RU2251752C2 - Semiconductor memory board and data-reading device - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: digital memory technologies.

SUBSTANCE: board has rewritable power-independent memory and control circuit, means for storing address, pointing at limit between authentication area and non-authentication area, circuit for changing size of said areas. Reading device contains estimation means, reading information, pointing at number of times, for which digital data can be read, and playback means. Second device variant additionally has means for digital output of contents.

EFFECT: higher efficiency.

3 cl, 23 dwg

Description

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates to a semiconductor memory card for storing digital content and a data reader for reading digital content from a semiconductor memory card. More specifically, the present invention relates to a semiconductor memory card and a data reader suitable for protecting copyright in digital content.

State of the art

The multimedia network technology has developed to such an extent that digital content, such as music content, is distributed via a communication network, such as the Internet. This makes it possible to sample a variety of music or the like broadcasted around the world at home. For example, music content can be downloaded to a personal computer (hereinafter referred to as a PC), then stored in a semiconductor memory card downloaded to a PC. Also, the semiconductor memory card can be removed from a PC and can be downloaded to a portable music player. This makes it possible to listen to music while walking. Semiconductor memory cards are compact and lightweight, contain semiconductor memory (for example, flash memory), which is non-volatile and has a large storage capacity.

With this distribution of music, the digital content stored on the semiconductor memory card must be encrypted in advance using a key or the like to prevent unauthorized copying of the digital content. Care must also be taken to ensure that file management software programs, many of which are standard on commercially available PCs, cannot copy digital content to other storage media.

In one possible way to prevent unauthorized copying, only specialized software programs can access the semiconductor memory card. For example, when the authentication process between the PC and the semiconductor memory card is completed in the affirmative, the PC can access the semiconductor memory card, and when the authentication process is not completed in the affirmative due to the lack of specialized software, the PC cannot access the semiconductor memory card.

However, in the aforementioned method, in which PCs should always have a specialized software program for accessing the semiconductor memory card, free exchange of data with users through the semiconductor memory card is not available. As a result, the aforementioned method loses the quality of conventional semiconductor memory cards, namely, the quality that file management software programs that are standard on commercially available PCs can be used to access the semiconductor memory card.

Semiconductor memory cards, which can only be accessed through specialized software programs, are the best as storage media for storing digital content, since such semiconductor memory cards serve as copyright protection for digital content. However, semiconductor memory cards have a problem in that they cannot be used as external storage devices in general purpose computer systems.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

Thus, it is an object of the present invention to provide a semiconductor memory card that can be used as a storage medium for storing digital content and as a storage medium for storing general purpose computer data (not subject to copyright protection), as well as a device for reading data from a storage medium carrier.

The aforementioned goal is achieved by a semiconductor memory card that can be used in an electronic device and retrieved from an electronic device containing a rewritable non-volatile memory; and a control circuit that controls the electronic device accesses the authentication area and non-authentication area in a rewritable non-volatile memory, in which the control circuit includes: a non-authentication area access control device that controls the electronic device access to the non-authentication area; an authentication device that performs the authentication process to check whether the electronic device is authorized to use a semiconductor memory card, and thus authentically authenticated; and an authentication area access control device that allows the electronic device to access the authentication area only when the authentication device authenticates the electronic device.

In the above structure, data that is subject to copyright can be stored in the authentication area, and other data can be stored in the non-authentication area, which makes it possible to make such a semiconductor memory card that can store both digital content with copyright protected, and other data together.

In the aforementioned semiconductor memory card, the authentication device can generate a key reflecting the result of the authentication process, and the authentication area access control device decrypts the encrypted command using the key generated by the authentication device in accordance with the decrypted command, the decrypted command being sent from the electronic device.

In the above structure, even if the connection between the semiconductor memory card and the electronic device is tapped, the command to access the authentication area is encrypted, reflecting the result of the previous authentication. Thus, such a semiconductor memory card has a reliable function of protecting the authentication area from illegal access.

In the aforementioned semiconductor memory card, the authentication device can perform mutual authentication of the request-response type with the electronic device and generates a key from the request data and the response data, the request data being sent to the electronic device to check whether the electronic device is correct and the response data is generated to to show that the authentication device is correct.

In the above structure, the key is shared between the semiconductor memory card and the electronic device only when both devices authentically authenticate each other. In addition, the key is changed for each authentication. This increases the degree of protection of the authentication domain, since the authentication domain cannot be accessed without using a key.

In the aforementioned semiconductor memory card, an encrypted command sent from an electronic device may include a feature field and an address field, the feature field is not encrypted and specifies the type of access to the authentication area, the address field is encrypted and specifies the address of the area to which the device is accessed the access control to the authentication area decrypts the address field using the key, and controls the access of the electronic device to the authentication area in such a way type of access specified in the tag field is performed in the region specified location decrypted address field.

In the above structure, only the command address field is encrypted. This makes it easier to decrypt and decode a command with a semiconductor memory card that receives the command.

The aforementioned semiconductor memory card may further comprise an identification data storage circuit that pre-stores identification data that is unique to the semiconductor memory card and allows the semiconductor memory card to be different from other semiconductor memory cards in which the authentication device performs mutual authentication with the electronic device, using the credentials stored in the identity storage scheme yes GOVERNMENTAL.

In the aforementioned structure, a mutual authentication process exchanges data unique to each semiconductor memory card. This supports the best level of protection against illegal decoding of mutual authentication.

The aforementioned semiconductor memory card may further comprise a region resizing circuit that resizes the authentication region and the non-authentication region.

In the above structure, a semiconductor memory card can be used dynamically. That is, a semiconductor memory card can be used mainly as a recording medium for digital content and can be used as an external storage device in a computer system.

In the aforementioned semiconductor memory card, an authentication region and a non-authentication region can be created by dividing a continuous region of a predetermined size in a rewritable non-volatile memory into two regions, and the region resizing circuit changes the size of the authentication region and the non-authentication region by changing the address marking the boundary between the authentication region and the non-authentication region .

In the above structure, the size of the authentication and non-authentication areas can only be changed by moving the border. This reduces the size of the circuit.

In the aforementioned semiconductor memory card, a region resizing scheme may include an authentication region mapping table that shows correspondence between logical addresses and physical addresses in the authentication region; a non-authentication domain conversion table that shows the correspondence between logical addresses and physical addresses in a non-authentication domain; and a conversion table modification device that changes the contents of the authentication area conversion table and the non-authentication area conversion table, in accordance with a command from an electronic device in which the access control device to the authentication area controls access of the electronic device to the authentication area by accessing the conversion area conversion table and the device non-authentication access control controls electronic access onnym device to a treatment area neautentifikatsionnoy conversion table neautentifikatsionnoy area.

In the above structure, it is possible to separately manage the authentication domain and the non-authentication domain with respect to the size of the domain and the relationship between logical addresses and physical addresses, since the translation tables for these areas are independently managed.

In the aforementioned semiconductor memory card, a region addressed by higher physical addresses and a region addressed by lower physical addresses, together constituting a region having a predetermined size, can respectively be allocated to the authentication region and the non-authentication region, the non-authentication region conversion table shows the correspondence between logical addresses in ascending order, and physical addresses in ascending order, and the authentication domain conversion table shows the correspondence between logical addresses arranged in increasing order and physical addresses arranged in decreasing order.

In the above structure, which makes it possible to use logical addresses in ascending order, the size of the area can be easily changed, since the probability of using the area near the border between the authentication area and the non-authentication area becomes low.

It also reduces the likelihood of saving or moving data that is required to move the border, resulting in simplified resizing of the area.

The aforementioned semiconductor memory card may further comprise a read-only memory circuit that previously stores data.

In the above structure, the copyright protection function is enhanced by storing the identification data of the semiconductor memory card in a dedicated memory and storing digital content depending on the identification results based on the identification data.

In the aforementioned semiconductor memory card, each of the authentication region and non-authentication region may include a read / write memory region from / in which the electronic device can read / write data; and a read-only memory area from which the electronic device can read data, but to which the electronic device cannot write data, the control circuit further includes: a random number generator that generates a random number each time the electronic device writes data to a non-volatile non-volatile memory, and each of the authentication access control device and the non-authentication access control device encrypts data using a random number oh, writes the encrypted data to the read / write memory area and writes a random number to the read-only memory area.

In the above structure, illegal attempts, such as damage to the read / write memory area, can be detected by checking compatibility with a random number stored in the read-only memory area. This increases write protection.

In the aforementioned semiconductor memory card, the control circuit may further include a conversion table that shows the correspondence between the logical addresses and the physical addresses in each of the authentication area and non-authentication area; and a conversion table modification circuit that changes the contents of the conversion table in accordance with a command from the electronic device, and the authentication area access control device and the non-authentication area access control device access the authentication area and the non-authentication area with a link to the conversion table.

In the aforementioned structure, even if a plurality of logical blocks constituting the same file are fragmented, they can be easily changed in order to become logically accessible. This increases the speed of access to the same file.

In the aforementioned semiconductor memory card, the control circuit may further include an encryption / decryption device that encrypts data recorded in the authentication region and non-authentication region and decrypts data read from the authentication region and non-authentication region.

In the aforementioned structure, it is possible to protect the authentication region and the non-authentication region from illegal intrusions, such as the failure of the semiconductor memory card and the direct reading of the contents of these regions.

In the aforementioned semiconductor memory card, the non-volatile memory may be flash memory, and the control circuit further includes an undeletable list reader which, in accordance with a command from the electronic device, identifies undeletable areas in the authentication area and non-authentication area and sends information indicating undeletable areas in electronic device.

In the above structure, the electronic device can identify non-removable areas and delete identified non-removable areas before the flash memory is overwritten. This increases the speed of dubbing.

In the aforementioned semiconductor memory card, the authentication device may prompt the user of the electronic device to enter a user key, which is information unique to the user, during the authentication process, and the control circuit further includes a user key storage device that stores the user key; an identification information storage device that stores a portion of identification information identifying an electronic device that is affirmatively authenticated by the authentication device; and a user key request prohibition device that receives a portion of identification information from the target electronic device after the identification device starts the identification process, checks whether the portion of identification information received from the target electronic device is already stored in the identification information storage device, and interferes with the device authentication request the user of the electronic device to enter the user key when a piece of identification information is received The data from the target electronic device is already stored in the identification information storage device.

In the above structure, the user does not need to enter a password or personal data each time the user accesses the semiconductor memory card. This prevents the case of illegal listening and use of personal data.

The aforementioned goal is also achieved by a data reader for reading digital content from the aforementioned semiconductor memory card, wherein the digital content is stored in a non-authentication area of the semiconductor memory card, and information indicating the number of times that the digital content can be read is pre-stored in the authenticated area, the device the data reader contains an evaluation tool that, when digital content is to be read from non-authentic munication region, reads the information indicative of the number of times the digital content can be read out from the authentication area, and judges whether the digital content is to be read based on the number of times indicated in the information; and reproducing means for reading digital content from the non-authentication domain only when the estimator estimates that the digital content can be read and reduces the number of times that the digital content can be read in information stored in the authentication area.

In the above structure, it is possible to limit the number of times that digital content can be read from a semiconductor memory card. This makes it possible to apply the present invention to paid rental music content.

The aforementioned goal is also achieved by a data reader for reading digital content from the aforementioned semiconductor memory card and reproducing the read digital content as an analog signal, the digital content that can be reproduced as an analog signal is stored in the non-authentication area of the semiconductor memory card, and information indicating the number of times that digital content can be digitally output by an electronic device is stored in authentic tele- communications area, the data reading apparatus comprising reproducing means for reading out the digital content neautentifikatsionnoy area and reproducing the read-out digital content as an analog signal; evaluation means for reading information indicating the number of times that digital content can be digitally output by an electronic device, and evaluating whether digital content can be digitally output based on the number of times indicated in the information; and digital output means for digitally digital outputting the digital content only when the estimator estimates that the digital content can be digitally output and reducing the number of times that the digital content can be digitized in the information stored in authentication area.

In the above structure, it is possible to limit the number of times that digital content is digitally copied from a semiconductor memory card. This provides copyright protection detailed by warning and warning, as implied by the copyright holder.

As described above, the present invention is a semiconductor memory card operating both as a recording device for storing digital content and as an external computer storage device. The present invention, in particular, protects the secure distribution of digital content for the distribution of electronic music, which is useful in practice.

Brief Description of the Drawings

Figure 1 depicts a PC device, which is an embodiment of the present invention and relates to the distribution of electronic music, and depicts the appearance of a semiconductor memory card that can be downloaded to a PC and removed from a PC.

Figure 2 shows the appearance of a player for which a semiconductor memory card is used as a recording medium.

Figure 3 is a block diagram depicting the hardware structure of a PC.

4 is a block diagram depicting the structure of the technical support of the player.

5 depicts the appearance and structure of the hardware of a semiconductor memory card.

6 depicts various memory areas in a semiconductor memory card that can be recognized by a PC and player.

FIG. 7A, FIG. 7B and FIG. 7C depict limitations and command formats when a PC or player accesses a region of a semiconductor memory card. Figa depicts the rules that are followed to access each area. 7B depicts the rules that are followed to resize each area. 7C is a schematic representation of regions in a semiconductor memory map.

Fig. 8 is a flowchart showing a procedure by which a PC (or player) writes music content or the like to a semiconductor memory card.

9 is a flowchart depicting a procedure in which music content or the like is read from a semiconductor memory card and played (played) by a player (or PC).

10 is a flowchart showing an operation in which a player (or PC) controls the number of reads stored in the authentication area of a semiconductor memory card.

11 is a flowchart depicting an operation in which a player (or PC) controls the number of permitted digital outputs stored in the authentication area of a semiconductor memory card.

12 shows a data structure that is common to the authentication region and the non-authentication region of the semiconductor memory card, and also depicts a flowchart of a read / write process corresponding to the data structure.

Figa - Fig.13D depict a change in the relationship between logical addresses and physical addresses. Figa depicts the relationship before the change. Figv depicts the relationship after the change. Figs depicts a conversion table corresponding to figa. Fig.13D depicts a conversion table corresponding to Fig.13B.

Figa-Fig.14D depict functions related to non-removable blocks in a semiconductor memory card. Figa depicts the state of use of logical and physical blocks. Figv depicts a list of non-removable blocks corresponding to the state of use of the blocks depicted in figa. Fig. 14C is a flowchart showing a procedure of a PC or player for deleting blocks before using the list command of undeletable blocks and the delete command. Fig.14D is a table depicting the state of use of logical blocks.

Fig depicts the sequence of interaction in authentication between the player and the semiconductor memory card, and also depicts the main components used in authentication.

Fig.16 depicts the sequence of interaction in the authentication option of the present invention between the memory card and the external device.

Fig.17 depicts the sequence of interaction in the detailed mutual authentication procedure depicted in Fig.16.

FIGS. 18A-18C depict a state before the boundary between the authentication region and the non-authentication region of the semiconductor memory card is changed. Figa is a memory card depicting the structure of physical blocks in flash memory. Figv depicts a conversion table specialized for non-authentication area. Fig. 18C depicts a conversion table specialized for an authentication domain.

Figa-fig.19C depict the state after the boundary between the authentication region and the non-authentication region of the semiconductor memory card. Figa - memory card depicting the structure of physical blocks in flash memory. Fig. 19B depicts a conversion table specialized for the non-authentication domain. Fig. 19C depicts a conversion table specialized for the authentication domain.

The best embodiment of the invention

An embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings.

Figure 1 is a schematic illustration of a PC that downloads digital content, such as, for example, through a communications network and a semiconductor memory card (hereinafter referred to as a memory card), which can be downloaded to or removed from a PC.

The PC 102 includes a display 103, a keyboard 104 and loudspeakers 104 and is connected to the communication line 101 through a modem integrated in the PC 102. A memory card recorder 107 is inserted into the card slot (input slot 105 of the memory card recorder) of the PC 102. Device input slot 105 recording memory cards is based on the standards of the international association of manufacturers of memory cards for personal computers (PCMCIA) or the like. The memory card recorder 107 is an adapter that electrically connects the PC 102 and the memory card 109. A memory card 109 is inserted into the memory card slot 108 of the memory card recording apparatus 107.

A user receives music data from a content provider over the Internet using the above system and the following procedure.

First, the user downloads the desired music content to the hard disk in the PC 102 via the communication line 101. However, since the music content is encrypted, the user needs to perform a certain procedure to play the received music content on the PC 102.

To play the received music content, the user needs to pay the costs to the content provider using a credit card or the like in advance. When the user pays the costs, the user receives a password and rights information from the content provider. A password is a key used by a user to decrypt encrypted music content. The rights information shows various conditions under which a user is allowed to play content on a PC, such as, for example, the number of allowed plays, the number of allowed entries in the memory card, the expiration date indicating the period allowed for the user to play the content.

After receiving the password and rights information, the user, when he intends to output music from the speakers 106 of the PC 102, enters the password through the keyboard 104 into the PC 102, and a specialized application program (hereinafter referred to as the application) having the copyright protection function is simultaneously executed on the PC 102. The application then verifies the rights information, decrypts the encrypted music content using a password, plays the encrypted music content to output audio information from the speakers 106.

When the rights information indicates that the contents are allowed to be recorded on the memory card, the application can record encrypted music data, password, and rights information on the memory card 109.

2 is a schematic illustration of a portable copy / play device (hereinafter referred to as a player) 201, for which a memory card 109 is used as a recording medium.

On the upper surface of the player 201, a liquid crystal display device 201 and operation keys 203 are installed. On the front side of the player 201, a memory card slot 206 and a communication port 213 are formed, where a memory card 109 is inserted into the memory card slot 206, the communication port 213 is executed in in the form of USB (universal serial bus) or a similar device and connected to the PC 102. On the side of the player 201, an analog output contact 204, a digital output contact 205 and an analog input contact 223 are formed.

The player 201 after the memory card 109 storing music data, a password, and rights information is loaded into the player 201, checks the rights information. When music is allowed to play, the player 201 reads the music data, decrypts the read music data, converts the decrypted music data to an analog signal, and outputs the sounds of the analog signal through headphones 208 connected to the analog output pin 204. Alternatively, player 201 outputs digital music data to digital output contact 205.

The player 201 can also convert the analog audio signal that is input to the player 201 through a microphone or the like via the analog input pin 223 into digital data and stores the digital data in the memory card 109. The player 201 can also download music data, password, and copyright information from the PC 102 via the communication port 213 and write the downloaded information to the memory card 109. That is, the player 201 can replace the PC 102 and the memory card recorder 107 shown in FIG. 1 in terms of recording music data on the memory card 109 and playing back music data recorded on the memory card 109.

Figure 3 is a block diagram depicting the hardware structure of PC 102.

The PC 102 includes a CPU (central processing unit) 110, read only memory (ROM) 111, a pre-storage device key 111a and a control program 111b, RAM 112, display 103, communication port 113, including a modem port used to connect to communication line 101, and USB (universal serial bus) used to connect to the player 201, a keyboard 104, an internal bus 114, a memory card recorder 107 connecting a memory card 109 and an internal bus 114, a decoder 117 for decrypting encrypted music data, is read output from the memory card 109, the AAC (asynchronous-address communication) decoder conforming to the international standard of the communication service in support of the MPEG2-AAC network multimedia recording medium (ISО13616-7) for decoding decrypted music data, D / A (digital-to-analog) converter 119 for converting the decoded digital music data to an analog audio signal, speakers 106 and a hard disk 120 storing a file management software program and an application.

PC 102 may do the following:

(1) use the memory card 109 as an external storage device having an independent file system (e.g., ISO9293) that hard disks have when executing a file management software program stored on the hard disk 120,

(2) download music content or the like from the communication line 101 through the modem port of the communication port 113 when executing a specialized application stored on the hard disk 120,

(3) storing music content or the like on the memory card 109 after mutual authentication, and

(4) read music content or the like from the memory card 109 and output the read content to the speakers 106 for playback.

The device key 111a stored in the ROM 111 is a secret key unique to the PC 102 and is used, as will be described later, for mutual authentication or the like.

4 is a block diagram depicting the technical structure of the player 201.

The player 201 includes a CPU 210, a ROM 211 pre-storing the device key 211a and a control program 211b, a random access memory (RAM) 212, a liquid crystal display device 203, a communication port 213 performed by USB or the like, used to connect to a PC 102 , operation keys 202, internal bus 214, I / F (interface) device 215 connecting the memory card 109 and internal bus 214, authentication circuit 216 for mutual authentication with memory card 109, decryptor 217 for decrypting encrypted music yes data read from the memory card 109, the AAC decoder 218 complying with the international MPEG2-AAC standard (ISO13818-7) for decoding decrypted music data, the D / A converter 219 for converting the decoded digital music data to an analog audio signal, loudspeakers 224, A / D a converter 221 for converting an analog audio signal output from an analog input terminal 223 to digital music data, an AAC encoder 220 conforming to the MPEG2-AAC standard (ISO13818-7), for encoding music data, a decoder 222 for decrypting encoded music data, an analog output contact 204, a digital output contact 205, and an analog input contact 223.

The player 211 loads the control program 211b from the ROM 211 into the RAM 212 in order to enable the CPU 210 to execute the control program. In this case, the player 201 can read the music content from the memory card 109, play and output the read music content to the speakers 224. and can also store music content inputted via the analog input pin 223 and communication port 213 to the memory card 109. That is, the user can use the player 201 not only for copying and playing music personally, as with a regular player, but also for copying and playing such music content (copyrighted) when it is distributed by the electronic music distribution system and the PC 102 is loaded.

5 depicts the appearance and structure of the hardware of the memory card 109.

The memory card 109 contains rewritable non-volatile memory in which data can be written repeatedly. Rewritable long-term memory has a capacity of 64 MB and is controlled by a 3.3 V supply voltage and a clock signal supplied from external sources. The memory card 109 is a rectangular parallelepiped 2.1 mm thick, 24 mm wide and 32 mm long. The memory card is provided with a write protection key on its side and is electrically connected to an external device via a 9-pin connector formed at the end of the memory card 109.

The memory card 109 contains three IC chips (integrated circuits): a control IC 302, a flash memory 303, and a ROM 304.

Flash memory 303 is an erasable, rewritable non-volatile flash memory of the block erase type and includes logical memory areas: authentication area 332 and non-authentication area 331. Access to the authentication area 332 can only be made by devices that are authenticated as authorized to use the device's semiconductor memory card. Access to the non-authentication area 331 can be done by devices, regardless of whether they are authenticated or not. In the present embodiment, the authentication area 332 is used to store important data related to copyright protection, and the non-authentication area 331 is used as an external storage device in a conventional computer system. Note that a specific address in flash memory 303 is used as the boundary between these two memory areas.

ROM 304 includes a memory area, which is a read-only area and is called a special area. A special area pre-remembers information including: a media identifier (ID) 341, which is an identifier of a memory card 109; and a manufacturer name 342, which indicates the name of the manufacturer of the memory card 109. Note that the carrier ID 341 is unique to the memory card 109 and distinguishes the memory card 109 from other semiconductor memory cards and that the carrier ID 341 is used for mutual authentication between devices and is used to prevent unauthorized access to the authentication area 332. The control IC 302 is a control circuit consisting of active elements (logic gates or the like) and includes an authentication device 321, an instruction evaluation control device 322, a storage device 323 of the key, the access control device 324 to a special area access control unit 325 to the authentication area access control unit 326 to neautentifikatsionnoy area and encryption scheme 327 / decryption.

The authentication device 323 is a circuit that performs mutual authentication of a request-response type with a remote device trying to access a memory card 109. The authentication device 321 includes a random number generator and an encryption device, and authenticates the remote device as authorized to use a semiconductor memory card as a device when confirming that the remote device has the same encryption device as the logical device. Note that in case of mutual authentication of the interrogation-response type, both two devices during communication perform the following: the logical device first sends the call data to the remote device, the remote device in response generates response data by processing the received call data to certify the correctness of the remote device and sends the generated response data to the logical device, and the logical device evaluates whether the remote device is correct by comparing the call data with the response data a.

The command evaluation control device 322 is a controller consisting of a decoding circuit and a control circuit. The decoding circuit identifies the command (command for the memory card 109), entered through the command contact, and executes the identified command. Command evaluation control device 322 controls components 321 through 327, in accordance with received commands.

The commands received by the received command evaluation control device 322 include not only commands for reading, writing, and deleting data from / to the flash memory 303, but also commands for managing the flash memory 303 (commands related to address space, data to be deleted, etc. .d.).

For example, with respect to reading / writing data, a secure account account read command and an address account secure write command are defined as commands for accessing the authentication area 332, and an address account read command and an address account write command are defined as commands for accessing the non-authentication area 331. In the above "address" is the sequence number of the first sector of the sector sequence from which data is read or written to by the command. An “account” is the total number of sectors from which data is read or to which data is written by the command. A “sector” is a unit representing the amount of data read from or written to the memory card 109. In the present embodiment, one sector is 512 bytes.

The master key storage device 323 pre-stores the master key 323a, which is used by the remote device during mutual authentication, and is used to protect data in the flash memory 303.

Special area access control device 324 is a circuit for reading information, such as carrier ID 341 from a special area (ROM) 304.

The authentication area access control device 325 and the non-authentication area access control device 326 are schemes for reading / writing data from / in the authentication area 332 and the non-authentication area 331, respectively. Each of the devices 325 and 326 sends / receives data to / from external devices (PC 102, player 201, etc.) through four data pins.

It should be noted here that the access control devices 325 and 326 each contain a buffer memory equal to one block (32 sectors or 16 kbytes), and logically inputs / outputs data in units of sectors to / from area 332 or 31 in response to a command, issued from an external device, although it inputs / outputs data in units of units when the flash memory 303 is overwritten. More specifically, when a sector in flash memory 303 is to be overwritten, access control device 325 or 326 reads data from a block including a sector from flash memory 303, immediately deletes the block in flash memory 303, rewrites the sector in buffer memory, then writes a data block including a rewritten sector to flash memory 303.

The encryption / decryption scheme 327 is a scheme that performs encryption and decryption using the master key 323a stored in the master key storage device 323, under the control of the authentication area access control device 325 and the non-authentication area access control device 326. The encryption / decryption circuit 327 encrypts the data before writing data to the flash memory 303 and decrypts the data after reading the data from the flash memory 303. These encryption and decryption operations are performed to prevent illegal actions, such as, for example, decrypting the memory card 109, analyzing the contents flash memory 303 directly and password theft from authentication area 332.

It should be noted that the control IC 302 includes a synchronization circuit, a region of non-volatile memory and a region of non-volatile memory, as well as the main components 321 to 327. The synchronization circuit generates an internal clock signal synchronously with the clock signal supplied from the clock contact and delivers the generated clock signal to each component.

Also, to protect information stored in a special area (ROM) 304 from counterfeiting by unauthorized persons, a special area (ROM) 304 can be integrated into the control IC. Alternatively, the information may be stored in the flash memory 303. In this case, the special area access control device 324 may impose a restriction on writing data to the information or the decryption encryption circuit 327 may encrypt the information before the information is stored in the flash memory 303.

6 depicts various memory areas in the memory card 109 that can be recognized by the PC 102 and the player 201. The memory areas in the memory card 109 are divided into three main areas: special area 304; authentication area 332; and non-authentication region 331.

Special area 304 is a read-only area. A specialized command is used to read data from special area 304. Reading / writing data from / to authentication area 332 is only possible when authentication between PC 102 or player 201 and memory card 109 is confirmed. The encrypted command is used to access the authentication area 332. Access to the non-authentication area 331 can be performed by open use commands, such as, for example, commands that comply with the ATA standard (AT connection (advanced technology)) or SCSI (small computer system interface). That is, data can be read / written from / in non-authentication area 331 without an authentication process. Thus, the file management software program, being a standard tool on PC 102, can be used to read / write data from / to non-authentication area 331, as with ATA flash or compact flash.

The three main areas store the types of information shown below, which provides the area with a function as an external memory device of a conventional PC and a function for copyright protection of music data distributed by the electronic music distribution system.

The non-authentication area 331 stores encrypted content 426, user data 427, etc. The encrypted content 426 is music data that is subject to copyright protection and is encrypted. User data 427 is ordinary data irrespective of copyright protection. The authentication region 332 stores the encryption key 425, which is the secret key used to decrypt the encrypted content 426 stored in the non-authentication region 331. The special region 304 stores the media ID 341, which is necessary to access the authentication region 332.

The PC 102 or player 201 first reads the media ID 341 from the special area 304 in the memory card 109 loaded into it, then extracts the encryption key 425 and rights information from the authentication area 332 using the media ID 341. When it is confirmed from the information of the rights that the encrypted content 426 stored in the non-authentication area 331 is allowed to play, the encrypted content 426 can be read and played at the same time, being decrypted using the encryption key 425.

Now suppose that the user only writes music data that was illegally obtained to the non-authentication area 331 in the memory card 109 using a PC 102 or the like, then tries to play the music data from the memory card 109 loaded in the player 201. In this case, despite that the non-authentication region 331 in the memory card 109 stores music data, the encryption key 425 or copyright information corresponding to the music data is not stored in the authentication region 332. Therefore, the player 201 is not deleted play music data. With a structure in which, when only music content is copied to a memory card 109 without an authorized encryption key or rights information, music content cannot be lost, unauthorized copying of digital content is prevented.

FIG. 7A, FIG. 7B and FIG. 7C depict limitations and command formats when a PC 102 or player 201 accesses an area in the memory card 109. Figa depicts the rules that are followed for access to each area. 7B depicts the rules that are followed to resize each area. 7C is a schematic representation of areas in a memory card 109.

Special area 304 is a read-only area and can only be accessed by a specialized team without an authentication process. A media ID 341 stored in a special area 304 is used to generate or decrypt an encrypted command that is used to access the authentication area 332. More specifically, a PC 102 or player 201 reads the media ID 341, encrypts a command used to access the authentication area 332 , and sends the encrypted command to the memory card 109. After receiving the encrypted command, the memory card 109 decrypts the encrypted command using the media ID 341, interprets and executes the command.

The authentication area can only be accessed when authentication is confirmed between a device trying to access a memory card 109, such as a PC 102 or player 201 and a memory card 109. The size of the authentication area 332 is equal to the size (YYYY + 1) of the sectors. That is, the authentication area 332 consists of sector 0 — the YYYY sector (YYYY sector) logically and consists of sectors having the address of the XXXX sector before the address of the (XXXX + YYYY) sector in the flash memory physically. Note that sector addresses are sequential numbers assigned uniquely to all sectors making up the flash memory 303.

The non-authentication area 331 may be accessible by a standard ATA or SCSI standard command. The size of the non-authentication area 331 is equal to XXXX sectors. That is, the non-authentication area 331 logically and physically consists of a sector of 0 - (XXXX-1) -go sectors.

It should be noted here that the alternative block region 501 may be allocated in flash memory in advance. Alternative block area 501 is a group of alternative blocks that are used to replace defective blocks (blocks that have a defective memory area from / in which data cannot be read / written normally) in authentication region 332 or non-authentication region 331.

In the present embodiment, special area 304 cannot be accessed without authentication. However, to prevent unlawful analysis by anyone, special area 304 can only be made available by such a device that is authenticated in the affirmative, or the commands used to access special area 304 can be encrypted.

Now, resizing of the authentication region 332 and non-authentication region 331 will be described with reference to FIGS. 7B and 7C.

The total memory capacity of the authentication region 332 and non-authentication region 331 in the flash memory 303 is equal to the capacity (XXXX + YYYY + 1) of the sectors, which is a fixed value obtained by subtracting the alternative block region 501 and others from all memory areas in the flash memory 303. Dimensions Areas 332 and 331 are each variable and can be changed by changing the value of the XXXX border address.

The first step in the procedure for resizing an area is to perform authentication. This authentication is performed to prevent any users from easily resizing the area using one of the standard hardware programs distributed to PC users or software programs designed for illegal access. After authentication is completed, the size of the non-authentication area 331 (the number of new sectors XXXX) is sent to the memory card 109, using a specialized command to resize the area.

The memory card 108, upon receipt of the above-mentioned specialized command for resizing the area, stores the value XXXX in the long-term memory area or the like in the memory card 109, then controls subsequent accesses to the authentication area 332 and the non-authentication area 331, using the value XXXX as the new boundary address. More specifically, the memory card 109 assigns the physical sector 0 to the XXXX sector in the flash memory 202 for the non-authentication area 331, and the XXXXth sector (the XXXX + YYYY) sector for the authentication area 332. Access control device 325 and 326 Converts the address between the logical address and the physical address and controls the generation of incorrect access outside the allocated memory area. It should be noted here that the logical addresses are recognized by external devices as addresses in the data space of the memory card 109 corresponding to the values used in the commands, and that the physical addresses are addresses in the data space of the flash memory 303 contained in the memory card 109.

If the authentication area 332 is increased in size by decreasing the border address, the device will be required to maintain logical compatibility before and after the address change. To this end, all data stored in the authentication area 332, for example, is moved (copied) to lower addresses by the amount of reduction of the border address. With this device, the physical addresses correspond to the new logical addresses, starting with the new border address. With this device, the data space of the authentication area 332 increases, while logical addresses for data stored in the authentication area 332 are supported.

A specialized team for resizing an area can be encrypted before use to prevent illegal access.

8 is a flowchart depicting a procedure in which a PC 102 (or player 201) writes music content or the like to a memory card 109. In the following description, it is assumed that the PC 102 writes music data to the memory card 109 (s601).

(1) The PC 102 performs a request-response authentication with the authentication device 321 of the memory card 109 using the device key 111a and the like, and extracts the master key 323a from the memory card 109 when the authentication is confirmed (s602).

(2) The PC 102 then retrieves the media ID 341 from the special area 304 in the memory card 109 using a dedicated command (s603).

(3) The PC 102 then generates a random number and generates a password, which is used to encrypt the music data, from the extracted master key 323a and the carrier ID 341 (s604). In the above step, a random number is generated, for example, by encrypting the call data (random number) sent to the memory card 109 during the authentication process.

(4) The generated password is encrypted using the master key 323a and the media ID 341, then is written to the authentication area 332 as the encryption key 425 (s605). By this time, before the data (encryption key 425) is transmitted, a command to write data to the authentication area 332 will be encrypted and sent to the memory card 109.

(5) The music data is encrypted using a password and stored in the non-authentication area 331 as encrypted content 426 (s606).

9 is a flowchart depicting a procedure in which music content or the like is read from a memory card 109 and played by a player 201 (or PC 192). In the following description, it is assumed that music data stored in the memory card 109 is played by the player 201 (s701).

(1) The player 201 performs a request-response authentication with the authentication device 321 of the memory card 109 using the device key 211a and the like, and extracts the master key 323a from the memory card 109 when the authentication is confirmed (s702).

(2) The player 201 then retrieves the media ID 341 from the special area 304 in the memory card 109 using a dedicated command (s703).

(3) The player 201 then retrieves the music data encryption key 425 from the authentication area 332 in the memory card 109 (S704). By this time, before the data (encryption key 425) is read, a command to read data from the authentication area 332 will be encrypted and sent to the memory card 109.

(4) The obtained encryption key 425 is decrypted using the master key 323a and the carrier ID 341 to extract the password (s705). This encryption step is the inverse of the encryption step s605 shown in FIG.

(5) The encrypted content 426 is read from the non-authentication area 331 and decrypted using the password extracted in step s705, while the decrypted content is played as music (s706).

As described above, the music data stored in the non-authentication region 331 in the memory card 109 cannot be decrypted without the encryption key 425 stored in the authentication region 332. Thus, even if the music data is illegally copied to another memory card, the music data copied is not can be played normally. Thanks to this structure, the copyright of music data is protected.

As described above, only devices that are authenticated affirmatively are allowed to access the authentication area in the memory card. This structure provides copyright protection, in which only devices that satisfy certain conditions are allowed to access the authentication area in the memory card. This is accomplished by selectively using a device key, encryption algorithm or the like, which are used for authentication.

In the above example, when the encrypted content is recorded in the memory card 109, first the password used in the encryption is encrypted using the master key and the media ID, then the encrypted password is stored in the authentication area 332 as the encryption key (s605). However, either the master key or the media ID can be used to encrypt the password. This structure simplifies encryption and provides such a quality that the size of the circuit of the memory card 109 or player 102 is reduced, although it is likely that the encryption is weakening.

In the above example, the player 201 and the PC 102 can retrieve the master key 323a from the memory card 109 only when authentication is confirmed. However, the master key 323a may be embedded in the player 201 or the PC 102 in advance. Alternatively, the master key 323a may be encrypted and stored in a special area 304 as an encrypted master key.

Two examples of using the authentication area of the memory card will now be described. In two examples, the “number of reads” and “the number of enabled digital outputs” are stored in the authentication area, respectively.

10 is a flowchart depicting an operation in which the player 201 (or PC 102) controls the number of reads 812 stored in the authentication area in the memory card 109. In the present example, the player 201 can play music data stored in the non-authentication area 331 in the memory card 109 as an audio signal as many times as indicated by the number of reads 812 stored in the memory card 109 (s801).

(1) The player 201 performs a request-response authentication with the authentication device 321 of the memory card 109 using the device key 211a and the like, and extracts the master key 323a from the memory card 109 when the authentication is confirmed (s802).

(2) The player 201 then retrieves the media ID 341 from the special area 304 in the memory card 109 using a dedicated command (s803).

(3) The player 201 then retrieves the music encryption key 425 from the authentication area 332 in the memory card 109 (s804). By this time, before the data (encryption key 425) is read, a command to read data from the authentication area 332 will be encrypted and sent to the memory card 109.

(4) The player 201 then extracts the number of reads 812 from the authentication area 332 in the memory card 109 and checks the number of reads 812 (s804). When the number indicates unrestricted read permission, the player 201 plays music in accordance with the procedure (s704 no s706) shown in Fig. 9 (s806 to s808).

(5) When the number of reads 812 is 0, it is estimated that no reads are allowed (s805), and the playback process ends (s809). When the number of reads 812 is equal to a value other than 0, and does not indicate the validity of unlimited reads, the player 201 reduces the number by one, writes the resulting number to the authentication area 332 (s805), then plays the music in accordance with the procedure (s704 to s706), depicted in Fig.9 (s806-s808).

As described above, the player 201 has the ability to control the number of times that the player 201 plays music by storing the number of reads 812 that indicate the number of times that music can be played. This makes it possible to apply the present method to analogue reproduction of music obtained, for example, through rental CDs or kiosk terminals (interactive vending machines for distributing music connected to a communication network).

It should be noted here that the “read time” can be stored instead of the number of reads 612 to impose restrictions on the total time that the music content can be played. Alternatively, combined information of the number of times and playing time may be stored instead. As another example, the number of reads 812 may be reduced when the contents are supported by the playback for a certain period (for example, 10 seconds). As another example, the number of reads 812 can be encrypted, then stored, so that the information is protected from tampering.

11 is a flowchart depicting an operation in which the player 201 (or PC 102) controls the number of enabled digital pins 913 stored in the authentication area in the memory card 109. In the present example, the player 201 can read music data from the non-authentication area 331 in the memory card 109 and output the read music data as many times as indicated by the number of enabled digital pins 913 stored in the memory card 109 (s901).

(1) The player 201, as in steps s701-s705 of FIG. 9, authenticates with a memory card 109 to retrieve the master key 323a (s902), retrieves the carrier ID 341 (s903), retrieves the encryption key 425 (s904), and retrieves the password (s905).

(2) The player 202 then extracts the number of enabled digital pins 913 from the authentication area 332 in the memory card 109 and checks the number of enabled digital pins 913 (s906). When the number indicates the validity of unlimited digital output, the player 201 reads the encrypted contents 426 from the non-authentication area 331 and decrypts the encrypted contents 426 into digital data using the password extracted in step s905 and outputs the decrypted digital data from the digital output contact 205 as music data (s909 )

(3) When the number of enabled digital outputs 913 is 0, it is estimated that no digital output is allowed (s908) and data is only played by the analog output (s908). More specifically, the encrypted content 426 is read from the non-authentication area 331 and the music is played, while the content is encrypted using a password (s908).

(4) When the number of permitted digital outputs 913 is a value other than 0, and does not show the validity of unlimited digital output, the player 201 reduces the number by one, writes the resulting number to the authentication area 332 (s907), then reads the encrypted content 426 from the non-authentication area 331, decrypts the encrypted content 426 into digital data using the password extracted in step s905, and outputs the decrypted digital data from the digital output contact 205 (s909).

As described above, the number of digital outputs from the player 201 can be controlled by storing the number of enabled digital outputs 813 in the authentication area 332 in the memory card 109. This makes it possible to apply the present method to the digital reproduction of music obtained, for example, through rental CDs or kiosk terminals, that is, digital duplication of music data stored in a memory card can be allowed a certain number of times in the copyright holder’s authority.

It should be noted here that, as with the “number of reads,” the “allowed digital output time” can be stored instead of the number of allowed digital outputs 913 to impose restrictions on the total time that digital data of music content can be output. Alternatively, combined information of the number of permitted digital outputs and playing time may be stored instead. As another example, the number of enabled digital pins 913 can be reduced when the content is maintained output after a certain period (e.g., 10 seconds). As another example, the number of enabled digital pins 913 can be encrypted, then stored, so that information is protected from tampering.

A function can be added so that the number of digital outputs allowed can be increased by the number determined by the copyright owner, in accordance with the responsibility that the copyright owner receives.

Now will be described the physical structure of the data (the structure of the sector and the block QC (correction code) card 109 memory.

The memory card 109 adopts such a data structure that is suitable for preventing illegal activities related to copying or restoring data stored in the flash memory 303 and for preventing illegal activities related to forgery. This data structure is adopted because of the need to deal with illegal operations that can be performed in relation to the above methods in which the “number of reads” or “number of permitted digital outputs” is stored in the authentication area 332 and the value decreases each time it is executed process.

More specifically, music can be replayed after all data recorded in the flash memory 303 is copied to an external auxiliary memory device or the like. Moreover, when the number of allowed playback operations becomes 0, the music can be played again again by restoring the copied data. Also, music can be illegally played by repeatedly faking the number of readings. As a result, some measures must be taken to prevent such illegal activities.

12 depicts a data structure that is common between authentication and non-authentication regions 332 and 331 of memory card 109, and also depicts a flow diagram of a read / write process corresponding to the data structure.

In the present example, the counter value generated by the random number generator 103 of the authentication device 321 in the control IC 302 is used as a key with a variable access time.

A 16-byte extension area 1005 is assigned to each of the 512 byte sectors 1004 in flash memory 303. Each sector stores data that is encrypted using a counter value. The extension area 1005 consists of QC data 1006 and a variable access time area 1007. Data 1006 KK (correction code) are 8 byte data, which is KK for encrypted data stored in the current sector. The variable access time region 1007 is 8 bytes and stores the counter value used to generate encrypted data stored in the current sector.

It should be noted here that only sectors 1004 can be accessed logically (i.e. using an open command or the like) and that only expansion area 1005 can be accessed physically (i.e. to be controlled by a device that reads / writes data from / to memory cards).

With the above structure, illegal data falsification can be prevented by comparing the sector data with the contents of the variable access time region 1007, where even if the sector data is faked using a command or the like, the contents of the variable access time region 1007 does not change.

More specifically, the PC 102 or the player 201 writes / reads data to / from the authentication region 332 or the non-authentication region 331 in the flash memory 109, following the procedure depicted in units of sectors 1004 below. First, a procedure will be described in which the PC 102 writes data to a memory card 109 (S1001).

(1) The PC 102 requests the memory card 109 to output a counter value. In response to this request, the control IC 302 in the memory card 109 generates a random number using the random number generator 1003 contained in the control IC 302 (S1005) and sends the generated random number to the PC 102 as the counter value (s1002).

(2) The password is generated from the obtained counter value and the main key 323a and the carrier ID 341 that are already received (s1003).

(3) One sector of the recorded data is encrypted using a password and sent to the memory card 109 (s1004). Together with the encrypted data (i) information determining the location of the sector into which the encrypted data is to be written, and (ii) the counter value used for encryption is sent to the memory card 109.

(4) A memory card 109 writes encrypted data to a specific sector 1004 (s1006).

(5) The QC is obtained by calculation from the encrypted data, and the obtained QC is recorded in the expansion area 1005 as QC data 1006 (s1007).

(6) The counter value obtained together with the encrypted data is recorded in the area 1007 with variable access time (s1008).

Next, a procedure will be described in which the PC 102 reads data from the memory card 109 (s1001).

(1) The PC 102 requests the memory card 109 to read the data by determining the location of the sector from which the data should be read. After receiving the request, the memory card 109 first reads the encrypted data from a specific sector 1004 and outputs the read data to the PC 102 (s1016). The PC 102 receives the encrypted data (s1012).

(2) The memory card 109 then reads the counter value from the current sector of the area 1007 with a variable access time in the expansion area 1005 corresponding to the specific sector 1004, and sends the read counter value to the PC 102 (s1017).

(3) A password is generated from the read value of the counter and the master key 323a and the media ID 341 that have already been received (s1014).

(4) encrypted data is decrypted using a password (s1005).

Here, if the data in sector 1004 is altered by a fake or similar, illegal action, decryption fails due to a mismatch between the counter value read from the variable access time area 1007.

As described above, the flash memory 303 comprises an area 1007 with a variable access time, an invisible area that cannot be seen (accessed) by users. Data is encrypted and stored using a password that is generated using a counter value stored in area 1007 with a variable access time. With this structure, data is protected from illegal fraud by users.

In the above example, a variable access time region 1007 is provided in the expansion region 1005 for storing the QC. However, it is possible to provide a region 1007 with variable access time in another region in the flash memory 303, provided that the data stored in the region cannot be changed outside the memory card.

In the above example, a random number is used as the counter value. However, the counter value may be a timer value indicating a time that changes every moment, or may be the number of times that data is recorded in the flash memory 303.

An example of a relationship between logical addresses and physical addresses in flash memory 303 will now be described.

Figa-fig.13D depict a change in the relationship between logical addresses and physical addresses. Figure 1 depicts the dependence before the change. Figv depicts the dependence after the change. 13C shows a conversion table 1101 corresponding to FIG. 13A. 13D depicts a conversion table 1101 corresponding to FIG. 13B.

Conversion table 1101 is a table in which all logical addresses (in FIGS. 13A-13D are logical block numbers) are stored with corresponding physical addresses (in FIGS. 13A-13D are sequential numbers of physical blocks constituting flash memory). The conversion table 1101 is stored in a long-term area in the control IC 302 or the like and is referenced by the authentication area access control device 325 or the non-authentication area access control device 326 when, for example, the logical address is mapped to a physical address.

The device accessing the memory card 109 cannot write data to all data storage spaces that physically exist in the memory card 109 (i.e., all physical blocks making up the flash memory 303), but can only write data to logical data spaces (logical blocks), which are defined by logical addresses.

The above device is made, for one reason, with the ability to save an alternative area that would replace the area from / in which data cannot be read / written due to a partial defect in the flash memory 303. Even if such a defective block is replaced by an alternative block, such changing the conversion table to reflect the change between the logical and physical block numbers allows the flash memory 303 not to inform external devices that any defects have occurred. This is because each file supports logical continuity, which corresponds to many continuous physical blocks.

However, fragmentation of logical blocks increases when, for example, a file consisting of a plurality of blocks is re-stored or deleted to / from a memory card 109. A specific example of this is shown in FIG. 13A, in which the logical addresses (0 and 2) of the logical blocks constituting the “file 1” are discontinuous.

When, for example, such discontinuity of logical blocks takes place, music data cannot be recorded in continuous logical regions in the memory card 109. This makes it necessary to issue a write command "write address count" for each block, resulting in a decrease in write speed. Similarly, this makes it necessary to issue a read command “read the address count” for each block even when the music data of the same motive needs to be read, making real-time reproduction of the music data difficult.

To solve the above problem, the control IC 302 of the memory card 109 has the function of overwriting the conversion table 1101 based on a command issued from an external device. More specifically, when a dedicated command to overwrite the conversion table 1101 is input from a command contact, the control IC 302 of the memory card 109 interprets the dedicated command and overwrites the conversion table 1101 using the parameter that is sent after the dedicated command.

The above operation will be detailed using the example depicted in FIGS. 13A-13D. Assume that before a specialized command is received, flash memory 303 contains data constituting file "file 1" at locations indicated by physical addresses 0 and 2, and data constituting file "file 2" at a location indicated by physical address 1, as shown in FIG. 13A, and that the conversion table 1101 shows that the logical addresses correspond to physical addresses. That is, in logical addresses, as well as in physical addresses, the data of “file 2” is in the middle of the data of “file 1”.

With the intention of solving the above state, the external device sends the aforementioned specialized command and parameter to the flash memory 303 indicating to preserve the continuity of "file 1". The device 322 for evaluating the command of the memory card 109, in accordance with the received specialized command and parameter, overwrites the conversion table 1101, as shown in Fig.13D. 13B shows a relationship between logical and physical addresses in flash memory 303 after the above process.

As is clear from FIG. 13B, although the arrangement of the physical blocks has not changed, the logical blocks making up the “file 1” are moved to be sequential. With this device, an external device can access “file 1” at a faster rate than before in subsequent accesses.

The conversion table 1101 can be overwritten, as indicated above, not only to solve the fragmentation of logical blocks, but also to resize each of the authentication region 332 and the non-authentication region 331 in the flash memory 303. In the latter case, the region can be moved at a high speed, since the conversion table 1101 is overwritten so that the physical block in order to become small is positioned as the physical block to become large.

Now, the function of the memory card 109 related to non-removable blocks will be described. More specifically, the operations of the memory card 109 will be described upon receipt of an undeleted block list command and a delete command. Here, non-removable blocks are physical blocks in flash memory 303 that contain data that is not physically deleted. That is, data in non-removable blocks must be deleted immediately before the blocks are used later (before other data is written to non-removable blocks).

A list of non-removable blocks command is one of the commands that the command evaluation control unit 322 can interpret and execute, and is issued to obtain a list of all non-removable blocks in the flash memory 303.

Existing data stored in the flash memory 303 of the memory card 109 must be deleted in units of blocks before the data is again written to the flash memory 303. The time to delete is approximately half the total recording time. As a result, the total recording time is reduced if deletion is completed in advance. Thus, to achieve this, the memory card 109 provides the external device with a list command of non-removable blocks and a delete command.

Assume that the current state of use of logical blocks and physical blocks of flash memory 303 is depicted in FIG. 14A. As shown in FIG. 14A, logical blocks 0 through 2 are currently in use, and physical blocks 0 through 2, 4, and 5 are non-removable blocks.

A list 1203 of non-removable blocks is stored in the command evaluation control unit 322 in the above state. The contents of the list 1204 of non-removable blocks corresponding to the usage state of the blocks depicted in FIG. 14A are depicted in FIG. 14B. Here, the list 1203 of non-removable blocks is a storage table consisting of elements corresponding to all physical blocks making up the flash memory 303 and having values that indicate data deletion states (blocks whose data is deleted are indicated as “0”, and blocks, data which are not deleted are indicated as "1") of the respective physical units under the control of the command evaluation control device 322.

Fig. 14C is a flowchart depicting a procedure of a PC 102 or player 201 for deleting blocks in advance using the list of undeleted blocks list command and the delete command in the above state. Here, it is assumed that the flash memory 303 contains a table, such as, for example, TRF (file allocation table), which shows the state of use of logical blocks, as shown in fig.14D.

An external device, such as, for example, PC 102 or player 201, issues a list of non-removable blocks list to the memory card 109 during a downtime in which the memory card 109 is unavailable (s1201). After receiving the command, the command evaluation control unit 322 of the memory card 109 accesses the list of non-removable blocks 1203 contained in the command evaluation control unit 322, detects that the state value “1” is assigned to physical blocks 0-2, 4 and 5, and sends the physical block numbers to an external device.

The external device then turns to a table that shows the state of use of the logical blocks in the flash memory 303 shown in FIG. 14D to identify blocks that are not logically used (s1202).

Based on the information obtained in steps s1201 and s1202, the external device identifies “deleted” blocks that are not logically used and are not physically removed (physical blocks 4 and 5 in this example (s1203). The external device then issues a delete command that identifies numbers 4 and 5 physical blocks to the memory card 109 (s1204). After receiving the command, the command evaluation device 322 of the command of the memory card 109 deletes the physical blocks 4 and 5 by sending commands to the authentication area access control device 325 and the access control device 326 mention to non-authentication area.

After the above operation is completed, data is written to the physical blocks 4 and 5 at a high speed, since the deletion process is not required for writing.

Now will be described the function of the memory card 109 related to the protection of personal data. More specifically, the personal data protection function is used when the memory card 109 checks the external device for authentication and requires the personal data of the user of the external device. Here, each piece of personal data is unique to the user and is used to identify the user. A user with the correct personal data is recognized by the memory card 109 as an authorized user who is allowed to access the authentication area 332 in the memory card 109.

Here, if the user is requested to enter personal data each time the user accesses the authentication area 332, or if the input of personal data is stored in the authentication area 332 for each of these accesses, there may be a problem in that the personal data is tapped by someone else or illegally read by another user who has authority to access authentication area 332.

One possible solution to this problem would be to encrypt personal data using a password provided personally by the user and store the encrypted personal data in some way, like music data.

However, in the aforementioned case, the user needs to enter a password each time when personal data is verified. The procedure is difficult and password management is also required. Thus, the memory card 109 provides a function in order to solve the problem of redundant and repeated input of personal data.

Fig. 15 shows an authentication interaction sequence between a player 201 and a memory card 109, and also depicts the main components used in authentication. Note that the processes depicted in FIG. 15 are mainly performed by the authentication circuit 216 of the player 201 and the authentication device 321 of the memory card 109.

As shown in FIG. 15, the authentication circuit 216 of the player 201 has encryption and decryption functions, and also pre-stores the master key 1301, which is a secret key that matches the master key 323a stored by the memory card 109, and the device ID 1302, which is unique The ID for the player 201, such as the serial number (s / n) of the product.

The authentication device 321 of the memory card 109 has encryption, decryption and comparison functions, and also has two long-term memory areas: a device ID group memory area 1310 and a user key memory area 1311. The memory area of the device ID group 1310 stores the device identifiers of all devices that are allowed access to the authentication area 332 in the memory card 109. The user key memory area 1311 stores the user key sent from the device as personal data. The authentication procedure will be described in detail below. Note that during transmissions and receptions, all data is encrypted before transmission and encrypted data is decrypted on the receiving side. The key used in encryption and decryption is generated during the following procedure.

(1) After the memory card 109 is connected to the player 201, the player 201 first encrypts the device ID 1302 using the master key 1301, and sends the encrypted device ID 1302 to the memory card 109.

(2) The memory card 109 decrypts the received encrypted device ID 1302 using the master key 323a, and checks if the device ID 1302 already received is stored in the memory area 1301 of the device ID group.

(3) When it is estimated that the device ID 1302 is already stored, the memory card 109 notifies the player 201 that the authentication is confirmed. When it is estimated that the device ID 1302 is not stored, the memory card 109 asks the player 201 to send a user key.

(4) The player 201 prompts the user to enter the user key, receives the user key as personal user data, and sends the received user key to the memory card 109.

(5) The memory card 109 compares the received user key with a user key previously stored in the user key memory area 1311. When it is estimated that the two user keys correspond to each other, or when the user key memory area 13311 is vacant, the memory card 109 notifies the player 201 that the authentication is confirmed and remembers the device ID 1302 obtained in the above step (3) in the ID group memory area 1310 devices.

With the aforementioned device, when the user device is connected to the memory card 109 for the first time, the user is required to enter personal data (user key). However, in the second connection and subsequent connections, the user is no longer prompted to enter personal data, since authentication ends automatically in the affirmative, using the device ID.

Now will be described a variant of the protocol between the memory card 109 and an external device, such as a PC 102 or player 201, with reference to Fig.16 and Fig.17.

Fig.16 depicts the interaction sequence in the authentication option between the memory card 109 and an external device (in the present example, player 201).

Note that the processes depicted in FIG. 16 are mainly performed by the authentication circuit 216 of the player 201, the control program 111b of the PC 102 and the authentication device 321 of the memory card 109. It is assumed here that the master key storage device 323 of the memory card 109 stores the encrypted master key (encrypted master key 323) and that the special area 304 stores the secure media ID 342 as well as the media ID 341, the secure media ID 343 being generated by encrypting the media ID 341.

First, the player 201 issues a command to the memory card 109 to obtain the master key 323b from the memory card 109 and decrypts the received master key 323b using the device key 211a. The decryption algorithm used in this decryption corresponds to the encryption algorithm used in encryption of the master key 323b, which is now read from the memory card 109.

Thus, when the device key 211a that the player 201 has as an authorized key, decryption is assumed to re-remember the original master key.

The player 201 then issues a command to the memory card 109 to obtain the media ID 341 from the memory card 109 and encrypts the received media ID 341 using the re-stored master key. The encryption algorithm used in this encryption is the same as the encryption algorithm used in encrypting the secure media ID 343, which is stored in the memory card 109. Thus, encryption provides a secure media ID 343, which is the same as the secure media ID 343 contained in the memory card 109.

The player 201 and the memory card 109 perform mutual authentication using the secure identifiers that they respectively have. Through this mutual authentication, each device generates information (OK / NG) and a secure key, wherein information (OK / NG) indicates whether the remote device is authenticated and the secure key is a temporary key that depends on the authentication result. The secure keys owned by both devices correspond to each other only when both devices 201 and 109 affirmatively authenticate the other devices, and the secure keys are changed each time mutual authentication is performed.

After the mutual authentication is completed in the affirmative, the player 201 generates a command that is used to access the authentication area 332 in the memory card 109. More specifically, for example, when data is read from the authentication area 332, the parameter (24-bit “address” and 8-bit account “count”) of the “secure read account count” command is encrypted using a secure key and an encrypted command that generated by combining the encrypted parameter and the feature (a 6-bit code indicating the type of the "secure read" command) the command is sent to the memory card 109.

After receiving the encrypted command, the memory card 109 evaluates the type of command. In the present example, the command is evaluated as a “secure read” for reading data from the authentication area 332.

When a command is evaluated as a command to access the authentication area 332, the parameter contained in the command is decrypted using the secure key obtained through mutual authentication. The decryption algorithm used in this decryption corresponds to the encryption algorithm used in encrypting the command by the player 201. Thus, when mutual authentication is completed in the affirmative, that is, when the secure keys used by both devices correspond to each other, the parameter obtained by decryption must be equal to the original parameter used by the player 201.

The memory card 109 then reads the encryption key 425 from the sector in the authentication area 332 indicated by the decrypted parameter, encrypts the read encryption keys 425 using the secure key, and sends the encrypted encryption key to the player 201.

Player 201 decrypts the received data using a secure key obtained through mutual authentication. The decryption algorithm used in this decryption corresponds to the encryption algorithm used in encrypting the encryption key 425 with the memory card 109. Thus, when mutual authentication completes in the affirmative, that is, when the secure keys used by both devices match, the data obtained by decryption must be equal to the original encryption key 425.

A memory card 109, every time a command is executed to access the authentication area 332, unloads (deletes) the protected key used when executing the command. With this device, an external device attempting to access the authentication area 332 in the memory card 109 requires mutual authentication each time the external device issues a command, and in order to be sure of the authentication in advance.

Fig.17 depicts the sequence of interaction in the detailed mutual authentication procedure depicted in Fig.16. In the present example, the memory card 109 and the player 201 perform mutual authentication of the request-response type.

The memory card 109 generates a random number and sends the random number to the player 201 as call data to verify the player 201 is correct. The player 201 encrypts the call data and returns the encrypted call data to the memory card 109 as response data to certify the player 201 as authorized for use. The memory card 109 encrypts a random number sent as call data and compares the received response data with encrypted call data. When the received response data and the encrypted call data match each other, the memory card 109 estimates that the authentication of the player 201 is confirmed (OK) and receives a command to access the authentication area 332 from the player 201. When the received response data and the encrypted call data do not match , the memory card 109 estimates that the authentication of the player 201 is not verified (NG), and if the player 201 sends a command to access the authentication area 332 after the evaluation, the memory card 109 rejects the command.

The player 201 performs a similar authentication procedure to verify the correctness of the memory card 109. That is, the player 201 generates a random number and sends the random number to the memory card 109 as call data to check the validity of the memory card 109. The memory card 109 encrypts the call data and returns the encrypted call data to the player 201 as response data for certifying the validity of the memory card 109. Player 201 encrypts a random number sent as call data and compares the received response data with encrypted call data. When the received response data and the encrypted call data match each other, the player 201 judges that the authentication of the memory card 109 is confirmed (OK), and accesses the authentication area 332 in the memory card 109. When the received response data and the encrypted call data do not match, the player 201 estimates that the authentication of the memory card 109 is not verified (NG), and leaves access to the authentication area 332.

All encryption algorithms used in mutual authentication must be the same since the memory card 109 and player 201 are authorized. The memory card 109 and player 201 receive a secure key by performing an exclusive OR operation using encrypted call data and response data obtained through authentication and authorization certification. The obtained secure key or the result of the above exclusive OR operation is used to access the authentication area 332 in the memory card 109. With this device, it is possible for both devices 109 and 201 to share a temporary secure key, which is common to them only when they are authenticated. This creates affirmative authentication as a prerequisite for accessing the authentication area 332.

A secure key may be the result of an exclusive OR operation using encrypted call data, response data, and a secure media ID.

An embodiment of a function for changing the boundary between the authentication region 332 and the non-authentication region 331 in the memory card 109 will now be described with reference to FIG. 18 and FIG. 19.

FIGS. 18A-18C depict a usage state of flash memory 303 before a boundary is changed. Figa is a memory card depicting the structure of physical blocks in flash memory 303.

FIG. 18B depicts a conversion table 1103 that is specialized for the non-authentication area 331 and is stored in the non-authentication memory area of the non-authentication area access control device 326. The mapping table 1103 depicts the relationship between the logical blocks and the physical blocks in the non-authentication area 331. The non-authentication area access control device 328 refers to the conversion table 103 to convert the logical address to a physical address or to detect incorrect access accessing outside the allocated memory area.

FIG. 18C depicts a conversion table 1102 that is specialized for the authentication area 332 and is stored in a non-volatile memory area in the access control device 325 of the authentication area. The conversion table 1102 depicts the relationship between the logical blocks and the physical blocks in the authentication area 332. The authentication area access control device 325 refers to the conversion table 1102 to convert the logical address to a physical address or to detect invalid access being accessed outside the allocated memory area.

As shown in FIG. 18A, before the boundary is changed, from the flash memory 303 consisting of physical blocks 0000 to FFFF, the physical blocks F000 to FFFF are allocated to the variable memory region 501, the physical blocks 0000 to ffff, whose addresses are less than the border is allocated for the non-authentication area 331, and the E000 physical blocks are EFFF, whose addresses are larger than the border, are allocated for the authentication region 332.

As is clear from the conversion table 1103 shown in FIG. 18B, the logical block numbers correspond to the numbers of physical blocks in the non-authentication region 331. On the other hand, as is clear from the conversion table 1102 shown in FIG. 18C, there is an inverse relationship between the logical block numbers and the physical block numbers in the authentication region 332, that is, the logical blocks 0000 - 0FFf correspond to the physical blocks EFFF according to E000, respectively. This arrangement is made under the assumption that the logical blocks are used in increasing order and that when the boundary moves, the data moved in the physical blocks needs to be saved or moved.

Figa-fig.19C depict the state of use of the flash memory 303 after the border is changed. Figa-fig.19C correspond figa-figa 18C, respectively. Note that changing the boundary is performed by the following procedure:

(1) A specialized command determining the boundary address is input to the command evaluation control device 322 via the command contact; and (2) the command score management device 322 overwrites the conversion table 1102 in the authentication area access control device 325 and the conversion table 1103 in the non-authentication area 331.

As shown in FIGS. 19A-19C, the boundary moves from between physical units E000 and DFFF to between physical units D000 and CFFF. This means that the size of the non-authentication area 331 is reduced by 1000 (hexadecimal numbers) blocks, and the size of the authentication region 332 is increased by 1000 (hexadecimal numbers) blocks.

As shown in FIG. 19B, along with changing the aforementioned boundary, the size of the non-authentication region conversion table 1103 is reduced by 1000 (hexadecimal numbers) elements, and the size of the authentication region 332 is increased by 1000 (hexadecimal numbers) elements, so the conversion table 1103 shows logical blocks 0000 - CFFF with the corresponding physical blocks 0000 - CFFF. Conversely, as shown in FIG. 19C, the size of the conversion table 1102 of the authentication area 332 is increased by 1000 (hexadecimal numbers) elements, and the size of the authentication area 332 is increased by 1000 (hexadecimal numbers) elements, so that the conversion table 1102 shows the logical blocks 0000 - 1FFF with corresponding physical blocks EFFF - D000.

As described above, a boundary is established between the authentication region and the non-authentication region in the flash memory 303, and the size of both regions is changed by moving the boundary. This makes it possible to use the memory card 109 for various purposes. For example, a memory card 109 can be mainly used for storing digital content that needs to be protected by copyright, or a memory card 109 can be mainly used for a purpose other than storing such digital content.

Both in the authentication domain and in the non-authentication domain, the amount of processing moves and data storage along with a change in the boundary can be reduced by matching logical blocks to physical blocks so that the physical blocks are used in order of remoteness, starting from the most remote block.

The above correspondence between logical and physical blocks is easily satisfied when the conversion table 1102 specialized for the authentication area 332 and the conversion table 1103 specialized for the non-authentication area are independently provided.

In the above example, in the authentication region 332, there is an inverse relationship between logical addresses and physical addresses in unit units. However, other units may be used. For example, there may be an inverse relationship between logical addresses and physical addresses in units of sectors or bytes.

Up to this point, the memory card of the present invention is described in its preferred and other embodiments. However, the present invention is not limited to the preferred embodiment and other options. In the above embodiment, a PC 102 or player 201 is required to perform mutual authentication with the memory card 109, using the same procedure each time it issues a command to access the authentication area 332 in the memory card 109. However, a simplified authentication procedure can be used to access the authentication area 332, depending on the type of command.

For example, when a “secure write” write command is issued, the encrypted master key 323b and media ID 341 may not be obtained from the memory card 109, but the memory card 109 may execute the “secure write” command even when only one-way authentication (device authentication memory card 109) ends in the affirmative. With this device, commands that are only indirectly related to copyright protection will be executed at high speed.

The flash memory 303 in the memory card 109 of the present invention may be replaced by another storage medium (for example, a long-term medium, such as a hard disk, an optical disk, a magnetic optical disk). A portable memory card capable of protecting copyright in stored data, as in accordance with the present invention, may be implemented using any of such media.

Industrial applicability

As is clear from the above description, the semiconductor device of the present invention is suitable for use as a recording medium for recording musical content in the distribution of electronic music using a network such as, for example, the Internet. The semiconductor device of the present invention is also suitable for use as a recording medium for recording computer programs or data, and is particularly suitable for use as a small recording medium for a portable recording / reproducing device.

Claims (14)

1. A semiconductor memory card that can be used in / removed from an electronic device, comprising a rewritable non-volatile memory and a control circuit that controls the electronic device accesses the authentication region and non-authentication region in a rewritable non-volatile memory, the control circuit including a control device access to a non-authentication area that controls the access of an electronic device to a non-authentication ion region, an authentication device that performs the authentication process to check whether the electronic device has authority to access the semiconductor memory card, and affirmatively authenticates the electronic device when the electronic device has authority to access the semiconductor memory card, access control device to the authentication area, which allows the electronic device to access the authentication area only when the device in authentication affirmatively authenticates an electronic device, wherein the authentication region and the non-authentication region are created by dividing a continuous region of a predetermined size in a rewritable non-volatile memory into two parts, and the semiconductor memory card also comprises means for storing an address marking the boundary between the authentication region and the non-authentication region, a region resizing scheme that changes the size of the authentication region the authentication region and the non-authentication region by changing the address marking the mentioned border, and the access control device to the authentication region and the access control device to the non-authentication region control the electronic device access to the authentication region and to the non-authentication region area by contacting the address marking the mentioned border. 2. The semiconductor memory card according to claim 1, characterized in that the authentication device generates a key that reflects the result of the authentication process, and the access control device to the authentication area decrypts the encrypted command using the key generated by the authentication device and controls the electronic device access to the authentication area in accordance with an encrypted command, the encrypted command being sent from an electronic device. 3. The semiconductor memory card according to claim 2, characterized in that the authentication device performs mutual authentication of the request-response type with the electronic device and generates a key from the request data and the response data, wherein the request data is sent to the electronic device to check whether the electronic an authorization device for accessing the semiconductor memory card, and response data is generated to indicate that the authentication device has authority for accessing the semiconductor memory card. 4. The semiconductor memory card according to claim 3, characterized in that the encrypted command sent from the electronic device includes a tag field and an address field, the tag field is not encrypted and specifies the type of access to the authentication area, and the address field is encrypted and specifies the address of the area to which access is made, while the access control device to the authentication area decrypts the address field using the key, and controls the access of the electronic device to the authentication area so that the type specified in the attribute field is accessed to the area indicated by the address of the decrypted address field. 5. The semiconductor memory card according to claim 4, characterized in that it further comprises an identification data storage circuit that pre-stores identification data that is unique to the semiconductor memory card, and makes it possible to distinguish said semiconductor memory card from other semiconductor memory cards, wherein the authentication device performs mutual authentication with the electronic device using the identification data stored in the identification storage circuit data, and generates a key from the identification data. 6. The semiconductor memory card according to claim 1, characterized in that the area resizing scheme includes an authentication domain conversion table that shows the correspondence between logical addresses and physical addresses in the authentication domain, a non-authentication domain conversion table that shows the correspondence between logical addresses and physical addresses in the non-authentication area, and a conversion table modification device that changes the contents of the conversion table the authentication area and the conversion table of the non-authentication area in accordance with a command from the electronic device, wherein the access control device to the authentication area controls access of the authentication device by the electronic device to the authentication area conversion table, and the access control device to the non-authentication area controls the access of the electronic device to nonauthentication area by referring to the conversion table nonauthentication area. 7. The semiconductor memory card according to claim 6, characterized in that the region addressed by the lower physical addresses and the region addressed by the lower physical addresses together constitute a region having a predetermined size and are allocated, respectively, for the authentication region and non-authentication areas, and the conversion table of the non-authentication area shows the correspondence between logical addresses located in increasing order and physical addresses located in increasing order and conversion table of the authentication area shows correspondence between logical addresses arranged in ascending order and physical addresses arranged in descending order. 8. The semiconductor memory card according to claim 1, characterized in that it further comprises a read-only memory circuit that previously stores the data. 9. The semiconductor memory card according to claim 1, characterized in that the control circuit further includes a conversion table that shows the correspondence between logical addresses and physical addresses in each of the authentication area and non-authentication area, and a change table of the conversion table that changes the contents conversion tables in accordance with a command from an electronic device, the access control device to the authentication area and the access control device to the non-authentication area, respectively, the electronic device accesses the authentication area and the non-authentication area by accessing the conversion table. 10. The semiconductor memory card according to claim 1, characterized in that the control circuit further includes an encryption / decryption device that encrypts data recorded in the authentication region and non-authentication region, and decrypts data read from the authentication region and non-authentication region. 11. The semiconductor memory card according to claim 1, characterized in that the non-volatile memory is flash memory, and the control circuit further includes an undeletable list storage device that stores an undeletable list that shows a list of undeletable areas in the authentication area and non-authentication area, and a device for sending information about non-removable areas, which, in accordance with a command from an electronic device, refers to a list of non-removable areas for identification of non-removable areas in the authentication area and neautentifikatsionnoy area and sends information indicating the identified non-removable area in the electronic device. 12. The semiconductor memory card according to claim 1, characterized in that the authentication device during the authentication process prompts the user of the electronic device to enter a user key, which is information unique to the user, and the control circuit further includes a user key storage device that stores a user key, an identification information storage device that stores a portion of identification information identifying an electronic device that is authorized is authentically authenticated by the authentication device, and the user key request denial device, which receives a portion of identification information from the target electronic device after the authentication device starts the authentication process, checks whether the portion of authentication information received from the target electronic device is already stored in the information storage device authentication, and prevents the authentication device from asking the user of the electronic device to enter a user key STUDIO when a portion of identification information obtained from the target electronic device has already stored in the identification information storage device. 13. A data reader for reading the digital contents of a semiconductor memory card according to claim 1, wherein the digital content is stored in the non-authentication area of the semiconductor memory card, and information indicating the number of times that the digital content can be read is previously stored in the authentication area, the device the data reader includes an evaluation tool that reads from the authentication area information indicating the number of times that digital content can be that is, if the digital content is to be read from the non-authentication area, and evaluating whether the digital content can be read based on the number of times indicated in the mentioned information, and a reproducing tool reading the digital content from the non-authentication area only when the evaluator judges that the digital content can be read, and reducing the number of times that the digital content can be read, in said information stored in the authentication this area. 14. A data reader for reading the digital contents of a semiconductor memory card according to claim 1 and reproducing the digital contents as an analog signal, the digital contents being stored in the non-authentication area of the semiconductor memory card, and information indicating the number of times that the digital content can be digitally outputted by an electronic device, stored in an authentication area, the data reader including a reproducing means reading a qi background content from the non-authentication area and reproducing the read digital content as an analog signal, an evaluation means reading information indicating the number of times that the digital content can be digitally output by an electronic device, and evaluating whether the digital content can be digitally output, based on the number of times indicated in the above information, and a digital output means that digitally outputs digital content only when the evaluation means evaluates that digital content may be digitally output, and decreasing the number of times that digital content may be digitally output, in said information stored in the authentication area.

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