KR101619695B1 - Method and Apparatus for Use of Secure Channel into Molecular Communications - Google Patents

Abstract

Presented are a method and an apparatus for use of a secure channel in molecular communications, which are intended to protect against eavesdropping. The method for use of a secure channel in molecular communications according to the present invention may comprise the steps of: simultaneously transmitting molecular data in a bit 0 or bit 1 form using a first nano-device and a second nano-device; receiving or ignoring the molecular data depending on the molecular data in a bit form which are transmitted by the first nano-device and the second nano-device; regarding the molecular data as a security key when the molecular data in a bit form are received; and encrypting molecular data in a bit form to be transmitted via molecular modulation after the generation of the security key, and loading the molecular data in a bit form over a channel.

Description

METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR USE OF SECURITY CHANNEL IN MOLECULAR COMMUNICATIONS Technical Field [1]

The present invention relates to a method and apparatus for using secure channels in molecular communications to prevent eavesdropping.

Molecular communication is expected to provide appropriate solutions in a wide range of applications, including biomedical, industrial and environmental applications. This is a field of study where researches are converged and there is a distinct difference from electromagnetic communication systems because biological molecules are used as carriers of information transfer. However, molecular communication has many technical problems to be overcome. Introducing security into molecular communications is a fundamental challenge for researchers. There are very few papers focusing on security aspects in this promising technology. This paper discusses some of the security and privacy issues and challenges of molecular communications. As it turns out, there has not yet been a well-publicized attempt to mitigate certain security risks. Therefore, there is a need to deal with eavesdropping that is particularly malignant and threats to the security of classified molecular communications.

Among these methods, there is a method of secretly receiving communication between two nano devices. In electromagnetic communication, a secure channel is formed to prevent eavesdropping. To this end, the two communicating parties follow the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol and use separate keys (for example, only two communication parties are known). Then, the information is encrypted using this key before transmission. In other words, in molecular communications, the main challenge is how to generate individual keys so that they do not know the keys that are exchanged externally. In addition, the key exchange process and encryption algorithm must be cost-effective in terms of computational complexity and energy consumption. According to the prior art, a Noisy Tag of high frequency identification (RFID) similar to a blocker tag is used for security key exchange. This tag intentionally generates noise, which prevents intruders in RFID communications from understanding the key. The same idea applies to the security of NFC. However, this has been done in the context of electromagnetic communication. Therefore, it requires a secure channel in molecular communications to prevent eavesdropping.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The present invention is directed to a secure molecular communication method and apparatus for defending eavesdropping. We propose a method based on the Diffie-Hellman algorithm in which a communication nano device can convert a secret key to a molecular signal, and use the secret key to perform operations. We also propose algorithms for secure key translation and secure molecular communication systems.

According to an aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method of using a secure channel in a molecular communication, comprising the steps of simultaneously transmitting bit 0 or bit 1 type of molecular data using a first nano device and a second nano device, Receiving or ignoring the molecular data according to the bit type molecular data transmitted from the device and the second nano device; receiving the bit data in the form of a bit, And encrypting and digitizing bit-type molecular data for transmission through molecular modulation after the key is generated.

When the first nanometer device and the second nanometer device simultaneously transmit the molecular data, the timing of the bit and the number of the molecular data can be synchronized.

The synchronization may allow an unauthorized receiver to notice the transmitting node and receive information during an un-synchronized interval between communicating nodes.

The step of receiving or ignoring the molecular data according to the bit-type molecular data transmitted by the first nano device and the second nano device may include receiving the first and second nano- It is possible to ignore all the bits and to receive the bit data in the form of bits of the counterpart nano device when the first and second nano devices transmit different bit type molecular data.

According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a secure channel utilization system for secure channel-based molecular communications in molecular communication, which comprises: a first nano device and a second nano device, A comparison unit for comparing bit-type molecular data transmitted by the first nano device and the second nano device, and a comparator for comparing the bit-type molecular data transmitted by the first nano device and the second nano device, Determines whether to receive the bit-type molecular data of the counterpart nano-device according to the comparison result, and transmits the received bit-type molecular data to the counterpart nano- And a determination unit regarded as a security key.

Wherein the transmitting unit synchronizes the timing of the bit and the number of the molecular data when the first nano device and the second nano device simultaneously transmit the molecular data, and the synchronization notifies the unauthorized receiver of the transmitting node And can receive information during an un-synchronized interval between communicating nodes.

Wherein when the first and second nano devices transmit the same bit-type molecular data to each other, the comparator ignores all bits, and the first nano device and the second nano device have different bit- When the molecule data is transmitted, the receiving unit may receive the bit data in the form of bits of the counterpart nano device.

According to embodiments of the present invention, the nanodevices exchange security keys that can not be understood by non-authorities through molecular signals. This mechanism of exchange requires only a small amount of additional energy. In addition, the system can be made simple and efficient in terms of energy consumption and computing efficiency by using an XOR cipher to encrypt and decrypt data using the generated security key. The proposed system can be applied efficiently from simple security to molecular communication requiring much more stringent security.

1 is a diagram for explaining eavesdropping in a molecular communication according to an embodiment of the related art.
2 is a flowchart illustrating a method of using a secure channel in a molecular communication according to an embodiment of the present invention.
3 is a flowchart illustrating a process of generating a secure channel in a molecular communication according to an embodiment of the present invention.
4 is a diagram illustrating a configuration of a secure channel using system in a molecular communication according to an embodiment of the present invention.
5 is a diagram illustrating a security key transformation in a molecular communication according to an embodiment of the present invention.
6 is a diagram illustrating an 8-bit parallel XOR coder according to an embodiment of the present invention.
7 is a diagram illustrating a molecular communication system having a secure channel according to an embodiment of the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

1 is a diagram for explaining eavesdropping in molecular communication according to the prior art.

Because molecular communications are actually wireless connections, eavesdropping is a very serious problem. The problem here is how malicious nanodevices decode transmitted data from a received molecule. There are two ways. First, the intruder needs to experiment before the attack. Second, the attacker has preliminary information through investigation. Also, because it does not require any special equipment, the intruder has the necessary hardware and software to decrypt the received molecule and the detector needed to receive the molecule. Molecular communication is typically used between two nanometer devices 110 and 120 in close proximity. The distance between them is only a few centimeters (or less). It is, of course, questionable as to how close the malicious nanodevice should be to detecting the molecules (111, 121) being transmitted. However, there is no correct answer to this question. The reason why I can not answer this question correctly is because there are many factors that determine this distance. For example, distances are affected by the following factors: the nature of the molecules communicating between the nanometers, the number of molecules exchanged between the nanometers communicating, the detector characteristics of the intruder, the intruder's own level of the nanometer and the location of the attack. Therefore, a certain distance is only meaningful by definition by the indicators described above and can not be used to develop a security strategy. Nevertheless, it can be said that the eavesdropper 130 is capable of eavesdropping at a distance greater than the distance between two nano devices in communication. In other words, a strong intruder can decode information even when operating at a relatively large distance compared to the two nanometer devices (110, 120) in communication.

2 is a flowchart illustrating a method of using a secure channel in a molecular communication according to an embodiment of the present invention.

A method of using a secure channel in a molecular communication includes simultaneously transmitting (210) a bit 0 or a bit 1 type of molecular data using a first nano device and a second nano device, (220) receiving or ignoring the molecular data according to the bit-type molecular data transmitted by the mobile terminal, receiving (230) the molecular data as a security key when receiving the bit-type molecular data, And then encrypting and writing the bit-type molecular data for transmission through the molecular modulation to the channel.

In step 210, the first nanometer device and the second nanometer device can be used to simultaneously transmit bit 0 or bit 1 type of molecular data. When the first nanometer device and the second nanometer device simultaneously transmit the molecular data, the timing of the bit and the number of the molecular data can be synchronized. The synchronization may allow an unauthorized receiver to notice the transmitting node and receive information during an un-synchronized interval between communicating nodes.

In step 220, the molecular data may be received or ignored according to the bit-type molecular data transmitted by the first nano device and the second nano device.

When the first nanometer device and the second nanometer device transmit the same bit-type molecular data, all bits can be ignored. On the other hand, when the first nano device and the second nano device transmit different bit-type molecular data, it is possible to receive bit-type molecular data of the counterpart nano device.

In step 230, when receiving the bit-type molecular data, the molecular data may be regarded as a secret key.

In step 240, after the secret key is generated, the bit-type molecular data for transmission through the molecular modulation may be encrypted and uploaded to the channel. A method of using a secure channel in molecular communication will be described in more detail with reference to FIG.

3 is a flowchart illustrating a process of generating a secure channel in a molecular communication according to an embodiment of the present invention.

First, we assume the system model as follows. The origin system is a timeslot system with a specific slot duration, and the nano devices participating in the communication are considered as fixed media within the network range. It is also assumed that these nanodevices are perfectly synchronized and communicate with each other using the same kind of mediator molecules. The code is assumed to be transmitted via on-off keying (OOK) modulation. Through this scheme, information bit 1 emits an impulse of z1 of the molecule at the beginning of the slot, while it does not emit a molecule of information zero. For ease of introduction, nano devices participating in the communication are considered as full-duplex systems capable of simultaneous reception and transmission. With only minor modifications, the proposed scheme can be equally applied to half-duplex systems. For reception, the nanometer counts the total number of molecules of the molecule received during the time slot. The random number z2 is compared with the threshold number z of the molecules. If z2 is less than z, the device considers the received bit to be 1, and vice versa. Furthermore, it is also assumed that there is a malicious nano-device with a suitable detector capable of receiving molecules transmitted for the purpose of eavesdropping.

Initially, a security service may be initialized 310 and a synchronization call 320 may be performed. When the first nanometer device and the second nanometer device simultaneously transmit the molecular data, the timing of the bit and the number of the molecular data can be synchronized. The synchronization may allow an unauthorized receiver to notice the transmitting node and receive information during an un-synchronized interval between communicating nodes.

Next, the symbol timer may be reset (330) and any '0' or '1' may be transmitted (340). The first nanometer device and the second nanometer device transmit arbitrary information at the same time. You can imagine that a nanometer can simultaneously emit and collect molecules. At design time, these two nanodevices are synchronized with the correct bit timing and energy (number of molecules). After the synchronization process, the first nano device and the second nano device can exchange the same number of molecules at the same time. When transmitting any bit 0 (not transmitting a molecule) or 1 (transmitting a mutually agreed amount of molecules), the first nano device and the second nano device hear a molecular signal. Next, the symbol timer can be checked (350).

Then, it can be determined whether or not the symbol timer is received at the same time. If the symbol timer is not received at the same time, it may return to check 350 of the symbol timer. On the other hand, if a symbol timer is received at the same time, the molecules may be detected 361 to receive the transmitted bits from the counterpart nanometer device.

Then, it can be determined 370 whether the same bit is transmitted or received. Now, let's consider possible cases.

In the first case, when both nanodevices transmit a molecular signal of zero, the sum of the two molecular signals is zero and the malicious device in the eavesdropper notices that the two nanodevices are sending zero. In this case, the malicious eavesdropper will notice which key the two devices are sending.

In the second case, when both molecules transmit a molecular signal of 1, the sum of the two molecules is doubled (twice the number of molecules to send 1) and the malicious eavesdropping device sends 1 both I notice. In this case, the malicious eavesdropper will also notice which key the two nanodevices are sending.

Finally, an interesting case occurs when the first nanometer device and the second nanometer device send 0 and 1 (when the first nanometer device sends 1, the second nanometer device sends 0, and vice versa). In this situation, the two nanodevices know what information they have transmitted, so that both devices can find the signal transmitted by the other. Conversely, malicious eavesdropping devices can only understand the sum of two molecular signals and can not find any device based on the fact that it has transmitted 1 and which device has transmitted 0.

If the same bit is transmitted or received, the bit can be discarded (371) and repeated from the symbol timer reset (330) step. On the other hand, if the same bit is not transmitted or received, the current bit can be stored 372 by being sent by a predefined nanometer device as a bit of the secret key.

Next, it can be determined 380 whether the number of stored bits is the same as the key of the required length. If the number of stored bits equals the required length of the key, then the stored bits are returned 381 and if the number of stored bits is not the same as the required length key, the symbol timer may be checked 350.

4 is a diagram illustrating a configuration of a secure channel using system in a molecular communication according to an embodiment of the present invention.

The secure channel utilization system 400 in the molecular communication according to the present embodiment may include a processor 410, a bus 420, a network interface 430, a memory 440 and a database 450. The memory 440 may include an operating system 441 and a molecular data encryption routine 442. The processor 410 may include a transmitting unit 411, a comparing unit 412, a receiving unit 413, and a determining unit 414. In other embodiments, the secure channel utilization system 400 in molecular communications may include more components than the components of FIG. However, there is no need to clearly illustrate most prior art components. For example, the secure channel utilization system 400 in molecular communications may include other components such as a display or a transceiver.

The memory 440 may be a computer-readable recording medium and may include a permanent mass storage device such as a random access memory (RAM), a read only memory (ROM), and a disk drive. The memory 440 may also store program codes for the operating system 441 and the molecular data encryption routine 442. [ These software components may be loaded from a computer readable recording medium separate from the memory 440 using a drive mechanism (not shown). Such a computer-readable recording medium may include a computer-readable recording medium (not shown) such as a floppy drive, a disk, a tape, a DVD / CD-ROM drive, or a memory card. In other embodiments, the software components may be loaded into the memory 440 via the network interface 430 rather than from a computer readable recording medium.

The bus 420 may enable communication and data transfer between components of the secure channel utilization system 400 in molecular communications. The bus 420 may be configured using a high-speed serial bus, a parallel bus, a Storage Area Network (SAN), and / or any other suitable communication technology.

Network interface 430 may be a computer hardware component for connecting secure channel utilization system 400 in molecular communications to a computer network. The network interface 430 may allow the secure channel utilization system 400 in molecular communications to connect to the computer network via a wireless or wired connection.

The database 450 may store and maintain all information required for molecular data encryption. In FIG. 4, a database 450 is constructed and included in the secure channel using system 400 in the molecular communication. However, the present invention is not limited thereto and may be omitted according to the system implementation method or environment, It is also possible that some databases exist as external databases built on separate, separate systems.

The processor 410 may be configured to process instructions of a computer program by performing input / output operations of the secure channel utilization system 400 in basic arithmetic, logic, and molecular communications. The instructions may be provided by the memory 440 or network interface 430 and to the processor 410 via the bus 420. The processor 410 may be configured to execute program codes for the transmitting unit 411, the comparing unit 412, the receiving unit 413, and the determining unit 414. [ Such program code may be stored in a recording device, such as memory 440. [

The transmitting unit 411, the comparing unit 412, the receiving unit 413, and the determining unit 414 may be configured to perform the steps 210 to 240 of FIG.

The secure channel utilization system 400 in the molecular communication may include a histogram transmission unit 411, a comparison unit 412, a reception unit 413, and a determination unit 414. [

The transmitting unit 411 can simultaneously transmit the bit 0 or bit 1 type of molecular data using the first nano device and the second nano device. The transmitting unit 411 may synchronize the timing of the bits and the number of the molecular data when the first nanometer apparatus and the second nanometer apparatus simultaneously transmit the molecular data. And, the synchronization can allow an unauthorized recipient to notice the transmitting node and to receive information during an un-synchronized interval between communicating nodes.

The comparing unit 412 may compare the bit data of the first nanometer device and the bit data transmitted by the second nanometer device. The comparator 412 can ignore all bits when the first and second nano devices transmit the same bit-type molecular data. On the other hand, when the first nano device and the second nano device transmit different bit-type molecular data, the receiver may receive the bit-type molecular data of the counterpart nano device.

When the first and second nano devices transmit different types of molecular data, the receiving unit 413 may receive the bit data in the form of bits of the corresponding nano device.

The determination unit 414 determines whether to receive the bit-type molecular data of the counterpart nano-device according to the comparison result, and may regard the received bit-type molecular data as a security key. After generating the secret key, the bit-type molecular data for transmission through the molecular modulation can be encrypted and uploaded to the channel

5 is a diagram illustrating a security key transformation in a molecular communication according to an embodiment of the present invention.

The concept described above is shown in Fig. The first first nano device molecule 510 shows the molecules released from the first nano device and the second second nano device molecule 520 refers to the molecules released by the second nano device. For example, the first nanometer device transmits any 8 bits (1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1) 540. The second nanometer device also transmits any 8 bits (0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1) 540. The final figure shows the resulting molecule (530), or the sum of the molecules, emitted by the two nanometer devices. This is the type of signal observed by the eavesdropper. The same result is obtained when the first nano device transmits 0 and the second nano device transmits 1 or when the first nano device transmits 1 and the second nano device transmits 0. Therefore, malicious eavesdropping devices do not recognize the difference between the two cases.

And two communicating nanodevices ignore all bits when they transmit the same number of molecules (for example, both send 0, or both send 1). They accept each bit if they send a different number of bits (for example, 0 for one, or 1 for the other). In this way, a key transmitted from the other party can be regarded as a security key. This is a preliminary agreement for security policy. In this way, the two nanodevices can exchange encrypted keys of a desired length. In other words, in this example, bits 0, 1, 2, and 4 serve as security keys because the communicating devices transmit different signals. Now if you read the second nanometer device with this security planning method, the encrypted key is 0101. If you are reading the first nanometer device, it is 1010. The length of the key obtained through 8-bit transmission is 4 bits. By continuing to work until both devices transmit bits of the desired length, a security key of the desired length will be obtained. The flow chart of Figure 3 shows a generalized algorithm of the proposed technique described above. In the present invention, it is assumed that the length is 8 bits.

6 is a diagram illustrating an 8-bit parallel XOR coder according to an embodiment of the present invention.

6 (a) shows an encryptor of an 8-bit parallel XOR encoder, and FIG. 6 (b) shows an ammo decoder of an 8-bit parallel XOR encoder.

The next step after generating the individual key is to encrypt the information bits so that they can be transmitted before being uploaded to the channel via molecular modulation. For this purpose, XOR cryptography, which is simple to implement and economical in terms of computation, is used (Fig. 4). If the j-th encrypted bit, the secret key, and the 8-bit information block are sequentially modulated for molecular communication in the order of X_j, B_kj, and B_ij, the encrypted bit can be obtained through the logic process of Equation (1).

수학식1

Equation 1

A variety of applications are possible in molecular communications where strict security is not required. As in this case, simply hiding information from unauthorized groups is sufficient. It is not necessary to change individual keys frequently. Conversely, security-sensitive areas require relatively frequent replacement of security keys.

At the receiving end, the decoding operation shown in Equation (2) will be performed on the information bits after the molecular inverse modulation operation applied in Equation (1).

수학식2

Equation 2

In Equation (2), y_j, b_kj, and b_ej denote decoded j-th bit, security key, and 8-bit inversely modulated information block. If there is error-free communication, y_j will be equal to b_ij.

7 is a diagram illustrating a molecular communication system having a secure channel according to an embodiment of the present invention.

The proposed secure molecular communications system will therefore look like the one in FIG. Since the 8-bit XOR coder 612 in the secure nano transmitter 610 performs an 8-bit parallel XOR operation, the S / P (serial to parallel) 611 and the P / S (parallel to serial) 613 ) Converter was used. After generating the secret key, the bit-type molecular data for transmission through the molecular modulation can be encrypted and uploaded to the channel (614).

Since the 8-bit XOR coder 622 in the secure nano receiver 620 performs an 8-bit parallel XOR operation, the P / S (parallel to serial) 621, the S / P (serial to parallel) 623, The converter was used. Then, the encrypted bit-type molecular data can be received (615). But this is only a matter of design. The same XOR cipher can be obtained by using one XOR gate.

In terms of energy consumption, it is clear that no additional energy is required to transmit secure molecular information through the proposed secure channel approach. This is because the number of bits that send the same amount of information does not change. However, this scheme requires energy in the process of exchanging security keys and transmitting information bits. Therefore, communication is somewhat inefficient in terms of energy compared to the [ref] computation and requires only negligible energy since the XOR operation is a simple operation. Therefore, the proposed scheme only requires additional energy to exchange security keys. However, in most molecular communications applications, keys are exchanged only once before transmission of information. You can use the same key for a relatively long time. Thus, the additional energy is not as large as the total energy for information transmission. Even when the key is very short compared to the length of the entire block or frame, even when there is frequent replacement of the shared key (using a different key a few frames later). Therefore, it can be said that the proposed method is energy efficient.

 In terms of information processing time, there is no complicated operation in the encryption process and P / S and S / P operations are solved instantaneously. Therefore, the processing time for using the secure molecular information in the channel is compared with the general baseband information processing time Can be ignored. In addition, using encryption hardware without software can further reduce the time involved. Therefore, the proposed communication system is also effective in information processing time.

In terms of synchronization, during the key exchange, the start time of the molecular signal at each communication node must be the same. This means that the nodes participating in the communication should be time synchronized. On the other hand, they forget the secret key sharing track. An unauthorized receiver may also be aware of the transmitting node and may receive information during an unsynchronized interval between communicating nodes. Separately, the number of molecules that mean 1 must be the same or nearly the same. If this number is quite different, the eavesdropper will be able to distinguish whether the molecular signal is sent from A or C.

In the proof of the length of the key in Fig. 4, two communication subjects can share a 4-bit security key after exchanging 8 bits of information. This result can be generalized to the fact that, on average, communication entities must exchange 2n bits of information in order to transmit an n-bit key. The information bits are randomly generated with the same probability, and all of the bits are ignored in two of the four cases.

The apparatus described above may be implemented as a hardware component, a software component, and / or a combination of hardware components and software components. For example, the apparatus and components described in the embodiments may be implemented within a computer system, such as, for example, a processor, a controller, an arithmetic logic unit (ALU), a digital signal processor, a microcomputer, a field programmable array (FPA) A programmable logic unit (PLU), a microprocessor, or any other device capable of executing and responding to instructions. The processing device may execute an operating system (OS) and one or more software applications running on the operating system. The processing device may also access, store, manipulate, process, and generate data in response to execution of the software. For ease of understanding, the processing apparatus may be described as being used singly, but those skilled in the art will recognize that the processing apparatus may have a plurality of processing elements and / As shown in FIG. For example, the processing unit may comprise a plurality of processors or one processor and one controller. Other processing configurations are also possible, such as a parallel processor.

The software may include a computer program, code, instructions, or a combination of one or more of the foregoing, and may be configured to configure the processing device to operate as desired or to process it collectively or collectively Device can be commanded. The software and / or data may be in the form of any type of machine, component, physical device, virtual equipment, computer storage media, or device , Or may be permanently or temporarily embodied in a transmitted signal wave. The software may be distributed over a networked computer system and stored or executed in a distributed manner. The software and data may be stored on one or more computer readable recording media.

The method according to an embodiment may be implemented in the form of a program command that can be executed through various computer means and recorded in a computer-readable medium. The computer-readable medium may include program instructions, data files, data structures, and the like, alone or in combination. The program instructions to be recorded on the medium may be those specially designed and configured for the embodiments or may be available to those skilled in the art of computer software. Examples of computer-readable media include magnetic media such as hard disks, floppy disks and magnetic tape; optical media such as CD-ROMs and DVDs; magnetic media such as floppy disks; Magneto-optical media, and hardware devices specifically configured to store and execute program instructions such as ROM, RAM, flash memory, and the like. Examples of program instructions include machine language code such as those produced by a compiler, as well as high-level language code that can be executed by a computer using an interpreter or the like. The hardware devices described above may be configured to operate as one or more software modules to perform the operations of the embodiments, and vice versa.

While the present invention has been particularly shown and described with reference to exemplary embodiments thereof, it is to be understood that the invention is not limited to the disclosed exemplary embodiments. For example, it is to be understood that the techniques described may be performed in a different order than the described methods, and / or that components of the described systems, structures, devices, circuits, Lt; / RTI > or equivalents, even if it is replaced or replaced.

Therefore, other implementations, other embodiments, and equivalents to the claims are also within the scope of the following claims.

Claims (7)

A method for using secure channels in molecular communications,
Simultaneously transmitting molecular data in the form of bit 0 or bit 1 using the first nano device and the second nano device;
Receiving or ignoring the molecular data according to the bit-type molecular data transmitted by the first nano device and the second nano device;
When receiving the bit-type molecular data, regarding the molecular data as a security key; And
Encrypting the bit-type molecular data for transmission through the molecular keying after generating the secret key,
Lt; / RTI >
When simultaneously transmitting the molecular data using the first nano device and the second nano device, synchronizing the timing of the bit and the number of the molecular data
≪ / RTI > wherein the secure channel is used in molecular communications. delete The method according to claim 1,
The synchronization may allow an unauthorized recipient to be aware of the transmitting node and to receive information during an un-synchronized interval between communicating nodes
≪ / RTI > wherein the secure channel is used in molecular communications. The method according to claim 1,
Receiving or ignoring the molecular data according to the bit-type molecular data transmitted by the first nano device and the second nano device,
When the first nanometer device and the second nanometer device transmit the same bit-type molecular data, all the bits are ignored,
When the first nano device and the second nano device transmit different types of molecular data in the form of bits,
≪ / RTI > wherein the secure channel is used in molecular communications. In a secure channel utilization system in molecular communications,
A transmitting unit for simultaneously transmitting bit 0 or bit 1 type of molecular data using the first nano device and the second nano device;
A comparison unit for comparing the bit type molecular data transmitted by the first nano device and the second nano device;
A receiving unit for receiving the bit-shaped molecular data of the counterpart nano device when the first nano device and the second nano device transmit different bit-type molecular data; And
Determines whether to receive the bit-type molecular data of the counterpart nano device according to the comparison result, and determines the received bit-type molecular data as a security key
Lt; / RTI >
Wherein the transmission unit comprises:
When simultaneously transmitting the molecular data using the first nano device and the second nano device, synchronizing the timing of the bit and the number of the molecular data
Wherein the secure channel utilization system in the molecular communication is characterized in that it comprises: 6. The method of claim 5,
Wherein the transmission unit comprises:
The synchronization may allow an unauthorized recipient to be aware of the transmitting node and to receive information during an un-synchronized interval between communicating nodes
Wherein the secure channel utilization system in the molecular communication is characterized in that it comprises: 6. The method of claim 5,
Wherein,
When the first nanometer device and the second nanometer device transmit the same bit-type molecular data, all the bits are ignored,
When the first nanomechanical device and the second nanomechanical device transmit different types of molecular data, the receiving unit is configured to receive the bit-shaped molecular data of the other nanomechanical device
Wherein the secure channel utilization system in the molecular communication is characterized in that it comprises:

Images