KR20220076934A - Terminal for payment and operaing method of thereof - Google Patents

Abstract

The embodiment relates to a terminal for payment and a method of operating the terminal. The method of operation of the terminal includes generating an authentication key of a card for payment, wherein the authentication key includes a private key and a public key; receiving authentication information; encrypting the private key and authentication information with the security key of the security SIM and storing the encrypted private key and the encrypted authentication information in the security SIM; generating an encrypted private key with N split keys; and backing up at least some of the N split keys to different clouds, respectively.

Description

Terminal and method of operation of the terminal for payment and {TERMINAL FOR PAYMENT AND OPERAING METHOD OF THEREOF}

The embodiment relates to a terminal for payment and a method of operating the terminal.

Currently, in the case of domestic cards (cards that are not affiliated with overseas card brands such as VISA or MASTER), plastic cards can be used for payment at overseas affiliates of some overseas card companies affiliated with some domestic card companies. Card payment is not supported. This is because the security level is low when verifying the app card in the smartphone abroad, so the KFTC cannot pass the certification examination for proof of ownership.

Currently, in various cards, domestic plastic cards can be used abroad through partnerships with local card companies in Japan and major countries in Southeast Asia. As it is not provided, it is impossible to pay by App Card overseas.

For the authentication security function, it is essential to store and authenticate the user authentication key and private key in an area that cannot be forged or tampered with, and authentication must be processed in a separate hardware security area.

In this regard, Korean Patent Application Laid-Open No. 2018-0045183 discloses a method, system and terminal device for providing a secure cryptocurrency service using a USIM security area.

In the invention according to the embodiment, by packaging the SIM and PUF (Physically Unclonable Function) chip with enhanced security function in the SIM, and encrypting and storing the authentication information required for payment by the app card in the PUF SIM, the domestic offline store stored in the mobile phone We want to provide a service that can be used when paying with a dedicated app card.

Specifically, in order to use a domestic-only card abroad as an App Card method, a PUF chip that has received the Root of Security certification, which has the highest security level, is packaged in the SIM to perform a user authentication function when making an App Card payment in the PUF SIM.

Through the invention according to the embodiment, by packaging the SIM and PUF (Physically Unclonable Function) chip with enhanced security function in the SIM, and by encrypting and storing the authentication information required for the app card payment in the PUF SIM, stored in the mobile phone even in overseas offline stores It is possible to provide services that can be used when paying with a domestic dedicated app card.

1 is a flowchart illustrating an operation method of a terminal for payment in an embodiment.
2 is a diagram for explaining a method of storing an authentication key in a SIM in an embodiment.
3 is a diagram for explaining a method of dividing and storing a private key according to an embodiment.
FIG. 4 is a diagram for explaining a method of recovering a private key using a part of a divided private key according to an embodiment.
5 is a diagram for explaining a payment method using an app card in the embodiment.
6 is a diagram for explaining a method of making a payment in an offline state of a terminal according to an embodiment.
7 is a block diagram for explaining the configuration of a terminal in the embodiment.

Hereinafter, embodiments will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, since various changes may be made to the embodiments, the scope of the patent application is not limited or limited by these embodiments. It should be understood that all modifications, equivalents and substitutes for the embodiments are included in the scope of the rights.

The terms used in the examples are used for the purpose of description only, and should not be construed as limiting. The singular expression includes the plural expression unless the context clearly dictates otherwise. In the present specification, terms such as "comprise" or "have" are intended to designate that a feature, number, step, operation, component, part, or combination thereof described in the specification exists, but one or more other features It should be understood that this does not preclude the existence or addition of numbers, steps, operations, components, parts, or combinations thereof.

Unless defined otherwise, all terms used herein, including technical or scientific terms, have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which the embodiment belongs. Terms such as those defined in commonly used dictionaries should be interpreted as having a meaning consistent with the meaning in the context of the related art, and should not be interpreted in an ideal or excessively formal meaning unless explicitly defined in the present application. does not

In addition, in the description with reference to the accompanying drawings, the same components are given the same reference numerals regardless of the reference numerals, and the overlapping description thereof will be omitted. In describing the embodiment, if it is determined that a detailed description of a related known technology may unnecessarily obscure the gist of the embodiment, the detailed description thereof will be omitted.

In addition, in describing the components of the embodiment, terms such as first, second, A, B, (a), (b), etc. may be used. These terms are only for distinguishing the elements from other elements, and the essence, order, or order of the elements are not limited by the terms. When it is described that a component is “connected”, “coupled” or “connected” to another component, the component may be directly connected or connected to the other component, but another component is between each component. It will be understood that may also be "connected", "coupled" or "connected".

Components included in one embodiment and components having a common function will be described using the same names in other embodiments. Unless otherwise stated, descriptions described in one embodiment may be applied to other embodiments as well, and detailed descriptions within the overlapping range will be omitted.

1 is a flowchart illustrating an operation method of a terminal for payment in an embodiment.

For the embodiment, the terminal is equipped with a high-security USIM, for example, a PUF (Physically Unclonable Function) SIM, and provides a high-security App Card payment method based on the interlocking of the PUF SIM's applet and the App Card. can do. Hereinafter, a sim such as a PUF sim used in the present invention will be described as a sim.

In step 110, the terminal generates an authentication key of the card for payment.

In an embodiment, a card for payment may be pre-registered in the terminal as an app card. The authentication key may be generated in a form including a private key and a public key. The App Card can be installed in the form of a dedicated app that is linked to the PUF SIM.

The authentication key may be issued by confirming the decrypted card information and the UICC ID of the SIM in the card company server. A method of generating an authentication key for card payment will be described in detail with reference to FIG. 2 below.

2 is a diagram for explaining a method of storing an authentication key in a SIM in an embodiment.

In step 201, the terminal can encrypt and store the card information of the App Card and the encryption key of the UICC ID (Universal Integrated Circuit Card Identifier) of the SIM with the security key of the SIM. At this time, the security key of the SIM is stored through the SIM. It can be obtained but not stored in the SIM Card information may include information such as card number, CVV, and expiration date.

In step 202, the terminal may decrypt the encrypted information with the security key of the SIM. The encrypted information may include card information and information in which an encryption key of the UICC ID is encrypted.

In step 203, the terminal may request an authentication key for payment from the card company server. In an embodiment, decrypted information, for example, decrypted card information, and an encryption key of the decrypted UICC ID may be transmitted in order to request an authentication key, and a period for using the corresponding authentication key may be set and transmitted. Thereafter, an authentication key for the corresponding app card may be issued through an authentication process for information decrypted through the card company server.

In step 204 , the card company server may request authentication for the UICC ID encryption key to a Trusted Service Manager (TSM) server. The TSM server is a server that issues a ^3rd party applet to the SIM and issues the UICC ID encryption key, so it can generate an authentication result for the decrypted UICC ID encryption key.

In step 205, the TSM server may transmit a response to the authentication request. If the encryption key of the decrypted UICC ID matches the encryption key of the issued UICC ID, a response to authentication for the decrypted UICC ID encryption key may be transmitted, and in the opposite case, the encryption key of the decrypted UICC ID A response for not authenticating can be transmitted. The following description is about a case in which the encryption key of the decrypted UICC ID is normally authenticated.

In step 206, the card company server may issue an authentication key for the corresponding app card based on the received response. In an embodiment, an authentication key including a private key and a public key may be generated, and a certificate for the corresponding authentication key may be generated. A certificate for an authentication key, an app card and an authentication key may be mapped and stored in the card company server.

In step 207, the terminal may receive the authentication key generated from the card company server. At this time, the authentication key to be transmitted is the issuer, issuance time, and validity period of the authentication key (the valid period is step 203) so that the payment of the App Card is possible even when the Internet is blocked in the terminal using the authentication key. may correspond to the requested period), and the signing of the certificate against the authentication key.

In step 208, the terminal may encrypt the transmitted authentication key with the security key of the SIM and store it in the SIM. As described above, the SIM's security key is not stored in the SIM.

In an embodiment, when the authentication key is encrypted and stored, the authentication information received below may be encrypted and stored in the terminal in the same manner.

Back again, in step 120, the terminal receives authentication information.

In an embodiment, the authentication information may include FIDO (Fast Identity Online) information, and the corresponding information may include, for example, at least one of biometric information such as a fingerprint, iris, face rest, etc., or a pin number.

In step 130, the terminal encrypts the private key and authentication information with the security key of the SIM, and stores the encrypted private key and the encrypted authentication information in the SIM.

In an embodiment, at least one of the above information may be selected by the user's setting of the terminal and stored in the SIM of the terminal. As described above, the SIM does not store the security key of the SIM, and can only be used to encrypt the private key and authentication information.

In the PUF SIM described above, since the security key of the SIM is not stored in any area of the hardware, the private key encrypted and stored with the security key is difficult to artificially decrypt the private key even if the SIM is stolen. have

In step 140, the terminal generates an encrypted private key as N split keys.

In step 150, the terminal backs up some of the N split keys to different clouds, respectively.

In an embodiment, N split keys may be generated by performing a Sharmir's Secret Sharing (SSS) algorithm on the private key. According to the SSS algorithm, the partitioned private key can be restored only when the partition key has a certain number of pieces or more.

If the private key for the SIM according to the embodiment is backed up to the server as it is, the private key may be immediately stolen by hacking of the server. By backing up to the server, the risk of hacking is blocked, and then, N-1 split keys can be used to provide a service in which the private key can be restored.

An embodiment in which the private key is split and the private key is restored using the split split key will be described in detail with reference to FIGS. 3 and 4 .

3 is a diagram for explaining a method of dividing and storing a private key according to an embodiment.

In the embodiment, an embodiment in which the private key 300 is divided into three split keys 301 to 303 will be described. The embodiment may be extended to an embodiment in which the private key is split into three or more split keys.

In an embodiment, the private key may be divided into three split keys 301 to 303 through the key backup/restore app of the terminal. Among them, one split key 301 may be stored in the SIM through an applet of the SIM.

In an embodiment, the backup/restore server 310 may receive the split keys 302 and 303 and distribute and store the split keys 302 and 303 to other cloud servers, respectively.

When four or more split keys are generated according to the embodiment, the cloud server for storing the split keys may be linked with the backup/restore server 310 to store three or more split keys one by one.

FIG. 4 is a diagram for explaining a method of recovering a private key using a part of a divided private key according to an embodiment.

In one embodiment, the private key relates to an embodiment of restoring a private key to a new SIM when a pre-stored SIM is lost or a new SIM is issued. Explain. The SIM installed in the terminal of FIG. 4 corresponds to a SIM different from the SIM of FIG. 3 .

In an embodiment, when a request for restoration for the private key is input in the key backup restoration app, the backup/restore server 310 may receive the split keys 302 and 303 stored in the cloud server, respectively, from the cloud servers. have. The backup/restore server 310 may transmit the received split keys 302 and 303 to the terminal.

The terminal may restore the private key by performing the SSS algorithm on the split keys 302 and 303 received through the key backup restoration app, and store the restored new private key in a new SIM.

In an embodiment, the terminal may update the public key based on the new private key.

In embodiments, data derived from the old private key prior to restoration may be updated. For example, in order to request an update of the public key, data signed with the old private key and the new public key may be transmitted to the FIDO server in a new public key registration message.

The terminal may generate a new split key by performing the SSS algorithm on the new private key through the key backup restoration app. The corresponding step may refer to the embodiment of FIG. 3 .

5 is a diagram for explaining a payment method using an app card in the embodiment.

In one embodiment, when registering the app card in order to pay using the app card, input of registered authentication information may be requested ( 510 ). In the embodiment, only a part of information about the app card may be exposed. The authentication information may include at least one of biometric information, such as a fingerprint, iris, face rest, or a pin number.

In an embodiment, the authentication information input to the SIM may be authenticated through the SIM applet, and an authentication message may be generated by decrypting the private key ( 520 ).

When authentication information for app card payment is input in the terminal, the terminal compares pre-stored authentication information with the input authentication information, and when the two information match, payment for the app card can be performed.

For an embodiment, the input authentication information may be authenticated by decrypting the authentication information encrypted with the security key of the SIM and comparing it with the input authentication information. If the entered authentication information matches the decrypted authentication information, the entered authentication information can be authenticated by decrypting the private key encrypted with the SIM's security key and signing the authentication message for the app card with the private key. .

In an embodiment, when the input authentication information is authenticated, a code for payment of the App Card may be generated ( 530 ). For example, a QR code or barcode for the App Card may be provided, and payment of the App Card may be made by scanning the corresponding code.

6 is a diagram for explaining a method of making a payment in an offline state of a terminal according to an embodiment.

The embodiment describes a method of performing payment with an app card in a terminal without network interworking in case the terminal is abroad or in an offline state. In an embodiment, authentication information for app card payment may be authenticated in the terminal prior to payment.

In step 601, the terminal may decrypt the authentication key with the security key of the SIM. In an embodiment, offline payment may be performed using the decrypted authentication key.

In step 602, the terminal may request payment to the payment terminal through the applet of the SIM linked with the app card. The decrypted authentication key may be transmitted to the payment terminal for a payment request. The payment request may be transmitted to the card terminal by scanning a QR code or barcode information of the app card.

In step 603, the payment terminal may request authentication for card use by transmitting the authentication key to the card company server. To this end, the payment terminal is provided with an online service.

In step 604, the card company server may validate the authentication key. The card company server maps the authentication key to card information and stores it in advance, verifies a signature with a token certificate based on the received authentication key, and detects card information mapped to the authentication key.

In step 605, the card company server may determine whether to authenticate the card use and respond to the card use approval.

In step 606, the payment terminal may approve payment for the corresponding app card, and perform payment with the app card.

7 is a block diagram for explaining the configuration of a terminal in the embodiment.

The terminal 700 according to the embodiment may include one or more memories 710 and one or more processors 720 , and may include at least one program stored in the memory 710 to be executed by the processor 720 .

The terminal 700 generates an authentication key of the card for payment.

In an embodiment, a card for payment may be pre-registered in the terminal 700 as an app card. The authentication key may be generated in a form including a private key and a public key. The App Card can be installed in the form of a dedicated app that is linked to the PUF SIM.

The authentication key may be issued by confirming the decrypted card information and the UICC ID of the SIM in the card company server.

The terminal 700 receives authentication information.

In an embodiment, the authentication information may include FIDO (Fast Identity Online) information, and the corresponding information may include, for example, at least one of biometric information such as a fingerprint, iris, face rest, etc., or a pin number.

The terminal 700 encrypts the private key and authentication information with the security key of the SIM, and stores the encrypted private key and the encrypted authentication information in the SIM.

In an embodiment, at least one of the above information may be selected by the user's setting of the terminal 700 and stored in the SIM of the terminal 700 . As described above, the SIM does not store the security key of the SIM, and can only be used to encrypt the private key and authentication information.

In the PUF SIM described above, since the security key of the SIM is not stored in any area of the hardware, the private key encrypted and stored with the security key is difficult to artificially decrypt the private key even if the SIM is stolen. have

The terminal 700 generates an encrypted private key as N split keys.

The terminal 700 backs up some of the N split keys to different clouds, respectively.

In an embodiment, N split keys may be generated by performing a Sharmir's Secret Sharing (SSS) algorithm on the private key. According to the SSS algorithm, the partitioned private key can be restored only when the partition key has a certain number of pieces or more.

In an embodiment, the private key may be divided into N split keys through the key backup/restore app of the terminal 700 . Among them, one split key may be stored in the SIM through an applet of the SIM, and the remaining N-1 split keys may be transmitted and backed up to different cloud servers, respectively.

In an embodiment, after a new SIM is mounted on the terminal 700, when a request for restoration of the private key is input in the key backup restoration app, the terminal 700 splits keys 302 and 303 stored in the cloud server, respectively. can receive

The terminal 700 may restore the private key by performing the SSS algorithm on the split key received through the key backup restoration app, and store the restored new private key in a new SIM.

The method according to the embodiment may be implemented in the form of program instructions that can be executed through various computer means and recorded in a computer-readable medium. The computer-readable medium may include program instructions, data files, data structures, etc. alone or in combination. The program instructions recorded on the medium may be specially designed and configured for the embodiment, or may be known and available to those skilled in the art of computer software. Examples of the computer-readable recording medium include magnetic media such as hard disks, floppy disks and magnetic tapes, optical media such as CD-ROMs and DVDs, and magnetic media such as floppy disks. - includes magneto-optical media, and hardware devices specially configured to store and execute program instructions, such as ROM, RAM, flash memory, and the like. Examples of program instructions include not only machine language codes such as those generated by a compiler, but also high-level language codes that can be executed by a computer using an interpreter or the like. The hardware devices described above may be configured to operate as one or more software modules to perform the operations of the embodiments, and vice versa.

Software may comprise a computer program, code, instructions, or a combination of one or more thereof, which configures a processing device to operate as desired or is independently or collectively processed You can command the device. The software and/or data may be any kind of machine, component, physical device, virtual equipment, computer storage medium or apparatus, to be interpreted by or to provide instructions or data to the processing device. , or may be permanently or temporarily embody in a transmitted signal wave. The software may be distributed over networked computer systems and stored or executed in a distributed manner. Software and data may be stored in one or more computer-readable recording media.

As described above, although the embodiments have been described with reference to the limited drawings, those skilled in the art may apply various technical modifications and variations based on the above. For example, the described techniques are performed in an order different from the described method, and/or the described components of the system, structure, apparatus, circuit, etc. are combined or combined in a different form than the described method, or other components Or substituted or substituted by equivalents may achieve an appropriate result.

Therefore, other implementations, other embodiments, and equivalents to the claims are also within the scope of the following claims.

Claims (21)

In the method of operating a terminal for payment,
generating an authentication key of a card for payment, wherein the authentication key includes a private key and a public key;
receiving authentication information;
encrypting the private key and the authentication information with the security key of the security SIM and storing the encrypted private key and the encrypted authentication information in the security SIM;
generating the encrypted private key into N split keys; and
Backing up at least some of the N split keys to different clouds, respectively
containing,
How the terminal operates.
According to claim 1,
The step of backing up at least some of the N split keys to different clouds,
Backing up N-1 split keys among the N split keys to different clouds, respectively.
containing,
How the terminal operates.
According to claim 1,
The security key is not stored in the security SIM,
How the terminal operates.
According to claim 1,
The step of generating an authentication key of the card for the payment comprises:
encrypting the card information of the card and the UICC ID of the security SIM using the security key;
decrypting the encrypted card information and UICC ID of the security SIM with the security key;
transmitting the card information and the UICC ID of the security SIM to a card company server to request an authentication key for payment; and
receiving the authentication key
containing,
How the terminal operates.
5. The method of claim 4,
The authentication key is
Issued by confirming the decrypted card information and the UICC ID of the security SIM in the card company server,
How the terminal operates.
According to claim 1,
decrypting the authentication key with the security key for offline payment; and
Transmitting a payment request to a payment terminal using the decrypted authentication key
further comprising,
How the terminal operates.
According to claim 1,
receiving an authentication request from a user to the terminal, wherein the authentication request includes authentication information input to the terminal;
checking whether the input authentication information and the encrypted authentication information match;
generating a signature message by decrypting the private key in response to the match; and
sending the signature message to an authentication server to request authentication
further comprising,
How the terminal operates.
8. The method of claim 7,
The signature message is verified using the public key,
How the terminal operates.
According to claim 1,
detecting a new security SIM;
receiving the at least some of the split keys from a cloud in which the at least some of the split keys are backed up, respectively; and
Restoring the private key using an SSS algorithm for the at least some of the partition keys
further comprising,
How the terminal operates.
10. The method of claim 9,
encrypting the restored private key with the security key of the new security SIM and storing it in the new security SIM
further comprising,
How the terminal operates.
A computer program stored in a computer readable medium in combination with hardware to execute the method of any one of claims 1 to 10.
In the terminal for payment,
one or more processors;
Memory; and
one or more programs stored in the memory and configured to be executed by the one or more processors;
The program is
generating an authentication key of a card for payment, wherein the authentication key includes a private key and a public key;
receiving authentication information;
encrypting the private key and the authentication information with the security key of the security SIM and storing the encrypted private key and the encrypted authentication information in the security SIM;
generating the encrypted private key into N split keys; and
Backing up at least some of the N split keys to different clouds, respectively
containing,
terminal.
13. The method of claim 12,
The step of backing up at least some of the N split keys to different clouds,
Backing up N-1 split keys among the N split keys to different clouds, respectively.
containing,
terminal.
13. The method of claim 12,
The security key is not stored in the security SIM,
terminal.
13. The method of claim 12,
The step of generating an authentication key of the card for the payment comprises:
encrypting the card information of the card and the UICC ID of the security SIM using the security key;
decrypting the encrypted card information and UICC ID of the security SIM with the security key;
transmitting the card information and the UICC ID of the security SIM to a card company server to request an authentication key for payment;
receiving the authentication key; and
encrypting and storing the authentication key with the security key
containing,
terminal.
16. The method of claim 15,
The authentication key is
Issued by confirming the decrypted card information and the UICC ID of the security SIM in the card company server,
terminal.
13. The method of claim 12,
decrypting the authentication key with the security key for offline payment; and
Transmitting a payment request to a payment terminal using the decrypted authentication key
further comprising,
terminal.
13. The method of claim 12,
receiving an authentication request from a user to the terminal, wherein the authentication request includes authentication information input to the terminal;
checking whether the input authentication information and the encrypted authentication information match;
generating a signature message by decrypting the private key in response to the match; and
sending the signature message to an authentication server to request authentication
further comprising,
terminal.
19. The method of claim 18,
The signature message is verified using the public key,
terminal.
13. The method of claim 12,
detecting a new security SIM;
receiving the at least some of the split keys from a cloud in which the at least some of the split keys are backed up, respectively; and
Restoring the private key using an SSS algorithm for the at least some of the partition keys
further comprising,
terminal.
21. The method of claim 20,
encrypting the restored private key with the security key of the new security SIM and storing it in the new security SIM
further comprising,
terminal.

Images