KR20070017505A - Packet radio transmission over an unlicensed-radio access network - Google Patents

Abstract

The unauthenticated radio access network is connected to the packet service node 200 in the core network portion of the authenticated mobile telephone network. The unauthenticated radio access network includes an access controller 303 connected to the core network portion and having a packet controller, and a fixed broadband network 302 connected to the access controller 303 and having a plurality of access points 301. . Each access point 301 defines a mini-cell coverage area 302 and is unauthenticated to allow packet data communication between the mobile station 1 and the access controller 303 located within each mini-cell. Interface support. According to the invention, the access controller comprises a database 3031 which stores the identification of the mobile station 1 related to the packet path information assigning the mobile station 1 on a fixed broadband network 302.

Core Network Unit, Mobile Station, Home Base Station, Home Base Station Controller, Packet Control Unit, Interface, Database, Identification

Description

PACKET RADIO TRANSMISSION OVER AN UNLICENSED-RADIO ACCESS NETWORK}

The present invention relates to packet radio service transmission over an unauthorized radio access network. In particular, it relates to the processing of the mobile station's identification of packet radio data in an unauthenticated radio access network.

In the Global Packet Radio Service in a GSM cellular network, packets (local link control or LLC frames) are exchanged between a mobile station (MS) and a GPRS support node (SGSN) in the core network, both of which correspond to corresponding protocols. Has a hierarchy. This exchange is handled by a processor called a packet control unit (PCU), which is part of a typical base station subsystem (BSS).

A mobile station that communicates with General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) in a GSM cellular network is assigned a mobile station identity called a Packet Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (P-TMSI). This P-TMSI is used on the GPRS Mobility Management Layer (GMM). Any single mobile station may have several different types of P-TMSI, some of which are assigned by a network, such as a GPRS support node (SGSN), during GPRS attach, routing area update, or P-TMSI reassignment procedures. The GMM protocol layer also assigns a Temporary Logical Link Identity (TLLI), which is a lower layer (eg, logical link control layer (LLC)), and a radio link control and media access control layer (RLC / MAC). It is derived from P-TMSI for use by.

1 shows an SPRS signaling panel for a mobile station (MS), base station subsystem (BSS) and GPRS support node (SGSN) corresponding to GSM 03.60. On top of the protocol stack shown, both the mobile station (MS) and the GPRS support node (SGSN) have a peer GPRS mobility management / session management (GMM / SM) protocol and a logical link control protocol layer. GMM / SM and LLC protocol messages are relayed by the base station subsystem, which do not have the same protocol layer. On the Um interface between the mobile station and the base station subsystem, the radio link control (RLC) and medium access control (MAC) protocol layers reside on the GSM radio frequency (RF) protocol layer. Facing the Gb interface between the base station subsystem and the GPRS support node (SGSN), the base station subsystem (GPRS) protocol (BSSGP) is supported on network service protocols and layer 1 protocols.

This TLLI is one of the main addressing components for packet exchange between the mobile station and the core network in addition to the base station subsystem packet layer (BSSGP) virtual circuit identifier, called BVCI. All packets between the mobile station and the core network will include TLLI in the header.

While the packet control unit (PCU) uses TLLI to assign packets to appropriate temporary block flows (TBFs) and direct the packets to the corresponding mobile stations, the packet control unit (PCU) is previously assigned to these identifiers. No knowledge of The mobile station includes the TLLI to which it is assigned in the uplink message. Also, if the core network has data to transmit, it transmits TLLI, but the mobile station is in idle mode, i.e., no TBF exists.

When an LLC frame is sent from the mobile station to the core network, the packet control unit (PCU) identifies the TLLI when the uplink TBF is established.

To send the LLC frame to the mobile station, the packet control unit (PCU) directs the LLC frame to one specific cell (BVC) and, if available, uses the established downlink TBF. If any downlink PBF is available, the packet control unit (PCU) can assign the mobile station to the downlink PBF using TLLI.

TLLI is originally a temporary telephone number used when a mobile station is in a particular routing area. TLLI is useful as long as the mobile station is in a routing area containing several cells. The GMM protocol layer in the mobile station informs the network of the mobile station's location.

When the mobile station is not active in packet transmission, the GMM protocol layer is in a standby state called GMM-STANDBY. In this state, the GMM protocol layer of the mobile station informs the core network when the mobile station will cross to another routing area as the routing area is updated from one routing area. Any message that needs to be sent to the mobile station by the core network while the mobile phone is in this state will require the mobile station to be paged to all cells belonging to its current routing area. When the mobile sends an uplink data packet (LLC-PDU) to the core network, it enters the GMM READY state. When the mobile station is in the GMM-READY state, ie active in packet mode transmission, the GMM layer informs the network every time the cell border intersects by performing a cell update. In this state, the exact location of the mobile station is known on the cell level; Any packet sent to such a mobile station by the core network may be immediately sent to the mobile station via the appropriate base station subsystem (BSS). The mobile station remains in the GMM-READY state for the time of the set period after transmitting the uplink LLC packet. A timer called READY-STATE TIMER is used to count down this period and is reset with each uplink LLC packet sent. The cell update message does not reset the timer. The timer value is integrated between the mobile station and the GPRS support node (SGSN) during the GPRS attach and routing area update procedure. The GMM state therefore exists in both the mobile station and the GPRS support node (SGSN) to which it is connected.

Recent proposals have been made to extend conventional cellular networks by including access networks that communicate with mobile stations using low power unauthenticated air interfaces. The access network is used for all of the core elements of a standard public mobile telephone network and is designed to consist essentially of a plug-in low power unauthenticated radio transceiver, or access point, each of which is an unauthenticated radio link and authentication with a mobile station (MS). It is designed to set up an interface node or controller that connects the wireless transceiver to the mobile telephone core network. The connection between the controller and the access point is a fixed broadband network. Suitable non-certified wireless formats include digital enhanced wireless telecommunications (DECT), wireless LAN, and Bluetooth. An adaptive mobile telephone handset that can operate over both a standard air interface (eg, Um interface) and an unauthenticated air interface means that the subscriber requires only one mobile station in all circumstances. The access network must be configured in such a way that the core network of the public mobile telephone network considers the interface node as a typical base station controller (BSC). In other words, the interface between the access network and the core network follows the 3GPP specification.

However, the combination of a small access point coverage area and the ease with which it can be installed and moved means that each access controller will control a very large but often varying number of cells compared to equivalent base station controllers of a typical cellular network. In addition, a mobile station serviced by an unauthenticated radio access network is connected to the access network by one or more dedicated control connections, typically a fixed TCP connection via a broadband network connecting the access controller to the access point. Therefore, conventional mechanisms for routing packet service data between mobile stations and core networks are not useful in such networks for the purpose of scale and signaling loads.

In view of the above problem, it is an object of the present invention to provide an unauthenticated radio access network capable of handling packet service traffic without improper signaling load.

These and other objects are achieved in an unauthenticated radio access network, and the method is performed identically with respect to the appended claims.

In particular, the unauthenticated radio access network is connected to the packet service node of the core network portion of the authenticated mobile telephone network. Unauthenticated radio access networks include access controllers having a packet controller connected to the core network portion and fixed broadband networks connected to the access controller and having multiple access points. Each access point defines a mini-cell coverage area and supports an unauthenticated air interface that allows communication of packet data between each mini-cell and mobile stations located within an access controller. In accordance with the present invention, an access controller comprises a database storing the identification of a mobile station related to packet path information addressing said mobile station on a fixed broadband network.

Provision of a database that associates the mobile station's temporary identification with a broadband network address or access point with which the mobile station communicates with the access network inherently provides intermediate level of mobility management. In this way, the access network can actively direct messages from the core network to a particular address, access point or group of access points, thereby reducing the amount of signaling to / from the access point.

An access point can include a separate entity that can establish contact with the access controller even when no mobile station is located in its coverage area, or the access point is essentially a conversation between an unauthenticated air interface and a fixed broadband network. It may be a transparent access point or a node to a broadband network that simply relays a message between the mobile station and the access controller while providing a. In the latter case, since the access point is not recognized as a separate entity by the access controller, the mobile station will be assigned a network address on the broadband network.

According to a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the database is updated without having to include the core network.

Additional objects and advantages of the present invention will become apparent from the following description of the preferred embodiments given by reference to the accompanying drawings.

1 is a schematic diagram of a signaling plane between a mobile station and a GPRS support node in a typical GSM network;

2 is part of a schematic diagram of a GSM network modified to include an unauthorized radio access network;

3 is a schematic diagram of an unauthenticated radio access network according to the present invention;

4 is a diagram showing a signaling plane between a mobile station and a home base station controller of an unauthenticated radio access network according to the first embodiment;

5 is a diagram showing a signaling plane between a mobile station and a home base station controller in an unauthenticated radio access network according to a second embodiment;

6-9 illustrate signaling between a mobile station and an access controller in an unauthenticated radio access network in accordance with the present invention.

The cellular mobile telephone network shown in FIG. 1 includes part of a typical GSM that supports General Packet Radio Service (GPRS). Such a network is originally divided into a core network unit 20 and an access unit 10. The elements of the core network shown in the figure include a GPRS support node (SGSN) 200, which is a packet and circuit switched packet such as intranet, extranet and internet via one or more gateway GPRS support node (GGSN) 201. One or more external networks 30 can be accessed, such as data networks and ISDN and PSTN networks. The functions and structures of such conventional GSM architecture elements are known to those skilled in the art and will not be described in further detail herein.

The access unit is originally composed of a base station subsystem (BSS) 10, one of which is shown in Figure 1, which communicates with the SGSN 200 of the core network portion 20 via a defined fixed standard Gb interface. Each base station subsystem (BSS) 10 is a base station controller (BSC) that communicates with one or more base station transceiver stations (BTSs) 101 through a base station controller (BSC) 103 and a defined _Avis air interface 102. 103). Base station transceiver station 101 communicates with a mobile station (MS) via a GSM standard Um air air interface. While the BTS 101 and BSC 103 are shown as forming a single entity within the BSS 10, the BSC 103 is often separated from the BTS 101, rather than the mobile station service switching center (MSC) 202. It can be located at.

In addition to the standard access network portion provided by the BSS 10, the network shown in FIG. 1 further includes the modified access network portion shown in the lower half of the figure. This will be described later as an unauthorized radio access network section 30.

The components constituting this unauthenticated radio access network section 30 also allow the mobile phone terminal 1 to access the GSM core network section and, thereby, the unauthenticated interface X represented by the double-headed arrow in FIG. Access other communication networks over the network. Unauthenticated radios ensure that any radio protocol does not require an operator to operate a mobile telephone network that has been certified from a suitable regulatory body. In general, this unauthorized wireless technology must be low power and therefore limited in scope compared to certified mobile phone wireless services. This means that the battery life of the mobile phone terminal will be longer. In addition, since the range is small, the unauthenticated radio may be a broadband radio, thus providing improved voice quality. The wireless interface may use any suitable unauthenticated wireless protocol (eg, wireless LAN protocol or digital enhanced wireless telecommunication (DECT)). However, it is desirable to use a Bluetooth radio, which has a high bandwidth and consumes less power than a typical public mobile telephone radio network.

The Bluetooth standard features a two-way digital radio link for short range connectivity between multiple devices. The device has a transceiver for transmitting and receiving in the frequency band of about 2.45 GHz. These bands can be useful for some bandwidth changes across countries around the world. In addition to the data, it is useful to reach up to three voice channels. Each device has a unique 48-bit address from the IEEE 802 standard. Built-in encryption and variations are also useful.

The unauthenticated radio access network section 30 shown in FIG. 1 includes an access network controller 303, referred to as a home base station controller (HBSC). The home base station controller (HBSC) 303 communicates with the Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) via the standard Gb interface of the core network section and provides a connection between the SGSN 203 and the mobile phone terminal 1. The home base station controller (HBSC) 303 is connected by a fixed broadband packet switched network 302 to a number of unauthenticated radio access points 301, which will be referred to as a home base station (HBS). The home base station (HBS) 301 is responsible for handling the radio link protocol because it communicates across the Bluetooth interface, and the mobile station MS1 similarly defines the cell for the operation of a conventional GSM base station transceiver (BTS) 101. It includes a wireless transceiver. The joint function of the home base station (HBS) 301 and the home base station controller (HBSC) 303 emulates the operation of a typical BSS 10 towards the SGSN 201. In other words, when considered from the elements of the core network 20 (eg, serving GPRS support node (SGSN) 201), fixed access configured by the home base station (HBS) 301 and the home base station controller (HBSC) Network portion 30 is similar to conventional access network portion 10.

The application running on the mobile phone terminal MS1 above the public mobile phone network air interface also operates on top of the Bluetooth radio between the mobile phone terminal 1 and the home base station (HBS) 301.

The home base station 301 may be a compact device that can be purchased and installed in a subscriber's desired location, for example, in a home or office environment, to achieve fixed access to the mobile telephone network. But they can also be installed as actuators in traffic hotspots. Therefore, in order to reduce installation costs at some of the operators, the interface between the home base station 301 and the home base station controller 301 preferably utilizes an existing connection provided by the fixed network 302. Suitable networks may include those based on ADSL, Ethernet, LMDS, and the like. Home access to these networks is increasingly available to subscribers. Although not shown in FIG. 1, a home base station (HBS) 301 is connected to a network terminal providing access to a fixed network 302, while a home base station controller (HBSC) 303 is connected to a network 302. It can be connected to an edge router (ER), which also links the fixed network 302 to other networks (eg, intranets and the Internet). IP is used for communication between the home base station (HBS) 301 and the home base station controller (HBSC) over the fixed network 302 to transport data regardless of the network type. The link between the home base station (HBS) 301 and the home base station controller (HBSC) 303 is always off, and this connection is always available without maintaining a channel.

A home base station (HBS) 301 is installed by plugging it into a portion of a suitable modem (eg, an ADSL or CATV modem) to access a fixed network 302. The port connects to an intranet bridged or routed on the IP level. According to the first embodiment, the home base station (HBS) 301 connected to the modem establishes a connection to the home base station controller (HBSC) 303 using standard protocols (IP, DHCP, DNS). The sign-on procedure for the home base station 301 connecting during the first time or reconnecting to the home base station controller (HBSC) 303 is described, for example, in EP-A-1 207 708. Before establishing a voice or data connection between the home base station controller (HBSC) 303 and the home base station (HBS) 301, a fixed TCP connection is established between these elements over the fixed broadband network 302.

In an alternative embodiment, the home base station 301 is not recognized as a separate entity by the home base station controller 303, but simply services the access network as an unauthenticated wireless access point and accesses the network (through an unauthenticated air interface). Relay the received packet to IP based on 203) and vice versa. In this embodiment, the mobile station (MS) has the necessary functions to establish and maintain a fixed connection with the home base station controller (HBSC) 303 over a broadband network. When the home base station (HBS) 301 is simply a transparent access point to an unauthenticated radio access network, it does not communicate with the home base station controller (HBSC) 303 independently of the mobile station, thus no sign-on procedure does not exist.

The signaling plane of an unauthenticated radio access network according to these two embodiments is shown in FIGS. 4 and 5. In both embodiments, the mobile station has two parallel protocol stacks. To handle communication over a typical GSM air interface, the mobile station includes a GSM radio layer below the radio resource RR-sub layer. Above it is a Service Coordination Sublayer (SSCS), which also connects to the unauthorized sublayer. Above, the Service Coordination Sublayer (SSCS) is a logical link control layer, mobility management layer that handles circuit switched and GPRS mobility management (MM and GMM), and GPRS session management (SM), short message service and circuit switched. A connection management (CM) layer with an equivalent protocol for traffic. Above it is the Sub-Network Dependent Integration Protocol (SNDCP) and IP Application Layer. In the present example, an unauthenticated air interface using Bluetooth is supported by different protocol layers in both embodiments. In Figure 4, the Bluetooth radio layer BT is provided below the Bluetooth adaptation layer (BAL) and the Bluetooth GPRS radio resource layer (BGRR). In addition to this new radio resource protocol, an additional new protocol layer, the Home GPRS Radio Resource Layer (HGRR), is supported. The HGRR protocol originally replaces the radio link control (RLC) protocol layer in conventional GSM access networks. At the home base station (HBS), a Bluetooth radio layer (BT), a Bluetooth adaptation layer (BAL) and a Bluetooth GPRS radio resource layer (BGRR) are provided. The home base station also includes a home GPRS radio resource layer (HGRR) that relays HGRR messages between the home base station controller and the mobile station (MS). The Home Mobility Management Layer (HMM) is also currently partly for relaying mobility management protocol messages. Broadband access or Y interface is supported by the Home Mobile Phone application part protocol over TCP over IP. The OSI layer (1, 2) protocol is below the IP protocol layer. At the home base station controller, this protocol layer is copied. Above this logical link control protocol and GPRS mobility management message are relayed. The Gb interface is supported by the same protocol layer present in a typical BSS as described with reference to FIG.

In Fig. 5, the X-interface protocol layer at the mobile station consists of an unauthenticated radio lower layer. Above they are provided with IP and TCP / UDP protocol layers. The home GPRS radio resource HGRR protocol layer is also provided on this interface in addition to the home mobility management (HMM) protocol layer. In a home base station (HBS) serving as a transparent access point, the X-interface is supported by an unauthenticated wireless protocol under IP. The Y-interface is only supported at Home Base Stations (HBS), OSI Layer 1 and OSI Layer 2 below IP. The protocol layer supporting the Y-interface in the home base station controller (HBSC) is originally the same as shown in FIG.

Mobile stations served by an unauthenticated radio access network are registered with this access network and connected to one or more dedicated control accessing access networks. This may be a fixed TCP connection established over a fixed broadband network, or may be another maintained fixed connection based on, for example, UDP. This connection is maintained even when the mobile station is idle.

In a typical GSM access network, the LLC-frame received from the core network is the mobile station's location only known on the location area level when the mobile station is in the GMM-STANBY state, i.e., not active in packet mode transmission. It does not face the mobile station. Therefore, to ensure that the message reaches the addressed mobile station, it is sent to all BSS coverage areas, or cells, in the same routing area as the mobile station. In an unauthenticated radio access network, a single home base station controller will control one or more routing areas. Small cells in an unauthenticated radio access network typically mean that far more home base stations, or access points, will potentially be assigned to a single routing area. Transmitting the LLC frame between the home base station controller (HBSC) 303 and all home base stations in the routing area results in enormously excessive signaling load on the access network. This problem can be mitigated by providing a lookup table or database that can access a home base station controller that classifies mobile station identifiers, typically routing information that can be accessed to an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI). IMSI is known by the core network and is typically used for circuit switched (ie, voice) and packet switched traffic exchange. However, this database will be very large whether they are idle or active when they contain entries for all mobile stations located in the coverage area of an unauthenticated radio access network. This results in enormously high signaling loads as the base station controller (HBSC) must access the database for each packet received from the core network when the mobile station actively exchanges packet data with the core network. An additional problem with this solution is that IMSI is not included in every LLC frame received from the core network. Therefore, according to the present invention, the home base station controller (HBSC) 303 actively assigns a packet service message to the correct mobile station (MS) or home base station (HBS) 301 using TLLI. In addition, this mechanism is only used when the mobile station actively exchanges packet service messages with the core network. This is shown to be equivalent to a period when the mobile station is in the GMM-READY state. This is shown in detail in FIG. 3, which shows in more detail an unauthorized radio access network.

The unauthenticated radio access network shown in FIG. 3 includes a home base station controller (HBSC) 303 connected to two access points or home base stations (HBS1, HBS2) 301 through a fixed broadband network 302. do. Unauthorized wireless coverage area 304 of each home base station is shown in dashed lines. This coverage area 304 will be called a mini-cell and will now distinguish them from the cells of a typical GSM network. Three mobile stations MS1-MS3 are located in the minicell 304 of this home base station (HBS) 301. A home base station controller (HBSC) 303 is connected to a GPRS support node (SGSN) 200. The remaining elements of a typical cellular core network 20 are omitted from the figure.

The home base station controller (HBSC) 303 of FIG. 3 includes a packet control unit 3032 and a database 3031 accessible by the packet control unit 3032 schematically shown in a table in the figure. The packet control unit is a processor for GPRS processing. The database 3031 is used to store the mobile station temporary identifier assigned to the mobile station assigned to the mobile station by the core network. This identifier is preferably a local link identifier (TLLI) assigned to the mobile station by the core network. In some cases, the identifier is equal to or at least indicative of a temporary identity contained in each LLC frame assigned by the core network 20 to the mobile station MS1 and exchanged between the mobile station and the core network 20. It must be frozen. As mentioned above, IMSI is not suitable as an identifier. IMSI is useful for identifying paging messages from the core network 20 but is not always available to the packet control unit in the downlink LLC frame received from the core network.

In this database 3031, the mobile station temporary identifier is associated with packet path information for the mobile station 1. When the home base station (HBS) 301 is independent of an entity in the unauthenticated wireless network 30 that can establish a connection with the mobile station 1 and the home base station controller (HBSC) 303, the packet path information is transmitted to the mobile station. It may be a packet path to the home base station controlling this currently located mini-cell 302. This is shown by way of example in FIG. 3, where the database includes TLLI values (TLLI-a through TLLI-c) related to information identifying a home base station (HBS) 301 (HBS1 or HBS2). The packet path information may be an identifier assigned to such a home base station (HBS) 301 or the information may be a network address (eg, an IP address) of the packet path for this home base station (HBS) on a fixed broadband network 302. And UDP port). Normally, when the home base station is a transparent access point, the temporary mobile station identifier will be mapped to the packet path or network address and the mobile station 1's own UDP port.

By way of example, mobile station MS1 is located in the mini-cell of home base station 1. As a result, the TLLI (TLLI-a) assigned to this mobile station MS1 is mapped to the packet path IP-address of the home base station HBS1 in the home base station controller database 3031. Similarly, TLLI (TLLI-b) of mobile station MS2 is mapped to home base station, and TLLI (TLLI-c) of mobile station MS3 is mapped to home base station HBS2.

The database 3031 is used by the packet control unit 3032 in the following manner. The downlink LLC frame is received from the core network (ie on the BSSGP-protocol layer) and the TLLI value is also received. The packet control unit 3032 performs a database lookup using the received TLLI value as a search key. This lookup returns the mobile station packet path for this mobile station, and the packet control unit 3032 directs the received LLC frame to the destination.

As a result of the small coverage area of each home base station (HBS) 301, the number of mini-cells in the routing area under the control of a single home base station controller (HBSC) 303 may be thousands. In addition, this number may continue to vary with the ease with which the home base station (HBS) 301 is added and removed from the unauthorized radio access network 30.

Therefore, it is not necessary for the home base station controller (HBSC) 303 to direct the LLC frame to a specific home base station (HBS) 301 in contact with the mobile station MS1, otherwise the home base station controller (HBSC) 303 and all home base stations ( This means that the amount of signaling that may be required between the HBS) 301 is greatly reduced. In addition, performing additional layer of mobility management at home base station controller 303 does not require an emulated radio access network to emulate the temporary block flow mechanism used in a conventional GSM access network, but with uncomplicated packet traffic exchange. This means that the mobile station can be identified in both the downlink and uplink LLC frames during the period.

In order to limit the size of the database 3031, the temporary mobile station identifier is maintained in the database only during the period in which the mobile station actively transmits the LLC frame. This corresponds to the period in which the original mobile station is in the GMM-READY state.

A new entry is created in the database 3031 by the packet control unit 3032 when a non-empty LLC frame is received from the mobile station. The temporary mobile station identifier or TLLI is included in the LLC frame. Optionally, an entry can be registered by implementing a procedure in the mobile station. This is shown in FIG. In particular, the GPRS Mobility Management Layer (GMM) is assigned a new P-TMSI, which assigns the derived temporary mobile station identifier or TLLI to Local Link Control (LLC) and Home GPRS Radio Resource Layer (HGRR). The HGRR layer in the mobile station registers the new TLLI value by sending a signaling message “HGRR_REGISTER_TLLI (new (TLLI)”) to the home base station controller (HBSC) The home base station controller (HBSC) registers the TLLI entry with the packet path to the associated home base station. Or register directly with the mobile station and return, acknowledging the message "HGRR_REGISTER_TLLI_ACK".

When the Serving GPRS Service Node (SGSN) indicates that a change should be made, the temporary mobile station identifier (TLLI) is changed. It is registered in a similar manner as shown in FIG. In this case, the registration message includes both the new TLLI and the old TLLI. When receiving a new TLLI value, the previous TLLI entry may be deleted.

This registration procedure may be performed every time there is an uplink LLC frame to be transmitted with the newly assigned TLLI by the mobile station.

There are a number of possibilities for removing the temporary mobile station identifier from the database 3031. 7 shows a procedure performed by a home base station (HBS). The mobile station leaves the coverage area of the home base station (HBS), which is signaled to the home base station (HBS). The HGRR layer in the home base station informs the home base station controller (HBSC) that the temporary mobile station identifier in the database 3031 is no longer valid by sending a deregistration message "HGRR_DEREGISTER_TLLI". This is acknowledged by the home base station controller (HBSC) with an additional message "HRGG_DEREGISTER_TLLI_ACK".

Since the home base station (HBS) cannot recognize when the mobile station is leaving its coverage area or cannot signal this to the home base station controller (HBSC), the deregistration procedure shown in FIG. Similarly, transparent access points cannot be explicitly implemented in unauthorized wireless access networks. In addition, since the unscrambled packet exchange period is more relatively short, it is more common for this level of traffic to abort, while the mobile station is within the coverage area of the mini-cell 304 and as a result the mini-cell Leaves. The protocol stack of the mobile station MS1 can be modified so that the lower layer, in particular the local link control (LLC) layer, knows when the GMM-READY state is changed to the GMM-STANBY state by the GMMS layer. The mobile station can then inform the home base station controller of this state change when using the LLC message. The TLLI entries may then be removed in the database 3031 associated with this mobile station because disruptive traffic flows are interrupted.

In order for the unauthorized radio access network 30 to control the update of the database without modifying the mobile station's protocol stack, a timer may be implemented in the home base station controller (HBSC) and accessed by the packet control unit 3032. Or can be accessed from the mobile station. This timer is started or reset when an LLC frame containing data is transmitted or received from the mobile station. Optionally, it can also be restarted when the LLC frame is sent to the mobile station. When the timer times out, the associated temporary mobile station identifier entry is removed from the database 3131. The duration of this timer preferably affects the duration of the timer that defines the GMM-READY state to the mobile station. This value is also defined in the Serving GPRS Service Node (SGSN) and in communication with the mobile station. Therefore, the database timer can be configured to have the same value as the GMM-READY state timer. Similar timers are implemented in the mobile station. 8 shows a case where a timer is implemented in a mobile station. When the timer times out, the mobile sends a TLLI deregistration message "HGRR_DEREGISTRATION_TLLI" to the home base station controller (HBSC). The home base station is acknowledged with an additional message "HGRR_DEREGISTRATION_TLLI_ACK" and deletes the corresponding TLLI entry from the database 3031. In Fig. 9, the same procedure occurs but is initiated by the home base station controller (HBSC).

When an unauthenticated radio access network is implemented using the transparency access point shown in Fig. 5, the mechanism described above and shown in Figs. 6, 8 and 9 can also be used. However, the access point (HBS) also cannot communicate with the access network when the mobile station leaves its coverage area. Therefore, the signaling shown in FIG. 7 is not possible. By optionally implementing a timer of the home base station controller (HBSC), the home base station can monitor the fixed connection with the mobile station and operate the connection maintenance mechanism. In particular, a connection that is preferably a fixed TCP connection is maintained by the exchange of a keep-alive message. If the home base station finds that the keep-alive message has not been recently received, it can delete the TLLI entry from the database.

While packet control unit 3032 is described above as a single central processor, routing of GPRS or similar packet services can also be further simplified by implementing the packet control unit as a number of loosely coupled devices. In particular, although the access point or home base station (HBS) may represent multiple cell identifiers to the mobile station, the home base station controller (HBSC) may be able to generate a small number of base station subsystem packet layer (BSSGP) virtual circuit identifiers (BVCIs). ) So each BVCI can be controlled by the packet control unit, and the TLLI database 3031 is divided into several parts for each processing device. The packet control unit then presents one or more unique BVCIs for each processing device to the core network. This allows the packet control unit to more easily route the downlink LLC frame to a dedicated processing device handling the addressing mobile station.

Claims (17)

An authenticated mobile telephone comprising an access controller 303 connected to the core network section and having a packet controller 3031, and a fixed broadband network 302 connected to the access controller and having a plurality of access points 301. An unauthenticated radio access network (30) connected with a packet service node in a core network portion (20) of a network, each said access point defining a mini-cell coverage area 304 and each mini-cell and said In an unauthenticated radio access network, which supports an unauthenticated air interface allowing communication of packet data between mobile stations (1) located within an access controller (303), The access controller 303 includes a database 3031 that stores temporary identification information assigned to the mobile station for use in packet service messages related to packet path information addressing the mobile station on the fixed broadband network. An unauthorized wireless access network characterized by the above. The method of claim 1, And the database (3031) stores the identity of the mobile station associated with one or more access points (301) for the coverage area in which the mobile station is located. The method according to claim 1 or 2, The access point controller 303 receives from the core network section 20 a packet data message containing the temporary identification information of the mobile station 1 located in the associated location area and associated with the identified mobile station. Retrieve the packet path and send the packet data message to the identified packet path address. The method according to any one of the preceding claims, The access network controller 303 receives a message from the mobile station 1 that registers temporary identification information for the mobile station and relates to packet path address information for the mobile station on the fixed broadband network 302. And store the new temporary identification information data of a database. The method according to any one of the preceding claims, And the mobile station temporary identification information is a temporary local link identifier (TLLI). The method according to any one of the preceding claims, And said packet path address information is a network address of said access point (301) on said fixed broadband network (302). The method of claim 6, And said packet path address information is assigned to an access point (30) in communication with said mobile station. The method according to any one of the preceding claims, Causing the access controller 303 to delete the temporary identification information when receiving a message from at least one of the access point 301 and the mobile station where the stored temporary identification information is no longer useful. An unauthorized wireless access network characterized by the above. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, The access network controller 303 determines whether a connection with the mobile station is maintained and, upon determining that the connection is no longer maintained, deletes the temporary identification information from the database 3031. Unauthorized wireless access network. The method of claim 9, The access controller 303 includes a timer having a predetermined count duration and is restarted when it receives a packet data message from the mobile station that includes stored temporary identification information, the packet controller 3031. And the timer is arranged to delete the mobile station identification when its count duration expires. A plurality of access points 301 communicating with the mobile station 1 over an unauthenticated air interface and a packet service node 200 of the core network portion of an authenticated wireless cellular network and an access controller 303 connected to the access point. A method of an unauthorized wireless access network comprising: Receiving temporary information identification information for the packet service message specific to the mobile station, and Registering the mobile station temporary identification information of the access point controller related to packet path information identifying one or more access points. The method of claim 11, Retrieving the temporary identification information from the packet service message; Identifying a packet path address at one or more access points for the addressed mobile station, and Directing the packet service message to at least one identified access point associated with the registered mobile station identification information. The method of claim 11 or 12, When receiving a message from the identified access point related to the mobile station identification information for which the mobile station identification information is no longer valid, further comprising updating the mobile station identification information. Method of unauthorized wireless access network. The method of claim 11 or 12, Setting a timer when receiving a packet service message from the mobile station containing stored temporary identification information, Resetting the timer if an additional packet service message containing the stored temporary identification information is received from the mobile station within a predetermined time delay; and When no additional packet service message including the stored temporary identification information is received from the mobile station within the predetermined time delay, deleting the mobile station identification information registered with the mobile station. Method of an unauthenticated radio access network. A fixed broadband network having a plurality of access points 301 and a packet service node of a core network portion of an authenticated wireless cellular network and an access controller 303 connected to the fixed broadband network, wherein a packet service message is transmitted to the fixed broadband network. In a method of an unauthenticated radio access network for exchanging with a mobile station (1) over an unauthenticated air interface through a point, The controller establishing communication with the mobile station using a network address on the fixed broadband network for the mobile station, Receiving temporary identification information for a packet service message specific to a mobile station from the mobile station, Registering the mobile station identification information related to a network address on the fixed broadband network specific to the mobile station; Retrieving the temporary identification information from a packet data message received from the core network, and Directing the packet data message to the stored network address associated with the temporary identification information. The method of claim 15, The access point controller determining when a connection established to the mobile station will no longer be maintained, and And when it is determined that the connection is no longer maintained, deleting the mobile station identification information. The method of claim 15, Setting a timer when receiving a packet service message from the mobile station containing stored temporary identification information, Resetting the timer if an additional packet service message containing the stored temporary identification information is received from the mobile station within a predetermined time delay; and When no additional packet service message including the stored temporary identification information is received from the mobile station within the predetermined time delay, deleting the mobile station identification information registered with the mobile station. Method of an unauthenticated radio access network.

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