KR101513100B1 - Apparatus and method for spoofing detection with single antenna gnss receiver and inertial measurement unit - Google Patents
Apparatus and method for spoofing detection with single antenna gnss receiver and inertial measurement unit Download PDFInfo
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- KR101513100B1 KR101513100B1 KR1020140011716A KR20140011716A KR101513100B1 KR 101513100 B1 KR101513100 B1 KR 101513100B1 KR 1020140011716 A KR1020140011716 A KR 1020140011716A KR 20140011716 A KR20140011716 A KR 20140011716A KR 101513100 B1 KR101513100 B1 KR 101513100B1
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/015—Arrangements for jamming, spoofing or other methods of denial of service of such systems
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/24—Acquisition or tracking or demodulation of signals transmitted by the system
- G01S19/26—Acquisition or tracking or demodulation of signals transmitted by the system involving a sensor measurement for aiding acquisition or tracking
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/24—Acquisition or tracking or demodulation of signals transmitted by the system
- G01S19/29—Acquisition or tracking or demodulation of signals transmitted by the system carrier including Doppler, related
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/38—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system
- G01S19/39—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system the satellite radio beacon positioning system transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/42—Determining position
- G01S19/45—Determining position by combining measurements of signals from the satellite radio beacon positioning system with a supplementary measurement
- G01S19/47—Determining position by combining measurements of signals from the satellite radio beacon positioning system with a supplementary measurement the supplementary measurement being an inertial measurement, e.g. tightly coupled inertial
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S7/00—Details of systems according to groups G01S13/00, G01S15/00, G01S17/00
- G01S7/02—Details of systems according to groups G01S13/00, G01S15/00, G01S17/00 of systems according to group G01S13/00
- G01S7/36—Means for anti-jamming, e.g. ECCM, i.e. electronic counter-counter measures
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
- Remote Sensing (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Position Fixing By Use Of Radio Waves (AREA)
Abstract
The present invention relates to an apparatus and method for detecting only a satellite signal signal which can implement only an instrument of incident angle detection using a single-antenna satellite navigation receiver and a low-cost inertial sensor. Measuring single-antenna satellite navigation receiver; And an inertial sensor for measuring the positional movement information of the user during a time period during which the GPS receiver measures the carrier wave, wherein the single antenna GPS receiver measures the position of the user And determines the angle of incidence of the satellite signal using the carrier measurement values received at the two points.
Description
The present invention relates to a deaf-mute detection apparatus and method for applying an incident angle detection method in response to deception of a navigation satellite signal in a satellite navigation receiver.
In general, the GNSS, which is represented by GPS, is known to be vulnerable to an artificial disturbance and deceit because the signal reaching the ground is very weak because the signal is transmitted over 20,200 km.
An artificial disturbance is a method of transmitting a signal having a very high intensity in the frequency band of the GNSS signal so that the user can not use the GNSS signal. On the contrary, the deception of the GNSS signal means that the replicated signal is transmitted similarly to the GNSS signal, and the user is induced by the replicated signal without recognizing the abnormality of the signal. This deception of the GNSS signal may pose a greater risk than an artificial disturbance in that the user is not aware that he is receiving the wrong GNSS signal.
Recently, research on the deception of satellite navigation signal has been actively carried out since the kidnap incident of unmanned airplane, which is estimated to be caused by deception of GPS signal. Through real experiments, we have confirmed that the unmanned aircraft or ship is guided to a different position by the deception signal.
This technique of deception can be classified into three types according to the complexity.
First, it is a simple deception apparatus that uses a GNSS simulator, and sends out an arbitrary GNSS signal while ignoring synchronization with an actual GNSS signal at a deception time point. Second, it is an intermediate stage deceptive device that uses a GNSS signal simulator combined with a GNSS receiver. It receives a GNSS signal at a degeneracy point and simulates the signal delay, the navigation message, and the signal strength very similarly, Method. Third, it is the most complex type of expiration structure, in which multiple GNSS receivers are concurrently connected to a combined simulator.
In the Volpe report of Mitre Corp. of the United States, only the stopping method corresponding to the above deceptive technique is classified according to the performance level as follows.
1. Amplitude discrimination
2. Time-of-arrival discrimination
3. Polarization discrimination
4. Consistency of navigation inertial measurement unit (IMU) cross-check with inertial navigation system
5. Angle-of-arrival discrimination
6. Cryptographic authentication
It is known that the first to third schemes of these schemes are easily deceived by deceptive devices with a little added complexity. The most robust of these is the sixth encryption and authentication scheme. This method can counteract even the highest level of deceptions in which many GNSS receivers are interlocked, but this is not a practical method at this time because the existing GNSS satellite signal system must be modified. Therefore, the consistency mutual verification method and the incidence angle detection method with the fourth and fifth inertial navigation devices have been mainly studied recently.
First, the coherent mutual verification method with the Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) compares the navigation speed using GNSS with the speed using IMU, so that the currently received GNSS signal matches the physical movement calculated by the IMU . This method is practically applicable since it is common to install IMU as a plurality of navigation devices in the case of a general aircraft and a ship.
The incident angle detection method is a method of detecting the transmission direction of a deception signal by using an array antenna GNSS receiver or a plurality of single antenna receivers composed of a plurality of antennas. It is determined whether or not the transmission direction of the received signal coincides with the satellite ephemeris information broadcast by the satellite to determine whether or not the signal is a deception signal. Since the user receives a large number of GNSS satellite signals, it is a method that utilizes the limitation that it can not place the dekie in the same direction for all satellites.
The consistency mutual verification method and the incident angle detection method with the inertial navigation apparatus described above can be applied at present time and only the excellent performance can be secured. However, there are the following problems.
First, the mutual verification method using the inertial navigation system has an advantage of using an independent navigation sensor, but it can respond to the gradually attacked defacement due to the noise and divergence characteristics of the IMU The limitations of this study are confirmed by the results of this study. This is because the IMU results are corrected based on the navigation results of the GNSS receiver in the combination of the general IMU and GNSS receivers. Therefore, if the GNSS receiver is slowly deceived within the error level of the IMU, Because it follows the deceptive GNSS signal. In order to overcome this problem, a high-precision IMU is required. However, since the price of IMU increases in accordance with accuracy, it has a limit to increase the cost.
Secondly, since the incident angle detection method is a method of detecting the incident angle of a signal received using signals received from a plurality of antennas, it is necessary to use a large and expensive array antenna and a signal processing section for processing a plurality of antenna reception signals do. In an environment where the miniaturization of the GNSS receiver is rapidly progressing, the increase of the array antenna structure and the signal processing portion leads to an increase in the price and size of the GNSS receiver. There is also a way to connect a single antenna receiver to a network to detect deception signals, but this is not a method applicable to general users.
Accordingly, it is an object of the present invention to provide an apparatus and method for detecting only a navigation satellite signal that can be applied to various satellite navigation receiver fields.
It is another object of the present invention to provide an apparatus and method for detecting only a navigation satellite signal that can be implemented using only a single antenna satellite navigation receiver and an inexpensive inertial sensor.
According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided an apparatus for detecting deception of a navigation satellite signal, including: a single antenna satellite navigation receiver for continuously measuring a carrier wave from a satellite signal at predetermined time intervals; And an inertial sensor for measuring the positional movement information of the user during a time period during which the GPS receiver measures the carrier wave, wherein the single antenna GPS receiver measures the position of the user And determines the angle of incidence of the satellite signal using the carrier measurement values received at the two points.
The single-antenna satellite navigation receiver is implemented as a GNSS receiver.
The single-antenna GPS receiver compensates the carrier measurement values by the amount of movement of the satellite during the measurement time, calculates the difference of the horizontal distance in the plane by subtracting the compensated carrier measurement values from each other, And estimates the incident angle of the satellite signal using the measured location information of the user.
The single-antenna satellite navigation receiver calculates the difference of the measured distances from the satellites by subtracting the compensated carrier measurement values from each other, and computes the difference of the calculated distance by projecting it on the horizon plane using the elevation angle of the satellite, do.
The single-antenna GPS receiver compensates the carrier measurement value by calculating the amount of compensation of the position change between the satellite and the satellite during the measurement time, and then adding the calculated compensation amount to the carrier measurement value.
The single-antenna satellite navigation receiver calculates the angle of incidence of the satellite signal using the calculated horizontal distance difference and the user's position movement distance measured by the inertial sensor.
According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method for detecting deception of a navigation satellite signal, comprising: continuously measuring a carrier wave in a satellite signal at a predetermined time interval through a single antenna GPS receiver; Compensating the measured carrier measurement values by a movement amount of a satellite; Calculating a difference in horizontal distance in a plane by subtracting the compensated carrier measurement values from each other; And estimating an incident angle of the received signal using the calculated horizontal distance difference and the positional movement information of the user measured by the inertial sensor.
The single-antenna satellite navigation receiver is implemented as a GNSS receiver with a single antenna.
Calculating the horizontal distance difference comprises: calculating a difference in distance measured from the satellite by subtracting the compensated carrier measurement values from each other; And calculating the difference in horizontal distance in the plane by projecting the difference in the measured distance from the calculated satellite to the horizon plane using the elevation angle of the satellite.
The step of compensating the carrier measurement value includes calculating a compensation amount by inscribing the position change amount of the satellite during the measurement time with the sight line vector between the user and the satellite. And summing the calculated compensation amount with a carrier measurement value to compensate the carrier measurement value.
The incident angle of the received signal is calculated using the computed horizontal distance difference and the distance traveled by the user measured by the inertial sensor.
The present invention realizes only an instrument using only an incidence angle detection method using a single antenna satellite navigation receiver and a low-cost inertial sensor, and thus, only the instrument that can be applied only to some major equipment such as military equipment The present invention can be applied to a variety of satellite navigation receivers such as airplanes, ships, military portable navigation devices, smart phones, etc. without adding hardware.
1 is a block diagram of a conventional navigation satellite signal detector only.
FIG. 2 is a block diagram of an apparatus for detecting a satellite signal signal only in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention, which is necessary for applying an incident angle detection technique. FIG.
FIG. 3 is a conceptual diagram for implementing an anti-vibration method based on an incident angle detection method in the present invention. FIG.
4 is a conceptual diagram for establishing a GNSS carrier measurement model of an incident angle detection method using a single antenna receiver;
The present invention proposes a method based only on an incident angle detection method using a single-antenna GNSS receiver and an inertial sensor. This method can be applied to a single antenna receiver instead of multiple antennas by using incident angle detection method. This is practically applicable as it is already equipped with a GNSS receiver and an inertial sensor, especially on most aircraft and ships as well as on most smartphones. In particular, this method can be applied to low cost hardware because the existing GNSS receiver and low cost IMU can be used without hardware modification.
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a conventional navigation satellite signal beacon detector, and shows the structure of an array antenna GNSS receiver necessary for applying an incident angle detection technique.
1, a conventional array
The above configuration has a configuration in which a general GNSS receiver is composed of a single antenna, a single RF signal processor, a baseband signal processor, and a navigation device, but additional devices for processing a plurality of antennas and a plurality of antenna signals are added.
FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a navigation satellite signal fog detecting apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention, which is required for applying an incident angle detection technique.
As shown in FIG. 2, the navigation satellite signal beacon detection apparatus according to the embodiment of the present invention includes a satellite navigation receiver (GNSS receiver) 200 having a single antenna and an
Therefore, it is generally unnecessary to change the hardware because the data of the GNSS receiver and the IMU are integrated in the case of an aircraft or a ship. In the case of a smartphone, since the GNSS receiver and the inertial sensor are built in, the technique proposed in the present invention can be immediately applied.
FIG. 3 is a conceptual diagram for implementing the anti-vibration only method based on the incident angle detection method in the present invention.
Referring to FIG. 3, the
The
Accordingly, the present invention proposes a method of estimating the angle of incidence of a received signal using a GNSS carrier measurement value received at two points with known relative positions.
Also, when estimating the angle of incidence of a received signal using a GNSS carrier measurement value for a continuous time interval (T), the carrier measurement value is compensated for by the amount of movement of the satellite by considering the movement of the satellite during that time Method. Since the applicable time interval T is several milliseconds, which is the time unit in which the GNSS receiver generally ascertains the carrier measurement value, sufficient accuracy can be ensured even with a low-cost inertial sensor, and the error of the GNSS carrier measurement value There is an advantage that the elements can cancel each other. It is also advantageous not to consider the carrier phase cycle slip of the carrier measurement, which is generally a consideration when using GNSS carrier measurements.
4 is a conceptual diagram for establishing a GNSS carrier measurement value model of an incident angle detection method using a single antenna receiver.
The
[Equation 1]
Where Iono is the ionospheric error, Tropo is the tropospheric error, and B is the receiver clock error.
Since the present invention utilizes continuous carrier measurement values for a very short time T, it is assumed that the ionospheric error Iono, tropospheric error (Tropo) and receiver clock error B in equation (1) If the carrier tracking of time (.) Is successful, then the unspecified number (N) is also a constant.
Since the carrier measurement values obtained as described above are measured at different times (t = 0, T), they have observed distances based on signals transmitted from different satellite positions.
Therefore, the present invention compensates the obtained carrier measurement value by the amount of movement of the satellite in consideration of movement of the satellite for T time based on the satellite orbit information. That is, the amount of change of the position R of the satellite is internally calculated with the line-of-sight vector (LOS) between the user and the satellite, and the amount of compensation is reflected to the carrier measurement value as shown in Equation (2).
&Quot; (2) "
This compensated carrier measurement value (
&Quot; (3) "
The incident angle [theta] of the satellite signal can be calculated as shown in Equation (4) using the position movement distance D and direction information of the user measured from the
&Quot; (4) "
An example of applying the interferometer technique to two consecutive observations is the directional detection algorithm (MUSIC, which is applied to the existing array antenna using the same number of observations) ESPIRIT).
As described above, the present invention is implemented by using only a single-antenna satellite navigation receiver and an inexpensive inertial sensor only in an apparatus using an incidence angle detection method. In order to implement the conventional incidence angle detection method, an array antenna including a plurality of antennas, an RF signal processor for processing the array antenna, and a signal processor for processing multiple signals are required. This configuration is difficult to apply to practically various satellite navigation receiver fields since the configuration is large and expensive equipment is required.
On the other hand, the method proposed in the present invention does not change the hardware configuration because the conventional single-antenna satellite navigation receiver is used as it is. In addition, since the inertial sensor used only applies the results for several milliseconds, it is possible to use a low-cost chip type device which does not require high performance. Particularly, it is advantageous that the portable device such as a smart phone as well as a general navigation device for an aircraft or a ship has an inertial sensor for applying the present invention, so that it can be easily applied.
Accordingly, the present invention is applicable to various satellite navigation receivers such as aircraft, ships, military portable navigation devices, smart phones, and the like, without adding additional hardware, which is applicable only to some major equipment such as military equipment due to shape and cost constraints. Will be applicable.
It will be appreciated that the configurations and methods of the embodiments described above are not to be limited and that the embodiments may be embodied in other specific forms without departing from the spirit or essential characteristics thereof. Therefore, it should be understood that the above-described embodiments are to be considered in all respects as illustrative and not restrictive.
100: Array antenna GNSS receiver 200: Single antenna GNSS receiver
201: inertia sensor
Claims (11)
And an inertial sensor for measuring the position movement information of the user during the time when the satellite navigation receiver measures the carrier wave,
The satellite navigation receiver
Calculating a horizontal distance difference in a plane by compensating the measured carrier measurement values by the amount of movement of the satellite and calculating a horizontal distance difference in a plane by using the calculated horizontal distance difference and the position movement information of the user measured by the inertia sensor, And the incident angle is estimated.
GNSS receiver. ≪ RTI ID = 0.0 > 8. < / RTI >
Calculating the difference of the measured distances from the satellites by subtracting the compensated carrier measurement values from each other and projecting the calculated difference in distance on the horizon plane using the elevation angle of the satellite to calculate the horizontal distance difference in the plane, Deception detector of signal.
Wherein the carrier measurement value is compensated by adding the calculated amount of compensation to the carrier measurement value by inserting the change amount of the position of the satellite during the measurement time into the visual vector between the user and the satellite and compensating the carrier measurement value. Detector.
Wherein the angle of incidence of the satellite signal is calculated according to the following equation based on the calculated horizontal distance difference and the distance traveled by the user measured by the inertial sensor.
Compensating the measured carrier measurement values by a movement amount of a satellite;
Calculating a difference in horizontal distance in a plane by subtracting the compensated carrier measurement values from each other; And
And estimating an incident angle of the received signal using the calculated horizontal distance difference and the position movement information of the user measured by the inertia sensor.
A GNSS receiver having a single antenna.
Calculating a difference in measured distances from satellites by subtracting the compensated carrier measurements from each other; And
And calculating a difference in horizontal distance on the plane by projecting a difference in measured distance from the calculated satellite on a horizon plane using an elevation angle of the satellite.
Computing a compensation amount of the positional change of the satellite during the measurement time internally with a visual vector between the user and the satellite; And
And summing the calculated compensation amount with a carrier measurement value to compensate the carrier measurement value.
Wherein the calculation is performed by the following equation based on the computed horizontal distance difference and the distance traveled by the user measured by the inertial sensor.
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Cited By (1)
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| KR20230040059A (en) | 2021-09-15 | 2023-03-22 | 덕산넵코어스 주식회사 | Apparatus and method for anti-spoofing beamforming using multi-prn based array atennas |
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| KR20130135739A (en) * | 2012-06-01 | 2013-12-11 | 한국전자통신연구원 | Apparatus of eliminating spoofing singnal for satellite navigation signal and method thereof |
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| KR20130135739A (en) * | 2012-06-01 | 2013-12-11 | 한국전자통신연구원 | Apparatus of eliminating spoofing singnal for satellite navigation signal and method thereof |
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