KR101730600B1 - Personal information leak detection apparatus and method using false personal information - Google Patents

Personal information leak detection apparatus and method using false personal information Download PDF

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Publication number
KR101730600B1
KR101730600B1 KR1020150183972A KR20150183972A KR101730600B1 KR 101730600 B1 KR101730600 B1 KR 101730600B1 KR 1020150183972 A KR1020150183972 A KR 1020150183972A KR 20150183972 A KR20150183972 A KR 20150183972A KR 101730600 B1 KR101730600 B1 KR 101730600B1
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KR
South Korea
Prior art keywords
personal information
false
hash value
user
target user
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KR1020150183972A
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Korean (ko)
Inventor
임을규
권일택
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한양대학교 산학협력단
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    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60Protecting data
    • G06F21/62Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • G06F21/6245Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes
    • G06F17/30109
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60Protecting data
    • G06F21/604Tools and structures for managing or administering access control systems
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60Protecting data
    • G06F21/62Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database

Abstract

Provided are an apparatus and a method for detecting a personal information leakage by using false personal information. The method for detecting a personal information leakage comprises the steps of: identifying personal information of a target user to use a specific service; extracting a hash value of the personal information of the target user by using a hash function; comparing the extracted hash value with a hash value related to false personal information stored in a personal information database of the specific service; and determining whether or not the personal information of the target user is leaked based on the result of the comparison with the hash value related to the false personal information. The hash function may be a hash function used in extracting the hash value of the false personal information stored in the personal information database of the specific service.

Description

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to personal information leakage detection apparatus and method using false personal information,

The present invention relates to a personal information leakage detection apparatus and method using false personal information, and more particularly, to an apparatus and method for detecting personal information leakage using false personal information, And an apparatus and method for determining whether the personal information database is leaked or not.

Recently, social problems are emerging due to leakage of personal information. However, since there is no technology to detect whether personal information is leaked, it is not easy to know whether the personal information of the user who wants to use various services provided is leaked information.

For example, if a hacking incident occurs for a specific company, it is assumed that the information stored in the databases accessible by the hacking incident is leaked. That is, if there is a database containing personal information among the databases accessible by the hacking accident, it can be assumed that the user's personal information has been leaked.

Therefore, it is difficult to confirm the leak of personal information against the insider's denial such as the manager who manages the personal information database. However, the conventional technology has a technique for managing personal information at one site, a method for exchanging personal information between two mobile phone terminals, and the like, but there is almost no technology for detecting personal information leakage.

The present invention relates to a personal information leakage detection apparatus and method using false personal information, and more particularly, to an apparatus and method for detecting personal information leakage using false personal information, It is possible to judge whether the personal information database is leaked or not.

According to an embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a false personal information generating method comprising: generating false personal information of a virtual user similar to an actual user's personal information; Inserting the generated false personal information into the personal information database; Extracting the hash value of the inserted false personal information using a specific hash function; And storing the extracted hash value of the false personal information in the hash database for the false private information.

The false personal information may be personal information about the actual user and another virtual user, and may be personal information that is formally similar to the personal information of the actual user.

A personal information leakage detection method according to an embodiment of the present invention includes: identifying personal information of a target user to use a specific service; Extracting a hash value for the personal information of the target user using a hash function; Comparing the extracted hash value with a hash value associated with false personal information stored in a private information database of the specific service; Determining whether or not the personal information of the target user has been leaked based on a result of the comparison with the hash value associated with the false personal information, It may be the hash function used to extract the hash value.

If the hash value related to the personal information of the target user matches the hash value associated with the false personal information, the determining step determines that the personal information database including the false personal information of the virtual user is leaked and suspends the specific service .

The method may further include requesting the target user to authenticate the personal information when the hash value of the target user matches the hash value associated with the false personal information.

And if the requested personal information authentication is successful, deleting the personal information of the virtual user from the personal information database.

If the requested personal information authentication fails, it is determined that the personal information database including the false personal information of the virtual user is leaked, and the specific service can be canceled.

An apparatus for detecting personal information leakage according to an embodiment of the present invention includes an identification unit for identifying personal information of a target user who wants to use a specific service; An extractor for extracting a hash value of the personal information of the target user using a hash function; A comparing unit comparing the extracted hash value with a hash value associated with false personal information stored in the private information database of the specific service; And a judging unit for judging whether or not the personal information of the target user is leaked based on a result of the comparison with the hash value associated with the false personal information, It may be the hash function used to extract the hash value.

When the hash value of the target user's personal information matches the hash value associated with the false personal information, the determination unit determines that the personal information database including the false personal information of the virtual user is leaked, and suspends the specific service .

The authentication server may further include an authentication unit for requesting the target user to authenticate the personal information when the hash value of the target user matches the hash value associated with the false personal information.

And a deletion unit deleting the personal information of the virtual user from the personal information database when the requested personal information authentication is successful.

If the requested personal information authentication fails, it is determined that the personal information database including the false personal information of the virtual user is leaked, and the specific service can be canceled.

The present invention relates to a personal information leakage detection apparatus and method using false personal information, and more particularly, to an apparatus and method for detecting personal information leakage using false personal information, It is possible to judge whether the personal information database is leaked or not.

1 is a view showing a false personal information generating apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 2 is a diagram showing an example of an element and an actual configuration of false personal information according to an embodiment of the present invention.
FIG. 3 illustrates a method for generating a false personalization hash database according to an embodiment of the present invention. Referring to FIG.
4 is a flowchart illustrating a false personal information generation method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
5 is a block diagram of a personal information leakage detection apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.
6 is a flowchart illustrating a personal information leakage detection method according to an embodiment of the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

1 is a view showing a false personal information generating apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.

The false personal information generation apparatus 100 may include a generation unit 110, an insertion unit 120, an extraction unit 130, and a storage unit 140. The generation unit 110 may generate false personal information of a virtual user similar to the personal information of the actual user. At this time, the false personal information of the generated virtual user may be the personal information formally similar to the personal information of the actual user. That is, the false personal information of the virtual user generated by the generation unit 110 is similar to the personal information of the actual user, so that even if the personal information database 150 is leaked, Or false personal information of a virtual user.

The inserting unit 120 may insert the false personal information of the virtual user generated by the generating unit 110 into the personal information database 150. [ That is, the personal information database 150 in which personal information of users is stored may include false personal information of a virtual user as well as personal information of an actual user.

At this time, the false personal information of the inserted virtual user can be used to detect whether or not the personal information database 150 containing the false personal information is leaked.

The extracting unit 130 may extract the hash value of the false personal information of the virtual user inserted into the personal information database by using a specific hash function.

For example, the extraction unit 130 may extract the hash value using the SHA256 algorithm, which is a kind of hash function. At this time, if there are a plurality of pieces of false personal information of the virtual user inserted in the personal information database 150, the extracting unit 130 extracts the hash values using the same specific hash function SHA256 for each of the plurality of false personal information .

The storage unit 140 may store the hash value of the false personal information of the extracted virtual user in the hash database 160. At this time, when there are a plurality of personal information databases 150, the storage unit 140 may classify and store hash values of false personal information of the virtual users included in each personal information database 150. [

FIG. 2 is a diagram showing an example of an element and an actual configuration of false personal information according to an embodiment of the present invention.

The false personal information generation apparatus 100 may generate false personal information of a virtual user similar to the personal information of an actual user. Accordingly, even if the personal information database 150 containing the false personal information of the corresponding virtual user is leaked out, the leaker can recognize that the personal information stored in the personal information database 150 is personal information of the actual user, It can be difficult to verify that it is personal information.

At this time, the false personal information generating apparatus 100 uses at least one of personal information elements such as a name, an age, an address, a mobile phone number, and a resident registration number as shown in FIG. 2A to generate false personal information of a virtual user .

The false personal information generation apparatus 100 can generate false personal information of a virtual user similar to an actual user as shown in FIG. 2 (b) using a personal information element. At this time, the false personal information generating apparatus 100 may generate false personal information of the virtual user so that it is formally similar to the personal information of the real user.

FIG. 3 illustrates a method for generating a false personalization hash database according to an embodiment of the present invention. Referring to FIG.

The false personal information generation apparatus 100 may store the hash value of the false personal information of the virtual user in the hash database 160. [ At this time, the false personal information generation apparatus 100 extracts a hash value using a specific hash function only for the false personal information of the virtual user excluding the personal information of the actual user included in the personal information database 150, can do.

The false personal information generation apparatus 100 may extract the hash value in addition to the false personal information of the virtual user by considering the date and time at which the false personal information of the virtual user is inserted into the personal information database 150. [

At this time, the hash value extracted in consideration of the date and time when the false personal information of the virtual user is inserted into the personal information database 150 may be used to more accurately distinguish the personal information of the actual user from the personal information of the virtual user.

At this time, when the false personal information of the virtual user included in the personal information database 150 is plural, the false personal information generation apparatus 100 extracts the hash value using the same specific hash function for each of the plurality of false personal information And store it in the hash database 160.

The personal information database 150 containing the personal information of the users and the hash database 160 storing the hash values of the false personal information of the virtual user may be included in the false personal information generating apparatus 100 or included in a separate server .

4 is a flowchart illustrating a false personal information generation method according to an embodiment of the present invention.

In operation 410, the false personal information generating apparatus 100 may generate false personal information of a virtual user similar to the personal information of the real user. At this time, the false personal information of the generated virtual user may be the personal information formally similar to the personal information of the actual user. That is, the false personal information of the virtual user generated by the generation unit 110 is similar to the personal information of the actual user, so that even if the personal information database 150 is leaked, Or false personal information of a virtual user.

In operation 420, the false personal information generation apparatus 100 may insert false personal information of the generated virtual user into the personal information database 150. [ That is, the personal information database 150 in which personal information of users is stored may include false personal information of a virtual user as well as personal information of an actual user.

At this time, the false personal information of the inserted virtual user can be used to detect whether or not the personal information database 150 containing the false personal information is leaked.

The false personal information generation apparatus 100 may generate false personal information of a virtual user similar to the personal information of an actual user. Accordingly, even if the personal information database 150 containing the false personal information of the corresponding virtual user is leaked out, the leaker can recognize that the personal information stored in the personal information database 150 is personal information of the actual user, It can be difficult to verify that it is personal information.

At this time, the false personal information generating apparatus 100 uses at least one of personal information elements such as a name, an age, an address, a mobile phone number, and a resident registration number as shown in FIG. 2A to generate false personal information of a virtual user .

The false personal information generation apparatus 100 can generate false personal information of a virtual user similar to an actual user as shown in FIG. 2 (b) using a personal information element. At this time, the false personal information generating apparatus 100 may generate false personal information of the virtual user so that it is formally similar to the personal information of the real user.

In operation 430, the false personal information generating apparatus 100 may extract the hash value of the false personal information of the virtual user inserted into the personal information database using a specific hash function.

For example, the extraction unit 130 may extract the hash value using the SHA256 algorithm, which is a kind of hash function. At this time, if there are a plurality of pieces of false personal information of the virtual user inserted in the personal information database 150, the extracting unit 130 extracts the hash values using the same specific hash function SHA256 for each of the plurality of false personal information .

The extracting unit 130 may extract the hash value in addition to the false personal information of the virtual user by considering the date and time at which the false personal information of the virtual user is inserted into the personal information database 150. [

At this time, the hash value extracted in consideration of the date and time when the false personal information of the virtual user is inserted into the personal information database 150 may be used to more accurately distinguish the personal information of the actual user from the personal information of the virtual user.

In operation 440, the false personal information generation apparatus 100 may store the hash value of the false personal information of the extracted virtual user in the hash database 160. At this time, when there are a plurality of personal information databases 150, the storage unit 140 may classify and store hash values of false personal information of the virtual users included in each personal information database 150. [

5 is a block diagram of a personal information leakage detection apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.

The personal information leakage detection apparatus 500 includes an identification unit 510, an extraction unit 520, a comparison unit 530, a determination unit 540, an authentication unit 550, a deletion unit 560, . The personal information leakage detection device 500 may be included in a server of a service provider that provides a specific service or may be included in a server of a service provider that provides a separate personal information leakage detection service.

The identification unit 510 can identify the personal information of the target user who wants to use the specific service. For example, personal information may be needed when a target user opens a bank account at a bank or makes a financial transaction, such as making a credit card at a credit card company. Accordingly, a service provider such as a bank or credit card company can receive personal information from a target user who desires to use a specific service, and can identify the personal information of the target user.

At this time, the personal information of the target user identified by the service provider may include at least one of personal information elements such as name, age, address, mobile phone number, and resident registration number.

The extracting unit 520 may extract a hash value of the target user's personal information using the hash function. At this time, the extracting unit 520 may extract a hash value of the personal information of the target user by using the hash function used for extracting the hash value of the false personal information of the virtual user stored in the hash database 590.

The comparing unit 530 may compare the hash value of the personal information of the target user extracted by the extracting unit 520 with the hash value of the false personal information of the virtual user stored in the hash database 590.

The determination unit 540 determines whether or not the personal information database 580 including the false personal information of the virtual user based on the result of comparing the hash value of the target user's personal information with the hash value of the false personal information of the virtual user It can be judged whether or not it has been leaked.

If the hash value of the target user's personal information is compared with the hash value of the virtual user's false personal information, if the two hash values match, the determination unit 540 determines that the personal information including the false personal information of the virtual user It is determined that the database 580 has been leaked, and the target user can stop providing the specific service to be used.

If it is determined by the determination unit 540 that the hash value of the personal information of the target user matches the hash value of the false personal information of the virtual user, the authentication unit 550 may request the corresponding target user for personal information authentication .

This is because the false personal information of the virtual user generated by the false personal information generating apparatus 100 is a very small probability but may exist in reality.

At this time, the authentication unit 550 may request the target user to authenticate the personal information either online or offline.

The deletion unit 560 deletes the corresponding false personal information from the personal information database 580 including the false personal information of the virtual user when the authentication of the personal information requested by the authentication unit 550 is successful, The provision of a specific service can be resumed.

When the authentication of the personal information requested by the authentication unit 550 fails, the cancellation unit 570 determines that the personal information database 580 including the corresponding false personal information has been leaked, and cancels the provision of the specific service .

6 is a flowchart illustrating a personal information leakage detection method according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Suppose that the target user wants to use the financial transaction service. In step 610, the personal information leakage detection device 500 may receive the personal information from the target user who intends to use the financial transaction service and identify the personal information of the target user.

At this time, the personal information of the target user identified by the personal information leakage detection device 500 may include at least one of personal information elements such as a name, an age, an address, a mobile phone number, and a resident registration number.

In step 620, the personal information leakage detection device 500 may extract a hash value of the target user's personal information using the hash function. At this time, the personal information leakage detection device 500 extracts a hash value of the personal information of the target user by using the hash function used for extracting the hash value of the false personal information of the virtual user stored in the personal information database 580 can do.

In step 630, the personal information leakage detection device 500 may compare the hash value of the extracted personal information of the target user with the hash value of the false personal information of the virtual user stored in the hash database 590.

If the hash value of the personal information of the target user does not match the hash value of the false personal information of the virtual user, the personal information outflow detection device 500 determines the target user as a normal user as in step 690 And provide financial transaction services.

However, if the hash value of the target user's personal information matches the hash value of the false personal information of the virtual user as a result of comparison, the personal information leakage detection device 500 may detect false personal information of the virtual user It is determined that the personal information database 580 including the personal information database 580 has been leaked, and the financial transaction service can be suspended.

However, there is a possibility that the false personal information of the virtual user generated by the personal information generating apparatus 100 is very small, but it may exist in the real world. Therefore, the personal information leakage detection apparatus 500 can request the target user to authenticate the personal information have. Such personal information authentication requests can be requested to the target user either online or offline.

If the requested personal information authentication is successful as in step 660, the corresponding personal information is deleted from the personal information database 580 including the false personal information of the virtual user, and the provision of the financial transaction service You can resume.

However, if the requested personal information authentication fails as in step 680, the personal information leakage detection device 500 confirms that the personal information database 580 including the false personal information of the virtual user has been leaked, Can be canceled.

The methods according to embodiments of the present invention may be implemented in the form of program instructions that can be executed through various computer means and recorded in a computer-readable medium. The computer-readable medium may include program instructions, data files, data structures, and the like, alone or in combination. The program instructions recorded on the medium may be those specially designed and constructed for the present invention or may be available to those skilled in the art of computer software.

While the invention has been shown and described with reference to certain preferred embodiments thereof, it will be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art that various changes in form and details may be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims. This is possible.

Therefore, the scope of the present invention should not be limited to the described embodiments, but should be determined by the equivalents of the claims, as well as the claims.

100: False private information generating device
110:
120:
130:
140:
150, 580: Personal information database
160, 590: hash database
500: Personal information leak detection device
510:
520:
530:
540:
550: authentication unit
560:
570: Cancellation part

Claims (12)

Generating false personal information of a virtual user similar to an actual user's personal information;
Inserting the generated false personal information into the personal information database;
Extracting the hash value of the inserted false personal information using a hash function; And
Storing the hash value of the extracted false personal information in a hash database for false personal information
Lt; / RTI >
Wherein the false personal information of the virtual user includes:
And personal information about the virtual user other than the actual user, the personal information being in a formally similar form to the personal information of the actual user,
The hash function,
A hash function used when extracting a hash value of a personal information of a target user who desires to use a specific service,
If the hash value of the false personal information stored in the hash database matches the hash value of the personal information of the target user, it is determined that the personal information database including the false personal information of the virtual user is leaked, A false false personal information creation method.
delete Identifying personal information of a target user to use a specific service;
Extracting a hash value for the personal information of the target user using a hash function;
Comparing the extracted hash value of the personal information of the target user with a hash value associated with false personal information of the virtual user stored in the private information database of the specific service;
Determining whether the personal information of the target user has been leaked based on a result of the comparison with the hash value associated with the false personal information of the virtual user
Lt; / RTI >
Wherein the determining step comprises:
When the hash value of the target user's personal information matches the hash value associated with the false personal information of the virtual user, it is determined that the personal information database including the false personal information of the virtual user is leaked, and,
The hash function,
And a hash function used to extract a hash value of the false personal information of the virtual user stored in the personal information database of the specific service.
delete Identifying personal information of a target user to use a specific service;
Extracting a hash value for the personal information of the target user using a hash function;
Comparing the extracted hash value of the personal information of the target user with a hash value associated with false personal information of the virtual user stored in the private information database of the specific service;
Determining whether the personal information of the target user has been leaked based on a result of the comparison with the hash value associated with the false personal information of the virtual user; And
Requesting personal information authentication to the target user if the hash value of the target user matches the hash value associated with the false personal information
Lt; / RTI >
The hash function,
And a hash function used to extract a hash value of the false personal information of the virtual user stored in the personal information database of the specific service.
6. The method of claim 5,
If the requested personal information authentication is successful, deleting the personal information of the virtual user from the personal information database
The method comprising the steps of:
6. The method of claim 5,
And determining that the personal information database including the false personal information of the virtual user has been leaked and canceling the specific service if the requested personal information authentication fails.
An identification unit for identifying personal information of a target user who wants to use a specific service;
An extractor for extracting a hash value of the personal information of the target user using a hash function;
A comparing unit comparing the extracted hash value of the personal information of the target user with a hash value associated with the false personal information of the virtual user stored in the private information database of the specific service;
A determination unit for determining whether personal information of the target user is leaked based on a result of comparison between the virtual user's hash value and a hash value associated with the false personal information,
Lt; / RTI >
Wherein,
When the hash value of the target user's personal information matches the hash value associated with the false personal information of the virtual user, it is determined that the personal information database including the false personal information of the virtual user is leaked, and,
The hash function,
And a hash function used to extract a hash value of false personal information of the virtual user stored in the private information database of the specific service.
delete An identification unit for identifying personal information of a target user who wants to use a specific service;
An extractor for extracting a hash value of the personal information of the target user using a hash function;
A comparing unit comparing the extracted hash value of the personal information of the target user with a hash value associated with the false personal information of the virtual user stored in the private information database of the specific service;
A determination unit for determining whether personal information of the target user is leaked based on a result of comparison between the virtual user's false personal information and a hash value; And
When the hash value of the target user matches the hash value associated with the false personal information,
Lt; / RTI >
The hash function,
And a hash function used to extract a hash value of false personal information of the virtual user stored in the private information database of the specific service.
11. The method of claim 10,
And deletes the personal information of the virtual user from the personal information database if the requested personal information authentication is successful,
And a personal information leakage detection device.
11. The method of claim 10,
And a revocation unit for confirming that the personal information database including the false personal information of the virtual user is leaked and canceling the specific service if the requested personal information authentication fails,
And a personal information leakage detection device.
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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
KR101950387B1 (en) * 2018-02-12 2019-02-20 주식회사 머니브레인 Method, computer device and computer readable recording medium for building or updating knowledgebase models for interactive ai agent systen, by labeling identifiable but not-learnable data in training data set
KR101999131B1 (en) * 2018-11-15 2019-07-11 (주)소만사 System for preventing data loss using decoy personal information data and method thereof

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
KR101950387B1 (en) * 2018-02-12 2019-02-20 주식회사 머니브레인 Method, computer device and computer readable recording medium for building or updating knowledgebase models for interactive ai agent systen, by labeling identifiable but not-learnable data in training data set
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