KR102267247B1 - Engineering risk analysis system and method of Digital Intelligent Electronic Device - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention relates to an engineering risk analysis system of a digital protection relay and a method thereof, and more particularly, due to human error of workers (experts, engineers, etc.) connecting to a digital protection relay (IED, Intelligent Electronic Device) through various paths. It relates to an engineering risk analysis system and method of a digital protection relay that can prevent IED accidents caused by accidents and can clarify the cause of an accident and respond quickly.

Description

Engineering risk analysis system and method of Digital Intelligent Electronic Device

The present invention relates to an engineering risk analysis system of a digital protection relay and a method thereof, and more particularly, due to human error of workers (experts, engineers, etc.) connecting to a digital protection relay (IED, Intelligent Electronic Device) through various paths. It relates to an engineering risk analysis system and method of a digital protection relay that can prevent an IED accident that occurs and can quickly respond to an accident by clarifying the cause.

The power system of a power plant consists of a generator, a transformer, a busbar, a transmission and distribution line, an electric motor, and a load center, but it is not possible to operate the system safely with these devices alone, and various control devices, measuring devices, and protection devices are required. Do.

In particular, the 'protection relay', which is the protection device, always monitors the generator, transformer, busbar, line and other components of the power system to ensure safety that does not operate under normal conditions, and when a failure occurs or an abnormality occurs in system operation, immediately It detects this and isolates the faulty part to prevent problems in the power supply from occurring and to minimize damage to faulty equipment or facilities.

Recently, based on the international standard established by IEC, the International Standards Organization for IEC 61850, it has evolved into a digital protection relay (IED, Intelligent Electronic Device), which is a 4th generation intelligent electronic device, providing a complex of protection, monitoring, control and communication. It has established itself as a key device in power plants that perform critical functions.

However, the digital protection relay is a facility that requires an expert's engineering work to check reliability and performance in all processes from the introduction and installation stage to the maintenance stage. It is a difficult device.

The engineering work of these digital protection relays can be performed by accessing the digital protection relay connected to the switch through the IED dedicated tool system installed in the terminal possessed by experts (workers, engineers, etc.) It is operated and performed through the connection.

However, as described above, the protection system power facilities (digital protection relays) supporting IEC 61850 communication have the advantage that they can be accessed and operated directly through IEC 61850 communication, but errors due to protection relay setting errors (especially human error) is very likely to occur.

In particular, even if very sensitive information such as a change in the digital protection relay setting value occurs due to a human error during engineering, if the operator does not directly inform the supervisor, it is a special field that the supervisor cannot check. , these management loopholes can lead to serious accidents leading to economic and social losses.

Conventionally, access control on the access of workers who perform engineering by connecting to the digital protection relay and the policy for allowing access to the digital protection relay are performed in the form of work management based on a passive method, or It was intended to prevent accidents by providing a structure in which engineering can be performed only by providing access information, or by providing a part of the access control function by the manufacturer of the digital protection relay by itself (setting a user password, etc.).

However, as described above, when an operator connects to the digital protection relay, if an unintentional change of setting information (change of correction value, etc.) occurs due to the operator's mistake, the confirmation method is very difficult, and when a problem occurs, the supervisor It is impossible to clearly determine whether it is a problem with the system itself or a human error of the operator, so it is impossible to determine the cause itself.

In addition, even if the operator performs engineering by connecting to another digital protection relay rather than the specific digital protection relay that the operator intends to perform engineering, it is not only impossible to control this, but also to the operator for the connection of the digital protection relay when the work is in progress. As access-related information is provided, it is also impossible to control access to bypass access with impure intentions.

In other words, the engineering of the digital protection relay that performs complex functions such as protection, monitoring, control and communication as a core device of the power system of a power plant responds to human errors that can be prevented in advance due to the inadequacy of systematic management and operation methods is insufficient.

In spite of these problems, there is no technology for preventing various human errors in advance or a technical device for identifying the cause when a problem occurs.

In other words, as the protection system power facilities are replaced with digital protection relays, the stability of the system is increased, but paradoxically, as the accessibility (using IEC 61850 communication) increases, the device caused by the error of a worker with relatively low expertise. There is a problem in that the risk of malfunctioning increases.

In particular, as power facilities become more complex due to digitalization, it is natural to face more serious and more problems if the management method is not quickly converted to a management method that matches the flow of the 4th industrial revolution era, which has to change from the existing human resource center to the system center. Do.

Above all, from the manager's point of view, it is very difficult and difficult to manage how the connection of the digital protection relay, which only allows the access of very professional personnel, is made, and the digital protection relay does not affect the operation of the digital protection relay itself. There is an urgent need to develop a technology that can accommodate professional integrated monitoring management (risk management) for engineering.

In this regard, Korean Patent Registration No. 10-1575862 (“Security Linkage between Heterogeneous Power Devices”) discloses a heterogeneous linkage security gateway that implements mapping and security by linking between different devices in the power system using different protocols. By providing a safe working environment from hacking and security threats, a system capable of improving data reliability by mutually transmitting data only through certified equipment is disclosed.

Domestic Registered Patent No. 10-1575862 (Registration Date 2015.12.02.)

The present invention has been devised to solve the problems of the prior art as described above, and not only prevents IED accidents caused by human error of the operator who connects to the digital protection relay through various routes, but also prevents an IED accident between the operator and the digital protection relay By restricting connections and policyizing access, it is possible to record and analyze all actions of workers, so that in the event of an accident, the cause can be clearly identified, providing a digital protection relay engineering risk analysis system and method for rapid response. will be.

The engineering risk analysis system of the digital protection relay according to an embodiment of the present invention is a system for analyzing the engineering risk of the digital protection relay, a plurality of digital protection relays (IED, Intelligent Electronic Device) 10, a maintenance unit 100 that performs engineering, receives data generated by engineering in the maintenance unit 100, and a behavior analysis unit that analyzes it ( 200) and under the control of the behavior analysis unit 200, receive the behavior information and policy information for performing engineering generated by the behavior analysis unit 200, and control the engineering execution of the maintenance unit 100 It is preferable to include a behavior control unit 300 to

Furthermore, the maintenance unit 100 controls the connection of the secure communication environment with each of the digital protection relays 10 by interworking with the behavior control unit 300 , and the behavior control unit 300 is the maintenance unit It is desirable to frequently store data generated by engineering in (100).

Furthermore, the behavior analysis unit 200 receives the operator-related information and engineering behavior-related information to perform engineering on the digital protection relay 10 from the outside, and generates operator information, engineering information and policy information. , it is preferable to transmit and store the linked behavior control unit 300 .

Furthermore, when the maintenance unit 100 is interlocked with the behavior control unit 300, the corresponding digital protection relay 10 is based on the information stored in the behavior control unit 300 using a pre-installed agent. ), it is desirable to establish a secure communication environment with

Furthermore, it is preferable that the behavior control unit 300 is interlocked with the maintenance unit 100 to receive and store the information related to the operator's behavior that has occurred and the change related information of the digital protection relay 10 from the agent.

Furthermore, the maintenance unit 100 is interlocked with the behavior control unit 300, and access is based on the worker information, engineering information and policy information stored in the behavior control unit 300 using the agent. It is preferable to establish only a secure communication environment with the allowed specific digital protection relay (10).

Furthermore, the maintenance unit 100 is interlocked with the behavior control unit 300, and based on the worker information, engineering information and policy information stored in the behavior control unit 300 using the agent, It is desirable to analyze the engineering possible remaining time, and to block the secure communication environment with the specific digital protection relay 10 constructed when the analyzed remaining time is exceeded.

Furthermore, when the maintenance unit 100 is interlocked with the behavior control unit 300 and then released, the operator information, engineering information, and policy information stored in the behavior control unit 300 using the agent are based on the maintenance unit 100. , it is desirable to store and manage it by determining whether it is an unauthorized release or a normal release.

Furthermore, the behavior analysis unit 200 receives the behavior-related information and change-related information from the behavior control unit 300, and performs engineering behavior analysis in the maintenance unit 100 to prevent human error of workers. It is desirable to determine

Engineering risk analysis method of digital protection relay according to another embodiment of the present invention, in the method of analyzing the risk for engineering of digital protection relay, in the maintenance unit, a plurality of digital protection relay (IED, Intelligent Electronic Device) ) in the agent installation step (S100) of installing a preset agent for establishing a secure communication environment with, in the behavior analysis unit, through the maintenance unit where the agent is installed by the agent installation step (S100), the digital A use registration step (S200) of receiving worker-related information and engineering action-related information to perform the engineering of the protection relay, and transmitting and storing operator information, engineering information, and policy information to the interlocked action control unit (S200), the use registration step Interworking step (S300) in which the behavior control unit that has received the information by (S200) and the maintenance unit are interlocked, and in the maintenance unit, after interworking is made by the interworking step (S300), the agent installation step ( Engineering control step (S400) of controlling to establish a secure communication environment with the corresponding digital protection relay and perform engineering based on the information stored in the behavior control unit using the agent installed by S100) In the control unit, the logging data storage step (S500) of storing the data generated by the engineering control step (S400) from time to time, according to a preset operation, the interworking between the behavior control unit and the maintenance unit is released ( S600) and in the behavior analysis unit, a risk analysis step (S700) of receiving and analyzing the data stored by the logging data storage step (S500) from the behavior control unit to determine the human error of the operator is preferably performed.

Furthermore, the engineering control step (S400) is based on the worker information, engineering information, and policy information stored in the behavior control unit using the agent by interworking with the behavior control unit, access is allowed specific It is desirable to establish only a secure communication environment with the digital protection relay.

Further, the engineering control step (S400) is based on the worker information, engineering information, and policy information stored in the behavior control unit using the agent by interworking with the behavior control unit, the remaining engineering possible time of the worker It is desirable to analyze and block the secure communication environment with the specific digital protection relay established when the analyzed remaining time is exceeded.

Furthermore, the engineering risk analysis method of the digital protection relay, in the behavior control unit, when the interworking of the behavior control unit and the maintenance unit is released, based on the information stored in the behavior control unit, the interworking release step (S600) ), it is desirable to store and manage it after determining whether it is a normal release or an unauthorized release.

Furthermore, the logging data storage step (S500) is interlocked with the maintenance unit to receive and store information related to the operator's behavior generated by the engineering control step (S400) and the change related information of the digital protection relay from the agent. It is preferable to do

The engineering risk analysis system and the method of the digital protection relay of the present invention according to the configuration as described above, there is an advantage that can prevent IED accidents caused by human error of the operator who connects to the digital protection relay through various paths.

In detail, by limiting the connection between the operator and the digital protection relay and policyizing the access, it is possible to record and analyze all actions of the operator, so that in the event of an accident, the cause can be clearly identified, thereby enabling rapid response.

In particular, the integrated monitoring and management (risk management) of all engineering activities performed by workers without any impact on the environment and operation of a separate network or existing system (system including digital protection relay) There are advantages that can be

In detail, the operator can access only the digital protection relay designated in advance by the control of the behavior control unit, and the unintended access to the digital protection relay is not allowed, so errors due to incorrect access can be prevented in advance. In addition, it has the advantage of performing secondary access management as it can be set up to the time allowed for access.

In addition, it not only collects and stores all behavioral information of workers who access the digital protection relay through various routes, but also analyzes the stored information, which can be used as source data to identify the cause of a problem, thereby enabling faster response.

In addition, by establishing a communication environment so that access to the digital protection relay is possible without disclosing information related to the digital protection relay to the operator, internal key information is not exposed to the outside, and problems such as bypass connection can be solved. There are advantages that can be

In addition, there is an advantage that the manager can control/control all policies and operator's action history for the engineering work of the digital protection relay, which is a very specialized and special field, and easily perform work management.

In particular, by securing technology for safe engineering of digital protection relay (digital protection system power facility) based on IEC 61850 communication, it has the advantage of contributing to the safe operation of the protection system with the protection relay as the core and furthermore the power system. .

1 is a block diagram of an engineering risk analysis system of a digital protection relay according to an embodiment of the present invention.
2 to 6 is a detailed configuration diagram of the engineering risk analysis system of the digital protection relay according to an embodiment of the present invention.
7 is a flowchart of an engineering risk analysis method of a digital protection relay according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Hereinafter, an engineering risk analysis system and method of the digital protection relay of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. The drawings introduced below are provided as examples in order to sufficiently convey the spirit of the present invention to those skilled in the art. Accordingly, the present invention is not limited to the drawings presented below and may be embodied in other forms. Also, like reference numerals refer to like elements throughout.

At this time, if there is no other definition in the technical terms and scientific terms used, it has the meaning commonly understood by those of ordinary skill in the art to which this invention belongs, and in the following description and accompanying drawings, the subject matter of the present invention Descriptions of known functions and configurations that may unnecessarily obscure will be omitted.

In addition, the system refers to a set of components including devices, instruments, and means that are organized and regularly interact to perform necessary functions.

The engineering risk analysis system of the digital protection relay according to an embodiment of the present invention is configured to include a maintenance unit 100, a behavior analysis unit 200 and a behavior control unit 300, as shown in FIGS. 1 and 2 . It is preferable to be

To learn more about each configuration,

The maintenance unit 100 is preferably configured to include a terminal (laptop, etc.) possessed by a worker (expert, engineer, etc.), and it is preferable to install an agent in the terminal in advance. In this case, the agent is preferably configured to include a dedicated tool and software for establishing and setting the driving environment of the digital protection relay.

The maintenance unit 100 may perform engineering by establishing a secure communication environment with a plurality of digital protection relays (IED, Intelligent Electronic Device) 10 using the installed agent.

Here, the digital protection relay 10 is a protection relay of the latest power system using the Ethernet-based IEC 61850 protocol (MMS, COOSE, SVM, etc.), a generator, a transformer, a busbar, a line and other power systems. The components of the system are always monitored to ensure safety that does not operate under normal conditions, and when a failure occurs or system operation is abnormal, it immediately detects and isolates the faulty part to prevent power supply disruption and damage to malfunctioning equipment or facilities. It can be minimized and is included in the power equipment.

It is preferable that the behavior analysis unit 200 receives data generated by engineering in the maintenance unit 100 and analyzes it.

In detail, it is possible to manage behavior information and policies after being connected with the digital protection relay 10 by the maintenance unit 100, and control the configuration operation of the behavior control unit 300, and the maintenance unit ( 100), by analyzing the data (Logging Data) generated by engineering, it is possible to derive work history, user behavior, and the like.

The behavior control unit 300 receives and stores the behavior information and policy information for performing engineering generated by the behavior analysis unit 200 under the control of the behavior analysis unit 200, and stores the stored information. It is possible to control the engineering execution of the maintenance unit 100 by using it.

To this end, the behavior control unit 300 is preferably interlocked with the maintenance unit 100, and is most preferably in the form of a portable storage device that can be directly coupled with the maintenance unit 100 for smooth interlocking. This is only one embodiment of the present invention.

The behavior control unit 300 is interlocked with the maintenance unit 100 to limit the connection between the operator and the digital protection relay 10, and by receiving and storing a record of all actions of the operator, the behavior analysis unit By analyzing this at 200 , it is possible to derive work details, user actions, and the like.

To this end, the maintenance unit 100 controls the connection of the secure communication environment with each of the digital protection relays 10 through interworking with the behavior control unit 300 as described above, and the behavior control unit 300 ) preferably stores the data generated by engineering in the maintenance unit 100 from time to time.

In detail, the behavior analysis unit 200 receives information related to a worker who wants to perform engineering on the digital protection relay 10 through the maintenance unit 100 from the outside (operator), and information related to engineering behavior. it is preferable

That is, as shown in FIG. 3 , the operator uses the maintenance unit 100 to perform the engineering of the digital protection relay 10 , prior to performing the engineering of the digital protection relay 10 , the operator related information set in advance with the behavior analysis unit 200 , engineering Enter information related to the action.

Preferably, the behavior analysis unit 200 receives the information, generates worker information, engineering information, and policy information, and transmits and stores the information to the interlocked behavior control unit 300 . In other words, as the manager of the behavior analysis unit 200 registers the use of the behavior control unit 300 , the operator links the behavior control unit 300 with the maintenance unit 100 to protect the digital Engineering of the relay 10 may be performed.

Through this, since information for access to the digital protection relay 10 is not provided to the operator at all, the access to the digital protection relay 10 itself is not allowed without the behavior control unit 300, thereby controlling the manager Without it, access to the digital protection relay 10 can be clearly controlled.

In particular, there is an advantage that the administrator can control/control and manage all policies and histories of the engineering work of the digital protection relay, which is a very specialized and special field that was difficult to access in the prior art.

At this time, the operator uses the maintenance unit 100 to input worker-related information preset to the behavior analysis unit 200, the worker's personal information, which is engineering activity-related information, expected work task information, etc., thereby analyzing the behavior The unit 200 transmits the worker information, engineering information and policy information (including worker identity information, work time information, allowable digital protection relay information, behavior control unit unique information, etc.) generated using this to the behavior control unit 300 . By transmitting, token information of the behavior control unit 300 may be set.

At this time, the behavior analysis unit 200 is configured to generate the token information to be transmitted to the behavior control unit 300 as shown in FIGS. 1 and 2 , and engineering-related data from the behavior control unit 300 . A configuration for receiving and analyzing data is separately configured, and it is only referred to as one behavior analysis unit 200 for convenience, and may be configured as one configuration in the same device or as a separate configuration in a separate device.

In addition, it is preferable that the behavior analysis unit 200 further includes a behavior analysis information DB unit, a usage policy information DB unit, and an environment setting information DB unit. The worker information, engineering information, and policy information may be generated using worker-related information received from the operator, personal information of the worker, expected work information, and the like.

In addition, results according to the analysis of data generated by engineering in the behavior analysis unit 200, which will be described later, may also be stored and managed. As an example, it is desirable to also store and manage work history (date, area, worker information, etc.) and security check results.

When the maintenance unit 100 is linked with the behavior control unit 300 , the information stored in the behavior control unit 300 is generated by using a pre-installed agent, that is, the behavior analysis unit 200 . By specifying the corresponding digital protection relay 10 based on the transmitted worker information, engineering information and policy information, it is possible to establish a secure communication environment with the specific digital protection relay 10 .

Through this, an operator can perform engineering on the digital protection relay 10 through the maintenance unit 100 .

In detail, as shown in FIG. 4 , by interworking the maintenance unit 100 and the behavior control unit 300 , the worker information, engineering information, and policy information stored in the behavior control unit 300 are It is transmitted to the agent installed in advance in the maintenance unit 100, and the agent specifies the corresponding digital protection relay 10 based on the worker information, engineering information and policy information, and the specific digital protection relay 10 A secure communication environment can be established.

Through this, it is possible to enable the operator to access only the digital protection relay 10 designated through the behavior analysis unit 200 by the administrator using the maintenance unit 100, and not intentionally due to the operator's mistake. It is possible to block the source of access to the digital protection relay (10) that is not.

In addition, through the operation of the agents installed in the maintenance unit 100, all behavior information (Logging Data) of the worker, which is the generated operator's action-related information, and the change-related information of the digital protection relay 10, the action control unit ( 300) and stored.

In detail, the agent installed in advance in the maintenance unit 100 is preferably divided into two services (a first agent and a second agent) as shown in FIGS. 1 and 6 . Through this, it is possible to complement each other to prevent forgery and falsification of important data, such as worker behavior information.

As the behavior control unit 300 is interlocked, the maintenance unit 100 passes through the authentication procedure of the behavior control unit 300 in pre-installed agents (first agent, second agent), and the digital protection relay 10 ) can establish a secure communication environment, and through this, behavior information can be collected in the process of engineering, and access is allowed only to the permitted digital protection relay (10) and is blocked by other digital protection relays (10) access will be restricted.

Among the agents pre-installed in the maintenance unit 100, the first agent is an 'onetime service' that is driven only when interworking with the behavior control unit 300 and is stopped when interworking is released, as the second agent. As an agent that is installed and started as a 'onetime daemon', it is run simultaneously with installation in order to detect an action that an operator attempts to access a location (path) where behavior information is stored.

The maintenance unit 100 recognizes the interworking of the behavior control unit 300 through the 'onetime service' agent and proceeds with a user authentication procedure.

At this time, rather than simply recognizing interlocking, when interlocking is released, it is determined whether the corresponding operation is abnormal or normal release, and it can be recorded as the operator's behavior information. Here, the normal release corresponds to a case where the operator cancels the interworking between the maintenance unit 100 and the behavior control unit 300 by performing a preset operation.

In addition, the maintenance unit 100 checks whether the token information of the behavior control unit 300 is damaged by using the information received from the behavior control unit 300 through the 'onetime service' agent, and if it is normal, The token information is transmitted to the 'onetime daemon' agent.

Through this, the maintenance unit 100 is connected to the permitted digital protection relay 10 through the 'onetime daemon' agent, and access to the unauthorized digital protection relay 10 is restricted.

In addition, the maintenance unit 100 monitors whether a worker accesses token information or behavior information stored in the behavior control unit 300 or a file change attempt occurs through the 'onetime service' agent, and when it occurs, This can also be recorded as operator behavior information.

In addition, the maintenance unit 100 through the 'onetime service' agent, the operator's behavior information, in particular, a situation that occurs due to a human error of the operator (forced termination of the agents of the maintenance unit 100, the behavior control unit ( 300), it is desirable to collect the set data file (in particular, the correction value information) of the digital protection relay 10 for which it is desirable to collect the forced interlocking, the reinterlocking after the forced interlocking, the work time exceeding, etc.) ) can be requested and saved.

In addition, the maintenance unit 100 can detect and block an unauthorized access attempt to the digital protection relay 10 through the 'onetime daemon' agent, which collects and analyzes IEC 61850 communication packets and is the approved The digital protection relay 10 allows the connection, and the unauthorized digital protection relay 10 blocks the connection.

In detail, the maintenance unit 100 collects IEC 61850 communication packets through the 'onetime daemon' agent, separates the packet header, and extracts Destination IP information included in the header.

By analyzing the extracted destination IP information, in the case of unapproved IP information, the corresponding packet is blocked, and in the case of approved IP information, a secure communication environment is established so that the operator performs engineering on the digital protection relay 10 .

At this time, in the case of unapproved IP information, after blocking the packet, extracting the packet body, analyzing it, and recording the action information (message logging) of the operator.

In addition, it is preferable that the maintenance unit 100 collects the operator's behavior information, ie, the behavior information generated in the engineering process, through the 'onetime daemon' agent.

In this way, the maintenance unit 100 is interlocked with the behavior control unit 300, and based on the worker information, engineering information, and policy information stored in the behavior control unit 300 using the agents, It is possible to analyze the remaining engineering available time, and block the established secure communication environment when the analyzed remaining time is exceeded.

In addition, when the maintenance unit 100 is interlocked with the behavior control unit 300 and then released, based on the worker information, engineering information and policy information stored in the behavior control unit 300 using the agents, It can be stored and managed by determining whether the release is unauthorized or normal release.

In the case of normal release, the token information stored in the behavior control unit 300 is read again when re-interlocking, and it is processed by checking whether there is a remaining working time,

In the case of unauthorized release (abnormal release), counterfeiting can be prevented by copying and overwriting the operator's logging data stored at the time of re-interlocking.

In addition, when the maintenance unit 100 is re-interlocked with the behavior control unit 300 after being released, in the case of the new behavior control unit 300, the new behavior control unit 300 regardless of whether the previous operation is unauthorized release or normal release. ), an operation is performed based on the information stored in the .

Furthermore, when it is determined that there is an abnormality in the token information, the maintenance unit 100 uses the agents, based on the worker information, engineering information, and policy information stored in the behavior control unit 300 . , it will not proceed with the establishment of a secure communication environment to prevent further work.

In addition, the maintenance unit 100 uses the agents to record and store it even when the maintenance unit 100 itself is abnormally terminated due to a battery problem or an OS error, and then when normal operation continues, By transmitting this information as the operator's behavior information, it can be utilized for risk determination according to the frequency of occurrence.

As shown in FIG. 5 , the behavior analysis unit 200 collects data (action-related information, change-related information) generated in the engineering execution process of the maintenance unit 100 through the behavior control unit 300 , and It can be stored and transmitted, and by analyzing it, it is possible to determine the human error situation of the operator.

Specifically, the behavior analysis unit 200 can determine the human error situation of the operator by precisely analyzing the information received from the behavior control unit 300, that is, the behavior-related information and the change-related information. . Of course, the determination and determination information are stored as a separate storage means.

Through this, there is an advantage that the manager can control and control all policies and histories of the engineering work of the digital protection relay, which is a very professional and special field, and easily perform work management.

As shown in Figure 7, the engineering risk analysis method of the digital protection relay according to an embodiment of the present invention is an agent installation step (S100), a use registration step (S200), an interlocking step (S300), an engineering control step (S400) ), logging data storage step (S500), interlock release step (S600), and risk analysis step (S700) are preferable.

To learn more about each step,

In the agent installation step ( S100 ), in the maintenance unit 100 , preset agents for establishing a secure communication environment with the plurality of digital protection relays 10 may be installed.

Specifically, it is preferable that the agents are separated into two services. Through this, it is possible to complement each other to prevent forgery and falsification of important data, such as worker behavior information. Among the agents pre-installed in the maintenance unit 100, 'onetime service' is an agent that is driven only when interworking with the behavior control unit 300 and is stopped when interworking is released, and 'onetime daemon' is an agent that is operated as soon as it is installed. , in order to detect an action that the operator attempts to access the location (path) where the action information is stored, it is operated simultaneously with installation.

In the use registration step (S200), in the behavior analysis unit 200, through the maintenance unit 100 in which the agent is installed by the agent installation step (S100), engineering of the digital protection relay 10 is performed It is possible to receive desired worker-related information and engineering action-related information, generate worker information, engineering information, and policy information, and transmit and store the worker information, engineering information and policy information in the interlocked action control unit 200 .

That is, the use registration step (S200) is information related to a worker who wants to perform engineering on the digital protection relay 10 through the maintenance unit 100 from the outside (operator) in the behavior analysis unit 200, It is desirable to receive information related to engineering activities. In other words, before performing the engineering of the digital protection relay 10 by using the maintenance unit 100, the operator inputs the operator-related information and engineering behavior-related information set in advance to the behavior analysis unit 200. . Using this, it is preferable that the behavior analysis unit 200 receives the information, generates worker information, engineering information, and policy information, and transmits and stores the information to the interlocked behavior control unit 300 . In other words, as the manager of the behavior analysis unit 200 registers use of the behavior control unit 300 , the operator links the behavior control unit 300 with the maintenance unit 100 to protect the digital Engineering of the relay 10 may be performed.

Through this, since information for access to the digital protection relay 10 is not provided to the operator at all, the access to the digital protection relay 10 itself is not allowed without the behavior control unit 300, thereby controlling the manager Without it, access to the digital protection relay 10 can be clearly controlled.

In particular, there is an advantage that the administrator can control/control and manage all policies and histories of the engineering work of the digital protection relay, which is a very specialized and special field that was difficult to access in the prior art.

In the interworking step (S300), the behavior control unit 300 that has received the information by the use registration step (S200) and the maintenance unit 100 are interlocked.

To this end, the maintenance unit 100 is preferably configured to include a terminal (laptop, etc.) possessed by an operator (expert, engineer, etc.), and it is preferable to install an agent in the terminal in advance. In this case, the agent is preferably configured to include a dedicated tool and software for establishing and setting the driving environment of the digital protection relay. The behavior control unit 300 is most preferably in the form of a portable storage device that can be directly coupled to the maintenance unit 100 for smooth interlocking, but this is only an embodiment of the present invention.

In the engineering control step (S400), in the maintenance unit 100, after interworking with the behavior control unit 300 is made by the interworking step (S300), the agents installed by the agent installation step (S100) are used. So, based on the information stored in the behavior control unit 300, the corresponding digital protection relay 10 is specified, a secure communication environment with the specific digital protection relay 10 is established, and engineering is performed. will take control

Through this, it is possible to enable the operator to access only the digital protection relay 10 designated through the behavior analysis unit 200 by the administrator using the maintenance unit 100, and not intentionally due to the operator's mistake. It is possible to block the source of access to the digital protection relay (10) that is not.

In addition, the behavior control unit 300 stores the data generated by the engineering control step (S400) at any time through the logging data storage step (S500).

That is, through the operation of the agents installed in the maintenance unit 100, all the behavior information (Logging Data) of the worker, which is the generated operator behavior-related information, and the change-related information of the digital protection relay 10, the behavior control unit 300 transmitted and stored.

In detail, the engineering control step (S400) limits the connection between the operator and the digital protection relay 10, and receives and stores a record of all actions of the operator. To this end, in the maintenance unit 100 , as the behavior control unit 300 is interlocked, pre-installed agents go through the authentication procedure of the behavior control unit 300 , and a secure communication environment with the digital protection relay 10 . can be built, and through this, behavior information can be collected in the process of engineering, access is allowed only to the permitted digital protection relay 10, and access through blocking is restricted to other digital protection relays 10 will become

The maintenance unit 100 recognizes the interworking of the behavior control unit 300 through the 'onetime service' agent and proceeds with a user authentication procedure.

At this time, rather than simply recognizing interlocking, when interlocking is released, it is determined whether the corresponding operation is abnormal or normal release, and it can be recorded as the operator's behavior information. Here, the normal release corresponds to a case where the operator cancels the interworking between the maintenance unit 100 and the behavior control unit 300 by performing a preset operation.

In addition, the maintenance unit 100 checks whether the token information of the behavior control unit 300 is damaged by using the information received from the behavior control unit 300 through the 'onetime service' agent, and if it is normal, The token information is transmitted to the 'onetime daemon' agent.

Through this, the maintenance unit 100 is connected to the permitted digital protection relay 10 through the 'onetime daemon' agent, and access to the unauthorized digital protection relay 10 is restricted.

In addition, the maintenance unit 100 monitors whether a worker accesses token information or behavior information stored in the behavior control unit 300 or a file change attempt occurs through the 'onetime service' agent, and when it occurs, This can also be recorded as operator behavior information.

In addition, the maintenance unit 100 through the 'onetime service' agent, the worker's behavior information, in particular, the worker's human error situation (forced termination of the agents of the maintenance unit 100, the forced termination of the behavior control unit 300) It is desirable to collect interlocking, forced interlocking, and then re-interlocking, work time exceeding, etc.), and input of the setting data file (in particular, correction value information) of the digital protection relay 10, which has been engineered by the operator You can request it and save it as input.

In addition, the maintenance unit 100 can detect and block an unauthorized access attempt to the digital protection relay 10 through the 'onetime daemon' agent, which collects and analyzes IEC 61850 communication packets and is the approved The digital protection relay 10 allows the connection, and the unauthorized digital protection relay 10 blocks the connection.

In detail, the maintenance unit 100 collects IEC 61850 communication packets through the 'onetime daemon' agent, separates the packet header, and extracts Destination IP information included in the header.

By analyzing the extracted destination IP information, in the case of unapproved IP information, the corresponding packet is blocked, and in the case of approved IP information, a secure communication environment is established so that the operator performs engineering on the digital protection relay 10 .

At this time, in the case of unapproved IP information, after blocking the packet, extracting the packet body, analyzing it, and recording the action information (message logging) of the operator.

In addition, it is preferable that the maintenance unit 100 collects the operator's behavior information, ie, the behavior information generated in the engineering process, through the 'onetime daemon' agent.

In this way, the maintenance unit 100 is interlocked with the behavior control unit 300, and based on the worker information, engineering information, and policy information stored in the behavior control unit 300 using the agents, It is possible to analyze the remaining engineering available time, and block the established secure communication environment when the analyzed remaining time is exceeded.

In addition, when the maintenance unit 100 is interlocked with the behavior control unit 300 and then released, based on the worker information, engineering information and policy information stored in the behavior control unit 300 using the agents, It can be stored and managed by judging whether it is an unauthorized release or a normal release.

In the case of normal release, the token information stored in the behavior control unit 300 is read again when re-interlocking, and it is processed by checking whether there is a remaining working time,

In the case of unauthorized release (abnormal release), counterfeiting can be prevented by copying and overwriting the operator's logging data stored at the time of re-interlocking.

In addition, when the maintenance unit 100 is re-interlocked with the behavior control unit 300 after being released, in the case of the new behavior control unit 300, the new behavior control unit 300 regardless of whether the previous operation is unauthorized release or normal release. ), an operation is performed based on the information stored in the .

Furthermore, when it is determined that there is an abnormality in the token information, the maintenance unit 100 uses the agents, based on the worker information, engineering information, and policy information stored in the behavior control unit 300 . , it will not proceed with the establishment of a secure communication environment to prevent further work.

In addition, the maintenance unit 100 uses the agents to record and store it even when the maintenance unit 100 itself is abnormally terminated due to a battery problem or an OS error, and then when normal operation continues, By transmitting this information as the operator's behavior information, it can be utilized for risk determination according to the frequency of occurrence.

In the interworking release step (S600), the interworking between the behavior control unit 300 and the maintenance unit 100 is released according to a preset operation.

After that, in the behavior analysis unit 200, through the risk analysis step (S700), the data stored by the logging data storage step (S500) is received and analyzed, and the human error situation of the operator can be determined. have.

That is, in the risk analysis step (S700), in the behavior analysis unit 200, data (action-related information, change-related information) generated in the engineering execution process of the maintenance unit 100 is transferred to the behavior control unit 300 . Through this, it is possible to collect, store, and receive transmission, and by analyzing it, it is possible to determine the human error situation of the operator.

In detail, the behavior analysis unit 200 may determine the human error situation of the operator by precisely analyzing the information received from the behavior control unit 300 . Of course, the determination and determination information is stored as a separate storage means (database, etc.).

Through this, there is an advantage that the manager can control and control all policies and histories of the engineering work of the digital protection relay, which is a very professional and special field, and easily perform work management.

As described above, in the present invention, specific matters such as specific elements and the like and limited embodiment drawings have been described, but these are only provided to help a more general understanding of the present invention, and the present invention is not limited to the above one embodiment. No, various modifications and variations are possible from these descriptions by those of ordinary skill in the art to which the present invention pertains.

Therefore, the spirit of the present invention should not be limited to the described embodiments, and not only the claims to be described later, but also all those with equivalent or equivalent modifications to the claims will be said to belong to the scope of the spirit of the present invention. .

100: maintenance department
200: behavior analysis unit
300: behavior control unit

Claims (9)

In the system for analyzing the risk to the engineering of the digital protection relay,
A maintenance unit 100 that performs engineering by establishing a secure communication environment with a plurality of digital protection relays (IED, Intelligent Electronic Device) 10 using a pre-installed agent;
a behavior analysis unit 200 for receiving and analyzing data generated by engineering in the maintenance unit 100; and
Under the control of the behavior analysis unit 200, the behavior information and policy information for performing the engineering generated by the behavior analysis unit 200 are received, and the maintenance unit 100 controls the engineering performance, and the Behavior control unit 300 for storing data generated by engineering of the maintenance unit 100 from time to time;
It consists of
The behavior analysis unit 200
Through the agent installed in the maintenance unit 100, the operator information to perform the engineering of the digital protection relay 10, the information related to the engineering action is received, the operator information to the action control unit 300 that is linked, By transmitting engineering information and policy information, the behavior control unit 300 and the maintenance unit 100 are interlocked with each other,
The maintenance unit 100 is
Through interworking with the behavior control unit 300, using the installed agent, based on the information stored in the behavior control unit 300, the connection of a secure communication environment with each of the digital protection relays 10 to control, to control to perform engineering;
According to a preset operation of the operator, when the interworking between the behavior control unit 300 and the maintenance unit 100 is released, the behavior analysis unit 200 receives and analyzes the data stored at any time from the behavior control unit 300 . Thus, the engineering risk analysis system of the digital protection relay, characterized in that determining the human error of the operator.
delete delete The method of claim 1,
The behavior control unit 300
Engineering risk analysis system of a digital protection relay, characterized in that it is interlocked with the maintenance unit (100), and receives and stores the information related to the operator's behavior and the change related information of the digital protection relay (10) from the agent.
5. The method of claim 4,
The maintenance unit 100 is
By interworking with the behavior control unit 300, only a secure communication environment with the specific digital protection relay 10 allowed access using the agent is established,
Engineering risk analysis system of digital protection relay, characterized in that it analyzes the remaining engineering possible time of the operator and blocks the established secure communication environment when the analyzed remaining time is exceeded.
5. The method of claim 4,
The maintenance unit 100 is
Engineering risk analysis system of a digital protection relay, characterized in that when it is released after interworking with the behavior control unit 300, it is determined whether it is an unauthorized release or a normal release using the agent, stored and managed.
In the method of analyzing the risk to the engineering of the digital protection relay,
In the maintenance unit, a plurality of digital protection relay (IED, Intelligent Electronic Device) agent installation step (S100) of installing a preset agent for establishing a secure communication environment;
In the behavior analysis unit, through the maintenance unit where the agent is installed by the agent installation step (S100), information related to a worker who wants to perform the engineering of the digital protection relay, information related to engineering activities, and information related to an engineering activity Use registration step of transmitting and storing operator information, engineering information and policy information to the control unit (S200);
an interworking step (S300) of interworking between the behavior control unit receiving the information received by the use registration step (S200) and the maintenance unit;
In the maintenance unit, after interworking is made by the interworking step (S300), the corresponding digital protection relay based on the information stored in the behavior control unit using the agent installed by the agent installation step (S100) An engineering control step (S400) of establishing a secure communication environment with and controlling to perform engineering;
In the behavior control unit, logging data storage step (S500) of storing the data generated by the engineering control step (S400) from time to time;
Interworking releasing step (S600) of canceling interworking between the behavior control unit and the maintenance unit according to a preset operation; and
a risk analysis step (S700) of receiving and analyzing the data stored by the logging data storage step (S500) from the behavior control unit in the behavior analysis unit, and determining the human error of the operator (S700);
Engineering risk analysis method of digital protection relay, characterized in that consisting of.
8. The method of claim 7,
The engineering control step (S400) is
Based on the worker information, engineering information, and policy information stored in the behavior control unit using the agent by interworking with the behavior control unit, only a secure communication environment with the specific digital protection relay that is allowed access is built, ,
Engineering risk analysis method of digital protection relay, characterized in that it analyzes the remaining engineering available time of the operator and blocks the established secure communication environment when the analyzed remaining time is exceeded.
9. The method of claim 8,
The engineering risk analysis method of the digital protection relay is
In the behavior control unit, when the interworking of the behavior control unit and the maintenance unit is released, based on the information stored in the behavior control unit, it is determined whether it is a normal release or an unauthorized release by the unlinking step (S600) and stored And engineering risk analysis method of digital protection relay, characterized in that the management.

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