MXPA03004364A

MXPA03004364A - A tamper indicating radio frequency identification label with tracking capability.

Info

Publication number: MXPA03004364A
Application number: MXPA03004364A
Authority: MX
Inventors: Peter S Atherton
Original assignee: Mikoh Corp
Priority date: 2000-11-16
Filing date: 2001-11-15
Publication date: 2005-04-19
Also published as: WO2002077939A1; EP1412928A1; EP1412928A4; CA2429374A1; WO2002095655A2

Abstract

A tamper indicating label (100) is provided. The label may include RFID components (401, 402) and a tamper track (102) coupled to the RFID components. The tamper track should be constructed from a destructible conducting path. Additionally, the tamper track can be formed such that it is damaged when the label is tampered. In one embodiment, adhesion characteristics (103) of the tamper track are adapted to break apart the tamper track when the label is tampered, for example, by removal from an object. The RFID components may retain their RF capability and detect when the tamper track has been damaged to indicate that the label has been tampered. Alternatively, the RFID capability of the RFID components may be disabled when the tamper track is damaged, indicating tampering.

Description

RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION LABEL IN COUNTERFEITING DICADORA. WITH TRAILING CAPACITY.

Background of the Invention Radio Frequency Identification (RFi D) is increasingly being used as a means of identifying products at a distance, without requiring physical contact or even access to the product observation line. RFI D allows information about an item to be stored on an item, and in some implementations also allows this stored information to be modified at a distance. The most compact and cost-effective means to provide this RFI D capability is by means of a pressure-sensitive label. { ie self-adhesive) that incorporates an RFD capability | . The ability to remotely detect whether a pressure-sensitive label or seal applied to an item has been falsified with or removed becomes increasingly important in order to detect theft, product substitution, counterfeiting, tampering Warranty and other problems. A disadvantage of the current pressure sensitive label technology is that it does not allow the remote determination of whether a label has been falsified or removed or relocated or not.

Description of the invention A counterfeit indicator label is provided. The tag may comprise RFI D components and a counterfeit track connected to the R FI components D. The counterfeit track is preferably formed by electronic components that can be destroyed. The counterfeit trail can be modified, interrupted or substantially altered when a label is falsified. In one embodiment, the RFI D components are capable of detecting the modification in the counterfeit track while maintaining its RFI D capacity. The detection of the modification in the counterfeit track indicates the forgery of the label. In an alternative mode, the modification in the counterfeit track disables the RFID function. In an additional embodiment the label comprises a layer RFID The RFI layer D may include a memory microcircuit and at least one of an antenna and an induction cycle. Means for attaching the R FI layer D to an object can also be provided. The media for bonding can be an adhesive layer. The adhesive layer can support the RFI layer D. A destructive conduction path can be sandwiched between the RFID layer and the adhesive layer. The driving path that can be destroyed must be interrupted when the label is falsified. The interruption preferably modifies in some way the RFI D characteristics of the RFI D layer.

In a further embodiment, at least a part of the conduction path that can be destroyed can be in contact with the adhesive layer. The conduction path that can be destroyed can therefore be modified when the label is at least partially removed from a surface to which it was applied, in turn, modifies the R FI D characteristics of the label, indicating the alteration . According to another embodiment, the invention includes an RFI system D. Un. Substrate having a top surface and a bottom surface is provided. The RF I D electronic components are applied to the lower surface of the substrate. A conductive layer can also be formed in a pattern on the lower surface of the substrate. An adhesive layer can support the substrate so that the RFI D electronic components and the conductive layer are sandwiched between the substrate and the adhesive layer. The adhesive layer, the substrate, and the conductive layer must have relative adhesion resistances such that when the system is partially removed from a surface to which it has been applied, at least one of the RFI components D and the conductive cap it is altered to modify the RFI D characteristics of the system. In accordance with another embodiment of the invention, a safety device to indicate the violation is also available. Here, an object can be provided with a driving path that has at least two endpoints. A security tag is placed on the object. The security label may be a counterfeit indicator label as described above and must include RFI D components and a conduction path that can be destroyed between the RFI D components and each individual end. In one or more of the detailed embodiments of the invention, a security label is combined with an object. The security tag may comprise R FI D components and means for joining the R FI D components to the object. The electronic components that can be destroyed can be connected to the RFID components. Electronic components that can be destroyed can be separated when the label is at least partially removable from the object. The object comprises a surface for receiving the safety label and a driving path having two ends. The ends of the conduction path can be connected to the electronic components that can be destroyed thereby forming a circuit through the RF I D components, the electronic components that can be destroyed and the driving path. The R F I D characteristics of the RFI D components can be modified if the connection between the end points and the electronic components that can be destroyed, or through the driving path, if they break or interrupt. Agree ??? another embodiment of the invention, a substrate having first and second portions is provided. The second portion of the substrate may be adapted to be interlocked and connected to the first portion. An RFI D transmitter-receiver can be placed on the substrate. A counterfeit track may be coupled to the RFI transmitter-receiver D and must extend at least partially within the second portion of the substrate. An adhesive layer will be provided on at least a portion of the second portion of the substrate that includes the counterfeit track, the adhesive layer that provides means for joining the second portion to the first portion. The counterfeit track in that part of its substrate can be adapted to be modified, due to the resistance to the direct adhesion of the counterfeit track, when the label is falsified. In an illustrative embodiment, the counterfeit indicator label comprises an RFI layer D that provides an RFI function D. An adhesive layer supports the RFI layer D. An electrically destructive conduction path is placed between the RFID layer and the adhesive layer. , so that the destructible conduction path is altered when the tag is falsified, modifying in this way the RFI D function of the RFI layer D. According to another modality, a falsification identifying tag comprises a substrate having first and second portions. The second portion is adapted to be interlocked and connected to the first portion. The RFID components are placed on the substrate. A counterfeit track is placed on the same side of the substrate as the RFI components D. The counterfeit track is coupled to the RF components I D and extends at least partially within the second portion of the substrate. The counterfeit track is preferably exposed to a portion of the second portion of the substrate. An adhesive layer is placed on the exposed part of the counterfeit track. The counterfeit track is adapted to be modified when the label is falsified due to the resistance to the relative adhesion of the counterfeit track to the adhesive layer, thereby modifying the R FID function of the RFI D components. According to another modality, a counterfeit indicator label comprises a substrate having first and second surfaces. The RFI D components are placed on the first surface of the substrate. At least one pair of pass connections extends across the surface. The first counterfeit traces are formed on the first surface of the substrate and the second counterfeit traces are formed on the second surface of the substrate. The second counterfeit traces are connected between the connections to the first counterfeit traces, so that the first and second counterfeit traces are electrically connected to each other. An adhesive layer is placed on the counterfeit traces between the second surface of the substrate, whereby the second counterfeit traces are interrupted or subtly altered when the label is removed at least partially from a surface to which it has been applied. by means of each adhesive, thus modifying the RFID characteristics of the RFID components In a further embodiment, a method for reading the information from an RFID tag is provided.The RFID tag incorporates an RFID device that includes a microcircuit. A property of the RFID device is stored as first data values in a first memory of the integrated microcircuit The first data values are read from the first memory with an RFID read / write device It is determined from the first values of data if the RFID tag has been falsified, the second data values were written in a second microcircuit memory integrated with the RFID reader / writer if the RFID tag has been falsified.

Brief Description of the Figures.

The present invention will now be described by way of non-limiting example with reference to the accompanying drawings, wherein: Figure 1 is a schematic illustration of the general design of an RFID tag indicating counterfeit which is the object of the present invention; Figures 2A and 2B are schematic illustrations of a preferred embodiment and features of the counterfeit indicator layer within an RFID tag indicating counterfeit; Figures 3A and 3B are schematic illustrations of a preferred embodiment of the counterfeit indicating conductive strip in the counterfeiting indicator layer of the RFI D counterfeit indicating label; Figures 4A and 4B are schematic illustrations of a preferred embodiment of a counterfeit indicator RFI D tag in which the tamper indicating cell is in series with an induction cycle in said label; Figures 5A and 5B are schematic illustrations of a preferred embodiment of a counterfeit indicator RFI D tag in which the tamper indicating strip forms the induction cycle of said tag; Figures 6A and 6B are schematic illustrations of a preferred embodiment of a forgery indicating RFI D tag in which counterfeit indicator conductive strips form the antenna of said tag; Figs. 7A and 7B are schematic illustrations of a variation of an RFI tag D of Fig. 6; Figures 8A and 8B are a schematic illustration of a method of manufacturing an RFI D tag according to the method of the invention; Figures 9A and 9B are schematic illustrations of another embodiment of the invention; Figures 10A, 1B and 10C are schematic illustrations of the top view, side view and bottom view of a preferred embodiment of an RFID tag indicating counterfeit which is the subject of the present invention; Figure 10D is a schematic illustration of the detail of a portion of the counterfeit indicator RFID tag of Figure 1; Figures 11A-11C are schematic illustrations of a variation of the RFID tag of Figure 10; Figures 12A-12I are schematic illustrations of a cycle mark based on the counterfeit indicator design of Figures 9 and 10; Figures 13A-13C are schematic illustrations of the use of a cycle mark of the type illustrated in Figure 12; Figures 14A-14C are schematic illustrations of a variation of the counterfeit indicator RFID tag design of Figure 10; Figures 15A-15C are schematic illustrations of another variation of the counterfeit indicator RFID tag design of Figure 10; Figure 16 is a schematic illustration of an object having an applied RFID tag.

Detailed Description of the Invention.

The term "passive", as used herein, refers to an RFID tag or transmitter-receiver that does not include an integrated power source such as a battery. The term "active", as used herein, refers to an RFI D or emitter-receiver tag that includes an integrated energy source such as a beteria. The advantages of an active RFI D label in relation to a passive RFI D tag is that an active RFI D tag can include continuous built-in functions such as a clock, and usually can enable greater reading and writing distances. A disadvantage of active RFID tags, relative to passive RF I D tags, is that active RF I D tags are physically larger due to the need to carry an integrated power source. It should be appreciated that the terms label and brand can be used interchangeably in this document. Where the term label is used, the term brand may be substituted in a valid manner. The essential difference between the two is the thickness and the types of material used in the construction. In general, a label will be made from thin and flexible materials, while a label will be made from more rigid and thicker materials. A brand can, for example, be similar to a plastic card with a pressure sensitive adhesive on the underside. Such marks can be used, for example, as compatibility plates or rating plates or specification plates in various types of equipment. A brand, due to its greater thickness, is more suitable for active RFI D technology. It should be appreciated that the illustrations herein are not to scale. In general, the thickness of the label constructions (and the component layers thereof) used in the figures have been exaggerated, to more clearly illustrate the internal structures and components. In general, an identification indicator label is provided. The label may include R FI D components and a counterfeit track coupled to the RFI components D. The counterfeit track is a path or electrically conductive paths, and must be constructed from a conductive path that can be destroyed. Additionally, the counterfeit trail can be formed so that it is damaged when the ethic is falsified. In one embodiment, the adhesion characteristics of the counterfeit track are adapted to separate the counterfeit track where the label is counterfeited, for example, by removing an object. The RFI D components can retain the RFI D capability and detect when the counterfeit track has been damaged to indicate that the label has been falsified. Alternatively, the RFI D capability of the R FI D components may be disabled when the counterfeit track is damaged, indicating the forgery. Figure 1 is a schematic illustration of the general design of a counterfeit indicator RFI D according to one embodiment of the invention. Figure 1 shows schematically a pressure sensitive (ie self-adhesive) label 1 00 in a cross-sectional view. Label 100 may include four functionally distinct layers.

The RFI layer D 101 includes RF iD components, such as (for example), a memory circuitry R ^ I D. The tag 100 may in some embodiments provide an "active" RFI D capability, in which case the layer 101 may incl u go also a battery or another source of energy. The second layer 102 may include one or more thin electrically conductive traces which must be coupled to the RFI components D in the layer 1 01. The traces are referred to herein as "counterfeit traces" as they provide a means to detect counterfeiting with or removal of the label 100 from a surface to which it has been applied. Layer 101 and layer 102 can together provide an RFI D capability. On the other hand, in some modalities a cap 1 01 may provide an RFI D capability per se, while the counterfeit traces 102 may modify the RF ID performance of the layer 101 depending on whether the counterfeit traces 102 are damaged or not. The RFI D capability provided by I layer 1 01, or layers 1 01 and 102 together, optionally includes the ability to store information on a microcircuit of RFI D memory in layer 101, and the ability to read and modify stored information from a distance. Additional capabilities, such as the ability to encode stored information or control access to stored information, can also be provided.

The third layer 103 may be an adhesive layer, which in some embodiments is a pressure-sensitive adhesive. The fourth layer 1 04 is a layer coated on its upper part applied to the upper part of the RFI layer D 1 01. The topcoat can be applied to protect the RFI D layer and to provide a superior surface to accept a printing process. The upper coating layer 1 04 is not essential and in some embodiments may not be included. The finished construction is the adhesive label 100. The counterfeit traces 102 can be destroyed. When the label 100 is applied to a surface and subsequently falsified or removed, the pressure sensitive adhesive 1 03 damages the counterfeit traces 102 for example, by peeling off all or part of them from the underside of the layer 1 01, which in turn it affects the RFI D performance of the tag 100. Since the counterfeit traces 1 02 are electrically connected to the R FI D components in the tag 100, they can be part of the RFI D components of the tag 100, the function RFID of tag 1 00 is modified if the tag is applied to a surface and subsequently falsified or removed. In this way, the forgery or removal of the label 100 can be detected at a distance by means of the change in the RFI D characteristics and the response of the label 100. The terms "forgery" and "falsified" as used in The present invention relates to the complete or partial removal of a forgery indicating label, such as the label 100, from a surface to which it has been applied. In this document the term "that can be destroyed" is used in relation to the counterfeit traces 102 in Figure 1 and in relation to other counterfeit traces through the document. In this context the term "that can be destroyed" means that counterfeit traces are designed to be damaged or broken in regions of the label that are counterfeit. Counterfeit traces 102 can occur in one of a number of different ways. In a preferred embodiment, counterfeit traces can be produced by printing electrically conductive dyeing (such as a conductive ink based on carbon / g, or a precious metal ink). In another preferred embodiment the counterfeit traces 102 can be produced using electrically conductive adhesive. In another modality, counterfeit traces can be tracked metal made of aluminum, copper or some other suitable metal. In general, counterfeit traces 1 02 will be made from a material, such as an electrically conductive ink, which has the appropriate electrical properties although it does not have the high intrinsic physical resistance. In this way, counterfeit traces 102 can be altered or damaged more easily as the label is partially or completely removed from a surface to which it has been applied.

In some preferred embodiments the destruction capacity of the counterfeit traces 1 02 can be improved by including a thin layer of a suitable adhesion modifier coating on the underside of the layer 101 either between the layer 101 and the counterfeit traces 1 02, or between the counterfeit traces 102 and the adhesive layer 103. At least a portion of the counterfeit traces should preferably make contact with the adhesive 1 03. The layer of the adhesion modifier coating can be applied as a uniform layer, or as a specified pattern or in some other way so that the properties of the adhesion modifier coating vary through layer 1 01. In some embodiments multiple layers of adhesion modifying coating can be applied for "fine-tuning" the properties of the final composite adhesion modifier coating. The exclusion of an adhesion modifier coating between the RFI layer 101 and the counterfeit traces 102 results in the adhesion of those layers to each other becoming stronger or weaker in a particular region according to whether the adhesion modifier coating is or absent in that region. Similarly, the inclusion of an adhesion modifier coating between the counterfeit traces 102 and the adhesive layer 1 03 results in the adhesion of the layers to each other becoming stronger or weaker in a particular region according to the coating [Adhesion modifier is absent or present in that region. As usual, although not necessarily, the adhesion modifier coating reduces the adhesion of two layers that it separates, so that the two potatoes can be separated more easily. The relative adhesion between the layer 101, the adhesion modifier coating, the counterfeit traces 102 and the adhesive layer 103 can be adjusted so that when the label 1 00 is applied to a surface and subsequently falsified or removed, the counterfeit traces 102 they are damaged in a pattern that corresponds to the pattern of the adhesion modifier coating. In some embodiments, the counterfeit traces 102 can be physically separated into a pattern corresponding to the pattern of the adhesion modifier coating, with some of the counterfeit traces 1 02 remaining on layer 1 01 and the rest of the counterfeit traces 1 02 which remain on the adhesive layer 103. This damage to the counterfeit traces 102 may affect the RFID rendition of the label 100. The adhesion modifier coating may be a lacquer layer, or a layer of counterfeit indicator varnish (for example). example, similar to that used in some constructions of a tag indicating visual falsification), or a layer of some other suitable material. The counterfeit indicator features of a preferred embodiment of the label 100 are illustrated in Figure 2A and 2B, which show the label 100 in a cross-sectional view before and after removal from a surface 201. Figure 2 B illustrates in particular the physical alteration of the counterfeit traces 1 02 during the forgery or removal of the label 1 00. In Figure 2A, the label 1 00 is shown before the removal from the surface 201. Here the counterfeit traces 102 are intact and the label 100 exhibits its normal RFI D operation. In FIG. 2B, the label 100 has been partially removed from the surface 201. As the tag 1 00 is removed, the portions of the counterfeit traces 1 02 remain with the top layer 101, and the complementary portions of the counterfeit traces 1 02 remain with the adhesive layer 103. The differential separation of the traces of falsification 102 can in some modalities be improved or achieved through inclusion of an adhesion modifier coating (as described above) in a specified pattern in the ipterface between the layer 101 and the counterfeit traces 102 so that the counterfeit traces 102 bind less strongly to the layer 101 where the Adhesion modifier coating has been applied and therefore in said region of the counterfeit traces 1 02 remain with the adhesive layer 103 when the label 100 is removed from the surface 101. As the label 100 is removed from the surface 201, the counterfeit traces 102 are damaged and their electrical properties are affected in this way. This in turn affects the RF ID properties of the tag 100, since the counterfeit traces 1 02 are electrically connected to the layer 1 01 which included the FI components D. In Figure 2 the separation of (i.e. daf a) the counterfeit traces 102 during the forgery of the tag are shown to form a regular repeating pattern. It should be appreciated that the pattern of the separation may instead be irregular and may be on a greater or lesser scale relative to the size of the label 100 or the RFI components D on the label 100 which is shown in FIG. 2. Label 1 00 may also contain information in another format, such as a bar code, a 2D bar code or some other optical information storage format printed on the upper surface of the top coating layer 1 04. It will now be described a preferred embodiment of the counterfeit traces 102 with reference to Figures 3A-3B, which show a modality of the RFI label D 1 00 in a cross-sectional view and which is moved from below through an adhesive layer 103 in the counterfeit traces 1 02. In figure 3 the layer RFI D 101 has two electrical points of connection "of connection of step", 301 and 302, in dortde electric circuits in the layer RF ID 101 they are connected to the lower side of layer 1 01. In this embodiment, the electrical connection between points 301 and 302 via counterfeit track 102 must be intact in order to maintain the normal RFID operation of tag 100.

Preferably, the counterfeit traces 1 02 can be altered even if only a portion of the 1 00 tag is counterfeited. In Figure 3B, the counterfeit track 1 02 moves around the perimeter of the lower side of the layer 101 between the points 301 and 302. This configuration of the counterfeit track 1 02 of Figure 3 ensures that the fake a small portion of the perimeter of the label 10? it will result in a break or damage of the counterfeit track 102 and therefore a rute in or alteration of the electrical connection between points 301 and 3Q2, which in turn modifies the RFI D behavior of the tag 100. It should be noted that other configurations of the counterfeit track 102 could also be used. For example, in some embodiments the counterfeit track 1 02 may form all or part of an antenna, in which case the points 301 and 302 may not be electrically connected to each other by means of an individual counterfeit track 102. An RFI label D will generally include an electronic microcircuit, such as an electronic memory chip, connected to an induction site or to an antenna. The induction cycle or antenna can allow the communication and exchange of data with a remote reading device. (It should be appreciated that different types of antenna design can be used). Other electrical or electronic components can also be included in an RF I D tag. An active RFI D tag will include an integrated power source such as a battery.

The preferred embodiments in which the counterfeit traces 1 02 can be configured on the underside of the RFI layer D 101 and coupled to the RFID layer 101 will now be described by way of a non-limiting example. It will be appreciated that in some embodiments the counterfeit traces 102 may be designed to be destructible in some regions and durable in other regions. For example, counterfeit traces 102 may include some sections that are durable and rigid, joined by sections that are destructible. The counterfeit traces 1 02 may be connected in one of different ways to each RFI D 1 01, depending on the design in the operation of the RFI layer D 101. Below are several nonlimiting examples. 1 . The counterfeit traces 102 can be connected in series with an induction cycle or antenna in layer 101. 2. Counterfeit traces 1 02 may constitute all or part of the antenna induction cycle of label 1 00. 3. The counterfeit traces 1 02 may be a part of a counterfeit detector electrical circuit on the label 1 00 which is separable from the induction cycle or antenna of the tag 100. Figures 4 to 7 are schematic illustration of the additional preferred embodiments of the R FID tag indicating counterfeit 1 00, which show, a cross-sectional view and a view seen from below through the adhesive layer 1 03 in the counterfeit traces 1 02.

Figures 4A and 4B are schematic illustrations of a preferred embodiment in which counterfeit track 1 02 connects points 301 and 302 and is in series with an induction cycle 401 in RFI layer D1 01. The RFI layer D 101 may include an induction cycle 401 and other components 402, which may be passive or active. For example, the components 402 in one embodiment may be a capacitor which, with the induction cycle 401, forms a resonant electrical circuit. Alternatively, the components 402 may include a passive electronic memory chip for storing data. The counterfeit track 102 will be intact for the RF label I D 100 of Figure 4 so that it is operative. When the tag 100 is forged, the counterfeit track 1 02 is broken or altered and the RF I D function of the tag 1 00 can be disabled or modified. In this way it can be determined whether the 1 00 tag has been falsified or not. A coating adhesion modifier can be includeded above, to improve the destruction capacity of the counterfeit traces 1 Q2. Figures 5A and 5B are schematic illustrations of another preferred embodiment in which the counterfeit track 1 02 forms an induction cycle 501 for the RFI tag D 100. In Figure 5, the step connection points 301 and 302 are connected to the RFID components 402 in layer 1 01. At the connection of points 301 and 302, counterfeit track 102 forms a number of cycles, with the general display of counterfeit track 102 acting as an induction cycle. The falsification or removal of the tag po results in a break or alteration of the counterfeit track 102, thus disabling or modifying the RF ID function of the tag 100. In this way it can be determined whether the tag 1 00 has been falsified or not. . An adhesion modifier coating, as described above, may be included to improve the destruction capacity of counterfeit traces 102. Figures 6A and 6B are schematic illustrations of another preferred embodiment which is a variation of the embodiment of the figure 5. In Fig. 6, counterfeit traces 102 form an antenna, considering that in Fig. 5 the counterfeit track 1 02 forms an induction cycle. The main difference is that in figure 6 the points 3O1 and 302 are not connected together by an individual counterfeit piston 1 02. In its place there are two counterfeit traces 1 02, one that starts at point 301 and the other that initiates at point 302. The two counterfeit traces 102 form an antenna. In Figure 6 the so-called oscillatory antenna is illustrated, although it should be appreciated that other antenna shapes may be employed. In some antenna designs the points 301 and 302 may be connected to each other by the counterfeit track 1 02. In FIG. 6 the step connection points 301 and 302 are connected to the RFID components 402. The counterfeit of the TAG_100_will result in damage to at least one of the counterfeit traces, thereby affecting the characteristics of the antenna and modifying or disabling the RFI D function of tag 100. In this way, it can be determined whether label 1 00 has been altered or not. An adhesion modifier coating, as described above, may be included to improve the destruction capacity of the counterfeit traces 1 02. Figures 7A and 7B are schematic illustrations of another preferred embodiment based on the modalities of the 5 and 6. The main difference between the illustrated designs of FIGS. 5 and 6, and the illustration illustrated in FIG. 7, is that in the design of FIG. 7 the RFI D 402 components are on the lower side of FIG. layer 101 In some embodiments, the RFI components D 402 may comprise only one RF ID microcircuit ID, in which case in the design of FIG. 7 the RF memory chip ID 402 and counterfeit traces 102 are on the lower side of layer 101 Counterfeit traces are designed to be destructible, as described herein. An advantage of the design of Figure 7 compared to the designs of Figures 5 and 6 is that in the design of Figure 7 there is no need for passage connections for the underside of layer 1 01, since the components RFI D 402 are on the lower side of layer 101. In the design of figure 7, the counterfeit traces 1 02 can form an induction cycle, as in the design of figure 5, or they can form an antenna, as in the design of figure 6. In figure 7 I know shows an antenna. An adhesion modifier coating, as described above, may be included to improve the destruction capacity of the counterfeit traces 1 02. In order to provide an additional counterfeit additive, the label 100 may be designed to display visual evidence of falsification if the label is removed from a surface to which it has been applied. The indication of visual falsification can be achieved in various ways. In a modality, a thin colored layer is applied to the underside of the layer RFJ D 101. An adhesion modifier layer pattern can be applied to the underside of the colored layer. The adhesion modifier layer may be in the same layer or in one layer in adhesion to the adhesion modifier coating described above. The presence of the adhesion modifier layer modifies the adhesion of the colored layer to the adhesive layer 103 so that when the label 1 00 is removed from a surface to which it has been applied, the color layer is separated. The color areas can adhere to the adhesive layer 103 and other complementary areas of color can be adhered to the layer RFI D 1 01. An alternative for this embodiment is to apply an adhesion modifier layer pattern directly to the underside of the RFI layer 101 and apply the thin color layer to the underside of the adhesion modifier layer. In another embodiment, the adhesion modifier coating can be applied directly to the underside of the RFI layer D 101 and a colored adhesive can be used as the adhesive layer 103. In this case, when the label is removed from a surface to which it is applied. has applied, the adhesive with color 1 03 must be separated and the areas of the adhesive with color can adhere to the layer R FI D 01 and complementary areas of the adhesive of color 1 03 can ad hurt the surface to which the application was applied. label. It will be appreciated that other methods may be used to produce an indicator effect of visual counterfeiting. When a visual counterfeiting indicator effect is used, a portion of the RFID layer 01 and the upper coating 104 (in case an upper coating 104 is present) must be transparent so that the visual effect can be observed by looking through of the RFI layer D 01 and the upper cover 1 04. This allows the easy inspection of the visual counterfeiting indicator feature without having to remove the label. The RFI D components in the RFID layer 01, such as the memory chip, may not be transparent, although they should only occupy a small portion of the surface area. Additionally, it may be desired to print information to patterns on the label. For example, as described above, a bar code or a serial number can be printed on the upper surface of the RFI layer D 1 01 or on the upper surface of the upper coating 104 (in case a upper coating 104). A sufficient portion of the R FID 101 layer and the top coat 104 should be transparent in order to allow the visual counterfeit identification feature to be visible.

Manufacturing Method A preferred manufacturing method for the label configuration described above in relation to FIG. 7 is now described and illustrated schematically in FIG. 8, which shows the illustrations of an RFI D tag construction and the manufacturing method. a cross section view. E | FIG. 8A and 5B illustrate a passive R FI D tag construction, which RFI D 402 components consist of an RFI D electronic memory microcircuit. An 801 adhesion modifier coating pattern may be applied to the underside of a substrate layer 802, which may in one embodiment be a polyester layer. The counterfeit traces 803 may be printed on the underside of the adhesion modifier coating. If necessary, counterfeit traces may include a "traversed" one, wherein a counterfeit track 803 is traversed along a link layer of the electrical insulator. The counterfeit traces 803 may be configured to form either an induction cycle or an antenna of suitable design and characteristics. An electronic memory chip RFI D 804 can be mounted on the underside of the layer 802 and placed to connect to appropriate endpoints on the counterfeit traces 803. The RFI D chip 804 and the counterfeit traces 803 can form a RF emitter-receiver I D. The construction 805 which consists of a substrate 802, adhesion modifier coating 801, counterfeit traces 803 and microcu rd RF ID 804 are cut by individual 806 receiver-receivers. Each transmitter-receiver 806 is placed in a specific position on the underside of a top coating layer 807 and can be fixed in position with a thin adhesive layer. A layer of pressure-sensitive adhesive 808 can be applied to the underside of top cover 807 and the individual counterfeit tracking receivers 806. The resulting construction consists of top cover layer 807, individual emitters-receivers 806 and top layer 806. Adhesive 808 which are mounted on a suitable carrier film 809 and produced in roll form. The resultant roll is cut by dice into individual labels 810 mounted on the continuous carrier film 809, wherein each label 810 includes an em-receiver 806. In a variation of the manufacturing method illustrated in FIG. , counterfeit traces 803 can be produced using an electrically conductive adhesive instead of an electrical conductive ink. The manufacturing method described in relation to FIG. 8 can also be used in the manufacture of falsification indicating R FI D labels based on other configurations of microcircuits, electronic memory, antenna or induction cycle and counterfeit track.

RF ID Tag Falsification Indicator with Tracking Capability.

Figures 9A and 9B are schematic illustrations of another preferred embodiment in which counterfeit track 102 forms part of a separate counterfeit indicator electric circuit. As shown in Figure 9, the RFI layer D 101 may contain an induction cycle or antenna 901 and other electronic components 402, including an electronic memory chip, to provide an RFI D capacity. The RF ID 101 layer must to be able to interact with an RFI D reader device in order to allow the reading or modification of the data stored in the electronic memory microcirculation. The connection points of step 301 and 302 are connected to the components 402 in the layer 1 01, and to each other by means of the counterfeit track 1 02. The components 402 must be configured to respond in a different manner to a signal from a RFI reader D depending on whether the points 301 and 302 are connected or not to each other by means of the counterfeit track 102. If the counterfeit track 102 is intact, the tag 100 will respond in a specific manner to an RF reader I D. On the other hand, if the tag 1 00 is falsified, so that the counterfeit track 102 is damaged and the connection between the points 301 and 302 by means of the track Forgery 1 02 is altered, label 1 00 will respond to an RFI reader D, albeit in a different way, indicating that the 1 00 tag has been falsified. In this manner, the tag 100 of FIG. 9 can provide means on the basis of RFI D to (i) determine whether the tag 100 is present, (i) read data from the tag 100 and modify datbs stored in the tag 100. , and (iii) determine if the 1 00 tag has been falsified or not. In a preferred embodiment, the components 402 may consist only of an electronic memory microcircuit R FI D, and the counterfeit track 1 02 forms a connection, which may be separate from the induction cycle or the antenna 901, between two points of contact in the memory microcircuit. In a variation of the above-described embodiments, the components 402 may undergo an irreversible change if the label 100 is tapered and the counterfeit track 102 is damaged, so that if the counterfeit track 102 is subsequently restored, the label 100 it will respond to an R FI D reader with a signal indicating that it has been falsified. In a preferred embodiment the RFI components D 402 are "active" (ie energized) and are configured to test the integrity of the counterfeit track 102 either continuously or at specified intervals. In this embodiment, if the RFID components 402 detect that the counterfeit piston 102 has been altered, they can then preferably be configured to record data for this purpose in the electronic memory microcircuit within the components 402, preferably in a buffer that It is permanent and irreversible. Preferably, if the components 402 are active they can also include a clock. In this case, the date and time of any forgery of the counterfeit track 1 02 or tag 100 may also be permanently and irreversibly recorded in the electronic memory chip within the RFID components D 402. A configuration mode RFI D indicating counterfeit label of FIG. 9 will now be described by way of non-limiting example with reference to the schematic illustrations shown in FIGS. 10 and 11. It should be appreciated that the term "antenna" as used below can refer to a conventional antenna or to μ? induction cycle (which is used as an antenna in some RFI D operating frequencies). Figure 10 is a schematic illustration of a counterfeit indicator RF ID 1000 displayed in top view (1 0A), side view in cross section (10B) and bottom view (1 0C). The tag 1000 may include a substrate layer 1001 made of, for example, polyester or some other suitable material. At the top of the substrate layer 1001, the electronic components for forming a transmitter-receiver R FI D which provides a function R FI D, can be applied. The electronic components may include an RFID 1 002 electronic memory chip and an antenna 1 003 (in FIG. 10 an antenna 1 003 in the form of an induction cycle is shown).

Figure 10D is a more detailed schematic illustration of an example of the electrical connections for the electronic microcircumit 1002. The microcircitum 1002 and the antenna 1003 must provide an RFID capability, which may include the ability to store information in microcircitum 1002, the ability to read information from microcirculation 1023 at a distance using an appropriate RFID device, and the ability to modify information in microcirculation 1002 from a distance using a suitable RFID device. The microswitch 1002 may include two contact points, or contact pads, connected to the antenna 1003, as illustrated in Figure 10D. Two contact pads on the microswitch 1002 may be connected by means of electrical "pass-through connections" 1004 to the underside of the substrate layer 1001. One or both or neither of those two contact pads may be the same as the pads The contacts used to connect the microswitch 1002 to the antenna 1003. Figure 10D shows the connections of passage 1004 directly below the microswitch 1002. It should be appreciated that other configurations may be used instead of the pass connections 1004. In another preferred embodiment, the passages 1004 may be located remote from the contact pads on the microswitch 1002, electrical tracks on the upper surface of the substrate layer 1001 connect the contact pads on the microcircuit 1 002 to the tops of the power connections. step 1004. The two connection points of passage 1004 on the underside of the substrate layer 1001 they are connected to each other by means of a counterfeit track 1 005, which is placed on the underside of the layer of its substrate 1 001. A layer of adhesive 1006 may also be applied to the underside of the substratum layer 1 001 and a counterfeit track 1 005. Preferably, the adhesive 1 006 is a pressure-sensitive adhesive. An upper layer 1007 can be applied to the upper part of the substrate 1 001, the microcircuit 1 002 and the antenna 1003. The upper layer 1 007 can provide protection for these components and can also provide a surface to accept the printing, for example, printing a number, a bar code, a logo or another image. It should be noted that in Figures 10A-1C the top view is a view through the upper layer 1007, the side view l is a cross-sectional side view, and the bottom view is a view through the adhesive layer 1 006. The counterfeit track 1 005 is preferably applied to the underside of the substrate layer 1001 together with one or more layers of adhesion modifier coating to improve the destruction capacity of the counterfeit track 1005. Accordingly, if the tag 100 is applied to a surface and subsequently removed, the counterfeit track 1 005 will be broken or altered to interrupt or alter the electrical connection between the contact points of passage 1004 on the underside of the cover layer. Substrate 1001. The application of the counterfeit track 1 005 and any desired adhesion modifier coatings to the underside of the substrate 1001 to improve the destructible nature of the counterfeit track 1005 can preferably be carried out as described herein and in the present invention. following patent applications which are incorporated by reference: "Materials and Construction For A Tamper I ndicating Radio Frequency Identification Label "; PCT Application No. PCT / US01 / 23639, filed July 27, 2001; Application of the United States of North America No. 09 / 915,760, filed on January 26, 2001; and" Tamper Indicating Radio Frequency Identification Labbel U IT Tracking Capability ", Provisional Application of the United States of America of Serial Number 60/249, 027, filed on November 15, 2000. The counterfeit track 1005 may be located in a number of different ways on the underside of the substrate layer 1 001. In the preferred embodiment illustrated in FIG. 10, the counterfeit track 1005 is moved from a connecting point 1004 almost all the distance around the perimeter of the underside of the substrate layer 1001 and then back to the other point. contacted in passing, with the external and return trajectories of the counterfeit track 1 005 very close to each other in order to avoid any electrical induction effects that could interfere with the antenna 1003 placed on the upper surface of the substrate layer 1001 The width and thickness of the counterfeit track 1005 can be adjusted to provide the correct properties in terms of electrical resistance and physical destruction capacity. The path made by the counterfeit track 1005 can be moved inwardly, or outwardly or directly behind the antenna 1003, which in Figure 10 is an induction cycle. In a preferred embodiment the counterfeit track 1005 forms a path that is external to the outer perimeter of the induction cycle 1003 thus ensuring that any alteration around the perimeter of the 1 000 label will cause the counterfeit track to be altered 1 005 When the tag 1000 is applied to a surface, the counterfeit track 1005 is intact and the corresponding contact pads on the microcircuit 1 002 are electrically connected to each other. When the tag 1000 is removed or substantially counterfeited with, the counterfeit track 1 005 must be broken or altered and this will be an open circuit or an increased electrical impedance between the corresponding contact pads on the microcircuit 1002. When said open circuit or increase In the impedance is presented, the function of the microcircuit RFI D 1 002 or the information stored in the microcircuit 1002 will be modified in a way that can be detected by an RFID reader.

If the tag 1000 is passive (ie without an integrated battery or other power source), the function of the modified microcircuit or information can be detected during the first reading operation of the tag after the tag 1000 is removed or falsified , and the reader (if it has a writing capability) can be programmed to write data on the microcircuit 1002 to indicate that the tag 1000 has been removed or falsified. The data that is written on the microcircuit 1002 to indicate the removal or falsification of the tag 1000 preferably is permanent and irreversible, to prevent the memory contents of the microcircuit being altered to the original state to distinguish the fact that the tag has been moved or falsified. Therefore, an RFID read / write device capable of detecting the change in RFID performance of the tag 1000 when the tag 1000 is falsified, and the write data back to the chip 1002 within the tag 1000 is described in the preamble. to indicate that said falsification has occurred, the data that are preferably written within the microcircuit 1002 to be permanent and irreversible. In a preferred embodiment, the specified electrical properties (such as electrical impedance) of the connection between the pass contact points 1004 through the counterfeit track 1005 are monitored during an RFID reading operation, and presented to the reader as values data in a specified memory area of the microcircuit 1002. A properly configured read / write RFI D device will read the data values and thus determine whether the 1 000 tag has been falsified or not, according to which the data left or not within up specified range. If the data values are such that they indicate falsification, the read / write device R FI D will write to another area of specified memory of the microcircuit 1002 a set of data values to indicate that the 1 000 tag has been falsified, with the data values preferably written permanently recorded in the microcircuit 1 002. If the label 1000 is active (ie it has an integrated battery or other power source), it can be configured in such a way that any alteration of the The counterfeit track can be detected internally within the tag 1000 without requiring a read operation RF I D. When said tampering with the counterfeit track 1005 is detected internally, the microcircuit 1002 can be programmed to modify its own memory contents in order to indicate that the 1 000 label has been falsified. The modification to the memory contents of the microcircuit 1002 indicates the removal or falsification of the tag 1000 which should preferably be permanent and irreversible, in order to prevent the memory contents of the microcircuit 1 002 from being altered to the original state to distinguish the fact that the label has been moved or falsified. Therefore the tag 1000 can function as a standard RFI D tag when it is applied to a surface for the first time. After the tag is moved or forged, the RF1D function of the tag 1000 can be maintained and the information can be read from and written to the RFID chip 1002, while the tag also provides RFID means to determine that it has been moved. or falsified. Figures 11A-11C are variations of the preferred embodiments of Figures 9 and 10. The basic design of the tag 1000 in Figure 11 is similar to that of Figure 10. The difference in the design of Figure 11 is that the counterfeit track 1005 extends beyond antenna 1003 or other RFID components in at least one direction. The counterfeit track 1005 should preferably be moved around the perimeter of the tag 1000 in order to detect falsification of any edge portion of the tag, either near the microcircuit 1002 and the antenna 1003 or at the end of the label away from those components. The tag 1000 may, for example, be applied around a corner so that the microcircuit 1002 and the antenna 1003 are on a flat surface while the other end of the transmitter-receiver, which includes the counterfeit track 1005, extends. around the corner.

Cycle Mark.

Figures 12A-12I sor) another variation of the embodiment of Figures 10 and 11. Figure 12 is a schematic illustration of a counterfeit indicator RFID cycle mark 1200, shown in top view (12Á), side view (12B) and bottom view (12C). In Fig. 12, the counterfeit track 1 005 on the underside of the substrate 1 001 extends beyond the antenna 1003 and forms a "tail" 1201. In the embodiment shown in Figure 12, the counterfeit track 1 005 is straight. The substrate 1 001 can be cut approximately to the shape of the electronic components, so that the cycle mark 1200 is wide at the end that includes the antenna 1 003 and narrow at the tail 1201. Alternatively, the cycle mark may be cut in any other way around the electronic components. Preferably, the counterfeit track 1005 will extend to the end of the tail 1201. A lower layer 1202 can be applied to a specific portion of | bottom side of its substrate 1 001 and a counterfeit track 1005. The counterfeit track will extend into the region 1 203 of the underside of the substrate 1001 that is not covered with the bottom layer 1202. In the region 1203 where the layer lower 1202 is not applied, an adhesive, such as a pressure sensitive adhesive 1204 can be applied to the underside of the substrate 1001 and the counterfeit track 005. A top layer 1007 can be applied over the upper part of the substrate 1 001, microcuchine 1 002 and antenna 1 003. Upper layer 1007 can provide protection for those components and can also provide a surface for accepting printing, for example, the printing of a number, a bar code, a logo or another image. It should be appreciated that in Figure 12 the top view is a view looking through the top layer 1007 towards the microcircuit 1002 and an antenna 1003, and the bottom view is a view through the bottom layer 1202 and the adhesive 1204 towards the counterfeit track 00 005 and the through connections 1004. In operation, the cycle mark 1200 can be loosely in a cycle 1 205 and the region 1203 of the pressure sensitive adhesive can press against a region of the layer lower 1202 as shown. The pressure sensitive adhesive 1204 must be strong enough to retain the closed cycle 1205. In another variation, a cycle 1206 may be formed by pressing region 1203 of pressure sensitive adhesive 1204 against a region of upper layer 1007, as shown. (It should be noted that the illustrations of the cycles 1205 and 1206 do not show the internal components, such as micro-circuit 1002, antenna 1003 and counterfeit track 1005, or separate layers of the cycle marking construction). The two regions of the cycle mark which are connected in this manner by pressure-sensitive adhesive 1204 preferably include electronic components for example, microcircuit 1 002, or antenna 1003, or counterfeit track 1 005, in order to ensure that the closed cycle can not be cut and the cycle opened without the RFI D performance of the brand mark 1200 is affected. For example, the tail of the counterfeit track 1201 may be cycled and attached to another portion of the counterfeit track tail 1201 or may be placed in the loop and attached to a region of the underside of the antenna 1003 (as it is illustrated in cycle 1205). The substrate 1001, the pressure sensitive adhesive 1204, the counterfeit track 1 005 and which adhesion modifier coatings which are applied (as described in relation to FIGS. 9 and 10) are preferably designed as described. presently so that the counterfeit track 1 005 is damaged when the closed cycle is separated in the region of the pressure sensitive adhesive 1204, thereby modifying the performance RF l D of the cycle mark 1200, as described above in relation to the tag constructions of FIGS. 9 and 10. A modification similar to the performance of the cycle gauge 1200 would occur if the cycle closed 1205 or 1206 is cut in order to open the cycle. In some preferred embodiments, the region of the cycle marking against which area 1203 is applied to close the cycle may also include a layer of adhesive, in order to reinforce the adhesive bond when the cycle is closed, and the adhesive layer it can be in direct contact with the electronic components on the substrate 1001. A variation of the mode shown in Figures 12A to 12E is illustrated in Figures 12F to 121. In this variation the counterfeit track 1005 is on the upper side of the substrate 1001, ie on the same side of the substrate as the microcircuit. 1002 and antine 1003. An electrically isolated region 1207 is applied between the annulus 1003 and a counterfeit track 1005 to prevent electrical contact. In the embodiment illustrated in Figures 12F to 12H, the counterfeit track is exposed in region 1208 on the superjor surface of substrate 1001. A coating of adhesive 1209 preferably a pressure sensitive adhesive is applied to region 1208 where the counterfeit track 1005 is exposed. In operation, the cycle mark 1200 illustrated in Figures 12F to 12H can be flexed in a cycle 1210, as shown in Figure 121, and the region 1209 of the pressure sensitive adhesive can be pressed against a region of the layer. upper 1007, as shown. (It should be noted that the cycle illustration 1210 does not show the internal components, such as the microcircuit 1002, the antenna 1003 and the counterfeit track 1005, or the separate layers of the cycle marking construction. The pressure-sensitive adhesive 1209 will retain the closed cycle 1210, the two regions of the cycle mark which are so linked by the pressure sensitive adhesive 1209 which preferably include electronic components, for example, the microcircuit 1002, or the antenna 1003, or the counterfeit track 1005, in order to ensure that the closed cycle can not be cut off and the cycle opened without the RFID performance of the cycle mark 1200 being affected. In some preferred embodiments, the region of the cyclone mark against which area 1208 is applied to close the cycle may also include an adhesive layer, in order to reinforce the adhesive bond when the cycle is closed, and the adhesive layer may to be in direct contact with the electronic components on the substrate 1 001. The cycle marking configuration illustrated in Figure 12 can be used to secure the marg 1200 around an article such as a handle, or to secure two items together. Figures 13A-1 3C are schematic illustrations of the use of the cycle mark 1200 for detecting the opening of a container 1 300 that includes a body 1301 and a lid 1302. The body 1301 and the lid 1302 have holes 1303 that align when the lid 1302 is suitably placed on the body 1 301 of the container 1300. Figure 13 B shows a cut-away cross-sectional view of a portion of the body 1301 and the lid 1302 of the container 1300 in the region of the holes 1303. In this embodiment, the cycle mark 1200 is applied to the container 1 300 with the open cycle portion 1304 passing through the aligned holes 1303. In this implementation, the microcircuit R FI D 1 002 at the cycle mark 1200 can store information about the contents of the container 1300. If the cycle mark 1200 is removed from the container 1300, either by extracting the cycle to open the cycle or by cutting the cycle mark, the track of lsification 1005 will be interrupted and the RFI D performance of the cycle mark 1200 will be modified in a detectable manner with an RFI reader D, as described above in connection with the label construction of Figures 9 and 1 0.

It will be appreciated that the 1200 cycle mark does not need to have a narrow tail region. Instead of what the cycle mark can be rectangular.

The Counterfeit Track.

It will be appreciated that the counterfeiting tracks described herein may be made of a number of different materials. In general, the counterfeit tracks will have adequate electrical properties (in particular, their electrical impedance will be within a specified range), although in at least some regions the counterfeit tracks will not have high intrinsic physical resistance, thus facilitating the damage or tampering with counterfeit tracks when a counterfeit FI D label is falsified. It will be appreciated that a counterfeit track can be made from more than one material, in order to achieve the required combination of electrical and mechanical properties. The two examples of modalities of said counterfeit tracks are now described, although it will be appreciated that other modalities are possible. In the first embodiment, a false track is made from regions of solid metallic conductor, such as copper or aluminum, with those regions that are electrically connected in sequence by regions of electrically conductive ink, the combination that forms therefore a trail of falsification. In the second embodiment, a region of thin solid (and therefore mechanically weak) conductive metal, such as copper or aluminum, is superimposed with an electrically conductive ink cover, thereby forming a counterfeit track.

Additional Modalities of the RFlD Fake Indicator Tag.

It will be appreciated that variations on the embodiments of Figures 9 to 12 are possible. For example, taking the design of Figure 10, one example, the microcircuit 1002, the antenna 1003 and the counterfeit track 1005 can be on the underside of the substrate 1001. The antenna 1003 can be made from a solid metallic conductor, such as copper or aluminum, to provide strength and durability, while the counterfeit track 1O05 can include at least some portions that are designed to be destructible to falsification of tag 1000. It may be necessary for counterfeit track 1005 to pass over antenna 1003 in order to extend outwardly from the antenna, in which case, a cap of electrical insulating material will be applied between antenna 1003 and the counterfeit track 1005 in the traversed region. The advantage of this embodiment is that the electrical passage connections 1004 described in relation to the designs of FIGS. 9 and 10 are not required.

Figure 14 shows a counterfeit indicator RFI D tag 1400, which is a variation of the embodiment of Figure 1 0. Figure 14 shows the tag 1400 in top view (14A), side view in cross section (1 4B) , and bottom view (14C). A difference between the embodiment of FIG. 10 and the embodiment of FIG. 14 is that in FIG. 14 a substantial portion 1401 of the counterfeit track is on the upper surface of the substrate 1 001, that is, on the same side of the substrate. Substrate 1 001 than the microcircuit 1002 and the antenna 1003, only with two short portions 1402 and 1403 of the counterfeit run extending to the underside of its substrate 1 001. The portions of short counterfeit tracks f402 and 1 403 are preferably applied to the underside of the substrate 1001 in a manner similar to the counterfeit track 1005 of Figure 1. In some embodiments one or more layers of adhesion modifier coating is they may also apply, as described herein, to improve the destruction capacity of the portions of counterfeit tracks 1402 and 1403. The portions of counterfeit tracks 1402 and 1403 are connected to the portions of the track. counterfeit 1401 on the upper surface of its substrate 10001 by means of electrical passage connections 1404. The counterfeit track 1401 and the antenna 1003 on the upper surface of the substrate 1001 are electrically isolated from one another by regions of thin insulating material 1405 which in one modality is applied by means of a printing process. Another difference between the embodiment of Figure 10 and the embodiment of Figure 14 is that the embodiment of Figure 14 applies an adhesive layer d to the lower side of substrate 1 001 only in areas 1406 and 1407, the areas of which cover portions of counterfeit tracks 1401 and 1402 respectively, without adhesive layer in other regions of the underside of substrate 1 001. The label of Figure 14 is applied to a surface by applying the adhesive areas 1406 and 1407 to the surface. The adhesive in the areas 1406 and 1407 must be strong enough to ensure damage to counterfeit track portions 1402 and 1403 when the 1400 label is falsified. In a variation of the embodiment of Figure 14, another adhesive, which it can be different from that applied in the areas 1 406 and 1407, it can be applied to the rest of the lower side of the substrate 1001. In a specific embodiment of the design of Figure 14, the antenna 1003 and the portions 1401 of the counterfeit track on the upper surface of the substrate 1001 can be made from a solid metallic conductor such as copper or aluminum, while the portions of counterfeit tracks 1402 and 1403 on the underside of the substrate 1 001 may be made from a destructible electrically conductive ink. This configuration has the advantages of (i) resistance and durability of the antenna and portions of counterfeit tracks on the upper surface of the substrate 1 001, and (ii) lower overall production cost than a modality in which the antenna and all the portions of counterfeit tracks are made from a destructible electrically conductive ink. The counterfeit indicator FI D of Figure 14 can be applied across the opening edge of a container, with the area 1406 of the adhesive applied to the container on one side of the opening edge, and the area 1407 of the adhesive applied to the container. container on the other side of the opening edge. In this implementation, the design of Figure 14 has the advantage that the tag 1 400 does not need to adhere to the contours of the container in any regions other than the contact regions for the adhesive areas 1406 and 1407. Figure 15 shows a label R FI D counterfeit indicator 1500, which is a variation on the embodiment of Figure 14. Figure 15 shows the label 1500 in top view (1 5A), in side view in cross section (1 5B) and bottom view (1 5C). The difference between the embodiment of Fig. 14 and the embodiment of Fig. 1 5 is that in Fig. 15 there is only a portion of counterfeit track 1 501 on the underside of substrate 1001 and consequently an adhesive layer is applied to the side. bottom of the substrate 1001 only in the area 1 502, which covers the counterfeit track portion 1 501, without adhesive layer in other regions of the underside of the substrate 1001. The label of Figure 1 5 is applied to a surface by application of the adhesive area 1502 to said surface. The adhesive in area 1502 must be strong enough to ensure damage to the counterfeit track portion 1501 when the label 1500 is misrepresented. In a variation of the embodiment of figure 15, another adhesive, which may be different from From that applied in area 1502, it can be applied to the rest of the underside of substrate 1001. It will be appreciated that variations on the mode of Figures 14 and 15 are possible. Figure 15 includes a counterfeit track portion on the underside of the substrate 1001, while Figure 14 includes two portions of the counterfeit track on the underside of the substrate 1001. It will be appreciated that other embodiments, incorporating more than two Counterfeit track portions on the underside of substrate 1001, while presenting the other key features of the designs of Figures 14 and 5, are also possible. In the case of a design incorporating more than two counterfeit track portions on the underside of the substrate 1001, the counterfeit track portions can be placed in a configuration that is suitable for the configuration of a surface to which a forgery-indicating RFID tag is applied.

Incorporation of an RFID Fake Indicator Tag with an Object.

In another embodiment of the invention, a counterfeit indicator label is incorporated with an object to which the label is applied. The label used can be any of the modalities described above. Figure 16 illustrates a label 1601 applied to an object 1602. A driving path 1603 will be incorporated into an object. For example, an electrically conductive ink conduction path can be formed around the object. The driving path 1603 on the object 1602 will have at least two end points. Counterfeit tracks on tag 1601 will have a corresponding number of connection points. When tag 1601 is applied to object 1602, each endpoint will be connected to a connection point. The driving path on object 1602 and the counterfeit tracks on tag 1 601 will together form one or more circuits, each or not from a counterfeit track to an end point, through the driving path on the object, towards the other extreme point and back towards a counterfeit trail. If a counterfeit track is tampered with by tag 1601 that is faked, or if the connection between a counterfeit track and the driving path on object 1 602 is broken, the RFI function D of tag 1601 can be modified in a manner described above, thus indicating counterfeiting. For example, if the label 1601 is applied to a cardboard box and the label is complete and that part of the box in which the label is adhered is cut, the counterfeit is indicated. The embodiments illustrated and described in this specification are intended only to teach those skilled in the art the best way for the inventors to make and use the invention: Nothing contained in this specification will be considered as limiting the scope of the present invention. The above-described embodiments of the invention can be modified or varied, and the elements added or omitted, without departing from the invention, as will be appreciated by those skilled in the art in light of the above teachings. It is therefore understood that, within the scope of the claims and their equivalents, the invention may be practiced otherwise than as specifically described.

Claims

REVIVAL D ICACTIONS 1 . A counterfeit indicator label comprising: an RFID layer that provides an RFID function; an adhesive layer that supports the R FI D layer; a destructible electrically conductive path between the RFID layer and the adhesive layer, whereby the destructive conduction path is altered when the label is falsified, thereby modifying the RF IQ function of the RFI D layer. 2. The label counterfeit indicator according to claim 1, characterized in that the destructible conduction path is formed from a sequence of metal conductor regions and regions of electrically conductive ink. 3. The counterfeit indicator label according to claim 1, characterized in that the destructible conduction path is formed from a thin metal conductor superimposed with an electrically conductive ink layer. 4. The counterfeit indicator label according to claim 1, characterized in that the destructible conduction path is an RFI component D. 5. The counterfeit indicator label according to any of claims 1-4, characterized in that the path of Destructive conduction is connected to the RFI D components in the RFI D layer. 6. The counterfeit indicator label according to any of claims 1 -4, further comprising a pattern of an adhesion modifier coating between the R FI layer D and the adhesive layer, the adhesion modifier coating modifying the adhesion modifier. Adhesion characteristics of the destructible conduction path. 7. The counterfeit indicator label according to claim 6, characterized in that the adhesion modifier coating pattern includes at least two types of adhesion modifier coating. 8. The tamper indicating label according to claim 6, characterized in that the adhesion modifier coating is printed on a lower surface of the RF layer I D and the destructible conduction path is formed on the adhesion modifier coating. 9. The counterfeit indicator label according to claim 6, further comprising a visual counterfeiting indicator placed below the RFID layer and wherein the RFI layer D is substantially transparent, thereby making the visual counterfeiting indicator visible. 1 0. The counterfeit indicator label according to claim 9, characterized in that the visual counterfeit indicator is a layer with color and an adhesion modifying substance is placed between the RF ID layer and the adhesive layer, the modifying substance of adhesion which causes the color layer to have different adhesion strengths with respect to the RFID layer and the adhesive layer and therefore creates a visual pattern on the fake of the label. eleven . The tamper indicating tag according to any of claims 1-4, characterized in that the layer RF ID includes a micro-circuit of memory and one of the antenna and an induction cycle. 2. A counterfeit indicator label comprising: a substrate having first and second portions, the second portion that is adapted to be placed in cycle and connected to the first portion; RFI D components placed on the substrate; a forgery track placed on the same substrate web as the RFID components, the counterfeit track that is coupled to the RFI components D and that extends at least partially within the second portion of the substrate, the counterfeit track that is exposed in a part of the second portion of your substrate; a layer of adhesive placed on the exposed part of the counterfeit track, the counterfeit track which is adapted to be modified when the label is falsified due to the relative adhesion strength of the counterfeit track to the adhesive layer, modifying by or the RFI function D of the RFI components D. The counterfeit indicator label according to claim 12, characterized in that the second portion is connected to the first portion in an area where the RF I D components or the counterfeit track are placed. The label according to any of claims 12 and 13, characterized in that a second adhesive layer is placed on the first portion of the substrate in an area where the second portion is connected. The label according to any one of claims 12 to 13, further comprising an upper to lower layer formed on regions of the substrate where the adhesive layer is not present. 16. The tag according to any of claims 12 to 13, characterized in that the components R F I D include an integrated microcircuit and one of an induction and an antenna. The label according to claim 16, characterized in that the antenna or induction cycle is placed in the first portion of the substrate and the counterfeit track extends from the first portion of the substrate over the induction cycle or the antenna and within the second portion of the substrate. The label according to claim 17, further comprising an electrically insulating region placed between the antenna or the induction cycle and the counterfeit track. The label according to any of claims 12 to 13, characterized in that the RF ID components and the counterfeit track are formed on an upper surface of the substrate. 20. The label according to any of claims 12 to 13, characterized in that the adhesive layer makes contact with the counterfeit tracks. twenty-one . A counterfeit indicator label that comprises: a substrate that has first and second surfaces; RFI D components placed on the first surface of the substrate; at least a pair of through connections extending through the substrate; first counterfeiting tracks formed on the first surface of the substrate and second counterfeiting tracks formed on the second surface of the substrate, the second counterfeiting tracks that are connected between the connections leading to the first counterfeit tracks, so that the first and second counterfeiting tracks are electrically connected to each other; and an adhesive layer placed over the counterfeit tracks on the second surface of the substrate, whereby the second counterfeit tracks are interrupted or substantially altered when the label is at least partially removed from a surface to which it has been removed. applied by means of the adhesive layer, thereby modifying the RFI D characteristics of the RFI components D. 22. The label according to claim 21, characterized in that the second counterfeit tracks are destructible. 23. The label according to claim 21, characterized in that the first counterfeit tracks are formed from a metal and the second counterfeit tracks are formed from an electrically conductive ink. 24. The label according to any of claims 21-23, characterized in that the RFI D components include an integrated microcircuit and one of an induction and an antenna. 25. The conformance label according to any of claims 21-23, characterized in that the adhesive layer is only formed in an area around the second counterfeit tracks. 26. The label according to claim 25, further comprising a second adhesive formed on the second surface of the substrate in areas where the adhesive layer is not formed. 27. The label according to claim 21, characterized in that the first and second counterfeit tracks form one or more electrical circuits connected to the RF ID components. 28. A method to read the information from an RFID tag, the RFI D tag that incorporates the RFI D device that includes an integrated microcu rk, the method that comprises: storing a property of the RFI D device as the first data values in a first memory of the integrated microcircuit; read the first data values from the first memory with an RFI D read / write device; determine from the first data values whether the label 'R FI D has been falsified; and wrote second data values to a second memory of the integrated circuit with the RFI D read / write device if the R FI D label has been falsified. 29. The method according to claim 28, characterized in that the second data values are recorded permanently in the integrated microcircuit. 30. The method according to claim 28, characterized in that the determination step comprises determining whether the first data values are within a predetermined range. RESU M IN OF THE I NVENTION A counterfeit indicator label is provided. The label may include RF components I D- The counterfeit track (1 02) coupled to the RFI D components. The trail of falsification must be constructed from a trajectory of destructible behavior. In addition, the counterfeit track can be formed so that it is damaged when the label is falsified. In one embodiment, adhesion characteristics (103) of the counterfeit track are adapted when the label is counterfeited, for example, through the removal of an object. RFI D components can retain their RF capability and detect when the counterfeit track has been damaged to indicate that the tag has been falsified. Alternatively, the RFI D capability of the RFI D components can be disabled when the counterfeit track is damaged, indicating counterfeiting.