KR100984298B1 - How to perform authentication, access attempts, and virtual random number generation - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention provides a pseudo-ESN rather than an electronic serial number (ESN) when a mobile equipment identifier (MEID) is used to identify a mobile station in a mobile communication system. The present invention relates to a method for performing authentication, access attempt, and virtual random number generation using separate parameters.

Electronic serial number (ESN), pseudo-ESN, mobile device identifier (MEID), authentication, access attempts, virtual random number generation

Description

Method for performing authentication, access attempt, and generation of pseudo-random number}

1 to 5 are diagrams for explaining a procedure for generating an authentication response (AUTHR or AUTHU) according to the prior art.

6 to 7 are diagrams for explaining a procedure for generating a shared secret data (SSD) and a base station authentication response (AUTHBS) according to the prior art.

8 is a diagram showing the structure of a conventional general electronic serial number (ESN).

9 illustrates a structure of a conventional general mobile device identifier (MEID).

10 to 13 are diagrams illustrating a pseudo-electronic serial number (pseudo-ESN) generation procedure according to various embodiments of the present invention.

14 to 20 are diagrams for explaining an authentication procedure using pseudo-electronic serial number (pseudo-ESN) in accordance with various embodiments of the present invention.

The present invention relates to a mobile communication system, and when a mobile equipment identifier (MEID) is used to identify a mobile station, authentication and access using a separate parameter rather than an electronic serial number (ESN). Attempt relates to a method of performing virtual random number generation.

Authentication is a procedure for performing a match between subscriber information stored in a base station / system and mobile station information. Authentication must be performed with an authentication key.

The cdma2000 system uses a symmetric key authentication scheme in which the base station / system and the mobile station have the same key.

Authentication can be performed or selectively performed for each outgoing or incoming call of the subscriber.

In the prior art, the authentication procedure can be divided into six types. Each authentication procedure will be described with reference to FIGS. 1 to 6.

The first is the Authentication of MS registration, which is an authentication procedure performed when the mobile registers with the base station / system, see FIG. At this time, the variable used as the input value of the authentication algorithm includes a random challenge value (hereinafter, abbreviated as RAND) and an electronic serial number which are broadcast to all mobile stations through an access parameter message (APM). Serial Number; hereinafter abbreviated as ESN) and subscriber's phone number Mobile Identification Number-1 (hereinafter abbreviated as MIN-1) and Shared Secret Data_A (hereinafter referred to as SSD_A) Abbreviated d). Here, SSD_A uses the most significant bit (MSB) 64 bits among 128 bits of shared secret data (hereinafter, abbreviated as SSD). And MIN-1 is a number excluding the service provider number (for example, 019-328-8312 to 328-8312).

As shown in FIG. 1, the mobile station transmits an authentication response (hereinafter referred to as AUTHR), which is a result value generated through the authentication algorithm, to the base station / system and compares it with the value calculated by the authentication center. Thus, it is authenticated that the mobile station is normally registered at the base station / system.

The second is authentication at the time of unique challenge response, which is an authentication procedure when responding when a unique challenge is requested from the authentication center to the mobile station, see FIG. 2. At this time, the variable used as the input value of the authentication algorithm is a unique RAND (hereinafter abbreviated as RANDU) representing the most significant bit (MSB) 24 bits of the RAND and Mobile Identification Number-2 (hereinafter, MIN-). MIN2 *, ESN, MIN-1, and SSD_A, which means the least significant bit (LSB) 8 bits, are used. Here, MIN-2 is a 10-bit number representing a carrier number among subscriber telephone numbers.

The process of generating the AUTHU used for authentication shown in FIG. 2 is performed when the authentication process fails. In this case, the authentication procedure is an authentication procedure at the outgoing or incoming call of the subscriber or at the transmission of a data burst.

At this time, the mobile station transmits a unique authentication response (AUTHU), which is a result value generated by the authentication algorithm, to the base station / system and compares it with the value calculated by the authentication center. Thus, it is authenticated that the mobile station is normally registered at the base station / system.

Third is Authentication of MS Origination, which is an authentication procedure performed when the mobile station requests access to a base station, see FIG. 3. At this time, the variables used as input values of the authentication algorithm are RAND, ESN, and the other party's telephone number (hereinafter abbreviated as DIGITS) and SSD_A inputted by the keypad from the mobile station.

At this time, the mobile station transmits the AUTHR, which is a result value generated through the authentication algorithm, to the base station / system as shown in FIG. 3 and compares it with the value calculated by the authentication center. Thus, it is authenticated that the mobile station is normally registered at the base station / system.

Fourth, authentication of MS Termination is an authentication procedure performed when the mobile station receives a paging from the base station, which is described with reference to FIG. 4. In this case, RAND, ESN, MIN-1, and SSD_A are used as input values of the authentication algorithm.

At this time, the mobile station transmits AUTHR, which is a result value generated through the authentication algorithm, to the base station / system and compares it with the value calculated by the authentication center. Thus, it is authenticated that the mobile station is normally registered at the base station / system.

Fifth is authentication of MS Data Bursts, which is performed when a mobile station transmits a short message service (SMS) to a base station. See. In this case, RAND, ESN, DIGITS, and SSD_A are used as input values of the authentication algorithm.

At this time, the mobile station transmits AUTHR, a result value generated through the authentication algorithm, to the base station / system as shown in FIG. 5 and compares it with the value calculated by the authentication center. Thus, it is authenticated that the mobile station is normally registered at the base station / system.

Sixth is an authentication process when updating the shared secret data (SSD), which is an authentication process that is performed when a serious security problem occurs and is rarely performed in a normal situation, see FIG. 6.

As shown in FIG. 6, first, new SSDs (SSD_A_NEW and SSD_B_NEW) should be generated using the SSD generation algorithm. In this case, variables used as input values of the SSD generation algorithm include random data for the computation of SSD (hereinafter, abbreviated as RANDSSD), an ESN, and an authentication key (A_Key). Used. The variable used as an input value of the SSD generation algorithm is transmitted by the base station to the mobile station through an SSD update message.

Subsequently, the mobile station uses the SSD_A_NEW, which is one of the new SSDs generated by the SSD generation algorithm of FIG. 6, and the base station RAND (hereinafter, RANDBS) ESN and MIN-1 in the authentication algorithm, as shown in FIG. 7. (Hereinafter abbreviated as AUTHBS).

At this time, the mobile station generates the AUTHBS and transmits the RANDBS to the base station through a base station challenge order.                         

The base station then generates an AUTHBS using the RANDBS, ESN, MIN-1 and SSD_A_NEW transmitted by the mobile station. Thus, the AUTHBS generated through the base station challenge confirmation order is transmitted to the mobile station.

The mobile station compares the AUTHBS generated through its authentication algorithm with the AUTHBS received from the base station. At this time, if the two AUTHBS are the same, it is determined that the update of the SSD was successful, and the fact is notified to the base station through the SSD update confirmation order (SSD update confirmation order).

The access attempt is for connecting to the base station at the mobile station, and the access attempt is applied when sending a response message, when registering with the base station / system, when making an outgoing call for making a call, when connecting a data call, and so on.

Since the access attempt is basically random access, collisions can occur during the access process with other mobile stations. Therefore, the system access rate is increased by using various techniques to ensure access success without collision between mobile stations.

One of the techniques for resolving the collision problem between mobile stations is a method of adjusting the time of an access subtall using one variable. The variable used here is a variable called PN Randomization Delay (hereinafter abbreviated as RN).

The variable RN is determined to be a value between "0" and "2 ^PROBE_PN_RAN -1" using a hash function, and input values used for the hash function are "RN_HASH_KEY" and "PROBE_PN_RAN". Here, "RN_HASH_KEY" is set to the same value as ESN, and "PROBE_PN_RAN" is a value received through an access parameter message (APM).

The randomly generated random number (virtual random number) is a process of selecting an access channel number, a process of selecting a variable sequence backoff (RS) and a probe backoff (RT) used for an access attempt, and the like. Used to perform That is, the above process is performed by a virtual random number.

The virtual random number generation used in the above processes is performed by the following procedure.

First, create a variable in the same way as in Equation 1.

Z _n = (a × Z _n-1 ) mod m

In Formula 1, a = 7 ⁵ = 16807, m = 2 ³¹ -1 = 2147483647, n is an integer of 1 or more.

On the other hand, Z _{0, which} is the initial value of Equation 1, is determined by Equation 2 below.

In Equation 2, "RANDOM_TIME" is set to 32 bits of the least significant bit (LSB) of the synchronization time value SYS_TIME transmitted through a synchronization channel message. However, if the initial value Z ₀ generated by Equation 2 is "0", the initial value Z ₀ is set to one.

The virtual random number is determined according to K _n generated by Equation 3 below.

는 x를 넘지 않는 최대 정수 값을 나타낸다.In Equation 3 above

Denotes the maximum integer value not exceeding x.

Therefore, the virtual random number K _n generated by Equation 3 is an integer value between 0 and (N-1).

ESN is commonly used for authentication, access attempt, and virtual random number generation according to the prior art described above.

The ESN is an identifier uniquely assigned to the mobile station in the cdma2000 system.

8 is a view showing the structure of a conventional general ESN.

As shown in FIG. 8, the ESN is composed of 32 bits. The most significant bit (MSB) of the ESN 8 bits is assigned a manufacturer number (hereinafter, referred to as MFC), and the least significant bit (LSB) 24 bits is corresponding manufacturer. Is assigned a mobile station serial number (SN).

In the above, the MFC is allocated to each manufacturer and uniquely set. When the number of mobile stations of the manufacturer exceeds the allocated serial number SN, a new MFC is allocated.                         

Meanwhile, as the production of mobile stations increases, the 32-bit ESN is expected to be exhausted in the future. Thus, a new identifier is needed to identify the mobile station on behalf of the ESN. The new identifier is a Mobile Equipment Identifier (hereinafter abbreviated as MEID).

9 is a view showing the structure of a conventional general MEID.

As shown in Fig. 9, the MEID is composed of 56 bits, the most significant bit (MSB) 32 bits of the MEID are assigned MFC, and the least significant bit (LSB) 24 bits are assigned the mobile station serial number of the corresponding manufacturer.

However, in the cdma2000 system, which is a next-generation mobile communication system, if the MEID is used instead of the ESN as the identifier of the mobile station, modification is required to the existing method used for authentication, access attempt, and virtual random number generation.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION An object of the present invention has been devised in view of the above, and in the case of using a mobile device identifier (MEID) instead of an electronic serial number (ESN) as an identifier for identifying a mobile station, It provides a method for performing authentication, access attempts, and virtual random number generation using other parameters.

In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides a method for generating a pseudo-ESN using an identifier assigned to one or more of a mobile station and a base station, and the pseudo-electronic serial number ( and transmitting the specific request value generated from the pseudo-ESN to the system side.

More preferably, the mobile device identifier (MEID) is used to generate pseudo-ESN.
The pseudo-ESN may also be generated in 32 bits by mapping a 56 bit mobile device identifier (MEID).

It also uses the mobile station identifier (MAC_ID), the base station identifier (BASE_ID), and the pilot pseudo noise sequence offset index (PILOT_PN) for the forward CDMA channel to generate pseudo-ESNs, which are not used by the mobile station. Do not set any value '10000000' to pseudo-ESN.

In addition, the mobile station identifier (MAC_ID) and the pilot pseudo noise sequence offset index (PILOT_PN) are used to generate pseudo-electronic serial numbers (pseudo-ESN), and any value '10000000' which is not used by the mobile station is pseudo-electronic. Set more on the serial number (pseudo-ESN). It also sets any value '0000000' or '1111111' further to pseudo-ESN.

In addition, the base station identifier (BASE_ID) and the mobile station identifier (MAC_ID) are used to generate pseudo-ESN, and a random value '10000000' which is not used by the mobile station is pseudo-electronic serial number (pseudo). -ESN).

More preferably, the request value is any one of a value requesting authentication and a value attempting random access.

The value for requesting authentication may be an authentication response (AUTHR) or a unique authentication response (AUTHU), which is a result value generated through an authentication algorithm using the generated pseudo-ESN as an input value. Base station authentication response (AUTHBS).

In addition, the value of attempting random access is a PN random delay (RN) variable determined using a hash function having the generated pseudo-electronic serial number (pseudo-ESN) as an input value.
In addition, pseudo-ESN is a virtual for performing one of access channel number selection and selection of sequence backoff (RS) and probe backoff (RT) which are variables used for access attempts. Can be used to generate random numbers. In addition, the virtual random number generation may be one.
According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method for performing authentication, access attempt, and virtual random number generation, using a mobile device identifier (MEID) as an identifier for identifying a mobile station, and a mobile device. Generating a pseudo-ESN using an identifier (MEID).
In addition, the method may further include transmitting a predetermined parameter generated using a pseudo-ESN to a base station / system for performing an authentication procedure.
The predetermined parameter may further include at least one of a mobile station identifier (MAC_ID), a base station identifier (BASE_ID), and a pilot-like noise sequence offset index (PILOT_ID). In addition, the predetermined parameter may further include an arbitrary value '10000000' not used in the existing mobile station. In addition, the predetermined parameter may further include another arbitrary value '0000000' or '1111111' not used in the existing mobile station.
In addition, the mobile device identifier (MEID) consists of 56 bits, and the pseudo-electronic serial number (pseudo-ESN) may be generated in 32 bits through mapping from the mobile device identifier (MEID).

Hereinafter, exemplary embodiments of the authentication, access attempt, and virtual random number generation method according to the present invention will be described with reference to the accompanying drawings.

In the present invention, when the mobile station identifier (MEID) is used instead of the existing electronic serial number (ESN) as the identifier of the mobile station to be used for performing authentication, access attempt, and virtual random number generation, respectively, a new pseudo-electronic serial number. (Hereinafter abbreviated as pseudo-ESN) is defined and the pseudo-ESN is generated.

In addition, authentication, access attempt, and virtual random number generation are performed using the pseudo-ESN defined in the present invention.

Various embodiments for generating pseudo-ESN according to the present invention are described below. In generating the following pseudo-ESN, each set of values constituting the pseudo-ESN may be changed in a system implementation. For example, values set in (P31 to P24), (P23 to P16), (P15 to P9), and (P8 to P0) may be changed in order, and the bit value or length may be changed. Can be adjusted as much. Therefore, the important point is the type of parameters used to generate the pseudo-ESN. In addition, the length of the generated pseudo-ESN is not limited to the description below, but may be changed in a system implementation.

First Embodiment                     

As shown in FIG. 10, a mobile device identifier (hereinafter, abbreviated as MEID) is used to generate a pseudo-ESN. That is, a 32-bit pseudo-ESN is generated by mapping from a 56-bit MEID.

Second Embodiment

In generating a pseudo-ESN, as shown in FIG. 11, a mobile station identifier (MAC_ID: Medium Access Control Identifier), a least significant 7-bit (LSB) 7 bit of a base station identifier (BASE_ID), and pilot similarity to a forward CDMA channel A pilot pseudo noise sequence offset index for the forward CDMA channel (PILOT_PN) is used.

As shown in FIG. 11, pseudo-ESNs (P31 to P0) generated in the present invention are classified into (P31 to P24), (P23 to P16), (P15 to P9), and (P8 to P0). Here, (P31 ~ P24) is set to '10000000', which is not used by the mobile station, and (P23 ~ P16) is set to the 8-bit mobile station identifier (MAC_ID) value used to identify the mobile station in one base station. do. And (P15 ~ P9) is set to the lowest (LSB) 7-bit value of the 16-bit base station identifier (BASE_ID) used to identify the base station, and (P8 ~ P0) is set to the pilot pseudo noise sequence offset index (PILOT_PN) value do.

Third embodiment

In generating a pseudo-ESN as shown in FIG. 12, a mobile station identifier (MAC_ID) and a pilot-like noise sequence offset index (PILOT_PN) are used.

As shown in FIG. 12, pseudo-ESNs (P31 to P0) generated in the present invention are classified into (P31 to P24), (P23 to P17), (P16 to P9), and (P8 to P0). Here, (P31 to P24) is set to '10000000' which is a value not used by the existing mobile station, and (P23 to P17) is set to an arbitrary value. For example, P23 to P17 set to an arbitrary value may be set to '0000000' as shown in FIG. 12, and in some cases, is set to '1111111'. (P16 ~ P9) is set to the 8-bit mobile station identifier (MAC_ID) value used to identify the mobile station in one base station, and (P8 ~ P0) is set to the pilot-like noise sequence offset index (PILOT_PN) value. .

Fourth Example

As shown in Fig. 13, in generating a pseudo-ESN, a base station identifier (BASE_ID) and a mobile station identifier (MAC_ID) are used.

As shown in FIG. 13, pseudo-ESNs (P31 to P0) generated in the present invention are classified into (P31 to P24), (P23 to P8), and (P7 to P0). Here, (P31 ~ P24) is set to '10000000', a value not used by the existing mobile station, and (P23 ~ P8) is set to a 16-bit base station identifier (BASE_ID) value used for base station identification, and (P7 ~ P0). Set to an 8-bit mobile station identifier (MAC_ID) value used to identify the mobile station in one base station.

Next, procedures for performing authentication, access attempt, and virtual random number generation using a pseudo-ESN generated according to the above embodiments will be described.

First, the authentication procedure according to the first to sixth embodiments of the present invention will be described below.

First Embodiment                     

This is an authentication procedure performed when a mobile station registers with a base station / system by authentication of MS registration. Refer to FIG. 14 for this.

In this case, the variables used as input values of the authentication algorithm are random challenge value (RAND), pseudo-ESN generated in the above process, mobile identification number-1 (MIN-1) of subscriber's phone number, shared secret data_A ( SSD_A) is used. The shared secret data_A (SSD_A) is 64 bits of the most significant bit (MSB) of the 128-bit shared secret data (SSD). The mobile identification number-1 (MIN-1) is a number excluding the service provider number (for example, 019-328-8312 to 328-8312).

As shown in FIG. 14, the mobile station transmits an authentication response (AUTHR), which is a result value generated through the authentication algorithm, to the base station / system and compares it with the value calculated by the authentication center. Thus, it is authenticated that the mobile station is normally registered at the base station / system.

Second Embodiment

When a unique challenge is requested from the authentication center to the mobile station, this is an authentication procedure when the unique challenge response is a response to the request, and FIG. 15 is referred to.

At this time, the variable used as the input value of the authentication algorithm is a unique RAND (hereinafter referred to as RANDU) representing the 24 bits of the most significant bit (MSB) of the random challenge value (RAND) and the least significant bit in the mobile identification number-2 (MIN-2). (LSB) MIN2 *, which stands for 8 bits, pseudo-ESN, mobile identification number-1 (MIN-1), and shared secret data_A (SSD_A) are used. Here, the shared secret data_A (SSD_A) is the 64-bit most significant bit (MSB) of the 128-bit shared secret data (SSD). Mobile identification number-2 (MIN-2) is a 10-bit indicating the carrier number among the subscriber's telephone number. Mobile identification number-1 (MIN-1) is a number excluding the service provider number (for example, 019-328-8312 to 328-8312).

As shown in FIG. 15, the mobile station transmits a unique authentication response (AUTHU), which is a result value generated by the authentication algorithm, to the base station / system and compares it with the value calculated by the authentication center. Thus, it is authenticated that the mobile station is normally registered at the base station / system.

Third embodiment

Authentication of MS Origination, which is an authentication procedure performed when a mobile station requests access to a base station, see FIG. 16.

At this time, the variable used as the input value of the authentication algorithm is a random challenge value (RAND), pseudo-ESN, the other party's telephone number (DIGITS) input from the mobile station using the keypad, and shared secret data_A (SSD_A). .

As shown in FIG. 16, the mobile station transmits an authentication response (AUTHR), which is a result value generated by the authentication algorithm, to the base station / system and compares it with the value calculated by the authentication center. Thus, it is authenticated that the mobile station is normally registered at the base station / system.

Fourth Example

An authentication of MS Termination, which is an authentication procedure performed when the mobile station receives a paging from the base station, see FIG. 17.

In this case, a random challenge value (RAND), pseudo-ESN, mobile identification number-1 (MIN-1), and shared secret data_A (SSD_A) are used as variables used as input values of the authentication algorithm.

Thereafter, the mobile station transmits an authentication response (AUTHR), which is a result value generated by the authentication algorithm, to the base station / system and compares it with the value calculated by the authentication center, as shown in FIG. Thus, it is authenticated that the mobile station is normally registered at the base station / system.

Fifth Embodiment

Authentication of MS Data Bursts, which is an authentication procedure performed when a mobile station sends a short message (SMS) to a base station. See FIG. 18 for this.

At this time, the variable used as the input value of the authentication algorithm is a random challenge value (RAND), pseudo-ESN, the other party's telephone number (DIGITS) input from the mobile station using the keypad, and shared secret data_A (SSD_A). .

As shown in FIG. 16, the mobile station transmits an authentication response (AUTHR), which is a result value generated by the authentication algorithm, to the base station / system and compares it with the value calculated by the authentication center. Thus, it is authenticated that the mobile station is normally registered at the base station / system.

Sixth Example

This is an authentication process when updating the shared secret data (SSD). It is an authentication process performed when a serious security problem occurs. Otherwise, it is optionally performed. This is described with reference to FIGS. 19 to 20.

As shown in FIG. 19, new shared secret data SSD_A_NEW and SSD_B_NEW are generated using a shared secret data SSD generation algorithm. In this case, the variables used as input values of the shared secret data (SSD) generation algorithm for generating new shared secret data include random data (RANDSSD), pseudo-ESN, and authentication key for calculating the shared secret data (SSD). (A_Key) is used. Here, the base station transmits the variables used in the shared secret data (SSD) generation algorithm to the mobile station through the shared secret data update message (SSD update message).

Subsequently, the mobile station uses SSD_A_NEW, one of the new shared secret data (SSD_A_NEW, SSD_B_NEW) generated by the shared secret data (SSD) generation algorithm, the base station random challenge value (RANDBS), pseudo-ESN, and mobile identification number-1. (MIN-1) is used in the authentication algorithm of FIG. 20 to generate a base station authentication response (AUTHBS). The reason for generating the base station authentication response (AUTHBS) is to determine whether the update of the shared secret data (SSD) was successful.

At this time, the mobile station generates a base station authentication response (AUTHBS) and transmits a base station random challenge value (RANDBS) to the base station through a base station challenge order.

The base station then generates new shared secret data (SSD_A_NEW, SSD_B_NEW) generated by the base station random challenge value (RANDBS) transmitted by the mobile station, pseudo-ESN, mobile identification number (MIN-1), and shared secret data (SSD) generation algorithm. ) Generates a base station authentication response (AUTHBS) using SSD_A_NEW.

Thus, the generated base station authentication response (AUTHBS) is transmitted to the mobile station through a base station challenge confirmation order.

The mobile station compares the base station authentication response (AUTHBS) generated by its authentication algorithm with the base station authentication response (AUTHBS) received from the base station. At this time, if the two base station authentication responses (AUTHBS) are the same, it is determined that the update of the shared secret data (SSD) is successful, and informs the base station of the fact through the shared secret data (SSD) update confirmation order (SSD).

The following describes a procedure for performing an access attempt using a pseudo-ESN generated according to the above embodiments.

The access attempt is for connecting to the base station at the mobile station, and the access attempt is applied when sending a response message, when registering with the base station / system, when making an outgoing call for making a call, when connecting a data call, and so on.

Since access attempts based on random access may cause collisions between mobile stations, various techniques are employed to ensure that accesses are successful without collisions between mobile stations.

One of the techniques for solving the collision problem between mobile stations is a method of adjusting the time of an access subtall using a variable called PN Randomization Delay.                     

The variable PN random delay (RN) is determined as a value between "0" and "2 ^PROBE_PN_RAN -1" using a hash function. The input values used for the hash function are "RN_HASH_KEY" and "PROBE_PN_RAN". Here, "RN_HASH_KEY" is set to a pseudo-ESN value according to the present invention, and "PROBE_PN_RAN" is a value received through an access parameter message (APM).

The following describes a procedure for generating a virtual random number using the pseudo-ESN generated according to the above embodiments.

The randomly generated random number (virtual random number) is a process of selecting an access channel number, a process of selecting a variable sequence backoff (RS) and a probe backoff (RT) used for an access attempt, and the like. Used to perform That is, the above process is performed by the virtual random number generated using the pseudo-ESN of the present invention.

The virtual random number generation according to the present invention used in the above processes is performed by the following procedure.

First, create a variable in the same way as in Equation 4.

Z _n = (a × Z _n-1 ) mod m

In Formula 4, a = 7 ⁵ = 16807, m = 2 ³¹ -1 = 2147483647, n is an integer of 1 or more.

On the other hand, Z _{0, which} is the initial value of Equation 4, is determined by Equation 5 below.

In Equation 5, "RANDOM_TIME" is set to 32 bits of the least significant bit (LSB) of the synchronization time value SYS_TIME transmitted through a synchronization channel message. However, if the initial value Z ₀ generated by Equation 5 is "0", the initial value Z ₀ is set to one.

The virtual random number is determined according to K _n generated by Equation 6 below.

는 x를 넘지 않는 최대 정수 값을 나타낸다.In the above formula 6

Denotes the maximum integer value not exceeding x.

Therefore, the virtual random number K _n generated by Equation 6 is an integer value between 0 and (N-1).

According to the present invention described above, even if a newly requested mobile device identifier (MEID) is used in the cdma2000 system, which is a next generation mobile communication system, instead of the ESN expected to be depleted in the future, the pseudo described in the present invention described above. -Newly created ESN can be applied to existing methods for authentication, access attempts and virtual random number generation without any modifications to existing methods for authentication, access attempts and virtual random number generation. Has

Claims (20)

Generating a pseudo-electronic serial number (pseudo-ESN) using an identifier assigned to at least one of the mobile station and the base station; Transmitting a specific request value generated from the pseudo-ESN to a base station / system, The identifier for generating the pseudo-ESN includes at least one of a mobile station identifier (MAC_ID), a base station identifier (BASE_ID), and a pilot-like noise sequence offset index (PILOT_PN). How to perform authentication, access attempts, and virtual random number generation. The method of claim 1, wherein the identifier for generating the pseudo-ESN comprises a mobile device identifier (MEID). Way. 3. The method of claim 2, wherein the pseudo-ESN is generated in 32 bits by mapping the 56-bit mobile device identifier (MEID) to generate an authentication, access attempt, and virtual random number generation. How to. delete The pseudo-ESN of claim 1, wherein the pseudo-ESN is 8 bits of a random value '10000000', 8 bits of the mobile station identifier (MAC_ID), least significant 7 bits of the base station identifier (BASE_ID), And generating 9 bits of the pilot pseudo noise sequence offset index (PILOT_PN). 2. The pseudo-ESN of claim 1, wherein the pseudo-ESN is a random value '10000000' 8 bits, another random value '0000000' or '1111111' 7 bits, and the mobile station identifier (MAC_ID). And generating 8 bits and 9 bits of the pilot-like noise sequence offset index (PILOT_PN) for generating authentication, access attempt, and virtual random number generation. The pseudo-ESN of claim 1, wherein the pseudo-ESN is generated by setting an arbitrary value of '10000000' 8 bits, the base station identifier (BASE_ID) 16 bits, and the mobile station identifier (MAC_ID) 8 bits. And authentication, access attempt, and virtual random number generation. The method of claim 1, wherein the request value is for an authentication procedure between the mobile station and the base station / system. 10. The method of claim 8, wherein the request value includes the pseudo-ESN. The pseudo-ESN of claim 1, wherein the pseudo-ESN is input to a hash function together with a value received through an access parameter message (APM) to be used to determine a PN random delay (RN) variable. Authentication, access attempts, and virtual random number generation. 12. The method of claim 10, wherein the PN random delay (RN) variable is a value for adjusting a time of an access attempt when a mobile station attempts a random access to a base station. Way. The method of claim 1, wherein the pseudo-ESN is used to generate a virtual random number. 13. The method of claim 12, wherein the virtual random number generation is for performing one of an access channel number selection and a selection of sequence backoff (RS) and probe backoff (RT) which are variables used for an access attempt. Authentication, access attempts, and virtual random number generation. Using a mobile device identifier (MEID) as an identifier for mobile station identification; Generating a pseudo-ESN using the mobile device identifier (MEID); And Transmitting a predetermined parameter generated using the pseudo-ESN to a base station / system for performing an authentication procedure, And wherein the predetermined parameter comprises at least one of a mobile station identifier (MAC_ID), a base station identifier (BASE_ID) and a pilot-like noise sequence offset index (PILOT_ID). delete delete 15. The method of claim 14, wherein the predetermined parameter further comprises an arbitrary value '10000000' not used by an existing mobile station. 18. The method of claim 17, wherein the predetermined parameter further comprises another random value '0000000' or '1111111' not used in an existing mobile station. . 15. The method of claim 14, wherein the mobile device identifier (MEID) consists of 56 bits. 15. The method of claim 14, wherein the pseudo-ESN is generated in 32 bits by mapping from the mobile device identifier (MEID). .

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