KR20190049333A - The PUF-QRNG remote meter reader - Google Patents

Abstract

According to the present invention, personal identification number (PIN) data is generated using a physical process variation occurring during a manufacturing process of a physically unclonable function (PUF) chip to generate a symmetric encryption key. An asymmetric cryptographic key is generated by encrypting the symmetric cryptographic key with a quantum random number generated through a quantum random number generator. An asymmetric cryptographic key is regenerated through either the quantum random number generator or a pseudo random number generator in the asymmetric cryptographic key. The asymmetric cryptographic key generated by the pseudo random number generator is stored by including the random number generating hash function in the newly generated asymmetric cryptographic key.

Description

The PUF-QRNG remote meter reader < RTI ID = 0.0 >

PUF-QRNG.

Patent related to PUF-QRNG system-on security chip and security terminal with PUF chip.

It is related to the blocking of the fire sale hacking from the North Korean quantum computer via the overseas proxy server from North Korea.

Personal Identification Number (PIN) data is extracted from the PUF chip through the process deviation that occurs in semiconductor manufacturing related to the security key generation and distribution using the miniature PUF (Phisycally Unclonable Function) chip and QRNG (Quantum Random Number Generator) chip. Generates a symmetric key (decryption key), and encrypts the symmetric key (decryption key) through a random quantum random number generated through the QRNG to generate an asymmetric key (cryptographic key).

When the data measured by the sensor is encrypted with the asymmetric key (encryption key), the data measured by the original sensor can be restored through the symmetric key (decryption key).

In particular, P2P bi-directional communication with both quantum security and PUF security is possible between any PC in the world connected to the Internet and a PC with remote USB and local USB.

An apparatus and method for generating an identification key for hardware security, the method comprising: performing a physical entity authentication by applying an apparatus and method for generating an identification key by implementing a PUF (Physically Unclonable Function) To enhance security.

Generally, IP camera can be secured by software, but software method is added after hardware is already formed, so there is a possibility of being modulated.

Therefore, in order to solve the fundamental problem of data security, it is necessary to design data security from the beginning of designing hardware to process data.

The present invention has no memory burden and high processing speed due to physical security implemented in hardware.

A PIN (Personal Identification Number) value is generated through the PUF using a deviation occurring in a production process of an IC (Integrated Circuit) chip, and then an authentication request key including a PIN value of a PUF installed in the terminal after storing in a public authentication platform The authentication process is performed when the PIN is received by the authorized authentication platform.

If the PUF authenticates the physical terminal in hardware, generating an authentication request key (cryptographic key / decryption key) in which the PIN value of the PUF is generated as a one-time quantum random number OTP (One Time Password) .

The quantum random number generator includes a random number generator and a pseudo random number generator, and the random number generator generates a cryptographic key using a random random number generated using an unpredictable natural phenomenon.

As the unpredictable natural phenomenon, a quantum random number (QRN) is generated by using natural light, LED (Light Emitting Diode), LD (Laser Diode), radiation, thermal noise and noise.

And generates a symmetric cryptographic key for mutual cryptographic communication using the cryptographic key with a pair of cryptographic keys.

Unlike the above quantum random number, the OTP (One Time Password) asymmetric cryptographic key is encrypted and generated through a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG).

The quantum random number generator of the present invention generates a quantum random number (QRN) symmetric cryptographic key and a pseudorandom number (PRN) asymmetric cryptographic key, enabling two-way communication and authentication through a pair of symmetric cryptographic keys Do.

And generating an asymmetric cryptographic key that is re-encrypted through the pseudo-random number generator to the quantum random symmetric cryptographic key so that the asymmetric cryptographic key can be decrypted through the symmetric cryptographic key.

Internet of Thing, a system for sharing information in daily life through wired / wireless networks, is becoming popular. The object Internet is a object space network that forms intelligent relationships such as sensing, networking, and information processing in cooperation with human, objects, and services.

The security threats are also increasing due to the generalization of the Internet. In order to secure the Internet security of things, it is necessary to secure all sections from the Internet device to the system without interruption. Especially because they have to communicate with devices with various functions and protocols, they are exposed to security threats because they have to use open standard technology.

On the other hand, the software-based random number generation technique has a problem in that it can use a lot of resources and can grasp a random number generation pattern by using an advanced hacking technique.

Therefore, in order to secure the security between the Internet devices of the objects, a natural random number or a genuine random number that extracts a random number from the randomness of a natural phenomenon is requested. Although it has no specific pattern and can not be predicted, it is large and very expensive, There is a problem that is difficult to apply to a device.

IP Security Protocol (IPSec) is a protocol developed for security in the packet processing layer of network communication. It is used to protect data transmitted and received through a VPN (Virtual Private Network) from public network users Lt; / RTI >

The local-based IPSec VPN service is a virtual private network service that allows various communication locales to connect to a VPN local to a public network and connect to a remote private network to exchange VPN traffic without setting up a separate VPN. In order to utilize the virtual private network service as described above, the VPN locally performs an authentication step for creating a virtual private network gateway (VPN GW) and an IPSec tunnel through a public network. In IPSec, a key exchange IKE method is divided into 1 step (Main Mode or Aggressive Mode) and 2 step (Quick Mode). The first stage of the IKE is an Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) step for exchanging encrypted data in a public network without security. The VPN local and virtual private network gateways (VPN G / W) Shared key (Pre-Shared Key), ISAKMP encryption method, and hash function. The second step is to negotiate the encryption method of data to be exchanged through the actual IPSec tunnel and the type of traffic to be exchanged through the IPSec tunnel.

These local IPsec VPN services can be divided into wired base and wireless base. In the wired base, the above-mentioned VPN local connects to the VPN G / W via the wired network, and the wireless base connects to the VPN G / W via the wireless network. will be. In the wireline-based VPN service, a fixed IP address is assigned to the VPN locale and a VPN local and virtual private network gateway (VPN G / W) is assigned for the IKE 1-step authentication between the VPN local and the virtual private network gateway (VPN G / W) (Pre-Shared Key) preset in the VPN G / W, and determines whether the IP address of the VPN local having the corresponding pre-shared key in the VPN G / W is the fixedly assigned IP address Authentication is performed in such a way as to confirm. In this case, the actual user local located in the subscriber's VPN local area can access the remote private network through the VPN local without any authentication procedure.

 As the use of wired and wireless communication including the Internet is rapidly expanding, the security problems of the communication network are becoming more and more important in terms of protection of important confidentiality in the state, enterprise, and finance and personal privacy protection. The asymmetric public key cryptosystem, which was developed in the 1970s and widely used in communication systems such as the Internet, is a method of encrypting information using a mathematical problem that is very difficult to solve as a public key and decrypting the information using the secret key. It is based on mathematical "computational complexity".

The RSA public-key cryptosystem developed by three people, Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman, for example, takes advantage of the fact that it is very difficult to decompose very large numbers into small numbers. In mathematical terms, the problem of factoring in small numbers increases exponentially with computation time as the size of the problem increases. Thus, if the sender and the receiver use a sufficiently large number of factorization problems as their public key, It will be impossible. However, the cryptosystem based on this mathematical computational complexity has been questioned about the safety of more sophisticated algorithms, and Peter Shor of AT & T in 1994 developed quantum computer decomposition algorithms using quantum computers. The RSA cryptosystem is found to be fundamentally decryptable.

Quantum cryptography technology, which has emerged as an alternative to solve this security problem, is based on the principle of quantum mechanics, which is the fundamental law of nature, rather than mathematical computational complexity. . In other words, the quantum cryptography communication technology is a technique for distributing cryptographic keys (disposable random numbers) absolutely securely in real time between a sender and a receiver on the basis of a quantum physics law such as " ) ".

The first quantum cryptography protocol was IBM's C.H. Bennett and G. Brassard of the University of Montreal.

Named after the designers, this protocol, named the BB84 protocol, uses four quantum states (for example, the polarization state of a single photon) that make up two bases.

However, according to the above prior art, there is a limitation in that a transmission / reception device for a communication image localizer and a server is required to transmit and receive a quantum cipher, and a cost for transmitting / receiving the communication image localizer and the server is increased.

In the field of object intelligence communication, a new technology called PUF allows a device to generate a password by itself and use it for authentication, thereby performing security authentication at a reliable level to identify each other among the devices and to confirm that the device is a legitimate entity Apparatus and method are provided.

In a secure communication using encryption / decryption is applied to a device or systems that perform object intelligence communication, security authentication devices and methods robust against a physical attack or unauthorized access to the security authentication system of the device are provided.

The key method in which data is transmitted only in one direction after generating a one-time quantum random number OTP (One Time Password) is the world's first technology.

It has a feature that data can be transmitted only in one direction, not in a bi-directional communication or a log-in manner by simply sharing a key.

The challenge is to enable P2P bi-directional communication with quantum security and PUF security between the remote USB and local USB-attached PCs in any PC connected to the Internet.

PIN (Personal Identification Number) data is extracted from the PUF chip through the process deviation occurring in semiconductor manufacturing related to security key generation and distribution using a PUF (Phisycally Unclonable Function) chip and a QRNG (Quantum Random Number Generator) chip, (Decryption key) is generated, and the asymmetric key (cryptographic key) is generated by encrypting the symmetric key (decryption key) through a random quantum random number generated through the QRNG.

Unidirectional cryptographic key that transmits data only in one direction through single PIN data of non-replicable physical PUF chip and one-time OTP quantum cryptographic key using random natural number of quantum random number generator compared with conventional security countermeasures through a pair of VPN Directional tunneling data communication between quantum terminals and an integrated control server is opened only by strengthening the security measures through the PUF Chip and the QRNG generating the natural random number. The One Time Password (OTP) It has the highest security that can not be hacked by a computer.

Even if the cipher key generated by the PIN data of the PUF chip manufactured at the first factory is leaked, if the user goes through the QRNG step, the first producer can not know the cipher key, and if the cipher key generated by the pseudo random number generator (PRNG) The plurality of cryptographic keys can be hacked, but the cryptographic key in the former stage of the quantum random number generator can not be hacked.

In particular, bi-directional communication with both quantum security and PUF security is possible between any PC in the world connected to the Internet and a PC with remote USB and local USB.

In addition, the conventional video surveillance system using SSL VPN has a drawback due to the limitation of the processing speed, and is vulnerable to security due to the nature of the IP camera.

Through the present invention, the above problem is solved through hardware (physical) security and quantum random number encryption.

In addition, if the remote meter reading device for remote meter reading of household water meter and the remote meter reading device for remote meter reading of business water meter are intentionally changed, the water rate is changed and charged.

Therefore, it is a technology applying security policy using a physically unique key using PUF chip.

In addition, based on security enhancement through security key generation and distribution using PUF Chip and QRNG Chip, a loneliness event of elderly people living alone is generated through a machine to machine between a remote meter and a leak detector, Prevent.

In addition, the real-time water quality inspection sensor is used to transmit the water quality information with enhanced security.

1 is a block diagram for understanding the present invention.
FIG. 2 is a view for explaining an embodiment
3 is a conceptual diagram for explaining an exemplary PUF structure.
4 to 6 are block diagrams for understanding the present invention

A microprocessor means that TTL or CMOS ICs only operate according to specified characteristics, but a microprocessor can inject a program into a processor to implement the desired operating characteristics. The microprocessor can issue a command like a computer CPU, (Universal Serial Bus) or PCI Board (Peripheral Component Interconnect Board) equipped with a microprocessor (or MCU (Micro Control Unit)) which is automatically controlled according to a predetermined processor map. .

The One Time Password (OTP) authentication security generated by the physical object authentication PUF (Phisycally Unclonable Function) Chip of the present invention and the QRNG (Quantum Random Number Generator) generating a natural random number is the best security that can not be hacked by a quantum computer .

Personal Identification Number (PIN) data is extracted from the PUF chip through the process deviation that occurs in semiconductor manufacturing related to the security key generation and distribution using the miniature PUF (Phisycally Unclonable Function) chip and QRNG (Quantum Random Number Generator) chip. Generates a symmetric key (decryption key), and encrypts the symmetric key (decryption key) through a random quantum random number generated through the QRNG to generate an asymmetric key (cryptographic key).

When the data measured by the sensor is encrypted with the asymmetric key (encryption key), the data measured by the original sensor can be restored through the symmetric key (decryption key).

In performing object-to-person communication between devices, a device performing object-intelligent communication can itself generate and hold a secure PIN or password, thereby performing knowledge-based authentication.

For this knowledge-based authentication, the device may include a Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) that is robust to external security attacks and generates a unique, random PIN.

According to one embodiment, the PUF generates a PIN that can be used as an authentication key for knowledge-based authentication. This PIN may be a random digital value generated by process variations that occur during the PUF manufacturing process.

In addition, the PIN may be a time-invariant digital value after its creation once the value is not changed according to the surrounding environment. Since such a PIN is not exposed to the outside, according to an embodiment, it is possible to prevent security threats to the authentication scheme of the device.

When the device performs object-to-person communication with another device via a communication interface, the authentication unit can perform the knowledge-based authentication by receiving the PIN generated by the PUF itself.

In a secure authentication according to an embodiment, the device may include a secret key module and a private key module. Here, at least one of the secret key module and the private key module may include a PUF.

According to one embodiment, each of the private key module and the private key module has its own unique PUF, and each PUF has a secret key and a private key from the physical property itself. Hereinafter, the secret key and / or the private key may be represented by a PIN. Thus, the PIN may be understood as including the secret key, the private key, and the like used for security authentication of the device.

The PUF is a circuit that generates different function values even if it is fabricated from the same design drawing by using characteristic deviations caused by process variations. In some embodiments, the PIN of the object intelligent communication device is generated and provided. It can be seen that the PIN is generated by using the digital value itself generated by the physical characteristics of the PUF.

For example, a value given from an external reliable source may be used as a seed, and a result value obtained by encrypting the original digital value generated by the PUF may be used as the PIN.

According to an embodiment of the present invention, a digital value V _PUF provided by the PUF is inserted into the seed and the hash function. Therefore, the finally used PIN value may be Hash (V _PUF || Seed).

According to this embodiment, when the private key is leaked by any path, the PIN can be easily changed by changing only the seed value, so that safety and convenience can be improved.

However, this PIN value generation is only a few embodiments, and the embodiments include both the case where the digital value itself generated by the PUF is used as a PIN, and the case where the value obtained by separately processing the PUF is used as a PIN. Hereinafter, the process of generating the new PIN by processing the digital value generated by the PUF will not be described in detail, but all of these embodiments should be understood.

On the other hand, the PUF has a random value that can not be predicted, so it can be used to determine the PIN of the device. If the PUF is used, it can prevent the pre-leakage of the PIN that may occur when the PUF is generated from the outside and stored in the memory.

In addition, since the PUF is physically impossible to replicate, it is possible to eliminate the possibility that the PIN number of the device will be leaked or duplicated posteriorly.

Also, the PIN value generated by the PUF is excellent in randomness, and in the embodiments, it is reliable that the value once generated does not change with time.

According to one embodiment, a serial number is stored as a unique value of a device provided by a factory in the manufacturing process of the device, and a unique serial number of the device is stored in an I / O Input to the device via the interface, and the first time - not necessarily once in accordance with the policy, but may be specified as a security clearance - only if the secret key from the secret key module is extracted .

And, according to one embodiment, the device may comprise a fuse portion. In this embodiment, the fuse unit physically disconnects the connection between the secret key module and the I / O interface after the first secret key extraction, which is irreversible.

Then, it is now possible to safely manage the subject having the management right only to the first extracted secret key, and it is impossible to newly extract the secret key of the device after the fuse unit is cut off. The secret key module is implemented by the PUF and is not physically replicable, and it is impossible or very difficult to extract the secret key by various reverse engineering including power analysis attack.

According to one embodiment, a device includes a private key module for generating a private key to be used in a public key encryption / decryption communication scheme, and the private key module can provide a private key by a PUF separate from the private key module .

The private key generated and provided by the private key module is physically isolated from the outside, and is not extracted from the manufacture of the device to distribution and use. Of course, for the same reasons as the above-described secret key module, it is impossible to leak an artificial private key by a physical attack.

Accordingly, since the private key provided by the private key module does not leak, the device can be authenticated through the PIN generated by the device itself in the intelligent communication (M2M).

According to one embodiment, the public key generation unit generates a public key for use by the device in the public key encryption / decryption communication method using the private key generated by the private key module, and stores the public key in the public key storage unit do. The public key storage unit is a means for storing the generated public key, and may be a non-volatile memory according to an embodiment.

Of course, the public key storage unit may be selectively employed. In another embodiment, it is possible to read the public key generated by the public key generation unit whenever authentication is required without the public key storage unit.

The encryption / decryption processor can be understood as a Crypto-coprocessor for performing normal data encryption and decryption, and a configuration for exchanging actual encrypted data with the outside in the communication network is a communication interface.

According to an embodiment of the present invention, the first extracted secret key is a public key that is exchanged with a certification authority (CA), which is a management entity having a proper authority to perform secure communication with the device, It is used only as a means to

That is, the secret key, which is already extracted once but not already used, is not directly used for encryption / decryption, but the secret key is used only in the process of sending the public key to the outside by the secret key encryption method, and double security is ensured. Therefore, the private key used for real device authentication is never exposed to the outside.

Hereinafter, a process of manufacturing a device at a factory, a process of circulating or distributing a device, a process of exchanging a public key with a secret key communication method while being actually used, a process of actually confirming each other's legitimacy with a CA The process to be performed will be described in detail below.

First, the differences adopted in the embodiments for the PUF implementation are described in comparison with the conventional PUF implementations and are described as an example of the following specific implementation.

A Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) can provide an unpredictable digital value. Although the individual PUFs are given an exact manufacturing process and are manufactured in the same process, the digital values provided by the individual PUFs are different.

Therefore, the PUF may be referred to as a physical one-way function (POWF) that is not replicable, and may also be referred to as a PRF (Physical Random Function).

Such a PUF may be used to generate a cryptographic key for security and / or authentication. For example, a PUF can be used to provide a unique key to distinguish devices from one another.

Conventionally, in order to realize such a PUF, a coating PUF is implemented using a randomly doped particle in the top layer of the IC, and a coating PUF is generally implemented in a hardware chip such as a latch Recent butterfly PUFs, which can be implemented in FPGAs, have also been implemented using process variations inside CMOS devices.

However, to be reliable so that an application utilizing PUF for PIN generation can be made commercially available, the impossibility of physical replication of the PUF circuit itself, the randomness of the generated PIN value and the value of the PIN once generated do not change with the passage of time All time invariance must be guaranteed.

However, most conventional PUF circuits have difficulty in commercialization because they can not guarantee at least one of the randomness and the time invariance to be satisfied as PUF or PRF to a high level.

The PUF used in the embodiments can solve this conventional problem to ensure that the time invariance and randomness are very reliable and can be produced at a very low cost in the semiconductor manufacturing process.

According to an exemplary embodiment, a random value is generated using a randomness due to a short circuit between nodes present in a semiconductor process to simultaneously satisfy the randomness and time invariance of the PIN generated by the PUF.

The PUF according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention may be used to reduce the size of a contact or via used for electrically connecting conductive layers in a semiconductor chip to a certain size So as to determine whether or not the short circuit is randomly determined. That is, the PIN value is randomly generated by violating the design rule.

Since this new PUF circuit is composed of a very simple short circuit, there is no additional circuit or process and no special measuring device is needed. Since the process characteristics are used, the stability can be satisfied while maintaining the randomness of the values.

The generation of the PUF according to the embodiment will be described in detail with reference to FIG.

And the vias are formed between the metal 1 layer 302 and the metal 2 layer 301 in the semiconductor manufacturing process.

In the group 310 where the via size is sufficiently large according to the design rule, all the vias short-circuit the metal 1 layer 302 and the metal 2 layer 301,

On the other hand, in the group 330 in which the via size is too small, all the vias can not short-circuit the metal 1 layer 302 and the metal 2 layer 301. Therefore, if a short circuit is represented by a digital value, it becomes 1.

In the group 320 where the via size is between the group 310 and the group 330, some vias short-circuit the metal 1 layer 302 and the metal 2 layer 301, The layer 302 and the metal 2 layer 301 can not be short-circuited.

The identification key generation unit according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention may be configured such that a group of vias shorts the metal 1 layer 302 and the metal 2 layer 301 and the other vias are connected to the metal 1 layer 302 And the via size is set so that the metal two layer 301 can not be short-circuited.

The design rule for the via size differs depending on the semiconductor manufacturing process. For example, if the design rule of the via in the CMOS (complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor) process of 0.18 micron (um) is set to 0.25 micron, The size of the via is set to 0.19 microns in the identification key generation unit according to the present invention so that the shortage among the metal layers is stochastically distributed.

It is ideal to have a short-circuit probability of 50%, and the secret key module and the private key module according to an embodiment are configured by setting the via size such that the probability distribution is as close to 50% as possible. This via size setting can be made by experimentation according to a specific specific semiconductor process.

According to this embodiment, tamper resistance is not required to cope with a physical attack by providing the PUF with a random and time-invariant security key or private key.

Tamper-resistance, which is mainly used in encryption modules to cope with physical attacks such as de-packaging, layout analysis, and memory attack, prevents the device's functions from functioning normally by deleting the contents of the memory device when attempting to release the device Protect the contents inside. However, additional protection devices are required or the implementation means is complicated, which not only increases the cost but also has the possibility of unintentional equipment damage such as data erasure due to user's mistake or failure. However, if the PUF is implemented by the principle described above with reference to FIG. 3, there is no such problem.

In addition, it is almost impossible to observe the PUF cell by selecting a PUF cell inside a chip having tens to hundreds of thousands of gates because it is very difficult to separate and observe each cell in the PUF according to the embodiment.

Also, since some PUF values are determined only when the power is turned on, when a part of the chip is damaged during the process of depacking for a physical attack or the like, the PUF has a different value from the usual value, Is very difficult.

Therefore, when the present invention uses a PUF, it is possible to provide a private key and a private key, which are robust against physical attacks and maintain randomness and time invariance without requiring additional cost such as tamper resistance.

The present invention generates a PIN that can be used as an authentication key for security authentication and is a time-invariant digital value whose value is not changed according to the surrounding environment after once generated, It is possible to prevent the security threats to the authentication scheme of the device (terminal) by adopting the quantum security technology to the security based on the PUF, so that more secure log authentication and three channel quantum security authentication technology .

In one embodiment,

PUF Chip is composed of System On Chip (SoC) and is composed of boot ROM (Read Only Memory), main CPU (Central Processing Unit), input / output port (I / O Port), security MCU (Machine Control Unit) SoC memory, PUF hardware pin (H / W PIN), and SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) controller.

Conventionally, when the main CPU boots the boot ROM, the debug interface is connected to the input / output port at the same time.

Thus, through this debugger interface, the system-on-chip internal program and data can be accessed from the outside.

In this situation, there is no security measure to protect the data on the system on chip.

On the other hand, the security MCU operates for data security using the security key stored in the SoC memory and the security key from the unique PUF hardware pin.

However, since both the SoC memory and the PUF hardware pin are provided in the PUF chip, the operation and the value may be changed by access from the outside through the debugger interface, and the operation of the main CPU or the security MCU itself is stopped There is also room.

Therefore, as long as the debugger interface is debugged in a connected state through the input / output port, there is a problem that security in a practical sense is impossible.

In order to solve the problems of the prior art, the present invention provides a system-on-chip type PUF chip having a security function. In order to enhance data security, the PUF chip has an internal SoC memory access restriction, a main CPU, A system on chip (SoC) security method that limits the operation of the boot ROM to prevent the boot ROM from being booted when the boot ROM is detected.

In addition, it is implemented as a USB (Universal Serial Bus) or a board type instead of a system on chip (SoC).

As shown in FIG. 6, when a security MCU is additionally included in the main CPU, it is the hardware that implements the security algorithm, and takes charge of the operation portion that needs to receive control of the main CPU and process it at a high speed.

The main CPU judges whether or not the symmetric key or the asymmetric key generated from the random number such as the quantum random number (QRANG) and the pseudo random number (PRANG) unique PIN data of the PUF is coincident.

In the present invention, an apparatus for protecting an application program is provided. When a hacker changes a main CPU application program through a debugger interface or a serial peripheral interface bus (SPI), the input / output port is shut off and the boot ROM is booted I can not.

In one embodiment,

Will be described in detail with reference to FIG.

PIN data is generated using the physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the PUF chip to generate a symmetric key.

And generates the asymmetric key by encrypting the symmetric key with the quantum random number generated through the quantum random number generator.

Generating an asymmetric key through the quantum random number generator or the pseudo random number generator on the asymmetric key, wherein the asymmetric key generated by the pseudo random number generator is a random number generated hash function used for random number generation, Is stored in the memory.

Referring to FIG. 1, a symmetric key 1 is generated through PIN data of a PUF chip and is encrypted through a quantum random number generator (QRANG) to generate an asymmetric key 1.

The cipher text generated through the asymmetric key 1 is decrypted only through the symmetric key 1 and can be decrypted.

When a pseudo-random number 1 is generated by putting a hash function 1 into the pseudo-random number generator PRANG, the asymmetric key 1 is re-encrypted with the pseudo-random number 1 to generate the asymmetric key 2, and the hash function 1 is stored in the asymmetric key 2.

The ciphertext generated through the asymmetric key 2 is decrypted only by the asymmetric key 1 and can be decrypted.

When a pseudo-random number 2 is generated by putting a hash function 2 into the pseudo-random number generator PRANG, the asymmetric key 2 is re-encrypted with the pseudo-random number 2 to generate the asymmetric key 3, the asymmetric key 3 including the hash function 2, The asymmetric key 3 stores the hash functions 1 and 2, and the ciphertext (encrypted data) generated through the asymmetric key 3 is decrypted through the asymmetric key 1 or 2 to generate the n-th asymmetric key , As shown in FIG. 1, the asymmetric key 3 can be generated by encrypting the asymmetric key 2 with a quantum random number generator generated by (QRANG).

Differentiation occurs in decryption when generating a lower asymmetric key through a quantum random number generator and a pseudo random number generator.

In FIG. 5, the PUF chip-equipped security terminal can decrypt the data encrypted through the asymmetric key 1 - 3 through the asymmetric key 1 - 2 and the asymmetric key 1 - 1, the asymmetric key 1, and the symmetric key 1.

In this process, the pseudo-random number generating hash function of the pseudo-random number generator is stored in order, and the symmetric key 1 can decrypt all the ciphertexts generated by the asymmetric keys 1, 1-1, 1-2 and 1-3, Asymmetric key 1 can decrypt all ciphertexts created in 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3, and asymmetric key 1-1 can decrypt only ciphertexts created in 1-2, 1-3. Do.

However, as shown in FIG. 1, when the PUF-equipped security terminal holds the asymmetric key 3-2 and creates the cipher text, the asymmetric key 2 and the asymmetric key 3 and the asymmetric key 3-1 can decrypt the ciphertext formed by the asymmetric key 3-2 However, when the asymmetric key 3-2 is hacked, the asymmetric key 3 is encrypted by a quantum random number (encrypted by a random quantum random number rather than a pseudo random number generated hash function), and the asymmetric key 3-1 and the asymmetric key 3-1 Key 3 can be hacked, but the asymmetric key 2 generated by the quantum random number generator is not hackable.

That is, the asymmetric key generated through the quantum random number can decrypt the lower asymmetric key generated by the pseudo-random number generator, but before the asymmetric key generated through the quantum random number, only the asymmetric key generated through the quantum random number is decrypted And more can not be hacked by a quantum computer.

That is, even at the manufacturing plant that generates the initial PIN data extracted through the PUF, it is impossible to hack after the quantum random number encryption step.

In conclusion, even if the initial PIN data extracted from the PUF manufacturing plant is hacked or leaked, it is impossible for the buyer (user) to perform hacking after self-encrypting through the quantum random number in the middle.

For example, if asymmetric keys 3, 3-1, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3 are generated in FIG. 1 and asymmetric key 2 is discarded, authentication of the PUF chip secure terminal can be performed regardless of the manufacturer do.

It is also possible to encrypt the asymmetric keys 3 and 3-1 with quantum random numbers.

The asymmetric key becomes the symmetric key as compared with the lower asymmetric key in the newly generated order.

In one embodiment,

Wherein the secure terminal comprises a quantum random number generator and a PUF PIN data generator, wherein the quantum random number generator comprises a random number source generator, a quantum detection diode, a quantum random pulse generator, and a quantum random number control unit, Wherein the quantum random pulse generator detects a quantum particle event from the quantum detection diode to generate a random pulse corresponding to the detection of the quantum particle, and the quantum random number generator controls the quantum random number generator And a microprocessor for generating a symmetric cryptographic key by generating quantum random numbers from a random random number source generated by a pulse generator. The PUF PIN data generator is composed of a PUF chip and a main controller,

The main control unit encrypts the asymmetric cryptographic key by encrypting the symmetric cryptographic key generated by the quantum random number generator with the PIN data of the PUF chip.

In one embodiment,

The security terminal comprises a quantum random number generator and a PUF PIN data generator, wherein the PUF PIN data generator comprises a PUF chip and a main control unit, wherein the main control unit generates a symmetric encryption key using PIN data of the PUF chip; Wherein the quantum random number generator comprises a random number generator, a quantum detection diode, a quantum random pulse generator, and a quantum random number control unit, wherein the quantum detection diode detects quantum particles generated from a random number source generator emitting quantum particles, The pulse generator detects a quantum particle event from the quantum detection diode to generate a random pulse corresponding to the detection of quantum particles, and the quantum random number control unit generates a quantum random number with a random random number source generated through the quantum random pulse generator ; The quantum random number control unit encrypts the symmetric cryptographic key with the quantum random number to encrypt and generate an asymmetric cryptographic key.

In one embodiment,

PIN data is generated using the physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the PUF chip to generate a symmetric encryption key.

And generates the asymmetric cryptographic key by encrypting the symmetric cryptographic key with a quantum random number generated through the quantum random number generator.

Wherein the asymmetric cryptographic key generated by the pseudo random number generator includes a random number generated hash function in a newly generated asymmetric cryptographic key by generating an asymmetric cryptographic key through the quantum random number generator or the pseudo random number generator in the asymmetric cryptographic key, Is stored.

In one embodiment,

PIN data is generated using the physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the PUF chip to generate a symmetric encryption key.

And generates the asymmetric cryptographic key by encrypting the symmetric cryptographic key with a quantum random number generated through the quantum random number generator.

The pseudo-random number generator generates a new pseudo-random number by generating a pseudo-random number as a random number generating hash function, and then generates a new asymmetric cryptographic key by encrypting the asymmetric cryptographic key. The new asymmetric cryptographic key generated by the pseudo- And the asymmetric cryptographic key is newly stored in the asymmetric cryptographic key.

In one embodiment,

A first step of generating PIN data by using a physical process variation occurring in the manufacturing process of the PUF chip to generate a first cryptographic key;

A second step of generating a second cryptographic key by encrypting the first cryptographic key with a quantum random number generated through a quantum random number generator;

Generating a second cryptographic key by encrypting the second cryptographic key with a random number generated through any one of a quantum random number generator and a pseudo random number generator,

A third step of storing a random number generated by the pseudo random number generator in a second cryptographic key as a random number generating hash function;

And a fourth step of repeating the second step and the third step N times.

In one embodiment,

Generating PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the PUF chip to generate a first cryptographic key;

Generating a second cryptographic key by encrypting the first cryptographic key with a quantum random number generated through a quantum random number generator;

Generating a second cryptographic key by encrypting the first cryptographic key with a random number generated by a random number generating hash function of the pseudo-random number generator,

Wherein the random number generation hash function is stored in the second cryptographic key, and the cryptographic key is generated by the PUF-QRNG.

Since the sub-cryptographic key includes the hash function that generated the upper cryptographic key, the upper cryptographic key can be decrypted. In the case of the hacking attack, the cryptographic key generated by the pseudo-random number can be debugged by the sub- A cryptographic key generated with a quantum random number can not be debugged,

The symmetric encryption key generated through the PIN data extracted through the PUF Chip is used for authentication or login when the security terminal equipped with the PUF Chip has an authentication or login request with an asymmetric encryption key.

In one embodiment,

The PUF Chip is a System On Chip (SoC), which consists of a boot ROM, a central processing unit (CPU), an I / O port, a secure MCU (Machine Control Unit) PUF hardware pin (H / W PIN), and SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) controller.

The CPU controls the secure MCU, boot ROM, SoC memory, I / O ports, PUF hardware pins, and SPI controller.

The CPU controls the secure MCU to extract PIN (Personal Identification Number) data from the PUF hardware pin, and is stored in the SoC memory and the platform memory of the high-speed quantum random number generator inside the security platform connected to the network.

The CPU controls the SPI controller to receive a quantum random number generated through a low-speed terminal random number source generator and transmits the quantum random number to the secure MCU.

The secure MCU generates a terminal symmetric cryptographic key using the PIN data in the SoC memory, and then generates a terminal asymmetric cryptographic key by encrypting the terminal symmetric cryptographic key with the quantum random number generated through the low-rate terminal random number source generator.

When the PIN data encrypted by the terminal asymmetric encryption key received through the input / output port is received, the CPU decrypts the encrypted PIN data using the terminal symmetric encryption key, and when the PIN data matches the PIN data stored in the SoC memory, the CPU connects the debugger interface through the input / (Log-in) connection,

The quantum terminal is composed of a modem chip, a main MCU, a power amp, and a low-speed terminal quantum random number generator.

The low-speed terminal quantum random number generator includes a low-speed terminal random number source generator and a PUF (Phisycally Unclonable Function) chip. The secure MCU inside the PUF chip generates the terminal symmetric encryption key using the PIN data extracted from the PUF hardware pin, And transmits the terminal symmetric cryptographic key and the terminal asymmetric cryptographic key, which have generated the terminal asymmetric cryptographic key by encrypting the terminal symmetric cryptographic key with the quantum random number generated through the random number source generator, to the main MCU in the quantum terminal.

The main MCU amplifies the terminal asymmetric cipher key and the Modem Chip or the MAC address of the MCU in the Power Amp and transmits the MAC address to the security platform through the modem chip, The terminal asymmetric cryptographic key and MAC address data to the cloud server, and the high-speed quantum random number generator in the security platform includes a high-speed random number source generator and a platform memory.

A fast symmetric encryption key is generated through the PIN data stored in the platform memory, and then a fast symmetric encryption key is generated by encrypting the fast symmetric encryption key through a high-speed random number generator to transmit the fast symmetric encryption key and the asymmetric encryption key to the cloud server do.

The cloud server encrypts and transmits a high-speed asymmetric cryptographic key with a terminal asymmetric cryptographic key to a modem chip of a quantum terminal MAC address, and the quantum terminal decrypts a fast asymmetric cryptographic key encrypted with the terminal asymmetric cryptographic key using a terminal symmetric cryptographic key, When the terminal transmits the terminal symmetric cipher key encrypted with the asymmetric cipher key to the cloud server, the cloud server decrypts the terminal symmetric cipher key with the fast symmetric cipher key, and the cloud server transmits the fast symmetric cipher key encrypted with the terminal asymmetric cipher key to the quantum terminal The quantum terminal decrypts the fast symmetric encryption key with the terminal symmetric encryption key, encrypts the fast symmetric encryption key with the symmetric encryption key when the quantum terminal transmits data in the unidirection of the cloud server, and transmits the data to the quantum terminal unidirectionally with the cloud server. Encrypted with the terminal symmetric encryption key and transmitted Speed tunneling data communication.

When the fast tunneling data communication is interrupted, the terminal symmetric cipher key and the fast symmetric cipher key generated by the quantum random number generator are lost, but the fast tunneling data communication is interrupted and the terminal symmetric cipher key generated by the quantum random number generator and the fast symmetric cipher key In high-speed tunneling data communication before disappearing,

The low-speed local quantum random number generator in the cloud local server comprises a low-speed local random number source generator and a low-speed local pseudo-random number generator to generate a local symmetric encryption key through a low-speed local random number source generator, A local asymmetric encryption key is generated from the local symmetric encryption key, the cloud local server transmits a local asymmetric encryption key to the cloud server, and the cloud server transmits a fast asymmetric encryption key encrypted with the local asymmetric encryption key to the cloud local server, The local server decrypts the high-speed asymmetric cryptographic key with the local symmetric cryptographic key, the local asymmetric cryptographic key encrypted with the local asymmetric cryptographic key, and the local symmetric cryptographic key with the high-speed asymmetric cryptographic key to the cloud server. A fast symmetric encryption key and a terminal encrypted with a local asymmetric encryption key The cloud local server transmits the local symmetric cryptographic key encrypted with the terminal asymmetric cryptographic key to the quantum terminal, and the cloud local server decrypts the fast symmetric cryptographic key and the terminal symmetric cryptographic key with the local symmetric cryptographic key. The quantum terminal decodes the local symmetric cryptographic key encrypted with the terminal asymmetric cryptographic key through the terminal symmetric cryptographic key, and the cloud server, the cloud local server, and the quantum terminal decrypt the fast symmetric cryptographic key, the local symmetric cryptographic key, Channel high-speed tunneling data communication, and at the end of the 3-channel fast tunneling data communication, a fast symmetric cryptographic key, a local symmetric cryptographic key, a terminal symmetric cryptographic key, a fast asymmetric cryptographic key, a local asymmetric cryptographic key, And the PUF-QRNG security terminal system.

In one embodiment,

The PUF Chip is a System On Chip (SoC), which consists of a boot ROM, a central processing unit (CPU), an I / O port, a secure MCU (Machine Control Unit) PUF hardware pin (H / W PIN), and SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) controller.

The CPU controls the secure MCU, boot ROM, SoC memory, I / O ports, PUF hardware pins, and SPI controller.

The CPU controls the secure MCU to extract PIN (Personal Identification Number) data from the PUF hardware pin, and is stored in the SoC memory and the platform memory of the high-speed quantum random number generator inside the security platform connected to the network.

The CPU controls the SPI controller to receive the symmetric encryption key generated through the quantum random number generated through the quantum random number generator (QRNG), and transmits the symmetric encryption key to the secure MCU.

The secure MCU encrypts the symmetric encryption key generated by the quantum random number generator with PIN data in the SoC memory to generate an asymmetric encryption key.

When the PIN data encrypted with the asymmetric encryption key received through the input / output port is received, the CPU decrypts the encrypted PIN data with the symmetric encryption key, and when the PIN data matches the PIN data stored in the SoC memory, the CPU connects the debugger interface through the input / output port, (Log-in).

In one embodiment,

Unidirectional cryptographic key that transmits data only in one direction through single PIN data of non-replicable physical PUF chip and one-time OTP quantum cryptographic key using random natural number of quantum random number generator compared with conventional security countermeasures through a pair of VPN Directional tunneling data communication is opened only between the quantum terminal and the integrated control server, and the PUF chip is installed in the quantum terminal, and the MCU inside the quantum terminal uses the physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process And the PIN data is stored in the integrated control server internal platform memory.

The integrated control server comprises a quantum random number generator and a platform memory.

The quantum random number generator comprises a random number source generator, a quantum detection diode, a quantum random pulse generator, and a quantum random number control unit. The random number source generator emits quantum particles, the quantum detection diode detects quantum particles generated from the random number source generator , The quantum random pulse generator detects a quantum particle event from the quantum detection diode to generate a random pulse corresponding to the detection of the quantum particle, and the quantum random number control unit comprises a microprocessor, Generates a symmetric encryption key by generating a quantum random number from a pulse random number source, and encrypts the symmetric encryption key with PIN data stored in the platform memory to generate an asymmetric encryption key.

The integrated control server transmits the asymmetric cryptographic key to the MAC address of the quantum terminal modem chip, and the quantum terminal includes the modem chip, the MCU, the power amplifier, and the PUF chip. The MCU receives the asymmetric cryptographic key through the modem chip The power amplifier amplifies the MAC address of the modem chip and the PIN data of the PUF chip using the asymmetric cryptographic key, and transmits the amplified data to the integrated control server through the modem chip. The integrated control server decrypts the data encrypted with the asymmetric cryptographic key with the symmetric cryptographic key Way bidirectional tunneling data communication between the integrated control server and the quantum terminal when the user matches the PIN data of one PUF chip and the MAC address of the quantum terminal modem chip.

In one embodiment,

The PUF chip is mounted on the terminal, and the MCU inside the terminal generates unique PIN data, and the PIN data is stored in the platform memory inside the control server.

The control server comprises a random number generator and a platform memory.

The control server generates a symmetric encryption key using a random number generated through a random number generator and encrypts the symmetric encryption key with PIN data stored in the platform memory to encrypt and generate an asymmetric encryption key.

The control server transmits the asymmetric cryptographic key to the terminal, and the terminal includes an MCU and a PUF chip. The MCU receives the asymmetric cryptographic key and encrypts the PIN data of the PUF chip with the asymmetric cryptographic key to the control server send.

If the PIN data of the PUF chip decrypted with the asymmetric cryptographic key is identical to the PIN data stored in the platform memory, the control server transmits a user login (log-in) bi-directional tunneling data communication between the control server and the quantum terminal Is opened.

In one embodiment,

The PUF chip is mounted on the quantum terminal, and the MCU inside the quantum terminal generates the unique PIN data using the physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process, and the PIN data is stored in the platform memory inside the control server.

The control server comprises a quantum random number generator and a platform memory.

The quantum random number generator comprises a random number source generator, a quantum detection diode, a quantum random pulse generator, and a quantum random number control unit. The random number source generator emits quantum particles, the quantum detection diode detects quantum particles generated from the random number source generator , The quantum random pulse generator detects a quantum particle event from the quantum detection diode to generate a random pulse corresponding to the detection of the quantum particle to generate a random random number source and the quantum random number control unit comprises a microprocessor, The quantum random number control unit generates a quantum random number from a random random number source generated through the quantum random pulse generator and the quantum random number control unit encrypts the symmetric encryption key with the quantum random number, Generates the encryption key.

The control server transmits the asymmetric cryptographic key to the MAC address of the quantum terminal modem chip, and the quantum terminal includes the modem chip, the MCU, the power amplifier, and the PUF chip. The MCU receives the asymmetric cryptographic key through the modem chip, The MAC address of the chip and the PIN data of the PUF chip are encrypted with the asymmetric cryptographic key. The power amplifier amplifies the data and transmits it to the control server through the modem chip. The control server uses the asymmetric cryptographic key to decrypt the data using the symmetric cryptographic key. Direction bidirectional tunneling data communication between the control server and the quantum terminal when the user matches the PIN data of the quantum terminal and the MAC address of the quantum terminal modem chip.

In one embodiment,

The PUF chip is mounted on the terminal, and the MCU inside the terminal generates unique PIN data, and the PIN data is stored in the platform memory inside the control server.

The control server comprises a random number generator and a platform memory.

The control server generates a random random number through a random number generator, and the control server generates a symmetric encryption key using PIN data stored in the platform memory, and encrypts the symmetric encryption key with the random random number to generate an asymmetric encryption key.

The control server transmits the asymmetric cryptographic key to the terminal.

The terminal includes an MCU and a PUF chip. The MCU receives the asymmetric cryptographic key, and transmits data obtained by encrypting the PIN data of the PUF chip with the asymmetric cryptographic key to the control server.

If the PIN data of the PUF chip decrypted with the asymmetric cryptographic key is identical to the PIN data stored in the platform memory, the control server transmits a user login (log-in) bi-directional tunneling data communication between the control server and the quantum terminal Is opened.

In one embodiment,

The remote server includes a remote PUF chip, a remote random number generator, a remote memory, and a remote control unit.

The remote control unit generates unique remote PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the remote PUF chip to generate a remote symmetric encryption key.

The remote control unit generates a random random number through the remote random number generator and encrypts the remote symmetric encryption key to generate a remote asymmetric encryption key.

The remote symmetric encryption key is stored in a local memory inside the local server.

The local server includes a local PUF chip, a local quantum random number generator, a local memory, and a local control unit.

The local control unit generates unique local PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the local PUF chip to generate a local symmetric encryption key.

The local controller generates a random random number through the local quantum random number generator and encrypts the local symmetric cryptographic key to generate a local asymmetric cryptographic key.

The local symmetric encryption key is stored in a remote server internal remote memory.

When the remote server logs in to the bidirectional tunneling data communication request to the local server, the local server sends the local asymmetric encryption key to the remote server IP address.

The remote server receives the local asymmetric cryptographic key and sends the remote cryptographic key, which is encrypted with the local symmetric cryptographic key to the remote symmetric cryptographic key, to the local server with the local server IP address.

When the remote symmetric encryption key decrypted with the local symmetric encryption key is identical to the remote symmetric encryption key stored in the local memory, the local server performs a log-in bi-directional tunneling data communication between the local server and the remote server It opens.

At the time of log-in, the local asymmetric encryption key and the remote encryption key are deleted.

When the local server logs in to the remote server in a bidirectional tunneling data communication request, the remote server transmits the remote asymmetric encryption key to the local server IP address.

The local server receives the remote asymmetric cryptographic key and transmits the local cryptographic key, which is the remote symmetric cryptographic key encrypted with the remote server IP address, to the remote server.

When the local symmetric encryption key decrypted with the remote symmetric encryption key is identical to the local symmetric encryption key stored in the remote memory, the remote server performs a log-in bi-directional tunneling data communication between the remote server and the local server It opens.

The remote asymmetric encryption key and the local encryption key are deleted at the time of log-in.

In one embodiment,

The remote server includes a remote PUF chip, a remote random number generator, a remote memory, and a remote control unit.

The remote random number generator generates a remote symmetric encryption key.

The remote control unit generates unique remote PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the remote PUF chip, and encrypts the remote symmetric encryption key to generate a remote asymmetric encryption key.

The remote symmetric encryption key is stored in a local memory inside the local server.

The local server includes a local PUF chip, a local quantum random number generator, a local memory, and a local control unit.

The local quantum random number generator generates a local symmetric cryptographic key.

The local control unit generates unique local PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the local PUF chip, and encrypts the local symmetric encryption key to generate a local asymmetric encryption key.

The local symmetric encryption key is stored in a remote server internal remote memory.

When the remote server logs in to the bidirectional tunneling data communication request to the local server, the local server sends the local asymmetric encryption key to the remote server IP address.

The remote server receives the local asymmetric cryptographic key and sends the remote cryptographic key, which is encrypted with the local symmetric cryptographic key to the remote symmetric cryptographic key, to the local server with the local server IP address.

When the remote symmetric encryption key decrypted with the local symmetric encryption key is identical to the remote symmetric encryption key stored in the local memory, the local server performs a log-in bi-directional tunneling data communication between the local server and the remote server It opens.

At the time of log-in, the local asymmetric encryption key and the remote encryption key are deleted.

When the local server logs in to the remote server in a bidirectional tunneling data communication request, the remote server transmits the remote asymmetric encryption key to the local server IP address.

The local server receives the remote asymmetric cryptographic key and transmits the local cryptographic key, which is the remote symmetric cryptographic key encrypted with the remote server IP address, to the remote server.

When the local symmetric cipher key decrypted with the remote symmetric encryption key is identical to the local symmetric encryption key stored in the remote memory, the remote server opens the log-in bi-directional tunneling data communication between the remote server and the local server do.

The remote asymmetric encryption key and the local encryption key are deleted at the time of log-in.

In one embodiment,

The remote USB (Universal Serial Bus) includes a remote PUF chip, a remote random number generator, a remote memory, and a remote control unit.

The remote control unit generates unique remote PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the remote PUF chip to generate a remote symmetric encryption key.

The remote control unit generates a random random number through the remote random number generator and encrypts the remote symmetric encryption key to generate a remote asymmetric encryption key.

The remote symmetric encryption key is stored in the local USB internal local memory.

The local USB (Universal Serial Bus) is composed of a local PUF chip, a local quantum random number generator, a local memory, and a local control unit.

The local control unit generates unique local PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the local PUF chip to generate a local symmetric encryption key.

The local controller generates a random random number through the local quantum random number generator and encrypts the local symmetric cryptographic key to generate a local asymmetric cryptographic key.

The local symmetric encryption key is stored in the remote USB internal remote memory.

When the remote USB requests a bidirectional tunneling data communication to the local USB, the local USB transfers the local asymmetric encryption key to the IP address of the remote USB.

Remote USB receives the local asymmetric encryption key and transmits the remote symmetric encryption key encrypted with the remote symmetric encryption key to the local USB IP address to the local USB.

Local USB logs in between Local USB and Remote USB when the remote symmetric encryption key decrypted with the local symmetric encryption key is identical to the remote symmetric encryption key stored in local memory. It opens.

At the time of log-in, the local asymmetric encryption key and the remote encryption key are deleted.

When the local USB requests the bi-directional tunneling data communication with the remote USB, the remote USB transfers the remote asymmetric encryption key to the IP address of the local USB.

The local USB receives the remote asymmetric encryption key and transmits the local encryption key encrypted with the remote symmetric encryption key to the remote USB as the IP address of the remote USB to the remote USB.

Remote USB logs in (Log-in) between remote USB and local USB when the local symmetric encryption key decrypted with the remote symmetric encryption key and the local symmetric encryption key stored in the remote memory are identical. It opens.

The remote asymmetric encryption key and the local encryption key are deleted at the time of log-in.

In one embodiment,

Referring to FIG. The quantum random number generator includes a random number generator, a quantum detection diode, a quantum random pulse generator, a quantum random number controller, and an input / output unit. The random number generator includes a light emitting diode (LED), a laser diode (LD), a radioisotope, And thermal noise, wherein the quantum detection diode detects quantum particles generated from the random number source generator, and the quantum random pulse generator detects a quantum particle event from the quantum detection diode, Wherein the quantum random number control unit comprises a microprocessor for generating a quantum random number from a random random number random source generated through the quantum random pulse generator to generate a symmetric encryption key.

The input / output unit includes a power supply port, an input data port, an output data port, and a grounding port. The input / output unit integrates a protruding input / output unit coupled to the depressed input / output unit of the PUF PIN data generator 1 on a plate, And a protruding input / output unit including a power supply port, an input data port, an output data port, and a grounding port which are inserted into a recessed input / output unit of the quantum terminal, ; An input data port, an output data port, and a grounding port of the protruding input / output unit of the quantum random number generator; And a PUF PIN data generator 1 including an integrated housing including a PUF controller.

When the protruding input / output unit of the PUF PIN data generator is inserted into the recessed input / output unit of the quantum terminal, the PUF control unit is powered by receiving power through a power port and a grounding port inside the quantum terminal, Output unit of the quantum random number generator is inserted into the PUF PIN data generator, the quantum random number controller is driven to receive power through the power port and the ground port in the PUF PIN data generator, and the quantum random number controller controls the random number generator A quantum detection diode, and a quantum random pulse generator, and transmits the generated symmetric cryptographic key to a PUF control unit in the PUF PIN data generator. The PUF control unit controls the quantum random number generator Upon receipt of the symmetric encryption key from the random number generator, the PIN data of the PUF Chip, Encrypt the generated encryption key to an asymmetric encryption key and characterized in that it sent to both devices.

In one embodiment,

The hardware configuration of the above embodiment is reversed,

The PUF control unit generates a symmetric encryption key through the PIN data of the PUF chip,

Wherein the quantum random number generator comprises an asymmetric cryptographic key by encrypting the symmetric cryptographic key with a quantum random number, and the input / output unit of the PUF PIN data generator comprises a protruding input / output unit,

The input / output unit of the quantum random number generator is composed of a protruding input / output unit and a depressed input / output unit.

In one embodiment,

And a VPN (Virtual Private Network) is additionally provided to perform 1: 1 encrypted data communication between VPNs.

In one embodiment,

And a MAC Address (Media Access Control Address) is replaced with an IP Address (Internet Protocol Address).

In one embodiment,

When the remote server is connected to the network, the connection server transmits the connection IP address of the remote server to the operation server connected to the network. When the local server connects to the network, the remote server connects to the operation server connected to the network When the connection IP address of the local server is transmitted, the operation server transmits the connection IP address of the local server to the remote server and transmits the connection IP address of the remote server to the local server.

In one embodiment,

When the remote server is connected to the network, the connection IP address of the remote USB is transmitted to the operation server. When the local server is replaced with the local USB and connected to the network, When the connection IP address of the local USB is transmitted, the operation server transmits the connection IP address of the local USB to the remote USB and transmits the connection IP address of the remote USB to the local USB.

In one embodiment,

When the remote server is connected to the network, the remote server transmits the connection IP address and remote PIN data of the remote server to the operation server connected to the network. When the local server connects to the network, When the remote PIN data and the local PIN data are mutually user authenticated, the remote server transmits the connection IP address of the local server and the local server transmits the local IP address and the local PIN data to the connected operation server. And transmits the connection IP address of the remote server.

In one embodiment,

When the remote server is connected to the network, the connection IP address of the remote USB and the remote PIN data are transmitted to the operation server, and the local server is replaced with the local USB and connected to the network The operation server transmits the connection IP address of the local USB and the local PIN data to the operation server, and when the remote PIN data and the local PIN data are mutually user authenticated, the operation server transmits the connection IP address of the local server to the remote server, And the connection IP address of the remote server is transmitted.

In one embodiment,

The remote server is replaced with a remote virtual private network (VPN), and the local server is replaced with a local virtual private network (VPN).

In one embodiment,

The remote server and the local server are replaced with a USB (Universal Serial Bus) equipped with a microprocessor MCU (Micro Control Unit), the remote server is replaced with a remote USB, and the local server is replaced with a local USB .

In one embodiment,

The remote server and the local server are PCI boards (Peripheral Component Interconnect Board) mounted with a microprocessor MCU (Micro Control Unit), the remote server is replaced with a remote PCI board, and the local server is replaced with a local PCI board .

In one embodiment,

USB (Universal Serial Bus) is replaced with a PCI Board (Peripheral Component Interconnect Board).

In one embodiment,

When the remote USB is connected to the network, the connection IP address of the remote USB and the remote PIN data are transmitted to the operation server. When the local USB is connected to the network, the local USB connection IP Address and local PIN data.

When the remote PIN data and the local PIN data are mutually authenticated by the operating server, the operating server transmits the connection IP address of the local USB to the remote USB and transmits the connection IP address of the remote USB to the local USB. Bi-directional communication with both quantum security and PUF security is possible between USB and local USB-attached PC.

In one embodiment,

Unidirectional cryptographic key that transmits data only in one direction through single PIN data of non-replicable physical PUF chip and one-time OTP quantum cryptographic key using random natural number of quantum random number generator compared with conventional security countermeasures through a pair of VPN Directional tunneling data communication only between the CCTV video surveillance device and the integrated control server, and the PUF chip is mounted on the CCTV video surveillance device, and the MCU inside the CCTV video surveillance device is generated during the manufacturing process And generates a symmetric encryption key, and the symmetric encryption key generated through the PIN data is stored in the integrated control server internal platform memory.

Wherein the integrated control server comprises a quantum random number generator and a platform memory, wherein the quantum random number generator comprises a random number source generator, a quantum detection diode, a quantum random pulse generator, and a quantum random number controller, The quantum random number generator detects a quantum particle event from the quantum detection diode to generate a random pulse corresponding to the detection of the quantum particle, and the quantum random number generator And generates a quantum random number by a random pulse random number source generated through the quantum random pulse generator.

The asymmetric cryptographic key is generated by encrypting the symmetric cryptographic key stored in the integrated control server internal platform memory with the quantum random number.

The integrated control server transmits the asymmetric cryptographic key to the MAC address of the CCTV video surveillance device, and the CCTV video surveillance device includes the modem chip, the MCU, the power amplifier, the PUF chip, and the surveillance camera. The asymmetric cipher key is received, and the MAC address of the modem chip and the PIN data of the PUF chip are encrypted with the asymmetric cipher key, and the data is amplified by the power amplifier and transmitted to the integrated control server through the modem chip. User login (Log-in) Bidirectional tunneling data between the integrated control server and the CCTV video surveillance device if the user matches the PIN data of the PUF chip decrypted with the symmetric encryption key and the MAC address of the CCTV video surveillance device modem chip Wherein the PUF-QRNG security terminal is connected to the PUF-QRNG security terminal.

In one embodiment,

Unidirectional cryptographic key that transmits data only in one direction through single PIN data of non-replicable physical PUF chip and one-time OTP quantum cryptographic key using random natural number of quantum random number generator compared with conventional security countermeasures through a pair of VPN To enable bi-directional tunneling data communication only between the CCTV video surveillance device and the integrated control server.

The PUF chip is mounted on the CCTV video monitoring device. The MCU inside the CCTV video monitoring device generates the unique PIN data using the physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process, and the PIN data is stored in the platform memory of the integrated control server do.

The integrated control server comprises a quantum random number generator and a platform memory.

The quantum random number generator consists of a random number source generator, a quantum detection diode, a quantum random pulse generator, and a quantum random number controller.

The random number source generator emits quantum particles, the quantum detection diode detects quantum particles generated from the random number source generator, and the quantum random pulse generator detects a quantum particle event from the quantum detection diode to detect quantum particles And generating a random number by generating a random random number from a random pulse random number source generated through the quantum random pulse generator to generate a symmetric encryption key, The integrated control server transmits the asymmetric cryptographic key to the MAC address of the CCTV video surveillance device, and the CCTV video surveillance device transmits the asymmetric cipher key to the modem chip, the MCU, the power amplifier, the PUF chip, And a surveillance camera, and the MCU receives the asymmetric cryptographic key through the modem chip and transmits the MAC Ad dress and PUF chip PIN data with the asymmetric encryption key is amplified by Power Amp and transmitted to the integrated control server through the modem chip and the integrated control server encrypts the data encrypted with the asymmetric encryption key by the symmetric encryption key Wherein the PUF-QRNG is configured to open a user-log-in bidirectional tunneling data communication between the integrated control server and the CCTV video surveillance device, if the user matches the MAC address of the PIN data and the CCTV video surveillance device modem chip. CCTV video surveillance device with security terminal.

In one embodiment,

The remote server includes a remote PUF chip, a remote random number generator, a remote memory, a surveillance camera, and a remote control unit.

Wherein the remote control unit generates unique remote PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during a manufacturing process of a remote PUF chip to generate a remote symmetric encryption key and the remote control unit generates a random number through the remote random number generator, And encrypts the remote symmetric encryption key to generate a remote asymmetric encryption key.

The remote PIN data is stored in the local server internal local memory.

The local server includes a local PUF chip, a local random number generator, a local memory, and a local control unit.

The local control unit generates unique local PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the local PUF chip to generate a local symmetric encryption key.

The local control unit generates a random random number through the local random number generator and encrypts the local symmetric encryption key to generate a local asymmetric encryption key.

The local PIN data is stored in a remote server internal remote memory.

When the remote server logs in to the bidirectional tunneling data communication request to the local server, the local server sends the local asymmetric encryption key to the remote server IP address.

The remote server receives the local asymmetric cryptographic key and transmits the remote PIN data encrypted with the local asymmetric cipher key to the local server using the local server IP address and the remote PIN data of the remote PUF chip.

If the remote PIN data decrypted by the local symmetric encryption key is identical to the remote PIN data stored in the local memory, the local server performs a log-in bi-directional operation between the local server and the remote server, Tunneling data communication is opened.

At the time of log-in, the remote PIN data encrypted with the local asymmetric encryption key and the local asymmetric encryption key is deleted.

When the local server logs in to the remote server in a bidirectional tunneling data communication request, the remote server transmits the remote asymmetric encryption key to the local server IP address.

The local server receives the remote asymmetric cipher key and transmits the local PIN data, which is encrypted with the remote asymmetric cipher key, to the remote server using the remote server IP address and the local PIN data of the local PUF chip.

When the local PIN data decrypted by the remote symmetric encryption key is decrypted by the remote symmetric encryption key and the local PIN data stored in the remote memory coincides with the remote symmetric encryption key, the remote server logs in (Log-in) between the remote server and the local server. The tunneling data communication is opened and the image data is transmitted to the local server.

The remote asymmetric encryption key and the local PIN data encrypted with the remote asymmetric encryption key are deleted at the time of log-in, and the PUF-QRNG secure terminal equipped CCTV video surveillance device.

In one embodiment,

The remote server includes a remote PUF chip, a remote random number generator, a remote memory, a surveillance camera, and a remote control unit, and the remote random number generator generates a remote symmetric encryption key.

The remote control unit generates unique remote PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the remote PUF chip, and encrypts the remote symmetric encryption key to generate a remote asymmetric encryption key.

The remote symmetric encryption key is stored in a local memory inside the local server.

The local server includes a local PUF chip, a local random number generator, a local memory, and a local control unit.

The local control unit generates unique local PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the local PUF chip, and encrypts the local symmetric encryption key to generate a local asymmetric encryption key.

The local symmetric encryption key is stored in a remote server internal remote memory.

When the remote server logs in to the bidirectional tunneling data communication request to the local server, the local server sends the local asymmetric encryption key to the remote server IP address.

The remote server receives the local asymmetric cryptographic key and sends the remote cryptographic key, which is encrypted with the local symmetric cryptographic key to the remote symmetric cryptographic key, to the local server with the local server IP address.

When the remote symmetric encryption key decrypted with the local symmetric encryption key is identical to the remote symmetric encryption key stored in the local memory, the local server performs a log-in bi-directional tunneling data communication between the local server and the remote server It opens.

At the time of log-in, the local asymmetric encryption key and the remote encryption key are deleted.

When the local server logs in to the remote server in a bidirectional tunneling data communication request, the remote server transmits the remote asymmetric encryption key to the local server IP address.

The local server receives the remote asymmetric cryptographic key and transmits the local cryptographic key, which is the remote symmetric cryptographic key encrypted with the remote server IP address, to the remote server.

When the local symmetric cipher key decrypted with the remote symmetric encryption key is identical to the local symmetric encryption key stored in the remote memory, the remote server opens the log-in bi-directional tunneling data communication between the remote server and the local server And transmits the data to the local server.

Wherein the remote asymmetric encryption key and the local encryption key are deleted at the time of log-in.

In one embodiment,

The leak detector is composed of a sound sensor, a communication unit, a control unit, a sound transmitting member, a vibration plate, a sound collecting unit, and a housing.

A communication unit that is installed in a water pipe and detects a sound of water transmitted through the water pipe; a communication unit that transmits information sensed by the sound sensor to a meter reading unit through a wired or wireless communication system; A housing having a hollow portion in which the communication unit and the control unit are installed, and a metal material portion of the housing, the housing being connected to the water pipe.

A sound transmission member for transmitting sound transmitted through the water pipe to the inside of the housing, a vibration plate installed in the inside of the housing for vibrating by a sound transmitted to the inside of the housing through the sound transmission member, A sound collecting unit for collecting the vibrating sound of the vibration plate and delivering the vibrating sound to the control unit, a control unit for analyzing the information sensed by the sound sensing sensor to check whether or not the corresponding water pipe is leaked, To the meter reading unit through a microprocessor.

In one embodiment,

Unidirectional cryptographic key that transmits data only in one direction through single PIN data of non-replicable physical PUF chip and one-time OTP quantum cryptographic key using random natural number of quantum random number generator compared with conventional security countermeasures through a pair of VPN The bidirectional tunneling data communication is opened only between the remote meter probe and the integrated control server.

The leak detector is composed of a sound detection sensor, a communication unit, a control unit, a sound transmission member, a vibration plate, a sound collecting unit, and a housing, and is installed in a water supply pipe to detect sound of water transmitted through the water supply pipe A sensor; A leakage communication unit for transmitting information sensed by the sound detection sensor to the meter reading unit through either a wired or wireless communication system; A housing in which a part is formed of a metal and in which an empty space in which the communication unit and the control unit are installed is formed; A sound transmitting member connected to the metal material portion of the housing and connected to the water pipe to transmit a sound transmitted through the water pipe to the inside of the housing; A vibration plate installed inside the housing and vibrating due to sound transmitted to the inside of the housing through the sound transmission member; A sound collecting unit installed in the housing and collecting the trembling sound of the tremble plate and transmitting the collected treble sound to the control unit; And a microprocessor for analyzing the information detected by the sound detection sensor to check whether the water supply pipe is leaking, and to transmit the leakage detection data to the meter reading unit through the leakage communication unit.

The water meter includes a meter reading communication unit for transmitting the water meter reading data to the meter reading unit through either a wired or wireless communication system.

The PUF chip is mounted on the remote meter. The MCU in the remote meter generates unique PIN data using the physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process to generate a symmetric encryption key, and generates a symmetric encryption key Is stored in the integrated control server internal platform memory.

Wherein the integrated control server comprises a quantum random number generator and a platform memory, wherein the quantum random number generator comprises a random number source generator, a quantum detection diode, a quantum random pulse generator, and a quantum random number controller, The quantum random number generator detects a quantum particle event from the quantum detection diode to generate a random pulse corresponding to the detection of the quantum particle, and the quantum random number generator And generates a quantum random number by a random pulse random number source generated through the quantum random pulse generator.

The asymmetric cryptographic key is generated by encrypting the symmetric cryptographic key stored in the integrated control server internal platform memory with the quantum random number.

The integrated control server transmits the asymmetric cryptographic key to the MAC address of the remote meter reader chip, and the remote meter reader includes the modem chip, the MCU, the power amplifier, the PUF chip, and the meter reading unit. The MCU transmits the asymmetric encryption key through the modem chip And transmits the data encrypted with the asymmetric cipher key to the integrated control server through the modem chip by amplifying the data obtained by encrypting the MAC address of the modem chip and the PIN data of the PUF chip with the asymmetric cipher key by Power Amp, When the PIN data of the PUF chip decrypted with the key and the MAC address of the remote meter reader are matched with the MAC address of the modem chip, a user login (Log-in) bidirectional tunneling data communication is opened between the integrated control server and the remote meter, Wherein the PUF-QRNG remote meter reading monitoring terminal

In one embodiment,

Unidirectional cryptographic key that transmits data only in one direction through single PIN data of non-replicable physical PUF chip and one-time OTP quantum cryptographic key using random natural number of quantum random number generator compared with conventional security countermeasures through a pair of VPN To enable bi-directional tunneling data communication only between the remote meter and the integrated control server.

The PUF chip is mounted on the remote meter, and the MCU inside the remote meter generates unique PIN data using the physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process, and the PIN data is stored in the integrated control server internal platform memory.

The integrated control server comprises a quantum random number generator and a platform memory.

The quantum random number generator consists of a random number source generator, a quantum detection diode, a quantum random pulse generator, and a quantum random number controller.

The random number source generator emits quantum particles, the quantum detection diode detects quantum particles generated from the random number source generator, and the quantum random pulse generator detects a quantum particle event from the quantum detection diode to detect quantum particles And generating a random number by generating a random random number from a random pulse random number source generated through the quantum random pulse generator to generate a symmetric encryption key, The asymmetric cipher key is generated by encrypting the symmetric cipher key. The integrated control server transmits the asymmetric cipher key to the MAC address of the remote meter reading module Modem Chip. The remote meter reading module includes the Modem Chip, the MCU, the Power Amp, the PUF Chip, And the MCU receives the asymmetric cryptographic key through the modem chip and transmits the MAC address of the modem chip and the P IN data is encrypted by the asymmetric encryption key and amplified by the power amplifier and transmitted to the integrated control server through the modem chip. The integrated control server transmits the PIN data of the PUF chip decrypted with the asymmetric encryption key, Directional tunneling data communication is opened between the integrated control server and the remote meter reading unit and the meter reading data measured by the meter reading unit is received when the user matches the MAC address of the modem chip. QRNG remote meter reading monitor terminal

In one embodiment,

The PUF chip is mounted in the remote meter, and the MCU in the remote meter generates unique PIN data using the physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process, and the PIN data is stored in the platform memory inside the control server.

The control server comprises a quantum random number generator and a platform memory.

The quantum random number generator consists of a random number source generator, a quantum detection diode, a quantum random pulse generator, and a quantum random number controller.

The random number source generator emits quantum particles, the quantum detection diode detects quantum particles generated from the random number source generator, and the quantum random pulse generator detects a quantum particle event from the quantum detection diode to detect quantum particles Random number generator generates a random random number source, and the quantum random number controller generates a symmetric encryption key using the PIN data stored in the platform memory, and the quantum random number controller generates the symmetric encryption key using the quantum random pulse generator Generates a quantum random number with a random random number source, and the quantum random number control unit encrypts the symmetric encryption key with the quantum random number to generate an asymmetric cryptographic key.

The control server transmits the asymmetric cipher key to the MAC address of the remote meter reading module Modem Chip and the remote meter reading module includes the Modem Chip, the MCU, the Power Amp, the PUF Chip, and the meter reading unit. The MCU receives the asymmetric cryptographic key through the Modem Chip The data obtained by encrypting the MAC address of the modem chip and the PIN data of the PUF chip with the asymmetric encryption key is amplified by Power Amp and transmitted to the control server through the modem chip. The control server decrypts the data encrypted by the asymmetric encryption key with the symmetric encryption key PUF Chip PIN data and remote meter reader If the user matches the MAC address of the modem chip, user login (Log-in) bidirectional tunneling data communication is opened between the control server and the remote meter reader to receive the meter reading data measured by the meter reading unit PUF-QRNG remote meter reading monitoring terminal

In one embodiment,

The remote server includes a remote PUF chip, a remote random number generator, a remote memory, a meter reading unit, and a remote control unit.

Wherein the remote control unit generates unique remote PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during a manufacturing process of a remote PUF chip to generate a remote symmetric encryption key and the remote control unit generates a random number through the remote random number generator, And encrypts the remote symmetric encryption key to generate a remote asymmetric encryption key.

The remote PIN data is stored in the local server internal local memory.

The local server includes a local PUF chip, a local quantum random number generator, a local memory, and a local controller to generate a local symmetric cryptographic key from the quantum random number generated from the local quantum random number generator.

The local control unit generates unique local PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the local PUF chip to generate a local symmetric encryption key.

The local control unit generates a random random number through the local random number generator and encrypts the local symmetric encryption key to generate a local asymmetric encryption key.

The local PIN data is stored in a remote server internal remote memory.

When the remote server logs in to the bidirectional tunneling data communication request to the local server, the local server sends the local asymmetric encryption key to the remote server IP address.

The remote server receives the local asymmetric cryptographic key and transmits the remote PIN data encrypted with the local asymmetric cipher key to the local server using the local server IP address and the remote PIN data of the remote PUF chip.

If the remote PIN data decrypted by the local symmetric encryption key is identical to the remote PIN data stored in the local memory, the local server performs a log-in bi-directional operation between the local server and the remote server, Tunneling data communication is opened.

At the time of log-in, the remote PIN data encrypted with the local asymmetric encryption key and the local asymmetric encryption key is deleted.

When the local server logs in to the remote server in a bidirectional tunneling data communication request, the remote server transmits the remote asymmetric encryption key to the local server IP address.

The local server receives the remote asymmetric cipher key and transmits the local PIN data, which is encrypted with the remote asymmetric cipher key, to the remote server using the remote server IP address and the local PIN data of the local PUF chip.

When the local PIN data decrypted by the remote symmetric encryption key is decrypted by the remote symmetric encryption key and the local PIN data stored in the remote memory coincides with the remote symmetric encryption key, the remote server logs in (Log-in) between the remote server and the local server. The tunneling data communication is opened and the meter reading data measured by the meter reading unit is transmitted to the local server.

The remote PIN code data encrypted with the remote asymmetric encryption key and the remote asymmetric encryption key are deleted at the time of log-in, and the PUF-QRNG remote metering monitoring terminal

In one embodiment,

The remote server includes a remote PUF chip, a remote random number generator, a remote memory, a meter reading unit, and a remote control unit, and the remote random number generator generates a remote symmetric encryption key.

The remote control unit generates unique remote PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the remote PUF chip, and encrypts the remote symmetric encryption key to generate a remote asymmetric encryption key.

The remote symmetric encryption key is stored in a local memory inside the local server.

The local server comprises a local PUF chip, a local quantum random number generator, a local memory, and a local controller, wherein the local quantum random number generator generates a local symmetric cryptographic key.

The local control unit generates unique local PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the local PUF chip, and encrypts the local symmetric encryption key to generate a local asymmetric encryption key.

The local symmetric encryption key is stored in a remote server internal remote memory.

When the remote server logs in to the bidirectional tunneling data communication request to the local server, the local server sends the local asymmetric encryption key to the remote server IP address.

The remote server receives the local asymmetric cryptographic key and sends the remote cryptographic key, which is encrypted with the local symmetric cryptographic key to the remote symmetric cryptographic key, to the local server with the local server IP address.

When the remote symmetric encryption key decrypted with the local symmetric encryption key is identical to the remote symmetric encryption key stored in the local memory, the local server performs a log-in bi-directional tunneling data communication between the local server and the remote server It opens.

At the time of log-in, the local asymmetric encryption key and the remote encryption key are deleted.

When the local server logs in to the remote server in a bidirectional tunneling data communication request, the remote server transmits the remote asymmetric encryption key to the local server IP address.

The local server receives the remote asymmetric cryptographic key and transmits the local cryptographic key, which is the remote symmetric cryptographic key encrypted with the remote server IP address, to the remote server.

When the local symmetric cipher key decrypted with the remote symmetric encryption key is identical to the local symmetric encryption key stored in the remote memory, the remote server opens the log-in bi-directional tunneling data communication between the remote server and the local server And transmits the meter reading data measured by the meter reading unit to the local server.

The remote asymmetric cipher key and the local cipher key are deleted at the time of log-in, and the PUF-QRNG remote meter reading monitoring terminal

In one embodiment,

The meter reading unit is characterized by receiving data from at least one of a leak detector, a water meter, a heat meter, a gas meter, a wattage meter, a solar generator, a renewable energy generator, an electricity distribution board, a broadcasting device, PUF-QRNG remote meter reading monitor terminal

In one embodiment,

The meter reading unit is replaced by any one of water meter, heat meter, gas meter, electric power meter, solar generator, renewable energy generator, switchboard, broadcasting device, automatic control panel and automatic control server.

In one embodiment,

A finger sensor or a bio-signal detector is additionally provided to detect a poisonous mood, and a PUF-QRNG remote meter reading monitoring terminal

In one embodiment,

Wherein the water quality measurement data measured by the water quality sensor is transmitted to the meter reading unit by further configuring a water quality sensor, and the PUF-QRNG remote meter reading monitoring terminal

In one embodiment,

Generating PIN data using a physical process variation occurring in the manufacturing process of the PUF chip to generate a symmetric encryption key; Encrypting the symmetric cryptographic key with a quantum random number generated through a quantum random number generator to generate an asymmetric cryptographic key; The pseudo-random number generator generates a new pseudo-random number by generating a pseudo-random number as a random number generating hash function, and then generates a new asymmetric cryptographic key by encrypting the asymmetric cryptographic key. The new asymmetric cryptographic key generated by the pseudo- And stores the hash function in the newly generated asymmetric cryptographic key.

In one embodiment,

The communication modem consists of TX LaRa module (TX-LoRA) and Receive Laura module (RX-LoRA), enabling bidirectional communication.

1: PUF PIN data generator
2: Quantum random number generator

Claims (26)

Unidirectional cryptographic key that transmits data only in one direction through single PIN data of non-replicable physical PUF chip and one-time OTP quantum cryptographic key using random natural number of quantum random number generator compared with conventional security countermeasures through a pair of VPN , The security countermeasures are strengthened to open bi-directional tunneling data communication only between the remote meter and the integrated control server,

The leak detector is composed of a sound sensor, a communication unit, a control unit, a sound transmitting member, a vibration plate, a sound collecting unit, and a housing,
A sound sensor installed in the water pipe to sense the sound of water transmitted through the water pipe;
A leakage communication unit for transmitting information sensed by the sound detection sensor to the meter reading unit through either a wired or wireless communication system;
A housing in which a part is formed of a metal and in which an empty space in which the communication unit and the control unit are installed is formed;
A sound transmitting member connected to the metal material portion of the housing and connected to the water pipe to transmit a sound transmitted through the water pipe to the inside of the housing;
A vibration plate installed inside the housing and vibrating due to sound transmitted to the inside of the housing through the sound transmission member;
A sound collecting unit installed in the housing and collecting the trembling sound of the tremble plate and transmitting the collected treble sound to the control unit;
And a microprocessor for analyzing the information detected by the sound detection sensor to check whether or not the water pipe is leaking, and to transmit the leak detection data to the meter reading unit through the leakage communication unit;

The water meter includes a meter reading communication unit for transmitting the water meter reading data to the meter reading unit through either a wired or wireless communication system;

The PUF chip is mounted on the remote meter. The MCU in the remote meter generates unique PIN data using the physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process to generate a symmetric encryption key, and generates a symmetric encryption key Is stored in the integrated control server internal platform memory;

The integrated control server comprises a quantum random number generator, a platform memory;
The quantum random number generator comprises a random number source generator, a quantum detection diode, a quantum random pulse generator, and a quantum random number controller,
The random number source generator emits quantum particles,
The quantum detection diode detects quantum particles generated from the random number source generator,
The quantum random pulse generator detects a quantum particle event from the quantum detection diode to generate a random pulse corresponding to the detection of the quantum particle,
Wherein the quantum random number control unit comprises a microprocessor and generates a quantum random number with a random pulse random number source generated through the quantum random pulse generator;
Generating an asymmetric cryptographic key by encrypting the symmetric cryptographic key stored in the integrated control server internal platform memory with the quantum random number,
The integrated control server transmits the asymmetric cryptographic key to the MAC address of the remote probe modem,
The remote meter consists of Modem Chip, MCU, Power Amp, PUF Chip, and meter reading unit. The MCU receives the asymmetric encryption key through Modem Chip and encrypts the MAC address of Modem Chip and PIN data of PUF Chip with asymmetric encryption key. Data is amplified by Power Amp and transmitted to the integrated control server through modem chip,
The integrated control server uses the asymmetric cipher key decrypted with the symmetric cipher key PIN data of the PUF chip and the remote meter reader If the user matches the MAC address of the modem chip, ) Bi-directional tunneling data communication to receive leakage detection data and water meter reading data received by the meter reading unit,
Wherein the integrated control server receives the leakage detection data and the water meter reading data and generates a lonely watering event when tap water use is not detected without leakage for more than 24 hours.
Unidirectional cryptographic key that transmits data only in one direction through single PIN data of non-replicable physical PUF chip and one-time OTP quantum cryptographic key using random natural number of quantum random number generator compared with conventional security countermeasures through a pair of VPN , The security countermeasures are strengthened to open bi-directional tunneling data communication only between the remote meter and the integrated control server,

The PUF chip is mounted on the remote meter, and the MCU in the remote meter generates unique PIN data using the physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process, and the PIN data is stored in the integrated control server internal platform memory;

The integrated control server comprises a quantum random number generator, a platform memory;
The quantum random number generator comprises a random number source generator, a quantum detection diode, a quantum random pulse generator, and a quantum random number controller,
The random number source generator emits quantum particles,
The quantum detection diode detects quantum particles generated from the random number source generator,
The quantum random pulse generator detects a quantum particle event from the quantum detection diode to generate a random pulse corresponding to the detection of the quantum particle,
The quantum random number control unit is composed of a microprocessor, generates a random number by generating a random number from a random pulse random number source generated through the quantum random pulse generator to generate a symmetric encryption key, encrypts the symmetric encryption key with PIN data stored in the platform memory Generates an asymmetric cryptographic key,
The integrated control server transmits the asymmetric cryptographic key to the MAC address of the remote probe modem,
The remote meter consists of Modem Chip, MCU, Power Amp, PUF Chip, and meter reading unit. The MCU receives the asymmetric encryption key through Modem Chip and encrypts the MAC address of Modem Chip and PIN data of PUF Chip with asymmetric encryption key. Data is amplified by Power Amp and transmitted to the integrated control server through modem chip,
The integrated control server uses the asymmetric cipher key decrypted with the symmetric cipher key PIN data of the PUF chip and the remote meter reader If the user matches the MAC address of the modem chip, ) Bi-directional tunneling data communication, and receives the meter reading data measured by the meter reading unit.
The PUF chip is mounted on the remote meter, and the MCU in the remote meter generates unique PIN data using the physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process, and the PIN data is stored in the integrated control server internal platform memory;

The integrated control server comprises a quantum random number generator and a platform memory,
The integrated control server generates a symmetric encryption key through a quantum random number generator, encrypts the symmetric encryption key with PIN data stored in the platform memory to encrypt and generate an asymmetric encryption key,
The integrated control server transmits the asymmetric cryptographic key to the MAC address of the remote probe modem,
The remote meter consists of Modem Chip, MCU, Power Amp, PUF Chip, and meter reading unit. The MCU receives the asymmetric encryption key through Modem Chip and encrypts the MAC address of Modem Chip and PIN data of PUF Chip with asymmetric encryption key. Data is amplified by Power Amp and transmitted to the integrated control server through modem chip,
If the PIN data of the PUF Chip decrypted with the asymmetric cryptographic key is matched with the PIN data stored in the platform memory and the MAC address of the remote meter reader Modem Chip matches the authorized user, Directional tunneling data communication between the server and the remote meter reading unit, and receives the meter reading data received from the meter reading unit.
The PUF chip is mounted on the remote meter, and the MCU in the remote meter generates unique PIN data using the physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process, and the PIN data is stored in the platform memory inside the integrated control server;

The integrated control server comprises a quantum random number generator and a platform memory,
Generating a symmetric encryption key through a quantum random number generator and encrypting the symmetric encryption key with PIN data stored in a platform memory to encrypt and generate an asymmetric encryption key;
The integrated control server sends the asymmetric cryptographic key to the remote meter;
The remote meter includes an MCU, a PUF chip, and a meter reading unit. The MCU receives the asymmetric encryption key and transmits the PIN data of the PUF chip encrypted with the asymmetric encryption key to the integrated control server.
If the PIN data of the PUF chip decrypted with the asymmetric encryption key is matched with the PIN data stored in the platform memory, the integrated control server performs a user login (log-in) bidirectional tunneling And the data communication is started and the meter reading data measured by the meter reading unit is received.
The PUF chip is mounted on the remote meter, and the MCU in the remote meter generates unique PIN data, and the PIN data is stored in the platform memory inside the control server;

The control server comprises a random number generator and a platform memory,
The control server generates a symmetric cryptographic key using a random number generated through a random number generator and encrypts the symmetric cryptographic key with PIN data stored in the platform memory to encrypt and generate an asymmetric cryptographic key;
The control server transmits the asymmetric cryptographic key to the remote meter;
The remote meter includes an MCU, a PUF chip, and a meter reading unit. The MCU receives the asymmetric cryptographic key and transmits the PIN data of the PUF chip encrypted with the asymmetric cryptographic key to the control server.
If the PIN data of the PUF Chip decrypted with the asymmetric cryptographic key is matched with the PIN data stored in the platform memory, the control server transmits a user login (log-in) bi-directional tunneling data communication And receives the meter reading data measured by the meter reading unit.
The PUF chip is mounted on the remote meter, and the MCU in the remote meter generates unique PIN data using the physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process, and the PIN data is stored in the platform memory inside the control server;

The control server comprises a quantum random number generator, a platform memory;
The quantum random number generator comprises a random number source generator, a quantum detection diode, a quantum random pulse generator, and a quantum random number controller,
The random number source generator emits quantum particles,
The quantum detection diode detects quantum particles generated from the random number source generator,
The quantum random pulse generator detects a quantum particle event from the quantum detection diode to generate a random pulse corresponding to the detection of the quantum particle to generate a random random number source,
The quantum random number control unit comprises a microprocessor, generates a symmetric encryption key through PIN data stored in the platform memory,
The quantum random number controller generates a quantum random number from a random random number source generated through the quantum random pulse generator,
The quantum random number control unit encrypts the symmetric encryption key with the quantum random number to generate an asymmetric encryption key;
The control server sends the asymmetric cryptographic key to the MAC address of the remote probe modem,
The remote meter consists of Modem Chip, MCU, Power Amp, PUF Chip, and meter reading unit. The MCU receives the asymmetric encryption key through Modem Chip and encrypts the MAC address of Modem Chip and PIN data of PUF Chip with asymmetric encryption key. The data is amplified by the power amplifier and transmitted to the control server through the modem chip,
The control server decrypts the data encrypted with the asymmetric encryption key with the symmetric encryption key. PIN data of the PUF chip and the remote meter. If the user matches the MAC address of the modem chip, the user logs in between the control server and the remote meter. And the tunneling data communication is opened and the meter reading data measured by the meter reading unit is received.
The PUF chip is mounted on the remote meter, and the MCU in the remote meter generates unique PIN data using the physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process, and the PIN data is stored in the platform memory inside the control server;

The control server comprises a quantum random number generator and a platform memory,
The control server generates a symmetric cryptographic key using PIN data stored in the platform memory, encrypts the symmetric cryptographic key using the quantum random number generated through the quantum random number generator, and generates an asymmetric cryptographic key;

The control server sends the asymmetric cryptographic key to the MAC address of the remote probe modem,
The remote meter consists of Modem Chip, MCU, Power Amp, PUF Chip, and meter reading unit. The MCU receives the asymmetric encryption key through Modem Chip and encrypts the MAC address of Modem Chip and PIN data of PUF Chip with asymmetric encryption key. The data is amplified by the power amplifier and transmitted to the control server through the modem chip,
The control server decrypts the data encrypted with the asymmetric encryption key with the symmetric encryption key. PIN data of the PUF chip and the remote meter. If the user matches the MAC address of the modem chip, the user logs in between the control server and the remote meter. And the tunneling data communication is opened and the meter reading data measured by the meter reading unit is received.
The PUF chip is mounted on the remote meter, and the MCU in the remote meter generates unique PIN data, and the PIN data is stored in the platform memory inside the control server;

The control server comprises a random number generator and a platform memory,
The control server generates a random number through a random number generator,
The control server generates a symmetric cryptographic key using the PIN data stored in the platform memory and encrypts the symmetric cryptographic key with the random random number to generate an asymmetric cryptographic key;
The control server transmits the asymmetric cryptographic key to the remote meter;
The remote meter includes an MCU, a PUF chip, and a meter reading unit. The MCU receives the asymmetric cryptographic key and transmits the PIN data of the PUF chip encrypted with the asymmetric cryptographic key to the control server.
If the PIN data of the PUF Chip decrypted with the asymmetric cryptographic key is matched with the PIN data stored in the platform memory, the control server transmits a user login (log-in) bi-directional tunneling data communication And receives the meter reading data measured by the meter reading unit.
The detection sensor equipped with the remote PUF Chip is a detection sensor that performs data communication with the remote server meter reading unit through either wired or wireless communication,
The remote server includes a remote random number generator, a remote memory, a meter reading unit, and a remote control unit,
Wherein the remote control unit generates a remote symmetric encryption key using unique remote PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the remote PUF chip;
The remote control unit generates a random random number through the remote random number generator and encrypts the remote symmetric encryption key to generate a remote asymmetric encryption key;
Wherein the remote PIN data is stored in a local server internal local memory;

The local server includes a local PUF chip, a local quantum random number generator, a local memory, and a local controller,
Generate a local symmetric cryptographic key from a quantum random number generated from the local quantum random number generator;
The local control unit generates unique local PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the local PUF chip to generate a local symmetric encryption key;
Wherein the local control unit generates a random number through the local random number generator and encrypts the local symmetric encryption key to generate a local asymmetric encryption key;
The local PIN data is stored in a remote server internal remote memory;

When the remote server logs in to the local server requesting bi-directional tunneling data communication,
The local server sends the local asymmetric cryptographic key to the remote server IP Address;
The remote server receives the local asymmetric cryptographic key and transmits the remote PIN data encrypted with the local asymmetric cipher key to the local server using the local server IP address and the remote PIN data of the remote PUF chip with the local asymmetric cipher key;
If the remote PIN data decrypted by the local symmetric encryption key is identical to the remote PIN data stored in the local memory, the local server performs a log-in bi-directional operation between the local server and the remote server, Opening the tunneling data communication
The remote PIN data encrypted with the local asymmetric encryption key and the local asymmetric encryption key are deleted at the time of log-in;

When the local server logs in to the remote server requesting bidirectional tunneling data communication,
The remote server sends the remote asymmetric cryptographic key to the local server IP Address;
The local server receives the remote asymmetric encryption key and transmits the local PIN data obtained by encrypting the local PIN data of the local PUF chip with the remote asymmetric encryption key to the remote server with the remote server IP address;
When the local PIN data decrypted by the remote symmetric encryption key is decrypted by the remote symmetric encryption key and the local PIN data stored in the remote memory coincides with the remote symmetric encryption key, the remote server logs in (Log-in) between the remote server and the local server. The tunneling data communication is opened to transmit the meter reading data measured by the meter reading unit and the data received from the detection sensor to the local server;
The remote PIN code data encrypted with the remote asymmetric encryption key and the remote asymmetric encryption key is deleted at the time of log-in.
The detection sensor equipped with the remote PUF Chip is a detection sensor that performs data communication with the remote server meter reading unit through either wired or wireless communication,
The remote server includes a remote random number generator, a remote memory, a meter reading unit, and a remote control unit,
Wherein the remote random number generator generates a remote symmetric encryption key;
The remote control unit generates unique remote PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during a manufacturing process of a remote PUF chip, and then encrypts the remote symmetric encryption key to generate a remote asymmetric encryption key;
Wherein the remote PIN data is stored in a local server internal local memory;

The local server includes a local PUF chip, a local quantum random number generator, a local memory, and a local controller,
The local quantum random number generator generating a local symmetric cryptographic key;
Wherein the local control unit generates unique local PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the local PUF chip to generate a local asymmetric cryptographic key by encrypting the local symmetric cryptographic key;
The local PIN data is stored in a remote server internal remote memory;

When the remote server logs in to the local server requesting bi-directional tunneling data communication,
The local server sends the local asymmetric cryptographic key to the remote server IP Address;
The remote server receives the local asymmetric cryptographic key and transmits the remote PIN data encrypted with the local asymmetric cipher key to the local server using the local server IP address and the remote PIN data of the remote PUF chip with the local asymmetric cipher key;
If the remote PIN data decrypted by the local symmetric encryption key is identical to the remote PIN data stored in the local memory, the local server performs a log-in bi-directional operation between the local server and the remote server, Opening tunneling data communication;
The remote PIN data encrypted with the local asymmetric encryption key and the local asymmetric encryption key are deleted at the time of log-in;

When the local server logs in to the remote server requesting bidirectional tunneling data communication,
The remote server sends the remote asymmetric cryptographic key to the local server IP Address;
The local server receives the remote asymmetric encryption key and transmits the local PIN data obtained by encrypting the local PIN data of the local PUF chip with the remote asymmetric encryption key to the remote server with the remote server IP address;
When the local PIN data decrypted by the remote symmetric encryption key is decrypted by the remote symmetric encryption key and the local PIN data stored in the remote memory coincides with the remote symmetric encryption key, the remote server logs in (Log-in) between the remote server and the local server. The tunneling data communication is opened to transmit the meter reading data measured by the meter reading unit and the data received from the detection sensor to the local server;
The remote PIN code data encrypted with the remote asymmetric encryption key and the remote asymmetric encryption key is deleted at the time of log-in.
The detection sensor equipped with the remote PUF Chip is a detection sensor that performs data communication with the remote server meter reading unit through either wired or wireless communication,
The remote server includes a remote random number generator, a remote memory, a meter reading unit, and a remote control unit,
Wherein the remote control unit generates a remote symmetric encryption key using unique remote PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the remote PUF chip;
The remote control unit generates a random random number through the remote random number generator and encrypts the remote symmetric encryption key to generate a remote asymmetric encryption key;
Wherein the remote symmetric encryption key is stored in a local server internal local memory;

The local server includes a local PUF chip, a local quantum random number generator, a local memory, and a local controller,
The local quantum random number generator generating a local symmetric cryptographic key;
The local control unit generates unique local PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the local PUF chip to generate a local symmetric encryption key;
Wherein the local control unit generates a random number through the local random number generator and encrypts the local symmetric encryption key to generate a local asymmetric encryption key;
The local symmetric encryption key is stored in a remote server internal remote memory;

When the remote server logs in to the local server requesting bi-directional tunneling data communication,
The local server sends the local asymmetric cryptographic key to the remote server IP Address;
The remote server receives the local asymmetric cryptographic key and transmits the remote cryptographic key, which is encrypted with the local asymmetric cryptographic key to the remote symmetric cryptographic key to the local server IP address, to the local server;
When the remote symmetric encryption key decrypted with the local symmetric encryption key is identical to the remote symmetric encryption key stored in the local memory, the local server performs a log-in bi-directional tunneling data communication between the local server and the remote server Open;
At the time of log-in, the local asymmetric encryption key and the remote encryption key are deleted;

When the local server logs in to the remote server requesting bidirectional tunneling data communication,
The remote server sends the remote asymmetric cryptographic key to the local server IP Address;
The local server receives the remote asymmetric cryptographic key and transmits the local cryptographic key, which is the remote symmetric cryptographic key encrypted with the remote server IP address, to the remote server;
When the local symmetric encryption key decrypted with the remote symmetric encryption key is identical to the local symmetric encryption key stored in the remote memory, the remote server performs a log-in bi-directional tunneling data communication between the remote server and the local server And transmits the meter reading data measured by the meter reading unit and the data received from the detection sensor to a local server;
Wherein the remote asymmetric cipher key and the local cipher key are deleted at the time of log-in.
The detection sensor equipped with the remote PUF Chip is a detection sensor that performs data communication with the remote server meter reading unit through either wired or wireless communication,
The remote server includes a remote random number generator, a remote memory, a meter reading unit, and a remote control unit,
Wherein the remote random number generator generates a remote symmetric encryption key;
Wherein the remote control unit generates unique remote PIN data using a physical process deviation occurring during a manufacturing process of a remote PUF chip and generates a remote asymmetric encryption key by encrypting the remote symmetric encryption key;
Wherein the remote symmetric encryption key is stored in a local server internal local memory;

The local server includes a local PUF chip, a local quantum random number generator, a local memory, and a local controller,
The local quantum random number generator generating a local symmetric cryptographic key;
Wherein the local control unit generates unique local PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the local PUF chip to generate a local asymmetric cryptographic key by encrypting the local symmetric cryptographic key;
The local symmetric encryption key is stored in a remote server internal remote memory;

When the remote server logs in to the local server requesting bi-directional tunneling data communication,
The local server sends the local asymmetric cryptographic key to the remote server IP Address;
The remote server receives the local asymmetric cryptographic key and transmits the remote cryptographic key, which is encrypted with the local asymmetric cryptographic key to the remote symmetric cryptographic key to the local server IP address, to the local server;
When the remote symmetric encryption key decrypted with the local symmetric encryption key is identical to the remote symmetric encryption key stored in the local memory, the local server performs a log-in bi-directional tunneling data communication between the local server and the remote server Open;
At the time of log-in, the local asymmetric encryption key and the remote encryption key are deleted;

When the local server logs in to the remote server requesting bidirectional tunneling data communication,
The remote server sends the remote asymmetric cryptographic key to the local server IP Address;
The local server receives the remote asymmetric cryptographic key and transmits the local cryptographic key, which is the remote symmetric cryptographic key encrypted with the remote server IP address, to the remote server;
When the local symmetric cipher key decrypted with the remote symmetric encryption key is identical to the local symmetric encryption key stored in the remote memory, the remote server opens the log-in bi-directional tunneling data communication between the remote server and the local server And transmits the meter reading data measured by the meter reading unit and the data received from the detection sensor to a local server;
Wherein the remote asymmetric cipher key and the local cipher key are deleted at the time of log-in.
The remote meter equipped with the remote PUF chip is a remote meter for data communication with the remote USB (Universal Serial Bus) through either wired or wireless communication.
The remote USB includes a remote random number generator, a remote memory, a meter reading unit, and a remote control unit,
Wherein the remote control unit generates a remote symmetric encryption key using unique remote PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the remote PUF chip;
The remote control unit generates a random random number through the remote random number generator and encrypts the remote symmetric encryption key to generate a remote asymmetric encryption key;
The remote symmetric encryption key is stored in a local USB internal local memory;

The local USB (Universal Serial Bus) includes a local PUF chip, a local quantum random number generator, a local memory, and a local control unit,
The local quantum random number generator generating a local symmetric cryptographic key;
The local control unit generates unique local PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the local PUF chip to generate a local symmetric encryption key;
Wherein the local control unit generates a random number through the local random number generator and encrypts the local symmetric encryption key to generate a local asymmetric encryption key;
The local symmetric encryption key is stored in a remote USB internal remote memory;

When the remote USB requests a bidirectional tunneling data communication to the local USB,
The local USB sends the local asymmetric encryption key to the IP address of the remote USB;
The remote USB receives the local asymmetric encryption key and transmits the remote encryption key encrypted with the local symmetric encryption key to the local USB via the local symmetric encryption key with the local USB's IP address;
Local USB logs in between Local USB and Remote USB when the remote symmetric encryption key decrypted with the local symmetric encryption key is identical to the remote symmetric encryption key stored in local memory. Open;
At the time of log-in, the local asymmetric encryption key and the remote encryption key are deleted;

When the local USB requests the bidirectional tunneling data communication to the remote USB,
The remote USB sends the remote asymmetric encryption key to the IP address of the local USB;
The local USB receives the remote asymmetric encryption key and transmits the local encryption key encrypted with the remote asymmetric encryption key to the remote USB as the IP address of the remote USB as the remote symmetric encryption key;
Remote USB logs in (Log-in) between remote USB and local USB when the local symmetric encryption key decrypted with the remote symmetric encryption key and the local symmetric encryption key stored in the remote memory are identical. And transmits the meter reading data measured by the meter reading unit to the local USB;
Wherein the remote asymmetric cipher key and the local cipher key are deleted at the time of log-in.
The remote meter equipped with the remote PUF chip is a remote meter for data communication with the remote USB (Universal Serial Bus) through either wired or wireless communication.
The remote USB includes a remote random number generator, a remote memory, a meter reading unit, and a remote control unit,
Wherein the remote random number generator generates a remote symmetric encryption key;
Wherein the remote control unit generates unique remote PIN data using a physical process deviation occurring during a manufacturing process of a remote PUF chip and generates a remote asymmetric encryption key by encrypting the remote symmetric encryption key;
The remote symmetric encryption key is stored in a local USB internal local memory;

Local USB consists of a local PUF chip, local quantum random number generator, local memory, local control,
The local quantum random number generator generating a local symmetric cryptographic key;
Wherein the local control unit generates unique local PIN data using a physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the local PUF chip to generate a local asymmetric cryptographic key by encrypting the local symmetric cryptographic key;
The local symmetric encryption key is stored in a remote USB internal remote memory;

When the remote USB requests a bidirectional tunneling data communication to the local USB,
The local USB sends the local asymmetric encryption key to the IP address of the remote USB;
The remote USB receives the local asymmetric encryption key and transmits the remote encryption key encrypted with the local symmetric encryption key to the local USB via the local symmetric encryption key with the local USB's IP address;
Local USB logs in between Local USB and Remote USB when the remote symmetric encryption key decrypted with the local symmetric encryption key is identical to the remote symmetric encryption key stored in local memory. Open;
At the time of log-in, the local asymmetric encryption key and the remote encryption key are deleted;

When the local USB requests the bidirectional tunneling data communication to the remote USB,
The remote USB sends the remote asymmetric encryption key to the IP address of the local USB;
The local USB receives the remote asymmetric encryption key and transmits the local encryption key encrypted with the remote asymmetric encryption key to the remote USB as the IP address of the remote USB as the remote symmetric encryption key;
Remote USB will be able to log in (Log-in) bidirectional tunneling data communication when the local symmetric encryption key decrypted with the remote symmetric encryption key is the same as the local symmetric encryption stored in the remote memory. And transmits the meter reading data measured by the meter reading unit to the local USB;
Wherein the remote asymmetric cipher key and the local cipher key are deleted at the time of log-in.
The secure terminal comprises a quantum random number generator and a PUF PIN data generator,
The PUF PIN data generator generates a symmetric encryption key using the PIN data of the PUF chip,
Wherein the quantum random number generator generates the asymmetric cryptographic key by encrypting the symmetric cryptographic key with a quantum random number.
The secure terminal comprises a quantum random number generator and a PUF PIN data generator,
A quantum random number generator generates a symmetric cryptographic key with a quantum random number,
Wherein the PUF PIN data generator generates the asymmetric encryption key by encrypting the symmetric encryption key with the PIN data of the PUF chip.
The security terminal generates the PIN data using the physical process variation occurring during the manufacturing process of the PUF chip to generate the symmetric encryption key,
Encrypting the symmetric cryptographic key with a quantum random number generated through a quantum random number generator to generate an asymmetric cryptographic key;
Generating an asymmetric cryptographic key through the quantum random number generator or the pseudo random number generator in the asymmetric cryptographic key,
Wherein the asymmetric cryptographic key generated by the pseudo-random number generator is stored by including the random number generated hash function in a newly generated asymmetric cryptographic key.
The method according to any one of claims 9, 10, 11, and 12,
The detection sensor is composed of a water meter reading sensor and a water leakage sensor equipped with a remote PUF chip,
The leakage detection sensor is composed of a sound detection sensor, a communication unit, a control unit, a sound transmitting member, a vibration plate, a sound collecting unit, and a housing,
A sound detection sensor installed in the water supply pipe and sensing sound of water transmitted through the water supply pipe;
A communication unit for transmitting information sensed by the sound detection sensor to a meter reading unit through either a wired or wireless communication system;
A housing in which a part is formed of a metal and in which an empty space in which the communication unit and the control unit are installed is formed;
A sound transmitting member connected to the metal material portion of the housing and connected to the water pipe to transmit a sound transmitted through the water pipe to the inside of the housing;
A vibration plate installed inside the housing and vibrating due to sound transmitted to the inside of the housing through the sound transmission member;
A sound collecting unit installed in the housing and collecting the trembling sound of the tremble plate and transmitting the collected treble sound to the control unit;
And a microprocessor for analyzing the information detected by the sound detection sensor to confirm whether or not the water supply pipe is leaking, and to transmit the leakage detection data to the meter reading unit through the communication unit.

The water meter probe sensor equipped with a remote PUF chip is a water meter probe sensor that transmits meter reading data to a remote server meter reading unit via either wired or wireless communication,

When the local PIN data decrypted by the remote symmetric encryption key is decrypted by the remote symmetric encryption key and the local PIN data stored in the remote memory coincides with the remote symmetric encryption key, the remote server logs in (Log-in) between the remote server and the local server. The tunneling data communication is opened to transmit the meter reading data and the leak detection data measured by the meter reading unit to a local server;

Wherein the local server generates a poisoning event when the tap water use meter reading data does not occur because the domestic leak is not detected after the metering time exceeding the manager input time.
The method according to any one of claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13,
The remote meter probe further comprises a leakage detection sensor,
The leakage detection sensor is composed of a sound detection sensor, a communication unit, a control unit, a sound transmitting member, a vibration plate, a sound collecting unit, and a housing,
A sound detection sensor installed in the water supply pipe and sensing sound of water transmitted through the water supply pipe;
A communication unit for transmitting information sensed by the sound detection sensor to a meter reading unit through either a wired or wireless communication system;
A housing in which a part is formed of a metal and in which an empty space in which the communication unit and the control unit are installed is formed;
A sound transmitting member connected to the metal material portion of the housing and connected to the water pipe to transmit a sound transmitted through the water pipe to the inside of the housing;
A vibration plate installed inside the housing and vibrating due to sound transmitted to the inside of the housing through the sound transmission member;
A sound collecting unit installed in the housing and collecting the trembling sound of the tremble plate and transmitting the collected treble sound to the control unit;
And a microprocessor for analyzing the information detected by the sound detection sensor to confirm whether or not the water supply pipe is leaking, and to transmit the leakage detection data to the meter reading unit through the communication unit.
Wherein the integrated control server generates a poisoning event when no tap water use meter reading data is generated without detecting an internal leak after the metering meter exceeds the manager input time.
14. A method according to any one of claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13,
The quantum random number generator and the PUF PIN data generator are installed in the remote meter,
Wherein the quantum random number generator comprises a random number generator, a quantum detection diode, a quantum random pulse generator, and a quantum random number control unit, wherein the quantum detection diode detects quantum particles generated from a random number source generator emitting quantum particles, The pulse generator generates a random pulse corresponding to detection of quantum particles by detecting a quantum particle event from the quantum detection diode, and the quantum random number control unit generates a quantum random number with a random random number source generated through the quantum random pulse generator And a microprocessor for generating a symmetric encryption key,
The PUF PIN data generator consists of a PUF chip and a main controller,
Wherein the main controller encrypts the asymmetric cryptographic key by encrypting the symmetric cryptographic key generated by the quantum random number generator with the PIN data of the PUF chip, thereby generating the asymmetric cryptographic key.
The method according to any one of claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13,
The quantum random number generator and the PUF PIN data generator are installed in the remote meter,
The PUF PIN data generator comprises a PUF chip and a main control unit, and the main control unit generates a symmetric encryption key using PIN data of the PUF chip;
Wherein the quantum random number generator comprises a random number generator, a quantum detection diode, a quantum random pulse generator, and a quantum random number control unit, wherein the quantum detection diode detects quantum particles generated from a random number source generator emitting quantum particles, The pulse generator detects a quantum particle event from the quantum detection diode to generate a random pulse corresponding to the detection of quantum particles, and the quantum random number control unit generates a quantum random number with a random random number source generated through the quantum random pulse generator ;
Wherein the quantum random number control unit encrypts the symmetric cipher key with the quantum random number to generate an asymmetric cipher key by encrypting the symmetric cipher key.
The method of claim 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 The method according to any one of claims 14 to 19,
The meter reading unit is characterized by receiving data from at least one of a leak detector, a water meter, a heat meter, a gas meter, a wattage meter, a solar generator, a renewable energy generator, an electricity distribution board, a broadcasting device, PUF-QRNG remote meter reading monitoring terminal.
The method of claim 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 The method according to any one of claims 14 to 19,
The meter reading unit is replaced by any one of water meter, heat meter, gas meter, electric power meter, solar generator, renewable energy generator, switchboard, broadcasting device, automatic control panel and automatic control server. .
The method of claim 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 The method according to any one of claims 14 to 19,
Wherein the system further comprises a fuselage detector or a bio-signal detector to detect a false alarm.
The method of claim 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 The method according to any one of claims 14 to 19,
Wherein the water quality sensor is further configured to transmit the water quality measurement data measured by the water quality sensor to the meter reading unit.
The method of claim 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 The method according to any one of claims 14 to 19,
By further configuring a communications modem,
Wherein the communication modem is composed of a transmission line module (TX-LoRA) and a reception line module (RX-LoRA) so that bi-directional communication is possible.

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