KR101697266B1 - Smart card defensing electromagnetic fault injection attack - Google Patents

Smart card defensing electromagnetic fault injection attack Download PDF

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Publication number
KR101697266B1
KR101697266B1 KR1020150172887A KR20150172887A KR101697266B1 KR 101697266 B1 KR101697266 B1 KR 101697266B1 KR 1020150172887 A KR1020150172887 A KR 1020150172887A KR 20150172887 A KR20150172887 A KR 20150172887A KR 101697266 B1 KR101697266 B1 KR 101697266B1
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KR
South Korea
Prior art keywords
frequency information
unit
power
control unit
card
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KR1020150172887A
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Korean (ko)
Inventor
김수학
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코나아이 (주)
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Priority to KR1020150172887A priority Critical patent/KR101697266B1/en
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G06K19/073—Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory
    • G06K19/07309—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G06K19/073—Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory
    • G06K19/07309—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers
    • G06K19/07318—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers by hindering electromagnetic reading or writing
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G06K19/073—Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory
    • G06K19/07309—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers
    • G06K19/07345—Means for preventing undesired reading or writing from or onto record carriers by activating or deactivating at least a part of the circuit on the record carrier, e.g. ON/OFF switches
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
    • G06K19/067—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components
    • G06K19/07—Record carriers with conductive marks, printed circuits or semiconductor circuit elements, e.g. credit or identity cards also with resonating or responding marks without active components with integrated circuit chips
    • G06K19/077—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier
    • G06K19/07749—Constructional details, e.g. mounting of circuits in the carrier the record carrier being capable of non-contact communication, e.g. constructional details of the antenna of a non-contact smart card

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Electromagnetism (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

The present invention relates to a smart card that protects against an electromagnetic wave error injection attack.
The present invention relates to a wireless communication device, which includes an RF antenna for receiving an RF signal transmitted from the outside, a power generator for converting a RF signal received by the RF antenna to generate a DC power source, And an application unit operable to receive the DC power from the power generation unit and a control unit that controls the operation of the application unit based on whether the frequency information transmitted from the frequency information sensing unit matches registration frequency information, And a control unit for controlling whether or not DC power is supplied.
According to the present invention, when frequency information inconsistent with the registered frequency information used in normal operation is detected in the smart operation process, the card power source is shut off, thereby effectively preventing an external electromagnetic wave error injection attack at an early stage at a low cost There is an effect.

Description

[0001] SMART CARD DEFENSING ELECTROMAGNETIC FAULT INJECTION ATTACK [0002]

The present invention relates to a smart card that protects against an electromagnetic wave error injection attack. More particularly, the present invention relates to a method and a device for preventing an external electromagnetic wave error injection attack from occurring at an initial stage in an initial stage by blocking the card power source itself when frequency information inconsistent with the registered frequency information used in a normal operation in a smart card operation is detected The present invention relates to a smart card that can be defended.

In general, an IC card such as a smart card stores important information such as a user's private key, personal information, and a main code in a card system, and is widely used in a secure payment system and an ID system. In addition, the non-contact type operation method of the IC card operation method is used in many application fields because it has an advantage that it is more convenient to use than the conventional magnetic tape card or contact type IC card, and it is expected to be applied to more applications in the future. The noncontact type IC card drives the internal circuit of the card by generating a power from an RF signal transmitted from the card reader wirelessly without an additional power source using the electromagnetic induction principle.

There are several methods of attacking smart cards, such as power or electromagnetic wave analysis methods and error injection attack methods. The power analysis attack technique is called Paul. Using the characteristics of the contact IC card, which is dependent on the external power supply as an independent module by C. Kocher's method, the change in the amount of power used during the operation of the contact type IC card is analyzed, As a means of differential power analysis attack, many experiments and methods have been proposed and carried out to derive confidential information stored in IC card using power analysis attack technique.

An error injection attack technique is a method of inducing a malfunction by injecting an error by applying an impact upon a smart card operation, and there are power error injection, clock error injection, laser error injection, and electromagnetic wave error injection attack. In the case of power error injection, clock error injection, and laser error injection, the attack method has been proposed for more than 10 years and is already protected by power sensor, clock sensor, optical sensor, etc. inside and outside the IC chip. However, although the electromagnetic wave error injection attack has been actively studied as the proposed attack method in the year 2012, there is little known research on the device and the method that can cope with such an attack.

The most common countermeasures against electromagnetic wave analysis attacks are partial redesign of an algorithm that performs overall circuit redesign or computation and perform computation. However, these methods have a problem of reducing overall circuit performance, requiring a long time for circuit design, and deteriorating system performance.

Korean Patent Registration No. 10-1025421 discloses a method for preventing electromagnetic wave analysis attacks in which a first IC chip that performs a card-inherent function, a first antenna, a random number generation And a second antenna connected to the second IC chip and performing RF communication with the terminal. The smart card includes a first IC chip and a second IC chip.

However, according to the technique disclosed in Korean Patent Registration No. 10-1025421, since a separate IC chip and an antenna must be provided in order to prevent an electromagnetic wave analysis attack, there is a problem that the cost of manufacturing a card increases and the internal structure of the card becomes complicated And there is a problem that it is not possible to defend against an error injection attack.

Korean Registered Patent No. 10-1025421 (Registered Date: March 21, 2011, entitled: Smart Card System for Preventing Electromagnetic Analysis Attacks)

The present invention can effectively prevent an external electromagnetic wave error injection attack at an initial stage by blocking an external electromagnetic wave error injection attack when frequency information inconsistent with the registered frequency information used in a normal operation in a smart card operation is detected, A technical problem is to provide a smart card.

In addition, the present invention can provide a card with a very low-complexity control means for controlling frequency information, means for interrupting the power supply of the card, and a control means for controlling them, thereby effectively preventing the electromagnetic- A technical problem is to provide a smart card.

A smart card for protecting against an electromagnetic wave error injection attack according to the present invention includes: an RF antenna for receiving an RF signal transmitted from the outside; a power generator for converting a RF signal received by the RF antenna to generate a DC power source; A frequency information sensing unit for sensing frequency information of an RF signal received by the RF antenna; an application unit for receiving the DC power from the power generator; And a controller for controlling whether the DC power is supplied to the application unit based on whether the DC power is supplied or not.

The smart card for defending against an electromagnetic wave error injection attack according to the present invention further includes a switch unit provided between the power generation unit and the application unit and the control unit detects the frequency information other than the registration frequency information The control unit turns off the switch unit to disconnect the electric power supply between the power generating unit and the application unit, thereby controlling the supply of the DC power to the application unit to be interrupted.

The smart card for defending against an electromagnetic wave error injection attack according to the present invention further includes a switch unit provided between the power generation unit and the application unit and the control unit detects the same frequency information as the registration frequency information The control unit turns on the switch unit to electrically connect the power generator to the application unit so that the DC power is supplied to the application unit.

The smart card for defending an electromagnetic wave error injection attack according to the present invention further includes a frequency information storage unit for storing the registered frequency information and the control unit controls the frequency information transmitted from the frequency information sensing unit and the frequency information storage unit And controls whether or not power is supplied based on whether or not the stored registration frequency information matches.

The smart card for defending the electromagnetic wave error injection attack according to the present invention further comprises a switch unit provided between the power generation unit and the application unit and a frequency information storage unit storing the registered frequency information, When the sensing unit senses frequency information other than the registered frequency information over a set time range by turning off the switch unit and disconnecting the electrical connection between the power generating unit and the application unit, And the supply of power is cut off.

In the smart card for defending an electromagnetic wave error injection attack according to the present invention, when the frequency information transmitted from the frequency information sensing unit does not match the registration frequency information stored in the frequency information storage unit, The frequency information transmitted from the information sensing unit is classified into suspect frequency information and is stored in the frequency information storage unit.

In the smart card for defending against an electromagnetic wave error injection attack according to the present invention, the control unit controls the suspicious frequency information stored in the frequency information storage unit to be transmitted to a management server at a remote location via a card terminal .

According to the present invention, when the frequency information that is inconsistent with the registered frequency information used in a normal operation is detected during the operation of the smart card, the card power itself is shut off, so that the smart card capable of defending an external electromagnetic- There is an effect that a card is provided.

In addition, since it is possible to add to the card a control means for detecting the frequency information, a means for interrupting the power supply of the card, and a very low computational amount for controlling the card, it is possible to provide a smart There is an effect that a card is provided.

1 is a diagram illustrating a smart card for defending against an electromagnetic wave error injection attack according to an embodiment of the present invention.
2 is a view for explaining an example of a concrete operation of a smart card for defending an electromagnetic wave error injection attack according to an embodiment of the present invention.

It is to be understood that the specific structural or functional description of embodiments of the present invention disclosed herein is for illustrative purposes only and is not intended to limit the scope of the inventive concept But may be embodied in many different forms and is not limited to the embodiments set forth herein.

The embodiments according to the concept of the present invention can make various changes and can take various forms, so that the embodiments are illustrated in the drawings and described in detail herein. It should be understood, however, that it is not intended to limit the embodiments according to the concepts of the present invention to the particular forms disclosed, but includes all modifications, equivalents, or alternatives falling within the spirit and scope of the invention.

The terms first, second, etc. may be used to describe various elements, but the elements should not be limited by the terms. The terms may be named for the purpose of distinguishing one element from another, for example, without departing from the scope of the right according to the concept of the present invention, the first element may be referred to as a second element, The component may also be referred to as a first component.

It is to be understood that when an element is referred to as being "connected" or "connected" to another element, it may be directly connected or connected to the other element, . On the other hand, when an element is referred to as being "directly connected" or "directly connected" to another element, it should be understood that there are no other elements in between. Other expressions that describe the relationship between components, such as "between" and "between" or "neighboring to" and "directly adjacent to" should be interpreted as well.

The terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of the invention. The singular expressions include plural expressions unless the context clearly dictates otherwise. In this specification, the terms "comprises" or "having" and the like are used to specify that there are features, numbers, steps, operations, elements, parts or combinations thereof described herein, But do not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integers, steps, operations, components, parts, or combinations thereof.

Unless otherwise defined, all terms used herein, including technical or scientific terms, have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this invention belongs. Terms such as those defined in commonly used dictionaries are to be interpreted as having a meaning consistent with the meaning of the context in the relevant art and, unless explicitly defined herein, are to be interpreted as ideal or overly formal Do not.

Hereinafter, preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

1 is a diagram illustrating a smart card for defending against an electromagnetic wave error injection attack according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 1, a smart card for defending an electromagnetic wave error injection attack according to an embodiment of the present invention includes an RF antenna 10, a power generator 20, a frequency information sensing unit 30, an application unit 40, A switch unit 50, a control unit 60, and a frequency information storage unit 70.

The RF antenna 10 functions to receive an RF signal transmitted from the outside.

More specifically, the RF antenna 10 is a means for wirelessly receiving power from an external smart card terminal and exchanging data with a card terminal. An example of the process of power supply and data transmission is as follows. For example, when data is loaded on an AC power source having a predetermined frequency, for example, a frequency of 13.56 MHz at the smart card terminal side, the current flowing through the RF antenna 10 provided in the smart card terminal changes, An induced current is generated in the RF antenna 10 due to the electromagnetic induction phenomenon.

For example, the RF antenna 10 may be composed of one single antenna, or may be separately configured with an antenna for power supply and an antenna for data transmission.

The power generator 20 converts the RF signal received by the RF antenna 10 to generate a DC power source. Since the other components that require the power supply operate as the DC power source, the power generator 20 converts the RF signal received by the RF antenna 10 into a direct current Power conversion. Although not shown in the drawings, the power generator 20 may be configured to include a rectifier circuit having a boosting function using a diode. Although not shown in the drawing, the smart card according to the present invention is provided with an RF circuit including a data transmission / reception circuit, which extracts data from an inductive current received by the RF antenna 10 Function.

The frequency information sensing unit 30 senses the frequency information of the RF signal received by the RF antenna 10, and transmits the sensed frequency information to the controller 60.

For example, when a normal smart card operation is performed, the RF antenna 10 receives an RF signal within a predetermined bandwidth having a center frequency of 13.56 MHz, and the frequency information of the RF signal is supplied to the frequency information sensing unit 30 And is transmitted to the control unit 60. [ In this normal operation, the frequency information received by the controller 60 coincides with the registered frequency information stored in the frequency information storage unit 70.

In addition, when an abnormal smart card operation is performed, for example, the RF antenna 10 can receive a RF signal having a center frequency other than 13.56 MHz as a center frequency, a predetermined bandwidth or a center frequency and a bandwidth different from each other The frequency information of the RF signal is also sensed by the frequency information sensing unit 30 and transmitted to the controller 60. In the case of the abnormal operation, the frequency information received by the control unit 60 does not coincide with the registered frequency information stored in the frequency information storage unit 70. For example, such an abnormal operation may be performed illegally by a person who shuns a smart card, and in this case, the card operation is stopped through the process described below.

The application unit 40 is operated by receiving the DC power from the power generation unit 20. The application unit 40 stores applications for performing a specific operation by the user such as purchase transaction settlement, Traffic transaction settlement, access control, and so on.

The switch unit 50 is provided between the power generating unit 20 and the application unit 40 and is turned on or turned off under the control of the controller 60 to be turned on or off, And provides or blocks the DC power supply path to the DC power supply.

The frequency information storage unit 70 stores registration frequency information, which is frequency information when a normal smart card operation is performed.

The control unit 60 controls whether or not the DC power is supplied to the application unit 40 based on whether the frequency information received from the frequency information sensing unit 30 matches the registration frequency information.

As an example, when the smart card according to an embodiment of the present invention includes the switch unit 50, the control unit 60 may be configured such that when the frequency information sensing unit 30 detects frequency information other than the registered frequency information The power supply generating unit 20 and the application unit 40 are disconnected from each other by turning the switch unit 50 off so that the supply of the DC power to the application unit 40 is interrupted have.

For example, when the smart card according to the embodiment of the present invention includes the switch unit 50, when the frequency information sensing unit 30 senses the same frequency information as the registered frequency information, The DC power can be controlled to be supplied to the application unit 40 by turning on the switch unit 50 and electrically connecting the power generator 20 and the application unit 40. [

In a case where the smart card according to an embodiment of the present invention includes the frequency information storage unit 70, the control unit 60 may control the frequency information received from the frequency information sensing unit 30, The control unit 70 may be configured to control whether power is supplied based on whether or not the registered frequency information stored in the storage unit 70 matches.

In a case where the smart card according to an embodiment of the present invention includes the switch unit 50 and the frequency information storage unit 70, the control unit 60 controls the frequency information sensing unit 30 to set the time range When detecting the frequency information other than the abnormal registration frequency information, the switch unit 50 is turned off to disconnect the electrical connection between the power generator 20 and the application unit 40, Can be controlled so as to be interrupted.

In another example, when the frequency information received from the frequency information sensing unit 30 does not match the registration frequency information stored in the frequency information storage unit 70, the control unit 60 controls the frequency information sensing unit 30, And stores the suspect frequency information stored in the frequency information storage unit 70 into the management server of the remote location via the card terminal Can be controlled.

2 is a view for explaining an example of a concrete operation of a smart card for defending an electromagnetic wave error injection attack according to an embodiment of the present invention. Although an example of the non-contact type operation will be described with reference to Fig. 2, the present invention is not limited to this, and can also be applied to the contact type operation.

Referring to FIG. 2, in step S10, a process of bringing a smart card according to the present invention to a card terminal is performed. This step can be classified into normal operation and abnormal operation. 1) When a legitimate card user brings the card close to a normal card terminal, it corresponds to a normal operation. In this case, the application unit 40 receives power and completes a normal operation through a process to be described later. 2) When an illegal card user, for example, a card cut-off person approaches an abnormal card terminal, for example, a hacking terminal, is an abnormal operation. In this case, The power supply to the unit 40 is interrupted, so that the operation is not completed.

In step S20, a process is performed in which the RF antenna 10 provided in the smart card receives an RF signal transmitted by the card terminal wirelessly.

In step S30, the power generator 20 converts the RF signal to generate DC power. Since the application section 40 requiring a power source operates as a DC power source, the power generation section 20 generates the RF signal received by the RF antenna 10, To a DC power source.

In step S40, the frequency information sensing unit 30 detects the frequency information of the RF signal. For example, when a normal smart card operation is performed, the RF antenna 10 receives an RF signal within a predetermined bandwidth having a center frequency of 13.56 MHz, and the frequency information of the RF signal is supplied to the frequency information sensing unit 30 Lt; / RTI > In addition, when an abnormal smart card operation is performed, for example, the RF antenna 10 can receive a RF signal having a center frequency other than 13.56 MHz as a center frequency, a predetermined bandwidth or a center frequency and a bandwidth different from each other And the frequency information of the RF signal is also detected by the frequency information sensing unit 30. [

In step S50, the process of transmitting the frequency information of the RF signal sensed by the frequency information sensing unit 30 to the controller 60 is performed.

In step S60, the control unit 60 compares the frequency information received from the frequency information sensing unit 30 with the registration frequency information stored in the frequency information storage unit 70, and determines whether the frequency information matches the registration frequency information. As a result of the judgment in the step S60, if both frequency information coincide with each other, the process goes to the step S70, and if both frequency information do not coincide, the process goes to the step S80.

The control unit 60 turns on the switch unit 50 to control the DC power generated by the power generating unit 20 to be supplied to the application unit 40 in step S70. That is, when the frequency information transmitted from the frequency information sensing unit 30 matches the registration frequency information, it can be determined that the normal operation is performed. Thus, the application unit 40 receives the DC power and operates normally, So that the normal operation requested by the user is completed.

If it is determined in step S60 that the two frequency information do not coincide with each other, the process proceeds to step S80. In step S80, a process of determining whether or not a preset time has elapsed is performed. That is, in step S80, it is determined whether the frequency information sensing unit 30 continuously senses frequency information different from the registered frequency information even after a predetermined time has elapsed. As a result of the determination in step S80, if it is determined that the two frequency information do not coincide with each other continuously so that the set time elapses, the process proceeds to step S90.

The control unit 60 turns off the switch unit 50 to disconnect the electrical connection between the power generator 20 and the application unit 40 in step S90. In other words, when the frequency information received from the frequency information sensing unit 30 continuously does not match the registration frequency information so that the set time elapses, it can be determined as an abnormal operation process. Therefore, So that the card user is protected from abnormal operation such as hacking.

In step S100, the control unit 60 classifies the frequency information received from the frequency information sensing unit 30 into suspect frequency information, and stores the classified frequency information in the frequency information storage unit 70. [ At this stage, together with the suspect frequency information, information on the time when the suspect frequency information is detected, and other requested operation related information can be stored together.

In step S110, a process of controlling the controller 60 to transmit information including the suspicious frequency information stored in the frequency information storage unit 70 to the management server at the remote site via the card terminal is performed. This step is for a case where a request for a later operation is generated through a card having a history of an abnormal operation request or hacking.

As described in detail above, according to the present invention, when the frequency information that is inconsistent with the registered frequency information used in a normal operation is detected in the smart operation process, the card power source itself is shut off so that an external electromagnetic- There is an effect that a smart card capable of defending is provided.

In addition, since it is possible to add to the card a control means for detecting the frequency information, a means for interrupting the power supply of the card, and a very low computational amount for controlling the card, it is possible to provide a smart There is an effect that a card is provided.

10: RF antenna
20: Power generator
30: frequency information sensing unit
40:
50:
60:
70: Frequency information storage unit

Claims (7)

An RF antenna for receiving an RF signal transmitted from the outside;
A power generator for converting a RF signal received by the RF antenna to generate a DC power;
A frequency information sensing unit for sensing frequency information of an RF signal received by the RF antenna;
An application unit operable to receive the DC power from the power generator; And
And a controller for controlling whether the DC power is supplied to the application unit based on whether the frequency information received from the frequency information sensing unit matches the registration frequency information. The method according to claim 1,
Further comprising a switch unit provided between the power generation unit and the application unit,
The control unit
Wherein when the frequency information sensing unit senses frequency information other than the registration frequency information, the switch unit is turned off to disconnect an electrical connection between the power generation unit and the application unit, So as to block the supply of the electromagnetic wave error injection attack. The method according to claim 1,
Further comprising a switch unit provided between the power generation unit and the application unit,
The control unit
Wherein the control unit turns on the switch unit to electrically connect the power generator to the application unit when the frequency information sensing unit senses the same frequency information as the registration frequency information so that the DC power is supplied to the application unit A smart card for defending against an electromagnetic wave error injection attack. The method according to claim 1,
And a frequency information storage unit in which the registration frequency information is stored,
The control unit
Wherein the control unit controls whether power is supplied based on whether the frequency information received from the frequency information sensing unit matches registration frequency information stored in the frequency information storage unit. The method according to claim 1,
A switch unit provided between the power generation unit and the application unit; And
And a frequency information storage unit in which the registration frequency information is stored,
The control unit
When the frequency information sensing unit senses frequency information other than the registration frequency information over a predetermined time range by turning off the switch unit and disconnecting the electrical connection between the power generation unit and the application unit, Wherein the controller is configured to control the supply of the DC power of the first power supply to the second power supply. The method according to claim 1,
The control unit
And a control unit for classifying the frequency information received from the frequency information sensing unit as suspect frequency information when the frequency information transmitted from the frequency information sensing unit does not match the registration frequency information stored in the frequency information storage unit, Wherein the smart card is protected against electromagnetic wave error injection attacks. The method according to claim 6,
The control unit
Wherein the controller controls the suspicious frequency information stored in the frequency information storage unit to be transmitted to a management server at a remote location via the card terminal.
KR1020150172887A 2015-12-07 2015-12-07 Smart card defensing electromagnetic fault injection attack KR101697266B1 (en)

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Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
KR20050027377A (en) * 2003-09-15 2005-03-21 삼성전자주식회사 Contactless integrated circuit card with real-time protocol switching function and card system including the same
KR20060109308A (en) * 2005-04-15 2006-10-19 주식회사 케이티프리텔 Non contact type integrated circuit card and method for communicating data by multiprotocol
KR20080079143A (en) * 2007-02-26 2008-08-29 고려대학교 산학협력단 Radio frequency identification card with esay security function and system for reading tag with this
KR20090121457A (en) * 2008-05-22 2009-11-26 김범규 Power control unit with rfid
KR101025421B1 (en) 2009-11-27 2011-03-30 한국조폐공사 Smart card system for defending electromagnetic analysis attack in smart card system

Patent Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
KR20050027377A (en) * 2003-09-15 2005-03-21 삼성전자주식회사 Contactless integrated circuit card with real-time protocol switching function and card system including the same
KR20060109308A (en) * 2005-04-15 2006-10-19 주식회사 케이티프리텔 Non contact type integrated circuit card and method for communicating data by multiprotocol
KR20080079143A (en) * 2007-02-26 2008-08-29 고려대학교 산학협력단 Radio frequency identification card with esay security function and system for reading tag with this
KR20090121457A (en) * 2008-05-22 2009-11-26 김범규 Power control unit with rfid
KR101025421B1 (en) 2009-11-27 2011-03-30 한국조폐공사 Smart card system for defending electromagnetic analysis attack in smart card system

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