KR101426479B1 - System for protecting data of storage and method thereof - Google Patents

Abstract

A storage information protection system according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention includes a memory part that is divided into a plurality of storage areas to store various data information and stores important data information encrypted in a predetermined storage area of the storage areas, A domain unit having a plurality of OS domains as access subjects and loading data information of the storage area that is allowed to access to each of the OS domains, and a control unit for controlling the operation so that the domain unit can access the memory unit . According to the present invention, it is possible to protect important data information stored in the storage from malicious access in an environment in which various access subjects can access information stored in the storage.

Storage, memory, domain, VMM, data

Description

Storage information protection system and method

The present invention relates to a system and method for protecting information stored in a storage medium such as a flash memory, and more particularly, to a system and method for protecting information stored in a storage from a malicious access, ≪ / RTI >

Generally, devices such as PC, PDA, wireless terminal, and DTV can use virtualization technology for safety and various applications and services. In order to provide a safe environment for such virtualization technology, it requires functions such as Secure Boot, Secure SW, and Access Control. As one of the core technologies for providing such functions, Storage security systems are being developed to protect critical data information stored in storage such as hard disks and flash memory from malicious access and to limit storage usage among different access entities (domains).

FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a conventional storage information protection system, and FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram showing an information access restriction area of a conventional storage information protection system.

1 and 2, a conventional storage information protection system is provided with a driver / control domain 31 (VMM) capable of directly accessing a memory (storage) 20 in an environment using a VMM And a general domain 32 accessible to the memory 31 only through the driver / control domain 31. [

The driver / control domain 31 can access both the driver / control domain use area (FIG. 2A) and the normal domain use area (FIG. 2B) ) Is accessible only to the general domain usage domain (domain (b)).

However, in the above conventional storage information protection system, due to the access area setting, the driver / control domain 31 may store important information such as the VMM 10, the security key, the driver / control domain kernel, Since the kernel stored in the use area (area (b)) can also be accessed, protection against important information stored in the storage is weak.

In order to enable secure booting, the VMM 10 and the kernel, or even the boot loader, must check whether the hardware or the VMM 10 is changed in order of the kernel, So that it is difficult to support security boot which is the basis of a safe environment.

There is also a risk of changing important information data codes due to malicious software, such as viruses. That is, if all the data such as the kernel, device driver, security policy, and master key are exposed to the normal use environment, it may be changed due to virus infection, etc., and the user may be disadvantageous. For example, when the virus changes the keyboard device driver, input data of a user, such as an ID / password, may be transmitted to another person.

In addition, there is a problem that a user may illegally change a commercial code or data such as digital rights management (DRM). That is, since the user can easily access all the data such as the VMM 10, the security policy, and the master key, the user can easily take data to be protected by the DRM using a crack program, And the like.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The present invention has been made to solve the above problems and it is an object of the present invention to provide a storage information protection system capable of protecting important data information stored in the storage from malicious access in an environment in which various access subjects can access information stored in the storage. System, and method.

The objects of the present invention are not limited to the above-mentioned objects, and other objects not mentioned can be clearly understood by those skilled in the art from the following description.

In order to achieve the above object, a storage information protection system according to an embodiment of the present invention is divided into a plurality of storage areas so that various data information can be classified and stored, A domain unit for storing a plurality of OS domains as an access subject and loading data information of the storage area that is allowed to access each of the OS domains; And a control unit for controlling access.

According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a storage information protection method comprising: (a) dividing and storing various data information; (B) dividing the domain part into a plurality of OS domains so that various access subjects for the data information of the memory part are formed, and (c) dividing the domain part into a plurality of OS domains in the memory part Accessing the storage area to be allocated and loading the data information.

The details of other embodiments are included in the detailed description and drawings.

According to the storage information protection system and method of the present invention as described above, there are one or more of the following effects.

First, in an environment in which various access subjects can access information stored in the storage, each access subject is controlled to access a storage area allocated to each of the storage objects in the storage, thereby storing the information in the storage from the malicious access It can protect important data information.

Second, it is possible to secure the safety of the data information stored in the storage by preventing the risk of changing the data code or the like from the malicious access to the important data information.

Third, secure boot support, which is the foundation of a secure environment for storage information protection, is available.

The effects of the present invention are not limited to the effects mentioned above, and other effects not mentioned can be clearly understood by those skilled in the art from the description of the claims.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS The advantages and features of the present invention, and the manner of achieving them, will be apparent from and elucidated with reference to the embodiments described hereinafter in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. The present invention may, however, be embodied in many different forms and should not be construed as limited to the embodiments set forth herein. Rather, these embodiments are provided so that this disclosure will be thorough and complete, and will fully convey the scope of the invention to those skilled in the art. To fully disclose the scope of the invention to those skilled in the art, and the invention is only defined by the scope of the claims. Like reference numerals refer to like elements throughout the specification.

Hereinafter, a storage information protection system and method according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. In the following description, well-known functions or constructions are not described in detail to avoid unnecessarily obscuring the subject matter of the present invention.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration of a storage information protection system according to an embodiment of the present invention, FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating divided storage areas of a memory unit in the storage information protection system of the present invention, FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating an area where each OS domain or the like, which is an access subject in the storage information protection system of the present invention, can access to storage areas of a memory unit.

3 to 5, the storage information protection system according to an embodiment of the present invention includes a memory unit 100, a domain unit 200, a control unit 300, and the like.

The memory unit 100 is a storage for storing data information. The memory unit 100 is divided into a plurality of storage areas so that various data information can be classified and stored according to type and security, and important data information is encrypted and stored in a predetermined storage area of the storage areas.

The memory unit 100 includes first, second, third, and fourth memory areas 110, 120, 130, and 140. The first memory area 110, the second memory area 130, and the third memory area 130 are flash memories, and the fourth memory area 140 is a non-volatile memory, )to be. That is, the first, second, and third memory areas 110, 120, and 130 are storage areas that can be accessed and updated from the authenticated system, and the fourth memory area 140 is illegally changed Can not be stored.

The first memory area 110 is an area in which important data information requiring security is encrypted and stored. The encrypted data information includes data requiring confidentiality and integrity, for example, a system manufacturer's certificate, a virtual machine monitor (VMM) image, an electronic signature value for each image, a security key, And is stored by being encrypted by the master key 142 stored in the master key 142. More specifically, the first memory area 110 includes a first security area (SP1) 111 in which data information of a digital signature value for a system manufacturer's certificate, a VMM image, and an OS kernel image are encrypted and stored, A second security zone (SP2) 112 in which data information of system policies used for access control is encrypted and stored in the control unit 300, a security key (SP2) 112 used in the first domain 210 And a third security zone (SP3) 113 in which data information of the first security zone (SP3) is encrypted and stored. The first memory area 110 must ensure confidentiality and integrity, minimize overhead according to the frequency of modification, and be accessible only to the authorized user and the VMM authority. The data information stored in an arbitrary area of the first memory area 110 is encrypted by the master key 142 stored in another area of the first memory area 110 or in the fourth memory area 140. [ Also, the encrypted data information stored in the first memory area 110 is updated in real time through the controller 300.

The second memory area 120 is an area for storing OS image data information of the first, second and third domains 210, 220 and 230 to be described later. The second memory area 120 stores a kernel image for booting the first, second, and third domains 210, 220, and 230, respectively. The second memory region 120 must guarantee the integrity of the OS images of the first, second and third domains 210, 220, and 230, and only the authenticated user and the VMM authority, the first domain 210 authority Should be accessible.

The third memory area 130 stores the areas DP1, DP2, and DP3 131, 132, and 133 in which specific data information necessary for execution of the first, second, and third domains 210, 220, )to be.

The fourth memory area 140 is an area for storing basic data information for system boot and information security. The boot loader 141 and the master key 142 data information are stored in the fourth memory area 140. The fourth memory area 140 should block illegal modification and access of data information from software and hardware attacks and the authenticated boot loader should include at least the verified code for functional aspects.

The domain unit 200 includes a plurality of OS domains, which are access subjects, and loads the data information of the storage area in which the memory unit 100 is allowed to access each OS domain. In the present invention, a domain means an environment in which each OS domain can operate.

The domain unit 200 includes first, second, and third domains 210, 220, and 230, and each of the domains 210, 220, and 230 may correspond to an allocated storage area of the memory unit 100 Access is restricted. This access restriction can be controlled according to the system policy.

More specifically, the first domain 210 downloads only authenticated software from an authenticated Internet server, thereby enabling safe installation and execution. The first domain 210 includes a file system 211 that does not include an FTL such as a FAT file system, a front-end MTD 212, a flash driver used by the first domain 210, An FTL 213 that can access only the area allocated to the front-end MTD 212, and the like. The first domain 210 is responsible for updating various security policies and kernel images and the like so that the second and third security areas 112 and 113 and the second memory area 120, and the third memory area 130, to the data area of the storage area 131 allocated to the third memory area 130.

The second domain 220 downloads and installs and executes any software from a general Internet server. The second domain 220 includes a file system 221 including an FTL such as JFFS2 used in a Linux device, a front-end MTD 222, and the like. The front-end MTDs 212 and 222 of the first and second domains 210 and 220 are allocated from the back-end MTDs 232 of the third domain 230, To the first and second domains 210,220. The second domain 220 can access the data information of the storage area 132 allocated to the second memory area 130 in the third memory area 130.

The third domain 230 allows the first and second domains 210 and 220 to access the data information of each allocated storage area of the memory unit 100 through the VMM and manages a hardware device driver. The third domain 230 includes an FTL 231 that protects the VMM from the frequent and unstable operation of the flash driver updated in the third domain 230 and reduces the weight of the VMM, A back-end MTD 232 for performing operations such as read / write / delete, and access control for access control of areas allocated by the back-end MTD 232. The back- An access control 233, and the like. Since the third domain 230 performs a substantially read / write operation, it is possible to access all of the data information of the first, second, and third memory areas 110, 120, and 130.

The control unit 300 controls the operation of the domain unit 200 so that the domain unit 200 can access the memory unit 100 using the VMM. The control unit 300 manages data stored in the first memory area 110 and uses the FTL 231 of the third domain 230 in an upcall to access the first memory area 110 And a Secure Repository Manager (310). The control unit 300 can access the data information of the first security area 111 of the first memory area 110 using the VMM.

Hereinafter, a storage information protection method according to an embodiment of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to FIGS.

6 is a flowchart illustrating a method for protecting storage information according to the present invention.

As shown in FIG. 6, the storage information protection method according to an embodiment of the present invention divides and stores various data information, and stores a plurality of storage units 100 in a memory unit 100 so as to encrypt and store important data information. (S101). A second memory area 120 in which OS image data information of each of the domains 210, 220 and 230 is stored, a first memory area 110 in which important data information requiring security is stored, A third memory area 130 in which data information necessary for execution of each of the domains 210, 220 and 230 is stored, and a fourth memory area 140 in which basic data information for system booting and information security is stored The memory unit 100 is divided. Next, the domain unit 100 is divided into a plurality of OS domains so that various access subjects to the data information of the memory unit 100 are formed (S102). A first domain 210 providing an OS capable of installing and executing authenticated security software, a second domain 220 providing an OS capable of installing and executing general software, The second domain 210 and the second domain 230 divide the domain into the third domain 230 that provides the OS with access to the allocated storage areas of the memory unit 100. Next, each of the domains 210, 220, and 230 accesses a storage area allocated to itself in the memory unit 100 to load data information. More specifically, the first domain 210 accesses data information of a storage area allocated to itself in the first, second and third memory areas 110, 120 and 130, and the second domain 220 accesses The third domain 230 accesses the data of all the storage areas of the first, second and third memory areas 110, 120, and 130, Information is accessed and the data information is loaded.

That is, the present invention allows only information necessary for each access subject to access the storage in an environment having various subjects (domains) accessible by using the VMM for data information stored in a storage such as a flash memory, It is possible to protect important information from a user or a malicious virus, for example, data information such as a master key, a VMM, a kernel, and a security policy.

7 is a flowchart illustrating an initialization method of the storage information protection system of the present invention.

7, when the system is reset (S201), the boot loader 141 of the fourth memory area 140 is activated (initialized) (S202). Next, the boot loader 141 decrypts the digital signature value for the VMM image and the OS image, and loads the digital signature value into the memory unit 100 (S203). Next, the boot loader 141 checks whether the VMM is changed, that is, the VMM integrity check, using the digital signature value of the decrypted VMM image and the OS image (S204). Next, as a result of the integrity check of the VMM, if there is no abnormality, the VMM is loaded and operated (S205). If abnormality is found, processing is performed according to a predetermined policy of the system (S206). Next, the VMM checks the integrity of the OS image (S207). If there is no abnormality, the third domain 230 is operated (S208). Next, the VMM loads the first and second domains 210 and 220 into the memory unit 100 to check and execute integrity (S209).

8 is a flowchart illustrating an example of loading a security key of a third security area of a first memory area by a first domain in the storage information protection system of the present invention.

As shown in FIG. 8, the first domain 210 requests a 'security 1 key' of the first security area 111. Next, the control unit 300 decrypts the 'security 1 key' using the 'master key' and provides it to the first domain 210. Next, the first domain 210 requests data information of the third security domain 113 from the third domain 230. Next, the third domain 230 provides data information of the encrypted third security area 113 to the first domain 210. Next, the first domain 210 decrypts and uses the 'security 3 key' using the 'security 1 key'.

While the present invention has been described in connection with what is presently considered to be practical exemplary embodiments, it is to be understood that the invention is not limited to the disclosed embodiments, but, on the contrary, You will understand. It is therefore to be understood that the embodiments described above are illustrative in all aspects and not restrictive. The scope of the present invention is defined by the appended claims rather than the detailed description and all changes or modifications derived from the meaning and scope of the claims and their equivalents are to be construed as being included within the scope of the present invention do.

1 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a conventional storage information protection system.

2 is a schematic view showing an information access restriction area of a conventional storage information protection system;

3 is a block diagram illustrating a configuration of a storage information protection system according to an embodiment of the present invention.

4 is a view showing divided storage areas of a memory unit in the storage information protection system of the present invention.

FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating an area where each OS domain or the like, which is an access subject in the storage information protection system of the present invention, is accessible to storage areas of a memory unit. FIG.

6 is a flowchart illustrating a method for protecting storage information according to the present invention.

7 is a flowchart illustrating a method of initializing a storage information protection system according to the present invention.

8 is a flowchart illustrating an example of loading a security key of a third security area in a first memory area by a first domain in the storage information protection system of the present invention.

Description of the Related Art

100: memory unit 110: first memory area

111: first security area 112: second security area

113: third security area 120: second memory area

130: third memory area 140: fourth memory area

141: Boot loader 142: Master key

200: domain unit 210: first domain

220: second domain 230: third domain

300:

Claims (22)

A plurality of storage areas, which are divided into a plurality of storage areas so that various data information can be separately stored, and are divided into a plurality of storage areas to store various data information among the storage areas, A memory unit in which data information is encrypted and stored; A domain unit having a plurality of OS domains as an access subject and loading data information of the storage area in which access is permitted to each of the OS domains; And And a control unit for controlling an access operation of the domain unit with respect to the memory unit, The domain unit includes: A first domain providing an OS capable of installing and executing authenticated security software; A second domain that provides an OS capable of installing and executing general software; And And a third domain that provides an OS that allows the first and second domains to be accessible to respective allocated storage areas of the memory unit, Wherein the first domain, the second domain, and the control unit are capable of accessing data information of each allocated storage area of the memory unit through the third domain. The method according to claim 1, Wherein the controller is controlled using a VMM (Virtual Machine Monitor). delete delete The method according to claim 1, Wherein the memory unit is a non-volatile memory. The memory device according to claim 1, A first memory area in which important data information requiring security is encrypted and stored; A second memory area for storing OS image data information of the OS domains; A third memory area for storing data information necessary for execution of the OS domains; And And a fourth memory area for storing basic data information for system boot and information security. 7. The memory device according to claim 6, A first security zone in which data information of a digital signature value for a certificate of a system manufacturer, a VMM image, and an OS kernel image are encrypted and stored; A second security zone in which data information of system policies used for access control in the control unit is encrypted and stored; And And a third security zone in which data information of a security key used in the first domain is encrypted and stored. The method according to claim 6, Wherein the data information stored in an arbitrary area of the first memory area is encrypted by a master key stored in another area of the first memory area or the fourth memory area. The method according to claim 6, Wherein the encrypted data information stored in the first memory area is updated in real time by the controller. The method according to claim 6, And a kernel image for booting the OS domains is stored in the second memory area. The method according to claim 6, And a boot loader and master key data information is stored in the fourth memory area. 8. The method of claim 7, Wherein the first domain is a storage area accessible from the first memory area to the second security area, the third security area, the second memory area, and the third memory area, Information protection system. 8. The method of claim 7, And the second domain can access data information of a storage area allocated to itself in the third memory area. 8. The method of claim 7, Wherein the third domain accesses all the data information of the first, second, and third memory areas. 8. The method of claim 7, Wherein the controller is able to access data information of the first security area of the first memory area using the VMM. (a) dividing and storing various data information, dividing a memory unit into a plurality of storage areas so that important data information can be encrypted and stored; (b) a first domain for providing an OS capable of installing and executing security software authenticated as a domain unit so that various access subjects for the data information of the memory unit are formed, and a first domain providing an OS capable of installing and executing general software 2 domain, and a third domain that provides an OS that allows the first and second domains to access the respective allocated storage areas of the memory unit; And (c) accessing a storage area allocated to the first to third domains in the memory unit, respectively, and loading the data information, wherein the first and second domains are allocated to respective ones of the memory units And loading the data information by accessing the data information of the storage area. 17. The method of claim 16, wherein step (a) A first memory area in which important data information requiring security is encrypted and stored, a second memory area in which OS image data information of the OS domains is stored, and a third memory And partitioning the memory unit into a fourth memory area in which basic data information for system boot and information security is stored. delete 18. The method of claim 17, wherein step (c) The first domain accesses data information of a storage area allocated to itself in the first, second and third memory areas, and the second domain accesses data information of a storage area allocated to itself in the third memory area And the third domain accesses data information of all the storage areas of the first, second, and third memory areas. 20. The method of claim 19, (d) initializing the storage information protection system. 21. The method of claim 20, wherein step (d) (d1) operating the boot loader in the fourth memory area when the system is reset; (d2) the boot loader decrypting the digital signature value for the VMM image and the OS image and loading the digital signature value into the memory unit; (d3) confirming whether the VMM is changed using the digital signature value of the VMM image and the OS image decrypted by the boot loader; (d4) loading and operating the VMM if there is no abnormality as a result of the integrity check of the VMM, and if the abnormality is found, processing according to a predetermined policy of the system; And (d5) checking the integrity of the OS image by the VMM, and operating the third domain if there is no abnormality. 22. The method of claim 21, (d6) loading the first and second domains into the memory unit to check and execute integrity of the VMM.

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