KR20200019381A - Method for handling security data - Google Patents

Abstract

According to an embodiment of the present invention, a security information management method performed between a first peer and a second peer constituting a network comprises the steps of: enabling the first peer to request the second peer to perform a user registration procedure, and to request the generation of a private key for a user; and enabling the second peer to generate the private key unique to the user, to divide the private key into two, to generate reference information for authentication unique to the user, to divide the authentication reference information into two, to generate manipulated reference information by combining a personal key front end with an authentication reference information front end in a predetermined combination manner, to generate a manipulated personal key by combining an authentication reference information rear end with a private key rear end in the combination manner, to generate additional information indicative of the point of division of the private key and the combination manner, to store the manipulated reference information by itself, and to transmit the manipulated private key and the additional information to the first peer. Therefore, the present invention can safely manage the private key among the peers constituting the network.

Description

How to manage security information {METHOD FOR HANDLING SECURITY DATA}

The present invention relates to a method for managing security information, and more particularly, to a method for securely managing a private key in a network.

Because all data is shared in a network, information that requires strict security, such as a private key, is protected by specific encryption.

When you create an account on a cryptocurrency exchange, you will automatically have an exchange wallet linked to your account. The exchange wallet holds cryptocurrency assets traded on the exchange. When using an exchange wallet, the user does not own the private and public keys of the wallet. Private and public keys are cryptographic values that you need to access your wallet, so owning keys means you own a cryptocurrency asset. When using an exchange wallet, both the wallet's private and public keys are managed by the exchange.

The user trades cryptocurrency in real time using the exchange account and password, and the exchange completes the cryptocurrency trading by connecting blocks to the chain after multiple confirmations that securely solve the Byzantine general problem. The exchange keeps the cryptocurrency in a cold wallet (hardware wallet), transfers the cryptocurrency to a hot wallet (software wallet) before proceeding with the transaction, and then proceeds with the trading process.

On the other hand, in the general trading system, the user's private key is stored in the hot wallet of the exchange. As such, when the hot wallet stores the private key, there is a possibility that the exchange is hacked to expose the private key.

The present invention is to provide a method for securely managing a private key among peers constituting a network as well as at a cryptocurrency exchange as described above.

In addition, we want to implement a reliable transaction by a private key managed securely.

Security information management method between the first and second peers constituting the network according to an embodiment of the present invention for achieving the above object is: the first peer: to the second peer, a user registration procedure Requesting execution of and requesting to generate a private key for the user, wherein the second peer is further configured to: generate a private key K unique to the user; Divide the private key K into two (K = A + B); Generating authentication reference information S unique to the user; Dividing the authentication reference information (S) by two (S = C + D); The private key front end (A) is combined with the standard information front end (C) for authentication in a predetermined combination to generate manipulated reference information (S '= C + A), and the back end (D) and the private key for authentication reference information. Combining the rear end (B) in the above combination to generate a manipulated private key (K '= D + B); Generate additional information (SOK) indicating a point at which the private key K is divided and the coupling scheme; The manipulated reference information S 'may be stored by itself, and the manipulated private key K' and the additional information SOK may be transmitted to the first peer.

Here, dividing the private key (K) into two parts comprises: the front end of the private key (A) and the rear end of the private key (B) at the point corresponding to 45 to 55% of the total number of bits of the private key (K). Further comprising, but the percentage is characterized in that the randomly determined each time generating a new private key (K).

In addition, dividing the authentication reference information (S) into two is: at the point where the authentication reference information rear end (D) becomes the same number of bits as the private key front end (A), the front end of the authentication reference information (C). ) And the authentication standard information rear end (D) further comprises.

In particular, the combination method of the authentication reference information rear end (D) and the private key rear end (B) is the private key rear end (B) at any bit position (R) of the authentication reference information rear end (D). A first method of inserting the first information; and a second method of dividing each of the back end D of the authentication reference information and the back end B of the private key into a specific number of bits N and alternately connecting the equalized units. It may be one of the.

On the other hand, the additional information (SOK), the first bit to indicate that the coupling scheme is the first scheme, the private key is divided into the private key front end (A) and the private key rear end (B) It may include a second bit representing a point.

Alternatively, the additional information SOK may include a first bit for indicating that the combination scheme is the second scheme, and the private key K to the front end of the private key A and the rear end B of the private key. And a second bit indicating the divided point and indicating the number of bits N equally divided into the back end D of the authentication reference information D and the back end B of the private key.

In addition, the first bit of the additional information SOK may be set to indicate the combining method according to a calculation result value by the PARITY algorithm of all bits constituting the additional information SOK. .

In this case, the point P may be determined using a lookup table composed of any number represented by the second bit and any point linked to the number.

At least one of the second bits of the additional information SOK may be used simultaneously to indicate the number for determining the point P and the number N of bits.

Alternatively, at least one bit of the second bits of the additional information SOK may be used simultaneously to indicate the number and the bit position R for determining the point P. FIG.

Here, the authentication reference information (S) is characterized in that the template information obtained by binary information of the information obtained from the biometrics of the legitimate user for the second peer.

As a method which can be added to the embodiment, the first peer: requests the second peer to execute a user authentication and private key restoration procedure, and the manipulated private key (K '= D + B); Requesting transmission of the private key front end (A) while providing the additional information (SOK); The second peer is: receiving authentication attempt information T from the user; With reference to the additional information SOK, the authentication reference information front end C is obtained from the stored stored reference information S '= C + A, and from the manipulated private key K', Acquiring authentication reference information rear end (D) to construct the authentication reference information (S = C + D); The step of authenticating or rejecting the user may be further considered by comparing the authentication attempt information T and the authentication reference information S. FIG.

Here, the second peer: if the user is authenticated, further comprising the step of transmitting the private key flyer (A) to the first peer, wherein the first peer is: the private key flyer ( Upon receiving A), the private key front end (A) is combined with the private key rear end (B) obtained from the stored private key (K ') stored in the private key (K = A + B). It may further comprise the step of restoring.

In addition, the private key front end A transmitted to the first peer may be encrypted using the back end D of the authentication reference information.

In addition, another embodiment of the present invention may be provided wherein the method for managing security information includes: the first peer: requesting the second peer to execute a user registration procedure and generating a private key for the user; Making; And the second peer: generates a private key K unique to the user, divides the private key K in any bit position P (K = A + B); Generating authentication reference information (S) unique to the user, and dividing the authentication reference information (S) at an arbitrary bit position (P ') (S = C + D); Each of the two-divided private keys A and B and each of the two-divided authentication reference information C and D are cross-linked with each other in an arbitrary manner to operate the private key K 'and the manipulated reference information ( S '); Generating a bit position P obtained by dividing the private key K, a bit position P ′ obtained by dividing the authentication reference information S into two, and additional information SOK indicating the crosslinking scheme. It may include.

The method may further include storing the manipulated reference information S ′ in the second peer and storing the manipulated private key K ′ and the additional information SOK in the first peer. can do.

According to the security information management method according to the present invention including the procedure described above, it is possible to securely manage by distributing and storing the security information of the user.

In addition, by cross-linking the security information of the user with each other, more secure management is possible.

Finally, using this securely managed security information, it is possible to establish a secure transaction procedure using cryptocurrency.

1 illustrates a system for implementing a security information management method according to the present invention.
2 is a diagram illustrating a method of dividing a private key and authentication reference information.
FIG. 3 is a diagram for explaining a method of configuring an operated private key and manipulated reference information, and a function of each bit of additional information (SOK).
4 is a flowchart illustrating a user registration procedure in a method for managing security information according to the present invention.
5 is a flowchart illustrating a user authentication and private key restoration procedure in the security information management method according to the present invention.

Hereinafter, with reference to the accompanying drawings will be described a preferred embodiment of a security information management method according to the present invention. For reference, terms referring to each component of the present invention are named by way of example in consideration of their functions, and thus, the technical contents of the present invention should not be predicted and limited by the term itself.

First, with reference to FIG. 1, a system for implementing the security information management method according to the present invention will be described. The security information management method proposed by the present invention may be implemented by at least two peers constituting the network.

The first peer 10 may be, for example, an exchange side terminal of a cryptocurrency, and may also be referred to as a hot wallet. In addition, the first peer 10 may exchange transaction information of a cryptocurrency in a blockchain manner through a network.

The first peer 10 may provide a dedicated electronic wallet to a given user, and the electronic wallet stores the balance of the cryptocurrency owned by the user. The user can use the balance stored in the electronic wallet to conduct transactions on the network. Transaction information, including the payment status of the transaction associated with the transaction, may be stored in the electronic wallet and shared with the blockchain.

This transaction information should be generated after a block is signed (or approved) using the private key K of the user who performed the transaction. The first peer 10 may request the user's private key K from the second peer 20 and sign the transaction information using the private key K provided from the second peer 20. .

The second peer 20 may be a user terminal for requesting a transaction using a cryptocurrency, and may also be referred to as a cold wallet.

In particular, the second peer 20 may further include a biometrics acquisition module 22 capable of obtaining biometrics from a specific body part of the user. Here, the bio-characteristics may be inherent and invariant, such as iris images, fingerprints, blood vessel patterns of specific body parts, DNA information, voices, and face shapes, and may be arbitrarily selected by users, such as passwords, specific phrases, facial expressions, or gestures. It may be something that can be specified. Acquisition module 22 for acquiring such bio-features may include various means such as a camera, a scanner, a keypad.

The second peer 20 may request payment by using a cryptocurrency by accessing the electronic wallet implemented in the first peer 10, and may transmit a user's private key K to approve the transaction. . At this time, the second peer 20 transmits the private key K only for a transaction by a legitimate user who has passed the biometric authentication using the biometrics acquisition module 22 described above (so that the transaction is approved). Can be implemented.

Next, a user registration procedure in the security information management method according to the present invention will be described with reference to the flowchart of FIG. 4. 2 and 3, the method of dividing the private key and the authentication reference information, and the method of configuring the operated private key, the manipulated reference information and additional information (SOK) in detail. Explain.

In the present invention, the private key K is exemplarily 256 bits long. In addition, the biometric information (that is, the authentication reference information and the authentication attempt information) generated by the biometric feature acquisition module 22 is assumed to be 4640 bits (580 bytes) in size.

The user may operate the second peer 20. When the user first accesses the first peer 10 by operating the second peer 20 and notifies the first peer 10 that he wants to conduct a transaction using a cryptocurrency, the first peer 10 receives the user. Generate a uniquely designated electronic wallet, and request the second peer 20 to execute a user registration procedure (301).

The second peer 20 initiates a user registration procedure and generates a private key K uniquely to the user (302). In this case, the second peer 20 may further generate a public key to be shared with the first peer 10 and may further generate its own account number to be used for cryptocurrency transactions.

The second peer 20 can divide the generated private key K into two. That is, the private key K may be divided into a private key front end A and a private key rear end B at an arbitrary point P (K = A + B).

At this time, the point (P) for separating the private key (K) is preferably a point of 50 ± 5% of the total number of bits constituting the private key (K), in this case, it is to exclude the point that is exactly 50% More preferred. That is, in the case of the private key K composed of 256 bits, it can be divided into two at the 116th to 140th points. If so, the private key front end A may consist of 116 to 140 bits, and in this regard, the private key back end B may consist of 140 to 116 bits.

Alternatively, the private key K can be split at points that are greater than 50% and up to 55%. If so, the private key front end (A) may have a size of 129 to 140 bits, and the private key back end (B) will have a size of 116 to 127 bits.

As will be described later, the number of gadgets that distinguish the private key K (that is, the type of the point P that can be selected) must be less than or equal to the number that can be represented by using four bits of additional information SOK. do. In the above example of dividing the private key K at a point greater than 50% to 55% or less, since the private key K can be distinguished at one of the 129th to 140th points, 12 points are possible, This allows linking each point with the number represented by four bits, so that all points can be represented by a lookup table.

In Fig. 2, by dividing the private key K at the point P where the 132th bit starts, the front end of the private key A consists of 131 bits, and the rear end of the private key consists of 125 bits. Doing.

On the other hand, the point P for dividing the private key K into two can be determined differently and randomly each time a new private key is generated. In other words, a 48% point may be selected when generating a private key for User 1, and a 54% point may be selected when generating a private key for User 2. In this way, since the private key is divided at different points for each user, even if the manipulated private key (K '= D + B) and the manipulated reference information (S' = C + A) are stolen, the private key (K = It is difficult to accurately restore A + B).

Meanwhile, the second peer 20 requests the biometric feature acquisition module 22 to acquire biometric features from the current user and transmit biometric information (304).

The biometric feature acquisition module 22 acquires the biometric feature by photographing or scanning a living body of the user (305). The obtained biocharacteristic is binary information to form the biometric information M, and the configured biometric information M is transmitted to the second peer 20.

The second peer 20 may set the received biometric information M as the reference information S for authentication (306). That is, since the received biometric information M may be regarded as biometric information of a legitimate user (ie, an authenticated user), the biometric information M is set as the authentication reference information S to be used for subsequent biometric authentication. It can be. The biometric information M, the authentication reference information S, and / or the authentication attempt information T may be configured with 4640 bits.

The standard information S for authentication is divided into two (S = C + D) 307. At this time, the point of dividing the authentication reference information (S) by two may be a predetermined fixed point or randomly determined. In particular, in the present invention, the point of dividing the authentication reference information (S) by two may be a point where the size of the reference information rear end (D) is the same number of bits as the private key front end (A). Thus, even if the rear end D of the reference information is replaced with the front end of the private key A, the total size of the authentication reference information S does not change.

That is, if the private key (K) is divided at the point (P) at which the 132th bit starts, and the front end of the private key (A) is 131 bits in size, the authentication reference information (S) at the point where the 4510th bit starts. In this way, the authentication reference information front end (C) has a size of 4509 bits, and the authentication reference information rear end (D) has a size of 131 bits (the same size as the size of the private key front end (A)). .

The second peer 20 combines the authentication standard information rear end (D) and the private key rear end (B) to form a manipulated private key (K '= D + B), and the authentication reference information front end (C). And the private key front end (A) are combined to form the manipulated reference information (S '= C + A) (308).

Here, the method of combining the authentication standard information rear end (D) and the private key rear end (B) and the method of combining the authentication reference information front end (C) and the private key front end (A) are preferably the same. At least two things can be considered.

The first combining method is to insert private key information in an arbitrary position in the middle of the authentication reference information. That is, when the manipulated private key K 'is to be configured, as shown in FIG. 3 (a), two units are obtained by dividing the authentication reference information rear end D at an arbitrary bit position R at two times. (D1, D2), and after the end of the bits constituting the divided unit (D1), the private key rear end (B) is placed, followed by the end of the bits constituting the private key rear end (B) followed by a unit ( D2) is placed (K '= D1 + B + D2). Thus, if the bit position R is not known, it is impossible to recover the authentication reference information rear end D and the private key rear end B from the manipulated private key k ', thereby improving security. Here, the bit position R may be indicated by the additional information SOK.

On the other hand, similarly, when constructing the manipulated reference information S ', the front end C for authentication is divided at the bit position R, and the private key front end A is inserted at this divided position. (S '= C1 + A + C2).

The second combining method is to divide each piece of information into smaller units and alternately arrange each divided unit. That is, an arbitrary number of equally divided bits (or bytes) N is determined, and the rear end D of the authentication reference information is divided for each number N, and a plurality of units D1, D2, D3, .. Make.) Further, the rear end B of the private key is divided for each bit number N to form a plurality of units B1, B2, B3, .... And, as shown in Fig. 3 (b), it is also possible to configure the manipulated private key (K '= D1 + B1 + D2 + B2 + D3 ...) by alternately connecting the units.

On the other hand, the same method can be used when configuring the manipulated reference information (S '). That is, by dividing the authentication reference information front end (C) and the private key front end (A) for each number (N) and alternately joining the divided units S '= C1 + It can be configured as A1 + C2 + A2 + C3 + A3 + C4 ...

The second peer 20 indicates the point P at which the private key K is cut off, and also the type of the combination scheme and the bit position to divide the divided information (ie, C and D) into two again. (R) and / or additional information SOK indicating the number of bits N divided into two pieces of divided information may be configured (309). As such, the additional information SOK is essential for restoring the private key K and restoring the authentication reference information S in the present invention.

The additional information SOK may be composed of a plurality of bytes. However, in the present invention, as shown, the additional information SOK is composed of a single byte having eight bits (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h). do. Here, the upper seven bits may be determined to indicate the point at which the private key K is cut off and / or the number of equally divided bytes N, and the lower one bit may be determined to indicate how to combine the information.

In particular, it is possible to indicate the point P at which the private key K is cut using the fourth to seventh bits d, e, f, and g. Here, the number of cases that can be represented by four bits (d, e, f, g) is 16, whereas in order to indicate a point P for dividing the private key K, the bit number is 116 to 140. Should be able to indicate Therefore, the number of 16 cases represented by four bits is linked by linking a selectable bit number (in this case, 25 cases, using only 16 points among them) as the point P to be divided. A method of constructing a lookup table and searching for a bit number corresponding to the number indicated by the four bits of additional information to determine the splitting point P may be utilized.

In particular, when the additional information SOK indicates the private key K 'combined in the second combining method, the point P where the private key K is cut using seven bits from the first to seventh. In addition, it should be possible to indicate the number of bits (N) obtained by dividing each piece of information. Therefore, in the present invention, the point P is obtained by cutting the private key K using the 4th to 7th four bits, and the number of bits divided by the 1st to 7th 7th bits ( N). That is, the four to seventh bits may be used in duplicate to indicate the point P and the number N. FIG.

Here, the additional information (SOK) is to indicate which of the two connection methods is used according to the result of calculating the Exclusive-OR, which is a simple parity algorithm, for all eight bits constituting the additional information (SOK). Can be configured. For example, if the result value of the 8-bit parity algorithm is "0" or "EVEN", it indicates that the first combining method is used. If the result value is "1" or "ODD", the second value is used. You can indicate that a binding method is used. As a matter of course, depending on whether the value of the eighth bit h is "0" or "1", each connection scheme may be indicated.

For example, if the eight bits of the additional information SOK are "10110011", the result of calculating the exclusive-OR of all eight bits becomes "1", and thus, the second combining method is used. Since the bits d, e, f, and g from the fourth to seventh are "1001", the cut point P may be determined by finding a value linked to "9" of the lookup table. In addition, "1011001" of the first through seventh bits (a, b, c, d, e, f, and g) may represent that each piece of information is divided into "89" bits. On the other hand, in this example, since the calculation result of the exclusive-OR of bits (a, b, c, d, e, f, g) from the first to seventh becomes "0", it indicates that the second combining method is used. The eighth bit (h) is set to "1".

The second peer 20 may provide the first peer with the manipulated private key K 'and the additional information SOK generated as described above. The second peer 20 stores and maintains the manipulated reference information S 'on its own, and does not delete and maintain the manipulated private key K' and additional information SOK on its own after operation (310). ).

The first peer 10 stores and maintains the received manipulated private key K 'and additional information SOK by itself (311).

Through the above-described processes, the procedure of registering the right user in the first and second peers is completed. At this time, since the first peer 10 does not have the entire private key of the user but only a part thereof, even if the private key K ′ manipulated by an external malicious hack is seized, the private key K is still present. Can be secured.

In addition, since the second peer 20 also has only a part of the private key and a part of the authentication reference information, the entire information can still be protected even if the information is hijacked by hacking.

In a further embodiment, similarly to the first combining method, the private key K is divided into two at an arbitrary position P to be divided into the private key front end A and the private key rear end B, and the authentication criteria The information S may be divided into two at another arbitrary position P ′ to be divided into the reference information front end C and the reference information rear end D.

Then, they can be combined with each other in any order or manner to form the manipulated private key K 'and the manipulated reference information S'.

For example, the manipulated private key K 'may be constructed by concatenating the private key front end A and the reference information front end C in any order (K' = A + C or K '= C). + A). Similarly, the manipulated reference information S 'can be constructed by concatenating the private key rear end B and the reference information rear end D in any order (S' = B + D or S = D + B).

On the other hand, the information indicating the position P obtained by dividing the private key K into two, the position P 'obtained by dividing the authentication reference information S into two, and the information indicating the order and method of cross-combining the divided information; Additional information (SOK) including a may be configured.

Next, a user authentication procedure and a private key restoration procedure in the security information management method according to the present invention will be described with reference to the flowchart of FIG. 5. Such a procedure may correspond to a procedure for approving a transaction using cryptocurrency. That is, when a user attempts to trade by cryptocurrency through the second peer 20, the first peer 10 constructs a transaction (ie, a RAW transaction) to complete the transaction, and the second peer 20 Sign the RAW transaction using the private key (K) provided by the user, broadcast the approved transaction to the blockchain network by the first peer, and complete the transaction settlement by connecting the generated block to the blockchain. do.

When the user registration procedure as described above with reference to FIG. 4 is performed, the first peer 10 is provided with the manipulated private key K ', and when the user's private key K is to be used later, After receiving the remaining portion of the private key K (i.e., the private key leaflet A) from the second peer 20, it must restore the complete private key K. On the other hand, since the second peer 20 provides the private key flyer A to the first peer 10 only when the user who is currently accessing the second peer 20 is a legitimate user, the second peer 20 can enhance security.

First, the first peer 10 requests the second peer 20 to provide information for restoring the private key K after authenticating the user (401). This request includes sending the manipulated private key (K '= D + B) and additional information (SOK) stored therein to the second peer (402).

The second peer 20 controls to acquire the biometric information M by operating the biometric feature acquisition module 22 in order to authenticate whether the user currently using the second peer 20 is a legitimate user (403).

The biometric feature acquisition module 22 acquires biometric features by photographing or scanning a user's living body and generates the biometric information M by binarizing the biometric feature (404).

The second peer 20 sets the received biometric information M as the authentication attempt information T (405).

On the other hand, the second peer 20 obtains the authentication reference information front end C from the self-stored manipulated reference information S 'and operates the private key K' provided by the first peer 10. From the end of the authentication reference information (D) is obtained, and combines the authentication reference information front end (C) and the rear end (D) to restore the complete authentication reference information (S = C + D) (406).

Subsequently, the authentication attempt information T received from the biometric feature acquisition module 22 and the authentication reference information S are compared with each other to perform a user authentication procedure (407).

If the similarity between the authentication attempt information T and the authentication reference information S does not reach the authentication reference value, authentication is determined to be a failure and the user's access is denied.

On the contrary, if the similarity between the authentication attempt information T and the authentication reference information S is equal to or higher than the authentication reference value, authentication is determined to be successful, and the user's private key restoration procedure is continued (408).

The second peer 20 may obtain the private key front end A from the manipulated reference information S ′ = C + A and transmit the obtained private key front end A to the first peer 10. . At this time, the private key front end (A) is preferably encrypted and transmitted. In the present invention, the back end (D) for authentication can be encrypted using the symmetric key (D (A)) 409.

Since the first peer 10 already knows the end of the authentication reference information (D), by decrypting the received encrypted private key front end (D (A)) using the authentication reference information (D) as a symmetric key, The private key leaflet A may be restored (410).

The first peer 10 may restore the complete private key (K = A + B) by combining the restored private key front end (A) and the private key back end (B) that it already has (411). By using the private key (K) it is possible to perform the desired operation.

The embodiments of the present invention described above are merely illustrative of the technical idea of the present invention, and the protection scope of the present invention should be interpreted by the following claims. In addition, various modifications and variations will be possible to those skilled in the art without departing from the essential characteristics of the present invention. All technical ideas within the scope equivalent to the present invention are the present invention. It should be construed as being included in the scope of rights.

Claims (16)

A security information management method performed between a first peer and a second peer constituting a network:
The first peer is:
Requesting the second peer to execute a user registration procedure and requesting to generate a private key for the user;
The second peer is:
Generate a private key K unique to the user;
Divide the private key K into two (K = A + B);
Generating authentication reference information S unique to the user;
Dividing the authentication reference information (S) by two (S = C + D);
The private key front end (A) is combined with the standard information front end (C) for authentication in a predetermined combination to generate manipulated reference information (S '= C + A), and the back end (D) and the private key for authentication reference information. Combining the rear end (B) in the above combination to generate a manipulated private key (K '= D + B);
Generate additional information (SOK) indicating a point at which the private key K is divided and the coupling scheme;
And storing the manipulated reference information (S ') by itself and transmitting the manipulated private key (K') and the additional information (SOK) to the first peer. The method of claim 1,
Dividing the private key (K) by two:
The method may further include dividing the private key front end (A) and the private key rear end (B) at a point P corresponding to 45 to 55% of the total number of bits of the private key K.
The percentage is randomly determined each time generating a new private key (K), security information management method. The method of claim 1,
Dividing the authentication reference information (S) into two is:
When the authentication reference information rear end (D) is the same number of bits as the front end of the private key (A), further divided into the authentication reference information front end (C) and the authentication reference information rear end (D). Security information management method. The method of claim 1,
The combination method of the back end (D) and the private key (B) of the authentication reference information,
A first method of inserting the private key rear end B into an arbitrary bit position R of the rear end D of the authentication reference information;
Characterized in that it is one of a second method of dividing each of the authentication standard information rear end (D) and the private key rear end (B) in units of a specific number of bits (N) and alternately connecting the divided units. How security information is managed. The method of claim 4, wherein
The additional information (SOK),
A first bit to indicate that the coupling scheme is the first scheme;
And a second bit representing the point (P) that divides the private key into the private key front end (A) and the private key rear end (B). The method of claim 4, wherein
The additional information (SOK),
A first bit to indicate that the combining method is the second method;
Represents the point P which divides the private key K into the private key front end A and the private key rear end B, and also the back end of the authentication reference information D and the private key back end B. And a second bit representing the number of bits (N) divided into equal parts. The method according to claim 5 or 6,
And the first bit is set to indicate the combination method according to a calculation result value by a PARITY algorithm of all bits constituting the additional information (SOK). The method according to claim 5 or 6,
The point P,
And a lookup table consisting of an arbitrary number represented by said second bit and a particular point linked to said number. The method of claim 8,
At least one of the second bits is used simultaneously to indicate the number for determining the point (P) and the number of bits (N). The method of claim 8,
At least one of the second bits is used simultaneously to indicate the number and the bit position (R) for determining the point (P). The method of claim 1,
The authentication reference information (S) is a security information management method, characterized in that the template information obtained by binarizing the information obtained from the biometrics of the legitimate user for the second peer. The method of claim 1,
The first peer is:
Requesting the second peer to execute a user authentication and private key restoration procedure, and providing the manipulated private key (K '= D + B) and the additional information (SOK), Requesting transmission;
The second peer is:
Receiving authentication attempt information (T) from the user;
With reference to the additional information SOK, the authentication reference information front end C is obtained from the stored stored reference information S '= C + A, and from the manipulated private key K', Acquiring authentication reference information back stage (D) to restore the authentication reference information (S = C + D);
And comparing or authenticating the authentication attempt information (T) with the restored authentication reference information (S) to authenticate or reject the user. The method of claim 12,
The second peer is:
If the user is authenticated, sending the private key leaflet A to the first peer,
In this case, the first peer is:
Upon receiving the private key front end (A), the private key front end (A) is combined with the private key rear end (B) obtained from the stored private key (K ') stored in the private key (K). = A + B) further comprising the step of restoring security information management. The method of claim 13,
The private key front end (A) transmitted to the first peer is encrypted using the authentication reference back end (D), security information management method. A security information management method performed between a first peer and a second peer constituting a network:
The first peer is:
Requesting the second peer to execute a user registration procedure and requesting to generate a private key for the user;
The second peer is:
Generate a private key (K) unique to the user, and divide the private key (K) into two at any bit position (P) (K = A + B);
Generating authentication reference information (S) unique to the user, and dividing the authentication reference information (S) at an arbitrary bit position (P ′) (S = C + D);
Each of the two-divided private keys A and B and each of the two-divided authentication reference information C and D are cross-linked with each other in an arbitrary manner to operate the private key K 'and the manipulated reference information ( S ');
Generating a bit position P obtained by dividing the private key K, a bit position P ′ obtained by dividing the authentication reference information S into two, and additional information SOK indicating the crosslinking scheme. Including, security information management method. The method of claim 15,
And storing the manipulated reference information S 'in the second peer and storing the manipulated private key K' and the additional information SOK in the first peer. How to manage.

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