KR101507572B1 - ID-Based Key Authentication Method for Security of Sensor Data Communications - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention relates to an ID-based key authentication method for security of sensor data communication. More specifically, the present invention includes performing a master preparation work of key data for making a session key for a security key of nodes within a cluster by generating a master key of a cluster head (CH) and configuring each sensor cluster (Ri) including a CH in a bootstrapping step of an ID generated by an algorithm K-proxies; and authenticating the key of the sensor node through a threshold ring signature.

Description

[0001] ID-based Key Authentication Method for Security of Sensor Data Communication [

The present invention relates to an ID-based key authentication method for securing sensor data communication, and more particularly, to an ID-based key authentication method for securing sensor data communication in consideration of characteristics, structure and security vulnerability of a sensor network .

Recently, wireless sensor networks are expanding service area by managing object information and environment information in real time. The location of the sensor nodes is not required to be determined in advance, and is arbitrarily placed for applications that are difficult to access or disaster relief. Therefore, the sensor network configuration requires self-configuration capability and cooperative operation of the sensor nodes. The number of sensor nodes constituting a sensor network is very large, each sensor node has limited resources and computing capability, and the sensor network topology is easily changed by insertion and removal of frequent sensor nodes.

In a wireless sensor network, a number of sensor nodes can be arranged without a predetermined form, and even if a sensor node operation fails or a function disappears due to a characteristic that neighboring sensor nodes sense similar information, There are problems such as low speed of the wireless medium, severe error transmission characteristics, limited power supply, and incompatibility due to arbitrary arrangement of the sensor nodes.

On the other hand, the sensor network is not suitable for the conventional wireless networking application for collecting information from the wireless sensor network having no existing communication infrastructure, and the energy consumption for sensor networking affects the entire network, thereby increasing the overall system life And it should be able to respond quickly to the dynamic change of the sensor nodes.

Therefore, a routing technique considering self-control capability, limited power, and data-centric characteristics of sensor nodes is required (see Non-Patent Document 1). In terms of the security of the sensor network, despite the necessity for secure communication due to the characteristics, structure type, and security vulnerability of the sensor node, it is a reality that it can not satisfy the sensor data protection according to its characteristics and form. Recently, support for sensor node mobility has become an important issue in Ubiquitous Sensor Networks (USN) service configuration, and it is necessary to support authentication and node mobility by adding nodes in sensor networks or clusters.

In the case of the first connected node, not only the possibility of shared information is very low, but also the identification of each node should be fast because of the frequent mobility such as insertion and removal of nodes, and the key management for the node should be made quick. In addition, if the node's secret key or master key is exposed due to an unexpected malicious attack, the key management system must be able to recover.

ID - based key management for fast node identification and key management with low computational complexity has been studied as a way to provide security for communication between nodes by identifying each node and generating a key. Recently, ID-based research [see Non-Patent Documents 2 and 3] has proposed an ID-based authentication scheme that does not have key distribution and can distribute the burden of the cluster head. However, The lack of self-control among the nodes has overloaded the delegation authentication role of the cluster node. In addition, [Non-Patent Document 4] using a double-linear cryptosystem using an ID-based public key scheme tries to reduce the amount of computation using an ID-based public key cryptosystem, but by using the Weil pairing technique, A similar calculation amount was obtained.

In the non-patent document 5 analyzing the encryption burden of the sensor network nodes, the asymmetric key (public key) technique used for authentication and encryption of the sensor node is compared with the symmetric key (shared key or secret key) The authentication and the computation cost for the cryptography are small, but it requires a predistribution key process and does not guarantee a complete communication connection. In addition, many recent studies [see Non-Patent Document 6-8] have been conducted to find a practical method for using a public key cryptosystem of a sensor network. However, a public key cryptosystem It has a serious problem of technology.

Also, it is difficult to apply the security technique due to the characteristics of the sensor network. Therefore, a light weighted key distribution and authentication technique is being studied for realizing security elements such as message confidentiality, integrity, and node authentication.

These studies have the disadvantage that the number of message transmission increases because key distribution is required, and an ID-based technique (see Non-Patent Documents 2-4 and 9) has been studied as a solution thereof. Identity-based Encryption (IBE) was first proposed by Shamir in 1984 [see non-patent document 10], but the scheme could only be used as a signature scheme and ID-based encryption was not addressed. In 2001, Boneh and Franklin We first introduced ID-based encryption [see Non-Patent Document 4] from this Weil Pairing.

Thereafter, a number of studies of ID-based schemes from Weil and bilinear pairs have been performed, including encryption, signing, and authentication schemes [see non-patent documents 11 and 12].

Level Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE) of Horwitz et al. [See Non-patent Document 13] is a two-level hierarchical structure consisting of a root private key generator (PKG) (HIBE) to show that a two-level hierarchical ID-based cryptosystem with an overall collision resistance at the upper level and a partial collision resistance at the lower level is secure under the BDH (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman) Security definition.

Many schemes against possible attacks, the performance of ID-based cryptography, and traditional symmetric cryptography require ID-based cryptography to significantly improve its performance. However, they have not been able to elaborate how the local keys are generated and transmitted and the packet is encrypted and signed.

The configuration of "sensor data security maintenance method, system and recording medium" disclosed in Korean Patent Application No. 10-1046992 discloses a technique of "generating a common encryption key in sensor data and an application from a key generation polynomial based on a time key, The key value for encrypting or authenticating the sensor data is not exposed even if the initial group key and the private key value of the sensor node are exposed and the random number value is exposed so that the sensor data can be transmitted to the system securely. And can improve the integrity, but can not escape the lightweight.

Korean Patent No. 10-1046992

Akyildiz, I., Su, W., Sankarasubramaniam, Y., and Cayirci, E., "Survey on Sensor Networks," IEEE Communications Magazine, Aug. 2002. Geng YANG, Chun-ming RONG, Christian VELGNER, Jiang-tae WANG and Hong-bing CHENG, "Identity-based key agreement and encryption for wireless sensor networks," The Journal of China Universities of Posts and Telecommunications, China, 2007. T.T. Huyen and Eui-Nam Huh, "A Reliable 2-mode Authentication Framework for Ubiquitous Sensor Network," Journal of the Korean Society for Internet Information, 2008. D.Boneh and M. Franklin, "Identity-based encryption from the Weil pairing," Advances in Cryptology-Crypto 2001, LNCS 2139, Springer-Verlag, pp. P. Ganesan, R. Venugopalan, P. Peddabachagari, A. Dean, F. Mueller, and M. Sichitiu, "Analyzing and Modeling Encryption Overhead for Sensor Network Nodes," in Proceedings of the 1st ACM International Workshop on Wireless Sensor Networks applications, San Diego, California, USA, Sep. 2003. G. Gaubatz, J. Kaps, and B. Sunar, "Public keys cryptography in sensor networks-revisited," in Proceedings of the 1st European Workshop on Security in Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks (ESAS), 2004. DJ Malan, M. Welsh, and MD Smith, "A public-key infrastructure for key distribution in Tiny OS based on elliptic curve cryptography," in The First IEEE International Conference on Sensor and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks, Santa Clara, California, pp. 71-79, Oct. 2004. W. Du, R. Wang, and P. Ning, "An efficient scheme for authenticating public keys in sensor networks," MobiHoc 05, May 25-27, 58-67, UrbanaChampaign, Illinois, USA, 2005. X. Boyen, "Multipurpose Identity-based signcryption, a Swiss army knife for identity-based cryptography," in Proceedings of the 23rd Interna. Cobf. On Advances in Cryptology, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol.2729, pp. 383-399, 2003. Shamir, A., "Identity-based cryptography and signature schemes," Advances in Cryptology Prc. of International Conference on Advances in Cryptology < RTI ID = 0.0 > CRYPTO'84, Aug. < / RTI & 1984. F. Hess, "Efficient Identity Based Signature Schemes Based on Pairings," Selected Areas in Cryptology-SAC 2002, LNCS 2595, pp. 310-324, 2003. B. Lynn, "Authenticated Identity-based Encryption," Cryptology e Print Archive, Report 2002/072, 2002. Jeremy Horwitz and Ben Lynn, "Toward Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption," Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA, 2002. Soonhwa Sung, "A Threshold Ring Group Signature for Ubiquitous Electronic Commerce," Korea Information Processing Society Journals D, vol.14-D, no. 4, ISSN 1598-2866, pp. 373-380, Jun. 2007. Xuan Hung Le, Sungyoung Lee, Ismail Butun et al., "An Energy Efficient Access Control Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography," JCN, vol. 11, no. 6, pp. 599-606, Dec. 2009. Fei Hu and Sunil Kumar, "Wireless Sensor Networks for Mobile Telemedicine: QoS support," IEEE Transactions on Information Technology in Bioinformatics, (2003), 2003. Tiny OS, TinyOS1.1.0, [Online]. Available: http://tinyOS.net (downloaded 2012, Dec. 17) A. L. Alberto Medina, Ibrahim Matta, and John Byers, "BRITE: An Approach to Universal Topology Generation," In MAS-COTS, 2001. Liqun Chen and Caroline Kudla, "Identity-based authenticated key agreement protocols from pairing," Cryptology e Print Archive, Report 2002/184, http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/184, 2002. K. Lauter, "The advantages of elliptic curve cryptography for wireless security," IEEE Wireless Communications, vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 62-67, Feb. 2004.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The present invention has been made in order to solve the above-described problems of the prior art, and it is an object of the present invention to provide a sensor node which is easily exposed to a physical environmental attack and easily transmitted information is changed or an unauthorized node transmits data, It is an object of the present invention to provide an ID-based key authentication method for securing sensor data communication by preventing a shortening of the lifetime of a network by depleting resources of an intermediate node by continuously generating necessary information by impersonating a legitimate sensor node

Also, it is an object of the present invention to provide an ID-based key authentication method that focuses on weight reduction for implementing a security element such as message confidentiality, integrity, and node authentication because it is difficult to apply a security technique due to characteristics of a sensor network.

Also, the present invention provides an ID-based key authentication method for security of sensor data communication capable of active key authentication in a cluster that does not require routing and a linear distribution key process considering fast mobility of sensor nodes based on an ID-based cryptosystem For the purpose of

According to an aspect of the present invention, there is provided a key generation center (KGC), which is a trusted third entity, and a plurality of sensor nodes capable of mutually exchanging information of plain text, an ID-based key authentication method for secure communication of sensor data in sensor networks, including, (a) the key generation center (KGC) is, the ID generated by the algorithm K- _proxies in the network the bootstrapping (bootstrapping) step, Or when a new node is added to the network or when the ID of the node needs to be updated due to a system failure, if the ID of the sensor node is damaged, ID creation, update, and withdrawal step; (B) The key generation center (KGC) assigns a public key which is an address of ID 1, -1, i , - i including a complex number so that a value of "1" is unique when the routing function R , A public key and a private key as a pair are generated as a {0, 1} ^* binary bit string of a pseudo-random binary sequence generator to constitute each sensor cluster Ri including a CH (Cluster Head) Performing master preparation of key data for creating a session key for a secret key of nodes in the cluster; And (C) authenticating a key of the sensor node through a threshold ring signature that does not require a setup procedure and a revocation procedure, and a method of authenticating an ID-based key for security of the sensor data communication .

As described above, according to the present invention, the ID-based key authentication does not require the linear distributed key process, and the number of bytes to code the ID can be reduced by simplifying the ID type, It is possible to achieve active key authentication that can cope with insertion and removal of fast nodes by not only a small amount of key computation but also node authentication by an authentication process in a cluster.

In addition, the ID-based key authentication technique, which is focused on weight reduction, can reduce the CPU time used for encryption and decryption under limited resources by the interaction of three layers, The transmission delay is improved.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS Figure 1 shows three-layer interactions in zones according to the present invention.
2 is a view showing a substitute node layer according to the present invention;
3 is a flowchart showing a routing function R () according to the present invention.
4 is a view showing a hidden layer according to the present invention.
5 is a view showing an example of ACL according to the present invention.
6 is a diagram illustrating an ID-based key distribution according to the present invention;
7 is a diagram illustrating an ID-based node authentication according to the present invention.
8 is a graph illustrating transmission performance according to the density of forwarding nodes according to the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS The present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. It is to be understood, however, that the drawings and description are to be regarded as illustrative in nature and not as a limitation on the scope of the invention. It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various changes and modifications can be made within the scope of the technical idea of the present invention based on these examples.

As described above, the present invention provides a key generation center (KGC), which is a trusted third organization, and a sensor including a plurality of sensor nodes capable of mutually exchanging information of plain text, An ID-based key authentication method for security of sensor data communication in a network,

(A) when the key generation center (KGC) receives the ID generated by the algorithm K- _proxies in a network bootstrapping step, or when a new node is added to the network or when a node failure Renewing and revoking an ID that is revoked from the counter-ID and discarded if the ID of the sensor node is damaged; (B) The key generation center (KGC) assigns a public key which is an address of ID 1, -1, i , - i including a complex number so that a value of "1" is unique when the routing function R , A public key and a private key as a pair are generated as a {0, 1} ^* binary bit string of a pseudo-random binary sequence generator to constitute each sensor cluster Ri including a CH (Cluster Head) Performing master preparation of key data for creating a session key for a secret key of nodes in the cluster; And (C) authenticating a key of the sensor node through a threshold ring signature that does not require a setup procedure and a revocation procedure.

The algorithm K- _proxies is ID 1, -1, i, in the four-any node, based on the trust relationship of the place around the sensor node is a relatively well-known algorithms in the prior art as an algorithm for assigning i. The proxy node of the ID is assigned by the algorithm K- _proxies . This algorithm, which generates the proxy node of the assigned ID, allocates the public key, which is the ID address, to four by constructing the proxy node layer for interacting with the hidden node. Therefore, it is an algorithm that can reduce the number of public keys and reduce energy and cost for public key management resource, that is, sensor data.

In the present invention, a ring signature having a threshold cipher (see Non-Patent Document 14) is considered to explain how the keys of the ID-based cipher having the self-control function are transmitted. If the parties in the group exceed their thresholds and cooperate with each other in the decryption protocol to decrypt the encrypted message, it is called a critical cryptosystem, in which the message is encrypted with the public key and the corresponding secret key is shared between the participating parties.

(T, n) threshold cryptosystem, if at least t parties can efficiently decrypt ciphertext in a group with n parties.

On the other hand, the ring signature should be difficult to determine who is the member member key used to generate the signature in the form of a digital signature formed by some member of each of the group users. Each group has a public key, a secret key pair (P _K1 , S _K1 ), (P _K2 , S _K2 ), ... , (P _Kn , S _Kn ), then party i can compute the ring signature for message m with inputs m, S _Ki , P _K1 , ..., P _Kn .

The validity of this ring signature must be verifiable by anyone, and it should be difficult for anyone to create a valid ring signature of a message without knowing the secret key of any group. And this is similar to group signatures, but there is no group manager, so there is no way to revoke the anonymity of each signature, and some groups of users can be used as improvised groups without additional setup.

Thus, the (t, n) critical cryptosystem can verify the authenticated secrets that can be authenticated without an undesired side effect and how to leak authoritative secrets in anonymous ways.

In the present invention, by performing each of the above steps by the interaction of the proxy node layer, the hidden layer, and the self control layer, not only the mobility support of the mobile node in the USN service, but also the calculation amount is reduced.

(A) ID generation step: performed at the proxy node layer

Sensor nodes are usually part of the same administrative entity, so they are different from the Internet environment because nodes have already met before deployment. That is, the sensor nodes can establish a trust relationship between them in the initial environment in which they can exchange plaintext information before deployment.

Therefore, based on the trust relationship of sensor nodes before deployment, simple ID assignment of generation, update, and withdrawal is made with algorithm K _{- proxies} .

(1) ID generation

The key generation center (KGC), which is a trusted third party, _grants the ID generated by the algorithm K _-Proxies to the node in the network bootstrapping step. The node that received the ID gets the trust of the whole network and the ring structure that can be transmitted to the one hop neighbor node and can regenerate the ID. Therefore, if a node wants to add to the network or update its ID with a system failure, the algorithm K _-Proxies must be determined before the network can be established.

The KGC assigns the public key, which is the address of ID 1, -1, i , - i including the complex number, and the public key and its secret key to {0,1} ^* of the pseudorandom binary sequence generator. And generates a binary bit string. As shown in FIG. 2, a cluster R _i having no limitation on the size including the CH (Cluster Head) (considering the mobility of the node) is configured. In addition, the KGC generates the master key of the CH together with the ID generation, thereby mastering the key data for creating the session key for the secret key of the nodes in the cluster. ID generation is technically the same as ID update, but requires more security.

(2) Updating ID

If a new node is added to the network after the initial ID is created in the node, or if it wants to update the node's ID with a system failure, it must be updated within the T _renew time and its ID is also updated if the node's key pair is updated do. To update the ID, the node must satisfy the current expiration time T <(current time + T _renew ) for the current valid ID and new ID.

(3) ID withdrawal

If the ID is compromised, it must be withdrawn from the counter-ID and discarded by itself, and a subset of the counter-ID must be maintained within the past T _renew time.

The proxy node creation algorithm for ID assignment is as follows.

(B) Simple routing step: Perform in the hidden layer

The hidden layer uses a routing function R () that outputs a value of "1" which is input with four IDs 1, -1, i , - i including complex numbers to protect the node's fast movement and ID exposure .

Routing function R () of Fig. 3 is a function that an output of a constant value as an input variable value as a hash function, the inputs to the ID 1, -1, i, - a variable that may be which of the four of the i . However, the variable size is proportional to the cluster size, and there is no cluster size limitation. Quot; 1 "which is a value obtained by quadrupling each node ID in an arbitrary cluster. That is, 1 × 1 × 1 × 1 = 1, -1 × -1 × -1 × -1 = 1, i × i × i × i = 1, - a i = 1 - i × - i × - i × The routing function R () is as follows.

_{R 1 (1) = R (} 1) × R (1) × R (1) × R (1) = 1

R _-1 -1 = R 1 _-1 R ₁ -1 R ₁ = 1

_{R i (i) = R (} i) × R (i) × R (i) × R (i) = 1

_{R -i (- i) = R} (- i) × R (- i) × R (- i) × R (- i) = 1

x=1, -1, i, -i k=k+1 (1≤k≤ 4)

x = 1, -1, i , - i k = k + 1 (1? k? 4)

Therefore, all the ID values in the cluster of FIG. 4 possess a unique "1 &quot;, so there is no need for a routing table to code the ID. Even if the nodes are easily removed and added, It is possible to protect the ID exposure from the attacker without being limited by the mobility such as the insertion removal of each node.

As a result of the routing function, all node IDs are set to "1" only once in each node life cycle. Then, each node receives the address of the ID generated at the proxy node layer as a public key, and the secret key of the pair is received from the KGC. Therefore, the hidden layer uses a temporary routing function for efficient routing and prepares the key authentication to authenticate the sensor data by interacting with the self-control layer.

(C) Key authentication step: Perform in the self-control layer

The self-control layer is a sensor node that performs key authentication with self-control capability that does not require setup procedures and revocation procedures. Such key authentication uses a threshold ring signature [see non-patent document 14], which must cooperate in order for the minimum nodes of the cluster to authenticate the key while hiding the exact membership of the subgroup.

According to the present invention, the ID-based sensor node authentication is performed based on the interaction between the surrogate node layer and the hidden layer, and the ID-based sensor node authentication protocol using the ID-based key agreement algorithm of the self-control layer. Hereinafter, these will be described in detail.

(1) Key generation

Previous sensor network key agreement [see non-patent document 15] was made between each node and KGC, but in the proposed key agreement, it is between CH and KGC. That is, the CH authenticates the keys of each node in the cluster using a threshold ring signature independent of the KGC. Therefore, it is possible to solve the problem of exposure of the secret key and master key under the previous KGC management. The sensor node receives the public key and secret key from the KGC and communicates with the authorized CH as a legitimate node for access. The cluster master key that the CH receives from the KGC carries out key management to change the key pair value of each node in the cluster, but the KGC only generates the keys.

The periodic key update for the dynamic phase change of the sensor node is calculated based on the mobility factor (see Non-Patent Document 16) and updates the two keys. First, the sensor data set security through the cluster master key is secured by updating the cluster master key shared with each CH and all the cluster members, and the key pair which is the public key and secret key of the cluster member used to generate the cluster master key.

In each cluster, the CH broadcasts a Hello message, including the ID of each node and the K _pub sequence, which is used only once in the entire sensor network lifetime, to all neighboring sensor nodes. When the neighboring sensor receives this message, the neighboring sensor returns the message authentication code (MAC) encrypted with the key pair to the CH. So the CH uses a threshold ring signature to regenerate a new key pair between itself and this sensor. Once all key pairs in the cluster have been updated, the new cluster master key is sent to each cluster member with the updated key pair.

The CH manages the access control list (ACL) for access by the KGC-generated key pair and the cluster master key as legitimate nodes in the proxy node layer.

As shown in FIG. 5, an ACL is composed of an ID, a public key, a private key, and an access privilege mask (APM), and consists of a binary bit set specifying node information and service approval.

The cluster public key (K _pub ) is generated by adding the public key of each node of the cluster and then hashing, and depends on the cluster size, which is the number of cluster nodes at that time. The cluster secret key K _priv is generated by XORing and then hashing the secret key of each node of the cluster. The cluster master key is generated by hashing the secret key of each node of the cluster and then XORing the hash again.

- Cluster public key:

- Cluster secret key:

- Cluster master key:

As shown in FIG. 6, the ID-based key distribution supports key generation in a zone in the same manner as a cluster key, and the method is as follows.

- Zone public key:

- Zone secret key:

- John Master Key:

(2) ID-based sensor key agreement algorithm

The ID-based sensor key agreement consists of four steps: setup, extraction, encryption, and decryption, and generates an ID-based encryption algorithm based on the four steps.

① Setup step

The new node N _new receives an ID from the KGC and broadcasts a Hello message to its neighbor nodes. After receiving the Hello message, the neighbor nodes exchange IDs to verify that the new node is a legitimate node. If the ID is corrupted, the CH removes the ID from the ACL. This is because the CH supervises the ACL based on the key generation information from the KGC. If K _priv = (K _pub ) ^s of the ID when the mast key of the CH is s, the communication channel is set. If in the re-keying for security KGC is new, any node with a short-lived K 'select _priv and then broadcast to all nodes in the cluster, only about ID K' _priv = (K _'pub) ^s, communication Set the channel.

An arbitrary node NR receives a public key and a private key from the KGC and a security parameter k∈Z ⁺ , and returns the secret key and the k system parameter of the arbitrary node to the KGC again. As a system parameter, the finite message space M and the finite cipher space C are public, and the master key is known only to KGC and CH, but the master key is managed only in CH after it is generated in KGC.

② Extraction step

The mobile node N _m receives the input k, the master key, and the random ID from the KGC, and returns the secret key K _priv to the CH. In this case, the ID address is an arbitrary string used as a public key, and _Kpriv is a decryption key which is a secret key.

③ Password phase

The generic node returns the cipher cεC with input k, ID, m∈M.

④ Decryption step

Common node returns the plaintext m∈M has the input k, c∈C, the private key K _priv.

∀ m ∈ M: Decryption (k, c, K _priv ) = m, c =

The ID-based cryptographic algorithms for the above steps ① to ④ are as follows (between line ******* and ********).

Each symbol means the following.

************************************************** ********

Setup: Given a security parameter k∈Z ⁺ , the algorithm proceeds as follows.

Step 1: Select any α∈G.

Step 2: Select any s∈Z ⁺ .

Step 3: Select a cryptographic hash function for some n.

(n: length of flat door)

H ₁ : {0,1} ^* ? G ^* H ₂ : G? {0,1} ⁿ

For security credentials, observe all hash functions with Random oracle.

Message space M = {0,1} ⁿ . Cryptographic space C = G ^* x {0,1} ⁿ . Output system parameter = {G, n, α, H ₁ , H ₂ }. The master key s? Z ⁺ . Extraction: For a given string ID ∈ {0,1} ^* , the algorithm is:

Step 4: Calculate public key K _pub = H ₁ (ID) ∈ G.

Step 5: Set the non-milky K _priv to be K _priv = (K _pub ) ^s (s is the mast key).

Password: To encrypt m∈M in the public key ID, proceed as follows.

Step 6: Calculate the public key K _pub = H ₁ (ID) ∈ G.

Step 7: Select any α ∈ {0,1} ⁿ .

Step 8: Set r = H ₂ (σ, m).

H₁ (ID)^s).
Step 9: Set the password to be ∀ c∈C. When ID is G, c = (k, ID, m

H ₁ (ID) ^s ).

Decoding: using the private key K _priv ∈G ^*, proceeds as follows: in order to decode the c∈C:

H₂ (K_priv) = σ를 계산한다.Step 10: c

Calculate H ₂ (K _priv ) = σ.

H2 ( σ　) = m을 계산한다 .Step 11: c

Calculate H2 () = m.

Step 12: Set r = H2 (σ, m) and test c = rα. If c ≠ rα, decrypt the ciphertext.

Step 13: Output m by decrypting c.

************************************************** **

(3) ID-based sensor node authentication protocol

In a typical cryptographic system, when a mast key is exposed, all users' private keys are exposed. However, the proposed study does not reveal the secret key of all nodes even if the mast key is exposed, and vice versa. This is because the KGC generates only the key as the multi- i due to the node's mobility is constantly changing, while the CH manages the ACL from the one-way hash function for the keys. Therefore, CH can perform key authentication independently of KGC.

Referring to Table 1, referring to Table 1, the KGC generates a key pair (K _pub, K _priv ) and sends it to the arbitrary (new) node N _R (N _new ) and the mobile node N _m . An arbitrary node N _R sends a clustering request message (RQC) to the CH, and the CH sends the first key information including the ID of the NR to the KGC. KGC checks the first secret key including the ID of N _R , and sends an authentication response message (RPA) to the CH if the key information is correct.

If the key information is not correct, the KGC sends a Clustering Response Message (RPC) to the CH. If a new node N _new is added to the network, it must be verified that it is a valid node. If N _new has the same ID as the granted N _R , then CH sends an RPA to N _new .

If CH suspects N _m as an attacker, it sends an emergency clustering request message (ERQC) to KGC. The KGC sends an emergency clustering response message (ERPC) with the key information including the ID address of N _{m to} the CH, and the CH authenticates the secret key of N _{m with} the master key. If the CH has authenticated the node with an ACL, it sends an RPA to N _m , otherwise N _m itself is removed.

In the same way, the N _m1 N _m2 This mask is suspected attackers, N _m1 sends ERQC to CH. CH is compared with the ACL information of N _m2 constructed based on KGC key generation. If the value of N _m2 does not match the ACL information, the CH sends the ERQC to the KGC, then the KGC removes the key generation information of N _m2 and sends the ERPC to the CH. The CH receiving the ERPC removes N _m2 from the ACL, while the KGC sends an RPC containing the updated key information of N ' _{m2 to} the CH.

[Table 1]

The key authentication method according to the present invention was evaluated through simulation.

For the simulation environment, the computer system model is Intel Pentium E2220 2.40 GHz, 1.75 GB RAM, and the operating system (OS) is Tiny OS [refer to non-patent document 17]. The number of cluster sensor nodes is 500, Is 100 m × 100 m, the wireless communication range of each node is 10 m, and each CH is set to any position in the zone. The simulation continues for 600 seconds, generating a randomly distributed topology in a square by BRITE v2.1b [see non-patent reference 18], and does not consider collision and congestion between sensor nodes.

The simulation of the proposed IBE scheme is compared with the proposed scheme of Chen et al. [See Non-Patent Document 19] and Hess [see Non-Patent Document 11], and the CPU time required for key operations of encryption and decryption, Respectively. The comparative analysis of the proposed IBE scheme with reference to [Non-Patent Document 20] is shown in [Table 2]. [Table 2] shows the CPU time required for encryption and decryption of the key length of the proposed scheme from the pairing to the Chen scheme of ID-based key authentication [see Non-Patent Document 19]. The average value of 20 times in the simulation environment , The CPU time required for encrypting and decrypting the proposed IBE scheme with a key length of 160 bits is 5.7 seconds and 4.3 seconds, respectively, and the CPU time required for encryption and decryption of the key length of 1024 bits [see Non-Patent Document 19] 11.7 seconds and 19.5 seconds, respectively, and the calculation time is proportional to the key length. The result of [Table 2] is that the key discovery operation must be performed when the pairing key is stored in each node and communicates with other nodes, Because it only computes the secret key.

[Table 2]

In Fig. 8, the number of sensors in the fixed 100 m x 100 m routing area changes from 100 to 500 in 100 increments. 8 shows the network transmission delay time according to the sensor density in the proposed IBE scheme and the Hess scheme. The proposed IBE scheme and the Hess scheme show that the transmission delay time increases as the sensor density increases.

In the proposed I BE scheme, when the sensor density increases, the number of sensor nodes in each cluster is larger and the number of packets to be transmitted to the CH is larger. The reason is that as the sensor density increases, the transmission delay time increases due to an increase in the key operation required for encryption and decryption in the proposed IBE scheme. The Hess scheme also shows that the transmission delay time is increased compared with the proposed IBE scheme despite the efficient pairing based ID-based signature.

This is because the proposed IBE scheme satisfies safety by preparing for mobility of the sensor node by simple routing and interaction of three layers.

As described above, the sensor node is exposed to a physical environment attack, so that the transmission information is easily changed or an unauthorized node transmits data, thereby easily collapsing the integrity of the entire information. If the malicious node masquerades as a legitimate sensor node It is possible to shorten the network lifetime by continuously generating unnecessary information and depleting resources of the intermediate node.

Therefore, the present invention proposes an ID-based key authentication technique based on this problem, which focuses on weight reduction. The advantage of this scheme is that it reduces the CPU time used for encryption and decryption under limited resources due to the interaction of three layers, and it shows that the transmission delay is improved than the previous research despite the fast phase change of the sensor node.

In addition, the previous key agreement is performed in each node and the KGC, but the proposed key agreement is key agreement in KGC and CH, and KGC generates key only. After key generation, key management is independent of KGC in CH and autonomous The master key exposure problem of the previous key generating organization can be solved, and a key authentication process that can adapt to the sensor node characteristic can be constructed.

Therefore, the ID-based key authentication of the present invention does not require a linear distributed key process as compared with the previous studies, and the number of bytes to code an ID can be reduced because the type of the ID is simple, and the public key, In addition, it is possible to achieve active key authentication to cope with insertion and deletion of fast nodes by node authentication by an authentication process in a cluster.

Claims (6)

A key generation center (KGC), which is a trusted third party,
An ID-based key authentication method for security of sensor data communication in a sensor network including a plurality of sensor nodes in which mutual trust relationships are established, that is,
(A) when the key generation center (KGC) receives the ID generated by the algorithm K- _proxies in a network bootstrapping step, or when a new node is added to the network or when a node failure Renewing and revoking an ID that is revoked from the counter-ID and discarded if the ID of the sensor node is damaged;
(B) The key generation center (KGC) assigns a public key which is an address of ID 1, -1, i , - i including a complex number so that a value of "1" is unique when the routing function R , A public key and a private key as a pair are generated as a {0, 1} ^* binary bit string of a pseudo-random binary sequence generator to constitute each sensor cluster Ri including a CH (Cluster Head) Performing master preparation of key data for creating a session key for a secret key of nodes in the cluster;
(C) authenticating a key of the sensor node through a set-up procedure, a thresholding ring signature that does not require a revocation procedure;
Wherein the authentication information includes at least one of a password and a password.
The method according to claim 1,
The step (C)
Wherein the ID-based encryption algorithm is composed of four steps: a setup step, an extraction step, an encryption step, and a decryption step, and generates an ID-based encryption algorithm based on the ID-based encryption algorithm.
3. The method of claim 2,
The setup step is performed when a new node N _new is added to the cluster,
The new node N _new receives an ID from the KGC and broadcasts a Hello message to the neighbor nodes and the neighbor nodes exchange IDs to verify whether or not the new node is a legitimate node after receiving the Hello message ID based key authentication method for security of sensor data communication.
3. The method of claim 2,
The extracting step is performed when the sensor node has a mobile node N _m moving to another cluster of the system,
The mobile node N _m receives an arbitrary ID, which is an arbitrary string used as an input k, a master key, and a public key, from the KGC, and returns a secret key K _priv as a decryption key to the CH. Key authentication method.
3. The method of claim 2,
In the encryption step,
Wherein the general node receives the input k, ID, m? M from the KGC, and returns the encrypted cryptogram c? C.
3. The method of claim 2,
In the decoding step,
Common input node k, c∈C from KGC, the secret key K ID key based authentication method for secure communication of the sensor data, characterized in that that _priv delivered being returned to a plaintext m∈M decrypting.

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