RU109945U1 - ON-BOARD COMPLEX FOR SUPPORT AND CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR LAND VEHICLES - Google Patents

Abstract

 1. On-board complex (BC) for the tracking system and control of ground vehicles (TS), comprising a navigation antenna and a navigation receiver for satellite navigation, a communication antenna and a cellular transceiver with a dispatch center (DC), on-board information subsystems, including at least , ignition on / off sensor, non-volatile memory and on-board microcontroller (MK), connected to all the mentioned devices and programmed to perform at least one function without security, as well as an additional communication channel between the microcontroller and the alienated storage medium that stores data necessary for the execution of the security function, characterized in that the MC is programmed to execute secure communication protocols using encryption and mutual authentication, including the calculation of electronic digital signatures (EDS) ) BC and checking it on the DC when transmitting a message, and checking the BC EDS DC when receiving a message, for which the BC is equipped with working keys for encryption and digital signature, and an additional communication channel made technological, in particular, in the form of a USB interface, to which, when performing service operations, it is envisaged to attach an alienable medium carrying key information (CI), including working encryption keys and digital signature, as well as a unique identifier for this copy of the BC when it is personalized at the end of production . ! 2. BC according to claim 1, characterized in that the transport key, the manufacturer’s name and the manufacturer’s key, generated once using physical

Description

The utility model (PM) refers to the components of remote tracking systems and control of land vehicles, in particular cars, namely, hardware complexes (terminals) installed on board vehicles.

The most advanced versions of these systems allow navigational monitoring of vehicles (TS) using GPS / GLONASS satellite navigation systems to obtain the current coordinates of the vehicle, and cellular communication systems in GSM / GPRS format for transmitting live data, including vehicle location coordinates, from the vehicle to Dispatch Center (DC). To solve this problem, their hardware on-board systems (BC), along with transceivers and modems of GPS / GLONASS and GSM systems, contain an onboard microcontroller (BM), which is their core. BM carries out the formation of message packets sent to the data center, including the current values of the coordinates of the vehicle and the readings integrated into the system of sensors, storing these packages for a time when they cannot be sent due to the vehicle leaving the cellular coverage area, as well as performing at least at least one additional function. Its presence determines the need for special BM programming, and / or inclusion of at least one additional unit in the BC. In particular, in the well-known BC according to [1], which is an analogue of PM, this additional function consists in monitoring its own state, for which such BC is additionally equipped with a control unit for its functioning.

The BC was adopted for the prototype PM according to [2], since its additional function, like PM, relates to security functions, and the BC is equipped not only with an additional unit, but also with an additional communication channel between it and the alienated storage medium that stores the necessary data for the security function .

This BC contains a navigation antenna and a satellite navigation navigation receiver, a communication antenna and a cellular transceiver with a data center, on-board information subsystems, including at least an ignition on / off sensor, non-volatile memory and an on-board microcontroller (MK) associated with all of these devices and programmed to perform at least one security function, as well as an additional communication channel between the MC and the alienated storage medium that stores the data necessary for To perform a safety function. Since the security function in this BC is to prevent theft of the vehicle, then the keyfob used for various types of anti-theft systems is used as an alienable information carrier, and the keyfob is a non-contact, keyfob electromagnetic radiation.

The disadvantages of this and similar BCs are the low information security associated with the openness of communication channels between the BC and the DC, which predetermines the danger of an intruder intercepting confidential data circulating in the system, and their low reliability (legal significance), due to the lack of mutual authentication, which determines the risk of misinformation as a driver TS from the side of the “false” DC, and the dispatcher of the DC from the side of the “false” TS.

The technical task of the PM is to increase the information security of all groups of users of remote tracking systems and control of land vehicles, which consists in ensuring the confidentiality and legal significance of the information circulating between the vehicle and the data center. The technical result achieved in connection with the solution of the problem lies in obtaining the next generation of BC, equipping them with TS (of course, if there are also stationary software and hardware complexes on the DC that are adequate for the task), it allows not only to provide a proper level of motion accounting and operational vehicle control by dispatchers, but also to exclude the possibility of all types of unauthorized access to the system.

The problem is solved in that in a BC containing a navigation antenna and a navigation receiver for satellite navigation, a communication antenna and a cellular transceiver with a data center, airborne information subsystems, including at least an ignition on / off sensor, non-volatile memory and onboard MK connected with all the devices mentioned and programmed to perform at least one safety function, and an additional communication channel between the microcontroller and the alienated storage medium, xp nyaschim data necessary for the execution of the safety function, the following changes have been made.

MK is programmed to execute secure communication protocols that use encryption and mutual authentication, including calculating the electronic digital signature (EDS) of the BC and checking it on the DC when transmitting a message, and checking the BC electronic digital signature on receiving a message. For these purposes, each BC is equipped with encryption and digital signature keys. An additional communication channel is made technological, in particular, in the form of a USB interface, to which, when performing service operations, it is envisaged to attach an alienable medium that carries key information (CI), including working encryption keys and digital signature, as well as a unique identifier for this copy of BC - for use in the BC personalization process at the end of its manufacture. As such a carrier, it is advisable to use the SHIPKA personal cryptographic protection means (PSKZI) developed and produced by the Design Bureau of CAD. On the DC side, the corresponding computers should also be adapted, it is advisable - by installing the Accord-U hardware module in them by the same developer and manufacturer.

It is advisable that, in order to protect the BC from copying and organize the safe loading of CI into it, the transport key, manufacturer name and manufacturer key, generated once using a physical random number sensor (FDSCH), would be flashed in the MK internal software.

It is advisable to protect the confidentiality of communication between the BC and the DC by programming the MK to use a system of derivative keys for protecting pair communication messages calculated using standard cryptographic algorithms based on the secret base master key generated by the DC and a unique identifier of the BC.

To calculate the BC of own EDS and check the EDS of the DC, it is advisable that the MC be programmed to use the private key to calculate the EDS, which is present only in the BC, and the public key to verify the EDS, as well as its certificate, which are also present in the DC.

In addition, it is advisable that in special versions requiring a particularly high level of information security (increased cryptographic strength of encrypted messages), the BC would be equipped with its own FDSCH connected to the MK.

The described set of distinctive features of the BC is such that any newly developed and based on its use the system of remote tracking and control of the vehicle meets all modern requirements in the field of information security, including stipulated by the international standard ISO / IEC 9798-2: 2008.

INFORMATION SOURCES

1. Russian patent for utility model RU No. 26271 U1.

2. Russian patent for utility model RU No. 35677 U1.

Claims (5)

1. On-board complex (BC) for the tracking system and control of ground vehicles (TS), comprising a navigation antenna and a navigation receiver for satellite navigation, a communication antenna and a cellular transceiver with a dispatch center (DC), on-board information subsystems, including at least , ignition on / off sensor, non-volatile memory and on-board microcontroller (MK), connected to all the mentioned devices and programmed to perform at least one function without security, as well as an additional communication channel between the microcontroller and the alienated storage medium that stores data necessary for the execution of the security function, characterized in that the MC is programmed to execute secure communication protocols using encryption and mutual authentication, including the calculation of electronic digital signatures (EDS) ) BC and checking it on the DC when transmitting a message, and checking the BC EDS DC when receiving a message, for which the BC is equipped with working keys for encryption and digital signature, and an additional communication channel made technological, in particular, in the form of a USB interface, to which, when performing service operations, it is envisaged to attach an alienable medium carrying key information (CI), including working encryption keys and digital signature, as well as a unique identifier for this copy of the BC when it is personalized at the end of production . 2. BC according to claim 1, characterized in that the transport key, the manufacturer’s name and the manufacturer’s key, generated once using a physical random number sensor (FDSCH) are flashed in the MK internal software. 3. BC according to claim 1, characterized in that the MC is programmed to use a system of derivative keys to protect pair communication messages calculated using standard cryptographic algorithms based on the secret base master key generated by the DC and the unique identifier of this BC instance. 4. BC according to claim 1, characterized in that the MK is programmed to use the private key for calculating the EDS, which is present only in the BC, and the public key for checking the EDS, as well as its certificate, which are also present in the DC. 5. BC according to claim 1, characterized in that it contains its own FDSCH connected to MK.