамма обращается к j-му столбцу, находит в нем идентичную комбинацию Uji для каждого байта Uji гаммы Uj. Затем происходит замена кода Uji на код Uj+1,i (Uji

Uj+1,i).In the second case, the formation of N gamma sequences for code blocks is performed by encoding the obtained initial gamma by the method of "spraying and replacing". For this, the column register block table of the gamut generation table 88-1, 88-2, ..., 88-n is used, which has n = 128 columns 256 bytes long. is he

used to get each of N = 64 gamma blocks. In contrast to the formation of code blocks, which is performed line by line using all N columns, the generation of N = 64 gamma blocks is carried out by encoding the original gamma by columns. At the same time, columns with the numbers j and (j + 1) are used to form the jth gamut, forming a "spraying and replacement table". In order to obtain the gamma for the next block j (j = 1, N), the original gamma refers to the jth column, finds in it an identical combination of Uji for each byte Uji of the gamma Uj. Then the Uji code is replaced by the code Uj + 1, i (Uji

Uj + 1, i).

The encoding and replacement of the 64 byte source gamut is performed over the entire length of the columns, equal to 256 bytes (“spraying” 64 bytes of 256 bytes with their subsequent replacement by the codes of the next column). Each obtained gamma with the number j = (1-64) is added to the adder mod 2 82 of the stochastic encoder 15 with the next j-th block coming from the block of column registers 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n of multi-alphabetical encoder.

Thus, the stochastic encoder 15 using the gamma generating circuit 84 provides stochastic encoding and gamming of a sequence of transmitted blocks in a one-time key mode. At the beginning of the generated sequence, variable values of polynomials and initial combinations of recurrence registers 83, 92 with a length of 16 bytes each are transmitted. Note that the variable values of the polynomials of the recurrence registers 83, 92 are generated in the protected processing control unit 21, 30.

These combinations are included in the service block, which is transmitted at the beginning of the sequence of N information blocks in a closed form. To encrypt the service block, a secret permutation is used, which is formed in the protected processing control block (21, 30). It is calculated based on the combination of the public key used for the next modification of the tables of the secret foreign (internal) key of the stochastic encoder 15.

After decryption, the service block is used to configure the registers of the stochastic decoder 14, which has an identical table of the external (internal) key and, accordingly, ensures the correct decoding of all N blocks received in the input register of the code block. At the same time, the reverse permutation table used in the stochastic encoder 15 is recorded in the output permutation register table. The described functions for generating, encrypting, and decrypting the service block are also used when stochastic transcoding devices 23, 24, 27, 28, and 29 are used to transmit and process information. These functions are implemented in the protected processing control units 21, 30 of the user device 2 and the distributed processing server 3 using the corresponding public keys.

Note that the one-time key mode in the stochastic encoder 15 can be implemented without using the gamma function. In this case, the process of converting information in the stochastic encoder 15 (stochastic decoder 14) is performed by switching off the gamma generation circuit 84 according to the signal of the control unit 87 (Fig. 9). In this case, the code block symbols generated in the block of register registers 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n of the multi-alphabet encoder are received without change through the adder mod 2 85 into the output register 86 of the code block.

The described gamma generation scheme is also used in stochastic transcoding devices 23, 24 of user device 2 and in stochastic transcoding devices 25, 27, 29 of distributed processing server 3.

Thus, to protect the information transmitted over the computer network between the user device 2 (user A) and the distributed processing server 3 (user B), as well as during intra-computer exchange, the “one-time key” mode is implemented, according to which each code block of the transmitted sequence encoded with its key. Each key is unique on the set of transmitted blocks. At the same time, to ensure a given level of security when transmitting information in the above stochastic encoders (decoders) 14, 15 and stochastic transcoding devices (23, 24, 25, 27, 29), the above-described system function of modifying the table of the external (internal) key is implemented.

In the process of implementing this function when transmitting information, it is possible to shorten the period of modification of key tables up to the transition to the mode of using one-time tables of foreign (internal) keys. This mode, which has the maximum level of security, involves the transfer of a new public key after each successive code block. Using this key, in the stochastic encoder (decoder), in accordance with the algorithm described above, a new random combination is recorded in the cyclic permutation registers 81, 90, in the input (output) permutation register 78 and the random combination of one of the columns of the column register block block of the gamma generation table 88 is replaced -1, 88-2, ..., 88-n. It is this random combination according to the signal of the control unit 95 along with other t randomly selected combinations of the column register block of the gamma table 88-1, 88-2, ..., 88-n that are used in the gamma generation for the next code block. Thus, in this mode, as well as in the classical scheme of a one-time key, a one-time random combination of length N is used to encrypt each next block of length N. Moreover, a one-time randomly generated multi-alphabet encoder is used to encode each next block. The device stochastic transcoding (figa, 11B)

Stochastic transcoding devices (23, 24 in FIGS. 3, 27, 28, 29 in FIG. 4), which are part of the user device 2 and the distributed processing server 3, are important for creating a unified secure data transmission and processing circuit. They implement additional encryption of protected information for its adaptation to transmission in a computer environment or through a computer system, as well as to various types of processing by stochastic conversion without disclosing the data content.

These devices have a single structure (figa, 11B), but, based on the functional purpose, they are divided into three types: "internal code - external code", "external code - internal code" and "internal code 1 - internal code 2" . The basis of these devices is constituted by elements of the first and second stages of stochastic transformation 98, 101, which have an identical structure that practically coincides with the structure of stochastic encoder 15. Note that the first stage 98 of stochastic conversion, if necessary, can perform the functions of a stochastic decoder, and the second stage 101 of stochastic conversion can be used as a stochastic encoder.

A stochastic transcoding device of the type “internal code - external code” provides the ability to transmit information encoded using the internal code through a computer system after establishing a secret connection between the user device 2 and the server 3 distributed data processing. Transcoding of transmitted information occurs without disclosing its content. To perform this function, the first stage 98 of stochastic conversion according to the service combination containing the polynomial and the value of the recursive register, and the public key is configured to process the first of the N code blocks received via the computer buses from the internal encoder. In this case, the block of register registers of columns 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n of the multi-alphabet encoder and the block of register of columns 88-1, 88-2, ..., 88-n of the gamma generation table of the first stage 98 of the stochastic conversion are filled based on the internal key table, similarly to the internal stochastic encoder 15. In the cyclic permutation register 81, the random combination calculated in the manner described above in the secure processing control unit 30 is recorded in the permutation register 99 and the gamma generating circuit 84. The second stochastic conversion stage 101 is configured using the foreign key table as an external stochastic encoder 74 to provide symmetrical closed communication with the distributed processing server 3. To connect and coordinate the first stage 98 of stochastic conversion with the second stage 101 of stochastic conversion, the control unit 21 of the protected processing of the user device 2 generates relative permutations, which are written through the control unit 87 to the permutation register 100. The second stage 101 of the stochastic conversion, performing the functions of the encoder described above order is entered into the symmetric closed transmission mode with the first stage 98 of stochastic transformation of the device 25 stochastic second transcoding server 3 distributed processing. This ensures the implementation of the system function of modifying the foreign key table using a periodically transmitted public key in stochastic transcoding devices 24, 25.

Conversion of each successive code block from the input register, starting from the first, is performed character-by-character. For this, in the first stage 98 of stochastic conversion and in the second stage 101 of stochastic conversion, according to the signal of the control unit 87, the column registers of the column register blocks of columns 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n are used, which are used to encode the first character of the code block . Then, for each code block in the gamma generating circuit 84, a corresponding random sequence is generated and the first symbol is selected in it, which is used to gamma the first symbol of this code block. This symbol is summed mod 2 with each column register symbol of the column register block of the columns 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n of the multi-alphabet stochastic transformation first stage encoder 98, which was used to encode the first character of the code block in the internal stochastic encoder 15 The same addition is performed using the first gamma symbol and column register symbols of the column register block of the columns 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n of the multi-alphabet encoder of the second stochastic transformation stage 101, included to encode the first character to One block of external code. After that, in the first stage 98 of stochastic conversion, the first character of the received code block of the internal code is compared with each of the characters in the included column register block of the column registers 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n of the multi-alphabet encoder. If one of the compared values coincides with the first character of the code block, this character is considered identified (a row of the register column is defined that has a code identical to the first character of the code block). In this case, the control unit 87 through the key 108 and the permutation register 99, 100 provides the transmission of this character via the corresponding bus to the column register of the first character of the external code of the block of the register of columns 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n of the multi-alphabet encoder second steps 101 of stochastic transformation. As a result, the first symbol of the code block of the internal code is replaced (without removing the gamma and decoding from it) by the first gamma-encoded symbol of the external code. Then, the same recoding procedure is performed with each successive character of the code block of the internal code, until the code block of the external code containing the identical information in a closed form is generated. Moreover, as follows from the description of this procedure, transcoding is performed without disclosing the content of the protected information. The encoded code block by the signal of the control unit 87 through the key 108 is recorded in the output register 102 of the code block of the second stage 101 of the stochastic conversion. As a result, the characters of the first code block are replaced. After this replacement, the control units 87 make the necessary change of combination in the recurrence registers 83 and the cyclic permutation registers 81, thereby preparing the first and second stages of stochastic transformation 98, 101 for transcoding the next code block. Then, the next code block is transcoded and written to the code block output register 102. After writing into the output register 102 of the code block of the entire sequence of N code blocks of the external code, the service block with the initial combination with the polynomials of the recursive register 83, 92 is written to the beginning and the protected sequence of code blocks is transmitted through the computer system to the distributed processing server 3.

As noted above, if necessary, the second stage 101 of the stochastic transformation can perform the functions of a stochastic encoder. In this case, the control unit 87 disables the first stochastic conversion stage 98, the input permutation table is written into the permutation register 100 of the second stochastic conversion stage 101, and all elements of the second stochastic conversion stage 101 are transferred to the operation mode of the stochastic encoder. Thus, in the transmission of the user device 2, the first type of stochastic transcoding device is implemented: “internal code - external code”.

At a reception in the distributed processing server 3, a second type of stochastic transcoding device is used: “external code - internal code”. This stochastic transcoding device 28, as described above, converts the code blocks of the external code into the code blocks of the internal code without revealing the contents of the information. To perform this function, the first stage 98 of stochastic conversion according to a service combination containing a polynomial and the value of recurrence registers 83, 90, is configured to process the first of the N code blocks that enter the transceiver block 31 of the distributed processing server 3. In this case, the block of register registers of columns 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n of the multi-alphabet encoder and the block of register of columns 88-1, 88-2, ..., 88-n of the gamma generation table of the first stage 98 of the stochastic conversion are filled based on the foreign key table. The second stage 101 of stochastic conversion is configured using the internal key table as the internal stochastic encoder 15 to provide symmetric closed transmission of information in the environment of the server 3 distributed processing. To connect and reconcile the first stage 98 of stochastic conversion with the second stage 101 of stochastic conversion, the control unit 21 of the secure processing of the user device 2 generates the corresponding relative permutations, which are written through the control unit 87 to the permutation registers 99. After that, the transcoding of each next received code block, starting with first, is performed character by character as described above. The converted code blocks are recorded through the secure processing control unit 30 into the memory of the information-logical secure computing system 35 of the distributed processing server 3.

In the process of transmitting the message, user A (user device 2) by random combinations received from the random number sensor 53 through the combination selection circuit 54 of the secret key table generation subsystem 25 (FIG. 6) using the public key calculated in the secure processing control unit 21 , can produce the implementation of the system function for modifying foreign key tables described above. This ensures periodic replacement of the contents of the cyclic register 81, 90 permutation, permutation registers 100, 99 stochastic transcoding devices 24, 25, as well as replacing the specified number of combinations of the block registers of columns 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n and a block of registers of the gamma generation table 88-1, 88-2, ..., 88-n of the gamma generation circuit 84. To generate the public key, the previous combinations are applied as described above, which were recorded in the cyclic permutation register 81, 90, and the newly received combination from the random number generator 53. In this case, an algorithm is used to calculate the public key with logical inference on transitive dependencies of permutation tables implemented in the subsystem 8 for generating public keys (Fig. 7). In the control unit 30, the protected processing of user B, based on the obtained public key using the logical output and the previous tables of the cyclic permutation register 81, a new secret permutation is calculated. After that, a synchronous transition to a new random combination of a cyclic permutation register 81, 90, permutation register 100, 99 in the device 24 for stochastic transcoding of user A and in the device 25 for stochastic transcoding of user B is performed.

Similarly, as shown above, partial replacement of the columns of the foreign key tables in the stochastic transcoding device 24 of the user A and the stochastic transcoding device 28 of the user B (distributed processing server 3) can be performed. This ensures a synchronous replacement of the contents of the column registers of the block of register registers 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n of the multi-alphabet encoder and the block of register of columns 88-1, 88-2, ..., 88-n of the gamma generation table respectively, the second stage 101 of the stochastic conversion of the user device 2 and the first stage 98 of the stochastic conversion of the server 3 distributed processing.

After character-by-character conversion of the received sequence of N code blocks in the stochastic transcoding device of the distributed data processing server 3, the received message protected by the internal code is recorded through the secure processing control unit 30 into the memory of the information-logical secure computing system 35 of the distributed processing server 3.

Thus, in order to protect the information transmitted in the computer environment, as well as during external closed exchange, the concept of a “one-time key” is implemented, according to which each code block of a sequence in a stochastic transcoding device is encoded with its own key. Moreover, this key is unique on the set of N transmitted blocks, and tables of secret keys and permutations are periodically modified using public keys during the implementation of the system function to increase the level of security of transmitted information.

After the closed communication session between users A and B is completed, the symmetric foreign key table (with the permission of the certification center 1, generation and distribution of keys) can be used as the basis for the formation of a new foreign key table when organizing the next closed symmetric communication session. To obtain a new symmetric foreign key table, the columns and rows of the previous foreign key table are rearranged by users A and B. In this case, the above-described algorithm for calculating public keys in protected control units 21, 30 and the modification of the foreign key table in subsystem 13, 25 are applied generating secret key tables of the user device 2 and the distributed processing server 3.

The encryption process of the secure table 37 of email addresses, secure data tables 39, and secure Web pages 38 is performed using an internal stochastic transcoding device 29, which is of the third type “internal stochastic code 1 - internal stochastic code 2”. This device is connected to the control unit 30 by a secure processing and a secure information and logic computing system 35. Moreover, it is used in the mode of an internal stochastic encoder.

In the encryption process of the secure email address table 37, the elements of each row of the table are considered as a sequence of N code blocks. As a result, after encryption, which is provided by the secure processing control unit 30 and the secure information and logic computing system 35, each row contains (N + 1) fields. The first field is a service field, it includes encrypted initial combinations and polynomials of recursive registers 83, 92, which were used when encoding this string. In this case, a separate table of public keys is formed - random combinations of length n bytes each. These combinations were used to modify the internal key table when encoding each row of the protected address table 37. They were also used to encrypt the above service field combinations. Moreover, the number of each combination of the public key table corresponds to the row number of the protected address table 37, in the encoding of which it was used.

Protected data tables 39 have the same structure.

When encrypting secure Web pages 38, each of them is converted into multiple sequences of N code blocks. At the beginning of each sequence of N code blocks, the corresponding public key is written, which was used to modify the internal key table when encoding this sequence of code blocks. At the beginning of the encrypted Web page, an encrypted service block is written with the initial combination and the recursive register polynomial. Decryption of service blocks (service fields of tables) is performed using the corresponding public keys in the protected processing control unit 30 before implementing the specified functions for processing protected information.

If it is determined in the secure processing control unit 30 that the received encrypted message is email, then only the encoded address part of the message is processed. The purpose of the processing is to determine the address of the distributed processing server 3 to which it is necessary to transmit an encrypted email message. To do this, in the protected table 37 email addresses you must find the appropriate line. It must contain the encoded address of the recipient user device 2 and the address of the distributed processing server 3 to which the message is to be transmitted. This procedure is performed using an internal stochastic transcoding device 29 connected to a secure processing control unit 30 and a secure information and logic computing system 35. As a result, the message recipient address will be transcoded without revealing its contents to the code that protects the recipient address of the first row of the table. After that, the received code and the encoded address of the first row of the table are read into the secure information-logic computing system 35 for comparison. If the compared values coincide, a field is read from the table, including the server 3 address code with secure processing, to which the received encrypted message must be transmitted. Then, the encoded e-mail message from the secure information and logic computing system 35 is sent to the secure processing control unit 30 and then to the stochastic transcoding device 28 of the transceiver unit 26 of the stochastic conversion for closed transmission to the selected distributed processing server 3.

If the compared encoded address values did not match, then the internal stochastic transcoding device 29 translates the message address code into the code that encoded the address of the second line of the protected email table 37 to search for the desired address in a protected form, etc. The search process continues until the required address for sending the message is found.

If it is determined in the secure processing control unit 30 by the message format that the type of processing of the received encoded information is arithmetic calculations, then the encrypted operands and arithmetic calculation codes are sent to the secure information-logic computer system 35. In this case, the first protected processing unit 30 the stochastic conversion stage 98 of the stochastic transcoding device 29 is tuned to the internal code that protects the received message. At the same time, the second stage 101 of stochastic conversion in cooperation with the secure information and logic computing system 35 is consistent with the code table of the protected arithmetic processor 34. For this, instead of the original numerical code, the contents of one of the column registers of the column register block are written to the input column of the code table of the arithmetic processor 34 79-1, 79-2, ..., 79-n of the multi-alphabet encoder of the second stage 101 of stochastic conversion. In this case, the second output column of the code table of the protected arithmetic processor 34 contains stochastic indices of numerical data used in performing calculations in a protected form. In the process of transcoding the sequence of code blocks of the received message in the second stage 101 of stochastic conversion, only one selected register will be constantly turned on by the signal of the control unit 87. Therefore, the obtained closed numerical information will be transcoded into the input code of the protected arithmetic processor 34 and by the commands of the protected information-logic computing system 35 it will be issued through the code table to the protected arithmetic processor 34 to perform the specified calculations. The data obtained as a result of the calculations in a secure form are transmitted through the output code table for transcoding from the stochastic indices of the protected arithmetic processor 34 into the internal stochastic code. To do this, in the output column of the reverse code table, the input column of which contains indexes of numerical data, the contents of one of the register registers of the multi-alphabet encoder of the stochastic code indexing block are recorded by the signal of the secure processing control unit 30. In the process of transcoding the sequence of code blocks of the obtained result in the first stage 98 of stochastic conversion, only one selected register will be constantly turned on by the signal of the control unit 87. Therefore, the obtained closed numerical information will be transcoded into a stochastic internal code and issued by commands of the secure control unit 30 to the stochastic transcoding device 27, which is of the type “internal code - external code”, for transmission in a secure form to the user device 2.

If it is determined in the control unit 30 by the secure processing by the message format that the type of processing of the received encoded information is search and selection by request of the required information from the secure data tables 39, then the secure information-logic computer system 35 is connected. It receives encrypted information that can contain: names of tables, their records or fields, numerical parameters (they must correspond to the selected data), codes of arithmetic calculations (they must be performed from the selected E number fields).

When processing a request to a secure information and logic computing system 35, a sequence of code blocks containing encrypted table names at the beginning of which contain encrypted combinations and polynomials of the recursive register of the internal code are read from the secure database 36. Then there come the corresponding public keys. After that, by applying the above-described procedures for transcoding and comparing information in a secure form, the tables are selected from the encrypted sequence of table codes necessary to process the request received from user device 2. Moreover, each code with the table name is alternately encoded using the appropriate combinations of recursive registers in the first 98 and second 101 steps of stochastic conversion into the internal code of the protected database 36, which encrypted each of them the protected data tables 39. When the compared values coincide, the necessary protected data tables 39 are read from their code from the protected database 36 into the protected information and logic computing system 35 for further processing.

In the processing process, it is taken into account that each of the records (rows) of the protected data tables 39 contains a sequence of code blocks. Moreover, each code block corresponds to a specific field, the code of which is contained in the table header. In the service field there is a combination of a recursive register for the table heading and each of its records. In the stochastic transcoding device 29, using the appropriate combinations of recursive registers, the field codes specified in the request are translated into the internal code that encoded the field codes in the table header and their comparison. If the compared values coincide, the code blocks of the fields indicated in the request are selected from the table entries.

If it is necessary to select certain data or numeric field parameters in encrypted form in accordance with the request codes from the table, then the request codes are transcoded into the internal code of each record to select the necessary protected data by comparing them with the request codes. This is implemented as described above using combinations of recurrence registers in the service fields of records. If, when comparing numerical parameters, the arithmetic operators “greater” or “less” are used, which are implemented by subtracting the protected numbers, and it is also necessary to perform arithmetic calculations with the selected fields in encrypted form, then the arithmetically protected processor 34 is connected to the processing process. protected information are implemented as described above. After completion of the request processing process, the encoded data selected from the protected tables 39 or the obtained calculation results are transferred in the stochastic transcoding device 29 to the internal code of the distributed processing server 3 and transferred to the user device 2 as described above.

If it is determined in the control unit 30 by secure processing according to the message format that the type of processing of the received encoded information is search and selection by request of secure Web pages 38, then the secure information and logic computing system 35 is connected. Two levels of search are implemented: the first level - by the titles of protected Web pages 38, the second - by their content. Therefore, when encoding secure Web pages 38, two internal stochastic codes are used: the first code is for encoding the header, the second is for protecting the content of the page itself. At the same time, at the beginning of each code sequence, a service block with a combination of a recursive register is placed. The received closed message with the terms of the request has a set of keyword codes that must be contained in the requested document.

When searching at the first level, the keyword codes are sent to the stochastic transcoding device 29, translated into the internal header code of the next protected Web page 38. In this case, the code of each keyword is alternately compared with each code block of the header. In case of mismatch of the compared codes, the encoded word base is highlighted in them by discarding the code characters of its end and a repeated comparison of the received codes is performed. If the compared values coincide, the presence of this keyword in the header is recorded. If the keyword codes do not match the header codes, they move to the next Web page, etc. Selected as a result of the search, the encoded headers of the protected Web pages 38 are converted in the device 27 of the stochastic transcoding of the server 3 of the distributed processing into external code and transmitted through the computer system to the user device 2. There, after receiving the code blocks, they are transcoded to the internal code, transmitted via the computer buses into the internal stochastic decoder 14 and the issuance in open form of the requested information on the monitor screen. When you select a specific Web page, the user enters a request for its receipt from the server 3 distributed data processing. After performing the above functions of stochastic coding and transcoding of the request in the user device 2, the transfer of protected information via a computer system occurs. As a result, the request arrives at the distributed processing server 3, where the functions of its transcoding, selecting the required secure Web page 38 and transmitting to the user device 2 are performed.

If the search for the required Web page at the first level did not yield results, then at the user's request, keywords can be searched directly in the text of those protected Web pages 38, the title of which contains at least one query keyword. In this case, the procedure for recoding keywords described above is used, their comparison with the word codes of the text and the codes of the foundations of words. If there is a certain number of matches of each of the query keywords with text codes, it is considered that this secure Web page 38 meets the query conditions and is transmitted in encrypted form using the transcoding functions to user device 2.

Industrial applicability

The claimed method and system can be widely used in computer systems using distributed processing of confidential information. These include modern banking and payment systems, e-mail systems with information protection, corporate networks and other systems of this type.

Claims (28)

1. A method for comprehensive protection of distributed information processing in computer systems, in which each user device and distributed data processing servers access a computer system and form a system of internal and foreign keys based on tables of private keys obtained from a certification, generation and distribution center keys, based on the received secret key tables, generate secret internal disposable keys in the user device and in the distributed processing server the keys for the symmetric encryption mode when transmitting data in the environment of the user device and the server, encrypted information storage and processing encrypt the data to be processed and transmitted in the environment of the user device and the distributed processing server by stochastic encoding using the received secret internal symmetric one-time keys, send a request for installation from the user device to the certification, generation and distribution center of keys A connection to a pre-selected server for distributed data processing for performing the specified processing function is obtained from a certification, key generation and distribution center, or public keys are generated in the user device and in the distributed processing server for upgrading secret key tables for stochastic encoding of information transmitted from the user devices to said server of distributed processing, processing information in a transformed form and output After the result of the distributed processing from the said distributed processing server to the user device, based on the received public keys and secret key tables, secret external one-time keys for the symmetric encryption mode are generated in the user device and the distributed processing server, and they also modify the secret key tables when transmitting information and processing it in an encrypted form, the transmitted information is encrypted by stochastic encoding to the user com device using the received secret external symmetric one-time keys, transmit the information encrypted by stochastic encoding to the distributed processing server, receive and process the received information in the distributed processing server, stochastically encoded using secret external symmetric one-time keys, in encrypted form after its additional encryption with using secret internal symmetric disposable keys in accordance with the type of processing determined according to the format of the mentioned data, in this case, the encrypted information obtained as a result of processing in the distributed processing server is stochastically encoded using secret external symmetric one-time keys, the stochastically encoded encrypted information is transmitted to the user device, the stochastically encoded encrypted information in the user device is received and decoded for delivery to the user in clear text. 2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the access to the computer system and the formation of the system of internal and foreign keys is carried out by entering the data carrier into the user device with the PIN code, password, password hash value, initial key table and data secret permutations of columns and rows to obtain the secret table of the base key and the secret table of the foreign key. 3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that the key system is formed in the form of a set of tables of secret basic and foreign keys generated by secret permutations of the columns and rows of the initial key table, which are obtained from the certification authority, the formation and distribution of keys. 4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that the formation of tables of secret symmetric internal one-time keys for transmitting information separately in the environment of the user device and the distributed processing server, encrypting data to be processed, including database tables, Web pages and a server email address table, is produced by permuting the columns and rows of the base key table using secret permutations. 5. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that the public keys in the form of relative permutation tables are formed in a certification, key generation and distribution center, user device, distributed processing server by logical inference on a set of secret permutation tables using transitive dependencies between row elements separately for the user device and the distributed processing server to bring their secret foreign key tables into a symmetric state and modify them secret key persons. 6. The method according to claim 3 or 4, characterized in that the tables of secret foreign keys of the user device and the distributed processing server are brought into a symmetrical state, as well as the modification of the secret key tables for the distributed processing of encrypted information is carried out by using permutations and replacing the columns and rows of the tables private keys of the user device and the distributed processing server using public keys. 7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that the generation of one-time keys is carried out by changing in a stochastic way random elements of symmetric key tables of a foreign or internal key for each transmitted block of information encrypted by stochastic encoding. 8. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that in the process of encrypting and transmitting encrypted information, periodically modify the symmetric key tables of the foreign and internal key in the user device and in the distributed processing server using public keys generated and transmitted by the user device and distributed processing server. 9. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that the processing of the encrypted information by executing the specified programs in a secure stochastically transformed form is performed in an information-logical secure computing device using a secure arithmetic processor, the interface of which is coordinated via information buses with the secret internal key table, and control buses transmit commands from an information-logical secure computing device. 10. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that before or after the stochastic conversion of each newly introduced program in the information-logical secure computing system, anti-virus protection is implemented based on detection by means of logical inference on a set of program codes of the program of virus functions in the form of chains of logically connected command codes and the destruction of detected viral functions to ensure the operability of the converted program. 11. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that when determining the type of processing according to the format of the received information as arithmetic calculations, encrypted operands and codes of arithmetic calculations are selected in the format of the received data and transferred to a secure arithmetic processor to implement the required calculations in encrypted form. 12. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that when determining the type of processing according to the format of the received data, such as searching and selecting, according to the query conditions, the required information from the encrypted database tables, the encrypted data is extracted in the format of the received information in the query condition, after which additional encryption by comparing the selected data field encrypted tables needed for sampling. 13. The method according to claim 11 or 12, characterized in that the implementation of these checks of compliance of the selected data from the encrypted tables with the required encrypted numerical parameters or arithmetic calculation procedures with the selected fields in encrypted form is performed in a secure arithmetic processor. 14. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that when determining the type of processing by the format of the received data as searching and selecting encrypted Web pages, the keywords of the encrypted request are additionally encrypted and the presence of identical keywords in each of the encrypted server web pages is determined by comparison distributed processing. 15. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that when determining the type of processing according to the format of the received data as email transmission, the received encrypted message is additionally encrypted, the address of the mail recipient is encrypted and the addresses of the system servers are selected, and a server containing the recipient's mailbox is selected, to which encrypted information is transmitted. 16. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that a hash function of the transmitted information is generated, an electronic digital signature of the sender of information is received and transmitted, and the sender is authenticated and the integrity of the received information is verified, while the hash function of the transmitted information in the form of a random combination of the specified lengths are formed by adding stochastically encoded blocks in a secure arithmetic processor of a user device and a distributed processing server. 17. The method according to clause 16, wherein the electronic digital signature is obtained by generating the sender’s secret private key in the form of random permutation of the rows of the secret foreign key table and calculating the public key, which is transmitted to the certification center, generating and distributing keys for registering the private key . 18. The method according to clause 16 or 17, characterized in that the sender authentication and integrity control of the received information using a hash function value and an electronic digital signature use a secret private key to encrypt the hash function of the transmitted information, and the public key is used to decrypt the received Hash function values for comparison with the value generated in the distributed processing server. 19. A system for comprehensive protection of distributed information processing in computer systems, comprising a certification, generation and distribution center for keys (1), at least one user device (2) and at least one distributed data processing server (3), with a certification center , formation and distribution of keys (1) contains a user certification subsystem (4), a secret key table generation subsystem (5), a secure information-logical computing system (6), a subsystem for generating n data carriers for certified users (7), a public key generation subsystem (8), an authentication and information integrity verification subsystem (9), a secure arithmetic processor (10), a key distribution subsystem (11), a secure processing control unit (12), each the user device (2) contains a subsystem for generating secret key tables (13), an internal stochastic decoder (14), an internal stochastic encoder (15), a secure access subsystem (16), a protected arithmetic processor (19), information logical-logical secure computing system (20), a secure processing control unit (21) and a stochastic transformation transceiver block (22), a distributed data processing server (3) contains a secret key table generation subsystem (25), a stochastic transformation transceiver block (26) , internal stochastic transcoding device (29), secure processing control unit (30), secure access subsystem (31), secure arithmetic processor (34), information and logic secure computing a dyeing system (35) and a secure database (36), and in the center of certification, generation and distribution of keys (1), the information-logical secure computing system (6) is connected to the user certification subsystem (4), the secret key table generation subsystem (5 ) to which the user certification subsystem (4) is connected, protected by an arithmetic processor (10), the public key generation subsystem (8), the storage medium generation subsystem for certified users (7), and the subsystem key distribution (11), to which the secure processing control unit (12) is connected, connected to the authentication and integrity check subsystem (9), in the user device (2), the information-logical secure computing system (20) is connected to the secure arithmetic processor ( 19), an internal stochastic encoder (15), an internal stochastic decoder (14) and with a transceiver stochastic conversion unit (22), the secure access subsystem (16) is connected to the secure processing control unit (21) connected to the internal stochastic encoder (15), the internal stochastic decoder (14), the stochastic conversion transceiver unit (22), the secret key table generation subsystem (13), and the information-logical secure computing system (20) in the server distributed data processing (3) information and logic secure computing system (35) is connected to a secure arithmetic processor (34), a secure database (36), an internal stochastic transcoding device (29) and a unit secure processing (30), to which the stochastic transceiver block (26), the internal stochastic transcoding device (29), the secret key table generation subsystem (25) and the secure access subsystem (31) are connected, and the key distribution subsystem (11) the center of certification, generation and distribution of keys (1) is connected respectively with subsystems for generating secret key tables (13, 25) of the user device (2) and the distributed data processing server (3). 20. The system according to claim 19, characterized in that the secure access subsystem (16) of the user device (2) contains a subsystem for inputting information from a data medium (17) connected to an authentication and integrity check subsystem of information (18) connected to a control unit protected processing (21) of the user device (2). 21. The system according to claim 19, characterized in that the transceiver unit of stochastic conversion (22) of the user device (2) contains the first and second stochastic transcoding devices (23, 24), and the first stochastic transcoding device (23) is included in the data transmission path from the distributed processing server (3) to the information-logical secure computing system (20) of the user device (2), and the second stochastic transcoding device (24) is included in the data reception path from the information ogicheskoy secure computing system (20) of the user device (2) to a distributed processing server (3). 22. The system according to claim 19 or 21, characterized in that the transceiver unit of stochastic transformation (26) of the distributed processing server (3) contains the first and second stochastic transcoding devices (27, 28), and the first stochastic transcoding device (27) is included in data transmission path from the secure processing control unit (30) of the distributed processing server (3) to the stochastic transceiver unit (22) of the user device (2), and the second stochastic transcoding device (28) keys to receive data path from the transceiver unit stochastic transformation (22) of the user device (2). 23. The system according to any one of paragraphs.19-22, characterized in that the secure access subsystem (31) of the distributed processing server (3) comprises a subsystem for inputting information from a data medium (32) connected to an authentication and information integrity verification subsystem (33) connected to the secure processing unit (30) of the distributed processing server (3). 24. The system according to any one of claims 19-23, characterized in that the secure database (36) of the distributed processing server (3) includes a secure table of email addresses (37), a secure array of Web pages (38) and secure data tables (39). 25. Subsystem for generating public keys for a comprehensive protection system for distributed information processing in computer systems, comprising a memory block for secret permutation tables of columns and rows of private key tables (61), a memory block for a symmetric permutation table of columns and rows of a foreign key table (62), transitive coupling sequence register between rows of secret permutation tables (63), inference block on a transitive dependence sequence (64), memory block for a relative table non-secret permutation of columns and rows of the foreign key table (65), the public key register (66), the input switching unit (67), the input of which is the input input of the subsystem's input data, the output switching unit (68), the output of which is the output of the public key output subsystems, and a control unit (69), while the outputs of the control unit (69) are connected respectively to the inputs of the memory block for tables of secret permutations of columns and rows of tables of secret keys (61), a memory block for a table of symmetric permutations of columns and a foreign key table (62), a transitive communication sequence register between rows of secret permutation tables (63), a public key register (66), input and output switching blocks (67, 68), a logic output block on a transitive dependence sequence (64), the second and the third inputs of which are connected respectively to the outputs of the memory block for the symmetric permutation table of columns and rows of the foreign key table (62) and the transitive coupling sequence register between the rows of secret permutation tables (63), and in output - with the input of the memory block for the table of relative non-secret permutation of columns and rows of the foreign key table (65), the output of which is connected to the input of the public key register (66), the output of which is connected to the input of the output switching block (68), the other input of which is connected to the outputs of the memory unit for tables of secret permutations of columns and rows of tables of secret keys (61) connected by its input to the output of the input switching unit (67), and the second outputs of the input switching unit (67) and the output switching unit (68) are connected an input control unit (69). 26. A stochastic encoder for a comprehensive protection system for distributed information processing, containing an input permutation register (78), the input of which is an input of encoded data of a stochastic encoder, a block of column registers of a multi-alphabet encoder (79-1, ..., 79-n), the first input connected to the output of the input permutation register (78), a column connection circuit (80), outputs connected to the second inputs of the column register block of the multi-alphabet encoder (79-1, ..., 79-n), a cyclic permutation register (81), outputs connected according the corresponding inputs of the column connection circuit (80), the inverter key block (82-1, ..., 82-n), the outputs of which are connected to the corresponding inputs of the cyclic permutation register (81), the recurrence register (83), the outputs are connected to the corresponding the inputs of the block of inverter keys (82-1, ..., 82-n), the gamma generation circuit (84), the adder according to mod 2 (85), whose inputs are connected respectively to the outputs of the column register block of the multi-alphabet encoder (79-1, ..., 79-n) and gamma generation circuits (84), and the output is with the input of the output register of the code block (86), the output of which is the encoded data output of a stochastic encoder, a control unit (87), the outputs of which are connected respectively to the inputs of the input permutation register (78), the column register block of the multi-alphabet encoder (79-1, ..., 79-n), column connection schemes (80 ), a cyclic permutation register (81), a block of inverter keys (82-1, ..., 82-n), a recurrence register (83), a gamma generation circuit (84), an adder mod 2 (85) and an output register code block (86), while the control unit (87), with the input of which is connected an additional output of the recurrent register (83), has an additional input and output for connecting with other control units of the integrated protection system of distributed information processing. 27. The stochastic encoder according to claim 26, wherein the gamma generation circuit (84) comprises a column register block of the gamma generation table (88-1, ..., 88-n), a column connection circuit (89) connected by outputs to the inputs of the column register block of the gamma generation table (88-1, ..., 88-n), the cyclic permutation register (90), the outputs connected to the corresponding inputs of the column connection circuit (89), the inverter key block (91-1 ,. .., 91-n), the outputs of which are connected to the corresponding inputs of the cyclic permutation register (90), the recurrence register (92), outputs connected to the corresponding inputs of the block of inverter keys (91-1, ..., 91-n), the register of the original gamma (93), the adder according to mod 2 (94), the key (95), the input of which is connected with the output of the block of register registers of the gamma generation table (88-1, ..., 88-n), and the first and second outputs respectively with the adder input mod 2 (94) of the gamma generation circuit (84) and with the adder input mod 2 (85) stochastic encoder, control unit (96), the outputs of which are connected respectively to the inputs of the recurrence register (92), block of inverter keys (91-1, ..., 91-n), cyclic register and permutations (90), column connection schemes (89), column register block of the gamma generation table (88-1, ..., 88-n), key (95), adder mod 2 (94), gamma generation schemes ( 84) and the source gamma register (93), the output of the gamma generation circuit connected to the input of the control unit (96), the second input of which is connected to the additional output of the recurrence register (92), and the third input of which is connected to the corresponding output of the stochastic control unit (87) encoder. 28. A stochastic transcoding device for a comprehensive protection system for distributed information processing, containing the input register of the code block (97), the first stage of stochastic conversion (98), the input of which is connected to the output of the input register of the code block (97), the first permutation register (99), the first and second inputs of which are connected respectively to the first and second outputs of the first stage of stochastic transformation (98), the second permutation register (100), the first inputs of which are connected respectively to the outputs p the first permutation register, the second stage of stochastic transformation (101), the input of which is connected to the output of the second permutation register (100), and the first output - with the second input of the second permutation register (100), and the output register of the code block (102), the input of which is connected with the second output of the second stage of stochastic transformation (101), each of the mentioned stages of stochastic transformation (98, 101) contains a block of column registers of the multi-alphabet encoder (79-1, ..., 79-n), the first input of which is the input corresponding stages of stochastic conversion, a column connection scheme (80), outputs connected to the second inputs of a block of register registers of a multi-alphabet encoder (79-1, ..., 79-n), a cyclic permutation register (81), outputs connected to the corresponding inputs of the connection scheme columns (80), the block of inverter keys (82-1, ..., 82-n), the outputs of which are connected to the corresponding inputs of the cyclic permutation register (81), the recurrence register (83), the outputs connected to the corresponding inputs of the key block- inverters (82-1, ..., 82-n), circuit form range of gamma (84), adder according to mod 2 (85), the first input of which through the key (103) is connected to the output of the block of register registers of the multi-alphabet encoder (79-1, ..., 79-n), and the second input is with the output a gamma generation circuit (84), the second output of the key (103) being the second output of the corresponding stochastic conversion stage (98, 101), a control unit (87), the first output of which is the first output of the corresponding stochastic conversion stage (98, 101), and the remaining outputs are connected respectively to the inputs of the column register block go encoder (79-1, ..., 79-n), column connection schemes (80), cyclic permutation register (81), inverter key block (82-1, ..., 82-n), recursive register (83), an additional output connected to the corresponding input of the control unit (87), a gamma generation circuit (84), an adder according to mod 2 (85) and a key (103), while the control unit (87) has an additional input and output for connection with other control units of the integrated protection system of distributed information processing.

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