KR20210083991A - Method of authenticating message for lightweight device and apparatuses performing the same - Google Patents

Abstract

Disclosed are a light weight device-dedicated message authentication method and apparatuses for performing the same. According to an embodiment, the light weight device-dedicated message authentication method comprises the following steps of: allowing a first electronic device to receive a packet generated by a message authentication server; and allowing the first electronic device to perform authentication on the message included in the packet in response to successful authentication of the message transmitted by a second electronic device of the message authentication server.

Description

Lightweight device-only message authentication method and devices for performing the same {METHOD OF AUTHENTICATING MESSAGE FOR LIGHTWEIGHT DEVICE AND APPARATUSES PERFORMING THE SAME}

The following embodiments relate to a message authentication method dedicated to a lightweight device and apparatuses for performing the same.

Recently, the lightweight device market is expanding. For example, recently, many people and devices may be connected through a smart device and/or a light-weight device that is a terminal such as a sensor. A lightweight device may have the characteristics of being very small, low power and low cost.

However, it may be difficult to apply a conventional encryption algorithm, a message authentication protocol, and/or an entity authentication protocol that requires a large amount of computation to a lightweight device.

In recent years, security issues such as authentication of users for lightweight devices and data, information integrity, hacking, invasion of privacy and/or reliability verification, etc. are emerging due to the expansion of the lightweight device startup. For example, in recent years, there is a demand for a new reliable security platform with lightweight features suitable for lightweight devices.

The reliability of the conventional security system implemented in software may be characterized in that it is proportional to the amount of computation of the algorithm. Therefore, the conventional security system is weak in that it relies on algorithmic operation.

In the conventional security system, when a key is shared between a client and a server, the key must be stored in a memory in a lightweight device. The conventional security system has a disadvantage in that it contains a risk of hacking due to storage of a shared key in a lightweight device. The conventional security system has a disadvantage in that it is difficult to cryptographically analyze and/or prove the reliability.

Embodiments may provide a technique for performing message authentication on a message transmitted by an electronic device through a security chip, which is hardware based on TRNG PUF and CRP PUF, and a message authentication server.

A light-weight device-only message authentication method according to an embodiment includes the steps of: receiving, by a first electronic device, a packet generated by a message authentication server; and performing authentication on the message included in the packet in response to authentication success.

The performing may include extracting a challenge signal, a first message authentication code (MAC) and the message from the packet, and inputting the challenge signal to a physical unclonable function (PUF) circuit included in the first electronic device. The method may include outputting a response signal, generating a second MAC using the message and the response signal, and authenticating the message by comparing the first MAC and the second MAC.

In the authenticating step, when the first MAC and the second MAC are the same, determining that the authentication of the message is successful, or when the first MAC and the second MAC are not the same, determining authentication to fail.

The message authentication method includes: receiving, by the message authentication server, a packet generated by the second electronic device; and performing, by the message authentication server, authentication on the message included in the packet generated by the second electronic device. and transmitting, by the message authentication server, an authentication result for the message to the second electronic device.

The step of the message authentication server authenticating the message included in the packet generated by the second electronic device may include extracting the challenge signal, the first MAC, and the message from the packet generated by the second electronic device. and extracting a response signal corresponding to the challenge signal from a list of challenge to response pairs (CRP); generating a second MAC using the message and the response signal; Comparing two MACs may include authenticating the message.

In the authenticating step, when the first MAC and the second MAC are the same, determining that the authentication of the message is successful, or when the first MAC and the second MAC are not the same, determining authentication to fail.

The message authentication method may further include transmitting, by the message authentication server, a packet generated by the message authentication server to the first electronic device in response to the ID of the first electronic device transmitted from the second electronic device. can

The transmitting may include generating a random number in response to the ID of the first electronic device, converting the random number into a challenge signal for authenticating the message, and receiving the random number from a list of challenge to response pairs (CRP). It may include extracting a response signal corresponding to the challenge signal, generating a MAC using the message and the response signal, and packetizing the challenge signal, the message, and the MAC.

An electronic device according to an embodiment communicates with a message authentication device and receives a packet generated by the message authentication device, and a transceiver in response to authentication success for messages transmitted by different electronic devices of the message authentication server. A security chip for authenticating the message included in the packet may be included.

The security chip includes a PUF circuit for outputting a response signal in response to the challenge signal included in the packet, a generator for generating a MAC using the message and the response signal, and the generated MAC and the MAC included in the packet. It may include an authenticator that compares and authenticates the message.

The authenticator determines that the authentication of the message is successful when the generated MAC and the MAC included in the packet are the same, or when the generated MAC and the MAC included in the packet are not the same, the authenticator authenticates the message can be determined to fail.

The transceiver may be implemented in the security chip.

1 shows an example for explaining a message authentication method.
2 shows an example for explaining a physically non-replicable function for generating a random number.
3 shows an example for explaining a physically non-replicable function for generating a challenge-response pair.
4 shows a schematic block diagram of a message authentication system according to an embodiment.
FIG. 5 is a schematic block diagram of the first electronic device shown in FIG. 4 .
6 shows a schematic block diagram of the message authentication server shown in FIG.
7A illustrates an example for explaining a message authentication operation between electronic devices and a message authentication server.
7B illustrates another example for describing a message authentication operation between electronic devices and a message authentication server.
8 is a flowchart illustrating message authentication for authenticating a message generated by the second electronic device shown in FIG. 4 .

Hereinafter, embodiments will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, since various changes may be made to the embodiments, the scope of the patent application is not limited or limited by these embodiments. It should be understood that all modifications, equivalents and substitutes for the embodiments are included in the scope of the rights.

Terms used in the examples are used for the purpose of description only, and should not be construed as limiting. The singular expression includes the plural expression unless the context clearly dictates otherwise. In the present specification, terms such as “comprise” or “have” are intended to designate that a feature, number, step, operation, component, part, or combination thereof described in the specification exists, but one or more other features It should be understood that this does not preclude the existence or addition of numbers, steps, operations, components, parts, or combinations thereof.

Terms such as first or second may be used to describe various elements, but the elements should not be limited by the terms. The terms are used only for the purpose of distinguishing one element from another element, for example, without departing from the scope of rights according to the concept of the embodiment, a first element may be named as a second element, and similarly The second component may also be referred to as the first component.

Unless defined otherwise, all terms used herein, including technical or scientific terms, have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which the embodiment belongs. Terms such as those defined in commonly used dictionaries should be interpreted as having a meaning consistent with the meaning in the context of the related art, and should not be interpreted in an ideal or excessively formal meaning unless explicitly defined in the present application. does not

In addition, in the description with reference to the accompanying drawings, the same components are given the same reference numerals regardless of the reference numerals, and the overlapping description thereof will be omitted. In the description of the embodiment, if it is determined that a detailed description of a related known technology may unnecessarily obscure the gist of the embodiment, the detailed description thereof will be omitted.

1 shows an example for explaining a message authentication method.

Message authentication is a process of authenticating that a message is a safe and reliable message depending on whether the other party has the same key as itself.

The existing message authentication method performs message authentication through a message authentication protocol based on a hash function, a message authentication code (MAC), and a shared key.

Existing message authentication protocols generate a MAC using a hash function and a shared secret key when sending a message. The existing message authentication protocol may be a protocol based on MAC and shared key that performs authentication on a message by transmitting the MAC along with the message. A MAC may be a small data block. The hash function used when generating the MAC may be a function that maps data of an arbitrary length to data (or hash value) of a fixed length. Existing message authentication protocols can generate evidence values that detect errors or tampering with input messages through hash functions.

1 , the message authentication method performs message authentication between a first device (alice) and a second device (bob) through an existing message authentication protocol.

)를 분배 및 공유하는 절차가 이미 수행되어 있을 수 있다.Specifically, the first device (alice) and the second device (bob) perform message authentication through the existing message authentication method. The first alice is a claimant claiming message authentication. The second device (bob) is a verifier that proves message authentication. The first device (alice) and the second device (bob) are pre-keyed through a secure channel.

) may already have been distributed and shared.

)를 키로 사용하여 해시 함수를 통해 제1 MAC(

, m)를 생성한다. 제1 기기(alice)는 제1 MAC을 메시지(m)와 함께 제2 기기(bob)에 전송한다.First, the first device (alice) receives a message (m) as an input and a pre-shared key

) as the key, the first MAC(

, m) is created. The first device (alice) transmits the first MAC together with the message (m) to the second device (bob).

)를 키로 사용하여 해시 함수를 통해 제2 MAC(

, m)을 생성한다.Thereafter, the second device (bob) receives the message (m) transmitted from the first device (alice) as an input to the pre-shared key (

) as the key, through the hash function to the second MAC(

, m) is created.

The second device (bob) authenticates the message between the first device (alice) and the second device (bob) through the process of comparing the first MAC and the second MAC, that is, the message authentication for the message of the first device (alice) carry out When the first MAC and the second MAC match, it may be determined that message authentication between the first device (alice) and the second device (bob) is successful.

Accordingly, the existing message authentication method verifies message integrity and message origin authentication by individually performing authentication procedures for individual messages through MAC. Since the existing message authentication method has an effect of compressing a large-capacity message into data of a fixed length, there is an advantage in that communication costs are reduced.

FIG. 2 shows an example for explaining a physically non-replicable function for generating a random number, and FIG. 3 shows an example for explaining a physically non-replicable function for generating a challenge-response pair.

The physically unclonable function (PUF) system may be a system based on a complementary metal-oxide semiconductor (CMOS) process. The CMOS process may be a process having advantages of high integration and low cost.

A physical unclonable function (PUF) system can rapidly and randomly generate a unique value based on a specific input. A particular input may be a challenge. The unique value is a value corresponding to an input and may be an ID or a response. When a physically non-replicable chip using CMOS is produced, a unique value may be generated due to a process mismatch even when different chips having the same structure (or the same layout) are produced.

The fact that the physically non-replicable function has the same physical value corresponding to the input by the same input regardless of changes in the external environment can be expressed as a probabilistic property of reproducibility and/or stability. The probabilistic property may be one of the important performance indicators of the physically non-replicable function. The fact that the physically non-replicable function has different physical values for different inputs can be expressed as uniqueness, randomness, or identity.

Referring to FIG. 2 , a true random number generator physical unclonable function (TRNG PUF) for generating random numbers may generate a random random number value according to a specific signal (response generation start signal). A random random number value may be determined by a process inconsistency.

The TRNG PUF may generate a different random number value for each chip even if the chips have the same structure. A random number value generated by one chip may have a completely different random number value when it is regenerated.

Referring to FIG. 3 , a challenge to response pairs physical unclonable function (CRP PUF) may generate a unique random response to a specific challenge input. A challenge-response pair (CRP) may be a pair between a particular challenge and a response corresponding to the challenge. The challenge-response pair list (CRP List) may be a list of challenge-response pairs.

Even if the CRP PUF is a chip having the same structure, there may be a feature of having a different challenge-response pair for each chip. However, the CRP PUF should generate the same response to the same challenge input within one chip. CRP PUFs must generate different responses for different challenge inputs.

4 shows a schematic block diagram of a message authentication system according to an embodiment.

The message authentication system 10 may be a message authentication system dedicated to lightweight devices replacing the existing message authentication system. The message authentication system 10 may perform message authentication using a message authentication technique based on the physically impossible function described in FIGS. 2 and 3 .

The message authentication system 10 includes a first electronic device 100 , a message authentication server 300 , and a second electronic device 500 .

The first electronic device 100 and the second electronic device 500 may be lightweight devices having the same structure. The first electronic device 100 and the second electronic device 500 may be electronic devices in which a processor (or a microprocessor), a memory, and a software-based CRP and random number generator are difficult to be installed (or embedded, mounted).

The electronic devices 100 and 500 may be various devices, such as an Internet of Things (IoT) device or a portable electronic device that does not require a large amount of computation. Portable electronic devices include a laptop computer, a mobile phone, a smart phone, a tablet PC, a mobile internet device (MID), a personal digital assistant (PDA), and an enterprise digital assistant (EDA). ), digital still camera, digital video camera, PMP (portable multimedia player), PND (personal navigation device or portable navigation device), handheld game console, e-book (e-book) may be implemented as a smart device. In this case, the smart device may be implemented as a smart watch or a smart band.

The first electronic device 100 and the second electronic device 500 transmit a CRP list (challenge to response pairs list, or CRP table) corresponding to each electronic device through a secure channel to the message authentication server 300 . can be shared with For example, the message authentication server 300 may store a first CRP list corresponding to the first electronic device 100 and a second CRP list corresponding to the second electronic device 500 in a database. The first CRP list is a CRP list in which a pair of a challenge signal and a response signal that can be input and output by the first electronic device 100 is sorted, and the second CRP list can be input and output by the second electronic device 500 The challenge signal and the response signal pair may be an ordered CRP list.

The first electronic device 100 and the second electronic device 500 may perform message authentication on a message transmitted by each other through the message authentication server 300 in order to perform message authentication on a message transmitted to each other. have.

The first electronic device 100 and the second electronic device 500 may perform message authentication through a security chip that is hardware based on the TRNG PUF and the CRP PUF. In this case, the security chip included in each of the first electronic device 100 and the second electronic device 500 may be a semiconductor chip based on a TRNG PUF and a CRP PUF.

The electronic devices 100 and 500 may perform message authentication without a processor (or microprocessor), memory, software-based CRP, and random number generator. That is, the electronic devices 100 and 500 do not generate a cryptographically secure random number through an operation based on an existing software algorithm, but may perform message authentication using hardware that is a PUF-based semiconductor that relies on natural laws. .

Since message authentication through the electronic devices 100 and 500 does not need to store the shared key in the internal memory, security and reliability can be effectively improved, and the existing message requiring a large amount of computation difficult to be utilized in light-weight devices. The authentication method can be substituted.

In addition, it is possible to solve the vulnerability problem of the existing message authentication method (or the existing message authentication platform, the existing security platform) that message authentication through the security chip and the message authentication server 300 is dependent on algorithm operation through software, It is a low-cost, low-power, and high-efficiency authentication system that can be used in various fields where it is difficult to apply a security system using software.

As described above, the first electronic device 100 and the second electronic device 500 may perform message authentication by performing the same message authentication operation.

Since the structures and message authentication operations of the first electronic device 100 and the second electronic device 500 are the same, hereinafter, for convenience of explanation, the first electronic device 100 transmits the message from the second electronic device 500 . It is assumed that authentication is performed on the received message. All contents of the first electronic device 100 may be applied to the second electronic device 500 , and all contents of the second electronic device 500 may be applied to the first electronic device 100 .

FIG. 5 is a schematic block diagram of the first electronic device shown in FIG. 4 .

The first electronic device 100 may include a transceiver 110 and a security chip 130 .

The transceiver 110 may communicate with the message authentication server 300 . For example, the transceiver 100 may transmit a packet generated by the first electronic device 100 to the message authentication server 300 so that authentication of the message generated by the first electronic device 100 is performed. The transceiver 110 may receive a packet transmitted from the message authentication server 300 to authenticate the message generated by the second electronic device 500 . In this case, the message may be various messages, signals and/or data generated, collected, and/or acquired by each electronic device. The packet transmitted from the message authentication server 300 may be a packet generated by the message authentication server 300 .

As shown in FIG. 5 , the transceiver 110 is implemented to be distinct from the security chip 130 , but is not limited thereto. For example, the transceiver 110 may be implemented in the security chip 130 .

The transceiver 110 may include a packetizer 111 and a depacketizer 113 .

The packetizer 111 may generate a packet by packetizing the message, the challenge signal, and the MAC generated by the first electronic device 100 . A packet may include a message, a challenge signal, and a MAC.

The packetizer 111 may transmit the packet to the message authentication server 300 . In this case, the packetizer 110 may transmit the ID (or identifier) of the first electronic device 100 together with the packet to the message authentication server 300 . For example, the ID of the first electronic device 100 may be transmitted independently from the packet or may be transmitted while being included in the packet.

The depacketizer 113 may depacketize the packet transmitted from the message authentication server 300 to extract a challenge signal, MAC, and message. In this case, the extracted challenge signal and MAC may be the challenge signal and MAC generated by the message authentication server 300 . The extracted message may be a message generated by the second electronic device 500 . The message generated by the second electronic device 500 is transmitted from the second electronic device 500 to the message authentication server 300, the message authentication is performed by the message authentication server 300, and when the message authentication is successful, the message authentication server It may be transmitted from 300 to the first electronic device 100 .

The depacketizer 113 may transmit the extracted challenge signal, MAC, and message to the security chip 130 .

When the first electronic device 100 performs message authentication on a message transmitted from the second electronic device 500 , the second electronic device 500 receives the message from the first electronic device 100 . When performing message authentication on a transmitted message, an operation related to message authentication may be performed.

The security chip 130 may include a first PUF circuit 131 , a second PUF circuit 133 , a generator 135 , and an authenticator 137 . In this case, the security chip 130 may be implemented as a printed circuit board (PCB) such as a motherboard, an integrated circuit (IC), and/or a system on chip (SoC). .

The first PUF circuit 131 may be used for message authentication for a message transmitted from the first electronic device 100 of the second electronic device 500 . The first PUF circuit 131 may be a TRNG PUF-based circuit. The first PUF circuit 131 may generate a random number. The first PUF circuit 131 may output the generated random number as a challenge signal for authenticating the message generated by the first electronic device 100 .

The second PUF circuit 133 authenticates the message transmitted from the second electronic device 500 of the first electronic device 100 and transmits the message transmitted from the first electronic device 100 of the second electronic device 500 . It can be used for message authentication for messages. The second PUF circuit 133 may be a CRP PUF-based circuit. The second PUF circuit 133 may output a response signal in response to an input signal.

For example, the second PUF circuit 133 may output a response signal used for message authentication with respect to a message transmitted from the first electronic device 100 of the second electronic device 500 . For example, the second PUF circuit 133 may output a response signal in response to the challenge signal output from the first PUF circuit 131 . The challenge signal output from the first PUF circuit 131 is input to the second PUF circuit 133 as an input signal, and the second PUF circuit 133 corresponds to the challenge signal output from the first PUF circuit 131 . A response signal can be output as an output signal.

As another example, the second PUF circuit 133 may output a response signal used for message authentication with respect to a message transmitted from the second electronic device 500 of the first electronic device 100 . For example, the second PUF circuit 133 may output a response signal in response to the challenge signal extracted from the depacketizer 133 . The challenge signal extracted from the depacketizer 133 is input to the second PUF circuit 133 as an input signal, and the second PUF circuit 133 is a response signal corresponding to the challenge signal extracted from the depacketizer 133 . can be printed out.

The generator 135 performs message authentication for a message transmitted from the second electronic device 500 of the first electronic device 100 and performs authentication for a message transmitted from the first electronic device 100 of the second electronic device 500 . It can be used for message authentication. The generator 135 may generate a MAC using the message and the response signal.

For example, the generator 135 may generate a MAC used for message authentication for a message transmitted from the first electronic device 100 of the second electronic device 500 . For example, the generator 135 may generate a MAC by using the message generated by the first electronic device 100 and a response signal corresponding to the challenge signal output from the first PUF circuit 131 .

As another example, the generator 135 may generate a MAC used for message authentication for a message transmitted from the second electronic device 500 of the first electronic device 100 . For example, the generator 135 may generate a MAC using a message extracted from the depacketizer 133 and a response signal corresponding to a challenge signal extracted from the depacketizer 133 .

The authenticator 137 may be used for message authentication for a message transmitted from the second electronic device 500 of the first electronic device 100 . For example, the authenticator 137 may authenticate the message extracted from the depacketizer 133 by comparing the MAC extracted from the depacketizer 133 and the MAC generated by the generator 135 . When the MAC extracted from the depacketizer 133 and the MAC generated by the generator 135 are the same, the authenticator 137 transmits the message extracted from the depacketizer 133 from the second electronic device 500 . The authentication for the message can be determined as success. When the MAC extracted from the depacketizer 133 and the MAC generated by the generator 135 are not the same, the authenticator 137 receives the message extracted from the depacketizer 133 from the second electronic device 500 . It may decide to fail authentication for the transmitted message.

For convenience of description, a message authentication operation for a message transmitted by the second electronic device 500 will be described below. A message authentication operation for a message transmitted by the first electronic device 100 may be the same as a message authentication operation for a message transmitted by the second electronic device 500 .

6 shows a schematic block diagram of the message authentication server shown in FIG.

In FIG. 6 , a message authentication operation performed by the message authentication server 300 in order for the first electronic device 100 to perform message authentication on a message transmitted from the second electronic device 500 will be described. This is substantially the same as a message authentication operation performed by the message authentication server 300 in order for the second electronic device 500 to perform message authentication on a message transmitted from the first electronic device 100 .

The message authentication server 300 may include a memory 310 and a processor 330 .

The memory 310 may store instructions (or programs) executable by the processor 330 . For example, the instructions may include instructions for executing an operation of the processor 330 and/or an operation of each component of the processor 330 .

The processor 330 may process data stored in the memory 310 . The processor 330 may execute computer readable code (eg, software) stored in the memory 310 and instructions induced by the processor 330 .

The processor 330 may be a hardware-implemented data processing device having a circuit having a physical structure for executing desired operations. For example, desired operations may include code or instructions included in a program.

For example, a data processing device implemented as hardware includes a microprocessor, a central processing unit, a processor core, a multi-core processor, and a multiprocessor. , an Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), and a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA).

The processor 330 may control the overall operation of the message authentication server 300 . For example, the processor 330 may control the operation of the memory 310 .

The processor 330 may receive the packet generated by the second electronic device 500 . In this case, the processor 330 may receive the ID of the second electronic device 500 . The ID of the second electronic device 500 may be transmitted independently from the packet generated by the second electronic device 500 or included in the packet generated by the second electronic device 500 and transmitted.

The processor 330 may authenticate the message included in the packet generated by the second electronic device 500 .

For example, the processor 330 may extract the challenge signal, the MAC, and the message from the packet generated by the second electronic device 500 . In this case, the extracted message may be a message generated by the second electronic device 500 . The extracted challenge signal and MAC may be the challenge signal and MAC generated by the second electronic device 500 so that authentication of the message generated by the second electronic device 500 is performed. When the ID of the second electronic device 500 is included in the packet generated by the second electronic device 500 , the processor 330 selects the second electronic device 500 from the packet generated by the second electronic device 500 . ID can be extracted.

The processor 330 may obtain (or extract) a second CRP list corresponding to the second electronic device 500 from among the shared CRP lists by using the ID of the second electronic device 500 . The processor 330 may extract a response signal corresponding to the challenge signal extracted from the second CRP list. The processor 330 may generate a MAC using the extracted message and the extracted response signal.

The processor 330 may authenticate the extracted message by comparing the extracted MAC and the generated MAC. When the extracted MAC and the generated MAC are the same, the processor 330 may determine that authentication of the extracted message is successful. When the extracted MAC and the generated MAC are not the same, the processor 330 may determine that authentication of the extracted message is failed.

The processor 330 may transmit an authentication result for the message generated by the second electronic device 500 that is the extracted message to the second electronic device 500 .

The processor 330 may transmit a packet generated by the processor 330 to the first electronic device 100 in response to the ID of the first electronic device 100 transmitted from the second electronic device 500 .

For example, the processor 330 may generate a random number based on the TRNG PUF in response to the ID of the first electronic device 100 transmitted from the second electronic device 500 . The processor 330 may convert the random number into a challenge signal for authenticating the message generated by the second electronic device 500 by the first electronic device 100 . The processor 330 may extract a response signal corresponding to the converted challenge signal from the first CRP list corresponding to the first electronic device 100 . The processor 330 may generate a MAC using the message generated by the second electronic device 500 and the extracted response signal. The processor 330 may generate a packet by packetizing the converted challenge signal, the message generated by the second electronic device 500, and the generated MAC.

7A shows an example for explaining a message authentication operation between electronic devices and a message authentication server, and FIG. 7B shows another example for explaining a message authentication operation between electronic devices and a user authentication server.

Referring to FIG. 7A , the individual electronic device is a lightweight device and does not include a memory for storing a shared key, but a TRNG PUF circuit and a CRP PUF circuit may be built-in. In the TRNG PUF, a random number distribution map and an autocorrelation function graph may be performance indicators of authentication randomness. In the CRP PUF, a Hamming distance and a bit error rate may be performance indicators of authentication identification and authentication stability.

Even if the electronic devices are designed to have the same structure, since the input/output pair of the physically non-replicable function is different for each electronic device, any electronic device cannot find out or store the secret key of another electronic device.

Accordingly, message authentication cannot be directly performed by an individual electronic device, but may be performed through a message authentication server 300 that is trusted and knows PUF input/output values of all electronic devices.

Referring to FIG. 7B , the message authentication server 300 may perform message authentication between the second to fourth electronic devices 500 , 700 , and 900 based on the first electronic device 100 .

As described above, the message authentication server 300 performs message authentication between the second to fourth electronic devices 500 , 700 , and 900 based on the first electronic device 100 , but is not limited thereto. . For example, the message authentication server 300 may include the first to fourth electronic devices 500, 700 and 900), message authentication may be performed between the remaining electronic devices except for any one electronic device.

That is, message authentication between the electronic devices 100 , 500 , 700 , and 900 is performed through a message authentication process based on a physically non-replicable function, so that the message authentication server 300 and the lightweight device can be applied and effective.

Accordingly, the most efficient method of message authentication may be a case where message authentication is performed between the electronic devices 100 , 500 , 700 and 900 through the message authentication server 300 . In the message authentication through the message authentication server 300, the secret key is not stored inside the lightweight device, and whenever necessary, message authentication is performed through a generation process based on a physically impossible function, so security and hardware (HW) ) may have an advantage. Message authentication through the message authentication server 300 can overcome the problem that the existing message authentication method is difficult to be employed in lightweight devices, and can lower the risk of hacking.

8 is a flowchart illustrating message authentication for authenticating a message generated by the second electronic device shown in FIG. 4 .

The first electronic device 100 may share the first CRP list corresponding to the first electronic device 100 with the message authentication server 300 through a secure channel. The second electronic device 500 may share the second CRP list corresponding to the second electronic device 500 with the message authentication server 300 through a secure channel.

In order to authenticate the first message generated by the second electronic device 500 , the second electronic device 500 generates a first packet including the first message and transmits the first packet to the message authentication server 300 . can (811).

For example, the second electronic device 500 may generate a TRNG PUF-based random number through the first PUF circuit included in the second electronic device 500 and convert the generated random number into a first challenge signal.

The second electronic device 500 inputs a first challenge signal to the second PUF circuit included in the second electronic device 500 so that the second PUF circuit outputs a first response signal corresponding to the first challenge signal. can

The second electronic device 500 may generate the first MAC by using the first message and the first response signal through the generator included in the second electronic device 500 . The first response signal may be an encryption key for generating the first MAC by encrypting the first message.

The second electronic device 500 may generate a first packet by packetizing the first message, the first challenge signal, and the first MAC through the packetizer included in the second electronic device 500 . In this case, the second electronic device 500 may include the ID of the second electronic device 500 in the first packet.

The second electronic device 500 may transmit the first packet to the message authentication server 300 .

The message authentication server 300 may receive the first packet (831) and authenticate the first message included in the first packet.

For example, the message authentication server 300 may extract the first message, the first challenge signal, and the first MAC from the first packet. In this case, the message authentication server 300 may also extract the ID of the second electronic device 500 from the first packet.

The message authentication server 300 may obtain a second CRP list corresponding to the second electronic device 500 from among the shared CRP lists by using the ID of the second electronic device 500 .

The message authentication server 300 may extract a response signal corresponding to the first challenge signal from the second CRP list.

The message authentication server 300 may generate the second MAC by using the first message and the response signal corresponding to the first challenge signal (833). The response signal corresponding to the first challenge signal may be an encryption key for generating the second MAC by encrypting the first message.

The message authentication server 300 may authenticate the first message by comparing the first MAC with the second MAC ( 835 ). When the first MAC and the second MAC are the same, the message authentication server 300 may determine that the authentication for the first message is successful ( 835a ). If the first MAC and the second MAC are not the same, the message authentication server 300 may determine the authentication for the first message as failure ( 835b ).

When the first message is authenticated by the message authentication server 300 , the message authentication server 300 may transmit an authentication result to the second electronic device 500 .

The second electronic device 500 may transmit the ID of the first electronic device 100 to the message authentication server 300 in response to the successful authentication of the first message of the message authentication server 300 ( 813 ).

The message authentication server 300 generates a second packet including the first message in response to the ID of the first electronic device 100 so that the first message is authenticated by the first electronic device 100 (837) , the second packet may be transmitted to the first electronic device 100 ( 839 ).

For example, the message authentication server 300 may generate a random number based on the TRNG PUF in response to the ID of the first electronic device 100 .

The message authentication server 300 may convert the generated random number into a second challenge signal.

The message authentication server 300 may obtain a first CRP list corresponding to the first electronic device 100 from among the shared CRP lists by using the ID of the first electronic device 100 .

The message authentication server 300 may extract a response signal corresponding to the second challenge signal from the first CRP list.

The message authentication server 300 may generate a third MAC by using a response signal corresponding to the first message and the second challenge signal. The response signal corresponding to the second challenge signal may be an encryption key for generating a third MAC by encrypting the first message.

The message authentication server 300 may generate a second packet by packetizing the first message, the second challenge signal, and the third MAC.

The message authentication server 300 may transmit the second packet to the first electronic device 100 .

The first electronic device 100 may receive the second packet generated by the message authentication server 300 (851) and authenticate the first message included in the second packet.

For example, the first electronic device 100 may depacketize the second packet through the depacketizer 113 to extract the first message, the second challenge signal, and the third MAC included in the second packet. .

The first electronic device 100 may input a second challenge signal to the second PUF circuit 133 to cause the second PUF circuit 133 to output a second response signal corresponding to the second challenge signal.

The first electronic device 100 may generate a fourth MAC by using the first message and the second response signal through the generator 135 ( 853 ). The second response signal may be an encryption key for generating a fourth MAC by encrypting the first message.

The first electronic device 100 may authenticate the first message by comparing the third MAC and the fourth MAC through the authenticator 137 ( 855 ). When the third MAC and the fourth MAC are the same, the first electronic device 100 may determine that the authentication of the first message is successful ( 855a ). When the third MAC and the fourth MAC are not the same, the first electronic device 100 may determine that the authentication of the first message fails ( 855b ).

When the first message is authenticated by the first electronic device 100 , the first electronic device 100 may check the integrity of the first message. In this case, the first electronic device 100 may communicate with the second electronic device 500 by identifying the second electronic device 500 as a correct sender who has transmitted the correct message.

When a communication session expires or a new message is transmitted, the first electronic device 100 , the message authentication server 300 , and the second electronic device 500 may perform message authentication again by repeating the above-described message authentication process.

The method according to the embodiment may be implemented in the form of program instructions that can be executed through various computer means and recorded in a computer-readable medium. The computer-readable medium may include program instructions, data files, data structures, etc. alone or in combination. The program instructions recorded on the medium may be specially designed and configured for the embodiment, or may be known and available to those skilled in the art of computer software. Examples of the computer-readable recording medium include magnetic media such as hard disks, floppy disks and magnetic tapes, optical media such as CD-ROMs and DVDs, and magnetic such as floppy disks. - includes magneto-optical media, and hardware devices specially configured to store and execute program instructions, such as ROM, RAM, flash memory, and the like. Examples of program instructions include not only machine language codes such as those generated by a compiler, but also high-level language codes that can be executed by a computer using an interpreter or the like. The hardware devices described above may be configured to operate as one or more software modules to perform the operations of the embodiments, and vice versa.

The software may comprise a computer program, code, instructions, or a combination of one or more thereof, which configures a processing device to operate as desired or is independently or collectively processed You can command the device. The software and/or data may be any kind of machine, component, physical device, virtual equipment, computer storage medium or device, to be interpreted by or to provide instructions or data to the processing device. , or may be permanently or temporarily embody in a transmitted signal wave. The software may be distributed over networked computer systems, and stored or executed in a distributed manner. Software and data may be stored in one or more computer-readable recording media.

As described above, although the embodiments have been described with reference to the limited drawings, those skilled in the art may apply various technical modifications and variations based on the above. For example, the described techniques are performed in a different order than the described method, and/or the described components of the system, structure, apparatus, circuit, etc. are combined or combined in a different form than the described method, or other components Or substituted or substituted by equivalents may achieve an appropriate result.

Therefore, other implementations, other embodiments, and equivalents to the claims are also within the scope of the following claims.

Claims (12)

receiving, by the first electronic device, a packet generated by the message authentication server; and
performing, by the first electronic device, authentication on the message included in the packet in response to successful authentication of the message transmitted by the second electronic device of the message authentication server
A message authentication method comprising
According to claim 1,
The performing step is,
extracting a challenge signal, a first message authentication code (MAC) and the message from the packet;
outputting a response signal by inputting the challenge signal to a physical unclonable function (PUF) circuit included in the first electronic device;
generating a second MAC using the message and the response signal; and
comparing the first MAC and the second MAC to authenticate the message
A message authentication method comprising
3. The method of claim 2,
The authentication step is
determining that authentication of the message is successful when the first MAC and the second MAC are the same; or
If the first MAC and the second MAC are not the same, determining that the authentication for the message fails
A message authentication method comprising
According to claim 1,
receiving, by the message authentication server, a packet generated by the second electronic device;
performing, by the message authentication server, authentication on the message included in the packet generated by the second electronic device; and
transmitting, by the message authentication server, an authentication result for the message to the second electronic device
A message authentication method comprising
5. The method of claim 4,
performing, by the message authentication server, authentication on the message included in the packet generated by the second electronic device,
extracting a challenge signal, a first MAC, and the message from the packet generated by the second electronic device;
extracting a response signal corresponding to the challenge signal from a challenge to response pairs (CRP) list;
generating a second MAC using the message and the response signal; and
comparing the first MAC and the second MAC to authenticate the message
A message authentication method comprising
6. The method of claim 5,
The authentication step is
determining that authentication of the message is successful when the first MAC and the second MAC are the same; or
If the first MAC and the second MAC are not the same, determining that the authentication for the message fails
A message authentication method comprising
5. The method of claim 4,
transmitting, by the message authentication server, a packet generated by the message authentication server to the first electronic device in response to the ID of the first electronic device transmitted from the second electronic device
A message authentication method further comprising a.
8. The method of claim 7,
The transmitting step is
generating a random number in response to the ID of the first electronic device;
converting the random number into a challenge signal for authenticating the message;
extracting a response signal corresponding to the challenge signal from a challenge to response pairs (CRP) list;
generating a MAC using the message and the response signal; and
packetizing the challenge signal, the message and the MAC.
A message authentication method comprising
In an electronic device,
a transceiver for communicating with a message authentication device to receive a packet generated by the message authentication device; and
A security chip that authenticates the message included in the packet in response to authentication success for messages transmitted by different electronic devices of the message authentication server
An electronic device comprising a.
10. The method of claim 9,
The security chip,
a PUF circuit for outputting a response signal in response to the challenge signal included in the packet;
a generator for generating a MAC by using the message and the response signal; and
An authenticator that authenticates the message by comparing the generated MAC and the MAC included in the packet.
An electronic device comprising a.
11. The method of claim 10,
The authenticator is
if the generated MAC and the MAC included in the packet are the same, determining authentication for the message as success; or
When the generated MAC and the MAC included in the packet are not the same, the message authentication method determines that authentication of the message fails.
10. The method of claim 9,
The transceiver is an electronic device implemented in the security chip.

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