KR19990025925A - Detection and Management Method of Mobile Service Terminal Duplication - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention provides a method of detecting and managing mobile communication service terminal duplication which detects and manages duplication much more accurately than when using only COUNT comparison when temporary secret key duplication or permanent secret key duplication occurs. will be.

To this end, the present invention, the process of transmitting the authentication request message from the terminal to the mobile communication network, the process of obtaining a parameter corresponding to the authentication parameter in the message in the mobile communication network and compare with each other, if the comparison result is the same for the terminal While allowing network access, if it is not identical, it consists of a process of allowing and rejecting network access after checking whether there is an inconsistency for each element constituting the authentication parameter. In addition to eradicating the system, it is possible to reduce the burden on the operator and the number of operating personnel by automatically controlling the authentication failure during the operation of the authentication center. Can contribute to improved customer service.

Description

Detection and Management Method of Mobile Service Terminal Duplication

The present invention relates to a method for detecting and managing mobile communication service terminal duplication, and more particularly, to a method for detecting and managing various terminal duplications that may occur in a public mobile communication system such as PCS and cellular having an authentication function. It is about.

The authentication function in the specification of the present invention refers to a semi-permanent secret key (A-Key) and a temporary secret key (SSD) generated from both the mobile communication terminal and the mobile communication network, such as IS-41C. And a function of authenticating the terminal using an authentication response (AUTHR: AUTHentication Response) generated therefrom.

In the specification of the present invention, the term "terminal duplication" means to inject all or part of various authentication related information of a legitimate subscriber terminal into another terminal and use it.

Authentication in mobile communication was introduced to prevent various kinds of illegal use which appeared as a big problem in the existing analog cellular service, and the illegal use is made in various ways, and the main method is terminal cloning.

Terminal duplication is a method of intercepting the identification information of a legitimate subscriber terminal on a wireless channel, that is, a mobile identification number (MIN) and an electronic serial number (ESN) and inputting it to a new terminal. There is also a method of extracting identification information directly from the subscriber terminal and injecting it into another terminal.

In order to prevent such illegal use, the second generation digital mobile communication systems all have their own authentication functions. Two of them are the authentication method of Global System for Mobile communication (GSM), a pan-European digital cellular system, and the authentication method of IS-41C, a standard for North American digital cellular systems.

GSM generates a signed response (SRES) directly from the semi-permanent secret key (Ki), while IS-41C passes the temporary secret key (SSD) from the semi-permanent secret key (A-Key). ) Is generated.

In addition, the IS-41C uses a COUNT as a parameter for recording a call history, and thus, the IS-41C has a feature of detecting a terminal that has duplicated a secret key.

In the case of GSM, if there is a duplicate terminal injecting all identification information including a semi-permanent secret key (Ki), there is no way to detect or block it. However, since GSM implements a subscriber identification module (SIM) as a smart card and stores a secret key therein, it is more difficult to duplicate a terminal, thus making efforts to develop the smart card copy protection technology. .

Since IS-41C's authentication method or similar authentication method uses COUNT, it is true that the possibility of detecting terminal duplication is increased. . This is because the possibility of a COUNT mismatch between the legitimate subscriber station and the communication network may not be excluded due to an error in the terminal, the wireless section, or the communication network.

Accordingly, the present invention has been made in view of the above-described conventional circumstances, and when a temporary secret key replication or a permanent secret key replication occurs, a mobile communication service that detects and manages a copy much more accurately than when using only a COUNT comparison. Its purpose is to provide a method for detecting and managing terminal duplication.

According to a preferred embodiment of the present invention to achieve the above object, the process of transmitting an authentication request message from the terminal to the mobile communication network, the process of obtaining a parameter corresponding to the authentication parameter in the message in the mobile communication network and comparing with each other; If the comparison result is the same, network access to the corresponding terminal is allowed, whereas if it is not identical, the process of replicating the mobile communication service terminal consisting of checking and confirming whether there is an inconsistency for each element constituting the authentication parameter is performed. Detection and management methods are provided.

1 is a view illustrating a terminal authentication procedure in a public mobile communication network to which the present invention is applied;

FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating a process of performing a terminal authentication procedure within a terminal and a mobile communication network shown in FIG. 1;

3 is a flowchart for explaining a method for detecting and managing a mobile communication service copy according to an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 4 is a flowchart of the authentication response mismatch processing shown in FIG. 3;

FIG. 5 is a flowchart related to count mismatch processing shown in FIG. 3;

FIG. 6 is a flowchart related to temporary secret key duplication management shown in FIG. 5.

* Explanation of symbols for main parts of drawing

10: terminal, 20: mobile communication network

Basically assumed in the present invention, like the IS-41C, the mobile communication network and the terminal obtains the same temporary secret key (SSD) from the same secret key (A-Key) to obtain an authentication response (AUTHR) by using the same, In addition, a temporary secret key update protocol is provided in which a terminal and a mobile communication network obtain a new temporary secret key different from the previous temporary secret key (SSD) through a series of protocols.

The basic fact from the result of the temporary secret key renewal is that the successful terminal has the same secret key as the A-Key of the mobile communication network, whereas the failed terminal does not have the same secret key as the mobile network. Is the point.

In addition, a feature of the present invention is that the number of occurrences of a COUNT mismatch can be recorded so that an operator can refer to whether or not duplication has occurred, but it is not used as a basis for decisive judgment. Instead, more accurate duplication detection is possible using patterns of authentication failures and patterns of temporary secret key update results.

Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

FIG. 1 is a view illustrating a terminal authentication procedure in a public mobile communication network to which the present invention is applied. FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating a signal transmission between a terminal and a mobile communication network in FIG. ) And the mobile communication network 20 distribute / store the same subscriber authentication secret key (A-Key) immediately after joining through a secure and secure method, and undergo a temporary secret key (SSD) renewal procedure before the authentication procedure is performed. It also stores the same temporary secret key.

Subsequently, when the terminal 10 accesses the mobile communication network 20, an authentication response (AUTHR) is generated by using a random number, a temporary secret key (SSD), and other parameters sent by the mobile communication network 20. This is sent to the mobile communication network (20).

The mobile communication network 20 calculates an authentication response (AUTHR) through the same generation process using the information related to the corresponding terminal stored by the mobile communication network 20 and checks whether it is the same as the authentication response (AUTHR) sent by the terminal 10.

In this case, the mobile communication network 20 checks whether the count COUNT, which is a parameter related to the call history sent by the terminal 10, with the count stored in the mobile communication network 20, and checks whether the values are the same. do. In the two comparison processes, if the calculation results of the terminal 10 and the mobile communication network 20 are the same, authentication is successful.

In FIG. 2, as an input of an algorithm for obtaining a temporary secret key (SSD), other parameters (for example, random number serial number (ESN), etc.) other than the secret key (A-Key) shown in the drawing are input values. Can be used.

In addition to the temporary secret key (SSD) and the random number, the device serial number (ESN), the terminal identifier (MIN), the called number, and the like may be used as input values of the algorithm for obtaining the authentication response (AUTHR).

The random number in the figure may be any of the two authentication challenges specified in IS-41C, that is, a global challenge and a unique challenge.

3 is a flowchart illustrating a method for detecting and managing duplication of a mobile communication service terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention. The method of the present invention will be described based on the flowchart.

When the mobile communication network 20 is placed in the standby state (step 30) and an authentication request message is received from the terminal 10 (step 31), the mobile communication network 20 receives an authentication parameter (i.e., authentication) included in the authentication request message. The response (AUTHR) and the count (COUNT) are obtained inside the mobile communication network 20 and then compared with each of the corresponding parameters (step 32).

As a result of the comparison, if the authentication is the same, authentication is considered to be successful, and network connection to the terminal 10 is allowed (step 33), and the state is returned to the standby state again. It is checked if it is a response (AUTHR) mismatch (step 34).

As a result of the verification, if the authentication response (AUTHR) is inconsistent, the authentication response mismatch processing is performed accordingly (step 35). If the authentication response (AUTHR) is not inconsistent, the count (COUNT) is inconsistent. The count mismatch process is performed (step 36).

The authentication response mismatch processing operation during the above operation will be described based on the flowchart of FIG. 4.

When the authentication response (AUTHR) mismatch processing operation is started, the number of occurrence counters (not shown) of an event (first event) called an authentication response (AUTHR) mismatch is first increased (+1) (step 40).

The result is then compared with a predetermined threshold (e.g., 3) (step 41), if it is less than that threshold (step 42) and the authentication response is terminated while the mismatch processing ends, while the threshold If not smaller, the counter is reset to zero (step 43) and an attempt is made to update the temporary secret key (SSD) for the terminal 10 (step 44).

As a result of the update attempt (step 45), if the terminal 10 fails to update the temporary secret key (SSD), the network connection to the terminal 10 is rejected (step 46) and the authentication response mismatch processing is terminated.

On the contrary, if the update attempt succeeds, the network connection to the terminal 10 is allowed (step 47), and the number of occurrences of the event (second event) of the temporary secret key update success after the authentication response mismatch (second event) ( Increase (+1) (step 48).

Then, the increased result is compared with a predetermined threshold (e.g., 2) (step 49), and if the comparison result is smaller than the threshold, the authentication response mismatch processing is terminated, but if it is not smaller than the threshold, A-key duplication is considered to occur and an alert or report to the operator (step 50).

The count mismatch processing operation in the overall operation description of the present invention described with reference to the flowchart of FIG. 3 will now be described based on the flowchart of FIG. 5.

When the count mismatch processing operation is started, the count counter (not shown) of the event (count 3) of the count mismatch is first increased (+1) (step 60).

Subsequently, the result is compared with a predetermined threshold (e.g., 3) (step 61) and if the threshold value is smaller than the threshold, the network connection to the terminal 10 is rejected (step 62) and the count mismatch process is terminated. If the count value is not smaller than the threshold, the counter is reset to zero (step 63), and an attempt is made to update the temporary secret key (SSD) for the terminal 10 (step 64).

As a result of the update attempt (step 65), if the terminal 10 succeeds in updating the temporary secret key (SSD), the network access to the terminal 10 is allowed (step 66). After increasing (+1) the occurrence count counter (not shown) of the (fourth event) (step 67), the count mismatch processing ends.

On the contrary, if the attempt to renew the temporary secret key (SSD) fails, the network access to the terminal 10 is rejected (step 68) and the temporary secret key (SSD) copy management operation is performed (step 69). The mismatch processing ends.

Here, the temporary secret key (SSD) duplication management operation will be described based on the flowchart of FIG. 6.

First, the mobile communication network 20 waits until the authentication request (step 71) comes from the corresponding terminal 10 in the waiting state (step 70).

When the authentication request comes, the authentication parameters (authentication response, count) are compared with the internally generated authentication parameters (step 72), and when all of the comparison results match, the temporary secret key (SSD) is updated for the terminal 10. Is attempted (step 73).

As a result of the update attempt (step 74), if it fails, the network connection to the terminal 10 is denied (step 75), and a temporary secret key (SSD) copy is reported to the operator (step 76). Return to the standby state of.

On the contrary, if the attempt to renew the temporary secret key (SSD) succeeds, allow network access to the terminal 10 (step 77), report the temporary secret key (SSD) copy to the operator (step 78). Terminate temporary secret key replication management.

On the other hand, if the authentication parameters between the terminal 10 and the mobile communication network 20 is not the same in the comparison of the authentication parameters in step 72, first it is confirmed whether the authentication response (AUTHR) mismatch (step 79), the confirmation As a result, if the authentication response is inconsistent with each other, after performing the authentication response mismatch processing operation described with reference to FIG. 4 (step 80), the process returns to the standby state again.

However, in the case where the authentication responses do not coincide with each other in step 79, it is regarded as a count mismatch, so that the occurrence count counter (not shown) of an event (third event) called a count mismatch is increased (+1). Step 81).

Subsequently, the increased result value (count value) is compared with a predetermined threshold value (for example, 3) (step 82), if it is smaller than the threshold value, the network connection to the terminal 10 is rejected (step 83), and waiting again. It will return to the state.

In contrast, if the result value is not smaller than the threshold, the counter is reset to zero (step 84), and a temporary secret key (SSD) for the corresponding terminal 10. An update is attempted (step 85).

As a result of the update attempt (step 86), when the terminal 10 fails to update the temporary secret key (SSD), it denies the network connection to the terminal 10 (step 87) and returns to the standby state. If the temporary secret key (SSD) update is successful, the network connection to the terminal 10 is allowed (step 88), and the temporary secret key duplication management is terminated.

The temporary secret key duplication management operation of FIG. 6 detects a temporary secret key (SSD) duplication for a legitimate terminal 10 and then attempts to access a mobile communication network 20. By denying access and renewing the temporary secret key (SSD) for the legitimate terminal 10, the temporary secret key duplication state is released.

According to the present invention as described above, it is possible to eradicate illegal activities such as terminal duplication by immediately detecting the duplication of a terminal by an illegal user, as well as to automatically control the authentication failure during operation of the authentication center. However, the number of operational personnel can be reduced.

In addition, since the sensitivity of the terminal replication is very high, unnecessary interference to the subscriber can be reduced, thereby contributing to the improvement of customer service.

The present invention is not limited only to the above-described embodiments, but may be modified and modified without departing from the scope of the present invention. However, modifications and variations of other technical ideas should be regarded as belonging to the following claims.

Claims (5)

Transmitting an authentication request message from the terminal to the mobile communication network; Obtaining and comparing a parameter corresponding to an authentication parameter in the message in the mobile communication network; If the comparison result is the same, the mobile communication service is configured to allow the network access to the corresponding terminal, and if it is not the same, confirms whether there is a discrepancy with each element constituting the authentication parameter and then performs network access allowance and rejection. Method of detecting and managing terminal duplication. The method of claim 1, wherein the elements constituting the authentication parameter are an authentication response and a count. 3. The method of claim 2, wherein in the case of inconsistency of the authentication response, increasing the number of occurrences of the first event (an event called authentication response inconsistency) and comparing it with a preset threshold; On the other hand, if the error is reset, attempting to update the temporary secret key for the corresponding terminal by resetting the counter. If the update attempt fails, the network access to the terminal is denied, while if successful, the network connection is allowed and the second event is performed. Incrementing the number of occurrences of the event (temporary secret key update success after authentication response mismatch) and comparing it with a predetermined threshold value, if the comparison result is less than the threshold, the authentication response mismatch processing is terminated, if abnormal, Mobile communication, characterized in that the processing in the order of notifying the occurrence of secret key duplication Detecting and managing a device of bis replication. The method of claim 2, wherein in the case of count mismatch, increasing the number of occurrences of the third event (count mismatch event) and comparing the count with a preset threshold value; In case of abnormality, resetting the counter and attempting to update a temporary secret key for the corresponding terminal. If the update attempt fails, the network access to the terminal is denied and temporary secret key duplication management is performed. Allowing and increasing the number of occurrence counters of the fourth event (an event called a temporary secret key update success after count mismatch) and ending the count mismatch processing. Way. The method of claim 4, wherein the temporary secret key duplication management compares mutual authentication parameters when an authentication request is received from a terminal to a standby mobile communication network and attempts to update a temporary secret key if the same is the same. In the case of rejecting the network access, if successful, reporting the temporary secret key duplication to the operator after allowing the network access; if the authentication parameters are not identical, checking the authentication response and count mismatch; In the case of a response mismatch, the corresponding process is performed, whereas in the case of a count mismatch, an increase in the number of occurrence counters of the third event (an event called a count mismatch) is increased and compared with a preset threshold value. While denying the network connection, if abnormal, reset the counter and Attempting to update the temporary secret key for the terminal, denying the network access to the terminal if the update attempt fails, while allowing the network access if successful, and ending the temporary secret key replication management. A method for detecting and managing duplication of a mobile communication service terminal.