KR101865452B1 - An Evaluation System of Physical Layer Security for Multi-hop Underlay Cognitive Radio Networks - Google Patents

An Evaluation System of Physical Layer Security for Multi-hop Underlay Cognitive Radio Networks Download PDF

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KR101865452B1
KR101865452B1 KR1020150182105A KR20150182105A KR101865452B1 KR 101865452 B1 KR101865452 B1 KR 101865452B1 KR 1020150182105 A KR1020150182105 A KR 1020150182105A KR 20150182105 A KR20150182105 A KR 20150182105A KR 101865452 B1 KR101865452 B1 KR 101865452B1
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channel capacity
frequency
hop
user
channel
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KR20170073329A (en
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안병구
심규성
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홍익대학교세종캠퍼스산학협력단
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W16/00—Network planning, e.g. coverage or traffic planning tools; Network deployment, e.g. resource partitioning or cells structures
    • H04W16/22—Traffic simulation tools or models
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W16/00—Network planning, e.g. coverage or traffic planning tools; Network deployment, e.g. resource partitioning or cells structures
    • H04W16/02—Resource partitioning among network components, e.g. reuse partitioning
    • H04W16/10—Dynamic resource partitioning

Abstract

The present invention relates to a multi-hop underlaying method in which a user who is not assigned a frequency in a line that does not exceed an interference threshold preset by a user assigned a frequency for efficient use of frequency uses multi- In a communication using an underlay cognitive radio scheme, a plurality of nodes are connected to avoid eavesdropping of eavesdroppers. A mathematical model is presented to easily evaluate the security failure probability of eavesdropping prevention.

Description

[0001] The present invention relates to a physical layer security evaluation system for multi-hop underlay or radio networks,

The present invention relates to a multi-hop underlaying method in which a user who is not assigned a frequency in a line that does not exceed an interference threshold preset by a user assigned a frequency for efficient use of frequency uses multi- The present invention relates to a wireless communication method and a wireless communication method, and more particularly, to a wireless communication method and a wireless communication method in which a plurality of nodes are connected to each other to avoid eavesdropping of an eavesdropper, Can be easily evaluated.

As recent technology develops, it is increasingly required to transmit important data using wireless communication. Security is important when transmitting data using wireless communications.

One type of security, cryptography, uses a "Key" to encrypt a message when it forwards it.

And when you check the message, you use "Key" to decrypt and get the message.

Here, "Key" is a rule created by mathematical complexity. However, as computer technology evolves, the cryptography of "Key", which relies on mathematical complexity with increasing computer process speed, is becoming more and more easily exposed to threats.

On the other hand, unlike cryptography, physical layer security is the one that started from the point of not delivering messages to eavesdroppers.

Physical layer security is a method of conveying a message to the eavesdropper by using the physical characteristics of the signal (antenna gain, transmission power, etc.) without sending as much as possible to the eavesdropper.

As wireless communication develops, there is an increasing use of frequency-limited resources. Frequency assigned technologies are not very high when they examine actual frequency utilization in a given space.

Accordingly, an underlay cognitive radio is used to allow users (PUs) allocated for efficient use of frequencies to use an unassigned user (SU) in a line that does not exceed a predetermined interference threshold.

Conventionally, when a user communicates with Underlay Cognitive Radio using a frequency, physical evaluation or complex simulation is performed in order to evaluate security against eavesdropping due to having a plurality of nodes.

Therefore, there is a problem that it takes a lot of cost and time.

Wyner, A. D., "The wire-tap channel," in Bell System Technical Journal, The, vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 1355-1387, Oct. 1975 Goldsmith, A .; Jafar, S.A .; Maric, I.; Srinivasa, S., " Breaking Spectrum Gridlock with Cognitive Radios: An Information Theoretic Perspective, " in Proceedings of the IEEE, vol.97, no.5, pp.894-914, May 2009

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The present invention has been made in view of the above problems, and it is an object of the present invention to provide a wireless communication method and a wireless communication method in which, in communication using a Underlay Cognitive Radio scheme, a plurality of nodes are connected to avoid eavesdropping of eavesdroppers, And to provide a physical layer security evaluation system for a multi-hop underlay or radio network that can be easily evaluated by presenting a mathematical model without physical experiment and complicated simulation.

According to an aspect of the present invention for achieving the above object, a first aspect of the present invention provides a radio network controller for a radio communication system, comprising: a multi-hop underlay using a frequency of a user (PU) (PU = P) to a frequency interference limit point (PU =

Figure 112015124631131-pat00001
An interference limit point setting unit that sets the interference limit point
Figure 112015124631131-pat00002
A plurality of nodes S, R 1 , R n , R k , and D used for communication of a user SU not having a frequency assigned thereto, 1 , R n , R k , and D), and calculates an inter-channel capacity based on the main channel capacity and the eavesdrop channel capacity used for communication of a user (SU) not assigned a frequency; A secure channel capacity calculating unit for calculating a secure channel capacity using the main channel capacity and the tapping channel capacity; And a security failure probability calculator for calculating a security failure probability based on the smallest value of the security channel capacity.

The second invention is characterized in that, in the first invention, the section channel capacity calculating section calculates a main channel capacity and an eavesdropping channel capacity by the following formula.

Main channel capacity (

Figure 112015124631131-pat00003
)

Figure 112015124631131-pat00004

Tap channel capacity (

Figure 112015124631131-pat00005
)

Figure 112015124631131-pat00006

In a third aspect of the present invention, in the first aspect, the secure channel capacity calculation unit calculates a secure channel capacity using the following formula.

Figure 112017013882105-pat00064

In a fourth aspect of the invention according to the first aspect of the present invention, the security failure probability calculation unit calculates a security failure probability

Figure 112015124631131-pat00008
) Is calculated.

Figure 112017013882105-pat00065

According to the physical layer security evaluation system for a multi-hop underlay or radio network according to the present invention, a plurality of nodes are connected to avoid eavesdropping of an eavesdropper, and a mathematical model is presented to prevent eavesdropping without performing physical experiment and complicated simulation It is easy to evaluate the security failure probability.

Accordingly, there is an evaluation cost and a time saving effect according to physical experiment and simulation.

1 is a block diagram of a physical layer security assessment system for a multi-hop underlay or radio network according to the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating a single node for avoiding eavesdropping when an eavesdropper is present in Underlay Cognitive Radio Networks;
FIG. 3 illustrates an example of a plurality of nodes to avoid eavesdropping when an eavesdropper is present in Underlay Cognitive Radio Networks,
FIG. 4 is a graph comparing simulation results of FIG. 3 with mathematical models presented in a physical layer security evaluation system for a multi-hop underlay or a radio network according to the present invention.

Hereinafter, a physical layer security evaluation system for a multi-hop underlay or radio network according to the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a physical layer security evaluation system for a multi-hop underlay or radio network according to the present invention. FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a single node for avoiding eavesdropping when an eavesdropper is present in Underlay Cognitive Radio Networks FIG. 3 is an exemplary diagram illustrating a plurality of nodes in order to avoid eavesdropping when an eavesdropper is present in Underlay Cognitive Radio Networks.

As shown in FIG. 1, in order to efficiently use a frequency, a user who has not been assigned a frequency in a line that does not exceed a predetermined interference limit point of a user (a primary user: PU = P) In this paper, we propose a mathematical model for the prevention of eavesdropping due to the presence of a large number of nodes in a multi - hop underlay or radio network. Layer security evaluation system.

A physical layer security evaluation system for a multi-hop underlay or radio network includes an interference threshold setting unit, a plurality of nodes, an interval channel capacity calculating unit, a secure channel capacity calculating unit, a secure channel capacity calculating unit, Probability calculator.

In this case, the interference threshold setting unit sets the interference threshold of the frequency from the P of the PU to which the frequency use is allocated,

Figure 112015124631131-pat00010
) Is not exceeded.

This means that P is the interference threshold (PU)

Figure 112015124631131-pat00011
), It should not interfere with PU communication.

Accordingly, the interference threshold setting unit may set the interference threshold value for the user's own smooth communication

Figure 112015124631131-pat00012
), From which the interference threshold of the frequency (
Figure 112015124631131-pat00013
) So that P and SU can use the same frequency simultaneously.

In order to avoid an eavesdropper, it is also possible to include a single node as shown in FIG. 2, and also to include the plurality (N) of nodes (S, R 1 , R n , R k , D) , The plurality (N) of nodes (S, R 1 , R n , R k , D)

Figure 112015124631131-pat00014
), And is used for communication of a user (SU) not assigned a frequency.

And S of the plurality of nodes (S, R 1, R n, R k, D) is a starting point, D is the destination, and, N relay to assist communications between the S and D nodes R 1, R n, and R k .

The inter-channel capacity calculation unit calculates a channel capacity between the plurality of nodes (S, R 1 , R n , R k , D), and calculates the channel capacity between the main channel capacity and the tapped channel capacity used for SU communication .

Before calculating the main channel capacity and the tapping channel capacity separately, P has set an interference limit point for his / her desired communication. And SUs should not exceed the interference limit. Therefore, considering the interference limit of P in S, R 1 , R n , R k ,

Figure 112017013882105-pat00066
)
Figure 112017013882105-pat00016
.

here

Figure 112015124631131-pat00017
Is a channel information state between each SU (S, R 1 , R n , R k ) and P.

At this time, P does not send its channel state information to SU. Therefore, in the present invention

Figure 112015124631131-pat00018
Is defined by the following equation (1).

In Equation (1)

Figure 112017013882105-pat00020
Is the channel state information between P and SU.
Figure 112017013882105-pat00067
Indicates the accuracy of the channel information,
Figure 112017013882105-pat00022
The bigger
Figure 112017013882105-pat00023
Wow
Figure 112017013882105-pat00024
Are similar.

The interval channel capacity calculating unit may calculate a main channel capacity and an eavesdropping channel capacity by substituting into the Shannon formula.

First, the main channel capacity (

Figure 112015124631131-pat00025
) Is a communication channel between SU (S, R 1 , R n , and R k ) and is expressed by Equation (2) below.

Figure 112015124631131-pat00026

Here, hop is the number of relay nodes,

Figure 112015124631131-pat00027
Is the transmission power of R k ,
Figure 112015124631131-pat00028
Lt; / RTI > Channel state information at the time of transmission,
Figure 112015124631131-pat00029
Is the noise power.

And the tapping channel capacity (

Figure 112015124631131-pat00030
) Is a communication channel between SU (S, R 1 , R n , R k ) and E (eavesdropper), and is expressed by Equation (3) below.

Figure 112015124631131-pat00031

here

Figure 112017013882105-pat00032
Is channel state information between R n and E (eavesdroppers)
Figure 112017013882105-pat00068
Is the transmission power of R k ,
Figure 112017013882105-pat00034
Is the noise power.

Meanwhile, the secure channel capacity calculation unit calculates a secure channel capacity using the main channel capacity and the tap channel capacity.

The secure channel capacity (

Figure 112017013882105-pat00069
) Is the main channel capacity
Figure 112017013882105-pat00070
) And tap channel capacity
Figure 112017013882105-pat00071
), The following equation (4) is obtained.

Figure 112017013882105-pat00072

On the other hand, the security failure probability calculator calculates the security channel capacity

Figure 112018020407567-pat00080
), And calculates the security failure probability on the basis thereof.

This is because when E (eavesdropper) eavesdrops, if the eavesdropping succeeds with the smallest value, the other case succeeds.

This is called the security failure probability (

Figure 112015124631131-pat00037
) Refers to a case where all the failures have passed once through the N relays, which can be expressed by Equation (5) as follows.

Figure 112017013882105-pat00073

Where R represents the channel capacity difference between the main channel and the eavesdrop channel in the system,

Figure 112017013882105-pat00039
Is the average channel value between P and SU,

Figure 112017013882105-pat00040
Is the average channel value of the main channel,
Figure 112017013882105-pat00041
Is the average channel value of the intercept channel, and K is the hop count. Where R is defined as failure if the difference between the main channel capacity and the tapped channel capacity is less than R. [

FIG. 4 is a graph comparing simulation results of FIG. 3 with mathematical models presented in a physical layer security evaluation system for a multi-hop underlay or a radio network according to the present invention.

As shown in FIG. 4, the solid line, which is a mathematical model, and the simulation (o) show that the security channel probability decreases and the security becomes better as the number of relay nodes (k = 1, k = 2, k3) increases.

Accordingly, the present invention provides a mathematical model of the communication failure probability according to Equation (5), so that the security failure probability can be easily obtained by saving costs and shortening the time through actual physical experiments and simulations.

Although the present invention has been described in connection with the preferred embodiments mentioned above, various other modifications and variations will be possible without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention. It is, therefore, to be understood that the appended claims are intended to cover such modifications and changes as fall within the true scope of the invention.

Claims (4)

1. A physical layer security evaluation system for a multi-hop underlay or radio network in which a user (SU) not assigned a frequency uses a frequency of a user (PU)
From the user (PU = P) assigned the frequency usage,
Figure 112015124631131-pat00042
An interference limit point setting unit for setting an interference limit point;
The interference threshold (
Figure 112015124631131-pat00043
A plurality of nodes S, R 1 , R n , R k , D used for communication of users (SUs) having channel information in a frequency-unallocated user (SU);
The channel capacity between the plurality of nodes S, R 1 , R n , R k , and D is calculated and the main channel capacity and the tapping channel capacity, which are used for communication of the user SU An inter-channel capacity calculation unit for calculating the inter-channel capacity;
A secure channel capacity calculation unit for calculating a secure channel capacity using the main channel capacity and the tapping channel capacity; And
And a security failure probability calculation unit for calculating a security failure probability based on the smallest value of the security channel capacity.
The method according to claim 1,
Wherein the inter-channel capacity calculation unit calculates a main channel capacity and an eavesdropping channel capacity according to the following formula.
Main channel capacity (
Figure 112017013882105-pat00044
)
Figure 112017013882105-pat00045

Here, hop is the number of relay nodes,
Figure 112017013882105-pat00046
Is the transmission power of R k ,
Figure 112017013882105-pat00047
Lt; / RTI > Channel state information at the time of transmission,
Figure 112017013882105-pat00048
Is the noise power.
Tap channel capacity (
Figure 112017013882105-pat00049
)
Figure 112017013882105-pat00050

here
Figure 112017013882105-pat00051
Is channel state information between R n and E (eavesdroppers)
Figure 112017013882105-pat00074
Is the transmission power of R k ,
Figure 112017013882105-pat00053
Is the noise power.
3. The method of claim 2,
The secure channel capacity calculation unit may calculate the secure channel capacity (
Figure 112017013882105-pat00075
Wherein the multi-hop underlay or the radio network is calculated based on the received signal.
Figure 112017013882105-pat00076

Here, hop is the number of relay nodes,
Figure 112017013882105-pat00077
Is the channel state information between each SU node (S, R 1 , R n , R k ) and P,
Figure 112017013882105-pat00078
Is channel state information between each SU node (S, R 1 , R n , R k ) and E (eavesdropper)
Figure 112017013882105-pat00079
Is the noise power.
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KR102578936B1 (en) * 2020-11-12 2023-09-18 한국과학기술원 Communication method of heterogeneous distributed wireless network system and network system thereof
CN112566127B (en) * 2020-11-30 2022-05-06 北京邮电大学 Physical layer secure transmission method in cognitive wireless network based on unmanned aerial vehicle assistance
KR102399979B1 (en) * 2021-02-08 2022-05-18 홍익대학교세종캠퍼스산학협력단 Node Selection and System Performance Evaluation Methods for improving system secrecy performance in multi-hop energy harvesting IoT networks
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KR102282744B1 (en) * 2020-03-26 2021-07-27 홍익대학교세종캠퍼스산학협력단 Opportunistic scheduling method to improve the Physical-Layer Security in MU-MISO NOMA systems

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