RU104751U1 - HIDDEN RECORDER OF UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO OBJECT OR ITS LOCAL ZONES - Google Patents

Abstract

 A hidden registrar of unauthorized access to an object or its local zones, containing a housing, microphone, display, keyboard, computer interface memory (CI), a sensor, an accelerometer and a processor, which is connected via its first to seventh ports to a microphone, display, and keyboard, respectively , with memory, with a KI unit, with a sensor and with an accelerometer, and made with the possibility of recording the facts of presence and / or activity near the places of its installation by individuals, giving the device (its case) an appearance according to which it is identified as a typical household product (TBI), functioning according to a program that provides emulation of TBI operation using a sensor, display and keyboard, as well as recognition of device movement paths to activate the corresponding types of interfaces, one of which is adapted to support registrar functions, and others - to support the functions of the TBI, characterized in that it includes an additional video module (VM) and a real-time clock module (RTM), which is connected to the eighth port by its port the volume of the processor, which is connected to the VM node by the ninth port, while the processor operates according to a program that provides the ability to process signals coming from the VM node with detection of the presence of movement of individuals (PL) and / or objects in the controlled zone (KZ) for them automatic activation of the data recording mode with synchronous recording into the memory of microphone signals, video data received from the VM node, and the date and time read from the MPRV node, support for the highly sensitive operating mode of the VM node for shooting in conditions of insufficient

Description

The utility model relates to signaling, and more specifically to portable recording devices, and can be used in various security and information security systems primarily for covert registration of unauthorized access of individuals to objects or their local zones.

According to sources [L1, L2], a serious source of information security threats is the activities of insiders [L3] - employees of firms, enterprises, etc., who are allowed to confidential information and carry out illegal actions related to the transfer of this information to other persons, companies, etc. .

The solution to the problem of identifying unlawful activities of individuals such as insiders is complicated by the fact that these individuals can have official access to confidential information, be legalized in access control and management systems, know the structure of security and control systems for objects, place and organize video surveillance and other security systems objects and their local zones.

In such cases, a contradictory situation is created in which, on the one hand, in order to identify the activities of individuals such as insiders, it is necessary to install technical means of control (TSC) at facilities or their local zones (OLZ), and on the other hand, the installation of such funds on an OLZ can unmask activities to identify the activities of these individuals. This complicates the use of TSCs without disclosing the intentions of security services to search for channels for the leak of confidential information and / or to identify other illegal activities of individuals such as insiders.

According to experts [L4, L5], most of the time insiders' activity is manifested in unauthorized access (NSD) to objects or their local zones, the main types of which are office rooms and workplaces of managers, drawers, desks, safes, folders, etc.

Since the activities of individuals (FL) such as insiders are fraught with the risk of being disclosed and the consequences are very serious for them, they carefully hide their actions and show a high level of caution. Therefore, to identify such a very cautious activity, only those TSCs that have a high level of hidden data recording, the information content of which is sufficient to identify specific individuals who carry out unauthorized access to an object or its local zones, are most effective.

Registration of access of PLs to OLS using standard (known) TSKs is ineffective, since such technical means can be visually identified, for example, by such signs as type of construction, design, etc. and / or by functional signs, for example, engine noise, blinking indicators, etc. That is, the secrecy of registrars depends on the presence in their form and / or functions performed of unmasking signs that can be detected by individuals visually and / or using technical means, for example [L6-L8].

It has been established that for a comparative assessment of various devices in terms of their effectiveness in solving the aforementioned task associated with identifying insider activity of the FL, it is advisable to use an integral indicator that takes into account both the degree of stealth of the functioning of the device (registrar) and the information content of the data recorded by this device, which is necessary for personal identification of individuals exercising unauthorized access to objects or their local zones.

As you know, the identification (automatic recognition) of people by their faces allows you to most effectively (reliably and promptly) identify insiders. Therefore, an integral indicator that takes into account the secrecy of the functioning of the device and the information content of the data recorded by it, we will conventionally call the coefficient of hidden registration (DAC). The higher the latency of the device’s functioning and the more informative the data it registers, the higher the DAC.

It can be assumed that, in the limit, the maximum value of the DAC will correspond to such a registrar in which there are no unmasking signs, and the information content of the recorded data and the reliability of their receipt are sufficient for personalized identification of PLs that carry out unauthorized access to the object or its local zone.

From the point of view of searching for the extremum of the DAC indicator, it can be assumed that the task to be solved is the search for technical solutions (TR) that provide a high level of hidden data recording with information content sufficient to identify individual PLs that carry out unauthorized access to OLS.

Studies have shown that many well-known technical solutions have a low DAC. This is due to the fact that in them they are optimized according to one of the indicators: either by the latency of functioning or by the information content of the recorded data.

In the first case, when the registrar has maximum secrecy, the data recorded by it may be of little use due to their low information content, which does not provide identification of individual PLs that carry out unauthorized access to the object or its local zones. So, fixing the facts of VAT only by date and time often turns out to be insufficient information that does not provide identification of specific PLs. That is, the low level of information content of the recorded data significantly affects the achievement of the task.

In the second case, when the registrar provides the fixation of informative data sufficient to identify the PL, its level of stealth is low, which reduces the effectiveness of the use of this device, since such a registrar can be detected and neutralized by insiders.

In this regard, the search for technical solutions (TR), which provide a high level of hidden data recording with information content sufficient to identify individual individuals who carry out NSD on the site, is an urgent task.

Analysis of known technical solutions performed using the DAC criterion yielded the following results.

The well-known from the technique [L9], a recorder consisting of a series-connected information sensor (ID), a controller and an interface that connects external devices (indication, alarm and registration) with the ability to automatically lock access to an object by signals generated by an ID that can respond to the physical approach of objects or people to the objects associated with it.

Essentially, this device relates to event recorders, and more specifically, to security devices that can record access to the access control devices on which they are installed.

This device operates as follows. An information sensor (ID), sensitive to the state of objects by the presence of capacitive coupling with them, is located on the OLC, for example, is fixed on a picture, safe, desktop cover, etc. Further, the device is configured, which is expressed in the coordination of the parameters of the ID and OLZ properties, that is, their capacitive coupling is performed. The field of this, the ID is included in the monitoring mode, in which the coordination parameters between the ID and the OLZ are controlled. This allows you to control access to the health care facilities, which is reflected in the fact that when approaching the health care facilities of individuals, their body contributes additional capacity to the health care facilities, which leads to a mismatch between the ID and the health care needs. The ID generates a mismatch signal, which is processed by the controller and is perceived as an alarm signal, which is recorded in the controller memory and sent via the interface to external devices for indicating, signaling and recording alarms.

This device provides registration of access to the OLZ, which is achieved due to the fact that the device can: be activated automatically, without operator intervention, respond to the appearance (approach) to the OLZ of individuals, mask the connection between the controlled OLZ and the ID due to capacitive coupling between them, in addition, the design of the ID in the form of two conductors makes them inconspicuous.

The disadvantage of this device is the low level of DAC due to the low latency of this device and the low information content of the data recorded by it, insufficient for identifying (recognizing) the PL accessing the object or its local zones. The low secrecy of this device is due to the presence of a number of unmasking signs, including the presence of a spatially distributed structure in the form of separate nodes installed in various places of the SIR, which can be detected by external inspection of the SLC. In addition, these nodes are connected by wire loops necessary for transmitting signals from the ID to the controller and from it via the wire interface to external devices for indicating, signaling and recording alarms, which are also unmasking signs that reduce the secrecy of this device. The low information content of the recorded data is due to the fact that these data do not allow identification of specific PLs that access the object or its local area.

It is established that an increase in the DAC can be achieved on the basis of camouflage of registrars in various containers. At the same time, an improvement in the DAC is achieved by increasing the secrecy of the use and functioning of the device (registrar). A container is understood to mean a household item, apparatus, etc. - everything that can be used to covertly place in it registrars of NSD of access of FL to the OLZ.

The use of containers is widely used in camouflage of various technical means. Simple camouflage can be arbitrarily called the method of constructive-technological masking, in which, usually, only the shell of the container is used to give the registrar of access (RD) to the OSS a look similar to the container.

A recorder consisting of an information sensor (ID) is known from the technology [L10], the output of which is wired to a registration unit (BR), which contains an ID input, display, keyboard, memory, a computer interface, and a processor, which is the first, second, third, fourth and fifth ports are connected, respectively, with the input of the ID, display, keyboard, memory and computer interface, while the ID is made in the form of a micro-video camera (MVK) with a lens design in the form of a button, in addition, it is possible to automatically iksirovaniya access of individuals to the OLZ, which is located in the review area of the IAC, which is implemented on the basis of software video detection by the processor of the physical movement of objects and / or individuals in the review area of the IAC.

This device relates to portable digital video recorders (DVRs), which can also be used to register access of individuals to the OLZ. This is ensured by the possibility of their functioning in the automatic activation mode of video recording by the presence of movement in a controlled sector, aimed at the GLS.

The product works as follows. MVK is located so that in the field of view of its lens was OLS. The CBR enters the registration mode by the video detection signal. At the same time, the processor of the device analyzes the signals from the MVK and determines the presence of signs characteristic of the movement of objects or individuals (PL). As soon as these signs are detected in the signal from the MVK, the DVR goes into registration mode, i.e. video recording. If the movement in the controlled sector stops, the video registration process stops. In this case, the recording of signals from the MVK is carried out in memory. Video clips stored in the memory can be viewed on the built-in display using the keyboard or transferred to the PC via a computer interface.

This CVR partially eliminates the drawbacks of the previous device, the value of its DAC is higher, since the device contains fewer unmasking features and has a higher value of information content, as it provides fixation of more data (date, time and video data). Its higher level of stealth is due to the miniature design and the use of a camouflage camera lens (in the form of a button), which increases the overall level of camouflage that can be obtained when installing a DVR on an overhead camera. The spatially distributed structure inherent in the previous device is reduced to two rather miniature nodes. An increase in the level of CVR stealth is also achieved through the use of video detection (reacting to the movement of objects and / or PL in the sector of the ID), which allows you to identify access facts to the ARS remotely, without laying wire communications between the ARS where the ID is installed and the registrar itself, as it required for the previous device.

The disadvantage of this device is the low coefficient of DAC. This is due to the low stealth of this device due to the presence of unmasking signs in it. So, by the appearance of the CBR, you can determine its purpose. Further, between the MVK and the Central Bank there is a connecting cable that requires a separate masking. In addition, the operation of the CBR in the video recording mode is accompanied by a glow of the display and LEDs indicating the operating modes of this device, which are also unmasking signs that reduce the secrecy of this device. In addition, the information content of the data recorded by this device is also low, which does not provide identification of the PL performing NSD on the OLZ. This is due to the low quality of the recorded video data (low resolution, low shooting frequency, lack of sound, etc.). It should be noted that this device implemented only partial camouflage, which was subjected to only one of the components of the CBR - a video camera, that is, the potential capabilities of camouflage were not used.

A recorder consisting of an information sensor (ID), an infrared motion sensor (ICD), an indicator, a memory, a computer interface (CI) and a processor, which is connected by the first, second, third, fourth and fifth ports, respectively, is known from the technology [11], with an ID, ICD, indicator, memory and CI, in this case, the FR design is made in the form of a monoblock containing a hole with a diameter of not more than 2 mm for installing a pinhole type microcamera of a video camera (VK), on the basis of which an ID is implemented, in addition, it is possible to fix access n object photographing method ICD activated responsive to the physical movement of objects or PL in the VC sector review.

This device belongs to compact digital photo recorders (DSCs), which can also be used to register access of individuals to the IDS, which is ensured by the possibility of their functioning in the automatic photography mode by the presence of movement of objects and / or PL in the action sector of the ID and / or ICD.

The device operates as follows. In a typical case, the DSP is placed on the wall in such a way that an OLZ is located in the viewing sector of the VC and ICD. When physical movement of objects or PL occurs in the indicated sector, the ICD generates an alarm signal, which is processed by the processor. The latter includes the photography process. At the same time, the captured frames are saved in memory and can be transferred to a PC for viewing them through a computer interface. The specified computer interface also allows you to program the DSP operation modes, including setting the sensitivity of the ICD and the speed of photography within one frame every 1-5 seconds to 10 frames per second.

This DSC partially eliminates the disadvantages of the previous device, has a higher value of the DAC index, since it contains fewer unmasking signs. Its higher level of secrecy is due to the placement of the recorder in the case, the appearance of which corresponds to a typical security sensor. That is, the camouflage of the CFR allows you to increase its stealth.

However, this device contains a number of elements that distinguish its appearance from a standard security sensor, in particular, the presence of a hole in the front panel in which the camera lens is mounted, the presence of additional light indicators on the same panel that display the status of the DSC, for example, when the process of taking pictures is ongoing, the nature of the indicators changes, which attracts attention. In addition, the design of the device is quite bulky and “striking”. The device works from a network adapter, which requires a power cable to it. An interface connector is located on the side surface of the RF, which is also a unmasking sign, since such a structural element is absent in a conventional security sensor. In addition, this device has low information content of the recorded data, for reasons similar to the previous device.

It has been established that the closest in technical essence to the proposed device (prototype) is the hidden access recorder (SR) known from the technique [L12] for access to an object consisting of a body, microphone, display, keyboard, memory, sensor, computer interface (KI), a sensor, an accelerometer, a real-time clock module (RTM) and a processor, which is connected from the first to eighth ports, respectively, with a microphone, with a display, with a keyboard, with memory, with a KI unit, with a sensor, with an MPRV unit and with an accelerometer , and executed with the ability to give the SR (its case) the appearance by which it is identified as a typical household product (TBI), the functioning of the processor according to a program that provides for the recording of the presence and / or activity near the installation sites of individuals, emulating the work of the TBI using a sensor, display and keyboards, as well as the recognition of the trajectories of the accelerometer to activate the corresponding types of interfaces, one of which is adapted to support the functions of the registrar, and the other to support the functions of T I. Functional diagram of this device is shown in figure 1.

The device (Fig. 1) contains a housing 1, in which a computer interface (CI) 2, a microphone 4, a memory 5, a sensor 6, a keyboard 7, an accelerometer 8, a display 9, an MPDV unit 10, and a processor 3, which are own from the first, are located through the eighth ports it is connected, respectively, with KI 2, microphone 4, memory 5, sensor 6, keyboard 7, accelerometer 8, display 9, and the MPRV unit 10.

The device shown in figure 1, operates as follows. The device supports two types of interfaces. The first interface is responsible for supporting the functions by which the device is identified as a household product. The second interface is responsible for supporting functions by which the device is identified as a registrar.

When the power is turned on, the first interface is activated, so that the device functions as a well-known household product, the type of which is determined by the design of the housing 1 and the type of sensor 6.

Thanks to the presence of two interfaces, visual and functional secrecy of the DRS on the OLC is achieved.

The operation of the device in the emulation mode of a household product is carried out in the following order.

For a special case of the implementation of the device, the housing 1 can be made in the form of a desktop electronic clock. This household product may correspond to a sensor 6, made in the form of a real-time clock module, the signals of which are processed by the processor 3 and displayed on the display 9 as the current date and time. Installation and correction of the display can be carried out using the keyboard 7 or using KI 2.

To increase the efficiency of identification of the device as a general household product, the housing 1 can be made in accordance with the traditional design. For example, if the sensor 6 is a clock module, then the case 1 can be made in the form corresponding to a typical clock, as was discussed above. If the sensor 6 is a temperature sensor, then the appropriate design of the housing 1 will be its implementation in the form of a thermometer.

The appearance of the device in appearance and the functions performed can correspond to various products of general use, in this example - an electronic clock, which is why it is identified by individuals who are not familiar with the “second side of the coin”, that is, the second interface that supports functions of the hidden registrar of unauthorized access to objects or their local zones.

That is, the secrecy of the NSD registrar for objects or their local zones is achieved by the possibility of giving it the appearance and functions of a household or other general-use product, which from the point of view of an insider does not pose any threat and cannot be used for covert registration of PL on an OLZ.

The device in access registration mode operates as follows. The main information element is the microphone. In the initial state, when the object or its local area (OLZ), due to the absence of individuals, the level of acoustic signals is low. Therefore, the device is in standby mode. When individuals appear on the OLS, their presence or activity (steps, mobile phone calls, conversations, etc.) - all this causes disturbance of the acoustic field on the OLZ, which leads to the activation of the device. At the same time, the signals from microphone 4 are sent to processor 3, which compares their intensity with a threshold level (background noise level) and if the current signals of microphone 4 exceed the threshold level, the registration process is activated - the facts of exceeding the threshold level are recorded in memory 5. If on the OSS of acoustic signals exceeding a predetermined threshold, the registration process is repeated in the order indicated above. It should be noted that the potential feature of this product is the recording of phonograms, the registration of which can be carried out in memory 5 and used to analyze the acoustic situation recorded by the facts of activation of the device.

Using the keyboard 7 and the display 9, the value of the permissible threshold of the noise level at the SIR can be adjusted in the direction of its increase or decrease. Also, using the keyboard 7 and the display 9 can be viewed statistics of the device. The presence of such positives and their number can be used to “calculate” the activities of insiders. The data stored in the memory 5, through the computer interface 2, can also be transferred to a computer (PC) for statistics and subsequent analysis.

Access to the functions of the hidden NSD recorder is protected, that is, the device does not have the ability to switch the interface in a standard way, for example, using a switch or by pressing the keyboard keys - any manipulations with these controls will not achieve this goal, since they do not participate in the activation of the second interface. The functions of the “switch” of the interfaces are based on the fact that when moving in the space of the accelerometer 8, signals are generated at its output that contain signs of the trajectory along which the specified accelerometer moves (with or without the device).

The digital “image” of the trajectory can be used as an access key to the interface. There can be several such “digital trajectory images” (DTTs) - according to the number of emulated interfaces. The creation of a CTC can be organized by transferring the device to the training mode, in which the process of forming the CTC is started, and the device (together with the accelerometer 8) moves along a certain trajectory. The signals generated by the accelerometer 8 are digitized and stored as an image file in a given area of memory 5 or the internal memory of processor 3.

As a result of the “training” procedure, a sufficient number of CTCs is accumulated in memory 5, but not less than two, which is associated with the number of emulated interfaces.

In the operating mode, the processor 3 constantly monitors the signals that come to it from the accelerometer 8. The “image” of the input digital stream is compared with the set of COTs stored in memory 5.

If the device is moved along a well-known path, the central heating center of which is stored in memory 5, then this fact will be interpreted as an activation signal of the corresponding interface.

Since the registrar’s interface is activated without using the keyboard and other controls available for external influence, and also taking into account that the configuration of the trajectory along which the DDS can be moved to activate access to its interface is known only to the user, it can be assumed that This achieves both high secrecy of the DRS and protection against unauthorized access by unauthorized persons.

This device partially eliminates the disadvantages of the previous device. So, the processor implements advanced capabilities for the formation of the first type of interface, adapted to support the functions of an object, device or general purpose device (PON), in which the sensor is needed to identify the specified PON at the functional level with the display showing physical quantities corresponding to its type (date, time, temperature, etc.). This combination of distinctive features allows you to implement a new property, expressed in that the device is given the functions of an object, device or general purpose device (PON), which provides masking of the registrar's functions, increasing the level of its functional secrecy. This helps to increase the CEP of this device. In addition, the use of the possibility of giving the body of the device an appearance by which it can be visually identified as an object, device or general purpose device (PON), which provides constructive masking of the recorder, increasing its level of visual secrecy, which also increases the RAC.

Further, the use of the accelerometer and the expansion of the capabilities of the program by which the processor operates and with the help of which it is possible to form a second type of interface adapted to support the functions of the registrar and activate any of these interfaces by recognizing pre-programmed types of paths along which the accelerometer (together with the registrar) can to be moved in space. This combination of distinctive features allows you to implement such properties as restricting access to the registrar's functions without using structural elements, which increases the level of visual and functional masking of the device as an access registrar for OL3- which also increases the DAC.

However, this technical solution (device) has a low value of the DAC. This is explained by the low information content of the recorded data obtained during registration of access to the OSS. This device provides the fixation of uninformative data (date and time) which is not enough to identify individuals who carry out unauthorized access to OLZ.

It has been established that in order to identify insider activity, it is necessary to use such data and methods of their processing that at the minimum time provide reliable identification (recognition) of individual individuals.

The purpose of the utility model is to expand the functionality of the known device associated with increasing the level of its hidden data recording with information content sufficient for the personal identification of individuals who carry out unauthorized access to the object or its local zones.

To achieve this goal, a hidden access recorder (SR) accesses an object consisting of a body, microphone, display, keyboard, memory, computer interface (CI), accelerometer, sensor, real-time clock module (RTM) and a processor that through the eighth ports it is connected, respectively, with a microphone, with a display, with a keyboard, with memory, with a KI unit, with a sensor, with an MPRV unit and with an accelerometer, and configured to give the SR (its case) the appearance by which it is identified as a typical household product e (TBI), the functioning of the processor according to a program that provides for recording the facts of the presence and / or activity of individuals near the installation sites of the SR, emulating the operation of the TBI using a sensor, display and keyboard, as well as recognizing the trajectories of the accelerometer (device) to activate the corresponding types interfaces, one of which is adapted to support the functions of the registrar, and the other to support the functions of the TBI, additionally introduced a video module (VM) which is connected by its port to the ninth port of the process a, which operates according to a program that provides the ability to process signals coming from the VM node, determining (detecting) them the presence of movement of individuals (PL) and / or objects in the controlled area (KZ), activating the data registration mode on the facts of motion detection in a frame in a short circuit with synchronous recording into the memory of microphone signals, video data received from the VM node, and the date and time read from the MPRV node, support for the highly sensitive operating mode of the VM node for shooting in low light conditions and high high-speed shooting for fixing dynamic (moving) objects, as well as the formation in the memory of digital images of the appearance (faces of people) with support for face recognition technology in the frame by signals from the VM node.

The proposed device provides the following combination of distinctive features and properties. The composition of the proposed device additionally introduced a video module (VM), which is connected by its port to the ninth port of the processor. The presence of this node allows you to implement new properties that provide a significant increase in the information content of the recorded data (date, time and video data), which increases the efficiency of the device and its DAC. Further, the processor of the proposed device operates according to a program that provides the ability to process signals coming from the VM node, with the determination (detection) of the presence of movement of individuals (PL) and / or objects in the controlled zone (KZ), which is used to activate the registration mode data with synchronous recording into the memory of microphone signals, video data received from the VM node, and the date and time read from the MPDV node. At the same time, to ensure reliable data acquisition, a highly sensitive mode of operation of the VM unit for operation in low light conditions is supported, a high-speed shooting function, which allows qualitatively recording blur events (clearly) to record dynamic events (PL actions on the camera), the possibility of formation in memory digital images of appearance (people's faces) with support for face recognition technology in the frame by signals coming from the VM node - all this provides both an increase in the information content of recorded data and the possibility of the personal identification of PLs carrying out NSD on OLZ.

The combination of distinguishing features and properties of the proposed hidden registrar of unauthorized access to an object is not known from the technology, therefore it meets the criterion of novelty. At the same time, in order to achieve the maximum effect on expanding the device’s functionality related to increasing the level of its hidden data recording with information content sufficient for the personal identification of PLs that access NSDs, it is necessary to use the whole set of distinguishing features and properties mentioned above.

Figure 2 shows a functional diagram of a hidden registrar of unauthorized access to an object or its local zones (hereinafter - the device or registrar).

The hidden registrar of unauthorized access to the object or its local zones (Fig. 1) contains a housing 1 in which a computer interface (KI) 2, a microphone 4, a memory 5, a sensor 6, a keyboard 7, an accelerometer 8, a display 9, a video module ( VM) 10, real-time clock module (RTM) 11 and processor 3, which is connected by the first, second, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth ports, respectively, to KI 2, with microphone 4, with memory 5, s sensor 6, with a keyboard 7, with an accelerometer 8, with a display 9, with a node VM 10 and with a node MCHRV 11.

The device shown in figure 2, operates as follows. Support for types of interfaces can be carried out in the same way as in the prototype. The first interface is responsible for supporting the functions by which the device is identified as a household product. The second interface is responsible for supporting functions by which the device is identified as a registrar.

When the power is turned on, the first interface is activated, so that the device functions as a well-known household product, the type of which is determined by the design of the housing 1 and the type of sensor 6.

Thanks to the presence of two interfaces, visual and functional secrecy of the device is achieved.

The operation of the device in the emulation mode of a household product can also be carried out in the manner similar to the prototype. Moreover, for a particular case of the implementation of the device, the housing 1 can be made in the form of a desktop electronic clock. This household product may correspond to a sensor 6, made in the form of a real-time clock module, the signals of which are processed by the processor 3 and displayed on the display 9 as the current date and time. Installation and correction of the display can be carried out using the keyboard 7 or using KI 2.

To increase the efficiency of identification of the device as a general household product, the housing 1 can be made in accordance with the traditional design. For example, if the sensor 6 is a clock module, then the case 1 can be made in the form corresponding to a typical clock, as was discussed above. If the sensor 6 is a temperature sensor, then the appropriate design of the housing 1 will be its implementation in the form of a thermometer.

The appearance of the device in appearance and the functions performed can correspond to various products of general use, in this example - an electronic clock, which is why it is identified by individuals who are not familiar with the “second side of the coin”, that is, the second interface that supports functions of the hidden registrar of access to objects or their local zones.

That is, the secrecy of the registrar of access to objects or their local zones is achieved by the possibility of giving it the appearance and functions of a household or other general-use product, which from the point of view of an insider does not pose any threat and cannot be used for secretive registration of PL on an OLZ.

The device in the registration mode of unauthorized access of PL to the object or its local zone operates as follows.

In the initial state, when there are no individuals on the controlled object or its local zone and there is no dynamics in the video signal coming to the processor 3 from the output of the VM 10 node, that is, there are no “movements in the frame”, then the recorder is in standby mode. When the appearance of PL on the OLS, the VM node generates signals in which the processor 3 detects the movement of these PLs. In cases of motion detection in the controlled area, the device automatically switches to the mode of synchronous registration of acoustic signals coming from microphone 4, video signals generated by VM 10, and the date and time read from the MPRV 11 node. In addition, to ensure reliable recording of video data, a highly sensitive mode of operation of the VM 10 node is supported, which can provide high-quality video shooting in low-light conditions. For a clear fixation of the PL actions during their quick manipulations (movements and other actions) on the ORS, processor 3 supports the function of the VM 10 node for high-speed shooting. In addition, for the personal identification of PLs performing NSD on OLZ, processor 3 supports face recognition technologies in the frame, that is, in the video material generated by VM node 10. The presence in memory 5 of a database of digital images of various persons belonging to legitimate PLs allows to recognize among of them insiders (by their persons) in cases of their unauthorized use or unlawful actions by them (at the facility controlled by this device or its local zones).

The formation of a database of digital images of faces in memory 5 can be carried out using a typical computer connected to the device using the KI 2 node.

Access to the functions of the hidden recorder is protected, that is, the device does not have the ability to switch the interface in a standard way, for example, using a switch or by pressing the keyboard keys - any manipulations with these controls will not achieve this goal, since they do not participate in the activation of the second interface . The functions of the “switch” of the interfaces are based on the fact that when moving in the space of the accelerometer 8, signals are generated at its output that contain signs of the trajectory along which the specified accelerometer moves (with or without the device).

The digital “image” of the trajectory can be used as an access key to the interface. There can be several such “digital trajectory images” (DTTs) - according to the number of emulated interfaces. The creation of the CTC can be organized by transferring the device to the training mode, in which the procedure for forming the CTC is started, and the device (along with the accelerometer 8 moves along a certain path. The signals generated by the accelerometer 8 are digitized and stored as an image file in the specified memory area 5 or internal memory CPU 3.

As a result of the “training” procedure, a sufficient number of CTCs is accumulated in memory 5, but not less than two, which is associated with the number of emulated interfaces.

In the operating mode, the processor 3 constantly monitors the signals that come to it from the accelerometer 8. The “image” of the input digital stream is compared with the set of COTs stored in memory 5.

If the device is moved along a well-known path, the central heating center of which is stored in memory 5, then this fact will be interpreted as an activation signal of the corresponding interface.

Since the activation of the registrar’s interface is carried out without using the keyboard and other controls available for external influence, and also taking into account that the configuration of the path along which the device can be moved to activate access to its interface is known only to the user, this is achieved as high the secrecy of the device, as well as protection against unauthorized access to it by unauthorized persons.

The algorithm of the functioning of the device in a generalized form can be represented in the following form.

- Start;

- Activation of the household appliance interface (PSU);

- Connecting the display 9, keyboard 7, KI 2 to control the PSU functions;

- Processing of VM 10 signals in the background;

- Check - 1: is there movement in the frame? If NO, then return, if YES, then go to the data registration procedure;

- Data recording procedure: recording in memory 5 microphone 4 signals (phonogram recording), VM 10 node signals (video recording) with fixing the date and time read from the CDM 11 node. After a specified time (3-5 minutes), return to check 1 ;

- Signal processing of the accelerometer 8 in the background;

- Check - 2: does the device's trajectory correspond to the recorder interface? If NO, then return, ate YES, then transfer the PSU functions to the background, activate the recorder interface, connect the display 9, keyboard 7 and the KI 2 node to control the recorder, write data from memory 5 to the computer disk, modify memory 5 (clear accumulated data), analysis of the results;

- Check - 3: does the device trajectory correspond to the PSU interface? If the date, from return to start, if - NO, then the completion of work with the registrar;

- The end.

The nodes of the housing 1, computer interface 2, processor 3, microphone 4, memory 5, sensor 6, keyboard 7, accelerometer 8 and display 9 are similar to the corresponding features of the prototype and do not require further development. At the same time, the housing unit 1 can be implemented by analogy with the design solutions used in the production of MP3 players, electronic watches, portable radios, cell phones, etc. Sensor unit 6 can have a different implementation, which is closely related to the design of unit 1, designating a product of general use. So, for example, when the housing 1 is in the form of an electronic thermometer, a digital temperature sensor can be used as the sensor assembly 6.

An advantageous solution for the implementation of processor node 3 is the use of microcontrollers of the PIC18X5XX [L13] family, which have sufficient performance, the required number of ports and built-in support for a computer interface such as a USB2.0 port. At the same time, the author's program [L14] can be used as the basic software for node 3.

The node of the video module (VM) 10 can be implemented on the basis of modules such as a miniature module with a VGA camera from Fujitsu [L15], which is highly miniature (5.7 * 5.7 * 3.5 mm). The most preferred solution is the implementation of the VM 10 node based on products such as a miniature HD video module from Sony [L16], in which high miniature size (9.5 * 7.1 mm) is combined with wide functionality. So, in addition to the high resolution corresponding to the HD standard, this module supports the video stabilization function, there is an autofocus system, high-speed shooting with a frequency of up to 120 frames / s is provided, and there is also a highly sensitive operating mode suitable for shooting in low light.

The implementation of processor algorithms 3, providing the ability to process signals from the VM node with the determination (detection) of the presence of movement of individuals (PL) and / or objects in the controlled zone (KZ), can be based on known from [L17, L18 ] face recognition technologies and systems.

The unit of the real-time clock module (RTM) 11 can be implemented based on chips of the TIMEKEEPER® NVRAM type from STMicroelectronics [L19]. These microcircuits contain a real-time clock with a calendar and can give the processor 3 system the exact time, day and date even in the absence of an external system power supply.

When implementing the proposed technical solution, software procedures known from copyright programs for computers [L20-L23] and solutions known from copyright patents [L24-L28] can also be used.

The above means, with which it is possible to implement a utility model, make it possible to ensure its industrial applicability.

Thus, the technical solution developed by the authors (TR) provides an extension of the functionality of the known device associated with an increase in the level of its hidden data recording with information content sufficient for the personal identification of individuals who carry out unauthorized access to the object or its local zones. This allows you to effectively use this TR to solve problems associated with the identification of insider activities of individuals.

The technical result achieved in the proposed utility model is to increase the reliability (reliability) of identification of individuals who carry out unauthorized access to an object or its local zone, which is achieved by increasing the information content of recorded data, which are: date, time, audio data (phonograms), video data , as well as integrated processing of these data according to the mentioned specialized algorithms.

The main components of the device are experimentally tested and can be used as the basis for the creation of serial samples of a hidden registrar of unauthorized access to an object or its local zones.

The technical solution developed by the authors significantly increases the integral indicator of known devices - the coefficient of hidden registration, taking into account the secrecy of operation and the information content of the recorded data, which ensures high identification efficiency of individuals who carry out unauthorized access to the object or its local zones. The combination of these properties with the presence of protection against unauthorized access to the functions (interface) of the registrar of unauthorized persons allows us to successfully use this utility model to solve a wide range of tasks related to identifying insider activities, controlling employee loyalty, and monitoring the activities of the FI in organizing confidential leakage channels information (for example, tacit acoustic monitoring), as well as the identification of other illegal activities of individuals carried out at various facilities and / and and local zones.

Hidden access registrars will be in demand by both various services and individuals who need to protect information security in general, and to neutralize threats posed by the activities of individuals such as insiders, in particular.

LIST OF USED LITERATURE

1. The information security of the company,

http://www.searchinform.ru/main/full-text-search-information-security.html

2. Protection of information and business from insiders,

http://www.cnews.ru:80/news/top/index.shtml?2008/12/08/330783

3. Insider, http://abc.informbureau.com/html/einaeaad.html

4. Protection from an insider, http://www.osp.ru/os/1072574.html

5. Insider trail. Secrets of Information Security

http://www.searchinform.ru/article1.html

6. Portable multifunction device CPM-700,

http://www.mascom.ru/node/383

7. Universal search device ST-032,

http://www.mascom.ru/node/214

8. Detector of hidden cameras Iris IQ-2V,

http://www.mascom.ru/node/613

9. Capacitive type security alarm device, patent RU No. 2306610 C2 of September 13, 2005, published: September 20, 2007, Bull. No. 28.

10. Miniature DVR JS-309M with an external wearable camera and motion sensor, http://microvideomir.ru/

11. MemoCam, http://www.memocam.ru/

12. FSUE “18 Central Research Institute” of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, utility model “Hidden object access registrar”, Utility Model Patent No. 86026 dated 08/20/2009, authors: Bugaenko OV, Khotyachuk VK, Khotyachuk K. M., Timoshkin BC

13. The family of microcontrollers PIC18FX5XX with support for USB2.0 bus http://www.trt.ru/products/microchip/pic18_2.htm

14. FSUE “18 Central Research Institute” of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the program for the computer “Sensor Manager”, Certificate on state registration of the computer program No. 2009961044 of 01/19/2009, authors: Khotyachuk VK, Khotyachuk KM, Skachkov A .A., Vasin M.S., Matveeva A.M.

15. A miniature module with a VGA camera from Fujitsu, http://www.3dnews.ru/news/miniaturnii_modul_s_vga_kameroi_ot_fujitsu/

16. Miniature HD-video module from Sony, http://www.hwp.ru/news/Sony_vipuskaet_samiy_miniatyumiy_HD_videom odul_65989 /

17. Face Recognition, http://www.hardbroker.ru/pages/recognition

18.Facial recognition systems, http://hardbroker.ru/catalog/producs/280/

19. Memory chips company STMicroelectronics, http://www.compitech.ru/html.cgi/arhiv/04_03/stat_st_memo_2.htm

20. FSUE “18 Central Research Institute” of the RF Ministry of Defense, computer program “Flash card driver”, Certificate on state registration of a computer program No. 86,08614977 dated 10/16/2008 authors: Zorkin AS, Izvolsky AA, Khotyachuk V .K., Bakunin I.B.

21. FSUE "18 Central Research Institute" of the RF Ministry of Defense, computer program "Keyboard Controller". Certificate of state registration of a computer program No. 20088614978 dated 2.09.2008. Authors: Bakunin I.B., Khotyachuk V.K., Zorkin A.S.

22. FSUE “18 Central Research Institute” of the RF Ministry of Defense, computer program “Program for restricting access to the interface”, Certificate on state registration of a computer program No. 20099613339 dated 05/05/2009 authors: Goncharov BC, Khotyachuk VK, Khotyachuk K. M., Bakunin I.B.

23. FSUE “18 Central Research Institute” of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, computer program “Keyboard Activity Control Program”, Certificate on state registration of a computer program No. 20100613935 of 04/20/2010 authors: Vasin MS, Khotyachuk V.K.

24. FSUE “18 Central Research Institute” of the RF Ministry of Defense, utility model “Storage device with memory access protection”, Utility Model Patent No. 86331 of 08/27/2009, authors: Khotyachuk VK, Khotyachuk KM, Zorkin A .S., Bakunin I.B.

25. FSUE “18 Central Research Institute” of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Utility Model “Storage with Protection Against Unauthorized Access to Memory”, Utility Model Patent No. 84591 of July 10, 2009, authors: Vdovin EV, Khotyachuk KM, Khotyachuk V.K., Shkirin V.G.

26. FSUE “18 Central Research Institute” of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Utility Model “Protected Drive”, Utility Model Patent No. 87276 of 09/27/2009, authors: Khotyachuk VK, Khotyachuk KM, Timoshkin BC, Pokormyak L. AT.

27. FSUE “18 Central Research Institute” of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Utility Model “Storage with Signaling Device”, Utility Model Patent No. 90595 of January 10, 2010, authors: Vdovin EV, Khotyachuk K.M., Khotyachuk V.K. , Shkirin V.G. Demina L.L.

28. FSUE “18 Central Research Institute” of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Utility model “Device for monitoring the activity of a mobile phone and protecting it from unauthorized activation”, Utility Model Patent No. 92593 of March 20, 2010, authors: Vdovin EV, Khotyachuk K. M., Khotyachuk V.K., Goncharov VS, Shkirin V.G.

Claims (1)

A hidden registrar of unauthorized access to an object or its local zones, containing a housing, a microphone, a display, a keyboard, a computer interface (CI) memory, a sensor, an accelerometer, and a processor, which are connected from the first through seventh ports to a microphone, display, and keyboard, respectively , with memory, with a KI unit, with a sensor and with an accelerometer, and made with the possibility of recording the facts of presence and / or activity near the places of its installation by individuals, giving the device (its case) an appearance according to which it is identified as a typical household product (TBI), functioning according to a program that provides emulation of TBI operation using a sensor, display and keyboard, as well as recognition of device movement paths to activate the corresponding types of interfaces, one of which is adapted to support registrar functions, and others - to support the functions of the TBI, characterized in that it includes an additional video module (VM) and a real-time clock module (RTM), which is connected to the eighth port by its port the volume of the processor, which is connected to the VM node by the ninth port, while the processor operates according to a program that provides the ability to process signals coming from the VM node with detection of the presence of movement of individuals (PL) and / or objects in the controlled zone (KZ) for them automatic activation of the data recording mode with synchronous recording into the memory of microphone signals, video data received from the VM node, and the date and time read from the MPRV node, support for the highly sensitive mode of operation of the VM node for shooting under conditions of full-time lighting and high-speed shooting functions for the clear capture of dynamic objects, the formation in the memory of digital images of the appearance (faces of people) and the support for face recognition technology in the frame by signals from the VM node.