KR20180066649A - hacking Prevent system using Verification format of Bluetooth device and method - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention relates to a system and a method for preventing hacking using a verification format between Bluetooth devices. More specifically, the present invention relates to a system and a method for preventing hacking using a verification format between Bluetooth devices, which prevent hacking at a user level by attaching a more result value to the back of a data protocol data unit (PDU) by using an asymmetric function and transmitting the data PDU while a master and a slave are in a connection state. The system for preventing hacking between Bluetooth devices comprises: a hacking prevention device (100) embedded in the other Bluetooth device (200) in order to make a verification format for the other Bluetooth device to transmit data to a one Bluetooth device; the other Bluetooth device (200) for transmitting the data PDU including the verification format provided from the hacking prevention device to the one Bluetooth device; and the one Bluetooth device (300) for analyzing and verifying the verification format included in the transmitted data PDU.

Description

[0001] The present invention relates to a hacking prevention system using a verification format between Bluetooth devices,

The present invention relates to an anti-hacking system and method using a verification format between Bluetooth devices, and more particularly, to a system and method for preventing hacking using a verification format between Bluetooth devices, And more particularly, to a system and method for preventing hacking using a verification format between Bluetooth devices capable of preventing hacking.

In recent years, Bluetooth has attracted attention as a next generation communication method. It uses low power (RF power: 1mW, 100mW) wireless communication that can communicate between various devices by using 2.4Ghz unlicensed ISM frequency band in a short distance of about 10m System.

Originally developed for the purpose of wirelessly replacing complex wired cables, it is evolving into a technology that enables the wireless transmission and reception of multimedia data between increasingly portable personal digital devices, personal mobile communication devices and computers.

In particular, we are using a frequency band that does not require a wireless license, we do not have to pay royalties according to the open license policy, we can flexibly connect various protocols such as IrDA, IEEE802.11b, etc. to be.

Such Bluetooth technology is currently used for transmitting and receiving data between various devices in close proximity to each other, similar to IrDA, an infrared communication standard commonly adopted in head sets, printers, digital cameras, and the like.

On the other hand, devices conforming to the Bluetooth specification designated for use in a mobile environment can use an authentication function or an encryption function as needed.

These authentication functions are largely divided into access authentication and authorization.

Here, the access authorization authentication is an authentication process for determining whether or not an external device is a device or a user who is entitled to access the device, and the use authorization authentication is a process for authenticating the access device It is an authentication process that determines whether the user of the device can use the program.

When the connection authentication is performed, the connection between the external device and the corresponding device is established. Then, when the packets are exchanged with each other, the corresponding application programs are used through authentication of the usage rights as needed do.

Since the Bluetooth protocol is a protocol specified for use in a mobile environment, all the information is transmitted through a non-secure propagation medium. Therefore, the above-mentioned access authorization and authorization are indispensable functions. To protect the information.

1 is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method of a conventional Bluetooth device.

FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating a mobile communication device and a Bluetooth device used in the Bluetooth authentication according to the conventional method of FIG.

1 and 2, in the first step, the user uses the mobile communication device 10 having the MMI means to access the Bluetooth devices 12, 14, and 16 (step S1).

That is, the user transmits a request signal to the outside through the mobile communication device 10 to request a user name fixed inside the Bluetooth devices 12, 14, and 16.

In addition, the Bluetooth devices 12, 14, and 16 refer to a headset or the like having no MMI means. The Bluetooth devices 12, 14, and 16 may be connected to a computing circuit Because it does not have, the operating program does not support it either.

However, the user names given to the respective Bluetooth devices 12, 14, and 16 are stored in advance in the device.

In the second step, the user name is transmitted to the mobile communication device 10 from the Bluetooth devices 12, 14, and 16 in the space in which the user exists according to the request signal of the first step (step S2).

In the third step, after the user confirms the user name transmitted in the second step, the user selects the user name of the Bluetooth device 12, 14, and 16 to be connected (step S3).

Here, the user names are different for each manufacturer of the Bluetooth devices 12, 14, and 16, and in the case of a Bluetooth device of the same manufacturer, generally the same user name is stored.

The fourth step is to change the user name of the Bluetooth devices 12, 14, and 16 selected in the third step so that the user name can be easily recognized by the user. The user name of the selected Bluetooth device 12, 14, (Step S4 and step S5).

That is, in the case of a Bluetooth device of the same company, in general, the same user name is initially stored, and when there are a plurality of Bluetooth devices in the same space, it is difficult for the user to identify a desired Bluetooth device, By changing the user name of the desired Bluetooth device to the name desired by the user, the user can easily find the Bluetooth device in the future.

In the fifth step, after changing the user name of the desired Bluetooth device in the fourth step, the user inputs a password (PIN code) through the mobile communication device 10 for authentication of the usage right, (10) and the Bluetooth devices (12, 14, and 16) selected in the third step (steps S6 and S7).

In the sixth step, after the mobile communication device 10 and the Bluetooth devices 12, 14, and 16 are connected, the user can change the password of the connected Bluetooth devices 12, 14, and 16 At this time, the user changes the password through the mobile communication device 10 (steps S8 and S9).

That is, when the mobile communication device 10 reconnects after disconnecting from the Bluetooth devices 12, 14, and 16, the Bluetooth devices 12, 14, and 16 and other devices are connected .

Accordingly, when the Bluetooth devices 12, 14, and 16 are lost or stolen, the Bluetooth devices 12, 14, and 16 can be prevented from being misused.

Finally, when the communication between the mobile communication device 10 and the Bluetooth devices 12, 14, and 16 is terminated, the connection between the mobile communication device 10 and the Bluetooth devices 12, 14, and 16 (Steps S10 and S11).

Conventionally, when a Bluetooth device is used between a mobile phone or a mobile phone and another Bluetooth device, a PIN code is input to each other and then the same value is used for connection.

The user has to input the authentication number manually when connecting.

In order to solve the above problem, the Bluetooth authentication step with the mobile phone is automatically processed using the authentication number stored in the request and response of the authentication number, and the second authentication step is performed using the encrypted protocol between the two devices There is an automatic authentication method between Bluetooth devices of Korean Patent Laid-Open Publication No. 10-2007-0096488.

A Bluetooth device authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention includes the steps of (i) providing a connection authorization number stored in one Bluetooth device and another Bluetooth device to a partner device in response to a Bluetooth device requesting connection to another Bluetooth device Performing connection qualification authentication; (ii) when the access authentication is performed, the one Bluetooth device executes the platform and provides the previously defined encrypted data to the other Bluetooth device; And (iii) determining whether to allow the Bluetooth connection between the one Bluetooth device and the other Bluetooth device according to the encrypted data provided from the one Bluetooth device to the other Bluetooth device.

However, as a prior art, if a hacking device such as an analyzer is installed between a Bluetooth device and another Bluetooth device, and the data is modified after the connection is allowed, the hacking can not be avoided.

FIG. 3 shows a background diagram in which a hacking machine is installed.

However, in the above-mentioned prior art, if the encrypted data is acquired by tapping in the middle and the data is transmitted to one Bluetooth device 60 by mimicking the other Bluetooth device 50, one Bluetooth device has to determine the connection permission It is still vulnerable to hacking.

Once a connection is allowed, it does not secure the connection for a certain period of time or for a certain transaction. Therefore, even if a hacking is made during this time, or a connection Bluetooth security device is requested from a Bluetooth device, Conventional technology could not be a fundamental measure because hacking can be continued because it can be accepted.

When the hacking device 70 receives data from other Bluetooth devices, the hacking device 70 transmits the data to the Bluetooth device and looks at the contents.

Then, when the authentication of the connection is completed, the data is manipulated to give it to the Bluetooth, and the Bluetooth receives the data from the hacking device and misunderstands that it is the Bluetooth.

Referring to the example of FIG. 4, in general, IOT devices can be connected to a mobile phone to view status and operate the iOuti devices.

Fig. 4 shows an example of the i-th equipment installed in the electric plug. It is installed in the room, and the plug is now turned off.

It turns on every day at 6 am and is set to turn off at 7 am every day.

These settings are stored in the iOuti server 80. When the settings are changed, the iOuti device connects to the mobile phone, and the iOuti device and the iOuti server are indirectly connected.

At this time, the security server may not set security. Because the iOuti device is usually about the configuration of the device without human intervention, unlike a cell phone, the server person can easily set up the security.

Therefore, there are cases where a hacking device is tricked like an iOuti device and connected to the iOuti server, and various files can be viewed and manipulated under a permission allowed on the server, resulting in hacking.

Therefore, using only the authentication of the connection as the security element as in the prior art can enhance the security but it can not be said as a fundamental countermeasure against hacking.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The present invention has been made in order to solve the problems of the related art described above by providing a verification format of a certain length at the rear end of a protocol data unit (PDU) and mixing the time, data length, We propose an invention that hacking is fundamentally prevented by the failure of the hacking device in deriving the result value of the asymmetric function even if the data is hacked by transmitting the result of the asymmetric function.

Korean Patent Publication No. 10-2007-0096488

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION Accordingly, the present invention has been made keeping in mind the above problems occurring in the prior art,

It is an object of the present invention to prevent hacking at a user level by attaching an additional result value to the rear of a data packet using an asymmetric function while the master and the slave are in a connected state.

According to an aspect of the present invention, there is provided an anti-hacking system using a verification format between Bluetooth devices,

An anti-hacking device 100 built in the other Bluetooth device 200 to make a verification format for transmitting data from the other Bluetooth device to the Bluetooth device;

A Bluetooth device (200) for transmitting a data packet including a verification format provided by the hacking prevention device to a Bluetooth device;

And a Bluetooth device (300) for analyzing and verifying a verification format included in the transmitted data packet, thereby solving the problems of the present invention.

A system and method for preventing hacking using a verification format between Bluetooth devices according to the present invention is characterized in that a verification format of a certain length is provided at a rear end of a protocol data unit (PDU), and a time, a data length, The result of the asymmetric function is mixed so that even if the data is hacked, the hacking device fails to derive the result value of the asymmetric function, thereby providing the effect of preventing the hacking fundamentally.

1 is a flowchart illustrating an authentication method of a conventional Bluetooth device.
FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating a mobile communication device and a Bluetooth device used in the Bluetooth authentication according to the conventional method of FIG.
3 is a background view in which a conventional hacking device is installed.
FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating an example of a screen displayed on a screen of a mobile phone with data provided from an EyeTime device installed in a conventional electric plug.
FIG. 5 is an exemplary view illustrating a verification format of an anti-hacking system using a verification format between Bluetooth devices according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 6 is an overall configuration diagram of an anti-hacking system using a verification format between Bluetooth devices according to an embodiment of the present invention.
7 is a block diagram of an anti-hacking device of a hacking prevention system using a verification format between Bluetooth devices according to an embodiment of the present invention.
8 is a flowchart illustrating a method of preventing hacking using a verification format between Bluetooth devices according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 9 is a flowchart illustrating a process of generating a verification format of a verification format generation step of an anti-hacking method using a Bluetooth device-to-device verification format according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS Hereinafter, embodiments of an anti-hacking system and method using a verification format between Bluetooth devices according to the present invention will be described in detail.

The key point of the present invention is that firstly, a verification format is provided at the end of a data packet in which hacked data is transmitted to prevent hacking after authorization and access permission authentication, thereby preventing hacking through the verification format.

Second, it derives the result using the asymmetric function with the key value of the length, time, and device address value of the data packet as a key, and sends it to the verification format so that the hacking device can not infer the verification format.

Among the terms used in the present invention, a mobile phone means a smartphone.

FIG. 5 is an exemplary view illustrating a verification format of an anti-hacking system using a verification format between Bluetooth devices according to an embodiment of the present invention.

12 bytes are provided at the rear end of the PDU data as described above, and a verification format using the 12 bytes is formed and transmitted.

One embodiment of the contents of the verification format is as follows.

Makes time visually divided.

Substitute the time in minutes into an integer type and assign it to the asymmetric function as the key value.

That is, assuming that the time is 12:17 on December 1, 2016, for example, using the MOD function, which is a typical asymmetric function, when the time = NOW (), the time "2016-12-01 12:05" Can be obtained.

Time (minutes) = MINUTE (time) to extract minutes.

If you use the mode function here, the time is 17 minutes, so the result is 2.

Here, the value 15 is an arbitrary value, which is set between a bluetooth device and a bluetooth device, and both devices are known.

In addition, the data length is extracted.

That is, the parameter length is extracted from the header of the PD header.

For example, if the parameter length is 6 bytes, then 27 MOD 15 = 6, resulting in 6.

This data length prevents hacking equipment from hacking.

If the hacking device adds any more bytes, the result will be different so that the Bluetooth devices know that it is hacked.

Instead of this data length, you can check the sum of the parameters and put it into the asymmetric function with the key value.

Expressing "value 423" as a hexadecimal value results in "ea b0 92 34 32 33".

If you add the backward digit arbitrarily, the value becomes 10 + 0 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 3, and the key value becomes 21.

Applying the asymmetric function here gives 21 MOD 15 = 6, and the result is 6.

Finally, the result of the asymmetric function is derived from the device address as the key value.

If the device address is 0x37a, it is 890 if it is changed to an integer, so 890 MOD 15 gives the result value 5.

The above values are 2, 6, and 5, respectively.

Therefore, the values of the verification format are 2, 6, and 5, respectively.

Hacking equipment will know the value of 2,6,5 by tapping in the middle.

However, since it is an asymmetric function that can not be known how it is calculated, only 2,6,5,500 can not infer the key values 17,6,890.

If the hacking machine processes the data, the length of the parameter changes and the value of the data is changed. Therefore, the value of the verification format is changed.

FIG. 6 is an overall configuration diagram of an anti-hacking system using a verification format between Bluetooth devices according to an embodiment of the present invention.

As shown in FIG. 6, the system of the present invention includes an anti-hacking apparatus 100, another Bluetooth device 200, and a Bluetooth device 300.

The anti-hacking apparatus 100 creates a verification format for transmitting data by another Bluetooth device to the Bluetooth device, and the other Bluetooth device 200 transmits the data including the verification format to the Bluetooth device 300 And transmits the data.

At this time, the anti-hacking device 100 is built in the other Bluetooth device 200.

At this time, one Bluetooth device 300 analyzes and verifies the verification format.

The anti-hacking apparatus 100 may be built in the other Bluetooth device 200 and operate.

7 is a block diagram of an anti-hacking device of a hacking prevention system using a verification format between Bluetooth devices according to an embodiment of the present invention.

As shown in Fig. 7, the hacking prevention apparatus 100 includes:

A time substitution unit 110 for substituting the time into the asymmetric function with the key value and calculating the result value;

A parameter length substitution unit 120 for substituting the parameter length of the data packet into the asymmetric function as a key value and calculating a result value;

And a device address substitution unit 130 for substituting the device address for the asymmetric function with the key value and calculating a result value.

The time length substitution unit 110 substitutes the time as a key value into the asymmetric function to calculate a result value. The parameter length substitution unit 120 substitutes the parameter length of the data packet for the key value into the asymmetric function, And the device address substitution unit 130 substitutes the device address as the key value into the asymmetric function to calculate the result value.

8 is a flowchart illustrating a method of preventing hacking using a verification format between Bluetooth devices according to an embodiment of the present invention.

As shown in Fig. 8, in the hacking prevention method using the verification format between the Bluetooth devices according to the present invention,

A verification format generation step (S100) of generating a verification format for transmitting data to other Bluetooth devices by the Bluetooth device;

A step S200 of transmitting the data packet including the verification format to the other Bluetooth device by the other Bluetooth device;

And a verification format analysis step (S300) in which the Bluetooth device analyzes and verifies the verification format.

That is, the anti-hacking device 100 creates a verification format for transmitting data to other Bluetooth devices, and at this time, another Bluetooth device transmits the data format including the verification format to the Bluetooth device .

Thereafter, one Bluetooth device analyzes and verifies the verification format.

FIG. 9 is a flowchart illustrating a process of generating a verification format of a verification format generation step of an anti-hacking method using a Bluetooth device-to-device verification format according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.

As shown in FIG. 9, the verification format generation step (SlOO)

(S110) of substituting the time as a key value into an asymmetric function and calculating a result value; and

A parameter length substitution step (S120) of substituting the parameter length of the data packet into the asymmetric function as a key value and calculating a result value;

And a device address substitution step (S130) of substituting the device address into the asymmetric function with the key value and calculating the result value.

That is, in the verification format generation step S100, the result is calculated by substituting the time into the asymmetric function. Then, the result value is calculated by substituting the parameter length of the data packet into the asymmetric function as the key value. The result value is calculated by substituting the device address into the asymmetric function with the key value.

Therefore, in order to prevent the hacking after the authentication of authorization and the authentication of the access permission, a verification format (for example, Time, parameter length, device address, etc.) so that hacking can be fundamentally prevented.

In addition, the result of using the asymmetric function with the length of the data packet and the mixed value of the device address value as a key is derived and sent to the verification format so that the hacking device can not infer the verification format.

Therefore, through the present invention, a verification format of a certain length is provided at the rear end of a protocol data unit (PDU), and the resulting value of the asymmetric function is transmitted by mixing the time, the data length, and the device address with the key value Even if the data is hacked, the hacking device can fail to derive the result of the asymmetric function, thereby providing the effect of preventing the hacking fundamentally.

It will be understood by those skilled in the art that the present invention may be embodied in other specific forms without departing from the spirit or essential characteristics thereof. It is to be understood, therefore, that the embodiments described above are to be considered in all respects as illustrative and not restrictive.

100: Anti-hacking device
200: Other Bluetooth devices
300: days Bluetooth device

Claims (3)

In a hacking prevention system between Bluetooth devices,
An anti-hacking device 100 built in the other Bluetooth device 200 to make a verification format for transmitting data from the other Bluetooth device to the Bluetooth device;
A Bluetooth device (200) for transmitting a data packet including a verification format provided by the hacking prevention device to a Bluetooth device;
And a Bluetooth device (300) for analyzing and verifying a verification format included in the transmitted data packet.
A method for preventing hacking between Bluetooth devices,
A verification format generation step (S100) of generating a verification format for transmitting data to other Bluetooth devices by the Bluetooth device;
A step S200 of transmitting the data packet including the verification format to the other Bluetooth device by the other Bluetooth device;
And a verification format analysis step (S300) in which the Bluetooth device analyzes and verifies the verification format.
3. The method of claim 2,
The verification format generation step (SlOO)
(S110) of substituting the time as a key value into an asymmetric function and calculating a result value; and
A parameter length substitution step (S120) of substituting the parameter length of the data packet into the asymmetric function as a key value and calculating a result value;
A device address substitution step (S130) of substituting the device address for the asymmetric function with the key value and calculating the result value; A method of preventing hacking using a verification format between Bluetooth devices.

Images