KR20090001497A - Internet voting method for all participants having mutual attestation functions on trusted computing environment and system thereof - Google Patents

Abstract

An Internet voting system for providing a mutual attestation function to each participant in a trusted computing environment by using a TMP is provided to make each participant trust and use the Internet voting system on a trusted platform by adding the mutual attestation function. An authentication server performs authentication. A voter terminal(100) performs the authentication with the authentication server by using TPM and performs voting after the mutual attestation between a voting server(200) and a ballot counting server(300). The voting server stores voting information received from the voter terminal. The ballot counting server performs the authentication with the authentication server by using the TPM and performing the mutual attestation with the voter terminal, and provides a voting ticket for inputting the voting information to the voter terminal during the voting, and announces a voting result by analyzing the voting information stored through the voting server during ballot counting.

Description

Internet Voting method for all participants having mutual attestation functions on trusted computing environment and system

1 is a view showing the configuration of the Internet electronic voting system according to an embodiment of the present invention,

2 is a view for explaining a preprocessing process of the Internet electronic voting method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

3a and 3b are views for explaining the voting process of the Internet electronic voting method according to an embodiment of the present invention;

Figure 4 is a view for explaining the counting process of the Internet electronic voting method according to an embodiment of the present invention,

Figure 5a is a view for explaining in more detail the warranty process of the voting server according to an embodiment of the present invention, and

Figure 5a is a view for explaining in more detail the warranty process of the ticket server according to an embodiment of the present invention.

The present invention relates to an Internet electronic voting method and system, and more particularly, to an Internet electronic voting method and system in which each participant has a mutual guarantee function using a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) technology.

In general, electronic voting refers to a concept applied to all aspects of voting, such as voting by electronic means or voting counting. That is, a combination of electronic means is possible in one part or in various parts for conducting an electronic voting. In fact, electronic voting counting has already been introduced in large parts of the world and its effectiveness has been proven.

Electronic voting can be divided into two methods: using electronic devices at large designated places and voting at various places other than designated places.

First, the use of electronic devices in designated places refers to the method of installing and voting electronic devices in places where people frequently gather or access easily, such as polling stations, public offices, shopping centers, and so on. It is divided into fixed / mobile kiosks.

The kiosk system is an electronic voting system using a voting device similar to an unmanned automatic guidance system installed at a convenient public institution or place in a voting district, not for a polling place, to facilitate voting convenience. Use technology.

Although the above method is inconvenient to vote in the polling place as in the conventional method, it is advantageous in that it provides a convenient and easy user interface, the counting and counting process is fast, and there is little probability of generating invalid votes. First of all, it is considered as a next-generation electronic voting method in that security risk is lower than Internet voting.

Remote voting means voting using a variety of other electronic technologies at various places other than designated polling places. There are telephone voting, short text service voting, two-way digital TV, and internet voting. .

The dual Internet voting system allows citizens to vote at any place by using the Internet. Voters express their intentions using a PC connected through the Internet, and the voting data leaving the terminal is transmitted through the network. And stored on the server.

It is a representative electronic voting method that several domestic and foreign companies started commercial service in the form of Application Service Provider (ASP), and can be called a concept similar to Internet banking or Internet e-commerce.

Meanwhile, TPM technology aims to provide a trusted computing environment through a combination of low power and high performance hardware / software for security and trust services. TPM supports platform integrity assurance, secure storage provisioning, and common cryptographic libraries.

Here, the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), a group that aims to standardize entrepreneurship on trusted computing, is a standard body of more than 120 companies worldwide, which is a successor of the Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA). Trusted computing aims to protect user information and computing environments, provide hardware-protected applications through cryptographic keys, and provide mutual authentication between secure platforms.

The TPM is hardware defined by the TCG, which is embedded in the computing platform and serves as a root of trust.

TPM provides so-called "sealed storage" that generates, uses and protects cryptographic keys and encrypts readable data only when the platform is in the same configuration.

In addition, the software on the platform is measured by storing and signing the platform configuration register (PCR).

And as a function associated with the present invention, it provides a PCR value assurance function for a third party by a method for authenticating that it is a valid TPM and providing a signature for the PCR value.

Assurance using the private-Certificate Authority (CA) is for the assurance process that each platform's TPM has a unique Endorsement Key (EK), and each verifier knows the EK of valid TPMs or is issued by a certification authority. You have a certificate for each EK.

If the verifier wants to know whether the platform is running a secure operating system (OS), the TPM sends a verifier (PCR value) to the verifier to ensure that the verifier is a valid TPM. Validate the PCR via EK to verify whether the TPM is valid.

However, in the above method, two or more verifiers know that they are guaranteed on the same platform, and there is a problem in that the anonymity of the TPM-equipped platform cannot be guaranteed because the operations of the same user may be linked.

To solve this problem, a third-party private certification authority is set up so that different validators can use different keys. Make sure that the TPM of each platform has an Attestation Identity Key (AIK) for each verifier in addition to the EK.

AIKi is an RSA key pair consisting of AIKi public key (validation key) and AIKi secret key (signature key). The assurance process using this is as follows (where i is 1≤i≤k and k is the number of validators).

The TPM sends the EK and AIKi_public key to the private certification authority, which checks whether the EK is valid.

Obtain SIG _privacy-CA (AIKi public key), which is a certificate of AIKi public key, signed by a private certification authority in EK encrypted form. Where SIGx (Y) is the signature for Y with X as the key

TPM obtains SIG _privacy-CA (AIKi_public key) through decryption.

At the request of the verifier, the TPM sends the SIG _privacy-CA (AIKi_public key) and AIKi_public key, and the SIG _{AIKi_Private key} (PCR) and platform measurement list (signed with the _{AIKi_Private key} ). Forward the Measurement List (ML) to the verifier.

The verifier verifies the AIKi public key received through the certificate SIG _privacy-CA (AIKi public key) received from the TPM, and verifies the SIG _{AIKi secret key} (PCR) through this key to obtain PCR.

And compare the contents of the ML and PCR received together to confirm the guarantee.

Accordingly, an object of the present invention is to add a mutual attestation function to trust all the voters, the voting server, and the ballot counting server, which constitute the Internet electronic voting, so that each participant can trust and use the electronic voting system on a trust platform. The present invention provides a method and system for electronic electronic voting.

In addition, the low-power, high-performance TPM chip is mounted on the main board of the voter (PC), the voting server, and the ballot counting server, respectively, to maximize performance, while allowing the certification authority on the existing public key infrastructure to act as a private certification authority. An object of the present invention is to provide an electronic voting method and system for internet voting that can be a subject of mutual guarantee between servers.

According to the present invention, a voter terminal, a voting server, a ballot server, and an authentication server according to the present invention have a participant. The voter terminal, the voting server, and the ballot server each use the TPM. Receiving a certificate of its own from an authentication server, the ballot server and the ballot server after the pre-processing process for generating each of the ballot processing information and the ballot processing information after exchanging their certificates; A voting process in which the voting server stores the voting information according to the voting process information after the voter terminal, the voting server and the ballot counting server guarantee each other by using the TPM, and then the voting terminal generates voting information. ; And a counting process for analyzing the stored voting information according to the counting information and counting and outputting the voting contents.

Internet voting system according to the present invention for achieving the above object, the authentication server for performing the authentication operation as a privacy-CA of the TPM; A voter terminal for performing a voting operation after performing an authentication operation with the authentication server and a mutual guarantee operation with a voting server and a ballot counting server using the TPM; A voting server for storing the voting information transmitted from the voter terminal after performing the authentication operation with the authentication server and the mutual guarantee operation with the voter terminal using the TPM; And after performing authentication work with the authentication server and mutual guarantee work with the voter terminal by using the TPM, provide a voting ticket for inputting the voting information into the voter terminal when voting. The city includes a counting server that analyzes the voting information stored through the voting server and announces a voting result.

Hereinafter, a preferred embodiment of the Internet electronic voting method according to the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. At this time, it will be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art that the system configuration described below is a system cited for the purpose of the present invention and does not limit the present invention to the following system.

1 is a view showing the configuration of the Internet electronic voting system according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to Figure 1, the Internet electronic voting system of the present invention is a voter terminal 100, voting server 200, ballot server 300, authentication server 400, and voter database 500 and voting database 600 It includes. Each voter terminal 100, the voting server 200, and the ballot counting server 300 are each equipped with a TPM.

The voter terminal 100 receives and holds its certificate (SIG _CA (AIK_Vi_public key)) from the authentication server 400 using the TPM, and receives voter TPM information when the voter information is input by the voter Vi. After attaching and transmitting to the voting server 200 and the ballot counting server 300, the actual voting work is performed only after the guarantee work using the TPM is normally completed.

The voting server 200 receives its certificate (SIG _CA (AIK_voting server_public key)) from the authentication server 400 using the TPM, and receives voter TPM information transmitted from the voter terminal 100 when voting. After assuring the voter terminal 100 using the voting information, the voting information is stored in the voting database 600. The voting information stored in the voting database 600 is provided to the voting server 300.

Vote server 300 receives its certificate (SIG _CA (AIK_count server_public key)) from the authentication server 400 using the TPM, and voter TPM information transmitted from the voter terminal 100 when voting After the endorsement of the voter terminal 100, the voting ticket T may be provided to generate voting information, and the voting information provided by the voting server 200 may be analyzed and the voting result may be analyzed. To announce.

The authentication server 400 performs a function as a private certification authority of the TPM, and performs authentication for each of the voter terminal 100, the voting server 200, and the ballot counting server 300 while providing anonymity of the platform. Provide each certificate.

The voter database 500 stores all information of the voter terminal (or voter) 100 related to voting, and the voting database 600 stores voting information stored by the voting server 200.

Hereinafter will be described the Internet electronic voting method according to an embodiment of the present invention.

2 is a view for explaining a preprocessing process of the Internet electronic voting method, Figures 3a and 3b is a view for explaining the voting process, Figure 4 is a view for explaining the counting process.

Referring to Figure 2, the pre-processing process for voting and counting the Internet electronic voting system will be described as follows.

First, the voter terminal 100, the voting server 200, and the ballot counting server 300 transmits its EK and AIK to the authentication server 400 in order to obtain a certificate regarding the guarantee (S110).

In step S110, the voter terminal 100 receives the EK_Vi and AIK_Vi_ public keys (where Vi is the identification number of the voter terminal), and the voting server 200 displays the EK_ voting server and the AIK_voting server_public key. The server 300 transmits the EK count server and the AIK count server public key to the authentication server 400, respectively.

The authentication server 400 checks the validity of the voter terminal 100, the voting server 200, and the voting server 300 by using the received EK_Vi, EK_ voting server, and EK_ voting server, respectively, AIK_ signed public key SIG _CA (AIK_Vi_ public key) of the certificate, SIG _CA (AIK_ _ voting server's public key), SIG _CA (AIK_ _ counting server's public key) to encrypt the corresponding EK voters terminal Provided to each of the 100, the voting server 200, and the ballot counting server 300 (S120).

Then, the voting server 200 and counting server 300 to mutually use their certificates of SIG _CA (AIK_ _ voting server's public key) and SIG _CA (AIK_ _ counting server's public key) during the election process Exchange (S130).

The voting server 200 generates a random sequence of N votes as many as (N) (S140), and the ballot counting server 300 generates a random sequence of N votes (N) and k kinds of voting tickets. Generate (T) as many voters as possible (N) and mix them (S150).

At this time, the voting server 200 and the ballot counting server 300 keeps the generated random sequence secret.

When the method of Figure 2 is completed, the voting process proceeds as shown in Figures 3a and 3b.

First, in step S211, when a voter makes an electronic vote through any voter terminal 100, the voter terminal 100 has a hash value for the first random number f1, the voting frequency RN, and the voting frequency RN. H (RN)), and generates a voting time (TS) and transmits it to the voting server 200 and the ballot counting server 300 together with voter TPM information.

At this time, the voter TPM information is composed of SIG _CA (AIK_Vi_ public key), AIK_Vi_ public key, and the signature value (S) and ML signed PCR with EK_Vi, the signature value (S) is generated according to Equation 1 do.

S = SIG _{AIK _Vi_ Secret} (H (RN) ∥ TS ∥ PCR)

In step S212, each of the voting server 200 and the ballot counting server 300 performs a guarantee operation for the voter by using the voter TPM information transmitted from the voter terminal 100, and double voting using the number of votes RN. After performing the inspection operation, the voter terminal 100 generates TPM information so as to trust itself, and transmits the TPM information to the voter terminal 100, respectively. A detailed description of step S212 will be described in more detail with reference to FIGS. 5A and 5B below.

Here, the voting server TPM information is a SIG _CA (AIK_voting server_public key), AIK_voting server_public key, and a signature value signed by PCR with the AIK_voting server_secret key of the voting server 200 (SIG _{AIK _ Ballot server _ secret key} (PCR) and ML, the ballot server TPM information is SIG _CA (AIK_ ballot server_ public key) and AIK_ ballot server_ public key, and PCR of the ballot server (300) It consists of a signature value (SIG _{AIK_Evaluation Server_Private Key} (PCR)) and an ML signed by _{AIK_Evaluation Server_Private key} .

In step S213, the voter terminal 100 confirms the reliability of the voting server 200 and the counting server 300 through the voting server TPM information and the counting server TPM information.

To this end, the voter terminal 100 checks the AIK_voting server_public key received through the SIG _CA (AIK_voting server_public key) received from the voting server 200, and through this key, the voting server ( Acquire the PCR by verifying the signature value (SIG _{AIK_ Ticket Server_Private Key} (PCR)) of 200), and then verify the guarantee by comparing the contents of the received PCR with the contents of the PCR. And it also checks the reliability of the counting server 300 in this same way.

In step S214, after the ballot counting server 300 generates the second random number f2, it is encrypted with the voter terminal 100 AIK_Vi_public key according to Equation 2 and transmitted to the voter terminal 100.

A = ENC _{AIK _Vi_public key} (f2)

Here, ENCx (Y) is a public key encryption function for Y with X as the key.

In step S215, the voter terminal 100 decrypts the encrypted second random number A to obtain a second random number f2, and encrypts it again through the first random number f1 generated by the voter server ( 300).

f2 = DEC _{AIK_Vi_secret} (A),

B = E _f2 (f1)

Here, DECx (Y) is a public key decryption function for Y with X as a key, and Ex (Y) is a symmetric key encryption function for Y with X as a key.

In step S216, the voter terminal 100 generates an exclusive logical OR (XOR) of the first random number f1 and the second random number f2 to generate a session key (SK_Vi count) with the count server 400.

SK_Vi count = f1 XOR f2

In step S217, the ballot counting server 400 extracts the first random number f1 from the encrypted second random number B, obtains the session key (SK_Vi counting) with the voter terminal 100, and then selects the session key (SK_Vi counting) ) And encrypts the voting ticket (T) to the voter terminal (100).

C = E _{SK _ Vi count} (T)

In step S218, the voter terminal 100 decrypts the encrypted voting ticket C using its session key (SK_Vi counting count) to obtain the voting ticket T, and thus the vote contents O and its password. Fill in (PW) to generate a vote p according to equation (6). After signing with its own EK_Vi to further generate the voter signature value r, the voting value p and the voter signature value r are transmitted to the voting server 300 together.

p = ENC _{AIK_voting server_public key} (T || O || PW),

r = SIG _{AIK_Vi_secret} (p)

In step S219, the voting server 300 receives the vote value (p) and voter signature value (r) to verify the voter signature value (r), the certificate serial number, certificate issuer, SIG _CA (AIK_Vi_public key), polling time (TS), the voter terminal's link address (URL), and the signature value (S), and stores information of the voter terminal (or voter). Then, the voting value p is signed by AIK_Voice Server_Private key according to Equation 7 and converted to the voting server signature value q, and then transmitted to the voter terminal 100.

q = SIG _{AIK voting server secret key} (p)

In step S210, the voter terminal 100 verifies the voting server signature value q and then notifies the ballot count 300 to notify the counting server 300 that the value p of the vote has been successfully delivered. It encrypts with the session key (SK_Vi count) with the count server 400 and transmits it to the count server 300.

D = E _{SK_Vi count} (RN)

In step S211, the ballot counting server 400 decrypts the encrypted session key (E _{SK_Vi ballot count} (RN)) with its session key (SK_Vi ballot count) to extract the number of votes (RN), and then stores them in the voter database 500. It is checked whether the correct number of votes (RN) has been transmitted by referring to the values, and at the same time, the vote server 300 checks whether the values are correctly recorded in the voter database 500. If the test is successful, the hash value H (RN + 1) of the voting frequency RN is transmitted to the voter terminal 100 and notified, and the voting frequency RN is recorded in the voter database 500. do.

In step S212, the voter terminal 100 compares the received hash value H (RN + 1) with its vote count RN to check whether the vote is normally performed, and then hashes it to indicate that the vote is normally completed. The value H (RN + 2) is transmitted to the voting server 300.

In step S213, the voting server 300 receives the hash value H (RN + 2) and compares it with the number of votes RN recorded in the voter database 500, and verifies that it is the correct value. The terminal 100 is notified, and a random sequence generated in advance to the voting value and the signature value pair (p, r) of the ballot counting server is mapped and stored in the voting database 600.

When the voting process of FIG. 3A and FIG. 3B is completed, the last counting process is performed as shown in FIG. 4.

In step S310, after the voting server 200 aligns the voting value and the signature value pair (p, r) of the ballot counting server according to the random sequence after the end of the voting, deletes the number described in the voting database 600 and counts the counting server 300 To).

In step S320, the ballot counting server 300 receives the voting database 600 and assigns a random sequence to the ballot value and the signature value pairs p and r of the ballot counting server and sorts them.

In step S330, the ballot counting server 300 publishes and counts the voting database 600 and checks whether the number of voting deadlines matches the number of voting in the voting database 600, and then, according to Equation 9, each voting value and the counting count server The signature of the voting server signature value (q) is verified with respect to the signature value pairs (p, r) of.

VER _{AIK _ voting server _ public key} (q, p)

Here, VER _X (Y, Z) is a function that verifies the signature Y through the key X and compares the result with Z.

In step S340, the ballot counting server 300 decrypts the voting value p with its AIK_counting server_secret key according to Equation 10 to vote contents (O), voting ticket (T), password (PW) and the like. Acquire.

(T∥O∥PW) = DECAIK_ Ticket server_Private _key (p)

In step S350, the ballot counting server 300 checks whether the voting ticket T includes the correct voting ticket and the number of the voting tickets through the issued contents, counts the voting contents, announces the voting contents, and verifies the voting contents (as verification data). O), voting ticket (T), password (PW) are disclosed.

5A and 5B are flowcharts for explaining step S212 of FIG. 3 in more detail, where FIG. 5A shows the guarantee operation of the voting server and FIG. 5B shows the guarantee operation of the counting server.

First, the operation of the voting server in step S212 will be described with reference to FIG. 5A.

The voting server 200 checks the AIK_Vi_public key received together through the SIG _CA (AIK_Vi_public key) received from the voter terminal 100 (S2121).

After SIG _{AIK_Vi_public key} (H (RN) || TS || PCR) is verified through AIK_Vi_ public key, PCR is obtained (S2122), and the received ML is compared with the contents of PCR to confirm the guarantee. (S2123).

Subsequently, the items of the voter database 500 are examined to determine whether the number of votes RN is present and to check whether or not there is a double vote (S2124).

As a result of the check in step S2124, if the same number of votes RN already exists in the voter database 500, the voting server 200 informs that the voters Vi are double votes and ends the voting, otherwise the next step Proceed to S213.

Subsequently, the operation of the ballot counting server in step S212 will be described with reference to FIG. 5B.

The ballot counting server 300 checks the AIK_Vi_public key received together through the SIG _CA (AIK_Vi_public key) received from the voter Vi (S2126).

And after verifying the SIG _{AIK_Vi_secret key} (H (RN) || TS || PCR) through the AIK_Vi_ public key to obtain the PCR (S2127), the number of ML and PCR received by the counting server 300 together Compare the to check the warranty (S2128).

Then, by checking the items in the voter database 500 to determine the existence of the number of votes (RN) (S2129).

As a result of the check in step S2129, if the same number of votes RN already exists in the voter database 500, the ballot counting server 300 informs that the voters Vi are double votes and ends the voting; otherwise, the next step Proceed to S213.

That is, the voting server and the ballot counting server of the present invention perform the guarantee work and the double voting check work for the voters in the same way using the TPM.

The present invention described above is not limited to the above-described embodiments and the accompanying drawings, and it is common in the art that various substitutions, modifications, and changes can be made without departing from the technical spirit of the present invention. It will be apparent to those skilled in the art.

As described above, according to the Internet electronic voting method and system according to the present invention, a low-power, high-performance TPM is mounted on a voter terminal, a voting server, and a voting server, which are components of the Internet voting, respectively, to maximize performance and at the same time. The certification authority in the key infrastructure can function as a private certification authority so that the voter terminal and the servers can be the subject of the guarantee, so that voters and the servers who vote as voting members can check with confidence through mutual guarantees, and then vote with confidence. It has an excellent effect.

Claims (18)

In the Internet voting method having a voter terminal, a voting server, a voting server, and an authentication server as participants, Each of the voter terminal, the voting server, and the ballot counting server receives its own certificate from the certificate server using a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), and the ballot server and the ballot counting server exchange their certificates with each other, and then vote processing information. And a preprocessing step of generating the counting information respectively; A voting process in which the voting server stores the voting information according to the voting process information after the voter terminal, the voting server and the ballot counting server guarantee each other by using the TPM, and then the voting terminal generates voting information. ; And And a ballot counting process for analyzing the stored ballot information according to the ballot counting information and counting and outputting the ballot contents. The method of claim 1, wherein the pretreatment process A first step of each of the voter terminal, the voting server, and the ballot counting server transmitting its encryption key and verification key to the authentication server; A second step in which each of the voter terminal, the voting server, and the voting server receive each of the voter terminal, the voting server, and the voting server certificate from the authentication server; A third step in which the voting server and the ballot counting server exchange their certificates with each other; A fourth step of generating, by the voting server, the voting processing information including a random sequence of the number of voters; And And a fifth step, wherein the ballot counting server generates the ballot counting information including a random number of votes and a voting ticket. The method of claim 2, wherein the voting process is A sixth step of generating, by the voter terminal, a first random number, a voting number, a first hash value of the voting number, a voting time, and a voter TPM information to the voting server and the counting server; Each of the voting server and the ballot counting server confirms the guarantee of the voter terminal through the voter TPM information and examines the double votes through the number of votes. Transmitting to the seventh step; An eighth step of the voter terminal confirming the reliability of each of the voting server and the ballot counting server using the voting server TPM information and the ballot counting server TPM information; A ninth step of generating, by the counting server, a second random number further, the counting server and the voter terminal generating a session key using the second random number and the first random number; The ballot counting server selects one of the voting tickets and provides it to the voter terminal, wherein the voter terminal obtains the voting ticket and generates the voting information including a voting value and a signed voting value. Transmitting to the tenth step; An eleventh step in which the voting server stores the information of the voter terminal after verifying the signed voting value, and the voter terminal transmits the number of votes to the counting server; And If the ballot counting server confirms that voting is normally performed through the number of votes, the voting server includes a twelfth step of mapping and storing the voting value and the signed voting value in the random sequence. Way. The method of claim 3, wherein the voter TPM information is An electronic voting method comprising a voter signature value, a voter certificate, a voter verification key, and a list of measured values of the platform as shown in the following equation. S = SIG _{AIK_Vi_ Secret} (H (RN) ∥ TS ∥ PCR) Where S is the voter signature value, AIK_Vi_secret key is the voter signature key, RN is the number of votes, H (RN) is the first hash value of the number of votes, TS is the voting time, PCR is the platform's measured value, SIG _X ( Y) is the signature function for Y with the X key. The method of claim 4, wherein the seventh step Each of the voting server and the ballot counting server verifies the voter verification key using the voter certificate, verifies the voter signature value, obtains the measured value of the platform, and compares it with the measured value list of the platform. Confirming a warranty of the voter terminal; And Each of the voting server and the voting server confirming the guarantee of the voter terminal checks whether the voting number is stored, and confirms whether the voting is double, and then generates the voting server TPM information and the voting server TPM information, respectively, to generate the voting terminal. And transmitting to the Internet electronic voting method. The method of claim 4, wherein The voting server TPM information includes the voting server certificate, the voting server verification key, the voting server signature value, and the measurement list of the platform,  The counting server TPM information includes the counting server certificate, the counting server verification key, the counting server signature value, and a list of measured values of the platform. The method of claim 6, wherein the eighth step After the voter terminal verifies the voting server verification key using the voting server certificate, verifies the voting server signature value using the voting server verification key, obtains the measurement value of the platform, and measures the platform. Confirming the guarantee of the voting server by comparing with a list of values; And After the voter terminal verifies the ticket server public key using the ticket server certificate, verifies the ticket server signature value using the ticket server public key, obtains a measured value of the platform, and measures the platform. And confirming the guarantee of the ballot counting server by comparing with the list of values. The method of claim 6, wherein the ninth step Generating, by the counting server, the second random number and encrypting the second random number with the voter signature key and transmitting the encrypted number to the voter terminal; Decrypting, by the voter terminal, the encrypted second random number transmitted from the ticket server, and transmitting the encrypted second random number to the ticket server again; And And generating, by the voter terminal, the session key using the second random number and the first random number. The method of claim 8, wherein the tenth step The ballot counting server decrypts the encrypted second random number transmitted from the voter terminal to obtain the first random number and the session key, selects one of the voting tickets, encrypts the session key, and transmits the encrypted number to the voter terminal. step; And After the voter terminal decrypts the encrypted voting ticket, the voting value is generated, and the voting value is generated by signing the voting value with the voter signature key to generate the signed voting value. Internet voting method comprising the step of transmitting to the voting server. The method of claim 9, wherein the eleventh step Verifying, by the voting server, the signed voting value, storing all information of the voter terminal related to voting, and signing the voting value with the voting server secret key and transmitting the result to the voter terminal; And And after the voter terminal verifies the signed voting value provided by the voting server, encrypting the voting frequency with the session key and transmitting the voting number to the voting server. The method of claim 10, wherein the twelfth step The ballot counting server analyzes the encrypted number of votes provided by the voter terminal, checks whether the correct number of votes has been transmitted or not, and if the ballot server has stored the correct information, and if the check succeeds, returns the second hash value of the number of votes. Generating and transmitting the vote count to the voter terminal; The voter terminal obtaining the number of votes from the second hash value of the number of votes, checking whether the vote is normally performed, and generating a third hash value of the number of votes and transmitting the generated number to the vote server. ; And The voting server acquires the number of votes from the third hash value of the number of votes, and confirms whether or not the voting is normally performed, and then mapping and storing the random sequence to the vote value and the signed vote value. Internet electronic voting method characterized in that. The method of claim 3, wherein the counting step Providing, by the voting server, the voting information including the voting value and the signed voting value according to its own random sequence, and providing the voting information to the voting server; Voting and voting, after the voting server sorts the voting value provided by the voting server and the signed voting value according to its random sequence;  After the ballot counting server checks whether the number of ballot deadlines matches the number of votes, the ballot server verification key verifies the signature of the signed ballot value, and decrypts the ballot counting server signature key to extract the contents of the ballot, the ballot ticket, and the password. Doing; And And counting and voting the voting contents by checking the voting ticket by checking whether the correct voting ticket is included in the voting ticket and whether the number is the same. A certificate server that performs authentication as a Privacy-CA (Certificate Authority) of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM); A voter terminal for performing a voting operation after performing an authentication operation with the authentication server and a mutual guarantee operation with a voting server and a ballot counting server using the TPM; A voting server for storing the voting information transmitted from the voter terminal after performing the authentication operation with the authentication server and the mutual guarantee operation with the voter terminal using the TPM; And After performing the authentication work with the authentication server and the mutual guarantee work with the voter terminal by using the TPM, provide a voting ticket for inputting the voting information into the voter terminal when voting. Internet voting system including a ballot server for analyzing the voting information stored through the voting server to announce a voting result. The method of claim 13, wherein the authentication server When the encryption key and the verification key are transmitted from the voter terminal, the voting server, and the ballot counting server performing the assurance work using the TPM, the certificate of the verification key signed by the user is verified after validating the encryption key. Internet voting system, characterized in that for providing the certificate. 15. The system of claim 14, wherein the voter terminal is In the preprocessing, the voter encryption key and the voter verification key are transmitted to the authentication server to receive the authentication key of the voter verification key, and during voting, the TPM information is exchanged with the voting server and the ballot counting server to perform a guarantee operation. And receiving the voting ticket from the ballot counting server to generate the voting information. 15. The system of claim 14, wherein the voting server is In the preprocessing, the authentication server of the voting server verification key is provided by transmitting the voting server encryption key and the voting server verification key to the authentication server. Internet voting system, characterized in that for storing the voting information generated through the voter terminal, and provides the stored voting information to the counting server when counting. The method of claim 14, wherein the counting server In the preprocessing, the voting server encryption key and the voting server verification key are transmitted to the authentication server to receive the authentication key of the voting server verification key, and when counting, voting results are analyzed by analyzing the voting information provided by the voting server. Internet voting system, characterized in that and announced. The method of claim 13, A voter database that stores information of the voter terminal related to voting; And And an voting database in which the voting information is stored.

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