KR101057650B1 - How to delegate authority to create social communities - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention relates to a method for delegating social community creation authority. The present invention relates to a method for delegating social community creation authority for mutual authentication and secure community creation authority delegation between community members applying a surrogate signature scheme in a community-based ubiquitous network. A first step (S10) in which the zone master and community members perform initial authentication to the authentication registration server through the EAP-TLS; A second step (S20) in which the authentication registration server delegates its signature authority to the authenticated zone master; A third step (S30) of generating a surrogate signature private key and a public key by adding the signature authority delegation information and its Diffie Hellman secret value to the delegated zone master; A fourth step (S40) of generating and issuing a surrogate signature to a community member existing in the community with the generated surrogate signature private key; A fifth step (S50) of verifying the surrogate signature public key by verifying the surrogate signature public key and verifying the surrogate signature by using the surrogate signature public key; A sixth step (S60) of exchanging mutual authentication and a shared secret key using a surrogate signature with another mobile node existing in the same community; A seventh step (S70) of requesting a community creation authority from the zone master for creating a social community to generate a surrogate signature for delegating community creation authority on behalf of the authentication registration server and issuing it to the community member (S70). Accordingly, the present invention provides a mutual authentication and secure key exchange scheme between community members in a community-based ubiquitous network, and securely delegates community creation authority so that community members can create autonomous communities created as needed. It is possible to perform mutual signature and secure key exchange between community members without the help of the authentication registration server, and the computation base is relatively small compared to the existing RSA signature-based proxy signature scheme, and thus various community-based terminals exist. It can be used for ubiquitous networks.

Community, ubiquitous, proxy signature, Diffie Hellman, ad hoc

Description

Method for authority delegation of social community creation}

The present invention relates to a method for delegating social community creation authority, and more particularly, to a method for delegating social community creation authority for mutual authentication and secure community creation authority delegation between community members applying proxy signature scheme in community-based ubiquitous network. will be.

As the ubiquitous network environment gradually expands to various social areas, technology research is being conducted to provide intelligent services to users, and among them, collecting and analyzing user's situational awareness information to provide necessary application services or network services. The research to do is being actively conducted.

In addition, the ubiquitous network environment coexists with various wireless and wired network environments to provide application services and network services that users need, so that users can access the network anytime and anywhere to use the necessary application services and network services. Intelligent network technologies are being developed to support these technologies, such as community-based ubiquitous networks that are being studied recently.

Community-based ubiquitous network enables users to provide the optimal network environment and necessary application services by utilizing the network situation awareness information of the terminal used for communication.For this, the zone-based ubiquitous network is zone master. It forms a community based on the zone master node and provides necessary application services and network services according to the community.

In addition, the smart packet protocol is used to share network context awareness information, service execution module, and network service execution module of users in the community. In the community-based ubiquitous network composed of such network environment, users need You can freely form and cancel your community for various purposes, including sharing your academic, gaming, information sharing, business, meetings, and networked devices at any time. Can be.

As a result, abnormal users can freely create communities for malicious purposes to hinder normal users from using the network, or confuse the entire community-based ubiquitous network, while users belonging to the community can directly ad hoc. Because of the communication, a malicious attacker can interrupt the communication of normal users at any time, and can attempt various attacks by pretending to be normal users.

Therefore, there is a need for security techniques to protect users existing in the community from such malicious attackers, to ensure secure communication, and to authenticate community masters that create communities when the community is created by the needs of users. However, security technologies are needed to provide the safety and reliability of the communities that are created.

In order to solve the problems described above, the present invention supports proxy authentication and secret key exchange and secure community generation between users in the community by applying a proxy signature scheme, but generates a signature of the authentication registration server. By delegating authority to the authenticated zone master to create the signature information generated by the registration server, the authorized zone master on behalf of the registration server for each community member in its own community. It generates and issues a signature, each community member uses it in the process of mutual authentication, and the signature information includes the Diffie Hellman public value of each community member so that they can exchange secret keys safely during mutual authentication. , And if a community member wants to create a community On the behalf of the certification registration server, the zone master can grant community creation authority to community members, and provide community community delegation authority delegation so that anyone who wants to join the community for community creation authority can verify. The purpose is to.

In order to achieve the object, there is provided a method comprising: a first step of zone master and community members performing initial authentication to an authentication registration server through EAP-TLS; A second step of the authentication registration server delegating its signature authority to the authenticated zone master; A third step of generating the surrogate signature private key and the public key by adding the signature authority delegation information and its Diffie Hellman secret value to the delegated zone master; A fourth step of generating and issuing a surrogate signature to a community member existing in the community with the generated surrogate signature private key; A fifth step of verifying the surrogate signature public key by verifying the surrogate signature public key, and verifying the surrogate signature by using the surrogate signature public key if the surrogate signature public key is verified successfully; A sixth step of exchanging mutual authentication and shared secret key using surrogate signature with another mobile node existing in the same community; Requesting a community creation authority to the zone master for creating a social community, the zone master generates a surrogate signature for delegating community creation authority on behalf of the authentication registration server, and then issues it to the community member.

As described above, the present invention provides a mutual authentication and secure secret key exchange scheme between community members in a community-based ubiquitous network, and provides a community creation authority so that community members can create autonomous communities created as needed. Delegation can be securely delegated, enabling mutual signature and secure key exchange based on surrogate signatures between community members without the help of a certificate registration server, and a variety of small terminals exist due to the relatively small amount of computation compared to the surrogate signature based on existing RSA signatures. This can be used for community-based ubiquitous networks.

1 is a reference diagram illustrating a community-based ubiquitous network structure according to the present invention, FIG. 2 is a flowchart of a method for delegating social community creation authority according to the present invention, and FIG. 3 is a method for delegating social community creation authority according to the present invention. This is a reference diagram for explanation.

Hereinafter, the components will be described with reference to the drawings.

Referring to FIG. 1, a community-based ubiquitous network of the present invention includes a uT-Gateway supporting a connection with an external network, and a user terminal that is a zone master and community member nodes used for community configuration.

The community created based on the zone master may be composed of one zone master as a group according to the nature of the community, and may be configured as a community managed by one zone master, and a mobile terminal belonging to the community They communicate directly between terminals using an ad hoc routing protocol, and pro-active and re-active routing protocols are used according to community network conditions.

Therefore, when the mobile station changes, the network settings should be automatically changed according to the network environment of the corresponding community, and the routing protocol appropriate to the environment should be used. To support this, the zone masters and mobile terminals belonging to the community are smart. The packet agent is pre-installed and provided with community status information and necessary network service modules through smart packets sent and received between smart packet agents, so that it can be executed and deleted automatically without additional actions. Mobile nodes belonging to the physical community can freely create and cancel the community according to the needs of community members.

The present invention relates to a method of mutual authentication and secure secret key exchange between community members in a community-based ubiquitous network environment, and a method for granting community creation authority to a community member who wants to autonomously create a community in a secure manner. In a community-based ubiquitous network environment such as 1, we assume an AAA / Registration server for initial authentication and registration of zone master nodes and community members, and also EAP-TLS for initial authentication of zone master and community members. Schnorr's signature method is used to generate the surrogate signature, and a secure channel is assumed between the authentication registration server, the zone master, and the zone masters.

Table 1 below summarizes the main terms used in the present invention.

Mark Justice s _o Signature of the original signature (certification registration server) s _ZM Signature of Surrogate Signer (John Master) p Small enough g Primitive roots on finite field GF (p) with the constructor of g∈Zp k randomly selected from o <k <q-1 h () One-way hash function SHA_1 ID _χ identifier of χ X _i , Y _i Diffie-Hellman Secrets and Public Values x _i , y _i Secret key and public key t Time stamp value

Referring to the flowchart of FIG. 2 and the reference diagram of FIG. 3, a method for delegating social community creation authority in a community-based ubiquitous network environment including a uT-Gateway, a zone master, and community member nodes is described. First step (S10) in which the zone master and community members perform initial authentication to the authentication registration server through EAP-TLS, and second step (S20) in which the authentication registration server delegates its signature authority to the authenticated zone master. And a third step (S30) of generating the surrogate signature private key and the public key by adding the signature authority delegation information and its Diffie Hellman secret value, and the generated master signature with the generated surrogate signature private key. A fourth step (S40) of generating and issuing a surrogate signature to a community member existing in his community; The member verifies the surrogate signature public key, and if the surrogate signature public key succeeds, step 5 (S50) of verifying the surrogate signature using the surrogate signature public key, and another mobile node existing in the same community. Step 6 (S60) of exchanging mutual authentication and shared secret key using surrogate signature, and requesting community creation authority from zone master for social community creation, the zone master grants community creation authority on behalf of the registration server. A seventh step (S70) of generating a proxy signature for delegation and issuing to a community member.

In the delegation of the signing authority of the second step (S20), after the zone master successfully performs initial authentication, the authentication registration server grants the signing authority to the zone master, and the authentication registration server first selects k∈ _R Z ^* _q . Calculate r _o = g ^k mod p, then create a signature s _o that delegates the surrogate signature authority to the zone master and pass it to the zone master along with the values of r _o , t _o , where t _o is the certificate registration It means the generation time of the signature s _o in the server, the signature generation is shown in Equation 1 below.

여기서, Y_ZM은 상기 존 마스터의 Diffie-Hellman 공개 값, ID_ZM은 상기 존 마스터의 식별자, ID_o는 상기 인증등록 서버의 식별자, x_o는 상기 인증등록 서버의 비밀 키를 각각 의미한다.

Here, Y _ZM represents a Diffie-Hellman public value of the zone master, ID _ZM represents an identifier of the zone master, ID _o represents an identifier of the authentication registration server, and x _o represents a secret key of the authentication registration server.

The generation of the surrogate signature private key and the public key in the third step (S30) is performed by the zone master, which has received the signature information from the authentication registration server, to calculate the g ^so , and to verify the signature. Create a surrogate signature private key x _zm = s _o + X _zm and a public key y _zm = g ^xzm mod p using your Diffie Hellman private value X _zm .

In the fourth step (S40), generation and issuance of the surrogate signature generate a surrogate signature private key and public key to be used for the surrogate signature, and the zone master requests signature information with the surrogate signature private key x _zm on behalf of the authentication registration server. Sign the community member's identifier ID _MN and the Diffie Hellman public value Y _MN of the community member requesting the signature information with the Schnorr signature scheme and then give the community member s _ZM , t _ZM , r _ZM and their public values Y _ZM . transmitted together, and wherein transmitting r _ZM is zone and the master is calculated using the k _ZM ∈ _r Z ^* _q to g ^kZM selecting arbitrarily value, generating an authentication registration server generates the signature verification and proxy signature are together Equation 2 below.

여기서, y_o는 상기 인증등록 서버의 공개 키, t_ZM은 상기 존 마스터에서의 s_ZM의 생성 시간을 각각 의미한다.

Here, y _o denotes a public key of the authentication registration server, and t _ZM denotes a generation time of s _ZM in the zone master, respectively.

In the proxy signature verification of step 5 (S50), the community member having received the signature uses the signature master's public key y _zm to verify whether the authentication block server is a signature generated by the zone master, which is normally authorized to generate the signature. Verify that the proxy has been delegated normally by verifying, and if the verification succeeds, the proxy signature s _ZM is verified using the public key y _zm , but Equation 3 below shows the verification of whether the proxy has been delegated successfully.

In the sixth step (S60), the mutual authentication is performed by a community member who has been issued a signature from the zone master to perform mutual authentication between community members existing in the same community using the signature as a certificate, and the community members who want to communicate with each other are mutually authenticated. The request message is transmitted to the counterpart node, and the mutual authentication request message includes S _ZM1 , Y _MN1 , and t.

One community member receives the message and confirm by signing the public key y _zm of John Masters, and when the verification is successful, community members will create a new private key SK using the Diffie Hellman public values, MAC _SK mutual authentication response message Y _MN2 , S _ZM2 , t are transferred together, and the secret keys SK and MAC _SK are generated as in Equation 4 below.

여기서, S_ZM1은 존 마스터가 상기 통신을 원하는 커뮤니티 멤버로 발급한 대리 서명, Y_MN1은 상기 통신을 원하는 커뮤니티 멤버의 Diffie-Hellman 공개 값, S_ZM2은 존 마스터가 상기 메시지를 수신한 커뮤니티 멤버로 발급한 대리 서명, Y_MN2은 상기 메시지를 수신한 커뮤니티 멤버의 Diffie-Hellman 공개 값, X_MN2은 상기 메시지를 수신한 커뮤니티 멤버의 Diffie-Hellman 비밀 값, t는 상기 메시지를 수신한 커뮤니티 멤버에서의 MAC_SK을 각각 의미한다.

Here, S _ZM1 is a surrogate signature issued by the zone master to the community member wanting the communication, Y _MN1 is a Diffie-Hellman public value of the community member wanting the communication, and S _ZM2 is a community member where the zone master has received the message. Issuing surrogate signature, Y _MN2 is the Diffie-Hellman public value of the community member that received the message, X _MN2 is the Diffie-Hellman secret value of the community member receiving the message, t is the community member that received the message MAC _SK stands for each.

Then, the community member receiving the mutual authentication response message performs mutual authentication and secure key exchange by verifying MAC _SK with the secret key generated using the included Diffie Hellman value.

In community-based ubiquitous networks, community members can freely create communities as needed, and a new signature that includes community creation rights from the zone master when a community member who has been signed by the zone master wants to create a community as needed. Should be issued.

In the community creation request of the seventh step (S70), a community member who wants to create a community requests a community creation authority from a zone master, and a user has a signature s _ZM issued from the zone master and community related information that he or she wants to create. The included message M and time information t _D are encrypted with the secret key SK _ZM and transmitted to the zone master. The secret key SK _ZM used at this time is a community member created through the Diffie Hellman public value Y _ZM of the zone master. The message is shown in Equation 5 below.

여기서, 시간 정보 t_D는 상기 커뮤니티 생성 권한을 요청한 커뮤니티 멤버에서의 상기 요청 메시지의 생성 시간을 의미한다.

Here, the time information t _D means the generation time of the request message in the community member who requested the community creation right.

Further, in the community generation delegation of the first step 7 (S70), zone master to SK _ZM using the Diffie Hellman public value Y _MN of community members for receiving the encrypted community generation capabilities request message, then the message decode After creating, decrypt the message, and then verify the community member's signature to verify that it is a normal community member, then generate and deliver a new signature S _ZM with community creation authority, and create a community in the newly created signature S _ZM. The CM _ZM information and the authority delegation time information t _CM including the authority to be generated are generated, and the response message transmitted is expressed by Equation 6 below.

In the seventh step (S70), community creation, the community member who has been granted the authority to create a community, requests the neighboring nodes to join the community created by passing a signature including the authority to create the community. A community member authorized to create a community is called a community master, and the community master can generate and distribute a group key for secure communication between community members who join the community and other community members of the community they create.

As described above, the method for delegating social community creation authority of the present invention satisfies the security and non-repudiation function required by the existing surrogate signature protocols, and uses the Diffie Hellman key distribution method in the process of exchanging mutual authentication and secret key. The mutual authentication and secret key can be shared between mobile nodes without the assumption of a secret channel, and at each performance stage, the original signer, the surrogate signer, and the mobile nodes can verify the delegation and signature information between each other. Can check and prevent use.

According to the above safety analysis, the present invention provides a method for distinguishing Distinguishability, Verifiability, Strong non-forgeability, Strong Identifiability, and Strong non-deniability. There is a characteristic.

The distinctiveness of the signature s _ZM includes the ID of the original signer and the ID of the zone master as the surrogate signer, and also requires both the public key y ₀ of the original signer and the public y y _ZM of the surrogate signer. For example, a surrogate signature s _ZM may verify that the surrogate signature is signed by an agent designated by the original signature holder.

The verifiability means that an arbitrary node can verify that the original signer normally delegates the signing authority to the surrogate signature, and the zone master, the surrogate signer, generates a surrogate signature private key x _ZM based on the signature s ₀ delivered by the original signature. G ^χZM to generate a surrogate signature public key y _ZM .

Thus, haebomyeon verifying the public key y _ZM of proxy signer to check that delegate signing authority normally Book Review woman, proxy signature verification of the public key y _ZM is y _ZM = y _o ^H r _o Y _ZM a verifiable through, that is The public key y _ZM cannot be generated without delegation of the original signature of the original signer, and authenticity can be verified through public key verification.

In the strong anti-counterfeiting, the signature of the original signature of the original signature and the ID of the surrogate signature are transferred to the signature of the original signature of the original signature, so that the signature of the original signature cannot be arbitrarily modified and forged, and this signature normally performs initial authentication with the registration server. since John master and share it forwarded to the zone master is encrypted proxy signer through a shared secret key that malicious attackers can not forge the signature s _o's Book Review.

In addition, the surrogate signature generated by the surrogate signer cannot be forged arbitrarily because it is signed with the surrogate's private key, which is generated based on the original signer's signature s _o . In particular, the signature of the surrogate signature is transmitted to the surrogate signature. The original signer's public key y _o , which is not arbitrarily disclosed and is required to verify the proxy signer's public key, is encrypted and transmitted as a secret key shared by the community member node in the initial authentication process with the registration server. none.

The strong identity verification means that the surrogate signature generated by the surrogate signature includes the signer's ID information and the Diffie Hellman public value, and the surrogate signature's ID and the original signer's ID are also signed by the original signature of the original signature. In addition, since the surrogate signature includes ID information of the surrogate signature and the Diffie Hellman public value, the surrogate signature can be identified.

Prevent the strong wife refers Book Review sleeping, because their proxy signer sign s _o that is generated to delegate signing authority to have been signed with the private key's Book Review is encrypted with the secret key that is shared with proxy signer delivery person Book Review for his signature It cannot be denied, because the surrogate signing the surrogate that it creates with its surrogate private key, which generates the surrogate's signature s _o and the surrogate's Diffie Hellman private value X _ZM Cannot be denied

In comparing the proposed technique based on Schnorr's signature technique proposed by the present invention and the case where the RSA signature technique is applied to the method proposed by the present invention, the efficiency comparison between the two techniques is performed in each of the techniques. Comparing and analyzing the amount of calculations generated in the process of generating as follows.

When the surrogate signature is provided using the RSA signature technique, the surrogate signature may be generated as shown in Equation 7 below.

The signature generated as shown in Equation 7 is transmitted to the mobile node that requested the signature, and the signature can be verified by the method shown in Equation 8 below.

Table 2 below summarizes a comparison between the computation of the present invention and the amount of computation in the process of generating and verifying the surrogate signature in the surrogate signature scheme using the RSA signature, where t _MUL used to compare the computation is multiplied. Computation time, t _MOU is the modular operation time, t _EXP is the exponential power operation time, t _ADD is the addition operation time, t _H is the time taken to perform the hash operation.

Inventive Technique RSA signature scheme Signer Count t _H + t _MUL + t _ADD + t _MOU t _H + t _EXP + t _MOU Validator Computation t _H + t _EXP + t _MUL + t _MOU t _H + 2t _EXP + t _MOU

As summarized in Table 2 above, the present invention requires one exponential operation once in the process of generating and verifying a signature, whereas the RSA signature method requires three exponential operations, thus compared to the RSA signature method. It can be seen that the amount of computation of the signature scheme proposed by the present invention is relatively small, which is more effective in a small terminal environment with poor computing power than a general computer environment.

Accordingly, the present invention provides a mutual authentication and secure key exchange scheme between community members in a community-based ubiquitous network, and securely delegates community creation authority so that community members can create autonomous communities created as needed. Can be.

In addition, we used surrogate signature technology based on Schnorr's signature technique to delegate the authority to generate surrogate signatures to community members who exist in the community on behalf of the certification server. By applying the Diffie Hellman key exchange scheme to allow members to securely share secret keys, it enables surrogate signature-based mutual authentication and secure key exchange between community members without the help of a registration server, and surrogate existing RSA signature-based surrogate. Compared to the signature method, the computational amount is relatively small, which is effective to apply to a community-based ubiquitous network in which various small terminals exist.

Although the present invention has been shown and described with respect to specific embodiments thereof, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various changes and modifications may be made without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims. Anyone who can afford it will know.

1 is a reference diagram showing a community-based ubiquitous network structure according to the present invention.

2 is a flowchart of a method for delegating social community creation authority according to the present invention;

3 is a reference diagram for explaining a social community creation authority delegation method according to the present invention.

Claims (8)

In the method of delegating social community creation authority in a community-based ubiquitous network environment consisting of uT-Gateway supporting connection with an external network and user terminals, which are zone master and community member nodes used for community construction, A first step (S10) in which the zone master and community members perform initial authentication to the authentication registration server through the EAP-TLS; A second step (S20) in which the authentication registration server delegates its signature authority to the authenticated zone master; A third step (S30) of generating a surrogate signature private key and a public key by adding the signature authority delegation information and its Diffie Hellman secret value to the delegated zone master; A fourth step (S40) of generating and issuing a surrogate signature to a community member existing in the community with the generated surrogate signature private key; A fifth step (S50) of verifying the surrogate signature public key by verifying the surrogate signature public key and verifying the surrogate signature by using the surrogate signature public key; A sixth step (S60) of exchanging mutual authentication and a shared secret key using a surrogate signature with another mobile node existing in the same community; Requesting a community creation authority from the zone master for creating a social community, the zone master generates a surrogate signature for delegating community creation authority on behalf of the authentication registration server, and then issues it to a community member (S70). Delegation of social community creation authority. The method of claim 1, Delegation of the signing authority in the second step (S20), after the authentication registration server selects k∈ _R Z ^* _q , calculates r _o = g ^k mod p, and then performs signature s _o delegating surrogate signing authority to the zone master. It generates and delivers to the zone master along with the values of r _o and t _o , where the time t _o means the creation time of the signature s _o in the authentication registration server, and the signature is

Where Y _ZM is a Diffie-Hellman public value of the zone master, ID _ZM is an identifier of the zone master, ID _o is an identifier of the authentication registration server, and x _o represents a secret key of the authentication registration server, respectively. Social community creation authority delegation method characterized in that. 3. The method of claim 2, Wherein the proxy signature generation of the private key and public key of step 3 (S30) is and to the zone master received the signature delegation information from the authentication registration server calculates the g ^so verify the signature S _o received from the certification register server, If the verification is successful, the surrogate signature private key x _zm = s _o + X _zm and the public key y _zm = g ^xzm mod using the signature authority delegation information received and the Diffie Hellman personal value X _zm ^received. A method for delegating social community creation authority, characterized by generating p. The method of claim 3, The generation and issuance of the surrogate signature in the fourth step S40 include the identifier ID _MN of the community member whose zone master requests the signature information with the surrogate signature private key x _zm on behalf of the authentication registration server, and the community which requests the signature information. members of the Diffie Hellman public value Y _MN Schnorr and signature techniques signatures sent together to the following community members s _ZM, t _ZM, r _ZM and its public value Y _ZM, the case r _ZM sending along the John master randomly and the a k _ZM ∈ _R Z ^* _q selecting calculated from the value g ^kZM, registered authentication server generates the signature verification and a proxy signature is

Generated by y _o denotes a public key of the authentication registration server, and t _ZM denotes a generation time of s _ZM in the zone master, respectively. The method of claim 4, wherein The surrogate signature verification in step 5 (S50) verifies that the surrogate signature is successfully delegated by verifying the signature public key y _zm of the zone master, and if the verification succeeds, verifies the surrogate signature s _ZM using the public key y _zm . But

Social community creation authority delegation method characterized in that for verifying whether or not normal delegate signature delegate using. The method of claim 5, The mutual authentication of the sixth step (S60), the community member wants to communicate the mutual authentication request message to the counterpart node, the mutual authentication request message includes S _ZM1 , Y _MN1 , t, the community receiving the message The member checks the zone master's signature public key y _zm, and if the validation is successful, the community member creates a new secret key SK using the Diffie Hellman public value, and the MAC _SK and Y _MN2 , S _ZM2 , passing t together, the secret keys SK and MAC _SK

Generated as is, but since the community members receives a mutual authentication response message, performs mutual authentication and secure key exchange by verifying the MAC _SK secret key created using the included Diffie Hellman value, S _ZM1 is that the zone master A surrogate signature issued to the community member wishing to communicate, Y _MN1 is a Diffie-Hellman public value of the community member wishing to communicate, S _ZM2 is a surrogate signature issued to the community member received by the zone master, Y _MN2 Is the Diffie-Hellman public value of the community member receiving the message, X _MN2 is the Diffie-Hellman secret value of the community member receiving the message, t is the creation time of MAC _SK in the community member receiving the message, respectively Delegation of social community creation authority characterized in that it means. The method of claim 6, The community creation request of the seventh step (S70) is the zone master by encrypting the signature s _ZM received from the zone master, the message M including the community related information to be created, and the time information t _D with the secret key SK _ZM . The secret key SK _ZM is created by the community member through the Diffie Hellman public value Y _ZM of the zone master, and the request message is

Wherein, the time information t _D is a social community creation authority delegation method characterized in that the generation time of the request message from the community member requesting the community creation authority. The method of claim 7, wherein The community creation authority delegation in the seventh step S70 is performed after the zone master receives the encrypted community creation authority request message and then generates a SK _ZM using the Diffie Hellman public value Y _MN of the community member for message decryption. After verifying the signature of the community member, it verifies that it is a normal community member, and then generates and delivers a new signature S _ZM containing the community creation authority, and the newly created signature S _ZM has authority to create a community. CM _ZM information and authority delegation time information t _CM are generated and included.

Social community creation authority delegation method characterized in that, such as.

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