KR102501794B1 - Method for user authentication based on hash chain suitable for unmanned systems and electronic apparatus using it - Google Patents

Abstract

An electronic device is disclosed. The electronic device performs hash processing by repeating a communication device capable of communicating with each of a beacon device, an administrator terminal device, and a server, and a first seed value a number of times (sp*dp) corresponding to a predetermined period (sp) and repetition information (dp). When receiving turn information (dp) and random value information corresponding to the turn information from a memory storing a plurality of key values in which one of a plurality of random values is XORed to each of a plurality of hash processed values, and a manager terminal device , The first hash processing value is calculated using the received round information, random value information, and a plurality of stored key values, and stored in the memory as a seed value of the electronic device, and the second seed value from the beacon device is the period of the beacon (Bk ) to generate an authentication value by performing calculation processing on the seed value of the electronic device and the received second hash value, and transmit the authentication value to the server. and a processor controlling the communication device.

Description

HASH CHAIN SUITABLE FOR UNMANNED SYSTEMS AND ELECTRONIC APPARATUS USING IT}

The present disclosure relates to a hash chain-based user authentication method suitable for an unmanned system and an electronic device using the same, and more particularly, to a hash chain-based user authentication method using a key delegation suitable for an unmanned system and an electronic device using the same It's about the device.

2. Description of the Related Art Due to the development of technology and the rapid rise of labor costs, an increasing number of workplaces manage customers or employees using unmanned systems. These workplaces install a kiosk and an electronic door linked to it at the entrance to check the residence time of customers or manage the attendance of employees.

However, the conventional system has a problem in that a bottleneck occurs when people are crowded at a specific time in that a process of recognizing oneself to a QR code or a camera is always required whenever entering or exiting.

In addition, in the case of employee management in an unmanned system, there is no way to check this even if the person leaves the workplace after the corresponding record is made in that only the employee's attendance/exit is recorded when commuting. To this end, there is a method of installing CCTV and the like, but there is a problem in that additional equipment and additional personnel are required to check it.

Accordingly, the present disclosure is intended to solve the above-mentioned problems, and is to provide a hash chain-based user authentication method suitable for an unmanned system using a key delegation suitable for an unmanned system and an electronic device using the same. .

The present disclosure is to achieve the above object, and an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure is a beacon device, a manager terminal device, a communication device capable of communicating with each server, and a first seed value at a predetermined period (sp) and A memory for storing a plurality of key values in which one of a plurality of random values is XOR-processed on each of a plurality of hash-processed values that have been repeatedly hashed by the number of times (sp*dp) corresponding to the turn information (dp), and the manager When receiving round information (dp) and random value information corresponding to the round information from the terminal device, a first hash processing value is calculated using the received round information, random value information and the plurality of stored key values, When a second hash value is stored in the memory as a seed value of the electronic device and hashed by repeating the second seed value as many times as the number of times corresponding to the beacon period (Bk) from the beacon device, the electronic device and a processor for generating an authentication value by calculating and processing the seed value and the received second hash value, and controlling the communication device to transmit the authentication value to a server.

In this case, when the processor receives the first seed value from the manager terminal device, the processor stores the first seed value in the memory, and converts the first seed value to the predetermined period (sp) and cycle information (dp). ) It is possible to verify the calculated first hash value by repeatedly hashing the number of times (sp*dp) corresponding to.

Meanwhile, the processor hash-processes the seed value of the electronic device a predetermined number of times to calculate a third hash-processed value, performs an XOR operation on the third hash-processed value and the second hash-processed value, and obtains the authentication value. can create

Meanwhile, when the communication device is adjacent to the beacon device within a preset distance, it may receive beacon information including a second hash value from the beacon device.

Meanwhile, the processor transmits the beacon information to the manager terminal device when the plurality of key values are not stored or when the validity period of the plurality of key values has elapsed, and the plurality of key values are transmitted from the manager terminal device. may be received and stored in the memory.

Meanwhile, the communication device may receive the turn information and the random value information from the manager terminal device in a first cycle, and receive a second hash processing value from the beacon device in a second cycle shorter than the first cycle.

Meanwhile, when receiving a request for transmission of an authentication value from the server, the processor may generate the authentication value and control the communication device to transmit the generated authentication value to the server.

Meanwhile, the communication device may transmit and receive data with the beacon device using a short-range wireless communication method, and transmit and receive data with the manager terminal device and the server using a wireless communication method different from the short-range wireless communication method.

On the other hand, in the user authentication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure, a plurality of hash processes are repeatedly hash-processed by the number of times (sp*dp) corresponding to the predetermined period (sp) and turn information (dp) for the first seed value. Storing a plurality of key values in which one of a plurality of random values for each value is subjected to an XOR operation, and upon reception of turn information (dp) and random value information corresponding to the turn information from a manager terminal device, the received turn information Calculating a first hash value by using information, random value information, and the plurality of stored key values; The second seed value from the beacon device is repeatedly hashed as many times as the number of times corresponding to the period (Bk) of the beacon. 2 Receiving a hash processing value, generating an authentication value by calculating and processing the calculated first hash processing value and the received second hash processing value, and transmitting the authentication value to a server. .

In this case, the storing step further stores the first seed value received from the manager terminal device, and the user authentication method corresponds to the first seed value to the predetermined period (sp) and repetition information (dp). The method may further include verifying the first hash processed value by repeatedly performing hash processing as many times as the number of times (sp*dp).

Meanwhile, in the generating of the authentication value, a third hash treatment value is calculated by hashing the calculated first hash treatment value a predetermined number of times, and the third hash treatment value and the second hash treatment value are XORed. The authentication value may be generated by arithmetic processing.

Meanwhile, in the step of receiving the second hash value, beacon information including the second hash value may be received from the beacon device if the beacon device is adjacent to the beacon device within a preset distance.

Meanwhile, in the storing step, when the plurality of key values are not stored or the validity period of the stored key values has elapsed, the beacon information is transmitted to the manager terminal device, and the plurality of key values are stored from the manager terminal device. A key value can be received and stored.

On the other hand, in the user authentication system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure, a plurality of hash processes are repeatedly hash-processed by the number of times (sp*dp) corresponding to the predetermined period (sp) and round information (dp) for the first seed value. A manager terminal device generating a plurality of key values in which one of a plurality of random values for each value is subjected to an XOR operation, and a second hash process in which the second seed value is hashed by repeating the number of times corresponding to the period (Bk) of the beacon. A beacon device that transmits beacon information including values, receives and stores the plurality of key values from the manager terminal device, and receives turn information (dp) and random value information corresponding to the turn information from the manager terminal device , a first hash processing value is calculated using the received round information, random value information, and the plurality of stored key values, and when the second hash processing value is received from the beacon device, the first hash processing value and a user terminal device generating an authentication value by calculating and processing the received second hash value, and upon receiving the authentication value from the user terminal device, the user terminal device based on the received authentication value generates the beacon It includes a server that checks if it is located in the vicinity of the device.

According to various embodiments of the present disclosure as described above, since a user authentication procedure can be performed using only a hash chain and previously generated random numbers, efficient authentication is possible.

1 is a diagram for explaining a user authentication system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;
2 is a diagram for explaining an operation of generating a delegation key according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;
3 is a diagram for explaining a key setup operation according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;
4 is a diagram for explaining an initialization operation for a delegation key according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;
5 is a diagram for explaining a user tracking operation using a delegation key according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;
6 is a diagram illustrating a configuration of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure, and
7 is a flowchart illustrating a user authentication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

Hereinafter, the present disclosure will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. Encryption/decryption may be applied to the information (data) transmission process performed in the present disclosure, if necessary, and expressions describing the information (data) transmission process in the present disclosure and claims are all encryption/decryption, even if not separately mentioned. It should be interpreted as including the case. In the present disclosure, expressions such as “transmission (delivery) from A to B” or “A receiving from B” include transmission (transmission) or reception with another medium included in the middle, and must be transmitted from A to B. It does not represent only what is directly transmitted (delivered) or received.

In the description of the present disclosure, the order of each step should be understood as non-limiting, unless the preceding step must logically and temporally necessarily precede the succeeding step. In other words, except for the above exceptional cases, even if the process described as the later step is performed before the process described as the preceding step, the nature of the disclosure is not affected, and the scope of rights must also be defined regardless of the order of the steps. And, in this specification, "A or B" is defined to mean not only selectively indicating either one of A and B, but also including both A and B. In addition, in the present disclosure, the term "include" has a meaning encompassing further including other components in addition to the elements listed as included.

In this disclosure, only essential components necessary for the description of the present disclosure are described, and components unrelated to the essence of the present disclosure are not mentioned. In addition, it should not be interpreted as an exclusive meaning that includes only the mentioned components, but should be interpreted as a non-exclusive meaning that may include other components.

In the present disclosure, “value” is defined as a concept including not only scalar values but also vectors and polynomial forms.

Mathematical operations and calculations of each step of the present disclosure described below may be implemented as computer operations by a known coding method and/or coding designed appropriately for the present disclosure to perform the calculations or calculations.

The specific equations described below are illustratively described among possible alternatives, and the scope of the present disclosure should not be construed as being limited to the equations mentioned in the present disclosure.

For convenience of explanation, in the present disclosure, the notation is defined as follows.

G: A cyclic group with a prime number q, and the generator of this group is g

h : a cryptographically secure hash function that does {0,1}* → {0,1} ^k

Gen (1 ⁿ ): Receives security parameters (n) and creates q cyclic groups and their generators (g)

[x] : largest integer less than x

Hereinafter, various embodiments of the present disclosure will be described in detail using the accompanying drawings.

1 is a diagram for explaining a user authentication system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

Referring to FIG. 1 , the user authentication system 1000 may include a beacon device 10, a user terminal device 100, a manager terminal device 200, and a server 300.

The beacon device 10 is disposed in a space to perform user authentication and periodically transmits beacon information. Here, the beacon information is information transmitted by a short-range wireless communication method, and may be Bluetooth, WiFi direct, or LTE D2D method, and includes ID information of the beacon device, hash chain period (n), and hash chain value (BV _Vk ) of the period. can include Meanwhile, in the illustrated example, although one beacon device 10 is shown as being located in a specific space, a plurality of beacon devices 10 may be located in implementation, and a plurality of beacon devices in one space have the same beacon information. or may transmit different beacon information.

The manager terminal device 200 generates a plurality of key values required to generate a hash value (or delegation key) in the user terminal device 100 and transmits them to the user terminal device 100 . Here, the key value is one of a plurality of random values for each of n hash processed values obtained by repeating the first seed value a number of times (sp*dp) corresponding to a predetermined period (sp) and turn information (dp). It is the value processed by XOR operation. Here, the number of key values may have a value corresponding to the number of sps (NSP) constituting the hash chain.

In addition, the manager terminal device 200 may transmit, to the user terminal device 100, session information dp for specifying a seed value to be used by the user terminal device 100 and random value information corresponding to the corresponding session information. Such turn information and random value information may be provided to the user terminal device 100 in units of the first period.

The user terminal device 100 may receive and store the plurality of key values described above from the manager terminal device 200, and determine a hash processing value (or seed value) to be used by using the received turn information and a random value. Specifically, the user terminal device 100 extracts a key value corresponding to the received round information from among a plurality of pre-stored key values, and generates a hash processing value that becomes the extracted key value through an XOR operation with the received random value. can be calculated The hash value calculated in this way may be used as a seed value of the user terminal device 100 .

At this time, the user terminal device 100 repeatedly hash-processes the first seed value provided from the manager terminal device 200 by the number of times (sp*dp) corresponding to the preset cycle and turn information, and the hash-processed value The previously calculated hash processing value may be verified by comparing whether the previously calculated hash processing value is the same.

And when the user terminal device 100 receives the second hash processing value from the beacon device 10, it generates an authentication value by calculating and processing the received second hash processing value and the previously calculated first hash processing value. Authentication information including one authentication value may be transmitted to the server 300 . At this time, the user terminal device 100 hash-processes the first hash value a number of times corresponding to the period Uk currently set in the user terminal device 100 to calculate a third hash value, and calculates the third hash value. An authentication value may be generated by performing an XOR operation on the processed value and the received second hash processed value.

The server 300 may set system parameters for the entire protocol for user authentication and transmit various types of information for user authentication to the beacon device 10 and the manager terminal device 200.

Further, when user authentication is required, the server 300 may request and receive authentication information from the user terminal device 100 and authenticate the user terminal device 100 through the received authentication information.

In addition, the server 300 may periodically perform the above-described authentication procedure to manage the stay time of the user terminal device 100 in the corresponding space. In addition, the server 300 may additionally perform a billing operation based on the managed time.

As described above, the user authentication system according to the present embodiment can perform computationally efficient authentication by using only the hash chain and previously generated random numbers in the user tracking process. In particular, the authentication value transmitted by the user terminal device to the server is a value obtained by XORing two hash values, that is, one time using the first hash value (BV _BK ), which is an actual authentication message, using a secret key (BV _Vk ). By having the effect of encryption with Pad (OTP), there is an effect of maintaining security even if the result is transmitted through an unsafe channel. Therefore, the burden of establishing communication between the user terminal device and the server using a private key or public key algorithm can be reduced.

In addition, since the hash processing value is masked with a random value for the plurality of key values provided by the manager terminal device 200 to the user terminal device 100, the hash processing value cannot be found unless the random value is known. .

On the other hand, in the illustration and description of FIG. 1, one manager terminal device and one user terminal device are shown in the user authentication system, but when implemented, the user authentication system includes a plurality of manager terminal devices and a plurality of user terminal devices. can do. In addition, the server may also be implemented as a plurality of server devices individually having the plurality of functions described above.

2 is a diagram for explaining an operation of generating a delegation key according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

A hash function used in cryptography is a one-way function in which it is probabilistically difficult to obtain an input of a hash function from an output of the hash function. In the present disclosure, the hash function is denoted as h, and is defined as a function that receives a binary string having an arbitrary length as an input and outputs a binary string having a length of ℓ.

[Equation 1]

h : {0,1}* → {0,1} ^ℓ

These hash functions are used in various fields of encryption, such as digital signature design, MAC (Message Authentication Code) algorithm design, and password-based authentication. When the hash function is repeatedly applied to the input (v), the output values of the hash function form a chain as shown below, which is called a hash chain.

[Equation 2]

v ₀ = h ⁿ (v) ← v ₁ = h ^n-1 (v) ← … ← v _n-2 = h ² (v _n ) ← v _n-1 = h(v _n ) ← v _n

Referring to FIG. 2, a hash function is repeatedly processed on the value of Vn to form a chain of 16 values. Here, hash processing values (V ₄ , V ₈ , V ₁₂ , and V ₀ ) of a predetermined period (sp) may be used as a seed of the user terminal device 100 . Meanwhile, in the illustrated example, a hash chain having a preset period (sp) of 4 and a number of sp (NSP) of 4 is used, but these values are examples, and hash chains having other sp and NSP values may be used. may be

Meanwhile, if the above-described hash processing value is directly transmitted and received between the user terminal device 100 and the manager terminal device 200, there is a burden of using a secure channel. In this regard, the present disclosure provides the user terminal device 100 with a key value necessary for generating the hash processing value without directly transmitting and receiving the above-described hash processing value, and the manager terminal device 200 transmits the corresponding key value. Through this, an operation of providing information capable of calculating a hash processing value is performed.

For such an operation, an initial setting is required in advance. Hereinafter, the entire operation required for user authentication is divided into a key setting operation, an initialization operation, and a user tracking operation, and each operation will be described in detail.

First, a key setting operation will be described below with reference to FIG. 3 .

3 is a diagram for explaining a key setup operation according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

Referring to FIG. 3 , the key setup operation may be largely divided into a key generation operation for the terminal device (S310) and a key generation operation for the beacon device (S360). Hereinafter, a key generation operation for terminal devices will be described first, but in implementation, the two operations may be performed in parallel, or a key generation operation for a beacon device may be performed in advance.

First, a key generation operation for the terminal device will be described (S310).

The server 300 generates system security parameters (G, q, g) to be used in the beacon device 10, the user terminal device 100, the manager terminal device 200, and the server 300, and the secret key of the server ( s) and a public key (g ^s ) can be generated (S315). Here, q is a prime number, G is a cyclic group having a prime number q, and g is a generator using the cyclic group.

In addition, the server 300 may transmit the server ID (KUMS), the generated system security parameters (G, q, g), and the public key (g ^s ) to the user terminal device 100 and the manager terminal device 200 ( S320, S335).

The user terminal device 100 may generate a secret key (u) and a public key (g ^u ) of the user terminal device based on the received system security parameter (S325). Further, the user terminal device 100 may transmit the generated public key (g ^u ) and user ID (U) to the server 300 (S330). Here, the user ID may be the ID of the user terminal device 100 or the ID of a user using the corresponding user terminal device 100 . That is, the user authentication system according to the present embodiment can manage the history of terminal devices connected to the corresponding system, and can also manage the history of users using the corresponding system. However, in general, one smartphone is generally used by one user. Hereinafter, a user terminal device and a user will be equated and described.

The manager terminal device 200 may also generate a secret key (m) and a public key (g ^m ) of the manager terminal device based on the provided information (S340). Then, the manager terminal device 200 may transmit the generated public key (g ^m ) and manager ID (M) to the server 300 (S345).

The server 300 stores the public keys provided from the two devices (S350).

In addition, the server 300 generates a hash chain period (n), a public value (BV ₀ ), and a hash chain seed (BV _n ) to be used by the beacon device 10 (S365). Here, the hash chain seed may have a chain shape as shown in FIG. 2 .

In addition, the server 300 may provide the generated hash chain period (n), public value (BV ₀ ), and hash chain seed (BV _n ) to the beacon device 10 (S370). At this time, the server 300 may provide the above-described information to the beacon device 10 through a secure channel.

The beacon device 10 may verify information provided from the server 300 and store the verified information. For example, the beacon device 10 repeatedly hashes the provided public value (BV ₀ ) a predetermined number of times (eg, hash chain period (n)), and the result of the operation and the provided hash chain seed are Verification can be performed by determining whether they are the same.

When such key setup is completed, an initialization operation for key value sharing may be performed. An initialization operation will be described below with reference to FIG. 4 .

4 is a diagram for explaining an initialization operation for a delegation key according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

Referring to FIG. 4 , the beacon device 10 calculates a hash value corresponding to the current cycle (S405), and broadcasts beacon information (B, B _k , BV _Vk ) including the calculated hash value. (S410). Here, B is the ID of the beacon device, and B _k is the current period of the beacon. BV _Vk is a hash value of the current cycle, and may be a second hash value obtained by repeatedly hashing the hash chain seed (BV _n ) a number of times corresponding to the beacon cycle (Bk).

When the user terminal device 100 is located adjacent to the beacon device 10, it may receive beacon information transmitted from the beacon device 10. In addition, when the user terminal device 100 receives the initial beacon information or the period of the key value provided from the manager terminal device 200 is completed, the received beacon information (B, B _k , BV _Vk ) and the user ID (U ) may be transmitted to the manager terminal device 200 (S415).

The manager terminal device 200 generates a key value to be used for authentication of the user terminal device 100 (S420). Specifically, the manager terminal device 200 determines a Short Period (SP), the number of SPs, and a Long Period (LP) according to management settings of an unmanned system. Here, SP is a predetermined period and may be a distance between V ₀ , V ₄ , V ₈ , and V ₁₂ in the tree structure of FIG. 2 . And the number of SPs (NSP) is the number of SPs constituting the lowest layer of the tree structure. For example, in FIG. 2, the number of SPs may be 4 and the number of SPs may be 4. Such management settings may be previously determined before the corresponding step.

In addition, the manager terminal device 200 applies the hash function (H ₁ ) lp times to MV _lp , which is the seed of the LP, while MV ₀ , MV _sp*1 , MV _sp*1 , . . . , MV _sp*(nsp-1) can be generated. For example, as shown in FIG. 2, the rightmost MV _lp is sequentially hashed lp times, and the 4th (MV ₁₂ ), 8th (MV ₈ ), 12th (MV ₄ ), 16th (MV ₀ ) It is possible to calculate four hash processing values such as The number of hash processing values generated here may be the same as the number of SPs (ie, NSPs).

In addition, the administrator terminal device 200 generates a plurality of R (R1, R2, ..., R _nsp ), which are random values, and XORs each of the hash processing value and the generated random value as follows to obtain a key value for the delegation key ( IKD = (IKD ₁ , IKD ₂ , …, IKD _nsp )).

[Equation 3]

IKD ₁ = MV _sp*1 R ₁ ,

IKD ₂ = MV _sp*2 R ₂ ,

…

IKD _nsp = MV _sp*nsp R _nsp ,

Also, the manager terminal device 200 may create a first message (Msg ₁ ) and a second message (Msg ₂ ). Here, the first message (Msg ₁ ) is a message having user ID, manager ID, sp, lp, MV ₀ , beacon ID, Bk, and BV _bk information, and the second message (Msg ₂ ) is the first message and a key value ( It is a message with IKD).

The manager terminal device 200 generates electronic signature values (CR, CS) for the first message using the secret key m of the manager terminal device 200, and generates the second message with the public key of the user terminal device. (g ^u ) can be used to encrypt to generate ciphertext (CU ₁ , CV ₁ ). At this time, the manager terminal device 200 may generate the ciphertext using Elgamal Encryption.

The manager terminal device 200 may transmit the generated electronic signature values (CR, CS) and ciphertexts (CU ₁ , CV ₁ ) to the user terminal device 100 (S425).

The user terminal device 100 receiving the digital signature value and the cipher text decrypts the cipher text (CU ₁ , CV ₁ ) using its own secret key (u), and uses the provided electronic signature values (CR, CS) to The first message (Msg ₁ ) is verified, and if the electronic signature value is valid, information in the first message and the second message is stored (S430), and the first message (Msg ₁ ) is converted into the server's public key (g ^s ) You can generate ciphertext (CU ₂ , CV ₂ ) by encrypting with .

In addition, the user terminal device 100 may transmit the electronic signature values (CR, CS) and the generated ciphertext (CU ₂ , CV ₂ ) to the server 300 (S435).

The server 300 decrypts the cipher texts (CU ₂ , CV ₂ ) using its own secret key (s), and verifies the first message (Msg ₁ ) using the provided electronic signature values (CR, CS). can And, if the electronic signature is valid, the server 300 may store the first message and the second message (S440).

Meanwhile, the aforementioned MV ₀ , MV _sp*1 , MV _sp*1 , . . . , MV _sp*(nsp-1) can be used as a delegation key (or authentication value). Specifically, when the manager terminal device 100 provides the user terminal device 100 with only round number information and a random value of the current round, the user terminal device 200 provides the plurality of key values previously provided to the user terminal device 200. The hash processing value of the current round can be determined by using Due to the characteristics of cryptographically secure hash function h such as SHA, if the user terminal device 100 does not receive R _i from the manager terminal device 200, it cannot find MV _i from IDK _k (k<i). .

In this way, when a plurality of key values for calculating hash processing values are generated in the manager terminal device 200 and the corresponding key values are shared by the user terminal device 100 and the server 300, all preparation processes for user tracking are performed. is complete. Hereinafter, a user tracking operation in a state in which a key value is shared will be described with reference to FIG. 5 .

5 is a diagram for explaining a user tracking operation using a delegation key according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

Referring to FIG. 5 , the user tracking operation may be divided into a key delegation step (S510) and a tracking step (S530).

First, the key delegation step (S510) is a process of transmitting information for selecting a delegation key generated in the initialization process. Specifically, the administrator terminal device 200 determines delegation period information (dp: Delegation Period), which is an effective use period of the delegation key MV _i necessary for generating an authentication message, and assigns a random value (R _dp ) corresponding to the determined delegation key to R After extracting from _{(1, 2, .., nps)} (S515), the number of times information (dp) and the random value of the number of times (R _dp ) are transmitted to the user terminal device 100 (S520).

The user terminal device 100 XORs IKD _dp and R _dp to generate MV _sp*sp , verifies this as MV ₀ , and if valid, may store MV _sp*sp as a seed (UV _seed ) of the user terminal device. (S525). Specifically, if the result value calculated by applying MV _sp* dp to the hash function (h ₁ ) times sp*dp is equal to MV ₀ , the calculated value may be determined to be valid.

The tracking step (S530) is a process of transmitting a message for notifying that the user terminal device 100 exists in a short distance of the beacon device 10 to the server 300.

The server 300 may periodically transmit a signal to the user terminal device 100 to send an authentication value (Auth) to the user (S535).

If the user terminal device 100 is not located adjacent to the beacon device 10, it may not perform the request of the server 300, and if it is adjacent to the beacon device 10, the following operations may be continued (S540). ).

The user terminal device 100 receives beacon information (B, Bk, BV _BK ) from the beacon device 10 (S545).

In addition, the user terminal device 100 repeatedly hash-processes the previously stored seed (UV _seed ) (Seed-Uk) times to generate a hash-processed value (UV _UK ), and the hash-processed value and the hash process received from the beacon device. An authentication value (Auth) may be generated by performing an XOR operation on the value (BV _BK ) (S550).

Further, the user terminal device 100 may transmit authentication information (U, UK, B, BK, Auth) including authentication values to the server 300 (S555). Here, U is the ID of the user terminal device, UK is the current period information of the user terminal device, B is the ID of the beacon device, BK is the period information of the beacon device, and Auth is the authentication value.

When receiving authentication information from the user terminal device 100, the server 300 verifies the received authentication information (S560). Specifically, the server 300 repeatedly hashes BV _BK included in the first message (Msg ₁ ) received during the initialization process (n-Bk) times to generate BV _BK ', and converts it to an authentication value (Auth). and XOR to calculate UV _uk . Finally, it is possible to verify whether the received authentication value is valid by hashing UV _uk UK times and checking whether it is the same as MV _O .

In addition, if the received authentication value is valid, the server 300 may store the received authentication information and authenticate that the user terminal device 100 is located within the communication distance of the beacon device 10 in a corresponding period.

6 is a diagram illustrating a configuration of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

Specifically, in the user authentication system 1000 of FIG. 1, an electronic device including a manager terminal device generating a key value, a user terminal device generating an authentication value using a key value, and a server performing authentication using the authentication value can be referred to as Such an electronic device may be a variety of devices such as a personal computer (PC), a laptop computer, a smart phone, a tablet, and a server.

Referring to FIG. 6 , an electronic device 600 may include a communication device 610, a memory 620, a display 630, a manipulation input device 640, and a processor 650. The electronic device 600 may be implemented as various devices such as a PC and a server.

The communication device 610 is formed to connect the electronic device 600 with other devices, and is connected to an external device through a Local Area Network (LAN) and an Internet network, as well as a Universal Serial Bus (USB). ) port or wireless communication (eg, WiFi 802.11a/b/g/n, 3G, 4G, 5G) or short-range wireless communication (eg, Bluetooth, WiFi Direct, LTE D2D) do. Such a communication device 610 may also be referred to as a transceiver.

The communication device 610 may transmit and receive various types of information for key setting. For example, the communication device 610 transmits and receives a device ID (KUMS, U, M), decimal information (p) required for data encryption, a generator (g), a public key (g ^s , g ^u , g ^m ), etc. can do.

Also, the communication device 610 may transmit/receive various types of information related to beacon operation. For example, when the electronic device 600 is the server 300, the communication device 610 transmits a chain period (n) for generating beacon information, a public value (BV ₀ ), and a hash chain seed (BV _n ) to a beacon. can be transmitted to the device 10. And when the electronic device 600 is the user terminal device 100, the communication device 610 receives beacon information (B, Bk, BV _BK ) from the beacon device 10 or receives the received beacon information from the manager terminal device ( 200) can be transmitted.

Also, the communication device 610 may transmit and receive various types of information for an initialization operation. For example, when the electronic device 600 is the administrator terminal device 200, the communication device 610 may receive beacon information from the user terminal device 100, and the electronic signature value and encryption of the first message. The second message may be provided to the user terminal device 100. Here, the beacon information is information that is periodically broadcast, and can be received when the user terminal device 100 is adjacent to the beacon device 10 within a predetermined distance (eg, 10 m).

Also, when the electronic device 600 is the user terminal device 200, the communication device 610 may receive an authentication value and an encrypted message from the manager terminal device 200, and may transmit it to the server 300. .

Also, the communication device 610 may transmit/receive various types of information for a user tracking operation. For example, when the electronic device 600 is the manager terminal device 200, the communication device 610 may transmit the turn information dp and random value information corresponding to the turn information to the user terminal device 100. . Further, when the electronic device 600 is the user terminal device 100, the communication device 610 receives turn information and random value information from the manager terminal device 200, and authentication including an authentication value generated based thereon. Information may be transmitted to the server 300 . Also, when the electronic device 600 is the server 300, the communication device 610 may receive authentication information from the user terminal device 100.

The memory 620 may store at least one instruction related to the electronic device 600 . For example, various programs (or software) for operating the electronic device 600 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure may be stored in the memory 620 . Here, the program may be a program for performing the operations of FIGS. 3 to 5 .

The memory 620 may be implemented in various forms such as RAM, ROM, flash memory, HDD, external memory, memory card, etc., but is not limited to any one.

The memory 620 may store information shared in a key setting step, information shared in an initialization operation, and the like. For example, the memory 620 may store a public key required for data encryption/decryption and its own private key information, and may store the above-described first message and second message. Here, the second message may include a plurality of key value (IKD) information used to determine the hash processing value of the user terminal device as described above.

And the memory 620 may store history information. Specifically, when the electronic device 600 is the server 300, the memory 620 stores sojourn time information (eg, first access time, final authentication time, total sojourn time) of the current space of the user terminal device 100. etc.) can be stored.

The memory 620 may temporarily store information received through the communication device 610 or temporarily store values calculated in a calculation process.

The display 630 displays a user interface window for selecting a function supported by the electronic device 600 . For example, the display 630 may display a user interface window for selecting various functions provided by the electronic device 600 . The display 630 may be a monitor such as a liquid crystal display (LCD), organic light emitting diodes (OLED), or the like, and may be implemented as a touch screen capable of simultaneously performing the functions of the manipulation input device 640 to be described later. .

The display 630 may display a message requesting input of parameters (eg, security parameters) necessary in the key generation process. For example, when the electronic device 600 is the server 300, messages necessary for setting various system parameters required for encryption may be displayed. And, when the electronic device 600 is the user terminal device 100, a message indicating whether to participate in the user authentication system 1000 may be displayed.

The manipulation input device 640 may receive a function selection of the electronic device 600 and a control command for the function from the user. For example, the manipulation input device 640 may receive parameters required for key generation from the user. Also, when the electronic device 600 is the user terminal device 100, the manipulation input device 640 may participate in the user authentication system 1000 and receive a command for performing an authentication procedure.

The processor 650 controls overall operations of the electronic device 600 . For example, the processor 650 may generally control the operation of the electronic device 600 by executing at least one instruction stored in the memory 620 . The processor 650 may be composed of a single device such as a central processing unit (CPU) and an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or may be composed of a plurality of devices such as a CPU and a graphics processing unit (GPU).

The processor 650 may perform various operations shown in FIGS. 3 to 5 . As the specific operation has been described above, only the operation of the processor 650 in the user terminal device 100 will be briefly described below.

The processor 650 controls the communication device 610 to transmit the received beacon information to the manager terminal device 200 when the plurality of key values are not stored or the validity period of the plurality of stored key values has elapsed. can

When the processor 650 receives a plurality of key value information, it stores the received key value information in the memory 620. Here, the plurality of key value information is obtained by repeating the first seed value the number of times (sp*dp) corresponding to the predetermined period (sp) and repetition information (dp), and each of the plurality of hash processed values has a plurality of random values. One of them is the value processed by the XOR operation. At this time, when first seed value information is received from the manager terminal device 200, the processor 650 may also store the received first seed value information in the memory 620. Here, the turn information and random value information may be received in a first cycle, and the above-described beacon information may be received in a second cycle shorter than the first cycle.

When the processor 650 receives the turn information (dp) and the random value information from the manager terminal device, the processor 650 calculates a first hash processing value using the received turn information, the random value information and a plurality of stored key values to calculate the user terminal It can be stored in the memory 620 as the seed value of the device.

In this case, the processor 650 may verify the received random value information before storing it as a seed value. Specifically, the processor 650 may verify the first hash value calculated by repeatedly hashing the first seed value the number of times (sp*dp) corresponding to the predetermined period (sp) and turn information (dp). there is.

Further, when the processor 650 receives the second hash processing value repeatedly hashed by the number of times the second seed value corresponds to the period Bk of the beacon from the beacon device 10, the user terminal stored in the memory 620 An authentication value may be generated by calculating and processing the seed value of the device 100 (ie, the first hash value) and the received second hash value. At this time, the processor 650 hash-processes the seed value stored in the memory 620 as many times as the number of times corresponding to the period Uk of the user terminal device 100 to calculate a third hash value, and the calculated third hash value. An authentication value may be generated by performing an XOR operation on the value and the received second hash value.

And the processor 650 controls the communication device 610 to transmit the generated authentication value to the server. Specifically, when receiving a request for transmission of an authentication value from the server 300, the processor 650 may control the communication device 610 to transmit authentication information including an authentication value generated in response to the request to the server 300. there is.

As described above, the electronic device 600 according to the present embodiment uses only the hash chain and previously generated random numbers in the user tracking process, thereby enabling computationally efficient authentication. In particular, the authentication value transmitted by the user terminal device to the server is a value obtained by XORing two hash values, that is, one time using the first hash value (BV _BK ), which is an actual authentication message, using a secret key (BV _Vk ). By having the effect of encryption with Pad (OTP), there is an effect of maintaining security even if the result is transmitted through an unsafe channel. Therefore, the burden of establishing communication between the user terminal device and the server using a private key or public key algorithm can be reduced.

In addition, the user authentication method as described above can authenticate and record their entry and exit like a high pass on a highway even without stopping in front of a QR code / NFC or camera recognizer for access authentication. In addition, it is possible to continuously check whether the user is in the office through the smart phone owned by the user and the beacon device installed in a specific space without the user's direct action. In this way, the amount of time a customer or employee has been in the space can be accurately measured, further increasing the reliability of the unmanned system.

Meanwhile, in the illustration and description of FIG. 6 , although the electronic device 600 is illustrated as including a plurality of components, some of the above-described components may be omitted during implementation, and other components may be added in addition to the above-described components. may be

7 is a flowchart illustrating a user authentication method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.

Referring to FIG. 7, a plurality of key values obtained by performing an XOR operation on one of a plurality of random values are stored in each of a plurality of hash-processed values that have been repeatedly hashed at a preset period (sp)*n times for the first seed value. Do (S710). Specifically, when the plurality of key values are not stored or the validity period of the plurality of stored key values has elapsed, beacon information may be transmitted to the manager terminal device, and the plurality of key values may be received and stored from the manager terminal device. . Such a key value may be provided from the manager terminal device 200 together with a first seed value, and the first seed value may be stored together with a plurality of key values.

Then, when the number of times information (dp) and random value information are received from the manager terminal device, a first hash processing value is calculated using the received number of times information and random value information and a plurality of stored key values (S720). In this case, the first hash value calculated by repeatedly hashing the first seed value a number of times (sp*dp) corresponding to the predetermined period (sp) and turn information (dp) may be verified.

Then, a second hash value obtained by repeatedly hashing the second seed value as many times as the number of times corresponding to the period (Bk) of the beacon is received from the beacon device (S730). Specifically, when the user terminal device is adjacent to the beacon device within a predetermined distance, beacon information including the second hash value may be received from the beacon device.

Then, an authentication value is generated by calculating and processing the calculated first hash value and the received second hash value (S740). Specifically, a third hash treatment value is calculated by hashing the calculated first hash treatment value a predetermined number of times, and an XOR operation is performed between the calculated third hash treatment value and the received second hash treatment value to obtain an authentication value. can create

Then, the generated authentication value is transmitted to the server (S750). Specifically, when receiving a request for transmission of an authentication value from the server, authentication information including the authentication value may be transmitted to the server.

As described above, the user authentication method according to the present embodiment can perform computationally efficient authentication by using only the hash chain and previously generated random numbers in the user tracking process.

Meanwhile, the user authentication method according to various embodiments described above may be implemented in the form of program code for performing each step, stored in a recording medium, and distributed. In this case, the device in which the recording medium is loaded can perform the above-described control operation.

Such a recording medium may be various types of computer readable media such as ROM, RAM, memory chip, memory card, external hard drive, hard drive, CD, DVD, magnetic disk or magnetic tape.

Although the present disclosure has been described with reference to the accompanying drawings, the scope of the present disclosure is determined by the claims described below and should not be construed as being limited to the foregoing embodiments and/or drawings. And it should be clearly understood that improvements, changes and modifications obvious to those skilled in the art of the disclosure described in the claims are also included in the scope of the present disclosure.

1000: user authentication system 100: user terminal device
200: manager terminal device 300: management server
600: electronic device 610: communication device
620: memory 630: display
640: operation input device 650: processor

Claims (14)

In electronic devices,
A communication device capable of communicating with each of the beacon device, the manager terminal device, and the server;
One of a plurality of random values is XOR-processed on each of a plurality of hash-processed values by repeating the first seed value a number of times (sp * dp) corresponding to the predetermined period (sp) and turn information (dp). a memory for storing a plurality of key values; and
When receiving round information (dp) and random value information corresponding to the round information from the manager terminal device, a first hash processing value is calculated using the received round information, random value information and the plurality of stored key values. and store it in the memory as a seed value of the electronic device,
When a second hash value obtained by repeating hash processing of the second seed value as many times as the number of times corresponding to the beacon period (Bk) is received from the beacon device, the seed value of the electronic device and the received second hash value are An electronic device comprising: a processor for generating an authentication value through calculation processing and controlling the communication device to transmit the authentication value to a server. According to claim 1,
the processor,
When receiving the first seed value from the manager terminal device, storing the first seed value in the memory;
The electronic device verifies the calculated first hash value by repeatedly hashing the first seed value a number of times (sp*dp) corresponding to the predetermined period (sp) and turn information (dp). According to claim 1,
the processor,
The electronic device that hash-processes the seed value of the electronic device a predetermined number of times to calculate a third hash-processed value, and performs an XOR operation on the third hash-processed value and the second hash-processed value to generate the authentication value. According to claim 1,
The communication device,
The electronic device receiving beacon information including a second hash processing value from the beacon device when adjacent to the beacon device within a preset distance. According to claim 4,
the processor,
When a plurality of key values are not stored or when the validity period of the stored key values has elapsed, the beacon information is transmitted to the manager terminal device, and the plurality of key values are received from the manager terminal device and stored in the memory electronic devices to store on. According to claim 1,
The communication device,
The electronic device receiving the turn information and the random value information from the manager terminal device in a first cycle, and receiving a second hash processing value from the beacon device in a second cycle shorter than the first cycle. According to claim 1,
the processor,
The electronic device that controls the communication device to generate the authentication value and transmit the generated authentication value to the server when receiving a request for transmission of an authentication value from the server. According to claim 1,
The communication device,
An electronic device that transmits and receives data with the beacon device using a short-range wireless communication method, and transmits and receives data with the manager terminal device and the server using a wireless communication method different from the short-range wireless communication method. In the user authentication method of the user terminal device,
One of a plurality of random values performs an XOR operation on each of the plurality of hash processed values repeatedly hashed by the number of times (sp*dp) corresponding to the predetermined period (sp) and the number of times (dp) for the first seed value. storing a plurality of processed key values;
When receiving round information (dp) and random value information corresponding to the round information from the manager terminal device, calculating a first hash processing value using the received round information, random value information and the plurality of stored key values step;
Receiving a hash-processed second hash value by repeating the second seed value the number of times corresponding to the period Bk of the beacon from the beacon device;
generating an authentication value by calculating and processing the calculated first hash-processed value and the received second hash-processed value; and
Transmitting the authentication value to the server; user authentication method comprising a. According to claim 9,
The storing step is
further storing a first seed value received from the manager terminal device;
The user authentication method,
Verifying the first hash value by repeatedly hashing the first seed value a number of times (sp*dp) corresponding to the preset period (sp) and turn information (dp); user authentication further comprising: method. According to claim 9,
Generating the authentication value,
A user who hash-processes the calculated first hash-processed value a predetermined number of times to calculate a third hash-processed value, and performs an XOR operation between the third hash-processed value and the second hash-processed value to generate the authentication value. authentication method. According to claim 9,
Receiving the second hash processing value,
A user authentication method for receiving beacon information including a second hash processing value from the beacon device when adjacent to the beacon device within a predetermined distance. According to claim 12,
The storing step is
Transmitting the beacon information to the manager terminal device and receiving and storing the plurality of key values from the manager terminal device when the plurality of key values are not stored or the validity period of the stored key values has elapsed User authentication method. In the user authentication system,
For the first seed value, one of a plurality of random values is XOR-processed for each of a plurality of hash processed values repeatedly hashed by the number of times (sp*dp) corresponding to the predetermined period (sp) and turn information (dp). a manager terminal device generating a plurality of key values;
a beacon device that transmits beacon information including a second hash value obtained by hashing the second seed value by repeating the number of times corresponding to the period Bk of the beacon;
When receiving and storing the plurality of key values from the manager terminal device and receiving turn information (dp) and random value information corresponding to the turn information from the manager terminal device, the received turn information, random value information and A first hash processing value is calculated using the stored plurality of key values, and when the second hash processing value is received from the beacon device, the first hash processing value and the received second hash processing value are calculated and processed. a user terminal device that generates an authentication value by doing; and
and a server for confirming whether the user terminal device is located in the vicinity of the beacon device based on the received authentication value when receiving the authentication value from the user terminal device.

Images