KR20170086174A - Method and appratus for cooperative authentication using pseudo id in vanet - Google Patents

Method and appratus for cooperative authentication using pseudo id in vanet Download PDF

Info

Publication number
KR20170086174A
KR20170086174A KR1020160005541A KR20160005541A KR20170086174A KR 20170086174 A KR20170086174 A KR 20170086174A KR 1020160005541 A KR1020160005541 A KR 1020160005541A KR 20160005541 A KR20160005541 A KR 20160005541A KR 20170086174 A KR20170086174 A KR 20170086174A
Authority
KR
South Korea
Prior art keywords
message
verification
anonymous
vehicle
another vehicle
Prior art date
Application number
KR1020160005541A
Other languages
Korean (ko)
Other versions
KR101802820B1 (en
Inventor
조효진
이동훈
우사무엘
Original Assignee
고려대학교 산학협력단
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 고려대학교 산학협력단 filed Critical 고려대학교 산학협력단
Priority to KR1020160005541A priority Critical patent/KR101802820B1/en
Publication of KR20170086174A publication Critical patent/KR20170086174A/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of KR101802820B1 publication Critical patent/KR101802820B1/en

Links

Images

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
    • H04L51/30—
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0407—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden
    • H04L63/0421—Anonymous communication, i.e. the party's identifiers are hidden from the other party or parties, e.g. using an anonymizer
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Traffic Control Systems (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

A method for performing collaborative verification of a safety message occurring in a plurality of vehicles using an anonymous ID in a VANET environment is disclosed. Wherein the message cooperation verification method comprises: receiving first messages including at least a safety message from another vehicle; selecting a first message to be verified among the first messages received from another vehicle and verifying the selected first message; Generating and signing and transmitting a second message including the verification result, receiving at least one or more second messages from another vehicle, and transmitting the second message to be verified from among the second messages received from another vehicle And a second message verification step of performing verification using the verification result included in the selected and selected second message.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD [0001] The present invention relates to a method and apparatus for verifying message cooperation using an anonymous ID in a VANET environment,

The present invention relates to a method and an apparatus for verifying message cooperation using an anonymous ID in a VANET environment. More particularly, the present invention relates to a method and apparatus for verifying message security by verifying a part of received security messages to generate a report message, And a method for verifying a message cooperation using an anonymous ID for performing verification of the remaining security messages.

 With the development of IT technology, various communication technologies are being applied to vehicles. Currently, various control network technologies such as CAN (Controller Area Networks), LIN (Local Interconnect Network) and FlexRay are applied to automobiles. In the future, it is expected that VANET (Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network) technology, which enables external network communication with automobiles, will be applied along with the development of unmanned vehicles. VANET is a form of MANET (Mobile Ad-hoc Network). It is composed of OBU (On Board Units) installed on the vehicle, RSU (Road Side Unit) installed on the road, and Ad-hoc network technology consist of. Each vehicle periodically transmits a safety message consisting of its position, speed, direction, time, deceleration / acceleration information, and traffic information to the surrounding vehicles. The traffic situation message transmitted periodically enables the driver to respond quickly to the surrounding environment, enabling safe and efficient vehicle operation. Currently, standardization of WAVE (Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments) which is IEEE 1609 standard is underway.

The safety message transmitted periodically in the VANET includes the location information of the vehicle. Therefore, in VANET communication, authentication technologies that provide anonymity are actively studied to prevent illegal location tracking due to periodical exposure of location information. An anonymous authentication scheme research that can be applied to recent VANET environment is divided into an authentication scheme using a group signature and an authentication scheme using a plurality of anonymous identities.

However, both group signatures and techniques using anonymous identities are not available in dense environments. For example, if there are between 100 and 300 vehicles in the communication range of an automobile, the message that the vehicle must verify is 100 to 300 vehicles per second. Therefore, various techniques such as batch signature verification algorithm and cooperative authentication algorithm, which can improve the efficiency of authentication, have been proposed. Recently, cooperation verification algorithms have been proposed.

The present invention proposes a number of anonymous ID-based message cooperation verification techniques for more efficient message verification in a crowded environment.

The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide an efficient and safe cooperation verification method and apparatus applicable to the VANET, which is an intelligent automobile network technology.

The cooperative verification apparatus included in each vehicle that performs cooperative verification of a safety message generated in a plurality of vehicles using an anonymous ID in a VANET environment according to an embodiment of the present invention includes a first message generation unit and a second message generation unit A message signature unit for signing the generated message using an anonymous ID and a corresponding signature key, a first message or a second message generated by the message generation unit to a cooperative verification apparatus of another vehicle And a verifying unit for verifying a first message or a second message received from the cooperation verification apparatus of the other vehicle, wherein the verifying unit verifies the first message or the second message received from the cooperation verification apparatus of another vehicle, 1 message includes the anonymous ID of the vehicle that generated the first message, the number of times the signature was performed using the anonymous ID, And the second message includes a verification result of at least one first message received from another vehicle.

In the VANET environment according to an embodiment of the present invention, a cooperative verification apparatus performs cooperation verification of a safety message generated in a plurality of vehicles by using an anonymous ID. The cooperative verification apparatus generates a first message including a safety message Signing and transmitting; Receiving at least one first messages from another vehicle; Selecting a first message to be verified among the first messages received from another vehicle, and verifying the first security messages included in the verification target first message to generate a verification result. A message validation step; Generating and signing and transmitting a second message including the verification result; Receiving at least one second messages from another vehicle; And selecting a second message to be verified from among the second messages received from the other vehicle based on the first message received from the first vehicle, Acquiring a verification result of a second security message including a verification result in the second message to be verified without selecting it as a safety message and selecting a first safety message from among the first messages received from another vehicle And generating a verification result by performing verification of a third security message that does not include the verification result in the second message to be verified.

According to the anonymous ID-based message cooperation verification method and apparatus according to the embodiment of the present invention, messages are efficiently verified in a dense environment of a vehicle and the reliability of verification is improved.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS In order to more fully understand the drawings recited in the detailed description of the present invention, a detailed description of each drawing is provided.
1 is a conceptual diagram of a cooperative verification system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Figure 2 is a functional block diagram of a message collaboration verification device.
FIG. 3 illustrates a report message structure according to an embodiment of the present invention.
4 is a flowchart illustrating a message cooperation verification method in the message cooperation verification apparatus shown in FIG.
FIG. 5 is a detailed block diagram of the security message and report message verification process shown in FIG.

It is to be understood that the specific structural or functional description of embodiments of the present invention disclosed herein is for illustrative purposes only and is not intended to limit the scope of the inventive concept But may be embodied in many different forms and is not limited to the embodiments set forth herein.

The embodiments according to the concept of the present invention can make various changes and can take various forms, so that the embodiments are illustrated in the drawings and described in detail herein. It should be understood, however, that it is not intended to limit the embodiments according to the concepts of the present invention to the particular forms disclosed, but includes all modifications, equivalents, or alternatives falling within the spirit and scope of the invention.

The terms first, second, etc. may be used to describe various elements, but the elements should not be limited by the terms. The terms may be named for the purpose of distinguishing one element from another, for example, without departing from the scope of the right according to the concept of the present invention, the first element may be referred to as a second element, The component may also be referred to as a first component.

The terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of the invention. The singular expressions include plural expressions unless the context clearly dictates otherwise. In this specification, the terms "comprises" or "having" and the like are used to specify that there are features, numbers, steps, operations, elements, parts or combinations thereof described herein, But do not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integers, steps, operations, components, parts, or combinations thereof.

Unless defined otherwise, all terms used herein, including technical or scientific terms, have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this invention belongs. Terms such as those defined in commonly used dictionaries are to be interpreted as having a meaning consistent with the meaning of the context in the relevant art and, unless explicitly defined herein, are to be interpreted as ideal or overly formal Do not.

Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the drawings attached hereto.

1 is a conceptual diagram of a collaboration verification system 10 of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 1, the cooperative verification system 10 includes a plurality of cooperating verification devices 100 and a Trusted Authority (TA) 200.

Each cooperative verification apparatus 100 can communicate with the cooperative verification apparatus 100 or the trusted authority 200 via a network. The network according to one embodiment includes a wide range of possible communication means such as an open Internet, a wired Internet network including a closed intranet, a wireless Internet communication network interlocked with a mobile communication network, and a computer network capable of various data communication . Preferably, each cooperation verification device 100 performs communication with another collaboration verification device 100 using the VANET network.

FIG. 2 is a functional block diagram of a message cooperation verification apparatus 100 according to the present invention.

2, the message cooperation verification apparatus 100 includes a setup unit 110, a message generation unit 120, a message signature unit 130, a verification unit 140, a communication unit 170, a storage unit 180, And a control unit 190.

The setup unit 110 registers a plurality of anonymous IDs (Pseudo IDs, PIDs) and signature keys after registering the actual ID of the vehicle with the trusted authority 200 under the control of the control unit 190.

The message generator 120 includes a safety message generator and a report message generator, and the safety message generator may generate a safety message and a message including the safety message. The safety message may include position, speed, direction, time, deceleration / acceleration information, traffic information, etc. of each vehicle. The report message generator may generate a report message for the safety message verification result.

Figure 3 illustrates the structure of a report message. The report message includes an anonymous ID, a counter value, and a verification result. The size of the report message can be reduced by including the counter value of the message in place of the safety message in the report message.

The message signing unit 130 performs signing using the arbitrary anonymous ID issued by the setup unit 110 and the corresponding signature key under the control of the control unit 190 can do. The message to be signed contains the number of times the anonymous ID was used in the signature (Counter).

The verification unit 140 performs verification of the safety message received from the other vehicle under the control of the control unit 190. [ In addition, the security message can be verified using a report message received from another vehicle. Detailed verification methods are described in detail in the cooperation verification method below.

The communication unit 170 can perform communication with another vehicle including the cooperation verification apparatus under the control of the control unit 190. [ Also, it is possible to perform communication with the trusted authority (TA) using the network.

The storage unit 180 may include a program storage unit and a data storage unit. Programs for controlling the operation of the cooperation verification apparatus 100 may be stored in the program storage unit. The data storage unit may store data generated during the execution of the programs.

The control unit 190 controls the overall operation of the cooperation verification apparatus 100. That is, the operation of the set-up unit 110, the message generating unit 120, the message signing unit 130, the verification unit 140, the communication unit 170, and the storage unit 180 can be controlled.

3 is a flowchart illustrating a method of performing cooperation verification of a security message in a message cooperation verification apparatus according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.

First, prior to the generation of the safety message, the message cooperation verification apparatus 100 of each vehicle performs a set-up step (SlOO). The message cooperation verification apparatus 100 of each vehicle receives a plurality of anonymous IDs (PIDs) and corresponding signature keys to be used by each vehicle for VANET communication. Specifically, each vehicle registers its own real ID in the trusted authority (TA, 200), and then a plurality of anonymous IDs and signature keys are issued, and the trusted authority (TA, 200) .

Next, prior to the cooperation verification of the safety message, the message cooperation verification apparatus 100 of each vehicle generates a safety message and transmits it to the cooperation verification apparatus of another vehicle or another vehicle (S200). Specifically, each vehicle generates a safety message including a position, a speed, a direction, a time, a deceleration / acceleration information, a traffic information, and the like of each vehicle and generates a message including a safety message, an anonymous ID, Hereinafter, referred to as 'first message') is generated as follows.

Figure pat00001

The generated first message is signed using any anonymous ID issued in the setup step and the corresponding signature key. The message to be signed contains the number of times the anonymous ID was used in the signature (Counter).

Next, each of the vehicles transmits the signature value of the first message and the first message including the safety message to the neighboring vehicle (or the message cooperation verification apparatuses of the vehicle) as shown below.

Figure pat00002

Here, Sign PID () means an ID-based signature algorithm function using a PID.

Next, the message cooperation verification apparatuses 100 of each vehicle perform cooperation verification (S310-S600). A vehicle that receives a safety message periodically generated from neighboring vehicles performs signature verification in cooperation with neighboring vehicles. The cooperation verification step is divided into a verification step of a first message including a safety message and a verification step of a second message, which means a report message. Each verification step may be performed periodically for a predetermined time.

First, the first message verification step will be described in detail.

The vehicle cooperation verification apparatus 100 receives a first message including a safety message, an anonymous ID (PID) of the vehicle, and a counter from the neighboring vehicle (S310), and transmits the first message (S330). The counter is the number of times an anonymous ID (PID) was used in the signature.

The verification probability preset by the administrator (

Figure pat00003
(Hereinafter, referred to as a 'first safety message'). In this case, when the report message verification step is performed immediately before the safety message verification step, the safety message generated during the report message verification time (DELTA RT) before the safety message verification step and the safety message generated during the current safety message verification time (ST) The first safety message is selected. The cooperation verification apparatus 100 that has selected the verification subject safety message (first safety message) performs message verification (S350) and stores the verification result. The cooperative verification apparatus 100 of all the vehicles repeats the above process during the safety message verification time (ST) to verify the first safety message among the received safety messages.

Next, when the first safety message verification is completed, the cooperative verification apparatus 100 generates and transmits a report message (S400). Specifically, after the safety message verification time? ST, the cooperative verification apparatus 100 of all the vehicles generates a report message about the verification result stored during the safety message verification time? ST, And transmits a report message (hereinafter, also referred to as a 'second message') to the neighboring vehicle (or the cooperation verification apparatuses of the neighboring vehicles) by signing the message.

Figure pat00004

Hereinafter, the second message verification step will be described in detail.

The vehicle cooperation verification apparatus 100 receives a second message from the neighboring vehicle (S510), and selects a second message to be verified from the received second message (S530). Specifically, the cooperative verification apparatus 100 of all the vehicles determines whether or not the report messages (second messages) received from the neighboring nodes during the report message verification time? RT

Figure pat00005
(The second message) are selected and verified.
Figure pat00006
(Step S550). In step S550, the security message verification unit 530 verifies the security message (hereinafter, referred to as a 'second security message') that was not selected in the first message verification step.

Next, among the safety messages not selected in the first message verification step

Figure pat00007
(Hereinafter, referred to as a 'third security message') that are not identified by the plurality of report messages. Preferably, the verification of the third safety message is performed during the remaining report message verification time [Delta] RT.

In order to improve the efficiency, the safety messages generated during the report message verification time (DELTA RT) are processed during the safety message verification time (DELTA ST) immediately after the report message verification time (DELTA RT).

FIG. 5 is a detailed block diagram of the security message and report message verification process shown in FIG.

The cooperation verification apparatus 100 checks the verification probability (for example, SM1) preset in the received message (for example, SM1) during the previous report message verification time? RT and the current safety message verification time? ST

Figure pat00008
(First safety message), performs the first safety message verification during the current safety message verification time RT, generates and transmits a report message (e.g., RM1) corresponding thereto .

Next, the cooperation verification apparatus 100 transmits the received report message (for example, RM1)

Figure pat00009
Select and verify the report messages.
Figure pat00010
(For example, SM1) received during the immediately preceding report message verification time? RT and the current safety message verification time? ST using the verification result included in the report message, The verification result of the corresponding safety message among the safety messages not selected as the first safety message,
Figure pat00011
(Hereinafter, referred to as 'second security message') included in the report message.

Also, among the messages (for example, SM1) received during the previous report message verification time (DELTA RT) and the current safety message verification time (ST), the remaining messages excluding the first safety message and the second safety message Safety message) during the remaining report message verification time (RT).

In the above-described VANET environment, the cooperative verification apparatus can perform cooperative verification of a safety message generated in a plurality of vehicles by using an anonymous ID by using a computer-readable recording medium And may be implemented in a general-purpose digital computer that operates the program.

Specifically, a program stored in a recording medium and performing cooperative verification of a safety message occurring in a plurality of vehicles using an anonymous ID, the program comprising: means for receiving first messages including at least a safety message from a vehicle running in the computing system A first message verification instruction set for selecting and verifying a first message to be verified among the first messages received from another vehicle, a command for generating and signing a second message including the verification result, A set of instructions for receiving at least one or more second messages from another vehicle and a second set of messages to be verified selected from the second messages received from another vehicle and verifying using the verification results contained in the selected second message The second message verification command set Can.

The cooperative verification program of the message is stored in the recording medium, and the recording medium may be a magnetic storage medium (for example, a ROM, a floppy disk, a hard disk, etc.), an optical reading medium (for example, a CD- And the like. In addition, the recording medium may be distributed and distributed to a network-connected computer system so that a computer-readable instruction set can be stored and executed in a distributed manner.

The block diagrams disclosed herein may be construed to those skilled in the art to conceptually represent circuitry for implementing the principles of the present invention. Likewise, any flow chart, flow diagram, state transitions, pseudo code, etc., may be substantially represented in a computer-readable medium to provide a variety of different ways in which a computer or processor, whether explicitly shown or not, It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art.

While the present invention has been particularly shown and described with reference to exemplary embodiments thereof, it is evident that many alternatives, modifications and variations will be apparent to those skilled in the art. Accordingly, the true scope of the present invention should be determined by the technical idea of the appended claims.

10: Cooperative verification system
100: Collaborative verification device 200: Trusted entity

Claims (8)

A cooperative verification apparatus included in each vehicle that performs cooperative verification of a safety message generated in a plurality of vehicles using an anonymous ID in a VANET environment,
A message generator including a first message generator and a second message generator,
A message signature unit for signing the generated message using an anonymous ID and a corresponding signature key,
A communication unit that transmits the first message or the second message generated by the message generator to the cooperation verification apparatus of another vehicle and receives the first message or the second message from the cooperation verification apparatus of another vehicle,
And a verification unit for verifying the first message or the second message received from the cooperation verification apparatus of the other vehicle,
Wherein the first message includes an anonymous ID of the vehicle that generated the first message, a number of times the signature was performed using the anonymous ID, and a security message, and the second message includes at least one or more 1 < / RTI > The method according to claim 1,
And a setup unit for registering the actual ID of the vehicle in the trusted authority and issuing a plurality of anonymous IDs and a plurality of signature keys corresponding to the real IDs. A method for performing collaborative verification of a safety message occurring in a plurality of vehicles using an anonymous ID in a cooperative verification apparatus in a VANET environment,
(1) generating and signing and transmitting a first message including a safety message by the cooperation verification apparatus;
(2) receiving at least one first messages from another vehicle;
(3) selecting a first message to be verified among the first messages received from another vehicle, and
And verifying the first security messages included in the first verification target message to generate a verification result;
(4) generating, signing and transmitting a second message including the verification result;
(5) receiving at least one second messages from another vehicle; And
(6) selecting a second message to be verified among the second messages received from another vehicle,
Wherein the second message includes a verification result in the second message without selecting the first message among the first messages received from another vehicle using the verification result included in the second message to be verified, Obtaining a verification result on the safety message, and
Performing a verification on a third security message that does not include a verification result in the verification target second message without selecting the first security message among the first messages received from another vehicle and generating a verification result And a second message validation step, wherein the second message validation step comprises: The method of claim 3,
Further comprising a setup step of registering the actual ID of the vehicle with a trusted authority and issuing a plurality of anonymous IDs and a plurality of signature keys from the trusted authority. 5. The method of claim 4,
Wherein the signature for the first message and the second message is performed using a signature key corresponding to the anonymous ID and the anonymous ID of any one of the plurality of anonymous IDs,
Wherein the first message comprises the security message, the anonymous ID, and the number of times the anonymous ID was used in the signature. The method of claim 3,
Wherein the verification target first message selection process selects the verification target first message according to a preset verification probability among the first messages received from other vehicles,
Wherein the verification target second message selection process selects the verification target second message based on a preset number of verifications among the second messages received from another vehicle. The method of claim 3,
The message collaboration verification method according to any one of (1) to (6) above is repeatedly performed. 8. The method of claim 7,
(2) In the first message receiving step,
Wherein the first messages received from another vehicle comprise a first message received during a current first message verification time (? ST) and a first message received during a previous report message verification time (? RT).
KR1020160005541A 2016-01-15 2016-01-15 Method and appratus for cooperative authentication using pseudo id in vanet KR101802820B1 (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
KR1020160005541A KR101802820B1 (en) 2016-01-15 2016-01-15 Method and appratus for cooperative authentication using pseudo id in vanet

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
KR1020160005541A KR101802820B1 (en) 2016-01-15 2016-01-15 Method and appratus for cooperative authentication using pseudo id in vanet

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
KR20170086174A true KR20170086174A (en) 2017-07-26
KR101802820B1 KR101802820B1 (en) 2017-11-30

Family

ID=59427225

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
KR1020160005541A KR101802820B1 (en) 2016-01-15 2016-01-15 Method and appratus for cooperative authentication using pseudo id in vanet

Country Status (1)

Country Link
KR (1) KR101802820B1 (en)

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN107835077A (en) * 2017-09-22 2018-03-23 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 Mutual trust cluster collaborative verification method for anonymous authentication of vehicle-mounted network
KR102042935B1 (en) * 2018-12-14 2019-11-08 부경대학교 산학협력단 Anonymous messenger reputation system based on blockchain and reputation appraisal method thereof
KR102129358B1 (en) * 2019-04-08 2020-07-02 주식회사 디젠 Method and computer program for preventing forgery and alteration of car control signal

Cited By (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN107835077A (en) * 2017-09-22 2018-03-23 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 Mutual trust cluster collaborative verification method for anonymous authentication of vehicle-mounted network
CN107835077B (en) * 2017-09-22 2020-10-02 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 Mutual trust cluster collaborative verification method for anonymous authentication of vehicle-mounted network
KR102042935B1 (en) * 2018-12-14 2019-11-08 부경대학교 산학협력단 Anonymous messenger reputation system based on blockchain and reputation appraisal method thereof
WO2020122292A1 (en) * 2018-12-14 2020-06-18 부경대학교 산학협력단 Blockchain-based anonymous message transmitter reputation system and reputation appraisal method
KR102129358B1 (en) * 2019-04-08 2020-07-02 주식회사 디젠 Method and computer program for preventing forgery and alteration of car control signal

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
KR101802820B1 (en) 2017-11-30

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
Lamssaggad et al. A survey on the current security landscape of intelligent transportation systems
Chuang et al. TEAM: Trust-extended authentication mechanism for vehicular ad hoc networks
Lam et al. ANT-centric IoT security reference architecture—Security-by-design for satellite-enabled smart cities
EP3576378B1 (en) Transferring control of vehicles
WO2014196181A1 (en) Data authentication device, and data authentication method
JP6484519B2 (en) Gateway device and control method thereof
Feng et al. On the cybersecurity of traffic signal control system with connected vehicles
KR101802820B1 (en) Method and appratus for cooperative authentication using pseudo id in vanet
CN103517203A (en) Data packet processing framework for security of vehicle-to-vehicle application programs on resource-constrained platforms
JP2022543670A (en) Vehicle control systems for cyber security and financial transactions
KR102393555B1 (en) Method for protected communication between a vehicle and an external server, device for carrying out the key derivation in the method and vehicle
KR101782483B1 (en) Method and apparatus for generating certificate of vehicle in vehicular ad-hoc network
Förster et al. Rewire–revocation without resolution: A privacy-friendly revocation mechanism for vehicular ad-hoc networks
Wang et al. Physical layer authentication based on nonlinear Kalman filter for V2X communication
US11488404B2 (en) Session unique access token for communications with a vehicle
Ferng et al. Messages classification and dynamic batch verification scheme for VANETs
Vasudev et al. P2-SHARP: privacy preserving secure hash based authentication and revelation protocol in IoVs
Mazhar et al. State-of-the-Art Authentication and Verification Schemes in VANETs: A Survey
Chawan et al. Security enhancement of over-the-air update for connected vehicles
US10263976B2 (en) Method for excluding a participant from a group having authorized communication
Kleberger et al. Protecting vehicles against unauthorised diagnostics sessions using trusted third parties
CN112702172B (en) Parking service privacy protection system and method based on v2p
KR101749449B1 (en) Two Level Privacy Preserving Pseudonymous Authentication Method for Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network and System Therefor
US20220239472A1 (en) Service-oriented architecture in a vehicle
Dewangan et al. Cyber Threats and Its Mitigation to Intelligent Transportation System

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
A201 Request for examination
E902 Notification of reason for refusal
E701 Decision to grant or registration of patent right
GRNT Written decision to grant