RU119910U1 - BUILT-IN TSM SECURITY MODULE - Google Patents

Abstract

1.A PC with protection against unauthorized access (NSD), containing a system bus, a basic input / output system (BIOS) and an embedded TSM security module connected to the BIOS, and the BIOS is made with the ability to transfer boot control to the TSM PC after passing the Power On Self procedure -Test (POST), while TSM contains a means for blocking access to BIOS settings for everyone except authorized TSM administrators, a means for authenticating a TSM user / administrator, and user / administrator authentication is performed using an identifying device (IU) connected to the system bus PC, means for transferring BIOS control to further boot the computer after user / administrator authentication. ! 2. PC with tamper protection according to claim 1, characterized in that the TSM further comprises a memory block for storing the TSM log containing information about events caused by the actions of TSM users, as well as about errors that have occurred. ! 3. A personal computer with tamper protection according to claim 2, characterized in that the TSM additionally comprises a means for detecting unauthorized modification of journal entries. !4. A PC with tamper protection according to claim 3, characterized in that the TSM additionally contains a means of blocking access to the PC for everyone except the administrator, in case of unauthorized modification of the journal entries. ! 5. A PC with tamper protection, containing a system bus, a basic BIOS and an embedded security module TSM connected to the BIOS, and the BIOS is capable of transferring boot control to the TSM PC after passing the POST procedure, while TSM contains a means to block access to BIOS settings everyone,

Description

Technical field

The utility model relates to computer technology, namely to trusted computer boot and protection against unauthorized access to information stored in personal computers and in computer information and computing systems.

State of the art

The use of modern information technologies when it is necessary to ensure confidentiality of data storage and processing is a source of specific threats from attackers. This necessitates the use of special means of protecting information systems from unauthorized access (unauthorized access). Established means of protecting personal computers from unauthorized access, for example, the use of user passwords set using the documentation for the supplied computers, does not guarantee that this problem can be solved, since it is possible to disable the control system by forced discharge of the power battery.

To protect information from unauthorized access, a method of encrypting information stored on a hard disk is widely used. After loading the OS (system areas and files of which are not encrypted), a trusted user can decrypt information and gain access to it using special or hardware-software.

Many modern tools offer the ability to encrypt the system partition and files of the operating system (which in modern OSs may contain confidential information). But at the same time, to ensure that the OS boots from the hard disk, unencrypted areas remain on it (specialized loaders, key information storages, etc.).

Known means of software data protection (encryption, trusted boot) from unauthorized access have the disadvantages that an attacker can change the BIOS system settings to boot from his system disk. This will give an attacker the ability to copy files as well as the ability to embed malicious software, which in the future will allow him to access data, for example: "keylogger", "trojan".

Utility Model Essence

The technical result is to increase the degree of protection of the computer from unauthorized access to information.

According to the first embodiment, a computer with protection against unauthorized access (NSD) contains a system bus, a basic input / output system (BIOS) and an embedded security module (TSM - Trusted Security Module) connected to the BIOS. The BIOS is configured to transfer TSM PC boot control after passing the Power On Self-Test (POST) procedure. At the same time, TSM contains means for blocking access to BIOS settings to everyone except authorized TSM administrators, means for authenticating TSM user / administrator, and user / administrator authentication is performed using an identifying device (IU) connected to the PC system bus, means for transferring BIOS control to boot the computer after user / administrator authentication.

TSM additionally contains a memory block for storing a TSM log containing information about events caused by TSM user actions, as well as errors that occurred.

TSM further includes a means for detecting unauthorized modification of journal entries.

TSM additionally contains a means of blocking access to the PC for everyone except the administrator in case of detection of unauthorized modification of journal entries.

According to a second embodiment, the anti-tamper-proof personal computer comprises a system bus, a base BIOS, and a TSM plug-in security module connected to the BIOS. The BIOS is configured to transfer TSM PC boot control after passing the POST procedure. At the same time, TSM contains a means to block access to BIOS settings to all except authorized TSM administrators, a means to authenticate a TSM user / administrator, and user / administrator authentication is performed using an IU connected to the PC system bus, a means of integrity control (CC) of the PC software environment , means for transferring BIOS control to further boot the computer after integrity control.

The integrity control is performed by comparing the checksums of the CC objects, and the calculation of the checksums of the CC objects is performed according to the MD5 algorithm.

To solve the above and related problems, some illustrative aspects are described here in connection with the following description and the accompanying drawings. However, these aspects represent only a few possible approaches to the application of the principles disclosed here and are intended to cover all such aspects and their equivalents. Other advantages and features of novelty follow from the following detailed description given in conjunction with the drawings.

Brief Description of the Drawings

Figure 1 presents a block diagram of the operation of TSM at the stage of loading the computer.

Figure 2 presents the structure of TSM and the basic elements with which it interacts.

Detailed description of utility model

In the following description, for purposes of explanation, numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the utility model. However, it is obvious that new embodiments can be practiced without these specific details. In other instances, well-known structures and devices are shown in block diagram form in order to facilitate their description.

TSM Embedded Security Module is designed for:

protection from unauthorized access to the computer before loading the operating system (OS),

registration of access events (including unauthorized ones) to the computer,

integrity control (CC) of the computer software environment.

TSM is located on the computer motherboard. After turning on the computer, the BIOS initializes. Then called for execution TSM (figure 1) after passing the POST procedure.

The reverse control of the BIOS for further loading the computer is carried out only after authentication of the TSM user and integrity control of the computer software environment if the integrity monitoring function is initialized.

After that, the computer boots in normal mode: it searches for a boot device, reads the boot loader of the operating system (OS), transfers control to the bootloader.

TSM interacts (figure 2) with identifying devices, which are, for example, eToken or JaCarta keys in the form factor of a USB key or smart card.

Thanks to the close integration of TSM with the BIOS of the motherboard, maximum security and compatibility with all used hardware are ensured.

TSM provides the following functions:

user identification and authentication;

setting and changing TSM settings;

TSM user management:

registration (adding new) user accounts, changing user information and settings of identifying devices (DUT),

delete user accounts,

blocking / unblocking user access;

user password change in the DUT;

integrity control of the computer software environment;

logging TSM events in the event log;

View event log

display summary information about version, settings, content

TSM storage

TSM data protection;

BIOS access restriction SETUP;

protection of residual information.

Enable / Disable TSM

Enabling / disabling TSM is done from BIOS SETUP.

After TSM is enabled, only TSM Administrators can access BIOS SETUP settings. This allows the Administrator to set the necessary BIOS settings, including the polling order of bootable devices, and block the possibility of changing them for users.

Since access to BIOS SETUP is limited, only TSM Administrator can disable TSM.

When TSM is disabled in the BIOS SETUP, there is an option to reset the contents of the TSM memory, if selected, the data on registered users, the integrity monitoring subsystem, event logs are reset, and when the TSM is turned on again, it is transferred to the initialization mode.

TSM user role model

TSM provides a separation of users into the following roles:

Administrator;

User.

The TSM administrator has the right to perform the following actions:

changing BIOS settings through BIOS SETUP;

enable / disable TSM via BIOS SETUP;

further computer boot;

change TSM settings;

TSM user management;

changing the password of the user of the connected DUT (eToken, JaCarta);

View event log

initialization of the CC software environment of the computer;

request summary information about the version, settings, contents of the TSM repository.

The TSM user has the right to perform the following actions:

loading the computer operating system;

Changing the password of the user of the DUT (eToken, JaCarta).

Identification, authentication and authorization in TSM

For example, one of the following devices acts as an identifying device (DUT):

eToken PRO, USB dongle / smart card with Siemens CardOS 4.01, 4.2V;

eToken PRO (Java), USB dongle / smart card;

eToken NG-OTP;

JaCarta, USB dongle / smart card;

iButton

When working with smart card devices, for example, the following smart card readers are supported:

Athena ASEDrive IIIe (USB, Keyboard);

CCID compatible smart card readers.

Authentication and Authentication Modes

TSM supports two authentication and authentication modes:

normal mode;

mode of work with corporate means of identification and authentication;

The conditions for successful authentication depend on the mode used. Authentication conditions for working with corporate means of identification and authentication are checked in addition to the usual conditions.

If the conditions for successful authentication are not met, further computer boot is not possible.

TSM provides the TSM Administrator with the ability to enable authentication and corporate authentication.

Common authentication and authentication mode

One user corresponds to one identifier.

Authentication of users is carried out by presenting a password to the IS. The number of authentication attempts is limited depending on the security policy of the organization, for example, in the range from 1 to 15.

After checking the password for the TS, TSM checks for the presence of an additional authentication factor for the TS, which is a random sequence stored in the TS and in the user profile in TSM.

User or Administrator authorization is performed in accordance with the role model described earlier.

Corporate Identity and Authentication Mode

In this mode, a prerequisite for successful authentication is confirmation of the fact that the user has an IU that has a feature unique to the corporate system.

When applying the conditions for successful authentication of this mode, the following restrictions apply:

TSM authorizes in accordance with the role of the User;

TSM captures the identifier of the IS using which access to computer resources is performed;

KC hard mode is used;

IU password change functions are not available.

Identifier Password Change

TSM provides the ability to change the password for the user's identifying device after completing the authorization procedure.

It also provides the ability to force a default password change.

TSM Modes of Operation

TSM has the following operating modes:

initialization mode;

regular mode of operation.

In initialization mode, TSM provides registration of the first TSM Administrator, after which it is automatically transferred to the normal operation mode.

In the normal operating mode, TSM provides the execution of functions and actions corresponding to the rights of the authorized user role.

Storing user information

TSM provides storage of information about users regardless of their role (User or Administrator).

User information may contain, for example, the following data:

Role;

Name;

Description;

Identifier;

Additional authenticator;

Date and time of registration;

Blocking status (always disabled for the Administrator);

Total number of inputs;

The number of consecutive failed authentication attempts;

Date and time of the last entry;

Integrity control mode (Soft / Hard, for the Administrator it is always Soft).

TSM Event Logging

The TSM log contains information about events triggered by the actions of TSM users, as well as errors that occurred.

The maximum number of entries in the event log is selected based on the amount of memory allocated for this log.

If an unauthorized modification of journal entries is detected, access to the computer is blocked for all users except the Administrator.

When the event log overflows, data about new events is written on top of the oldest entries to avoid log overflow.

The function of downloading the event log from TSM by the Administrator is provided using an application for operating systems, for example, such as: Microsoft Windows XP / 2003 / Vista / 2008/7 / 2008R2 (x86 / x64), Linux (LSB 3.6, 4.0).

TSM provides the function of sending TSM event log entries to the server in automatic mode after loading the operating system.

Display TSM Summary

TSM at the request of the Administrator provides in the form of a report, for example, the following information:

TSM instance serial number

TSM software version

motherboard model;

motherboard BIOS version;

a list of TSM users sorted by date and time of user registration, including, for example, the following information:

role,

name,

description,

identifier,

date and time of registration,

lock state

total number of inputs

number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts

Authentication

date and time of the last entry,

CC mode;

event log information, including:

total number of entries in the event log,

number of records that are error information:

the number of records that are events that change user information;

CC information, including:

activity state

number of controlled FS objects;

the ability to use the default PS password.

There is a function to download this report using an application for operating systems, for example, such as: Microsoft Windows XP / 2003 / Vista / 2008/7 / 2008R2 (x86 / x64), Linux (LSB 3.6, 4.0).

Software Integrity Control (CC)

The KC subsystem provides integrity control for the following objects:

1. Files on the computer for file systems, for example, such as:

NTFS / FAT32 / FAT16 / Ext2 / Ext3;

2. Critical sectors of hard drives:

Master Boot Record;

62 sectors after Master Boot Record;

Volume (Partition) Boot Sector for each partition of the hard drive;

Extended Boot Record for each partition of the hard drive. The calculation of the checksums of CC objects is performed according to the MD5 algorithm.

Integrity control is performed after authentication of the User or Administrator in TSM. Until the end of the CC check, further computer loading is impossible.

There are two CC modes for TSM users:

1. Hard (when using this mode, in case of violation of the CC, further computer loading is impossible);

2. Soft (when using this mode, in case of violation of the CC, the user is warned about the violation of the CC, but further computer boot is possible).

For Administrators, the “Soft” CC mode is always active.

Initialization of the CC subsystem

The process of initialization of the CC is a process of forming and maintaining a list of objects to be controlled by the subsystem of the CC.

The application for operating systems, for example, such as: Microsoft Windows XP / 2003 / Vista / 2008/7 / 2008R2 (x86 / x64), Linux (LSB 3.4, 4.0), which performs the following functions, is responsible for forming a list of file system (FS) objects. :

1. Formation of a list of files for CC;

2. Calculation of checksums for files and sectors of HDD subject to CC;

3. Formation of an object (file) containing a list of objects of control and checksums.

The application runs as a wizard.

Used in this application, the terms "tool", "component" and "system" refer to a computer entity, which is either hardware, or a combination of hardware and software, or software, or executable software. For example, a component can be, but is not limited to, a process running on a processor, a processor, a hard disk drive, multiple drives (optical and / or magnetic media), an object, an executable module, a thread of execution, a program, and / or a computer.

In general, program modules include procedures, programs, objects, components, data structures, etc. that perform specific tasks or implement specific abstract data types. In addition, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that methods consistent with the technical solution can be practiced by other computer system configurations, including uniprocessor or multiprocessor computer systems, minicomputers, universal computers, as well as personal computers, handheld computing devices, microprocessor or programmable consumer electronic devices, etc., each of which during operation can be connected to one or more of relevant devices.

A computer typically includes various computer-readable media. Computer-readable media can be any available media that a computer can access, and includes both volatile and non-volatile media, removable and stationary media. By way of example, but not limitation, computer-readable media may include computer storage media and communication media. Computer storage media includes volatile and non-volatile, removable and fixed media implemented using any method or technology for storing information, such as computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules or other data. Computer storage media includes, but is not limited to, RAM, ROM, EEPROM, flash memory or other memory technology, CD-ROM, digital versatile disks (DVDs) or other optical disks, magnetic tapes, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices or any other medium that can be used to store useful information, and to which the computer can access.

An exemplary computing system for implementing various aspects includes a computer, the computer including a processor, system memory, and a system bus. The system bus provides an interface for system components, including, but not limited to, system memory to the processor. The processor may be any of various commercially available processors. Dual microprocessors and other multiprocessor architectures can also be used as a processor.

A system bus can be any of several types of bus structures, and can optionally be connected to a memory bus (with or without a memory controller), a peripheral bus, and a local bus using any of a variety of commercially available bus architectures. System memory includes read-only memory (ROM) and random access memory (RAM). The BIOS is stored in non-volatile memory, for example, ROM, EEPROM, EEPROM, and the BIOS contains basic procedures that help transfer information between computer elements, for example, at startup. RAM may also include high-speed RAM, for example, static RAM for caching data.

The computer further includes an internal hard disk drive (HDD) (for example, EIDE, SATA), and the internal hard disk drive can also be adapted for external use in a suitable case (not shown), a magnetic floppy disk drive (FDD), (for example , for reading from or writing to a removable diskette) and an optical disk drive (for example, reading a CD-ROM or for reading from or writing to other high-capacity optical media, such as DVD). The hard disk drive, the magnetic disk drive, and the optical disk drive can be connected to the system bus via the hard disk drive interface, the magnetic disk drive interface, and the optical drive interface, respectively. An interface for implementing an external drive includes at least one or both of the universal serial bus (USB) technologies and the IEEE 1394 interface.

Drives and associated computer storage media provide a non-volatile storage of data, data structures, computer instructions, etc. For computers, drives and media provide the storage of any data in a suitable digital format. Although the above description of computer-readable media relates to HDD, removable magnetic floppy disk and removable optical media, such as CD or DVD, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that other types of computer-readable media, such as zip disks, magnetic tapes, flash cards, cartridges, and the like are also mono use in an illustrative operating environment, and moreover, any such media may contain computer instructions for implementing new methods of the disclosed architecture.

A number of software modules can be stored on drives and RAM, including the operating system, one or more application programs, other program modules, and program data. In whole or in part, the operating system, applications, modules and / or data can also be cached in RAM. It is also obvious that the disclosed architecture can also be implemented with various commercially available operating systems or combinations of operating systems.

A user can enter commands and information into a computer through one or more wired / wireless input devices, such as a keyboard and pointing device, such as a mouse. I / O devices can include a microphone / speakers and another device, for example, an IR remote control, joystick, game pad, stylus, touch screen, etc. These and other input devices are often connected to the processor through the interface of input devices, which is connected to system bus, but can be connected via other interfaces, for example, parallel port, IEEE 1394 serial port, game port, USB port, IR interface, etc.

Another type of monitor or display device is also connected to the system bus via an interface, such as a video adapter. In addition to the monitor, the computer usually includes other peripheral output devices, such as speakers, printers, etc.

Examples of the disclosed architecture have been described above. Of course, it is impossible to describe all conceivable combinations of components or methods, but it is obvious to a person skilled in the art that many additional combinations and permutations are possible. Accordingly, the new architecture is designed to cover all such changes, modifications and variations that correspond to the essence and scope of the utility model formula. In addition, to the extent that the term “includes” is used in the detailed description or in the claims, such a term is intended to be inclusive similarly to the term “comprising”, since “comprising” is interpreted when used as a transition word in the claims.

Claims (6)

1. A tamper-resistant personal computer (NSD) comprising a system bus, a basic input / output system (BIOS) and a TSM plug-in security module connected to the BIOS, the BIOS being able to transfer control of the TSM PC loading after passing the Power On Self procedure -Test (POST), while TSM contains a means to block access to BIOS settings for everyone except authorized TSM administrators, a means to authenticate a TSM user / administrator, and user / administrator authentication is performed using identification device (IU) connected to the PC system bus, means for transferring BIOS control for further computer boot after user / administrator authentication. 2. A PC with protection against unauthorized access according to claim 1, characterized in that TSM further comprises a memory unit for storing a TSM log containing information about events caused by actions of TSM users, as well as errors that occurred. 3. PC with protection against unauthorized access according to claim 2, characterized in that TSM further comprises a means for detecting unauthorized modification of journal entries. 4. PC with protection against unauthorized access according to claim 3, characterized in that TSM additionally contains a means of blocking access to the PC for all but the administrator in case of detection of unauthorized modification of journal entries. 5. An anti-tamper-proof personal computer comprising a system bus, a base BIOS, and a TSM plug-in security module connected to the BIOS, the BIOS being configured to transfer control of the TSM PC boot after the POST procedure, while the TSM contains a means to block access to BIOS settings to all but authorized TSM administrators, TSM user / administrator authentication means, and user / administrator authentication being performed using an IU connected to the PC system bus, integer control means NOSTA (KC) PC software environment, means for transmitting control BIOS to boot the computer after further integrity. 6. PC with protection against unauthorized access according to claim 5, characterized in that the integrity control is performed by comparing the checksums of the CC objects, and the calculation of the checksums of the CC objects is performed according to the MD5 algorithm.