KR101958494B1 - Apparatus and method for denial of service defense using triangle counting - Google Patents

Abstract

Triangle counting for protecting denial of service attacks of sensor networks with limited resources such as large scale sensor networks and denial of service attacks using triangle counting for finding attacker nodes using sensor network information transfer characteristics / RTI > A service denial attack defense apparatus using triangle counting according to the present invention includes an information collecting unit for collecting packet information collected from at least one sensor node, And an extracting unit for extracting an attacker node by analyzing a node path having at least one triangular path.

Description

[0001] APPARATUS AND METHOD FOR DEFENSE USING TRIANGLE COUNTING [0002]

The present invention relates to a service denial attack defense apparatus and method using triangle counting. More particularly, the present invention relates to triangle counting for protecting a denial of service attack of a sensor network having a limited resource such as a large-scale sensor network, and triangle counting for finding an attacker node using a sensor network information transfer characteristic The present invention relates to an apparatus and method for preventing a denial of service attack.

A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a network of various sensor devices connected by a wireless network. Sensor networks collect various information measured in specific areas such as traffic flow, weather information, forest fire information, security system of military or enterprise.

Such a wireless sensor network is divided into a network such as a mobile ad hoc network (MANET) in which sensor equipment moves and a sensor network which can not be moved once installed.

An immovable sensor network is installed in a large area and operates independently after it is installed. It forms a network by connecting with neighboring sensors and transmits information measured by the sensor to one or more sink nodes. Since the fixed wireless sensor network operates only until the internal battery is consumed once installed, various methods of routing and communication algorithms for reducing energy consumption have appeared.

Conversely, to paralyze such a wireless sensor network, it is effective to stop the operation by excessively consuming energy of a sensor using a limited battery.

If the denial of service (DoS) is received in the wireless sensor network environment, the operation of the entire sensor network as well as the specific sensor node may be interrupted. Therefore, it is necessary to find the attacker of DoS attack or DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attack on the sensor network and block the connection.

Currently, there are four defense methods against DDoS attacks on wired networks: attack prevention, attack detection, attack source identification, and attack reaction.

Attack prevention is a technique to block DDoS attacks in advance, and attack detection is a technology to detect if only DDoS attacks occur.

Attack source identification is the method of finding the first attacker who attacked, and finally attack reaction is the system or method that responds when a DDoS attack occurs.

Among these methods, a method applied to a wireless sensor network is a method of attack source identification. When a DDoS attack occurs, packets of routers are collected. Based on the collected information, a simple computation process and a flow of a DDoS attack are detected in a short time In a short period of time.

Among these methods, a suitable method for wireless sensor networks is fast attack detection and attacker detection method. In the present invention, a method of finding an attacker is selected using a triangle counting algorithm.

Triangle Counting refers to how to find the number of triangles. All networks can be represented by graphs consisting of nodes and edges representing connections. This way of finding triangles in the entire network graph is called triangle counting.

Most wireless sensor networks transmit measured data from the sensor to the sink node. Thus, communication between most sensors is in the direction of transmitting information to the sink node.

However, from the attacker 's point of view, paralysis of the entire sensor network is used to communicate with neighboring nodes other than the normal path. In this case, many triangles occur in the entire communication graph.

Especially in a large sensor network environment, it is more efficient to find attacker using triangle counting. However, since it is difficult to find an attacker in real time, it is possible to perform partial triangle counting calculation so that each sensor node can find an attacker with only a small calculation using an efficient sampling method at an appropriate probability. Korean Patent Publication No. 2010-0084681 exists as a related art.

It is an object of the present invention to solve the above problems of the prior art and to provide a method and apparatus for accurately and efficiently protecting a DoS attack by using a triangle counting method in a sensor network having a stable resource such as a large- It is possible to find out.

According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided an apparatus for protecting against denial of service using triangle counting, comprising: an information collecting unit for collecting packet information collected from at least one sensor node; A determination unit for determining whether the shape of a path between the nodes is a triangle, and an extracting unit for analyzing a node path having at least one triangular path to extract an attacker node.

In this case, the information collecting unit may store information on all packets passing through the at least one sensor node in correspondence with predetermined probabilities.

At this time, the at least one sensor node can transmit information on all packets passing through the at least one sensor node to the sink node.

At this time, the information on all packets passing through the self may include a Source ID and a Destination ID.

At this time, the information on all the packets passing by itself may further include a Next ID.

In this case, the determining unit may include a sink node and an attacker node in the plurality of sensor nodes in determining whether the shape of the path between the plurality of sensor nodes is triangular.

At this time, the attacker node can perform an attack via at least one node in its communication range.

In this case, when the attacker node is extracted by the extracting unit, the transmitting unit may transmit the information about the attacker node to a neighboring node or an administrator.

In this case, when the attacker node is extracted by the extracting unit, the blocking unit may block the connection to the attacker node.

At this time, the predetermined probability may be changed corresponding to the distance between the at least one sensor node and the sink node.

According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method for protecting against a service denial attack using triangle counting, comprising the steps of: collecting packet information collected by at least one sensor node by an information collecting unit; A determination step of determining whether a shape of a path between a plurality of sensor nodes is a triangle based on the collected packet information and an extracting unit to extract an attacker node by analyzing a node path having at least one triangle- Extraction step.

At this time, the information collecting step may store information on all packets passing through the at least one sensor node according to a predetermined probability.

At this time, the at least one sensor node can transmit information on all packets passing through the at least one sensor node to the sink node.

At this time, the information on all packets passing through the self may include a Source ID and a Destination ID.

At this time, the information on all the packets passing by itself may further include a Next ID.

In this case, in the step of determining whether the shape of the path between the plurality of sensor nodes is a triangle, the plurality of sensor nodes may include a sink node and an attacker node.

At this time, the attacker node can perform an attack via at least one node in its communication range.

In this case, after the extracting step, if the attacker node is extracted in the extracting step, the transmitting unit may transmit the information about the attacker node to the neighboring node or the manager.

In this case, after the extracting step, if the attacker node is extracted in the extracting step, the blocking unit may block the connection to the attacker node.

At this time, the predetermined probability may be changed corresponding to the distance between the at least one sensor node and the sink node.

According to the present invention, it is possible to accurately and efficiently protect a DoS attack and to detect an attacker by using a triangle counting method in a sensor network having stable resources such as a large-scale wireless sensor network.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a service denial attack defense apparatus using triangle counting according to the present invention.
2 is a diagram for explaining a sensor network to which a triangle counting method is applied.
3 is a diagram for explaining the logical configuration of the sensor network.
FIG. 4 is a diagram for explaining a DoS attack from the node N. FIG.
5 is a diagram for explaining a logical configuration of a sensor network in which a DoS attack occurs.
Fig. 6 is a diagram for explaining the logical configuration of the packet collected at the node J. Fig.
Fig. 7 is a diagram for explaining the logical configuration of the packet collected at the node D. Fig.
FIG. 8 is a flowchart illustrating a method of protecting a denial of service attack using triangle counting according to the present invention.

The present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. Hereinafter, a repeated description, a known function that may obscure the gist of the present invention, and a detailed description of the configuration will be omitted.

Embodiments of the present invention are provided to more fully describe the present invention to those skilled in the art. Accordingly, the shapes and sizes of the elements in the drawings and the like can be exaggerated for clarity.

In describing the components of the present invention, terms such as first, second, A, B, (a), and (b) may be used. These terms are intended to distinguish the constituent elements from other constituent elements, and the terms do not limit the nature, order or order of the constituent elements.

Hereinafter, a description will be made of a service denial-of-attack protection apparatus using triangle counting according to the present invention with reference to the drawings.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a service denial attack defense apparatus using triangle counting according to the present invention.

1, a service denial attack defense apparatus 100 using a triangle counting method according to the present invention includes an information collecting unit 110, a determining unit 120, an extracting unit 130, a transmitting unit 140, And a blocking unit 150, as shown in FIG.

More specifically, the service denial-of-attack protection apparatus 100 using triangle counting according to the present invention includes an information collecting unit 110 for collecting packet information collected from at least one sensor node, A determination unit 120 for determining whether the shape of a path between the sensor nodes is a triangle, and an extraction unit 130 for analyzing a node path having at least one triangular path and extracting an attacker node.

When the attacker node is extracted by the extracting unit 130, the transmitting unit 140 may transmit the information about the attacker node to a neighboring node or an administrator.

In addition, when the attacker node is extracted by the extracting unit 130, the blocking unit 150 may block the connection to the attacker node.

Hereinafter, the principle of triangle counting will be described.

In recent years, the explosion of technology has led to the accumulation of large amounts of data. World Wide Web, social networks, biological networks, computer networks, Web graphs, Road networks, Autonomous systems, Wikipedia networks, Twitter and Memetracker.

All of these fields have large amounts of data and can be represented graphically. The fact that it is possible to express by graph can be expressed by the relation of node and edge, and it has characteristic of graph.

The most important of these is the calculation of triangular numbers, and especially the problem of calculating the number of triangles in complex network analysis plays an important role. The triangle counting method is a method of obtaining the number of triangles in a graph composed of various data.

The problem of calculating the number of triangles in graph analysis is the most important problem in current data mining applications.

Recently, a triangle expectation method has been proposed that can be used for spamming activity detection and to detect DDoS attacks by collecting a lot of data from various routers.

In particular, in the present invention, a triple counting triangle is obtained by applying a method of detecting a DDoS attacker of the triangle expectation method to triangle counting to find an attacker and a victim of a denial of service attack.

The method of finding the triangle of the triangle counting method and the fact that most of the sensor network communication is performed based on the sink node is used to find the attacker causing the DoS attack in the sensor node.

Hereinafter, a method for finding an attacker of a denial of service attack in a sensor network environment will be described using a service denial attack defense apparatus and method using triangle counting according to the present invention.

The network environment in the present invention is based on a hybrid network. A hybrid network is a complex network environment in which both a wired network and various wireless networks and sensor networks are connected.

In this hybrid network, especially, it is targeted at denial of service attacks in a large-scale wireless sensor network environment.

Typical large-scale sensor network environments include forest fire control, highway control, and military network. Especially, in case of military sensor network, enemy intrusion can be detected by using infrared sensor, motion sensor, and acoustic sensor scattered in a specific area. In addition, each mobile sensor can be installed as a sensor network, tank, armored vehicle, airplane, ship, etc., and it can be configured as an independent sensor network for military operations.

In the present invention, a large-scale sensor network environment included in the complex network structure is assumed.

In addition, all sensor nodes have a fixed and limited battery. Also, sensor network routing method is mostly applicable, but it uses a general method of concentrating communication to sink node.

2 is a diagram for explaining a sensor network to which a triangle counting method is applied.

Referring to FIG. 2, each sensor node exists from a sink node A to a node N, a blue circle is a radio wave transmission radius of each node, and a black line is a currently set routing table.

In the assumption of the present invention, it is difficult to apply the table-based routing algorithm to a large-scale sensor network. However, in order to show a definite example, the route to the sink node is determined by the table-based routing algorithm.

3 is a diagram for explaining the logical configuration of the sensor network. FIG. 4 is a diagram for explaining a DoS attack from the node N. FIG.

Referring to FIG. 3, since most of the packets actually transmit the collected data to the sink node at each node, the configuration shown in FIG. 3 is obtained.

For example, in the packet header of data collected at node D, the source ID and destination ID are set in the form of {node D, node A, ....}, but the actual path is transmitted through D -> C -> A path.

Assume here that node N is an attacker. If it is assumed that the attack is not the attack of the specific node but the whole network, the attack will be performed as shown in FIG.

In fact, most nodes that node N knows will perform DDoS attacks. Node N's attack will be attacked as follows. In general, if a message is forwarded to another node, it is forwarded to {Source ID, Destination ID, Next ID ....}.

That is, node N performs attack using all the nodes within its communication range by using this routing characteristic. It can be even more effective if it propagates traffic using nodes in its coverage.

NJA,

NMA,

NKA,

NLA,

NDA,

NCA,

NEA,

NGA,

NHA 가 만들어 졌다,FIG. 5 is a diagram for explaining a logical configuration of a sensor network in which a DoS attack occurs. Referring to FIG. 5, when a black line, which is an existing routing path, and a red arrow with a DoS attack are used, Notice that many triangles are created. Specifically,

NJA,

NMA,

NKA,

NLA,

NDA,

NCA,

NEA,

NGA,

NHA was created,

When analyzing the created triangles, triangles are created in common with the edge AN, which indicates that the attacker is N, not sink node A.

However, in order to perform such analysis in a real sensor network, a sink node or an administrator must collect and analyze all the packets of the entire sensor node.

In this case, since the DoS attack must be analyzed after all, the sensor network nodes will be consumed a lot of energy or exhausted and can not function.

Hereinafter, detection on a node-by-node basis will be described.

If a denial of service attack occurs and all attacks have been completed or a long time analysis is not possible, the sensor nodes will have already consumed a lot of energy.

In order to analyze and respond to such DoS attacks in real time, all sensor nodes store all packets passing through it at a certain probability p1 and analyze them through simple calculation.

Fig. 6 is a diagram for explaining the logical configuration of the packet collected at the node J. Fig. Fig. 7 is a diagram for explaining the logical configuration of the packet collected at the node D. Fig.

It is possible to detect five triangles at node D in FIG. 7 and to detect that node N is the attacker. To the neighboring node or the manager and disconnect the connection to the node N. [

However, only one triangle was found in J in Fig. A small number of triangles will degrade reliability and will not perform tasks such as reporting or blocking immediately. This is because communication between sensor nodes is performed even though the number is small.

However, Node J does not fail to detect DoS attacks. Nodes L, K, and M that are lower than node J based on sink node A transmit their collected information sampled at a certain probability p2 when they send their data to the sink node.

Assuming that node N does not report its sensor collection data to sink node A or send attack packets, node C, D, E, F, G, H, You will not be able to make triangles. Thus, all nodes know the sink node and assume that it is transmitting data to the sink node.

Hereinafter, matters to be considered for testing the performance of a service denial attack defense apparatus and method using the triangle counting according to the present invention will be described.

The purpose of the experiment is to measure the limit of using the sampling to reduce the calculation amount and to obtain the most accurate result. The following lists the values to be found in the experiment.

1. The connection information is calculated by triangle counting by sampling at probability p1 using the connection information collected from the sensor node.

2. Compute the probability of p3 and store it for t1 time (calculate the ratio of stored information to the total size of the sensor network)

3. When data is transmitted to the sink node, it transmits its collected information to neighboring nodes with probability p2.

It is difficult to determine the attacker due to the sampling probability and the narrow path of the node adjacent to the attacker node.

However, the closer to the leaf node, the additional information is collected by collecting the sampling information within the communication range through various paths, so that an accurate attacker can be determined.

However, it is necessary to perform experiments by changing the sampling probability p1 of the node to be closer to the sink node because it is good for the entire network to judge and respond quickly to the attacker node near the attacker node.

Hereinafter, a service denial attack defense method using the triangle counting according to the present invention will be described.

As described above, the description of the contents overlapping with the denial of service attack apparatus using the triangle counting according to the present invention will be omitted.

FIG. 8 is a flowchart illustrating a method of protecting a denial of service attack using triangle counting according to the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 8, a method of denial-of-service attack using triangle counting according to the present invention includes an information collecting step (S100) of collecting packet information collected by at least one sensor node by an information collecting unit, (S110) for determining whether the shape of a path between the plurality of sensor nodes is a triangle based on the collected packet information, and analyzing a node path having at least one triangular path by an extracting unit And extracting the node (S120).

If the attacker node is extracted in the extracting step (S120) after the extracting step (S120), the transmitting unit may further include a transmitting step of transmitting information on the attacker node to a neighboring node or an administrator can do.

In addition, after the extracting step (S120), if the attacker node is extracted in the extracting step (S120), the blocking unit may block the connection to the attacker node.

As described above, according to the service denial-of-attack protection apparatus 100 and method using the triangle counting method according to the present invention, in a sensor network having a stable resource such as a large-scale wireless sensor network, a triangle counting method It has the advantage of efficiently protecting DoS attacks and detecting attackers.

As described above, the configuration and method of the exemplary embodiments described above are not limited to the above-described embodiments, but the embodiments may be applied to various variations All or some of the embodiments may be selectively combined.

100: Denial of Service attack using triangle counting
110: Information collecting unit
120:
130:
140:
150:
130:

Claims (20)

An information collecting unit collecting packet information collected from at least one sensor node;
A determination unit for determining whether a shape of a path between the plurality of sensor nodes is a triangle based on the collected packet information; And
And an extracting unit for extracting an attacker node by analyzing a node path having at least one triangular path,
The information collecting unit,
And stores the collected information of all the packets passing through the at least one sensor node in accordance with a predetermined probability in order to analyze and respond in real time. Defensive device. delete The method according to claim 1,
Wherein the at least one sensor node comprises:
And transmits information about all packets passing through the packet to the sink node. The method of claim 3,
The information on all packets passing through the self-
A Source ID, and a Destination ID. The method of claim 4,
The information on all packets passing through the self-
And further includes a Next ID. The method according to claim 1,
Wherein,
In determining whether the shape of the path between the plurality of sensor nodes is triangular,
Wherein the plurality of sensor nodes include a sink node and an attacker node. The method of claim 6,
The attacker node,
Wherein the attack is performed via at least one node within the communication range of the service attacker using the triangle counting method. The method according to claim 1,
Further comprising a transmitter for transmitting information on the attacker node to a neighboring node or an administrator when the attacker node is extracted by the extracting unit. The method according to claim 1,
Further comprising a blocking unit for blocking a connection to the attacker node when the attacker node is extracted by the extracting unit. The method according to claim 1,
The pre-
Wherein the at least one sensor node is changed according to a distance between the at least one sensor node and the sink node. An information collecting step of collecting packet information collected by at least one sensor node by an information collecting unit;
A determination step of determining, by the determination unit, whether the shape of the path between the plurality of sensor nodes is triangular based on the collected packet information; And
And an extracting step of extracting an attacker node by analyzing a node path having at least one triangular path by the extracting unit,
The information collecting step includes:
And stores the collected information of all the packets passing through the at least one sensor node in accordance with a predetermined probability in order to analyze and respond in real time. Defense method. delete The method of claim 11,
Wherein the at least one sensor node comprises:
And transmits information about all packets passing through the sink node to the sink node. 14. The method of claim 13,
The information on all packets passing through the self-
A Source ID, and a Destination ID. 15. The method of claim 14,
The information on all packets passing through the self-
And further comprising a Next ID. ≪ RTI ID = 0.0 > [10] < / RTI > The method of claim 11,
Wherein,
In determining whether the shape of the path between the plurality of sensor nodes is triangular,
Wherein the plurality of sensor nodes include a sink node and an attacker node. 18. The method of claim 16,
The attacker node,
Wherein the attack is performed via at least one node within the communication range of the user. The method of claim 11,
After the extraction step,
Further comprising a transmitting step of, when the attacker node is extracted in the extracting step, transmitting information about the attacker node to a neighboring node or an administrator by a transmitting unit. The method of claim 11,
After the extraction step,
Further comprising a blocking step of blocking a connection to the attacker node by a blocking unit when the attacker node is extracted in the extracting step. The method of claim 11,
The pre-
Wherein the at least one sensor node and the sink node are changed in correspondence with the distance between the at least one sensor node and the sink node.

Images