KR20090026846A - Separator of the internal/external network throughout the dual indepentent environment and th controlling method thereof - Google Patents

Abstract

An apparatus for separating internal and external networks through dualized independent environments and a control method thereof are provided to offer a free and open common environment and a restricted secret environment, and thoroughly prevent an unauthorized access and infiltration as having an independent work environment on one operating system. The first and second HDDs(Hard Disc Drives)(110a,110b) are virtually separated. The first HDD is provided to a general common environment. The second HDD is provided to a restricted secret environment. An operating system(130) comprises a kernel for supporting the computer hardware connection of the first and second HDDs. The operating system controls the kernel to stably and perfectly separate the first and second HDDs. Therefore, two work environments and two networks can be isolated.

Description

Separator of the internal / external network throughout the dual indepentent environment and th controlling method

The present invention relates to an internal and external network separation device and a control method thereof.

In particular, in the personal computer using a network based on the overall operating system environment that controls the personal computer in the virtual or physically separated into two separate working environment by applying a standard and security structure for each environment The present invention relates to an internal and external network separation device and a control method through a dual independent environment that enables separate operation of internal and external networks in a public, secret, and network environment.

The conventional network separation / switching system is divided into two types: a switch type separated by software or a PCI card type with a personal computer, a network switching device with a hardware switch type, and two physical computers composed of one personal computer. 2 in 1 system.

The network switching method of the conventional software is simple to install, easy to use, and has advantages of fast switching of networks and low cost without rebooting a personal computer, but uses virtual space by sharing a hard disk drive. Because it does not have complete control over the kernel process part of the operating system, there are many vulnerabilities for external intrusion, file hiding function enables non-use network, and security weakness that is easy to intrude external malicious purpose accessor.

In addition, the conventional hardware network switching method is a physical switching method, while the internal network and the Internet are separated from each other, the security of supporting the use of the Internet by protecting the resources of the internal network from external hacking is great. Power supply short-circuit, time required when switching network (minimum 3-8 minutes), work efficiency deterioration due to non-continuity of work, wasteful work (1 person 2 computer, 1 person 2 monitor), network switching device And unification of computer equipment shows problems such as defects and failures.

The two-in-one system, which has the hardware of two personal computers from the above two security points in one desktop, is completely blocked and improves the short circuit method. This has the advantage of having a user interface (UI: User Intedrface) built to switch the system and network.

However, there is a big disadvantage of hardware cost and lack of software control.

Public institutions and corporations also have a variety of countermeasures to prevent illegal information leakage through unauthorized access from outside and to protect important internal confidentiality and files.

When using the external network, various methods such as exposure of important data used in the internal network, internal information leakage by hackers, internal information access by viruses, internal information such as malicious code / Trojan horse / worm / backdoor / Snoof, etc. Countermeasures have been taken, and various antivirus programs, spyware search and treatment programs, web server SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) authentication, and server administrator's server (SSH) are used. Security responses to general-purpose personal computers, such as connection management, are also diversified.

 However, as the basic security by separating the network that is the absolute and complete isolation operation of the working environment and the infiltration path as the most basic response, the application of the dual internal / external network separation / transition method is becoming active and the stable and reliable network separation A switching system is required.

Accordingly, the present invention has been made in order to meet the above-described needs, a processor by the kernel of the operating system, various processors, memory, file system, diva

Controlling and hooking data and networks, separating the environment into two dual environments, each with its own independent working environment on one operating system, free and open public environment, and unauthorized access and penetration. It is an object of the present invention to provide a device for separating internal and external networks and a control method through a dual independent environment capable of providing a thorough quarantined and restricted secret environment.

In addition, the present invention, the internal and external networks can be applied to separate and isolate the operation, the external network is possible to work on the external network, such as the general and free Internet, the internal network to perform the work in a blocked intranet environment Firewall, IDS (Intrusion Delection System), advanced features to prevent unauthorized persons and various intrusions and leaks in advance, finds attack signatures, monitors directly from the devices connected to the network, and automatically takes some action An object of the present invention is to provide an internal and external network separation apparatus and a control method through a dual independent environment providing a function such as an IPS (Intrusion Prevention System) to stop.

In addition, the present invention, the internal and external network separation device through a dual independent environment that enables the storage, use and separation of various application programs through the independent process control of the environment and to enable integrated security and control, such as blocking viruses and spyware And a control method thereof.

The present invention for achieving the above object is a separate and separated hard disk drive is provided in a common common environment and the other is provided in a limited secret environment; It includes a kernel (Kernel) to support the connection of the computer hardware of the hard disk drive, and to control the kernel to separate and separate the hard disk drive stable and completely separate the two working environment and two networks An operating system to enable; And the one separate hard disk drive provided in a general public environment to be connected to an external internet network and the operating system, and the other separated hard disk drive provided in a limited secret environment to the internal network network and the operating system. It is characterized by including a dual independent independent environment system to be connected to the system.

In addition, the present invention provides a processor run control subsystem of an independent environment system, comprising: a first step of discovering a process deviating from a rule by a process rule; A second step of the processor run control subsystem determining whether it is suitable for an existing parent process and calling the parent process if it is appropriate, and if not, calling the sign process after accepting or generating a new rule; And a third step of determining, by the processor run control subsystem, whether the copying process is reasonable and driving a new scheduler after increasing the count value if it is reasonable and driving the scheduler without increasing the count value if it is not. .

According to the present invention, to implement a dual internal and external network, by providing two environments isolated from one operating system to build an independent working environment and each internal and external network for each environment, unauthorized external intrusion and other It is effective to block and terminate unauthorized access and other viruses and spyware.

In addition, according to the present invention, in one public environment, free web access and network activity are possible, and there is no hassle with external access, and in a closed secret environment, absolute blocking with external access and control of application programs are performed. It is possible to block from other external factors, other viruses, spyware, etc., so you can receive absolute protection for security data, important documents, objects, etc., and work efficiency with a smooth intranet with designated internal groups. It is effective to increase.

In addition, according to the present invention, by separating the internal and external network under the control of the network, it is possible to control the access of the external network and control the internal network by group management, and the internal access factor is also blocked by infiltration or monitoring by management by the group. There is an effect to make this possible.

In addition, according to the present invention, the influence of the control and control between the server is increased in the future, and based on the embedded software field, there is an effect that can be affected.

In addition, according to the present invention, when mounted in a general control server, there is an effect that it is possible to introduce the enterprise type ubiquitous technology of the enterprise or public organizations that can be controlled in the server-to-client concept.

Referring now to Figure 1 below it will be described in detail the internal and external network separation apparatus and method through a dual independent environment according to the present invention.

1 is a block diagram of an internal and external network separation apparatus through a dual independent environment according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to the drawings, the internal and external network separation apparatus 100 through a dual independent environment according to an embodiment of the present invention is divided into two hard disk drives (110a, 110b), these two hard disk drives (110a, 110b) and a dual independent environment system 120, operating system 130, which provides and controls access to the operating system 130 (of course, the hard disk drive may be virtually separated into two here). And physically separated into two).

Here, the hard disk drive (110a, 110b) is a hard disk drive (110a) is provided in a general public environment to connect to the external Internet network and the operating system 130 through the dual independent independent environment system 120, It is separated into a hard disk drive 110b provided in a restricted secret environment that accesses an internal network and accesses an operating system through a dual independent environment system 120.

The dual independent environment system 120 allows a hard disk drive 110a provided in a general public environment to be connected to an external Internet network and an operating system, and internally provides a hard disk drive 110b provided in a restricted secret environment. It is connected to the network network and to the operating system. The dual independent environment system 120 includes an external network network interface 121a that can be connected to an external Internet network and an internal network network interface 121b that can be connected to an internal intranet network.

In addition, the operating system 130 supports the dual independent environment system 120 so that a general public environment and a limited secret environment can be separated, and two hard disk drives 110a, respectively, in each separated environment. 110b) is driven.

The operating system 130 includes a kernel that supports access to a dual independent environment system and hardware. The operating system 130 controls these kernels to stably and completely separate the two separate hard disk drives 110a and 110b. In order to separate the two work environment and two networks on one operating system 130 to separate.

2A is a conceptual diagram illustrating a connection relationship between an application and an operating system according to the related art.

Referring to FIG. 2A, in general, a user asks a kernel 210 of an operating system in an application 200, and the kernel 210 of the operating system responds to an application 200.

As such, the application 200 and the kernel 210 perform tasks in response to questions and answers. According to the related art, a kernel, which is an operating system, directly undergoes a user's request and execution process.

2B is a conceptual diagram illustrating a connection relationship between an application and an operating system using an independent environment system in a general common environment according to an embodiment of the present invention, and FIG. 2C illustrates an independent environment system in a limited secret environment according to an embodiment of the present invention. The conceptual diagram shows the connection between the used application and the operating system.

2B and 2C, a connection relationship between an application and an operating system using an independent environment system in a general public environment or a limited secret environment according to an embodiment of the present invention may be determined by the independent environment system 205 between the application 200 and the kernel. (210) Located in the middle, it controls and hooks the kernel and takes over the commands for the user's execution, responses to queries, and the role of the performer.

The independent environment system 205 may include Including File System, Registry, Network, Named Object, Mutex, Semaphore, Event, LPC / RPC, Windows Messages, Keyboard, Video, removable devices, I on the kernel 210 of the operating system. Manage and run / Os.

In the case of FIG. 2B, when a user commands installation and execution (Create [1]) in an application 200 in a general public environment connected to an external network or the Internet, the independent environment system 205 executes a kernel. In the above example, the query or command is executed and the user (Reply [4]) is conceptually shown to the user instead of the result of the execution.

Here, [AA] arbitrarily represents an execution space for a control object or a library for the application 200.

At this time, the independent environment system 205 involves the installation and execution (Create [1]) of the application 200 received from the user and analyzes it, and stores the conceptual part in the virtual space, and then recognizes the recognized contents. After asking the kernel 210 for a query and a possible decision (Create [2]), receiving a response (Reply [3]), and responding to the application 200 again (Reply). [4]).

[BB] arbitrarily specifies the storage and execution elements for the independent environment system 205 and the kernel 210.

Meanwhile, referring to FIG. 2C, the restricted secret environment performs work in an environment blocked from the external network, and has a higher rule range than the public environment.

In a restricted secret environment, the independent environment system 205 has enhanced restrictions and rules for objects and drives on the kernel 210.

Figure 3 is a block diagram of the internal and external network separation apparatus through a dual independent environment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 3, the internal and external network separation apparatus through the dual independent environment of the present invention includes an application 310, a public environment hard disk drive 314, a secret environment hard disk drive 316, a network management module 320, and a file. System / Filter Driver 322, Independent Environment Driver 324, System Call Interface 326, File Subsystem 328, Buffer Cache 330, Properties 332, Block 334, Device Driver 336 And an interprocess 340, a scheduler 342, a memory manager 344, a hardware controller 346, and a hardware 348.

In this case, the network management module 320, the file system module / filter driver 322, and the independent environment driver 324 constitute an independent environment system.

Here, the independent environment driver 324 controls and hooks a management process and memory, a file system, and other device kernels by a processor, which is a system call interface (SCI) 326. We will create a, and have an integrated parallel delivery scheme.

This system call interface 326 serves as a conceptual bearer and virtual table for the kernel's file subsystem 328, process control subsystem 338, and independent environment driver 324.

On the other hand, the network management module 320 separates and isolates the internal and external networks, generates group resources of the internal network, and controls and manages the classification of authorized persons.

In addition, the file system module / filter driver 322 is separated into two blocked independent environments, the Public Independent Environment and the Secured Independent Environment, and performs a filtering role for various applications. It acts as an intermediary for the medium.

On the other hand, in terms of using such a dual independent environment, the relationship between the two independent environments, The Public Independent Environment (HDD1) and The Secured Independent Environment (HDD2), is isolated and is open. In the Internet, e-mail, games, communication, various entertainment, office, other development, common work, such as common work is used in an unlimited environment (generally using a PC) and access to the outside is free.

All of these activities cannot be shared in a secret environment, and conversely, sharing in an open environment is restricted.

To run an independent work environment, two work environments are required and each operating system and application programs must be installed and run in parallel.

This requires two installations and two software licenses. It is inconvenient in terms of users and inferior in management efficiency.

So here, an independent environment system separates two environments into physical systems on the kernel of one operating system, giving each of them an independent workspace. In other words, it is a single operating system, but in an independent operating system.

In that way, the independent environment system should define the limited interception and rule coverage of the separate internal and external networks and the two environments. That is, execution processes of an application or a commonly used operating system in each environment require a sequential scheduler of execution processes and non-execution processes.

The use of one operating system in common by the blocking of running and non-executing processes, while each independent process controls the absolute blocking of other access, is independent and closed to the Secured Independent Environment (HDD2). You can maintain an absolute environment.

4 is an exemplary diagram illustrating a sequential concept of performing a process kernel of an independent environment system and performing the same according to an embodiment of the present invention.

The process run control subsystem 410 of the independent environment system allocates process table entries for new processes and assigns child processes to recognize, assign, and control the processes of each of the processes 401-404. Give it a unique ID.

Process run control subsystem 410 also copies the contents of the parent process to increment the associated file table and inode table counters. New processes depend on subconcepts and new processes are created by duplicating the old process.

There is a new process waiting for the scheduler to choose and execute itself. The new data structure creates a data identifier, which in turn makes the identifier dependent as the parent process.

It is a secret environment that separates the two environments and has limited permission to share resources of processes (process files, signal handlers and virtual memory) in the kernel for authorization and control of application programs. When you do this, you can increase the count value so that all processes do not deallocate the resource before it finishes using it.

When sharing virtual memory with a replicated process, the struct of the process has a pointer to the struct of the original process and the count of the struct is incremented to control the amount of amplification of the shared process.

Also, when running application programs and existing kernel executions, new objects can be executed (e.g., non-specific viruses, spyware, etc.), or new child processes stacks and data segments (parent copies) can be created. When the memory shortage call is made, the fork call by the dependent processor is followed by the call by the process and file system.

Add_to_runquese () Adds a process to runquese

Del_from_runquese () executes when permission is granted

Move_last_runquese () Moves a process to the end of the run queue

Move_first_runquese () Moves the process to the first run queue

Select priority process

Sched () / Goodness () / Sys_nice ()

Fork system call execution in the system call interface 420 is executed and fork () in the process.c file of the process is called, which in turn calls do_fork ().

do_fork () calls and subordinates to multiple child processes, causing the parent process to increment bindmt by this invocation command and terminate the new running processes.

When new processes terminate, they create new child processes, where records created in the open environment are transferred to the secret environment and terminate the corresponding information in the secret environment.

The final report contains the contents of copy_thead, copy_file, cppy_fs, etc. This is the context of the behavior of the new process (child of the virus or spyware), the stack and data segment of the initial process, and the recording of the file system configuration changes.

In a secret environment, you read the final decision on that part and decide to block the use of that process.

Called when an error handling occurs and a process access is found due to execution of an unspecified program.

-If you violate the usage rules of the application program in the secret environment

When memory cannot use the allocation of a process's task struct

An error occurs when copying the stack and data segment of the parent process.

Wake aborted process. Task running the process state and adding it to the list of ready states. Wake_up_process () All processes run in user mode or system mode.

User mode has much less privileges than system mode. Every concept takes place in system mode when each has to wait for some system event to occur. Processes use library functions to read and open files, and to do this, call system calls that read the file in turn.

In this case, the entire process is suspended and another executable process is selected and executed.

In this case, the intermediate termination record for this case is recorded with the transfer value, and the schedule is recorded in the defined rule function. When the execution is executed that is inconsistent with the basic rules of the suspended process and the executed process, a call is made to the details. The management of and blocking is determined.

At this time, a scheduler is needed to copy the rules of processes in the kernel that are executed in the existing operating system (OS) environment and read the erroneous executions of the rules, and the execution of these schedulers is performed in two virtual environments. Control, blocking, etc. are managed.

The internal and external networks are separated by two environments for such external access or internal data transfer, and the concept of firewalls of open environment using external network and secret environment using internal network is also wrong.

The open environment connecting the external network is basically detected by the Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) and the blocking command and its record are left.The secret environment of the internal network is left as a result and the corresponding DB Will also be different.

If unauthorized access is made from the outside, access to the secret environment by the internal network is not possible at all, and access to the open environment is also detected and blocked in the open environment. Exists in a state.

In the internal network of the secret environment, a group authorizer can be created, and all accesses and transmissions performed in the authorized internal network are managed through the IP filtering module.

Access via internal licensors can also be blocked immediately if they deviate from the established rules, so that access to the internal network with the promised internal licensors can also be controlled.

That is, the transmission and access of data are managed by the rule array filtering module by the present invention engine with the blocked group authorizer.

5 is a flowchart illustrating control and interruption between the independent environments of the process run control subsystem of the independent environment system according to the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 5, the processor run control subsystem of the independent environment system first arranges process rules (step S110).

Thereafter, the processor run control subsystem generates a process scheduler rule (step S112), and if it finds a process that violates the rule (step S114), it determines whether it is suitable for the existing parent process (step S116).

As a result of the determination, if it is appropriate to the existing parent process, it is determined whether the copy process is appropriate after calling the parent process (step S124).

If the determination result is correct, the count value is increased (step S126), and then a new scheduler is executed or not performed (step S128).

On the other hand, as a result of the determination, if it is not suitable for the existing parent process, the system call is called (step S118), and it is isolated or generates a new rule (step S120).

Thereafter, after calling the parent process, it is determined whether the copying process is appropriate (step S124).

If the determination result is correct, the count value is increased (step S126), and then a new scheduler is executed or not performed (step S128).

6 is a diagram illustrating a kernel control process through a system call interface of an independent environment system according to the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 6, the independent environment system temporarily stops the entry / exit process delivered to the kernel APC through the system call interface (step S210).

The independent environment system hooks the registry information through the system call interface (step S212) and adds a new register (step S214).

Thereafter, the independent environment system changes and deletes the outflow registry through the system call interface (step S216), and resumes the interrupted entry / exit process (step S218).

1 is a block diagram of an internal and external network separation apparatus through a dual independent environment according to an embodiment of the present invention.

2A is a conceptual diagram illustrating a connection relationship between an application and an operating system according to the prior art, and FIG. 2B is a conceptual diagram illustrating a connection relationship between an application and an operating system using an independent environment system in a general common environment according to an embodiment of the present invention. 2c is a conceptual diagram illustrating a connection relationship between an application and an operating system using an independent environment system in a restricted secret environment according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Figure 3 is a block diagram of the internal and external network separation apparatus through a dual independent environment of the present invention.

4 is an exemplary diagram illustrating a sequential concept of performing a process kernel of an independent environment system and performing the same according to an embodiment of the present invention.

5 is a flowchart illustrating control and interruption between the independent environments of the process run control subsystem of the independent environment system according to the present invention.

Claims (10)

A hard disk drive that is separate and separate, provided in a general public environment, and in a restricted secret environment; It includes a kernel (Kernel) to support the connection of the computer hardware of the hard disk drive, and to control the kernel to separate and separate the hard disk drive stable and completely separate the two working environment and two networks An operating system to enable; And The separate hard disk drive provided in a general public environment is connected to an external Internet network and the operating system, and the separate separate hard disk drive provided in a limited secret environment is connected to an internal network network and the operating system. Internal and external network separation devices through a dual independent environment, including a dual independent environment system to be connected to. The method of claim 1, The internal and external network separation apparatus through a dual independent environment, characterized in that the hard disk drive is virtually separated. The method of claim 1, The internal and external network separation apparatus through a dual independent environment, characterized in that the hard disk drive is physically separated. The method of claim 1, The dual independent environment system, A network management module for generating a group resource of the internal network and controlling and managing the division of licensers while separating and isolating the internal and external networks; A file system module / filter driver that separates two blocked independent environments, The Public Independent Environment and The Secured Independent Environment, and acts as a filter for various applications; And Device that separates internal and external networks through a dual independent environment including a processor-managed process, and an independent environment driver that controls and hooks memory, filesystems, and other device kernels. The method of claim 4, wherein The independent environment driver generates a system call interface (SCI: System CallInterface) for controlling and hooking a processor-managed process, memory, file system, and other device kernels to the operating system, and integrated parallel transfer. Internal and external network separation device through a dual independent environment characterized in that it has a system. The method of claim 5, wherein The independent environment driver copies the process, creates a table, increments a count, and allocates virtual memory. The processor run control subsystem of the independent environment system may include a first step of detecting a process that is out of compliance by the process rule; A second step of the processor run control subsystem determining whether it is suitable for an existing parent process and calling the parent process if it is appropriate, and if not, calling the sign process after accepting or generating a new rule; And And a third step of the processor run control subsystem determining whether the copying process is reasonable and starting a new scheduler after increasing the count value if it is reasonable and driving the scheduler without increasing the count value if it is not. Control method of internal and external network separation device through. The method of claim 7, wherein The first step is, A processor run control subsystem of the independent environment system, arranging process rules; The processor run control subsystem generating a process scheduler rule; And And detecting, by the processor run control subsystem, a process that violates the rules. The method of claim 7, wherein The second step, Determining, by the processor run control subsystem, whether the existing parent process is appropriate; Invoking the parent process if it is reasonable; And If not determined, the control method of the internal and external network separation device through a dual independent environment, comprising the step of calling the parent process after receiving the system call or creating a new rule after calling the system call. The method of claim 7, wherein The third step, Determining, by the processor run control subsystem, whether a copy process is reasonable; Determining, by the processor run control subsystem, that the copying process is reasonable; if so, driving the new scheduler after increasing the count value; And And the processor run control subsystem includes executing a new scheduler if the copying process is reasonable.

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